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HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION.

FOURTEENTH REPORT, APPENDIX, PART V.

THE  
MANUSCRIPTS

OF

J. B. FORTESCUE, Esq., //

PRESERVED AT

DROMORE.

VOL. II.

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.*

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## INTRODUCTION.

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A FULL account of the manner in which the vast collection of political papers and correspondence was brought together at Dropmore by Lord Grenville was given in the first volume of selections made from them, ranging in date between the end of the seventeenth century and 1790. This volume was issued as an Appendix to the Thirteenth Report of this Commission. After 1790, the letters addressed to Lord Grenville increase in number and in importance, owing partly to his appointment in 1791 to the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Walter FitzPatrick has continued the work of selection from them, and has brought it down so as to include nearly all the papers in the collection written between 1791 and the earlier years of the present century; but the material relating to this period, momentous not only in the history of England but also in that of Europe generally, has proved so extensive that it has not been found practicable to print more than the correspondence of four years, namely, down to the end of the year 1794, in the present issue. On this account it does not appear advisable to the Commissioners to write at any length, in the present Introduction, on the limited portion of the correspondence which appears in this volume; it will be more satisfactory to defer any exhaustive analysis of its value for historical and biographical purposes until they shall have been able to put the whole of it into print. The Commissioners, therefore, confine themselves on this occasion to making a few general remarks on the contents of the text which follows.

Grenville's position of course placed it in his power to obtain the most accurate information as to the course of the revolution in France, and as to the manner in which all the States of Europe were gradually affected by that crisis. The letters addressed to him from the different capitals are, therefore, of the highest interest and importance, and may be said to be quite unknown to the historians of the revolutionary period, though it is possible that drafts of a few of them have been found in

public or private collections of State Papers. The communications passing between Lord Grenville and the different representatives of England abroad, which are preserved at Dropmore, are, for the most part, quite distinct from ordinary official or diplomatic letters, being marked "private," "most private," "secret and confidential," &c. Among Grenville's chief correspondents were the Earl of Westmorland, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Earl Gower, ambassador at Paris, Lord Auckland at the Hague, Joseph Ewart, and Sir Morton Eden at Berlin, and William Fawkener, who represented this country at St. Petersburg; the Marquis of Buckingham, Grenville's brother, wrote continually from Stowe commenting on public affairs, and Lord Mornington from Naples, Spa, and elsewhere, describing his travels. There are many brief notes and instructions in the handwriting of George III., to which attention should be called, such as the remarks he makes from time to time on the misfortunes of the royal family of France. Letters from William Pitt are also frequent but generally very brief. Lord Grenville's replies to some of the letters are also printed from the drafts of them which he has preserved. There are also letters of Madame de Staël and Talleyrand, written at Juniper Hall, Leatherhead, after their flight from France. Perhaps the most remarkable documents describing affairs in Paris will be found to be a series of "Bulletins" in French which reach Grenville by way of Genoa, through Francis Drake, our resident there. The first of them is dated 2nd September 1793, and they give detailed accounts of the sittings of the Committee of Nine, or of Public Safety, drawn up, Drake assures Lord Grenville, by no less a person than the Secretary of that Committee, who concealed his real principles under the cloak of the most extravagant Jacobinism.

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THE MANUSCRIPTS OF J. B. FORTESCUE,  
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VOL. II.

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LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, January 3, Whitehall.—“I am much obliged to you for the communication of the letters you received by Sunday’s mail. You will easily judge of the satisfaction I felt from seeing that there appeared so much disposition among the members of the Dutch Government to avoid anything that could lead to a coolness between two countries which have been, and which I trust will continue to be, so closely and intimately connected.

“I should think the King’s servants extremely wanting in what they owe to this important object, if they did not, on their side, feel the sincerest desire that, whatever may now be the ultimate result of this business, it may be carried on in such a manner as may be just and honourable towards the feelings of the members of the Dutch Government, and wholly consonant to the dignity of the Republic.

“I conclude, from the turn of Lord Henry Spencer’s despatch, and also from what Monsieur de Nagell said to me yesterday, that some formal explanation will be given in answer to my communication to the latter, and that this explanation will contain assurances of the two points particularly stated in the Grand Pensionary’s letter to you, namely, that the Republic will not, and indeed had not intended to, accept the Emperor’s modified ratification, except in conjunction with both her allies; and that the arrangements which have been in view between the Government of the Republic and that of the Netherlands are not intended to give to the Emperor, either avowedly or in effect, the dangerous power of interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic, or acting as co-guarantee with the Allies of the present form of government in the Dutch Provinces.

“Till this answer is received, I do not see what more can be done by me than to instruct Lord Henry Spencer to express the sense which is entertained here of the friendly dispositions which have been manifested at the Hague on this occasion, and of the justice which is done to the only motive that could have induced us to urge our opinion with so much earnestness. I do not take notice to him of the expression of our having shewn *de Phumeur* on this occasion, because I think that the best way of proving that we have no such feeling is to avoid such a discussion. In truth, you are not ignorant of the particular attention which I paid to the object of giving to our communication a tone and colour very different from that of ill-humour; and if, in my despatch to Lord Henry, I stated the danger forcibly, it was only because it was impossible, without doing this, to convey the impression of our real sentiments upon it.

“Whenever the answer to our communication arrives, it will be an object of my immediate attention to consider what may be the best turn

to give to this business in its further progress, if it is thought necessary that it should in any shape proceed much farther. With this view, I shall be very desirous to know your sentiments, particularly on the following points, which appear to me to contain what is most material on the subject.

"1st. The Republic, by stating to the Emperor that she cannot ratify the Hague Convention with the restricted clause except in conjunction with her allies, and that all negotiations for this object must be carried on jointly with the three Allied Powers, will certainly be freed from all embarrassment on that point. But,

"2ndly, with respect to the proposed Convention itself, can any mode be suggested of forming a stipulation for mutual succours in support of the respective Constitutions, which shall not, in appearance, and still more in effect, involve in it an alliance between the two Powers, and a mutual guaranty of their Constitutions? I fairly own that I do not see how this is practicable, because the right of judging of the *casus fœderis* must always remain with the Emperor; and I do not see what can prevent him from alleging, if he chooses it, that the *lawful Government*, which he is bound to support, is not that of the States-General as now constituted, but that of any other set of men in the Republic, who may, in case of internal dissensions, call themselves the lawful representatives of the different Provinces.

"3rdly, if this argument goes as far as it appears to me to do, the conclusion that must follow from it would be, that the Convention cannot, consistently with the principle on which the Dutch Government wish to act, be carried further than an agreement not to harbour declared rebels, or to suffer any military array of persons meditating to disturb the respective Governments, and this would, perhaps, be fully sufficient to answer the object of discouraging the patriots within the Republic. To such a stipulation it would also be easy to add whatever arrangements of limits or commerce it may be practicable to make.

"But the point would then be to consider, supposing it were agreed to keep this object in view, what would be the best means of doing it, without giving the Emperor any ground of complaint against the Republic. It is obvious without going now into the detail of the measures to be taken for this purpose, that this would be by no means difficult, and that it might be accomplished, without the Republic having even the appearance of withdrawing any part of her proposals.

"The point of the former Convention seems to me to afford the best ground for this. I conclude that if the qualified ratification is not accepted by the Allies, it will be thought impossible for the Republic to acknowledge in a new Convention the existence of a former agreement still remaining unratified. And the force of the same objection may easily be carried further, at a moment when the Emperor has recalled the amnesty which by that Convention he had agreed to grant to his subjects in Brabant; and when the Republic may, therefore, justly demur as to the binding herself in any form to act in support of the measures grounded on this revocation.

"I have stated to you all these points rather as matters for consideration and discussion, than as those on which a decisive opinion has been formed. And, in the present state of this business, there is, perhaps, no mode which could so well answer the desire of mutual and amicable arrangement which, I flatter myself, is equally felt on both sides of the water, as that of a confidential communication on the subject between the members of the two Governments, previous to any further official and Ministerial discussion of it."

## The EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, January 3, Dublin Castle.—“As I could not wait any longer for your paragraph on general politics, I have sent the Speech. If you have not any matter, the communication of which is necessary, or any business on the *tapis* in which Ireland may be involved, the less communication of general politics to the Irish Parliament I should think the better. I am very happy at your intentions of passing a Bill to open the trade to Nootka Sound; nothing could be so palatable to the friends of Government or so injurious to the clamours of Opposition.

“The circumstance of contribution being asked and granted for a war in which Ireland could receive no benefit, will, of course, be loudly pressed, and is a topic that has a sense and force which cannot fail to have an effect on the popular opinion. If you have sufficiently come to a decision, it will be particularly advantageous to the King’s Government if I might be authorised to say, by the mouth of the Secretary, when we are pressed on the trade to Nootka Sound, as we certainly shall be, very probably upon some amendment to the address, that it is in contemplation of his Majesty’s Ministers to open the trade to Nootka Sound, and that if that intention should be carried into effect, it was intended to open the trade with equal advantages to the people of England and Ireland. An assurance of this import would have the most beneficial effects, and I cannot conceive any difficulty would afterwards arise in passing a Bill to prevent the contraband trade with the Spanish colonies. I must beg you to be very explicit in the communication you permit me to make, and equally request you, whatever may be your determination, to tell me what answer must be made on the subject of the Nootka trade, which will certainly be strongly pushed on the meeting of Parliament. If you should happen to have any plans that may be implicated with Ireland, pray give us early notice, that we may not be under the necessity of prolonging a session whose prolongation would certainly give force to an Opposition from their connections as well as numbers, you know, by no means to be neglected.”

## The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 4, Naples.—“Your letter of the 26th of November gave me the most sincere pleasure. I am very sensible of your kind attention in giving me the first intelligence of your new honours; it is a strong proof of your regard for me, and of your confidence in the interest which I take in whatever can affect your situation. You know my opinion of the wisdom of the arrangement which has taken place, both as it concerns the general cause and your own particular importance and weight. I shall therefore say no more than that it is a great additional pleasure to me to find that you are satisfied with the circumstances which have attended the conclusion of this business, and that the moment which has been taken appears favourable to your wishes. I shall look with great eagerness, but without the least apprehension, for the account of your first exhibition amongst their Lordships in Mr. Woodfall’s paper, which I receive every post. I find it an excellent substitute for all the correspondents who promised to write to me from England, and who have never written a syllable. All my friends are prevented either by unavoidable business, or by unconquerable idleness, from fulfilling their promises, excepting yourself; all are silent as the

grave, which is really a serious calamity, for, after all the amusement of my journey, I

‘ Still to my country turn with ceaseless pain,  
And drag at each remove a lengthening chain.’

I find my anxiety to know what passes in London increase with the distance, and the difficulty of receiving intelligence.

“ On the whole, I think I have reason to be content with my journey. I have been very much amused, and although I have been often out of order, since I felt the first air of the warm climate I have never had any serious attack. I have never been confined to my bed since I left England, now near six months. This is at least a respite, for I have generally undergone more than one attack of fever in England in the autumn, and at the approach of winter, for these last three years. I wish I could communicate to you all the various sorts of amusement which I have received in different parts of my journey, but I know this is quite impossible. I will just mention how far my expectations have been answered by the different objects which have so often raised our curiosity together when we have thought of a tour in Italy.

“ The passage of the Alps from Pont Beauvoisin to the foot of Mont Cenis exceeded all the ideas I have formed of it. The impression it made on me was such as I would willingly travel as far again to receive from any object. It would be ridiculous to attempt to describe things so much better described in every book of travels that you can meet with; but *whenever you are turned out* remember the Alps; you will find the first parts much more beautiful than you have ever seen them described. I expected nothing but rude wild rocks and forests; there are scenes enough of this kind, and of the most astonishing, even *dreadful*, magnificence; but the beauty of the first valleys, their richness, and cultivation, was quite unexpected to me. Unfortunately, Mont Cenis *wore a cap* when I crossed, so that I cannot say much either of his head or of the descent into *Piemont*. But when I had got down into *Piemont* and advanced about a day’s journey, the turning back on the Alps (which are much more steep on this side than on that of Savoy) was such a pleasure as I wish I could communicate to you. The outline of the mountains, stretched out along the whole horizon, is really an amazing sight; their tops stand so mixed with the clouds, and so many regions above Snowdon, Skiddaw, and such *warts*, that it is difficult to persuade oneself that they are really mountains. Add to this their strange broken shapes, their *glacieres*, and the reflection of the rising and setting sun (for I saw both) on them; and recollect that they form the boundary of the richest plain in the world, covered with vineyards and cornfields, and you will have some idea of the scene. But I find my letter is growing *purple*, so I will stop my description.

“ Turin very well deserves a few days, but not more. I there saw the French monarchy *expulsam atque exterminatam suis sedibus*. The contrast with Paris, which I had just left, was curious. I crossed Mont Cenis on the 12th of October; I remained at Turin four days, and from thence went to Genoa over the Apennines, which are not to be compared with the Alps either in beauty or magnificence. Genoa fully answered my idea of it. It is very well described in Gray’s letters. Here we first met with alleys of cypress, olive trees, great plantations of figs, aloes in the crevices of the rocks, and orange and lemon trees in fruit and flower, in the gardens, and on the terraces over the sea; not forgetting myrtle hedges at *Doge Lomellino*, and a profusion of marble on the outside of the house of every considerable merchant in the town. Do not omit Genoa *in your tour*; it is well

worth any trouble you may employ to see it, but I was so unfortunate as to find a cursed *scirocco* wind there, which, even at the end of October, was insupportably hot. This wind is the great objection to every place near the sea in Italy; it is dreadful to a nervous constitution. I cannot describe how I have suffered from it in Genoa, Rome, and Naples; it is very well described in Brydone's letters.

"After I had left Genoa and had passed the Apennines a second time, I went by the way of Placentia (over the river Trebia) to Parma, where I stayed a day, and saw several charming pictures. The weather at this time (early in November) was very like the same month in England, cold and foggy, with a great deal of rain; I therefore thought it best to advance into the warm climate as soon as possible, and to leave Bologna and Florence for my return. Accordingly, I passed through Bologna without attempting to see anything, and I remained only two days at Florence, where the weather was very cold indeed. However, I just looked into the gallery, and adored the Venus of Medicis and some other statues; I say statues, for although there are many fine pictures there, the statues are more new to me, and the effect of them is surprising. I shall be able to speak more fully of Florence at my return in spring. Now, conceive the delight of being on the road to Rome in Etruria. I should be ridiculous if I ventured to say how much all the old ideas of Eton and Oxford employed my mind; but I assure you I have felt real pleasure in recurring to them, and without them I think the journey through Italy would lose the greatest part of its amusement. What we saw of Tuscany is very beautiful, covered with the olive and the vine, not a miserable cropped twig like the French vine, but of true Virgilian race, *laris per purum immissus habenis*, and hanging in festoons amongst the olive trees. In Lombardy the vines are hung in the same way upon elms, poplars, and mulberry trees. On the borders of Tuscany the country becomes desolate and dismal, with, however, some few pretty spots, particularly about the lake of Bolsena, and another lake, the modern name of which I forget, but Virgil calls it Ciminus. The desolation and misery of the country gradually increase as you approach Rome, and nothing can surpass the wretchedness of the prospect when you arrive within about twenty miles of the town. It is exactly like the very worst parts of Ireland, and the people are even more beggarly in their appearance than the citizens of Trim. It required a great deal of enthusiasm to keep up one's spirits in such a scene; however, I had the comfort of spying Soracte, *altâ nive candidum*, during the whole of this dismal journey, and, at last, here and there, an old sepulchre, which announced that we were in the neighbourhood of Rome.

"You cannot see any part of the town until you are within about four miles of it, excepting the dome of St. Peter's, which is visible at about fifteen miles distance. The first view of the town is very beautiful from the great inequality of the ground on which it is built, from the astonishing number of domes, columns, obelisks, and towers of all shapes and sizes, and from the gardens amongst them, all planted with cypress. There are so many gardens, and of such a size, that at a distance the town looks like a number of magnificent villas, rather than a regularly built town. The road to the famous entrance by the *Porta del Popolo* was repairing, so that we could not pass that way; and instead of crossing the Tyber by the *Pons Emilius*, we kept along the banks of the river for some way till we arrived at the *Porta Angelica*, just under the Vatican Hill. Here let me do justice to old *Pater Tyberinus*, whom I saw for the first time; he is by no means so contemptible a

stream as he has been represented to be; he is of a very handsome breadth, and his banks are so steep, and himself so rapid and noisy, that although it must be owned that he is rather a bilious complexion, I should not have thought him an ugly fellow, even if his name had not been Tyber. I did not at all lament that the *Porta del Popolo* happened to be inaccessible, for, immediately after we had entered the *Porta Angelica*, we came quite suddenly in front of St. Peter's. It is not possible to express the astonishment with which I was struck at the first view of the building, although I had raised my expectations very high, and imagined that I had formed a just idea of what I was to see. I assure you sincerely (not on the word of a traveller) that I never felt such an impression from the sight of any building in my life. It is amongst the very few objects of which the expectation cannot be raised too high; and I have never seen any print or picture which gave anything like a sufficient idea of it. The most striking parts of the building are certainly the great colonnade and the dome; but I must not forget the ornaments in the space between the wings of the colonnade, I mean the famous Egyptian obelisk and the two fountains. These fountains were so great a novelty to me, that I was as much pleased with them as with any part of the scene; they are not miserable piddling things such as we see in England and France, but two great streams thrown at least thirty feet high, with a prodigious noise, and falling down in foam and smoke like great natural cascades. They play day and night. Rome has many more fountains as large and as beautiful. I do not know how to give you a better idea of the difference between them and all other things of the same sort which I have seen, than by recalling a passage in Bolingbroke to your recollection, where he compares frothy holiday speeches with real eloquence, flowing without interruption and fed by a continual spring. This is the exact difference between Roman fountains and all others.

"The inside of St. Peter's is, if possible, superior to the outside. As I do not pretend to be a connoisseur, I am not ashamed to own that I do not understand the criticisms which I have heard made on some parts of it. I will not bore you with my reasons for admiring the whole; when I return, if you have a mind to talk of St. Peter's, I am certain I shall retain the impression which I received from the first view of it. I saw his Holiness rub his bald head under Jupiter Capitolinus's bronze toe, and then kiss the toe with great seeming devotion, and wipe it afterwards with his handkerchief; this is a ceremony which he performs every day. You know that Jove has changed his name to Peter for an estate at Rome, and now sits under a canopy near the high altar under the name, style, and title of St. Peter. His toe is almost kissed away to nothing by Popes and other good Catholics. I remained at Rome a week; it was not prudent at that season to remain longer, but I could pass months there with pleasure. I employed my week in endeavouring to get a general idea of every great object in the town, and of its plan and distribution. With this view I went over almost the whole town; many of the streets are miserably dirty, narrow, and the houses mere hovels; but they are mixed with the most pictureque points of view imaginable, and with such a number of noble fountains, palaces, churches, columns, statues, and obelisks as would be sufficient to ornament twenty towns of the same size. This is modern Rome, which is, in itself, an object of the greatest magnificence, and which does not, by any means, disgrace the ruins of ancient Rome. I went to the Capitol and looked down into the old Forum, which you know is the great scene of the antiquities which remain at Rome. It might be kept in better order; it is even in its present state so striking, that one has scarcely time to



observe the filth of the market which is held there. I walked through the Forum to the great Amphitheatre of Vespasian which is called the Colosseum, and which you know is the largest and most perfect of all the ancient buildings at Rome. The effect of this is at least as great as the first view of St. Peter's; but when I got upon a rising ground just by the Colosseum, and at one view took in that astonishing building against a great Triumphal Arch, the ruins of the Palace of the Cæsars on *Mons Palatinus*, and behind, immense masses of aqueducts at a distance, I leave you to judge with how great a roar I spouted—

*“ Aspice murorum moles præruptaque saxa,  
Obrutaque horrenti vasta theatra situ—  
Hæc sunt Roma.—videri velut ipsa cadavera tantæ  
Urbs adhuc spirent imperiosa ruinas.*

which are most admirable verses, and I am convinced must have been written exactly in the very spot on which I then stood.

“I have already told you that I had not time to take more than a general view of the town. I did not see the inside of any palace, nor of any church excepting St. Peter's and the Pantheon, which I need not describe to you. The present Pope has really done a great deal at Rome in restoring obelisks, repairing fountains, and many other public works. Amongst other things he has repaired an Egyptian obelisk, which formerly stood at the Mausoleum of Augustus, and had lain for some time on a heap of rubbish near that building. He has removed this obelisk to *Monte Cavallo* alias *Mons Quirinalis*, where he has placed it between two famous colossal statues, which are both said to represent Alexander the Great, and to be the rival works of Phidias and Praxiteles. On the base of the obelisk the Pope's Poet Laureat (I suppose) has inscribed some verses which I took down on purpose to send to you, as being the excess of toad-eating. I don't think Louis XIV. would have endured such extravagant flattery. Considering all circumstances, I believe you will be of opinion that this exceeds the *Viro immortalis* and *Victori perpetuo* at Paris. The Obelisk *loquitur*—the Pope's name is Pius Sextus.

*“ Me quondam Egypti desectum e cautibus, undas  
Vis quem per medias Romæ transtulerat,  
Ut stare Augusti moles miranda sepulcri,  
Cæsareum Tyberis qua nemus adlueret,  
Jam frustra eversum fractumque infesta vetustas  
Nisa est aggestis condere rudibus,  
Nam Pius in lucem revocat, sartumque Quirini  
Sublimem in collis vertice stare jubet;  
Inter Alexandri mediusque maxima signa  
Testabor quanto sit minor Ille Pio.*

“You will perceive I do not send you these verses for any other merit than the flattery in the two last lines; the idea is also very curious *that Alexander is just as much inferior to Pius as the Obelisk is higher than the statues*. This inscription is dated 1786, but I do not think the fame of it has yet reached England.

“From Rome we came by the new road over the Pomptine marshes to Naples; the road is really a great work begun and completed by the present Pope on the remains of the *Via Appia*. A great deal has been done towards draining the marshes, which you know have long been the terror of the neighbourhood on account of their unwholesome exhalations in summer and autumn, and which are not entirely without their danger

even in winter. If they can be effectually drained, that part of the country will be very fine. Of course I read Horace's journey, *egressum magnâ me accepit Aricia Româ*. We followed his steps almost exactly; in addition to this we passed the Amasenus described by Virgil in the eleventh book. This is the river over which Metabus throws Camilla. The Pope has turned the course of this river, and it now runs in the bed of the Ufens (also mentioned by Virgil in the seventh book). The Papal Poet Laureat has recorded this circumstance on the bridge over the river in the following execrable lines:—

“ *Quà leni resonans prius susurro  
Molli flumine sese agebat Ufens,  
Nunc rapax Amasenus it, lubensque  
Vias dedidicisse ait priores,  
Ut Sexto gereret Pio iubenti.  
Morem, neu sibi jure ut ante possit,  
Viator maledicere aut colonus.*

“ From this bridge we soon came very near the Circæan Promontory—

“ *Dives inaccessos ubi solis filia lucos  
Assiduo resonat cantu.* . . .

“ Notwithstanding all these verses the road from Rome to Terracina is very dismal, excepting just the neighbourhood of Aricia, where the nymph Egeria has a very beautiful wood. Terracina is Auxur; there you come close upon the sea, and the country is very romantic, high rocks, myrtles, olives, and orange-trees on the shore. I slept at Mola di Gaeta, *alias* Formiæ, and in the morning had a delightful view of the promontory of *Caieta*, with the town built on the rock, and advancing very far into the sea; and on the other side, *Inarime Jovis imperiis imposita Typhæo*, which makes a beautiful appearance with its companion Prochyta. I know you have a passion for islands as well as myself; you will find them in perfection on this coast. Nothing can be finer than the country the whole way from Mola di Gaeta to Naples. We passed the Liris, which is one of the best Italian rivers I have seen; for it must be owned that the rivers of Italy make a better appearance in verse than in reality. They are generally of a muddy colour, and as most of them are subject to violent floods either from the Alps or the Apennines, their banks are marshy for a considerable way on both sides, and even the stream in many places is broken with heaps of mud and rubbish. The *Rex Fluviorum* himself is not exempt from this defect, but the Tyber and the Liris run between very steep banks, and are more like our rivers, always excepting the colour of the waters. We passed through modern Capua, which has no great appearance of luxury; from thence almost the whole road to Naples is between immense woods of poplar with vines hanging between them in all directions.

“ It grew dark before we got into the town of Naples, so that we could form a judgment of nothing but the populousness of the town from the crowd of carriages and people in the streets, which was very striking, particularly after the dead tranquillity of all the other great towns of Italy, excepting only Genoa, which, however, is not to be compared to Naples in any respect. The next morning I was really astonished at the view from the windows of the hotel where I lodge; in front, Capræa, the most beautifully shaped island I ever saw; on one side the promontory of Pansilype, covered with villas to the very point, with vineyards and gardens intermixed, and here and there a pine tree, and a rock so formed that you can scarcely believe it to be natural. This

side is not very high, and is so near that you can distinguish every object; on the other side, at a greater distance, is the coast of Surrentum, which is extremely high and bold, and cut into all sorts of strange shapes. The nearest of the mountains to the town on this side is Vesuvius, which becomes a new picture with every change of the wind and weather; his shape at top you know is a beautiful cone, then comes his smoke of all sorts of forms and colours; when the sun sets the reflection on Vesuvius is an object worth the fatigue of the whole journey from London. I have seen the mountain quite of a deep purple, and the smoke of a bright rose colour; his base is covered with villas and towns. Unfortunately he is at present very quiet. You know that there was a great eruption in the autumn; Sir William Hamilton says it was the third in rank of those he had seen within 25 years; we cannot therefore expect much from the mountains for some time. However, I have had the satisfaction of seeing him throw up fire three or four nights, and from what I have seen, I can form some idea of the magnificence of a larger eruption.

"I was very much affected by the climate at my first arrival; although we have had no cold weather, the season has not been at all pleasant. The rain has been almost incessant since I came here, the 1st of December; we have not seen more than five or six completely fair days, but they have been exactly like the finest summer days in England. The great damp and the heat of the Scirocco wind (which is the rainy wind here) are very trying to a constitution accustomed to a northern climate. You cannot imagine the effect they produce; for the first ten days I entirely lost my appetite, my spirits, and almost the use of my limbs; and even people arriving here in perfect health, after a few days complained of the same symptoms. But I am now as well as I ever was in my life. You will perceive by my account of the weather that I have not been able yet to see much of the country. Of course my first visit was to Virgil's tomb, which is only venerable from being supposed to be his tomb; at present it is very much like an old lime-kiln grown over with bushes, amongst which there is no laurel. I do not know why that coxcomb, Mr. Addison, chooses to say that this ruin cannot be Virgil's tomb: he gives no reason for his opinion in his ridiculous books of travels, and I think there are many for supposing that Virgil was buried in the spot where the antient sepulchre stands which bears his name. It is so interesting a point, in my opinion, that I mean to endeavour to ascertain it. Virgil had a villa at Naples, and there is reason to believe that the sepulchre stands in the ground which was the garden of that villa. Antiquaries tell me that the Romans were often buried in the gardens of their villas; and it is said that Silius Italicus purchased this very villa as having been Virgil's, with the tomb, where he used to offer his devotions as if it had been sacred, and write those abominable verses of which Mr. Addison has quoted so many in his travels, and of which he has so perfectly preserved the spirit in equally abominable English translations. All these circumstances are in favour of my wish that this should really be Virgil's tomb, particularly as it is certain that he was buried at Naples. This letter has grown to such an unreasonable length that I should be ashamed to enter into any account of Pozzuoli, Baïæ, or Portici; and as I have had but a general view of them as yet, I can better reserve them for another letter, if I should find anything worth mentioning after I have seen them more fully. I can say, at present, that the beauty of the coast in every direction is quite surprising, even after all one has read and heard of it.

"I am quite charmed with Sir William Hamilton, he is such an enthusiast, and so happy to find anybody that will listen to the history of his vases and antiquities of all sorts. There are very few English arrived here yet; the most pleasant is a son of old Brandling's, who is really a very good sort of young man, with the warmest zeal for our cause, and the most engaging abhorrence of his cousin Grey. Hastings's Middleton is here, and in the same hotel with me; but it is so large that I have been able to keep clear of him till now, notwithstanding the annoying custom which has been established that all Englishmen travelling in Italy are to visit and be acquainted. As I hope you continue to pay great attention to your table as a most useful instrument of government, I thought it might be some object to you to have a quantity of the best macaroni that is made in Italy. The coast of Amalfi near Naples is famous for the manufacture of macaroni, and the Italians prefer what is made there to any other. I have ordered a box to be sent by the first ship that sails for England. With the macaroni I have sent some *cedrati*, and a sort of *bergamot* which is called here *mela rosa*, for mixing with lemon ice. How these will taste in England I cannot tell, but if they preserve their flavour, nothing can be more delicious. I have also sent a box of macaroni to Pitt; if you are disposed to be generous, I wish, between you, you would give some to the Duke of Montrose, with my humble duty to his Grace. The ship is to sail in about three weeks, and the passage is usually about six. The boxes are directed to Nesbitt and Stewart, my bankers in Aldermanbury; they will send them to you when they arrive.

"Do you remember some time ago you were so good as to say you would endeavour to get my brother Henry into the suite of one of our foreign Ministers. He is just now returned from the Academy at Brunswick, and is in London, where I am afraid he will do no good. If you have any prospect of being able to assist him, pray let my mother know.

"I mean to remain here about six weeks more; the weather is very unpleasant at Naples in February, and that is the best time for Rome. I shall stay at Rome until the weather is mild enough to allow me to move towards England. I hope to see you in spring and to find you all as well as I left you."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 9 [Stowe].—"Having heard from James that you had determined to pass some days at Stowe, I have not troubled you by letter with any inquiries into the progress of the arrangement which Pitt meant to undertake, and which has been delayed so long. When we last conversed upon it you did not seem surprised at the impatience which I expressed upon this head. I told you that I should not urge him upon it, but that I could not but feel very sensibly that my objects were unfairly and unkindly hazarded by Pitt by any *unnecessary* delay in the discussion of this business. Here then the business has stopped, at least as far as I am informed, and by a mere accident, I have reason to believe that *no proposition has been opened* to —, and I think it probable (from the same accidental information) that he looks to his first object. I do not choose to write more upon this subject by the post, but I am sure you will agree with me that I have a right to expect from Pitt's justice, as well as his friendship, that an explanation should take place, and that it should not be so unfairly delayed.

"I see by the papers that he is now gone to the west; not having heard from you for the last three weeks, I do not know your motions, or the reasons why you changed your Christmas destination, but from all these circumstances I conclude that you can have no explanation with Pitt till he returns, and I then fear, from his parliamentary avocations, a further delay of suspense to me and certainly of hazard. However, all this I trust to your affection, being determined not to speak or write to him upon it?"

"I have been very warmly solicited upon the subject of the Aylesbury vicarage, which has now been vacant a month. The bishop of Lincoln has (it seems) promised it to Pitt. You know the essential object to us to secure it; should I write to him about it?"

"My house has been full of company, and our party very noisy; at present it is a little diminished. I do not yet know when I am to look for my party from the west. Bulkeley will be here in a few days. Arthur Wesley came to me yesterday from Ireland, full of resentment to the Lord Lieutenant, who has not spoke one word to him since March last, and has refused to recommend him for any purchase out of his own regiment. You know the real cause of all this, but I think it probable that Wesley will soon fly out and resign his appointment. I have laboured to sooth him upon it, but I rather think that it might be right for Mornington to call for some explanation, or for some change in this marked line of disapprobation. He says that the book of numbers is very certain; but both he and Dr. Little say that the attack upon Lord Westmoreland will be very warm, as the Opposition have found out, or at least have conceived, that he is very sensible to personal abuse. Conolly told Dr. Little, in Grattan's presence, that they were determined to make an example of Lord Clonmell for his *fiat* law, to which the latter assented, and said that it was to be their first attack.

"I have exhausted all my budget of news to you, and, in return, you should send me your Russian speculation, which must, by this time, be tolerably advanced to a certainty.

*Postscript.*—"Poor Young! He writes to me almost every day, but so incoherently that I see he is quite broken-hearted."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 10, Longleat.—"Just before I left town Sir George Younge told me he had given a note to Mr. Nepean of some merchants in the City being concerned in some ships the object of whose voyage was to carry a large quantity of cannon from Ostend to Tippto Sultan. If this idea is at all founded, or to any extent, ought not something to be done about it, either to prevent it going, or, if that cannot be done, it ought certainly be right to write both to Madras and Bombay, so as to enable our fleet in India to intercept them before they reach Tippto; the ports in his dominions where they could be landed are very limited indeed. David Scott can speak accurately as to that, and probably Sir Archibald Campbell. If he is to be seen, I shall make it my business to see him when I go to Bath to-morrow. I am very sorry, however, to hear that he has been very ill again since he went to Bath.

"Another Indian subject. I have a letter from Mr. Lewis of the War Office to inform me that, after fully supplying all the regiments at home, there will be towards 4,000 men of the independent levies applicable to the service of India. We shall probably hear from India before the meeting of Parliament; till then, it is impossible to form a decided opinion, but it would be a thousand pities, if the war is still going on

there, to lose so favourable an opportunity of completely recruiting our European establishment. In my opinion the best way would be to add so many complete companies to each of the King's regiments in India, so as to augment them to their former number of 1,000 men. This would prevent the danger of dissatisfaction among the men, if you should attempt to transfer the men without the officers, which is always a disagreeable business; and, besides answering our immediate object in India, it would ease the half-pay list very materially at home. Think of this, and, in the meantime, converse with Lewis and Steele (to whom I believe Mr. Pitt is to write from Somersetshire) that the officers and men may not be set adrift.

"We did not get here till late Saturday night, and the Chancellor went away on Sunday before breakfast, so that I had no opportunity of speaking with him on the subject of the Indian judges."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 11, 1½ p.m., Burton Pynsent.—"I arrived here only last night, and have not had the possibility till this morning of putting down what occurred to me respecting the *projet* and instructions to Lord Auckland. I now send them on a separate paper. You will find very little in them, as, on the whole, I am satisfied that in substance your proposal is the best that can be made. I have suggested some alteration as to the form, which I wish you to consider and to dispose of as you think best, as it does not appear to me to be of much consequence either way. I see no possibility of conveying this to the Office without its being known that you have been chiefly concerned in the manufacture. I have thought that the best way of avoiding any difficulty on that account was to send a letter to the Duke of Leeds, which Smith can seal, and forward with the draft. The Chancellor is by this time returned to town. Perhaps it may be as well to let him see the instructions before they go, but then you must take care not to let him keep them a week. I am obliged to defer answering your letter which arrived last night, by your messenger, but I will despatch him some time to day."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 11, 4¼ p.m., Burton Pynsent.—"I think the words you propose might be improved by a very small variation and addition, which would make the sentence run as follows:—

'That His Excellency is at liberty to authorise his Secretary to state in Parliament, that it is intended to bring forward a bill in the British Parliament to authorise and regulate the trade to be carried on by British subjects in general to the north-west coast of America. That, in doing this, it may be necessary to consider the effect and operation of charters, and the arrangement which may be requisite in consequence, but that it will be an object of attention to His Majesty's servants that the trade to be carried on individually by His Majesty's subjects should be open, with equal benefit and under the same regulations, to his subjects in Ireland as to those in Great Britain.' You will see that the object of this alteration is to guard against our being pledged to Irish subjects being able to carry on the trade on the same footing precisely as our Companies may do. I do not know that that would be impracticable, but I think it might, at least as far as relates to the East India Company, and it seems to me sufficient if they are assured that *individuals*

in Ireland shall participate in the trade as favourably as individuals here. We shall certainly, for our own sake, make the terms on which the trade is to be carried on as good as we can, and I do not believe any of the charters will occasion any serious trouble. I told Parnell that I could not answer for the ultimate decision respecting corn, but that Government would endeavour to carry the measure which was suggested last year in the report of the committee, if they did not find that it would give considerable dissatisfaction. This seemed to be as much as he expected.

"You will, I hope, have received by this time the impeachment brief from the Speaker. I shall not fail to ruminate again and again on the bill, which, I believe, may be very well settled. The Polish papers I sent you, because you some time ago talked of going through that whole subject. I believe nothing more can be done in it till we hear again both from Poland and Prussia."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1791, January 11, St. James's Square.—"I enclose you a copy of a letter from Mitford which I must answer, and much wish to know your ideas upon it without delay.

"My notion of an answer would be, after expressions of personal civility to him, to say that there does *not* appear to me, personally, any particular circumstance, in the present moment, which should render the agitation of the question intended to be brought forward by him embarrassing to the general measures of Government.

"Tell me if you think this right. Some sort of answer I must in common civility send him in the course of three or four days at furthest.

"You have, as I understand, carried out of town with you Lord Dorchester's despatch containing his draft of a bill. My own draft I have here, but cannot work upon it without his, and I begin to be afraid of being pressed in point of time."

*Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 11, night, Burton Pynsent.—"I wish there did not exist the occasion for the application of the Catholics. It certainly never can be agitated without a possibility of its being improperly confounded with the question of the Dissenters. This, however, is no good reason against the Catholics, and I think, under all the circumstances, the answer which you propose to return to Mitford is the right one.

"You will make so much more use of the Quebec papers than I find any chance of doing, that I have thought it best to return the whole contents of the box which I brought with me, including Lord Dorchester's draft of the bill.

*Postscript.*—"I say nothing about the heads of the bill respecting the Catholics or the oath. I have hardly read them, and your answer seems to imply no opinion on the particulars."

The EARL of WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, January 12, Dublin Castle.—"The enclosed Bill was drawn in consequence of conversations between Pitt, your Lordship, and Lord

FitzGibbon. The general principle that the King should pursue the person and property of his debtor through every part of his dominions cannot be questioned. Whether the proposed is the best or only method of carrying that principle into effect is beyond my ability to decide; but before the Bill is stirred, I would recommend it very seriously to the consideration of the lawyers on your side the water, especially how the necessary adoption of the judgment of an Irish Court (if such case should ever arise) might be relished in England.

"This Bill, if calculated to serve English Government, should be passed in England before it is mentioned here. I fear the first stirring of this business by Irish Government might be argued as a facility of sacrificing the rights of the equal subjects of Ireland to a Court of foreign jurisdiction; an object would be immediately pointed out; we should be charged with the discredit of attempting to frame a law for the express purpose of catching an Irish patriot; should difficulties afterwards arise in England we might be defeated. The circumstance to which I allude gives me apprehensions that this Bill may occasion much discussion here; the person [Mr. Bruen] by his political connexions and other means has a great many friends; it seems not difficult to parade, upon constitutional principles, upon the tyranny of robbing a man of his birthright, the jury of his neighbours and countrymen; to insinuate that had a man pursued other politics, inimical to the interest of the country, this measure would not have been attempted, and to deprecate the punishment of Irish patriotism in the English Court of Exchequer. I do not mean in having said so much to state this Bill as impracticable, but it seems my duty to state to you what clamour it is possible this proposition may produce (as the proposal is secret one can only conjecture). You have the decision whether the object is worth pursuing; when you have considered the Bill I should be glad of your further sentiments.

"No mail has arrived since the first of January, and the wind keeps so high in an adverse quarter that there is little prospect of a packet."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

Private.

1791, January 13, St. James's Square.—"You will receive with this letter a dispatch on the subject of the Nootka trade, which will, I hope, be sufficient to answer your purpose. You see, I am persuaded, that our object is to enable you to satisfy your House of Commons upon the subject, without at the same time saying anything which might give alarm to our Companies, previous to bringing the business forward here. Our general idea (but that must not on any account be opened in Ireland) is to enable any persons to carry on that trade under certain licences, to which are to be annexed as conditions such regulations as are, *bond fide*, necessary to secure the East India Company's monopoly of the tea-trade to these kingdoms, the only one of the objects under the charters I have mentioned that is of real importance. These licences may just as well be granted in Ireland and enforced there as in Great Britain, so that, under this plan, not the least distinction would be made between the subjects at large of the two nations. The East India Company is in fact an Imperial Company, equally open to Irishmen as to Englishmen who are desirous of becoming members of it; and their commerce, by the mode of carrying it on, is as much excluded from all the other parts of Great Britain, except London, as it is from those of Ireland.



"I understand from Pitt that he told Sir John Parnell, on the subject of corn, that Government in the House of Commons would endeavour to carry the measure suggested last year in the report of the Committee, if they did not find that it would give considerable dissatisfaction. You shall have an answer about the Mint as soon as possible, but, in the meantime, for God's sake, discourage by all possible means the idea of a separate Mint, which would produce confusion and frauds beyond all calculation."

*Copy.*

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 17, Dublin Castle.—"This evening's mail conveys to you the report of our law officers on Mr. Butler's claim. I do not apprehend you need consult any lawyers in England before you authorise me to refer the claim according to their recommendation; but, if you are obliged, take care they do not start difficulties.

"I have recommended Yale to a Lieutenancy in the list of succession, which indeed I have so long delayed that I might include him; and I would beg you to humbly represent to his Majesty my satisfaction in having been able so immediately to obey his commands.

"When I wrote to you on the subject of Mr. Yale, I fairly told the political reasons that influenced my conduct; when I told General Ward my determination to recommend Yale to the present Lieutenancy, which is fairly at the regulation, he represented to me his disinclination to show any favour to Mr. Yale, who, he assured me, did not deserve the character given of him by General Lascelles; but, on the contrary, merited a different one.

"The messenger arrived yesterday, and your letter relative to Nootka this day; the weather has been so severe that neither Parnell, Clements, and a prodigious number of members, would venture in the packets."

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, January 18, Dublin Castle.—"Some time last spring General Pitt proposed to me an arrangement that Lord Conyngham should purchase the major-brigadeship of Major Reede, and that his Lordship should afterwards exchange with Captain Vallancy of the 46th Regiment. I told the General that I should be happy to carry into effect any arrangement that he desired, but that as Major Reed had sold his troop, and did not appear to have purchased the office of brigade-major, I could not venture to recommend the sale of that commission; that you should be privately informed, that his Majesty might know the real circumstances of the case; that, with the King's previous consent, I would recommend the sale of the brigade-major; that exchanges had not a good appearance; and, if the officers of the 46th had no objection, it appeared much better that Vallancy should purchase directly of Reed, and Lord Conyngham of Vallancy. Upon the idea therefore that the officers of the 46th would not purchase, I engaged to recommend Vallancy to the office of brigade-major (which the King approved) and Lord Conyngham to the company of 46th. After the King's consent to Vallancy's purchase I was informed that I was considered as doing a very harsh thing in forcing Lord Conyngham by purchase over the

heads of the officers of 46th Regiment, and particularly Lieutenant Dallas is eldest, an officer of long and honourable service; and that General Pitt was observed upon in the army as having *lent* himself to this improper arrangement of Government. I told General Pitt that it had never been my intention to force Lord Conyngham over the head of the officers of 46th, and that it could not be done. I considered it very extraordinary that Captain Vallancy should have engaged me so far in this business, without previously ascertaining whether the officers of the 46th would or would not purchase. I felt that Vallancy had brought me into the dilemma of having the appearance of attempting an improper arrangement, which I had never intended; and that I either had not power in England to carry my point, or had been terrified by a little opposition out of my scheme. I desired one of my family privately to hint to the officers of the 46th that the arrangement had proceeded upon a misunderstanding, and that it had never been in my mind to force a lieutenant by purchase over their heads; thus the matter stopped, and I was in the unpleasant predicament of having his Majesty's consent to the transfer of Reed's commission, which, from attention to General Pitt, I kept in my bureau. On the death of Captain Urquhart (about the time the 46th were ordered to prepare for service) General Pitt desired I would give the vacant company in 58th to Vallancy in hopes, I imagine, that Vallancy might be able to sell the company of 58th on terms that he could not that of 46th. I considered that the removal of Captain Vallancy out of the 46th (that he might sell advantageously) and the putting another officer over those lieutenants, would have strongly manifested my inclination to oppress them in the former instance, if I had had the power, and would have ill corresponded with what had been privately told them; and I thought the dilemma I had been brought to by Mr. Vallancy's real or pretended ignorance of the inclination of the 46th lieutenants did not deserve that he should meet with favour from me.

"I therefore declined General Pitt's application, gave the company of 58th to Captain Fitch of 61st, from this personal reason, that he is the only *aide [du] camp* that is well acquainted with the people, and that, in Cradock's absence, I should be in great difficulty without Fitch. The 61st Regiment is in turn soon to quit this kingdom. Fitch's company was given to Captain Saunders from half-pay. I have been informed that, since my refusal, Vallancy has negotiated the sale of his company in 46th, and that the sale of brigade-majorship would come forward again. However, it has not reached me, General Ward having represented, I believe, to General Pitt that the office of secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, which Vallancy holds, and the office of brigade-major cannot be executed by the same person. No objection has ever been made on my part; in every occasion I have made it my peculiar wish to be on good terms with the Commander-in-Chief, and really considered myself entirely so till I was surprised by two letters from the General to Hobart yesterday morning.

"The first excessively affronted that I had not complied with his request in exchanging Vallancy to the 58th, for which I have stated public reason enough; besides that, my personal convenience, as Fitch was in a regiment likely soon to go abroad, had a right to be consulted as soon at least as General Pitt's.

"He insinuated, at the same time, that there was in agitation some parliamentary interference and scheme to impede Vallancy's advancement to the office of brigade-major. Whence these apprehensions originated,

as I never heard of any scheme upon the subject, I cannot say; he pretended upon this to mount the military grievance of the impossibility of carrying on the command without having the recommendation to the staff, and expressed his resolution to represent this situation of the Commander-in-Chief to his Majesty. Hobart assured him that he had no knowledge of any arrangement of the staff he seemed to suspect; explained my conduct about the company of 58th; and said he would not give the General's letter to me till he heard from him again, as he knew my respect and good wishes to the General, and how sorry I should be at any misunderstanding. The General's second letter enforces his first, adding that the army was suffering through parliamentary influence, the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation of little weight, promotions recommended unknown to him, and that it was impossible for him to carry on the service without the army was put more immediately under the protection of the Commander-in-Chief; insinuating that, in many recent instances, officers willing to purchase had had juniors pressed over them, though refused in the case only of Vallancy to him.

"What may be General Pitt's object I am at a loss to guess, except that he may be tired of this country, and by quarrelling with this Government he may make his return impossible; that he would persuade people in England that his difficulty is owing to his exertions in favour of the army, and thus would found a claim for a more agreeable situation in England. With his objects or success I am quite indifferent; I am only anxious that his Majesty should be fully acquainted with the real circumstances of the business. I have ever paid the utmost attention to General Pitt's wishes (civil as well as military). I would have recommended Major Vilette to a lieutenant-colonelcy, but that went of [off] upon some accident. In Vallancy's case, I forwarded his desired arrangement as much as I could with justice to his Majesty's officers of 46th Regiment. I have made it my particular object that parliamentary necessity should interfere as little as possible with the army; and having had the honour not to have had an objection made to any succession (except in the case of Yale, which I had previously engaged to rectify), it has always been a very pleasing idea in which I flattered myself that I had conducted the military business to his Majesty's satisfaction. I have heard of no military complaint or grievances against the Castle, and the necessity of pitching upon the present ground of quarrel pretty strongly argues that there are none. His Majesty's army has neither been oppressed or neglected, and I am not under the smallest apprehensions that any well-founded representation can be made of injury to the army, or that could induce his Majesty to mark such an opinion of my conduct as to lessen the powers of my situation or increase those of the Commander-in-Chief.

*Private.*—"I have troubled you with a terrible long detail; you will be equally bored to make yourself master of it and repeat it to the King. I therefore only add that if you see no objection I have none that the epistle should be seen by his Majesty, but would rather like it, as it is necessary that he should be fully acquainted with the subject, as you know he is attacked by Generals' grievances at all hours. I suppose by General Pitt's epistles he has commenced his complaints ere now."

*Seal of arms.*

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 18, Naples.—"Although I have troubled you with a most unreasonably long letter so lately, I cannot delay my answer to your letter

of the 23rd of December, which gave me such sincere heart-felt satisfaction as I scarcely ever received from any event in my life. After so long and so intimate friendship I could not be surprised at any instance of the goodness of your heart or of the warmth of your regard for me, but it was not possible to take any method of proving either which could affect me so deeply as your visit to my little children. For many obvious reasons I have never mentioned them to you, although I thought it my duty to them to name you as one of their guardians in my will. I have now abundant reason to know that you would not think that office troublesome, if it should happen to devolve on you. I never can forget either the manner or the time you have chosen to set my mind at ease on a subject sufficiently anxious from its own nature, and (I am sorry to add) rendered much more so by the conduct of my brother Pole, who has never *even seen* three of my children. After the interest you have taken in their situation I ought not to conceal from you a circumstance which makes it so much more delicate, but I am sure you will not allow this communication to go any further. I leave you to judge with what pain I left them in the state of health which forced me to quit England, when my brother *never mentioned them* to me at my departure; and although I have had the good fortune, in a great measure, to recover my health, which has diminished in some degree the anxiety I felt on their account, it is too painful to me to know that he has never been near them during my absence. However you may lament a conduct so unfeeling, and (let me add) so ungrateful, it must be a pleasure to such a heart as yours to be acquainted with the full extent of the kindness you have done; and you will easily perceive that the disagreeable circumstance of the neglect of the person who naturally should be the protector of these children, gives great additional value to any attention from my friends. Whatever may have been the folly which produced these little children, I am sure you have too much real feeling not to agree with me that they are a charge as dear and as sacred as if they had been born under the most solemn engagement. I am persuaded you are of my opinion by the affectionate manner in which you speak of them, which I assure you went to my very heart; and I must not except your application of the Greek, which, when I translated to the mother of those you visited, *Κλαῖε μὲν Ἀργεῖη Ἐλενη*, I think you would find it very difficult to escape from her if she ever finds an opportunity of kissing you. If you did not see my children without emotion, believe me I could not, without emotion, think of all the circumstances of your visit. Since you have set the example of quoting Homer, pray apply these lines properly—

ἐέλδeto γάρ σε ἰδεσθαι,  
Πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλγ' ἔχει πατὴρ πᾶσι διχο μένοιο  
Ἐν μεγάροις, ὅμη αἱλοὶ ἀοσσηγῆρες εἰσὶν  
Ὅς νυν Τηλεμάχῳ, ὁ μὲν διχεται, οὐδε ἱ ἄλλοι  
Εἰς, ὅκειν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάλοειν κακότητα.

“So long ago as when I was at Spa, my brother Arthur communicated a most kind message from Lord Buckingham on the subject of my children, in answer to which I immediately wrote a letter to express my gratitude for his kindness; but I never have heard a word from Lord Buckingham. I am afraid that, from some words in your letter, that this has been owing to Lord Buckingham having been ill, of which I never had heard any account. I mean, however, to write to him soon.

"I am very much obliged to you for your account of your success in your new character, which I had rather hear from you than through any other channel. I believe most men can form a very correct judgment of the impression of their speeches, but some endeavour to deceive themselves, and will believe that they have spoken well in defiance even of their own senses. As I know you are rather in the class of severe self-critics than in any other, if you are tolerably well satisfied, I have no doubt that your audience was very much pleased. But do not suppose that your fame has not reached Italy. The very day I went to see the remains of Cicero's Academic villa at Puteoli, on my return I found a newspaper, I think the *London Chronicle*, in which it is said that Lord Grenville *replied in a very nervous and animated speech*. Mr. Woodfall indeed was silent, but he was engaged in the House of Commons. I assure you I share most cordially in your prosperity of every sort, perhaps I am even more eager here than if I was on the spot. The character of Government is astonishingly high amongst all foreigners. If I had worn blue and buff all my life, I believe I should, from mere shame, pretend to be Pitt's friend. It is perfectly true that there is but one sentiment respecting him abroad, whatever there may be at home. In this I do not pretend to include the Pope, whose holy sentiments I have had no opportunity of ascertaining. I think it remarkably fortunate for you to have had your first engagement with Lord Lansdown, no better game could be started than his speech. I have no doubt that you will easily *bring his gray hairs with sorrow to the grave*, if he should continue on the line he seems to have taken. I have as little doubt of your finding every reason to be satisfied with the change of your situation, it was in every view of it a very wise measure. As to Burke's pamphlet, I have only seen extracts from it in some of the papers. I have admired most of them very much, but I have not seen any of those passages of which you speak, excepting Hugh Peters, which is incomparable. I was in hopes you might have been able to have sent me the pamphlet through Sir William Hamilton.

"I hope you will not now complain of my having said nothing of all the *great things* at Rome, as I think I have sent you as *great* a letter as ever was put into the post at one time. Since I wrote I have seen Portici, Pozzuoli, and Cumæ, but I must reserve them for another letter; nothing is wanting to the pleasure of these sights but that of having you to spout Virgil. I wished for you particularly at Cumæ, where I spouted the whole sixth book over a large bottle of true Falernian wine (which is not very bad) on a rock just under the temple of Apollo. There is no vestige remaining of the temple, but the view is enchanting, and the day happening to be a true Neapolitan winter's day (*id est*, clearer beyond all comparison, and full as warm as any day in the finest English summer) we had the whole prospect, in full perfection, from Circe's promontory to the Cape of Misenus.

*"Qui nunc Misenus ab illo  
Dicitur, æternumque tenet per sæcula nomen.*

"Add to this Inarime and Prochyta, which I can never see enough, and on the road to Naples, such a view of Avernus! the castle of Baiæ where Julius Cæsar's villa stood, the whole bay of Pozzuoli terminated by Capræ, not forgetting Monte Nuovo rising on the site of the Lucrine lake (now a little pond). *Spout here* :—

*An memorem Portus, Lucrinoque addita claustra* . . . . .

"But I wish above all things to show you the little island of Nisita, a

rock covered with olives, and with a castle on its summit. It is separated by a very narrow channel from the point of Pausilypo, and coming from Pozzuoli, you look directly through this channel across the bay of Naples to Surrentum. Such a view as this is in fine weather ! with a sea so blue that one can hardly believe it to be natural, and boats and tartanes (who are very pretty fellows with masks running so *X*) without number. I find great want of you on all these expeditions. I am sorry to say I am too old to be able to replace your absence by the company of my brother Gerald. I must confess, on the whole, we have had a great deal of rain, and dull, heavy, damp weather, with storms of wind, since I arrived here ; but at intervals complete summer. I have found all Virgil's signs of storms to be exactly true in this climate ; so you may immediately *spout them all in this place*, and imagine yourself on the point of Pausilypo seeing

*Resonantia longé,  
Littora misceri, and hearing the Mergi  
Cum medio celeres revolant ex æquore  
Clamoremque ferunt ad littora . . . .*

“Notwithstanding the damp, I have been perfectly well, and have not yet had a single cold this winter ; but I take great care of myself, being resolved not to be an exile for nothing ; if my care succeeds for the rest of the winter I shall be fortunate indeed. Pray remember me to Lord Buckingham and to Pitt ; I wrote to King from Rome in answer to a letter I received from him.

“I mean to go to Rome the beginning of February if the weather should happen to be dry ; if not, I shall wait here until it is settled.”

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, January 22, Dublin Castle.—“Our addresses were carried almost without observation. I hardly know to what cause to attribute the patriotic silence ; a calm frequently precedes a storm ; we shall unquestionably have noise enough shortly. It has not been necessary to say anything relative to the trade to Nootka Sound ; your despatch has been only shown to the King's confidential servants, who all expressed themselves much pleased. The Irish business will be entirely concluded by the first week in March, and the producing of any business after that time will be very troublesome and disagreeable to the members ; and it is not possible to say what cabals may be cooked in a long session ; have the goodness therefore to pass, as soon as possible, your additional duties on sugar . . . . The Irish Parliament must follow your duties in certain proportions ; we cannot move till your laws are passed ; we are in the same situation respecting any trade you may open to the North-west Coast of America. Pray give me immediate notice of any measures necessary for this year.

“O'Niel of Shanes Castle has for sometime been flirting ; he wanted a Viscounty. I have always answered impossible ; he has since sounded to a Baroncy. I have not given a direct answer, willing first to understand from you whether his having figured as a delegate to his Royal Highness would be considered as a personal objection to him, provided I could make terms that would be advantageous to the Government. He has always been described to me as a man of great weight and

respectability, on whose word and promise for future support one might most undoubtedly rely. If he fails in carrying his point with us, he will deliver himself over to the Ponsonbys for this honour at a future period. His weight in Parliament will be a disagreeable auxiliary to that formidable phalanx, and his quitting them at present very injurious to them. I fancy, if he makes the terms that may be expected, he will look to his honours towards the close of this session; but he must make his election for his borough or the county of Antrim within a fortnight, and his choice of representative as well as his Parliamentary conduct will probably hesitate till I give him an answer; a speedy reply to him is necessary and fair."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, January 26, St. James's Square.—"It was Lord Grenville's intention to have taken the liberty to trouble your Majesty this morning with the inclosed copy of a private letter, which he has received from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, on the subject of some differences which have arisen between the Lord Lieutenant and General Pitt. But, upon consideration, Lord Grenville thought that your Majesty might perhaps rather choose that the letter should in the first instance be sent to your Majesty, and he has, for that reason, now taken the liberty of transmitting it. Lord Grenville has heard nothing from General Pitt upon the subject, but, if he had, he should have felt [it] his duty to endeavor, as far as was in his power, to accommodate matters between them, without your Majesty being troubled on the subject; but as the Lord Lieutenant seems particularly to wish that his statement of what has passed should be submitted to your Majesty, Lord Grenville thinks that he should be wanting to the Lord Lieutenant if he did not comply with his wishes in that respect. Lord Grenville is under the necessity of transmitting to your Majesty a copy of the letter in question as the original is written in so crowded and small a hand as to be scarcely legible, at least not without great trouble and difficulty."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 27, Queen's House.—"The letter of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland on the subject of Lieutenant-General Pitt was of a nature to be transmitted rather than personally communicated by Lord Grenville, and therefore he deserves my approbation for having adopted that mode. I am sorry any ill-humour has arisen, and I trust the good sense of Lord Grenville will make him try to reconcile this business, and then I need not in the least appear acquainted with it. I know the merit of General Pitt, and should be sorry if any want of temper of either side should deprive the public of so useful and intelligent an officer being employed in Ireland, where there ever is too much tendency to Parliamentary jobs; but the General on his side must not encourage personal jobs equally detrimental to the interest of the army."

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, January 28, Dublin Castle.—"Mr. Grattan has moved that the convention with Spain should be taken into consideration on Thursday

the 10th of February. The trade to North-west coast of America necessarily will be discussed, probably that beyond the Capes; it would be very beneficial if we could previously receive information if you have taken any steps, or made further decision relative to the above-mentioned trades to the Hudson's Bay, South Sea, or East India Company.

"The patriots have not yet commenced their clamour. Grattan is very peevish, because Hobart anticipated him by seconding the motion for a committee to consider of the mischiefs arising from spirituous liquors, and to endeavour to remedy them. It seems the general wish that the duties on beer should be lowered; if that proposal should be adopted, any regulation upon the import of English beer to counterbalance the English bounty on export of 1s. the barrel (about which I wrote to you lately) may probably be less observed in England.

"I long to hear if General Pitt has commenced his complaints."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to W. PITT.

1791, January 29, Hague.—"The Petersburg despatches by this messenger are what we expected. The Empress expressly desires our good offices to obtain for her a new frontier, *c'est à dire, Oczchow et son district jusqu' au Dniester.*

"If our negotiations at Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Madrid should have any material success, it is probable that we still may have means to intimidate effectually; but it seems more reasonable, under all the circumstances, to presume that nothing beyond good words will be given by Spain, by Vienna, and by Denmark; and that no assistance is to be expected from Sweden otherwise than *à poids de l'or.* And, lastly, that the Empress will not recede from her present demand (in which her new and brilliant successes will have fortified her) otherwise than by force.

"The question then comes, will you seriously prepare for war, for the object in question? I make no difficulty in saying that I hope you will not, because I think it extremely difficult in the execution, and certain to produce an expence far beyond any adequate object to be attained. In that opinion I am influenced partly by feeling the importance of peace to your whole system of government, and to the support perhaps of our existence as a great and prosperous nation; and partly, also, by a suspicion that we over-rate the object in question. It is a good thing, certainly, both to humble Russia and to check her progress; but she is humbled by giving up such immense conquests as she is willing to cede; and her progress, if I am not misinformed, is little advanced by the possession of Oczchow. If the Turks proceed to fortify the banks of the Dniester, or if they restore only their fortifications on the banks of the Danube upon a better system of defence, I am assured that, in any future war, they would have at least as good means of resistance as in the case of the present disastrous war. Time will not allow me to add all that presents itself farther on this subject, because the messenger will be too late for the tide.

"I ought to mention, because I presume that one of our difficulties turns on the Court of Berlin, that I have strong reasons to believe, from various conversations with persons who ought to know, that his Prussian Majesty is as averse to entering into war with Russia as he is desirous to find a pretext for war with Austria; and that if we can, *honnêtement*, get him out of the scrape, *il ne demande pas mieux.*



"The intimation about sending Schlieffre (which *secretly* originated from the Pensionary and from me) may perhaps be applied to this end; and I am not sure that it can by any possibility do mischief, and it may do much good. Whether any congress could be proposed upon some slight modification of the old principle, or upon the idea that if Ochzchow should be given, some explanations should also be given in a previous negotiation as to the future security to the Turks; and in the meantime to continue our ostensible menaces and intentions to come forward.

"I fear from Lord Grenville's letter, which I have this moment received, that the Commercial treaty will fail. If I cannot carry it by a *coup de main* upon receiving the farther instructions, we must leave it to my successor; for I never can hope for a concurrence of circumstances and support and good disposition so favourable as the present. I will do everything that I possibly can upon receiving the instructions, which I expect to-morrow night, but my hopes are small if the alterations are great. Besides, I suspect that we are mistaken in supposing that the Dutch have not a clear right to carry French sugars from St. Eustatius to a neutral port at all times, in peace and in war, certainly in peace."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, January, Stowe.]—"As to the other point of my letter to you I must have expressed myself very ill to have conveyed any complaint of *you* in it, and I fully allow for Pitt's employment, but, considering that this idea has been so many months afloat, and that I saw no end or even beginning of the business, I could not but state to you what I understand we agree upon, namely, that the delay hazards the only object in which I can be interested in this business, and having determined not to speak myself, I can only worry myself and *you*."

"I conceived your Russian politics drawing to conclusion for a very obvious reason, that Potemkin seems likely to carry every point unless you stop him from St. Petersburg, and that circumstance induced me to believe that you would have brought your propositions to a point, least the Turk should not have even his beard left to fight or to negotiate for. It is not very probable, but it is barely possible, that we may be (in case this ends unpleasantly) to carry on part of our naval operations (even if it is only of frigates) in the Black Sea, and I wish you to know that there is not in the Royal Navy one officer who has ever been there, nor (as I believe) a chart of it extant. Seymour Finch is the only officer who has carried his ship even to Constantinople since the year 1764. Surely it is worth while in any contingency to send a frigate there to know a little of the Straits, and of that Sea, even if you should think my speculation ever so wild."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO W. PITT.

Private.

1791, February 2, Hague.—"My hopes of bringing this same eternal commercial treaty to a conclusion are much dashed by Lord Grenville's letter from Holwood. I suppose that I am wrong in my judgment upon the points in question, but I own that they do not strike me in the same point of view in which they appear to you. I had conceived it to be of the highest importance to have established in the most positive terms that, during such wars as may arise, the Dutch shall not

carry any goods whatever, or trade in any manner whatever, to the islands of our enemies; and that they shall not, from their own colonies, carry any goods to the ports of our enemies on the Continent; and, finally, that they shall not carry any of the naval and military stores, or any of that long list included in the article of contraband. When you wish, in addition to this, to specify that they shall not carry any French produce from their own or from neutral islands to neutral ports upon the Continent, you state a claim which appears to me calculated against a mischief of no possible extent in itself, and open to subtrefuges which we never can prevent, and not (I believe) within the strictest description of the law of nations. However, I am not unwilling to try a clause to that effect if it is insisted on, though the Pensionary is of opinion against me respecting it; but when you add that the clause should also prevent their carrying French produce into Dutch ports on the Continent, or from Dutch ports into the ports of the Continent, I should deceive you if I held out the most distant probability of success.

"That right has always subsisted in war and in peace; and all the ports of the Continent are, at this hour, supplied occasionally from the Dutch warehouses either with raw sugar, or with sugar from the Dutch refineries, as the case may be. In short, my individual opinion is that when we effectually prohibit the produce of the enemies' islands from being carried, direct in Dutch bottoms, either to the islands or to neutral ports or to the enemies' ports, or from the Dutch islands or neutral ports direct to the enemies' ports, we take more security than we ever yet have had in any treaty. We give a model for the same useful stipulation to be made with other nations, and we have much more security than we can have by resting on the law of nations, in which, when we push its rigour against the innocent articles of commerce, all mankind rises against us. And what is most material, we remove between the two countries, by the list of contraband, an object of incessant and corroding dissatisfaction in time of peace, and of certain and fatal disagreement in time of war. In short, having said thus much, *liberavi animam meam*; and I submit cheerfully to better judgments; again remarking that the delay is almost as bad as death to the negotiation. Our friends are gone to Amsterdam to resist wrong impressions; but there are some conceited and ill-disposed men who are creating discontents and pretensions of all sorts.

"As to the other point, I mean that of the Eastern seas, if the object can be attained by safer words than I have used I shall be glad of it. I certainly had plumed myself on having agreed here to take a phrase which recognises our free navigation, and, at the same time, leaves us all the rights and exercise of commerce that we have ever claimed, without binding us in any shape whatever. The plain and evident meaning of those words are that we do not claim any interference in the Dutch spiceries.

"I now submit this matter finally to you and to Lord Grenville, only entreating you to let me hear soon. One of these commissaries (M. Van Harem) has sent his resignation, being tired of the business; M. Van de Pol is settling at Amsterdam as reigning *Bourgeois-maitre*; M. Graafland is averse to us, and M. Steengragl is only retained here by a friendly disposition towards the Pensionary and towards me.

*Secret.*—"I enclose a letter from Amsterdam on account of two lines which you will find in the second page. The sum is 250,000 guineas; but though the writer is an accurate and prudent man, it must be observed that he does not speak from his own knowledge.

*Secret.*—"I next enclose another paper which will in great measure explain itself, I mean a letter from the Pensionary. His first paragraph turns on a paper war which we are carrying on in a friendly way with Mr. Ewart, respecting the advantages or disadvantages of extending the alliance to Poland and the Porte, on which subject Mr. Ewart has sent to us a very good paper. The remainder of the letter relates to a subject which begins to be of great importance; for the Russian despatches, which are all this time delayed by the westerly storms at Helvoet, will call upon you to decide, (1) Whether you will acquiesce in the Empress's claim of Oczchow; or (2) Whether you will try to qualify it in some of the ways suggested by the Pensionary, or in some better mode; or (3) Whether you will urge the effect of farther menaces and ostensible preparations; or (4) Whether you will positively decide to proceed to extremities if the Empress persists in her claim. On the last question I have no doubt; and cannot help recollecting the last lines of the history of the Russian war with the Turks in 1737 (in which, by the bye, the Russians took Oczakow but did not keep it, because the whole district is a desert and without water); *Ainsi finit cette malheureuse guerre: Ah! quelle guerre ne l'est pas?*

"Our opinion is that much good might be obtained from ascertaining with precision the feelings and wishes of the King of Prussia on this subject, in some manner not too offensive to M. de Hertzberg. We have every reason to believe that the King of Prussia is against the war. The Pensionary's last paragraph alludes to the Duke of Brunswick under the words *La Personne*. The Princess of Orange has offered to me to convey anything that we may wish to say on the subject to the Duke, to whom I could write without difficulty or any risk of committing anybody, if I knew your wishes."

#### Enclosure Number 1.

Extract.

HENRY RICH? to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, January 29, Amsterdam.—"I hear a loan of 3 millions 600 thousand florins is made at Antwerp, at 5 *per centum*, for the three Royal brothers."

#### Enclosure Number 2.

VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, January 31.—"*La Personne sur la quelle vous faites une question, est tres capable pour la besogne, et meme plus qu'il ne faut; cependant je doute qu'il soit l'homme à la chose. 1° On le connoit pour un fin merle, et c'est pourquoi on se defie de tout ce qu'il dit. 2° Il seroit difficile de le diriger, parce qu'il aime à avoir une opinion à lui. Plus je pense à la chose, plus M. Elliot me paroît propre à cette commission; il ne lachera pas prise, et il ne chicanera pas sur quelques lieues de chemin, si les circonstances exigeoient qu'il passât outre.*" *French.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, February 2, Hague.—"I have addressed to Mr. Pitt the answer which I wished to write to your letter from Holwood, and as happily for both of you, and for the public, whatever is written to the one may be considered as written to the other, I will not detain the packet, or

give a trouble unnecessary to you by transcribing what you will of course see, more especially as there are some other matters of a very interesting kind in my letter, which Mr. Pitt will certainly communicate to you.

"I have only to add that I am gratefully sensible of your kindness in having so early and so fully apprized me of the new doubts which were arising. I have ventured to combat those doubts according to the sentiments which I really feel, and, therefore, you will receive what I say with indulgence. I hope that your Lordship will bring this matter to an early decision. It was in so fair a way of being concluded that it is quite a mortification to see it again precipitated down the stream.

"I enclose a few lines which I this moment receive from my worthy friend Van de Poll, and which will explain and exemplify some of the remarks which I have made to Mr. Pitt.

"I hope that the private letter which I have written on the subject of Ochzchow, and the possibility of a Baltic war, will obtain your perusal."

*Enclosed is a letter from JAN VAN DE POLL, on the subject of objections which had recently been urged against the proposed commercial treaty with England by a leading Member of the Dutch Government.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

Private.

1791, February 3, St. James's Square.—"I enclose to your Excellency a paper stating the particulars of the arrangement which has been adopted here for the disposal of the vacancies made on this establishment, by the promotion of those officers who are allowed to acquire rank from the independent companies. I have not thought it right to take any steps for receiving or signifying to your Excellency the King's commands respecting the adoption of any similar plan with respect to the vacancies created on the Irish Establishment by the same measure, till you have had an opportunity of considering the particulars of the proposed arrangement, and of stating to me your sentiments upon it. According to the list which I have seen (but for the accuracy of which I do not vouch) the whole number of lieutenantcies vacated by this measure on the Irish Establishment is 21, and of ensigncies 18. If the same regulation precisely was adopted there as in this country, 14 of the lieutenantcies and 15 of the ensigncies would be sold at the regulated price, and seven lieutenantcies and three ensigncies at the regulated difference.

"The object of this measure has been, as you will easily see, to diminish as much as possible the expence of the new levies, on an occasion in which they have not been wanted for actual service. You will best be enabled to judge, in the first instance, what are the best means of answering the same object by the arrangement to be adopted in Ireland, in such mode as may, at the same time, be most convenient and advantageous to the general purposes of Government there. I should be glad to hear from you as soon as possible on the subject, in order that the whole may be finally settled, and, in the meantime, you will of course not take any measures for recommending to any of the vacancies till the mode of filling them up is arranged."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

Private.

1791, February 3, St. James's Square.—"I have, according to your suggestion, sent the bill about Exchequer process to our lawyers,

with whom I conclude it will, according to custom, sleep for a considerable time to come. But unless the advantage is very clear, and the means very unexceptionable, I incline to think the idea had better be deferred till the next alarm of war, when it seems to come forward more naturally than in the moments of peace.

"Butler's memorial shall immediately be returned.

"You know enough of the Parliamentary business of this country to be well aware that it is not in my power to bring the Parliamentary business forwarder than it comes from other offices, however sincerely desirous I am of doing so, for the sake of Government here, as well as in Ireland. You may be assured that no endeavours of mine are or shall be wanting for that purpose. Still, however, it seems quite impossible to look to our having passed our Nootka Sound Bill so early as the beginning of March. All I think, therefore, that you can do on that subject is, to keep to the general assurances of my former despatch, adding that next Session will be time enough for the Irish Parliament to follow any Bill of ours, rather than to be kept sitting till June for that purpose; and this latter point would, I should think, be sufficiently popular with your country gentlemen.

"I have mentioned to the King what you have stated on the subject of O'Neill, and His Majesty has commanded me to say, that he is willing to rely entirely on this subject upon your judgment of the effect to be produced, with respect to his government in Ireland, by granting or refusing the request. The objection you state is certainly a strong one; but His Majesty would not consider it as unsurmountable, if, on a consideration of all the circumstances, you are of opinion that the giving this mark of favour would not produce a bad effect in Ireland, both as an impression of weakness, and as holding out encouragement to persons to go all lengths without apprehension of materially injuring their situation in any event. Of all this you are unquestionably the fittest judge, and must decide. There is nothing like personal objection to the character of Mr. O'Neil, which I represented to His Majesty to be, as I had always understood, respectable; and his situation in the country such as to make him, in that respect, a proper object of this mark of favour. Nor is there the least wish to mark personal resentment as against him for measures which are not supposed to have originated with him. You now know all that is felt on the subject, and the decision rests with yourself.

"I heartily wish that the question about English beer had not been stirred, especially at a period when there is so little leisure here to consider new points. I find the difficulties here are thought to be almost insuperable as to the two proposals you suggest, either of withdrawing the bounty here or agreeing to the imposition of any countervailing or protecting duty there. In truth it is not easy to find any reason for doing either of the two last on the subject of beer, which might not be used with equal force on that of any other manufacture which Ireland wished to establish as against Great Britain. It is perfectly evident that this cannot be necessary for the sole object of discouraging the sale of spirits, because this would best be done by making *all* beer cheap, whereas the measures now proposed are contrivances for making Irish beer cheap and English beer dear. The business has, however, as its importance required, been sent to the proper Offices for their reports upon it, previous to my writing to you any formal communication of His Majesty's pleasure. As soon as I receive their reports, no time shall be lost by me in writing to you upon it.

"I communicated to His Majesty, as I conceived you wished I should, your letter on the subject of General Pitt. From what the King has said to me upon it, I have no reason to believe that General Pitt has made any complaint in that quarter; and I can assure you that His Majesty, although very strongly, and I believe justly, impressed with General Pitt's merits as an officer, is by no means disposed to listen to anything prejudicial to the established claims of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. He at the same time expressed a very strong wish that measures of conciliation might be adopted; and particularly laid His commands upon me to exert myself to the utmost for that purpose. If I had heard, or should hear anything on the subject from General Pitt, I should certainly adopt that line to the utmost of my power; and I think that the tenor of your letter authorizes me to hope that you are not indisposed to meet the King's wishes in this respect."

*Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, February 5, Dublin Castle.—"The great length of time which has elapsed since the vacancies on this establishment by promotion to the English were known, and conceived were to be filled in the usual mode of recommendation, has, of course, produced numberless applications and engagements that would have been avoided if Sir George's plan had been sooner known here. I shall, therefore, submit to you that the recommending to the vacancies in the usual form would be the most advantageous and useful to the Irish Government, and relieve me from the embarrassments of engagements entered into upon the concurrent opinion of all military people, and the invariable practice of the Government of this country. However, if his Majesty wishes the contrary, I see no other objection to adopting nearly the plan you have adopted in England, and applying the money to the expences of the Irish Government in the levy for the war. I must, however, object to the recommendation of the colonels to the half-pay commissions, not seeing the least reason for the interference of those gentlemen. Have the goodness to tell me, as soon as convenient, what is your decision upon this subject.

"I wrote to you last year about Mr. Stewart, son of Londonderry. I am sorry to say that, in the only two divisions of this year, he has voted against us. The first most decidedly hostile, as it was for some ridiculous papers that the Opposition would not have divided upon, if the Speaker had not given the cry in their favour, and then they were compelled. The second hostile motion's upon the measure of the Lord Lieutenant (in dividing the Boards) bearing nearly similar date with his father's patent. You need not be told the bad effect of this conduct in the son of the almost only Irishman who received his Majesty's favour, without *rendering service*; and, as I conceive my Lord Camden ought to be responsible for this gentleman's conduct, pray make a terrible grievance to his Lordship about it. Perhaps if the ingratitude is handsomely stated, it may have an effect.

"Our supply will be finished before your sugar duties can possibly be laid; and, as the measure of adopting the corresponding duty is optional in the Irish Parliament, either in this or the next session, you need not hurry that business on our account."

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, February 6 [Stowe].—"I have many thanks to give you for all the anxiety which you so kindly express upon the subject which has failed, after our expectation had been so long flattered by our hopes for its success. I will not yet give up all idea that it will not ultimately succeed, but I own that I did not expect the great man to have refused the *douceur* annexed to the offer. After all, I have reaped one advantage in the proof it gives me of your affectionate interest in what concerns me, added to the many others which I have received from you; and, though I do not pretend to be at all indifferent to the question, yet I should be sorry that it should give you the trouble and uneasiness you express.

"The good people of Ireland seem to have run mad upon their plan of sobering themselves; and I need not detain your time by giving any reasons (you know them all) why no system whatsoever of that nature can operate in Ireland, where every penal statute upon distillery only operates as a *premium of which every rank from the highest to the lowest partake*. No one except Parnell ever appeared to me to conceive one-tenth part of the real difficulties of arranging the relative duties upon Irish spirits, foreign brandies, West Indian rums, malt English beer, and Irish beer, all of which form a most complicated question, even if you were certain that the laws would be enforced in any point where it was intended to check the consumption by raising by duties the price of the commodity which is intrinsically worth so little. But you must be aware that no measure of that sort ought to be taken without the fullest consideration of the effect to be produced upon the trade in those articles carried on by Ireland to our colonies and to this island itself. I must likewise earnestly entreat you to reconsider the determination taken by Government in Ireland not to impose your new temporary sugar duties, for it is certain that you will subject yourselves to the most serious difficulties if once you depart from Lord North's compact, to which they acceded, of equal duties upon colonial imports; and you are, I am sure, fully sensible of the particular advantages which Ireland would immediately derive from an import of sugars (now scandalously and fraudulently rated in Ireland) with a difference of 2s. 8d. per cwt. You will excuse all these observations. I am not fond of obtruding opinions, but they strike me so forcibly that I cannot withhold them from you.

"I wish likewise that Pitt should know that immense orders have been given to all our sugar trade from Hamburg, Riga, and in general from all Europe, upon the speculation of the French imports from Martinique and St. Domingo having *totally* failed; the prices offered are so enormous that they will force an immense export, and, consequently, by increasing the drawbacks, will proportionably decrease his revenue. Young tells me this from Bettesworth, who says that the orders are almost unlimited.

"Nepean has clearly the first claim upon your goodness; I shall therefore say nothing till I hear from you (or see you, which seems not impossible) again upon it, but I will thank you once more for your kindness."

*Postscript.*—"The hop question is simply this; England gives no drawback of excise duty upon hops exported to Ireland. This has been always promised, and ought to be done; the object is very trifling."

## THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, February 7, Dublin Castle.—“If you decide that the vacant commissions should be sold to defray part of our expence in the levy for the war, I should be glad if you would not strictly bind me in your instructions, after one promotion in each regiment, to take the lieutenants from half-pay; but let me recommend ensigns, which would be very useful in relieving me from some applications, do no injury to the regiments, as it must be indifferent to the ensigns whether the lieutenants are taken from the half-pay or ensigncies, and the half-pay has not had any considerable addition here.”

## THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, February 8, Dublin Castle.—“I am particularly happy in learning by your letter of 2nd that your business relative to Nootka and East India trade cannot come to us this year. I am decidedly with you in opinion that we had better confine ourselves to general assurances till the business is completely over and settled on your side the water; and have considerable pleasure in the reflection that no business from you will prolong our session, an event that might prove disagreeable.

“I should be very uneasy if anything stirred here should cause embarrassment in England. You will observe by the Parliamentary debates, that Government could not easily have avoided coinciding with the prevailing opinion of new modelling the duties on drink; I trust we shall *not* be *losers* in revenue. I troubled you with the despatch relative to the bounty, that I might be prepared with your opinion. Beresford collected from Rose that there would not be much objection. You will observe, by the enclosed intended proposal, that the English barrel of beer will have an advantage of ten pence (Irish money) over the Irish barrel; it has at present thirteen pence. In conformity to your wishes of not stirring the question, I mean not a word should be said upon the shilling bounty paid in England on the export of a barrel, but that it should be proposed to leave the import duty on English beer exactly as it now stands. By our silence perhaps the present duty may be continued without observation, whereas, if we should attempt to continue the preference of English beer over Irish beer thirteen pence, as it now is, by reducing the duty the proportional three pence, we should draw the attention of Opposition to that point. You must, I am convinced, see that it will be impossible in argument to resist them; and perhaps the clamour upon the injustice and absurdity of giving English beer a preference, at the time that our pretext is to encourage the Irish brewery, [may] make such a preference more unpopular and difficult than the thing is worth. I am in great hopes, as there is some difficulty in understanding the duties, that patriotism will be silent. I would recommend to the English brewers not to open their lips, for you must be sensible that the more the matter is discussed, the more difficulty will be found in making the proposed preference of ten pence on the English barrel; and should it be warmly contested, it will be too unreasonable to desire Parnel or Beresford to expose themselves, and to be abused, with the argument so plain against them, for such a trifle; and I am sure the proportioned duties on spirits



will fully make amends to the English brewers, by the increased consumption, for the diminished preference of three pence per barrel; or, if we should be compelled (which I trust we shall not), the full thirteen pence preference they enjoy at present."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, February 8, Hague.—"I fear that our indispensables will not do at Amsterdam, and that the second article with the words *directem ou indirectem*, and without the words *ports Hollandois ou ports neutres*, will prove the last feather which will break the back of this negotiation. It is so clear a point that French and Spanish sugars are arriving at this hour, and at all times, both in the Maes and in Texel, from the Dutch islands, that the ill-disposed party at Amsterdam (which is not inconsiderable) will insist with success that we go beyond our own principle. And though it may be answered that, by the recital of that principle in the same article, we moderate its rigour, because the cases which may arise must be construed conformably to it, merchants, and particularly Dutch merchants, are not open to reason and to conviction. I will, however, plague you no farther on points with which I have already interrupted you too much. I will do the best that I can, and, if the business fails, we shall at least retain the consciousness of having spared no pains that might make it succeed.

"I do not know what turn to give to the entire omission of the 16th article. If we refuse to say anything on that subject, for the settlement of which the commissaries were specifically appointed, we shall be accused of deviating entirely from the promise alleged to have been given in the Treaty of Alliance. And, in truth, I doubt whether the article proposed by me was meant to be received by the Dutch in a more favourable sense for themselves than the words import. They contend strenuously for a right to exclude us from all commerce with the islands in which they have any actual establishment or possession, and I do not know that we make any claim to the contrary; but they do not, so far as I can trace, (and particularly since the late Spanish dispute) flatter themselves that we shall be brought to abstain from commerce with the inhabitants of unsettled islands.

"Here therefore arises another difficulty which I can hardly expect to surmount.

"I am more anxious at this moment about the Russian question than about any other. I am fully convinced that if we could honourably compromise that business by some qualified cession of Ockzakow, it would be the best result. Every despatch from Berlin bring some new proof that our ally has no appetite towards it; and now we are informed from that quarter that ships of war cannot go within five miles of Riga. It is possible that we shall hear of some peace between Prince Potemkin and the Turks before the critical month arrives; if the conditions were moderate I should be heartily glad of it."

"Since writing the above I have received a letter from the Grand Pensionary on the last changes in the commercial *projet*. Mr. Burges will lay it before your Lordship; it differs little from what I have said, and does not encourage me to proceed farther."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, February 13, Hague.—"I torment my own understanding and the superior understanding of the Pensionary to no purpose on the

subject of our *ultimate projet*. There is not a probability of its success in its present form ; and I am reduced to discussions of the best means of breaking off the negotiation, which, when broken off, will leave the whole system of the alliance loose and disjointed. And yet I sometimes think that if I may be at liberty to insert the two words marked in the margin of the enclosed paper, I could perhaps maintain the 2nd article ; without some qualifying words of that sort it is utterly impossible. The influence of our friends in the Republic would be irreparably lost, if they gave their support to an article which stipulates 'that *bonâ fide* Dutch property shall not be brought from Dutch ports in the islands to Dutch ports in Europe.'

"We never at any period carried the exercise of our pretensions on this subject to such a length ; and, in 1759, and on many subsequent occasions, Sir Joseph Yorke offered *projets* far short of what I think it possible to carry, and they were rejected without hesitation.

"There would still remain the stipulation as to the Spice Islands. The two principal objects of this negotiation founded on the Treaties of Peace and Alliance were *the restoration of Negapatnam, and the explanation of our pretensions in the Eastern seas*. I have withdrawn the first because nothing has been offered that we think an equivalent ; and we withdraw the second, because (in plain truth) we do not know how to form an article which would not say both too much and too little. That reason, however, though very good in a private correspondence, will not prevent great clamours among the *frondeurs* at Amsterdam ; and the Pensionary even fears that a sort of consternation will arise, as if our silence meant to imply distant views of establishing ourselves in the Archipelago among the Spice Islands. Still, however, I think, although there will be a cry against our good faith in not bringing forward some stipulation on this point, that I could fight the battle with a chance of success if the alternative above proposed could be made in the second article.

"The messenger who carries this letter carries Mr. Drake's despatch from Copenhagen, the purport of which your Lordship will collect from the enclosed note, which you will be so good as to burn after perusing it.

"I understand that the Emperor has ordered the officers of his army not to dispose of their camp equipages. I should have little faith in his pacific sentiments if the King of Prussia should become involved in the embarrassments of a war with Russia."

*Two enclosures.*

#### THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, February 15, Naples.—"This letter (if it reaches you at all) will be delivered by the captain of the ship who brings a box for you and another for Pitt ; you must send for your boxes to Messrs. Nesbitt and Stewart, Aldermanbury.

"At my second visit to Virgil's tomb, I found a bay tree (really and truly) growing on the top of the sepulchre. I have been twaddling enough to cut off several slips from this most sacred *laurus*, and I send them in the enclosed paper. Plant them just as they are, either at your own villa, if you have bought one yet, or at Holwood, in some beautiful and well-sheltered spot, with some *grat* inscription. Do not build the temple until I come over. If I do not find my bays growing, I shall despise your skill as a planter, and decide that you are only fit to wield *the rude axe with heaved stroke, and the nymphs to daunt* . . . ;

see the *Penseroso*. I know you are a famous wood-cutter, when your own leg does not happen to be in the way; now let me see how well you can plant."

LORD GRENVILLE to R. HOBART.

Most private.

1791, February 15, St. James's Square.—"In addition to what I have said in my letter to the Lord Lieutenant on the subject of Mr. Stewart [afterwards Lord Castlereagh], I am desired to mention to *you* particularly, that at the beginning of the session he had expressed himself much pleased with some attention of yours, and that his friends are persuaded that you might contribute very much to fix him in the right way.

"I am told that I am to congratulate you on the very great effect and impression of your speech in answer to Grattan. I hope you believe that it is not *pro forma* only that I assure you of the sincere pleasure which it gives me to do so."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

1791, February 16, St. James's Square.—"I send your Excellency by this post a public letter desiring you to state a plan for filling up the Irish vacancies. We think you deal a little Jewishly with us in proposing to apply the money to the general expences of the armament in Ireland, instead of applying it, as it ought to be in common justice applied, to the expence incurred on account of *this mode of levy* by Great Britain, who alone has been put to any expence on that account. I understand the whole will not amount to above 13,000*l.*, which is certainly not a sum for two such countries as Great Britain and Ireland, or even for their Governments, to squabble about. But unless you really think it material for any reason which I am ignorant of, I freely own that I think that part of the proposal very unreasonable, and untenable in argument, if anybody here should ever think it worth his while to argue about it.

"I have the strongest assurances from Mr. Stewart's connections of his real desire to give support, where he can do it consistently with the engagements into which his contest forced him. As long as he professes this intention, and I really believe he has it, you will probably think it worth while to pay him some attention, notwithstanding occasional opposition.

"I see no inconvenience which can arise from the postponing the sugar duties to another year; but I take it for granted you will lose no time in passing those on foreign spirits, which seem indeed to accord with your plan of making Ireland sober.

"With respect to the proposal in your letter of the 7th, it seems liable to this objection, that it does away one part of the intended economy which was meant to arise from the reduction of the half-pay list. In truth, the whole of this arrangement here was calculated upon a notion of being able to prove in the House of Commons that the last levy was as remarkable for its cheapness as for its unprecedented rapidity. In my own private opinion, I am inclined to think that it might have been safely rested on the latter ground, without infringing upon the usual

practice of the army by regulations the detail of which, and their merit in point of economy, I believe even Pitt's eloquence will never get the House of Commons to understand. The whole consideration for you seems to be how far it is advisable for Government in Ireland to stand the imputation of deviating, without sufficient reason, from the example of economy set you here.

"With respect to the question of the beer duties, I have not yet had any answer from the Treasury, to whom I referred your letter. If you can continue the present import duty on English beer, without adverting to the bounty, I, as an individual, do not think that any great harm will be done, though I am not authorized to say so officially, or on the part of others; but I fairly own to you that I think it absolutely necessary for you to resist the idea of laying on any additional duty, or stipulating for our taking off the bounty. You will observe, first, that our bounty is not constant, but is only paid when a bounty is also paid on the export of barley, which is the raw material. And, secondly, that it is a bounty in the nature of a drawback, but by no means a complete drawback, of the duties paid here. And, therefore, that nothing can be more unfair or incorrect than to suppose that the bounty operates as a preference *pro tanto* in favour of English beer over Irish. If our brewers were to make up a similar account to that which you sent me, they would state more justly the whole amount of duty paid by them here, and the difference between the bounty and the import duty, as opposed to the 3s. 10d. to be paid in Ireland on Irish beer; and the balance would certainly be much in favour of Irish beer. I hope, however, these questions will not be stirred, and, if the import duty is not augmented, nor the bounty discontinued, I think our people will be wise enough to be silent."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF LEEDS.

1791, February 20, St. James's Square.—"Mr. Napean has communicated to me a letter which he has received from Mr. Burges, informing him, by your Grace's desire, that Mr. Erskine has assured your Grace that the Prince of Wales has no desire to keep Walter the printer any longer in prison, and that he has no objection to his being released, and adding that your Grace wished that this should be imparted to me.

"Your Grace must, I am sure, be sensible of the impossibility of my laying a communication of this nature before His Majesty, as any ground for inducing His Majesty to consent to a further extension of mercy in this case, or even as a statement of His Royal Highness's sentiments upon it, I having no command from his Royal Highness for that purpose; and it not being stated by Mr. Burges that such commands have been signified either to Mr. Erskine, or through him to your Grace.

"When I submitted to the King the circumstances which induced me humbly to advise His Majesty to remit that part of Walter's sentence which condemned him to stand in the pillory, His Majesty, in consenting to that application, was pleased to tell me that it was not his intention to grant any further remission of the sentence. But if their Royal Highnesses the Prince of Wales, the Duke of York, or the Duke of Clarence, to all of whom as I recollect the papers in question related, should condescend to authorise any person to signify their wishes for a

further extension of mercy, it would certainly, in such case, become my duty to lay this circumstance before His Majesty, and to receive His Majesty's further pleasure on the subject."

*Copy.*

R. HOBART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, February 22, Dublin Castle.—"I had the honour yesterday of receiving your letter on the subject of Mr. Stewart, and should have been extremely happy to have found myself enabled to confirm those sentiments which you seem to entertain respecting that gentleman; and should have felt a real pleasure in contributing to fix in the *right way* a young man, certainly of talents, and of very pleasing manners. But, let the representation of his conduct and political sentiments made to you be what it may, take my word for it he is a decided enemy of the King's Government in *Ireland*; and perhaps a more dangerous one from the circumstance of his English political connections being such as to warrant his *professing* himself a warm friend to Mr. Pitt's administration in England.

"There were points upon which the disagreeable contest in which he was engaged had pledged him. Upon those subjects I always conceived he *must* vote against us; and he did so, without *opening his lips*. Upon the East India business he was not pledged; but he, nevertheless, thought proper not only to vote, but, on both occasions, to speak at large upon the business; and, on the first question, accompanied his vote by a long panegyric on Mr. Pitt. This conduct needs no comment.

"I have written fully to Nepean on the subject of the East India business, and must take the liberty of referring you to that letter. I have little to add, except that Grattan is determined to use every effort to inflame the public upon it, and it is difficult for any man to foresee what turn the potatoe may take. As we are totally ignorant of your intentions upon that subject, it is impossible for us to form any opinion as to the result; but I am inclined to think that anything that is reasonable can be carried. The general impression, both with friends and foes, is that Ireland has something to give up, and that her interest should be considered in the arrangement.

"I am thankful to you for your kind expressions with regard to myself; your account must have come from a most sanguine friend.

"Will you have the goodness to sound Pole respecting his interest in the Queen's county in case of a new election, which is most probable. His determination would, as I am informed, be decisive."

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, February 24, Dublin Castle.—"Hobart's letter and the account of debates were so full that it seemed unnecessary for me to trouble you by the same post; uninformed of Pitt's plan, I thought it my duty to take the broadest ground that could be maintained. The power of British laws to defend the India Company's monopoly either on this or the other side the Capes could not be hinted at. The attempt to support the India Company's monopoly by the construction of general words in Yelverton's law was given up even by the Chancellor, and such an argument would necessarily have produced a bill to explain; and, if the trade was only restricted by *Irish* laws, it seemed of no import

whether by Yelverton's or any other *Irish* law. I, therefore, recommended to object to Mr. Grattan's committee, on the small value of the trade to Ireland, the injury it might do to England; and that as little light or hopes might be thrown out as possible, that the public mind might not be affected by present expectation or future disappointment. It was not very easy to induce our friends to hold boldly the language, as many of them think that it is a very delicate point to England, upon which if they stand they may either get a share of the trade or negotiate it for something very considerable. I think it right to give you this hint of our interior politics, not that I see anything alarming at present, and everybody we desired spoke boldly and handsomely. It is the last desperate point of patriotism on which they hope to raise the public clamour. I do not see at present any symptoms of their success, and only one thing a little unpleasant has occurred since, which have the goodness to keep to yourself. Latouche—who, you know, is a very respectable man—seems resolved to quit Government upon this subject unless we can make him see the truth. I hope no others will follow his example, and I think their proposal to repeal the revenue clause restricting the import of teas, is so violent a measure that they must be silent for the remainder of the year.

“I hope our Money Bills will be through the Commons on Tuesday; to-morrow we must vote finally the hop duty and British beer. On the last I daresay not a word will be said, as the same duty is continued. With respect to the hops, Sir J. Parnell and everybody here declare the English Government had given their consent to your brother, and that Sir John was instructed to move for the admission of foreign hops under a duty; but, as I have not heard from you, I will endeavour that such a duty shall be laid as will give the preference to the English hops.

“I have no hopes of Mr. Stewart; he uniformly votes against us; and declaration of good wishes to Mr. Pitt's Government is more injurious, as you know opposition with pretended unwillingness is worse than decided. Really Lord Camden, a member of the English Cabinet, should prevent a family for whom he has obtained favours, and over whom he is considered by everybody to have an influence, from supporting questions extremely injurious to English connexion; but I am afraid it will be of no use in you to speak or me to write about it, and we must both submit to what we can't help. Mr. Stewart seems a promising young man, and, if he should turn out able, may hereafter speak with effect the sentiments of the North.

“Mr. Rose has signified some wishes of Pitt that Mr. Henniker should succeed Major Allen of 5th Dragoons. I told Pitt, if he wished it, I should be ready to give my assistance; but, upon considering the matter, I think it very objectionable, and I wish you would talk to him; for I am afraid the King will, with some reason indeed, object, and, at all events, you must take His Majesty's pleasure first. Mr. Henniker has been in the army about five years, two of those in a disbanded regiment; has no experience of military business. The army here will be much dissatisfied as we have several old majors only with troops. I cannot conceive there can be any interest in England in his favour worth breaking this arrangement to the King, especially after my late correspondence with you on military subjects. The officers of 5th Dragoons decline the purchase. There is, of course, no regimental difficulties. I think there is great difficulty in your commission business; I will trouble you [with it] as soon as possible.

"I am very sensible of your confidence respecting O'Niel, but I do not think I shall make use of your powers."

G. BOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret.

1791, March 3, Philadelphia.—"The blank in the ninth page of the Appendix, after the words American Commerce, may be filled up as follows:—'As well as in a higher quarter, that, in short, the K[ing] is 'much opposed to it, but that the Q[ueen] is more favourably inclined 'to the measure, as well as Mr. Pitt himself.'"

*Nota Bene.*—"Such are Mr. Morris' opinions and communications; and they have weight in this country."

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, March 4, Dublin Castle.—"I delayed to the last moment the Bill for the admission of foreign hops; it has at last been obliged to go to the Lords. I conclude, as you have not sent any answer, that it is of no importance. We have laid double duty, and I will endeavour by regulation not to admit foreign hops except when English hops are at certain prices. We should have incurred a great deal of odium if I had attempted to reject the measure.

"The election committees have very much, and still continue, to delay our business; I expect, however, to dispatch all the Money Bills on Saturday. Pray expedite them, for they expire on 25th of March; there is not a day to spare. Ponsonby has not yet brought in his Bill for repeal of revenue clause restricting the admission of teas except from Great Britain, but he threatens us with it next week; the proposal is so violent, I hardly think he will venture that precise question, in whatever other shape he may choose to find an opportunity of making orations."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

1791, March 4, St. James's Square.—"By the event of the motion on the East India trade, I am inclined to hope that it will not be easy to raise real discontent on that subject; and I am sensible that, even amongst the supporters of Government, there sometimes exists a disposition not to lessen the impression of difficulties which they are to resist. As a new arrangement of the East India Company's charter must be made next year, it does not seem to me material on what ground the stand was made for the present year; although I differ most entirely with the interpretation now given, and am confident and *certain* that it was differently understood when Yelverton's Act passed. Our own opinion with respect to the measure to be adopted next year is by no means formed. I take it for granted that Hobart will be in England in the course of the summer, when the whole may, and must be, distinctly considered as it relates to Ireland; it being of the utmost importance that we should not propose anything here on the subject which we are not pretty certain of carrying in Ireland. I had some conversation with Parnell about it, and he will state to you, and I have no doubt will state fairly, what passed between us. But, for God's sake, discourage among any people who call themselves friends to English Government, the idea that anything can be got to Ireland by

way of bargain on this subject. We could not propose such an idea here, nor would we if we could. Whatever advantages Ireland has asked, she has got upon the liberal and enlarged principle that facility to Ireland in point of commerce was beneficial to this country. But if there is one mode more certain than another of reviving prejudices and jealousies between the two countries, it would be the principle of transacting this business by way of bargain. In truth, I know not what Ireland has to ask or gain beyond what she has ; but, whatever it is, it neither can nor will be given as a price for her consenting not to overthrow the system on which the East India possessions of this country rest. I must earnestly beg you to omit no opportunity of holding this language firmly and decisively. In the particular measure to be adopted on the subject, every reasonable degree of attention will be given to the just interests and even the prejudices of Ireland. But we should betray our trust if we were to hear for a moment of Ireland's *selling* to this country an acquiescence by which she loses nothing.

"I know nothing, and can learn nothing, of any former proceeding about hops, and the bringing these questions forward at a time when every public office here is entirely occupied in the business of our own Parliament, makes it impossible for me to transmit to you public opinions upon them. I can therefore only hope and trust that whatever you are compelled to do will be done cautiously, as I am persuaded it will.

"I am sorry you think Stewart decidedly hostile, as he seems to me a young man of considerable talents, but I am afraid nothing more can be done about it.

"I have not yet been able to speak to Pitt about Henniker, but I will in the course of a day or two."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, March 5, Hague.—"This letter will go by the messenger who carries the answer from Sweden, and sundry despatches from Copenhagen. The sum total of our position in regard to those two Courts is, that we have nothing to expect from the Danish Ministry, which is decidedly devoted to Russia ; and that Sweden, unless previously purchased by the Empress, would incline to undertake one campaign upon payment of one million and a half sterling, and sundry other advances, presents, guaranties of Turkish subsidies, and continued subsidies, which in reason cannot be estimated at less than another million and a half. In plain truth this business has for some time appeared to me to beckon us towards an abyss of debts and difficulties, at a moment of general fermentation in the world, when it appears essential, possibly to the very existence of our Government and of every other civilized State, that we should maintain our own internal peace, and the uninterrupted course of our prosperity.

"I have, perhaps, too often harped on this string, which I have little pretension to touch ; but the subject affects me so far that it carries me above delicacies which, on other occasions, would have restrained me ; and I have collected with concern from your silence, and from the silence of Mr. Pitt, in answer to all that I have written, that my sentiments and those of the Grand Pensionary have not the good fortune to be approved by you. I continue to think, however, that the best mode would have been to have sent some person of weight with powers and propositions



to have adjusted the business on condition of demolishing Ockzakow ; still accompanying that step, if it had been thought necessary for our dignity, with some display of preparations both towards the Baltic and the Archipelago.

"Permit me to add one word on a point which more immediately concerns me ; and to entreat your perusal of the papers which I transmitted yesterday on the subject of the treaty of commerce. I have brought it to the verge of conclusion, if Mr. Pitt can bestow one hour's consideration on it ; and I really think that it would be a substantial and most beneficial work.

"Have the goodness to burn the enclosed scrap which I have this moment received."

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, March 7, Dublin Castle.—"The public letter will inform you what is the real sentiment here relative to the sale of the commissions. The money is too trifling for either Government to write a syllable about, I am sure not worth the harangues it would produce. I do not believe we differ much in opinion about the measure. I am convinced the public and the Government would have received more benefit in England by the encouragement and favour to the army by the promotions, than by the cash ; and, independent of the convenience to the Irish Government of disposing of the commissions, the principle of favour to the Irish army is stronger, as there was no promotion upon this establishment, and I should be very glad to obtain the promotion for them to the lieutenancies. If the King gives the promotion to the army, I should certainly have several ensigncies sold to relieve the adjutantcies ; a measure, I believe, much desired by his Majesty, and certainly very useful to the army. I shall submit very cheerfully to his Majesty's direction upon this subject, and am very sorry it seems to me advisable not to concur in your first plan.

"Now the Bills are passed, I may venture to say that I think we have outwitted Mr. Grattan most completely, and shall have to thank him for some additional cash to the Treasury ; pray don't let anybody say so, however.

"On Saturday I got a hint, which I instantly communicated to Pitt, that the lower Irish Catholics were resolved to demand further privileges ; that Lord Kenmare had endeavoured to stop them without effect ; but that Lord Kenmare and the superior Catholics expect to obtain further privileges, which they understand the Catholics are to be given in England by the agitation of that question in England, and by his Majesty's kindness. I would not pretend to speak upon so important a point without much consultation ; the general opinion of the Protestants here certainly is that the Catholics cannot be entrusted with further privileges. I have hinted what I had heard to Lord Chancellor only, who told me, *coute qui coute*, the Catholics' application must be resisted for further indulgence. It would not be right to make public this opinion for fear the Catholics should resent it. It may perhaps be difficult to resist here what is given to the Catholics in England, however politic or impolitic, upon the comparative strength of the professors, such indulgence may be ; I would, therefore, merely remind you of us whenever the Catholic subject is in debate. There have been private meetings, riots, and some cruelties by the Catholics, both North and South : nothing alarming ; at the same time it is not easy to tell how far the contagion extends. The Dissenters certainly have manifested

an inclination to join the Catholics; by the last accounts I gave you the Catholics had not agreed with them, and I have heard nothing on that subject since.

"Mr. Ponsonby brings on the India Question to-day; I hope the last decision met with your approbation."

#### R. HOBART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, March 8, Dublin Castle.—"Mr. G. Ponsonby moved last night for a committee to consider the laws which had passed in this country relative to the East India trade. I shall beg leave to refer you to the official letter to Nepean for the substance of the debate. I wish, however, to apprise you that the impression hitherto is with us. The country has not yet been made to feel the question, and as we have, not without difficulty, been able to prevail on our friends to meet it boldly, I do not much apprehend mischief from its discussion.

"The most material circumstance was Mr. Latouche's speaking, and voting against us; but I do not think his doing so had any evident effect. He told me some days before that he should, but, at the same time, he mentioned that although upon the police question and that of last night he should oppose, I was not on that account to consider him inimical to Government. Mr. Stewart continues uniform in his encomiums on the English Administration, and equally consistent in his opposition to us."

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, March 12, Dublin Castle.—"The Catholics of Ireland have desired to wait upon Mr. Hobart with their petition to Parliament for a removal of the legal restraints they lie under, and to request the support of Government in their favour. I have not seen their petition. In these times of general toleration and innovation it is not easy to foretell the effects of such an application, but the Irish Senate does not seem a very favourable ground for them. I trust, before their petition can be presented, to hear from you what indulgence will be given to the Catholics in England."

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, March 14, Dublin Castle.—"I have enclosed to you the resolves of the committee and petition of Roman Catholics. Lord Kenmare and Lord Fingal altered their intentions, and came with the deputation. Their desire seems that Government should interfere in their favour; I should think it is to be wished that Government should appear to take as little part as possible. The general opinion seems not to concede anything further to the Catholics. I should therefore imagine their prayer would be negatived in the House of Commons without Government's appearing to interfere much. I will endeavour to avoid saying anything in the answer to be returned them. The session is so far advanced that the business can hardly be much discussed this year; however, you will suppose I am very anxious to know what you mean to do in England. Mr. Ponsonby has expressed himself much dissatisfied with Mr. Fox's language.

"I cannot say what construction some persons might have put on Yelverton's law at the time it passed, but I cannot discover the trace of such a construction by any of the King's law servants, and no one of the King's law servants would maintain such an opinion at present. If you refer to the Irish debates you will find the India trade argued on the revenue law over and over again. I am sure if Government could not support the revenue law they could not support such a construction of Yelverton's.

"Having never received any directions from you, and imagining that you had not fixed any plan on the India business, I have cautiously avoided giving any other idea than that the India trade was of the utmost importance to England, and Ireland ought not to form expectations. Negotiating something for it is certainly very prevalent in the minds of many. I shall endeavour to throw out every objection to such talk. I thought it necessary you should have a hint of these opinions to enable you better to judge upon the subject. The judgment of the manner in which the point has been debated has been that the debate was very favourable to English Government, but very bad for Ireland. I am happy in assuring you that, let the business have been argued any other way, the country could not have entertained less expectations from the expiration of the Company's charter, nor be in a calmer temper than it is at present on the consideration of the subject."

*Copies of a Report of the Catholic Committee, and a Petition of the Catholics of Ireland, are enclosed.*

**THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.**

Private.

1791, March 19th, Dublin Castle.—"I have sent by the messenger the resolves of the House of Lords on Mr. Butler's claim to the Ormond title; if you would return his Majesty's answer speedily, that the writ for the Earldom may be issued during the session, the family would be very considerably gratified."

**LORD GRENVILLE TO THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND.**

1791, March 24, St. James's Square.—"I this morning received yours of the 19th instant, and have given directions for expediting the answer about Mr. Butler without delay.

"Lord Arden has desired me to mention to you his request in favour of a Mr. Purcell, Rector of Castletown Roche in the county of Cork, and who is soliciting the Deanery of Lismore."

"With respect to the Catholics, that business seems to me to be put by you exactly on its right footing. I by no means think that the consideration of what is doing here ought to influence Government in Ireland, because I have ever held the whole of that question to be matter of expediency, not of right, except as far as relates to toleration only, strictly so called. It does not by any means follow that what is right and expedient to be done here will be expedient to be done in Ireland under circumstances so extremely different. It seems by no means settled as yet what we shall do here. I enclose you Mitford's Bill, as it was brought in. Fox is to move to extend the provisions of it to all Catholics. How this will be received it is impossible to tell, and on this subject the wish of Government must be to follow the general and public opinion.

"I am extremely happy in the manner in which the East India discussion has ended for this year in Ireland. Our plan is as yet by no means fixed, and, long before it is so, I shall probably have an opportunity to converse with Hobart upon it. Our India Company are full of all sorts of difficulties about our proposals relative to the trade to the North-west Coast of America; and I have some doubt whether we shall not be obliged to postpone it, so as to let the whole come together.

"I will send you in a few days an official answer about the military arrangement, but I have been so hurried for the last ten days that I have not been able to receive the King's pleasure upon it yet.

"I have received from the Secretary at War the transmission of a complaint made to him by a Major Montgomery of the 12th against Lieutenant-Colonel Kay, Major of that regiment, for offering his majority to sale at more than the regulated price. This comes in so formal a manner that it cannot be passed over, although I fear the practice is too common. I have not yet absolutely decided what to do upon it, but I think I must send it officially to you with the King's orders to institute such an enquiry as must terminate in the dismissal of Kay, if the fact turns out such as it is represented.

*Copy.*

"Let me hint to you *quite confidentially* that it is by no means improbable that we may very soon have another armament with a view to force the Empress of Russia to reasonable terms of peace. But I think we shall not make any call upon you for assistance, unless we should be actually engaged in war."

*Holograph copy.*

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, March 29, Dublin Castle.—"I received yours of 24th and 26th; hope you will be able to settle your business as fortunately with the Empress as with the Spaniards; trust we shall be able to answer your calls when necessary. The communication of your dispatch relative to the trade to North-west Coast of America not appearing absolutely necessary has not been mentioned in Parliament, and signified to a very few confidential persons.

"The Roman Catholics have not yet presented their petition. I doubt much if they will, unless the appearance of hostilities should encourage them. They wished Mr. O'Neil to present their petition; he had agreed, but, on conference with the Speaker, he declined. The granting further privileges is a point of expediency in both countries; I would only bring to your consideration when these points may be in debate how the Government in Ireland will be able to resist the claims of the Irish Catholics, however inexpedient in Ireland, to those privileges which are given to their English brethren, though the concession may be expedient in England considered by herself without reference to Ireland. Mitford's Bill does not seem to give more privileges to the English protesting Catholics than all Catholics at present enjoy in Ireland; except that, I suspect, it repeals the statutes forbidding them having arms; but I am not at present master of the subject.

"I am in hopes our business in the Commons will close on Thursday or Friday next."

GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, March 30, Windsor.—"The division in the House of Lords transmitted by Lord Grenville must give confidence abroad from shewing

the support given to the measure of augmenting the Navy, but I do not expect it will bring the Empress of Russia to view her situation with the temper necessary to make her acquiesce to the propositions which, in reality, would tend towards reinstating her finances."

**The EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.**

Private.

1791, April 2, Dublin Castle.—"The business of the Irish session will be concluded on Thursday next, by that day fortnight the Bills will probably be returned, and the Parliament, if you approve, may be prorogued, and need certainly not meet again for the purposes of Irish Government till the usual time next year. The continuance of our session to wait the events of negotiation would be very disagreeable on many accounts, as well as on account of the new sugar duties, which must be laid, if the session should be much prolonged, or whenever the Parliament meets again, and will be a business of some length. As the decision of war or peace with you does not seem very near, or easy of conjecture, I would take the liberty of suggesting to your consideration whether, if in any event you mean to call on Ireland previous to the usual time of the Irish meeting, it might not be expedient now to take a vote of credit for nearly the same amount and for the same services as last year. I should have the option of making use of the money or no as you would direct. I am satisfied it would be granted, in our present strength and temper, without difficulty. This is perhaps more advisable than to leave us to the chance of what alteration may be made in the Parliament by war or other accidents, or to the necessity of calling it at an injudicious time.

"If this should be your opinion, I should imagine a communication of state of affairs ever so loose, would authorize me to get a vote of credit. Much objection would probably not be made upon a verbal assurance that the money should not be applied to the current service of the year, but to the same extraordinary expences as during the last armament. Have the goodness not to detain this messenger with the Bills, as another will be dispatched Monday or Tuesday, but send him back with your directions upon this subject, as I wish not to keep the Parliament sitting, and it would be proper to circulate our intentions of moving a vote of credit, if such should be your determination, for a few days.

"I have nothing but the thread-bare Irish topics for my Speech, which I will transmit to you in a day or two."

**The EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.**

Private.

1791, April 6, Dublin Castle.—"Your public letter of 2nd which arrived yesterday seems to have anticipated my private one of the same date. As it is the determination of his Majesty's Ministers not to call upon Ireland, it is most advisable to insert his Majesty's communication in a paragraph in the Speech. Your message would not be thought sufficiently full to demand a vote of credit, and making your politics a subject of discussion in the Irish Parliament without getting money and assistance does not seem in any degree worth while or to answer any good purpose.

"I shall therefore communicate his Majesty's information in a paragraph of the Speech at the close of the session, which I hope may be

about Thursday fortnight; as our business is completely over, and we have only to wait the return of the Bills. Pray do not let them be delayed."

LORD GREENVILLE TO EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

Separate and private.

1791, April 6, St. James's Square.—"I have sent by this post the papers to which I alluded, with a sort of ostensible though not official letter. If the fact turns out to be as stated, it is absolutely necessary to take some step upon it, but as it is, I believe, the first instance which has occurred of any formal complaint upon the subject, it may perhaps be sufficient if you send over an application to his Majesty for his orders to oblige Lieutenant-Colonel Kay to sell to Montgomery at the regulated price. Of this however you will judge."

*Copy.*

JOSEPH EWART to [W. PITT].

*Observations* on the nature of the connection which has hitherto subsisted between Great Britain and Russia, and on their relative situation with regard to other Powers.

1791, April [London].—"From the first intercourse being established between Russia and the other Powers of Europe, Great Britain having always taken about three-fourths of the production of that country, and furnished the necessary advances for raising them, naturally enjoyed considerable advantages of trade, which were continued, under different degrees of favour, till the expiration of the treaty of commerce in the year 1766.

"The Court of Petersburg then proposed various restrictions, and the treaty concluded by Lord Macartney secured no real advantage to this country beyond that of the British merchants settled at Petersburg being exempted from paying the duties in dollars, a privilege which has since been granted to almost all other nations. Some other advantages were stipulated for in that treaty, but were never carried into effect; and, since that period, all the manufactures and merchandise of this country have paid very high duties in Russia; so that the balance remitted to Petersburg in money has always been increasing.

"The political influence of Great Britain in Russia, founded chiefly on the importance of its commerce, was long very great; and it is an undoubted fact, that from the year 1764 down to 1777, this country might have formed a defensive alliance, of the most eligible nature, with Russia and Prussia, to which one of the inferior Baltic Powers and Holland would have acceded; and the advantages which might have been derived from such a powerful system, during the last war, are evident. But, from the Peace of 1763 till 1782, the only attention paid to foreign politics by the Government of this country consisted, 1st, in fruitlessly soliciting the alliance of Austria, (for all our overtures were invariably rejected, and the intimate connection with France openly avowed); and 2nd, in employing our influence at Petersburg, not for any benefit to ourselves, but solely with a view to overturn that of the King of Prussia; though it was well known at the time that a formal alliance, of the most intimate nature, subsisted between him and the Empress, and that he governed that country as much as his own, through the means of Count Panin, from the year 1764 to 1778.

"At the last-mentioned period, the contest between England and Prussia at Petersburg, avowedly provoked by the former, produced the natural effect of destroying the political influence of both, and made it easy for the Emperor to supplant them; the consequences of which soon appeared.

"During the war between Russia and the Porte, which was terminated by the Peace of Kainardgi, Prussia, as an ally, furnished every assistance to Russia; and Great Britain, to the astonishment of all Europe, gratuitously gave Russia officers, seamen, shipbuilders, and every assistance to enable her to equip a considerable naval force; and it is certain that the fleet which sailed to the Archipelago could never have reached its destination had it not been fitted out and supplied with everything in our ports.

"Many of our officers, seamen, and shipbuilders have been employed since that period, both in the Baltic and Black Sea, in creating a new maritime Power in Europe.

"No alliance subsisted between Great Britain and Russia during the period that has been referred to. In the year 1779, however, a negotiation was set on foot, in order to have the assistance of a Russian squadron. But, after the English Minister at Petersburg had obtained a direct assurance from the Empress herself that the squadron then ready should immediately proceed to join the fleet at Spithead, instead of this being done, that very armament was made the basis, and constituted in fact the only effective force of the armed neutrality that was avowedly directed against this country, to add to the misfortunes with which it was then overpowered. It is here to be observed that the late King of Prussia, so far from being the author of this maritime league, repeatedly rejected the proposals for his accession, made to him by the Empress of Russia; excusing himself always on the principle that, not having a single ship of war, he could take no part in it. Nor did he accede till he saw that there was no danger of his being committed by it.

"During the period from the year 1779 to 1782, the plan for driving the Turks out of Europe was arranged between the Empress of Russia and the late Emperor; and its execution would have been attempted in the spring of 1783 had the Peace of Paris not been concluded.

"Upon the change of Administration in 1782, overtures were immediately made to the late King of Prussia, with a view to make him employ his good offices for effecting a peace; and a defensive alliance was, at the same time, proposed to him; but general polite assurances were the only result of this negotiation. One of the first objects of the new Administration in 1783 was to renew the proposals of alliance to the King of Prussia, and to endeavour to interest him in the affairs of Holland. His answer was, that he would enter into both measures, provided the alliance of Russia could be, at the same time, secured. And it is proper here to observe that the accession of Russia was not considered, on the two occasions above mentioned, as necessary for the formation of the alliance by the Administration of this country, but it was proposed to close with Prussia alone, with a view to counteract the influence of France in Holland, to accomplish which Russia could be of no service.

"In the summer of 1783, after the Empress of Russia had taken possession of the Crimea, for making the Porte cede which the influence of Great Britain was exerted in favour of Russia, and that the Emperor was preparing to co-operate with her, in order to execute their original plan for the conquest and partition of Turkey in Europe, the Court of

France made a remonstrance to that of Vienna; and, about the same time, made an overture to this country, to know if it would allow the Turks to be crushed. Both applications having been equally unsuccessful, Monsieur de Vergennes first encouraged the Emperor to undertake to open the navigation of the Scheld, and, finding that met with so much difficulty, suggested the plan for the exchange of the Netherlands against Bavaria, to which the Court of Versailles agreed, on condition that the Emperor should not prosecute his views against the Turks. The French Minister, likewise, expected to accomplish his object in Holland, and to cut off England entirely from all connection with the Continent, by establishing the petty King of Austrasia, who, from his situation, must have been always dependent on France. Russia took the lead in this business, and it was the Russian Minister at Frankfort who proposed this plan of exchange to the Duke of Deux Ponts, in the name of Austria, Russia, and France.

"The execution of this measure, which would have unhinged the whole system of Europe, rivetted the dependence of Holland on France, and completely insulated this country, was prevented solely by the interference of the Courts of London and Berlin; the negotiations for forming the German Association not having been set on foot till after the Emperor had abandoned his project, which he did, by the advice of France, as soon as he knew that England and Prussia were disposed to co-operate in order to prevent its execution.

"The French Minister, having been baffled in all the attempts that have been mentioned, and aware of the critical situation in which France stood, both on account of its finances and the state of its party in Holland, determined to sacrifice the Turks and every other consideration to his favourite object, and immediately made advances to Russia, which were very well received. The treaty of commerce, making France the most favoured nation, was concluded with every circumstance calculated to insult this country; and the negotiation for forming a political connection, to which both Austria and Spain were to be invited to accede, in order to form a combination directly hostile to Great Britain, was carried on without interruption from the year 1785.

"On the expiration of the treaty of commerce between England and Russia in 1786, the latter not only refused to grant any privilege to the British merchants, but made such extravagant proposals that even the Russia Company expressed their desire that the treaty should not be concluded. Since that period, Great Britain has been treated as the least favoured nation; all the manufactures of this country have been made to pay a duty from 20 to 100 per cent., though we take about four-fifths of the whole produce of Russia that is raised solely by English money, of which there is always about three millions floating in that country. The Cabal, consisting of a few individuals, which has governed, or rather misled, the councils of the Empress of Russia for some years past, assured her that England would be obliged to solicit the treaty of commerce on any terms; but this having been completely refuted by the exportation trade to this country having increased every year since, in spite of every obstacle, the Empress has been convinced of her mistake, and the principal adviser of the measure has been disgraced in consequence of it. Neither is there any doubt now of her wish to conclude a treaty of commerce with this country on the principles of that of 1766.

"Meanwhile, things arrived to such a crisis in Holland in the year 1787, that there was no alternative left between both the



Republic and its possessions in India becoming totally dependent on France, or, this country attempting to effectuate a revolution. A plan of co-operation was concerted with Prussia, and this great object was accomplished at a very trifling expense to this country, though it gained more by it than by its most successful wars; as it thereby re-established its lost influence in Europe, secured its possessions in India, and unmasked the ruined state of France, that paved the way to the great revolution which has since happened in that country.

"It was naturally to be expected that both the Bourbon and Imperial courts, especially after the intercourse which had lately taken place between all the four, would be jealous of the great advantage which England and Prussia gained by the revolution in Holland; and their negotiations for forming a combination against this country were renewed with redoubled activity, and would, in all probability, have been brought to a conclusion had it not been for the backwardness of Spain, the representations made to Russia by England and Prussia on the subject, and the commencement of the Revolution in France. But in the summer of 1787, previous to the revolution in Holland, the Turks, harassed by the continual encroachments and other vexatious proceedings of Russia, declared war against that Power, establishing their reason for so doing in a manifesto which has never been refuted. It has been said that England and Prussia encouraged the Porte to take this step; but this is so far from having the least foundation that, the moment the Court of London was informed of the rupture, it offered to Russia, in conjunction with Prussia, to use its utmost endeavours to prevent the commencement of hostilities on the most honourable terms for the Empress, being well aware that a Turkish war, at such a critical moment, might not only produce dangerous alterations in the relative situation of the Powers concerned, but be likely to occasion a general war.

"The Empress of Russia hesitated for some time; and it would appear that she was induced to reject the offers of England and Prussia, chiefly by the Emperor's engaging to become a principal party in the war. The King of Prussia was naturally very much alarmed at the prospect of the aggrandizement of both the Imperial courts at the expense of Turkey, which, if considerable, would destroy all proportion between his resources and theirs; and even expose him to the most imminent danger of being overpowered.

"Having stated his apprehension to this country, it was admitted to be a most important object of mutual interest to prevent, if possible, any essential alteration in the relative situation of the belligerent Powers; and it was therefore agreed to act in concert, with a view to restore peace on this principle. At the very time the allies were treating on this subject, during the summer of 1788, the King of Sweden, alleging his own grievances and his being an ally of the Porte, declared war against Russia. Great Britain and Prussia so far from having given any encouragement to this measure, expressed their disapprobation of it to his Swedish Majesty in strong terms; and immediately sent joint overtures to Stockholm and Petersburg in order to prevent the commencement of hostilities, and to mediate an accommodation on the principle of the *status quo*. The King of Sweden did not hesitate to accept this offer, but Russia rejected it without any qualification, insisting on a signal revenge. In this state of things, the allies represented to Denmark that it was no longer obliged by any defensive engagements to assist Russia against Sweden, which they could not allow to be crushed, or to become dependent on

Russia; as the freedom of the commerce and navigation of the Baltic would, in that case, be at her mercy, and the political balance overturned. When Denmark, notwithstanding these representations, and its own assurances, invaded Sweden, the allies saved that country by their interposition, and thereby prevented the bad consequences above mentioned, which would have essentially affected their own interests, as well as the general balance and tranquility of Europe.

"In the beginning of winter 1788, Russia proposed to Poland to conclude an offensive alliance against the Porte, and by means of the Russian faction which then governed that Republic, the measure was on the point of being carried. The King of Prussia, however, foreseeing that such an alliance would not only expose his extensive frontier by making Poland the theatre of the war, but that, by rendering it totally dependent on Russia, he would be reduced to a situation of constant alarm and serious danger, made a memorial be presented to the Polish Diet, stating how much their prosperity and safety as well as his would be endangered by the measure, and his readiness to give them every support against its accomplishment. In consequence of this, the States came to an unanimous resolution to reject the Russian proposals; and the influence of the Court of Petersburg from being all powerful in Poland was completely overturned. A negotiation was immediately set on foot for concluding a defensive alliance between Prussia and Poland which was soon brought to the desired termination, and secured the independence of the latter country.

"The events of the war, both in the North and in the East, during the campaigns of 1788-89, are too recent to require being mentioned; but it is necessary to observe, that the allies seized every proper opportunity of renewing their pacific overtures to all the belligerent Powers. Turkey as well as Sweden accepted their mediation, but Russia constantly refused it.

"In the meantime, the important conquests made by the Imperial Courts over the Turks became so alarming to the King of Prussia, that His Majesty began to negotiate seriously with the Porte for supporting them, and entered into formal engagements for that purpose in the winter of 1789. Their great object being to effectuate a peace on the principle of the *status quo*, as things stood at the commencement of the war, this country, considering its own interests as well as those of its ally to be very deeply concerned, agreed to join with Prussia in making fresh representations to the Imperial Courts, and to secure the neutrality of Denmark and the Bourbon Court. Russia persisted in rejecting all mediation, and in proposing to keep possession of almost all her conquests; but the present Emperor of Germany no sooner succeeded to his brother than he accepted the mediation of the allies and entered into a negotiation with them for settling a basis of accommodation with the Porte. Nothing positive being fixed, however, and a suspicion being entertained that the object of the Court of Vienna was to gain time, without being seriously disposed to make peace, the King of Prussia took the field in the month of last June, with an army of 150,000 men, which he posted on the frontier of Bohemia and Moravia. Meanwhile the negotiation continued to be carried on, under the two following alternatives: 1st. that Austria should restore all her conquests to the Porte, and 2nd, that this principle of the *status quo* might be modified, provided no considerable alteration should take place; that Poland should obtain a part of Galicia, in proportion to the cession made by the Porte to Austria; and that Prussia should have Dantzic and Thorn. The Court of Vienna gave the preference to the

second alternative, but, after much variation, required such important concessions of the Turks that the King of Prussia was obliged by his engagements with the Porte, and by his own essential interests, to revert to the first principle of making the Emperor restore all his conquests, and engage to give no assistance to Russia. Harsh and even humiliating as these conditions may, at first, appear, it is to be considered in what a critical situation the King of Prussia was placed, having been obliged after three years' fruitless negotiation with the Imperial Courts, to contract engagements with the Porte to save his own existence as an independent power; and was then keeping his army inactive at an immense expense on the frontier, while every moment was precious with a view to detach Austria from Russia, or strike an important blow before the latter could interfere. The Emperor, in opposition to the opinion of his Ministers, accepted the terms proposed, and formal instruments drawn up with the concurrence of the English and Dutch Plenipotentiaries, who stipulated for the guaranty of their Courts, were executed at Reichenbach on the 27th of July, the chief objects of which were that Austria should restore all its conquests to the Porte, and give no assistance, either directly or indirectly, to Russia; and that the Austrian government should be re-established in the Netherlands, together with the antient constitution and privileges as they existed after the Peace of Utrecht, and with the addition of the guaranty of Prussia to that of England and Holland."

"A formal convention was afterwards signed at the Hague upon these principles, which the Austrian Minister subscribed after some difficulty, so that the advantage of having a right to maintain the constitution and liberties of the Netherlands, the only one which the two maritime powers gained by the war of the Succession, is recovered and strengthened by the guaranty of Prussia, which affords a great additional security to Holland, and to the whole system of the allies.

"This arrangement was no sooner settled with the Emperor than a new representation was made by Great Britain and Prussia to the Empress of Russia, urging her to imitate the example of His Imperial Majesty in making peace with Sweden and the Porte on the same terms. Effectual measures were at the same time taken to prevent the King of Sweden from being overpowered, and the King of Prussia immediately detached 30,000 men to reinforce his army of observation, consisting of about the same number, posted on the frontier of Prussia towards Livonia, measures which could not be taken before, or at the time of the contest with Austria.

"As soon as the Empress of Russia foresaw that the Emperor would abandon her, and restore everything rather than risk the consequences of a war with Prussia, she made a separate peace with Sweden on the very terms proposed by the allies, and, at the same time, offered to restore the countries conquered from the Porte excepting Oczakow and the district between the rivers Bog and Dniester, in which state the negotiation has remained ever since."

**MEMORANDUM** in MR. EWART's writing, apparently of instructions by which he was to be guided in the conduct of negotiations then pending for the termination of war between Russia and Turkey.

[1791, April].—"1st. To invite the Emperor to accede to the system of the allies, and to the guarantee of Turkey, and to hold out advantages to him for the security of those parts of his own dominions which are at present in so precarious a state. It seems probable that, by these

means, and from the confidential intercourse which actually subsists between the Emperor and the King of Prussia, His Imperial Majesty might be engaged to concur seriously with the allies in insisting that Russia should restore everything to the Porte, especially as on becoming a part of the system, which he seems very desirous of doing, he would have the same interest with the allies.

"2nd. Supposing this not to succeed, it appears probable on the grounds just stated, and from the known dispositions of the Emperor, that he would unite with the allies in requiring that the country between the Bog and the Dniester should be reduced to the state of a desert, which would render the frontier equally defensive both for Turkey and Russia, secure the navigation of the Dniester to the former, and leave Russia no grounds of complaint respecting the situation of her frontier.

"3rd. That the alternative of giving up part of the district of Oczakow to Russia, provided both banks of the Dniester be preserved to the Porte, should only be resorted to in the supposition of the Emperor not agreeing to act in concert with the allies on either of the two first alternatives."

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, April 13, Dublin Castle.—"I have sent by this post the monthly list of successions; if any objection is made to the promotion of Mr. Drummond to the Lieutenancy of 41, I would observe that Ellis, the senior ensign for purchase, had his commission when a child and is now very young, and that there is another promotion this month in the same regiment. Much complaint is made in the regiments from the delay of the vacant commission, by the promotion of officers to independent companies.

"The regiments are in want of officers and the ensigns are in doubt whether to purchase or not; have the goodness as soon as you can to send me your orders. The money is but trifling, and the promotion would be gratifying to the army and the patronage very convenient. If difficulties do not occur, you cannot have much doubt which mode I shall like best.

"I have directed a letter to Colonel Kay, to know what he has to say in his defence. It will be very curious to punish Colonel Kay for what almost every officer in the army, English as well as Irish, is guilty of; but I hardly know what can be done except what you propose. I have never had an application from any Captain for the purchase of his majority."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, April 16, St. James's Square.—"It will be unnecessary for me now to enter into those circumstances which prevented me from answering the letters which you had the goodness to write to me in the course of the two last months respecting our continental politics, and the line to be adopted towards the Court of Petersburg. I am persuaded that you will have done me the justice not to attribute my silence to any want of personal attention to yourself.

"With respect to our present measures, the great fear which I entertain is that the line of concession, which what has happened here compels us to adopt, will too evidently betray our weakness, and that the Empress will rise in her demands instead of being disposed to modify

them. An appearance of firmness is therefore necessary both here and in Holland; but it will, I am afraid, be but a very thin veil indeed.

"We are all very sensible of what has been done in Holland, in support of measures to which the Dutch Ministers were averse. I hope that nothing now doing will alter their conduct. The effect at Berlin ought certainly to be very different from that of dissatisfaction or complaint, and I think it will be so.

"I had brought the commercial treaty to a point, and have actually prepared instructions authorizing the adoption of your last suggestion about the second article. I meant to have submitted these to the Cabinet, in order that, if approved of, the Dutch might send either those or something on the same principles. But it has occurred to me that it might really produce a very mischievous effect here, if, just at the present moment we were to bring forward to public view a treaty authorizing the Dutch to protect the Russian commerce in case of our being at war with the Empress, and containing no stipulation in our favour which would apply to such a war. All that we gain about naval stores, and about colonial commerce, is important with a view to a French or a Spanish war. It has no application to Russia, who neither has colonies, nor imports naval stores; while, on the other hand, the admission by us of the principle *free ships, free goods*, would appear to operate against us with peculiar force under the circumstances of the present moment.

"Pray turn this in your mind and let me know your opinion upon it. It is certainly an awkward thing to suspend a business which is now so near its conclusion, but it would be still more awkward to conclude it at a moment when its impression might be so unfavourable to us. If you agree with me in my apprehensions on the subject, perhaps you might find some mode of delaying it more *honnête* in its appearance than that of mere procrastination without any reason assigned for it."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, April 19, St. James's Square.—"In addition to my other private letter which was written a few days ago, I think it right to mention to you that Mr. Ewart is to set off for Berlin on Wednesday, and that copies of his instructions will be sent to you. They will explain our plans, and you will probably hear from other quarters the reason of your receiving them under a new signature. On account of the present strange state of the Prussian government, Ewart is to address himself directly to the King, which circumstance is an additional reason for the greatest caution in your communications."

*Copy:*

JOSEPH EWART TO W. PITT.

Private.

1791, April 19 [London].—"Before returning to Berlin, I find myself under the necessity of troubling you with a few words on the subject of my private affairs. When the situation in which I have been placed, and the approbation with which my endeavours have been honoured, are considered, I flatter myself I may hope to be treated with that favour which has been shown to others in similar circumstances. My greatest anxiety is about my family, especially in case of my death, for which, after the frequent accidents my health has had, and the

fatigues I must be again exposed to, I ought to be prepared. Permit me, therefore, to solicit a pension for Mrs. Ewart's life.

"The expense attending the unsettled way of life I have been obliged to lead in this country, from the frequent calls to town on business, together with that of the establishment I have kept up at Berlin, has so far exceeded my appointments, that I find myself under the necessity of applying for some extraordinary allowance, which I understand it has been the practice to grant in such cases. I likewise beg leave to observe, that the expense of living at Berlin has increased to near the double during the time I have been there, and yet it has been necessary for me to see more company than any of my predecessors. I have, accordingly, always spent the greatest part of my appointments in entertaining the persons of most influence at Berlin, which produces more effect there than perhaps anywhere else, and appears particularly necessary on the present occasion. Whatever augmentation you might judge proper to allow me should be spent entirely in the same way, and without it I should be unable to live as I have hitherto done. Permit me only to add, that the Ministers at the Hague, when they had the same rank which I have, with the addition of the title of Privy Councillor, were allowed the appointments of Ambassador; and that Sir Robert Murray Keith is in the same situation at Vienna. I shall not make any comparison between the importance, as well as the expense, of those missions, and that of Berlin. But I ask pardon for having intruded upon you so long with such a subject, which nothing but necessity could induce me to do."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD ST. HELENS.

1791, April 19, Whitehall.—His Majesty has been pleased to direct that I should inform your Excellency of the substance of the language held by M. del Campo in a conference with the Duke of Leeds some days ago, and of the conduct which His Majesty thinks proper for you to adopt in consequence thereof.

"M. del Campo, after expressing the wish of his Court to see the general tranquillity restored, and lamenting the difficulties which had arisen between the Allies and Russia respecting the terms of pacification with the Porte, stated that some middle term might be adopted of a nature to satisfy both parties, and to lay the foundation of a lasting peace. The idea, which he professed to be that which Count Florida Blanca wished to propose to the consideration of this Court, was to leave Ockzakow and its district in the hands of Russia, agreeably to the Empress's wishes; to stipulate that the fortress should be dismantled, and that the town be destroyed; and also to provide that the navigation of the Niester should remain in its present state; and further that the remaining possessions of the Turks should be guaranteed to them.

"The Ambassador not having made this communication in writing, altho' he stated it as made by order of His Court, His Majesty thinks it necessary that you should ascertain, with precision, how far he was justified by his instructions to hold this language, and to what degree it may be consistent with the real sentiments of his Court. This is become the more material from the present state of the negotiations with Russia, which may probably lead to the adoption of some middle term, on grounds similar to those stated by M. del Campo. In any discussion on this subject, the point which His Majesty's Confidential Servants would consider as the most material, would be that of preventing Russia from acquiring the command of the navigation of the Niester. Perhaps the most satisfactory of all modes of doing this, short of the adoption of the

strict *status quo*, would be the providing that the district in question should always remain uninhabited, and thereby form the most effectual barrier of defence between the two frontiers; and it is therefore of great importance to ascertain the entire concurrence of the Court of Madrid in the wishes of the Allies on this subject.

"Mr. Whitworth's letters represent the co-operation of the Spanish Minister at Petersburg as having been by no means so full and unqualified as the nature of the instructions communicated to your Excellency appeared to require from him. To whatever cause this has been owing, the effect has unquestionably been very prejudicial to the success of those negotiations in the object of which the Court of Madrid appeared to concur with the Allies; and it would therefore be important, especially at the present moment, that the most distinct orders should be given to the Spanish Minister at Petersburg to co-operate in the fullest manner in endeavouring to induce that Court to adopt, without delay, the modifications now stated. The most effectual way of securing this point would probably be by prevailing on Count Florida Blanca to send a written representation on the subject, to be delivered to the Russian Ministers.

"In the present situation of affairs, it would also be of the utmost importance to ascertain, with precision, the real sentiments of that Court with respect to the idea, thrown out by M. del Campo, of a joint guaranty of the remaining possessions of the Porte by the Allied Powers, and by Spain. The degree of security and protection to be derived to the Turks from such a guaranty, entered into by so many of the most considerable powers of Europe, might serve in great measure to counterbalance the loss which they would sustain by the cession of Oczakow; and, if there was a reasonable and sufficient ground to expect that Spain would enter into such a guaranty, His Majesty might be disposed to concur in it jointly with His Allies, who would most probably, in such case, make themselves parties in it.

"Your Excellency will, therefore, endeavour by every means in your power, to obtain an explicit and written communication of the sentiments of the Court of Spain on these important subjects. Your Excellency is at liberty for this purpose, if you judge it necessary, to deliver to Count Florida Blanca a written note, stating the satisfaction which the King has received from the verbal overtures made by M. del Campo on this subject; His Majesty's earnest wish that the most explicit and confidential intercourse should be established between the two Courts on this important occasion, with a view to their co-operating jointly to the restoration and subsequent continuance of general tranquillity; and the strongest assurances that the object which His Majesty has in view by his conduct on this occasion is that of re-establishing peace between the belligerent parties, on such terms as may not in their effect too much endanger the security of the weaker country, or alter in too great a degree the relative situation of those nations in the East of Europe, whose situation forms so material a part in the general balance of power.

"Since the above was written, the enclosed note has been received from Mr. Jackson, it having been delivered by the Spanish Minister at Berlin to that Court. The purport of it corresponds very nearly with the language held by M. del Campo, and there seems little reason to doubt that he was fully authorized, if he had thought proper, to have delivered a similar note to the Duke of Leeds. As this, however, has not been done, it is still material that you should procure a written communication on the subject, in which there now seems little reason

to apprehend that you will find much difficulty. The principal points to be pressed are, the leaving the district uninhabited; the obtaining a positive assurance that Spain will consent to a guaranty subsequent to the peace; and the endeavouring to render the co-operation of that Court more apparent, and consequently more effectual, than it has hitherto been."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ST. HELENS.

Private.

1791, April 19, Whitehall.—"I have little to add to the despatches which you will receive by this messenger except to request that you will exert yourself that whatever is done on either of the points in question may be soon done, as, without that, our ship will lose its passage, and the assistance, whatever it may be, of Spain at Petersburg arrive too late. I am fully persuaded that our good friend Del Campo thought the written note might have been of use to us, and therefore withheld it.

"I say nothing to you of the circumstances which have led to your receiving these despatches under a new signature. You will be glad to hear that I think Lord Buckingham better than he has ever been since your Irish campaign together."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, April 19, Whitehall.—"It having been this day determined at a meeting of your Majesty's confidential servants humbly to advise your Majesty that instructions should be sent to the Earl of Elgin and Lord St. Helens, in conformity to the enclosed drafts, Lord Grenville has the honour of humbly submitting them to your Majesty; and, as his Grace the Duke of Leeds was not present at the meeting, Lord Grenville humbly requests to be honoured with your Majesty's commands whether your Majesty would be pleased to authorize and direct Lord Grenville to sign the instructions above mentioned.

"It being thought of importance that no time should be lost in the execution of the measures there stated, supposing them to receive your Majesty's approbation, Lord Grenville has taken this manner of laying them before your Majesty. He will have the honour of submitting to your Majesty to-morrow the drafts of instructions to Mr. Ewart, who has undertaken to set out to-morrow evening to return to his post at Berlin, if your Majesty should approve of it."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, April 19, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville, whatever can tend to secure a continuation of peace to my dominions must meet with my fullest approbation, and, as such, I approve of the drafts to Lord Elgin and Lord St. Helens, and authorize you to sign those instructions; and, also, cannot help expressing my approbation at Mr. Ewart's returning to-morrow evening to Berlin, who will be able to state how impossible it would be, at present, to encline this country to take a cordial part in any measures that might involve it in a war."



## THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, April 19, Dublin Castle.—“As the session is nearly closed, it is necessary to prepare for the payment of our engagements. Have the goodness to enquire by what title Lord Donegal would be created a Marquis, that I may send the recommendation for him and Lord Drogheda, as you agreed, when Hobart was in England, should be done at the close of this session.

“Lord Welles, ever since Lord Northington, has been encouraged with hopes of a Viscountcy. He was only to be pacified last year by a positive promise at the end of this session. Lord Harburton, [who] has been a very honourable supporter of the King's Government, is very anxious to be a Viscount. I am not aware his promotion can give offence. I should think it advantageous to confer this mark of favour on him as well as Lord Welles; and would therefore recommend them to his Majesty's consideration. Make my respects to Lord Arden, and express my disposition to show attention to him; but when I tell you that I have not had the disposal of a piece of Crown preferment worth 200*l.* per annum, except the Bishopric of Kildare, and not more than two or three trifling livings, it is unnecessary to say to you how impossible it is to hold expectations to Mr. Purcell; nor indeed have vacancies been more frequent in the civil line. Lord Waterford, some time ago, mentioned to me an intimation he had had that English Dukes were to be created, with a sort of beating about application for similar promotion in Ireland; I professed total ignorance. Lord Waterford and Lord Hillsborough both hold this argument, that whenever a change of government happens, their enemies will be put over them. I have no opinion to give, but I should wish to know, if you would have any particular language held, should such a conversation be renewed.

“I long since wrote to you my sentiments about Captain Henniker's succession to Major Allen; that if Pitt chose it, I would send it over; that there was no regimental objection, but that Henniker was a young officer, and that his promotion would give offence to old Captains and Majors with troops. I would therefore wish you to explain to his Majesty that it is an English arrangement, and have his previous consent, for you must be sensible, after a late military correspondence, how sedulously military complaints will be magnified; nor can I guess what interest Henniker can have with Pitt to make it worth while to press this matter, if the King should manifest a disinclination to it. I shall wait your answer before I send the recommendation.

“Will you have the kindness to hint to Mr. Rose that Mr. Fane is in England, and will be at or near town if he wants him in the House of Commons. I hope Williams is arrived. The Attorney-General tells me Mr. Mitford's Bill will open the law to Roman Catholics; I fear, if he is correct, the concession will not be approved here.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, April 21, Queen's House.—“The Duke of Leeds having this day delivered up the Seals of his Office, I send them to Lord Grenville agreeable to what I mentioned this morning in Hyde Park.

“The Lord President escaped to Camden Place after the Committee of Council; I made the Lord Privy Seal act for him at the Council for passing the Irish Bills.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, April 21, St. James's Square.—“Lord Grenville has just been honoured with your Majesty's note, accompanying the seals of the Foreign Department, and begs leave humbly to express to your Majesty his grateful and dutiful acknowledgments for this mark of your Majesty's confidence, and to assure your Majesty of his unremitting diligence in carrying on your Majesty's service till your Majesty shall have appointed a successor to the Duke of Leeds.

“Lord Grenville is extremely concerned at the mistake which occasioned his not attending your Majesty to-day to hold the Council in the absence of the Lord President, but Lord Grenville had understood the Lord President that he meant to be there himself. Lord Grenville earnestly hopes that no delay or inconvenience to your Majesty was occasioned by his absence.”

*Copy.*

## LORD THURLOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, April 21, London.—“The Commission was suspended last year on doubts how far the authorities there given were conformable or compatible with the statutes now existing concerning Newfoundland. In the course of that consideration, it also occurred that a plan was wanting more adapted to the actual situation of the island, in respect of the changes it was supposed to have undergone since the former acts, and that a new act formed upon principles suitable to the policy now requisite would be the properest measure to adopt.

“This I should have stated to have passed in conversation with your Lordship in my room behind the House of Lords, if your letter did not consider the original commission as still depending, and that it was the sequel of a conversation I held with Mr. Nepean by your Lordship's direction, and that I had communicated the same idea to Lord Hawkesbury.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791 April 21 [Stowe].—“I have had of late so little confidential communication of any public event affecting either your personal situation or the public service, that I am not surprised at receiving the information of the Duke of Leeds's intention to resign from you after I knew from another quarter that it would take place, and by the same post by which I learn it from Bulkeley as the news of the town; but I own that I feel a little hurt that you should conceive me either so little anxious for your sake personally, or for the sake of a Government which I support, as to the result of this resignation; or so little worthy the confidence of those to whom I have ever shown the greatest attentions, that you have not added one iota of information to the fact. I am sure that, upon second thoughts, you will think a little more confidence due to my affection and situation; but, even if you should not change the line which you have lately marked to me more than ever, I certainly love you too well to mark to you the effect it has upon my feelings by repeating to you this sort of complaint at a time when you tell me that your difficulties are increased; but, on the contrary, wherever I can prove my affection to you I am happy in doing it. Though I fear that this will

only produce unkindness on your part, yet I owe to you this explanation as I feel that I make it without a spark of ill-humour towards you or yours.

"As to your Indian mail, I own I feel much disappointment, as I fear that Meadows will not have been able to advance for want of grain, and the impression of disadvantage in the first onset is very serious. Lord Cornwallis's intention of taking the command does not argue too much confidence in Meadows, and the delay is of the most serious consequences, particularly at this crisis in Europe which, I suppose, is what you advert to in your letter when you talk of the hazard of your situation. But, whatever be the hazards, I have the fullest confidence in your exertions, and in your abilities, and I need not add (what you have long known) that I feel for your honour and advantage as for my own."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Most Private.

1791, April 23, Hague.—"Without compliment to you, it is a great luxury to my mind, and a full consolation to me under our present mortifying embarrassments, to address my correspondence to you. The intimate knowledge which I have of your judgment, energy, punctuality, candour, and indulgence will inspire a new life into me. I confess to you that my disgust and discouragement were become extreme, and that nothing but a sense of duty to the King in times so critical, and of obligation and attachment in all possible circumstances to Mr. Pitt, could have retained me in this situation. During every hour of the last two months I have panted to be relieved from it, like a man under slow and continued torture.

"There are many particulars in the late business far beyond my comprehension, but I hope some day or other to discuss the whole with you at Holwood historically. The only point worth attention at present is how to arrive at some creditable issue. I think it possible that the Empress of Russia may accept in part the modification which we are now to propose; and this appears to me more likely than any success in our attempt upon the Emperor, of whose fair dealing (whatever may have been the extent of his secret communications to the King of Prussia) I have not yet seen any reason to adopt a favourable idea. If, however, His Imperial Majesty and the King of Prussia should have wisdom and generosity enough to feel the advantage of establishing a cordial pacification with each other, the result will be advantageous to the whole alliance, and very honourable to the English Ministry. Lastly, if both their Imperial Majesties prove impracticable, and unreasonable, and perverse, and deaf to all that we may suggest, I still think the business will work itself into a good shape, for the Turks have made great efforts of preparations; and though they will, of course, be beat in detail as usual, the position of the King of Prussia and of the King of Sweden are such as to make it difficult for the Imperial powers (exhausted as they are to a certain degree) to push the war to any advantage. With respect to the King of Prussia, if Mr. Ewart can bring his own enthusiasm to give way with a good grace to the imperious necessity of circumstances, there will be little difficulty. Till Colonel Bishoffsworder entered into the late managements, the King of Prussia was heartily adverse to the war; and he will now be convinced that the English nation is unwilling to enter into any war for an indirect object of Continental politics.

"In truth, it is to me most wonderful how any man possessing any object whatever of honour, property, or security, in any established government under the sun, can incline to increase the confusions of the world in a moment like the present. Internal tranquillity seems to me to be a consideration which, with the example of France before our eyes, ought to supersede all others. I do not deny that from the confusions and horrors of the French democracy some good and great Government may perhaps ultimately arise, because it is not probable that a numerous and well-informed people will always remain in anarchy; but if the same dissolution of all order should extend itself to other nations, it will be impossible to fix bounds to the extent of the calamity.

"It is a perplexing part of our situation what to do as to our great armament. The completion of it beyond a respectable squadron for summer cruising seems to be to no purpose, either in appearance or in reality; for our impression, such as under the notoriety of our circumstances it can be, will not be improved by increasing our expense; and the possibility of acting in the Baltic will be over before your Lordship can have any answer from Mr. Fawkener; or at least the season will be too far advanced to leave it possible to act to any extent.

"Under your Lordship's auspices, I hope that we shall still do well, but the difficulty is certainly great. The helm, however, of the State must not be abandoned in a moment like the present. You may be assured that there is good sense enough in our countrymen to support the present Government even when they differ from it; and Mr. Fox's strange declaration in favour of the French Constitution will strengthen that disposition.

"I will write on the subject of the treaty of Commerce by the next post; I feel the weight of your remark upon it; but I think I can state the business in few words so as to have your approbation and concurrence towards putting it in a state of forwardness for completion."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, April 24 [Stowe].—"If you feel it a reproach from me, which you have not deserved, to be reminded that I must be hurt at receiving from you the first intimation of an event so interesting to you and to the public with a request to keep it secret, written exactly on the day upon which the fact was stated in the newspapers, and avowed by the Duke of Leeds; and if you think it unkind that I should observe upon the entire want of confidential communication which you have shown me upon this point, and which I certainly have felt in your general conduct to me, I must regret very sincerely that our ideas differ so widely upon a point so interesting to us both as the reciprocity of that confidence which I know I have felt unbounded towards you. At the same time, I am very little sanguine (particularly after your last letter, which supposes me to know every point of a detail of which I most certainly know nothing) in my hopes of inducing you to change that line, of which you think I complain with so little reason or justice or kindness towards you. I shall therefore take my leave of complaints, which I promise you not to renew, and shall only add my earnest wishes that the difficulties which I understand from you press so heavily upon your time, spirits, and exertions may be solved in some manner satisfactory to your private feelings and advantageous to the public service. And these wishes are the result of the truest affection, anxious for your personal credit and for the interests of the Government with which you are connected, and certainly not diminished by the conduct of which I have complained.

"I fear that your health may in some degree be affected by your confinement and anxiety, particularly as you looked ill when I left London. I wish you could pass a few days at Holwood, or even sleep at my little Paddington villa for the remainder of this week ; it is, as usual, at your orders, and we do not return till Monday."

(Lord Grenville's answer to this letter has been published in "Courts and Cabinets of George III.")

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, April 28, Hague.—"It has given me great pleasure to collect from M. de Kalitcheff, in a visit which he made to me yesterday, that M. de Woronzow expresses himself at present in conciliatory language, and particularly that he speaks in high terms of Mr. Fawkener's discretion and candour. Under every consideration which presents itself, I now feel very sanguine that the measures pursuing will produce a speedy and general pacification, accompanied with better securities to the frail existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe than it could have obtained by a less disastrous war. I feel more afraid of embarrassment and mischief from Vienna than from Petersburg ; there is nothing but the advance of the season that can materially injure our negotiations with the latter.

"I have had great uneasiness all this time that the first *projet* of our joint declaration to Petersburg would by some means or other find its way into the *Leyden Gazette*, which is in the pay of Russia, and well and ably conducted. There is much less secrecy at Berlin than there is even at this place ; and it is a notorious fact, not denied by M. de Hertzberg, that M. de Nesselrode gains speedy possession of many official papers ; but that Declaration seems to have escaped, and will now be superseded by other objects of attention.

"I do not exactly trace what is to become of the two preliminary conventions, or rather of that respecting Dantzic, proposed to have been signed at Berlin."

#### W. FAWKENER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, April 29, Hague.—"I do not mean to trouble your Lordship from hence with more than an account of my arrival here this evening after some unavoidable delay at Harwich, and rather a tedious passage. It was my intention to have pursued my journey to-morrow morning early, but having waited on the Grand Pensionary this evening, and, by Lord Auckland's advice, communicated my instructions to him, it has been settled between us that I am to see him again in the morning ; and it might have been thought a want of proper respect to the Prince and Princess of Orange if I had not signified my desire of being honoured with their commands to Berlin, which I am likewise to receive to-morrow. In the evening, however, I shall certainly leave this place, and make the best of my way to Berlin.

"Your Lordship has been so fully acquainted by Lord Auckland with the Pensionary's sentiments on the business now in agitation, that it is unnecessary for me to enter into any detail of his conversation with me this evening. I pressed upon him, as your Lordship directed,

the importance of a perfect concert between the allies, and the necessity of a continuance of vigorous demonstrations; he answered me that nothing should be done here that might make that concert doubtful; and, in fact, the instructions given to the Dutch Minister at Petersburg (copy of which Lord Auckland transmits by this mail) are as full and as much to the point as can well be expected. With respect to demonstration, he would tell me that could be only *jusqu'à un certain point*; but that, with respect to a war, he would not have us deceive ourselves in supposing that Holland could, on the present occasion, be brought to take an active part. That they had no interest in the point in dispute, that they had been but little consulted, that they had not in any degree committed themselves with the Empress, and that they had much to apprehend from the Emperor's force in the Low Countries, who, the Pensionary seemed to be persuaded, would not remain in a state of neutrality and inaction in the event of a war between Prussia and Russia. He did not encourage me in any hope that the Empress would listen to any modification, and, indeed, all I have heard since my arrival here serves to convince me of the difficulty of the commission I have undertaken. I will, however, go through with it with zeal and cheerfulness; and leave nothing wanting on my part to ensure success.

"I will not fail to write again to your Lordship as soon as I shall have reached Berlin."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, April 29, Hollwood.—"As Lord Grenville understands that Mr. Pitt submits to your Majesty, by this messenger, the ideas which have occurred to him on the subject of the arrangements which have become necessary in consequence of the Duke of Leeds's resignation, Lord Grenville is desirous of availing himself of the same occasion humbly to renew the expressions of his gratitude to your Majesty for what your Majesty was graciously pleased to say both to Mr. Pitt and to himself on the subject of his being charged with the Foreign Department, if he preferred it to his former situation. Lord Grenville begs leave with the utmost sincerity to assure your Majesty that he has no other wish upon the subject than that of contributing in the best manner he is able to the carrying on your Majesty's service in such a way as may be satisfactory to your Majesty, and that he will undertake with cheerfulness and zeal any situation in which he can hope that his exertions can be at all conducive to that object, to which he is bound by the strongest sentiments of gratitude as well as of duty."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, April 30, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville's conduct on the vacancy of the Foreign Department is consonant with what I have experienced from him at all times; and I cannot help adding that, in addition to his ability and diligence, the knowledge of his decided opinion how essential peace is to the welfare of this kingdom makes me think it most advantageous that he should hold the Seals of the Foreign Department."

## JOSEPH EWART to W. PITT.

Private.

1791, April 30, Berlin.—“I flatter myself you will be satisfied with the expedition I have made, and with the result of the long audience I have just had of the King of Prussia, which, I confess, far surpassed my expectation; but I am really too much fatigued to be able to do justice to all that he said; at the same time I thought it much better not to delay a moment in transmitting such essential information.

“His Prussian Majesty expressed the highest regard for you, and entered into your feelings as well as your reasonings on the present unfortunate disappointment, sentiments that he desired me to communicate to you. The King and Colonel Bishofswerder are extremely eager for the Emperor's accession, and Count Finckenstein and Count Schulenburg, who have been very lately acquainted with what has passed, seem likewise to approve of the measure very much. The King desired me to treat the subject with them without having any communication respecting it with Count Hertzberg. Should the Emperor furnish any opening in his answer to the King of Prussia, or in his conversation with Lord Elgin, Colonel Bishofswerder has agreed to carry the result of what may be settled here in consequence to His Imperial Majesty, and to co-operate with Lord Elgin in bringing the negotiation to a speedy issue.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRANVILLE.

Private.

1791, April 30, Hague.—“It has been a great satisfaction to me to have the occasion of a three or four hours' conversation with Mr. Fawkener; I was glad to have a full talk on the subject of his mission with a countryman so capable of talking about it, and in our own native language. All the last advices which he could collect from the several papers on my table, which are transmitted to your Lordship by this mail, and the conversation of the Pensionary in their first meeting, had tended to dispirit him; but this morning he will turn to the cheerful side of the speculation, and it really gives ground to expect a good result.

“On the one hand, it is true that the Danes are so entirely attached to Russia that we have nothing to hope for from them, not even the use of their ports perhaps, and the honest observance of a mere neutrality. The Swede is not much to be depended on even when highly paid; and, at present, he will be discontented with the remittance from the Port[e]. The Court of Austria appears, from every evidence except Colonel Bishofswerder's, to mean every practicable mischief towards us if troubles take place; and to take credit for fair proceedings and good faith only in the event of being unable to pursue a different line of conduct. The conduct of Spain is open to possible suspicions. The Poles, from whom we were taught to expect much, though I own that I never expected anything, are utterly untractable in negotiation, and in too unsettled and turbulent a state to afford assistance even if they were better disposed. The Empress of Russia will be haughtier than ever under the knowledge of our embarrassment, of which she will have full information; and she will probably be desirous not only to manifest her self-importance, but to create to herself a party in England. Last of all, the Prussian Ministry is wretchedly composed, and it is impossible to say, from day to day, where it is, and in whose hands it is placed.

“But, on the other hand, Denmark is interested in urging most

earnestly the success of the modifications which we propose; Sweden, however dissatisfied, has a similar interest; Spain is entirely with us, though possibly she did not mean to be so; Prussia has forces towards the frontiers of Russia large enough to create a most serious attention; the English resources are well known, as well as the possibility of bringing them into action by the Empress's pursuing an unreasonable conduct. It is equally well known that the Turks have made great and incredible exertions for the ensuing campaign; and, lastly, it is notorious that Russia is exhausted at home, and that her credit is stretched to the utmost in foreign countries, which the very slow success of the last loan at Amsterdam will shew to her. There is also a large chapter of accidents amidst so many ferments as are prevailing in every part of Europe; but it is difficult to argue either way from uncertain events, many of which will probably have taken place before Mr. Fawkener's arrival at Petersburg.

"Your Lordship has at least the satisfaction of having given every possible instruction that may contribute to a full success.

"There are two objects in this business which are much before my eyes whenever I look towards it, and they are of great importance; and if it were possible without committing too far the necessary weight and character of Government, and the dignity of the nation, to say, in a manly and decided language, *that the turn given to the negotiation is such as to make His Majesty think it sufficient to preserve only a respectable tone, and to hope that the success of the exertions which he has recently adopted in concert both with his allies and OTHER POWERS, will, in a few months, give success to his wishes to promote a general pacification*; if it were possible to make any declaration to this effect, in the form of a message or otherwise, my two objects would be accomplished. The one is, to retrench our expence, which cannot by any possibility or, at least, by any reasonable calculation be applied to use this year; and the other is to suffer the Baltic merchant vessels to proceed immediately on their voyages. I confess that I consider this last step as a very essential one to be adopted. Whether, at the same time, a small squadron might be attached to the Archipelago, or come to the Dardanelles, or to Constantinople, to wait for orders, is another consideration too weighty for me.

"I write all this without reserves or hesitation as it occurs to me, but with an anxious wish always to submit what may shew my attachment to His Majesty's Government, and to the great interests connected with it."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, April 30, Hague.—"I conceive that our convention respecting the Netherlands is very material to be ratified at a proper time, and it probably will, at last, be ratified. The enclosed paper on the subject will serve for your Lordship's consideration in any moment of leisure. I should, however, explain its origin.

"Whilst I was in France, I lived much with the Comte de Mercy, and had an occasional correspondence with him afterwards. During his residence in this place, he was constantly in my private society, and we were perfectly well together as individuals, though we had some disagreement as negotiators. Since his return to Brussels, he has



shewn an implicit regard to every recommendation that I have given for the pardon and protection of individuals for whom the Pensionary and I were interested, and has constantly sent most friendly messages to me. Upon his sending lately, through the Baron de Buol, some expressions of regret as to the ratification on our part being delayed, it occurred to me that I should like to ask the enclosed question of him for my own information; but extra-officially and merely as a private individual. I would not even commit it to writing; but Colonel Gardiner did so, by a literal translation of the words which I had used to him. My reasoning is this: the Emperor by the publication of his ratification has done an irregular and exceptionable act; but it binds him towards the Provinces as far as it goes, and, the States not having objected to his additional clause, it may be presumed that it is not open to any solid objection. If then, on any occasion of a disposition to civility arising soon between the two Courts, we should accept his Instrument, and could, without impropriety, give him ours in return, the business would be completed; and it appears that there would be no essential objection on his part to such an exchange. This act must be considered as having three parties: 1st, the Emperor; 2d, the Allies; 3d, the Provinces. In the ratifications, any two of those parties may bind themselves to each other, as is already done between the Emperor and the Provinces. We might perhaps do the same thing by a mere publication without an exchange; but it would be better to complete the act by extending it to all the parties. In the hurry of the moment, I am not sure whether I am quite intelligible. I am fearful of losing the tide.

"Colonel Gardiner modestly expresses to me his unhappiness at not knowing whether he may presume to address his letters to your Lordship."

*Enclosing an opinion obtained from the Count de Mercy-Argenteau, upon points connected with an exchange of ratifications.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, May 1, Whitehall.—"I have received your two private letters of the 23rd and 28th ultimo. My letters to Ewart will shew you that my suspicions and fears very much coincide with yours respecting the Emperor, but if the Sistovo negotiation is put on the footing now proposed, it will be difficult for the Cabinet of Vienna to protract it, without an avowed breach of faith. I consider the convention respecting Dantzic as entirely suspended. No approbation has been sent from hence of the alterations proposed to have been made in it, and certainly, under the present circumstances, it seems more advisable to drop the idea, desirable as it certainly would have been to us, in every point of view, to have raised up a commercial rival to Russia.

"The Landgrave of Hesse is making proposals for the renewal of his subsidy treaty, which expires this year. Would it have any bad effect in Holland, if we suffered it to drop entirely? We are continually hearing of fresh claims there from the *patriotes*, and it was very much with a view to them, and to the assistance which they might have derived from France, or the Low Countries, that the step was originally taken. The saving 30 or 40,000 pounds per annum is no small temptation."

## LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, May 1, Whitehall.—“Mr. Jackson’s last despatch has, in great measure, anticipated what I had written on the subject of the negotiations at Sistovo. I have, however, sent that letter as it stood in order that, in case of any fluctuation of opinion at Berlin, you might be apprized in detail of the manner in which we consider the points in question. In truth there can hardly be anything more important under the present circumstances than a speedy conclusion of that business; and, if it is retarded by the Emperor, the delay ought evidently to rest with him.

“There seems too much reason to fear that he is desirous of keeping the negotiation open in order eventually to bring forward some fresh demand as a compensation to him for the acquisition of Ochzakow by Russia, and of Dantzig by Prussia.

“With respect to the last of these, I suspend writing anything officially till I hear from you on the subject; but the difficulties of carrying through any new arrangement respecting it, such as we could wish, appear to increase on all sides; and it seems probable that the persevering in it will only create embarrassments in our other negotiations without much prospect of success in this. Bukaty has made a sort of suggestion here, said to be by private orders from the King, that Prussia might be indemnified for lowering the duties, without acquiring Dantzig, by the annual payment of a sum equal to that loss of revenue she would sustain. I do not think anything could be made of this idea, but I am inclined to believe that we could give him advantages in return for such a concession, by lowering the duties on timber *et cetera* from Memel. But I believe the whole subject had better be postponed to a more favourable opportunity; and you will, of course, not do anything further in it till you hear from me officially in answer to what you may have written upon it.”

*Copy.*

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, May 2, Queen’s House.—“I had flattered myself after the proposal of Lord Grenville that no further trouble would arise on the subject of Mr. Copley; but, yesterday, to my great surprise, Lord William Gordon came to Windsor at the desire of Lord Sydney with a memorial signed by several inhabitants of the houses adjacent to the Queen’s Walk, complaining of this erection as greatly detrimental to them, to which Lord Sydney had added a list of the chief of the other inhabitants who, he alledged, would also have signed this representation; they had sent also to Lord Orford, who had in consequence ordered the building to be discontinued, which order Mr. Copley had not attended to. As the idea had arisen from Lord Grenville, I did [not?] choose to give Lord William Gordon any directions, but referred him to the directions I should send through you subsequent to my arrival this day in town. I desire therefore Lord Grenville will see Lord William Gordon and see if there is any means of satisfying these gentlemen. Lord Sydney seems alarmed that a temporary erection will hurt the sale of his house, which seems unfounded; the letting coaches come down the narrow passage to the park may be a real nuisance and deserves consideration. On the whole I wish it was in Hyde Park, but I am not aware whether Lord Grenville may not be too far committed to render that practicable.”

## LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, May 4, Aranjuez.—“The messenger Slater arrived here on the 1st instant, and I lose no time in re-dispatching him with the enclosed note and counter note, which have been interchanged between myself and Count Florida Blanca upon the important business mentioned in your Lordship’s No. 1.

“The Spanish Minister’s reply seem to correspond pretty nearly with His Majesty’s views and expectations; and it would indeed be doing him an injustice were I to omit mentioning that he has manifested an extraordinary degree of facility and friendliness of disposition throughout the whole of this transaction. I must add that though for the present we have judged it most prudent not to communicate what has passed to any of the foreign Ministers here, it has been expressly agreed that His Majesty’s confidential servants are to be at full liberty to communicate the inclosed papers, in any manner, and to any extent, that they may deem advisable.

“M. de la Heras’s instructions are in great forwardness, and I have every reason to be persuaded that he will set out for England in a fortnight at the very latest.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1491, May 4, Hague.—“We have not yet received any news from England of a later date than the letters of the 26th February.

“The enclosed is a note from the Grand Pensionary relative to Mr. Fawkener and his instructions. I presume that the omission to which he adverts was designed; and there seem to be good reasons for it, if, which is always possible, the Empress should refuse to adopt any modification upon our requisition, reserving to herself to make peace with the Turks on terms which she may think just and reasonable. If she should answer that the overture already so repeatedly made by her contains her ultimate conditions; or even, if, under the impression of all the new circumstances, she should rise in her demands and insist on some cession beyond that of Ochzakow and its district; in any of these cases it appears best that Mr. Fawkener should come away without making any farther declaration. It is, however, most probable that the business will fall into a course of negotiation, and that the poor Turks, who can neither fight nor negotiate, will arrive somehow at a state of peace under our guaranty, and under that of Spain, which I have always thought very material. I wish that they may also obtain the guaranty of the Emperor joined to ours, and it is for his interest that they should. But it is impossible to frame conjectures about the Austrian politics, which, hitherto, appear to have neither system nor principle; and it is wonderful that the King of Prussia should have given even a momentary credit to a few vague phrases transmitted to him by the Emperor. *La feinte si peu necessaire, et si maladroite, de la disgrâce, de Monsieur Bishoffswerder, et son entrevue avec l’Empereur*, are now published in the Paris newspapers.

“One of the three propositions confided to Mr. Fawkener is *that the cession should be restricted to some boundary short of the Niester*. Would not our object be answered, even if the Niester should be the boundary, by a stipulation that the whole river and its navigation should

belong to the Turks? I continue to doubt whether the Poles, in the result, will be found to have any material interest in leaving that river subject only to the port [Porte]; and still farther, whether we should, at any rate, be benefited by facilitating that issue to the Polish commerce.

"M. de Kalitcheff, who saw Mr. Fawkenner on his passage, and who earnestly wishes the pacification, has remarked to me that some disadvantage will arise from the co-operation of M. de Goltz, who is on bad terms with the Russian Ministers. I have reason to believe that Mr. Fawkenner will see the utility of his treating personally and separately, as far as propriety will allow.

"It is very difficult to ascertain whether the fortress of Ochzakow is destroyed; but it certainly is so stated in the Comte de Bernstorff's paper, and, probably, by authority from Petersburg.

"The Duke of Brunswick has deferred proceeding towards the army on account of sickness, and is at Brunswick. The Princess of Orange suggested through me to Mr. Fawkenner that it might, in the result, prove very material for him to have seen the Duke for three or four hours in passing through Brunswick; and he will follow that advice if circumstances allow it."

VAN DE SPIEGEL [Grand Pensionary] to LORD AUCKLAND.

*Enclosed.*

"Il est impossible, My lord, d'être plus content de la conversation de Mr. Fawkenner, que je ne l'ai été; il possède toutes les qualités qui previennent en faveur d'un homme qu'on voit pour la première fois; et cet hereux talent fait beaucoup dans les affaires du monde; mais, outre cela, il me paroît tres instruit et nullement chaud. . . .

"Quant à ses Instructions, je les trouve sage et bein raisonnées; mais j'y aurais désiré quelque chose de plus décidé, au cas que l'Imperatrice se refuse à toutes les modifications proposées: ou qu'elle veuille pousser son dessein sur la Capitale Turque, ce qui paroît être le grand coup que Potemkin n'abandonnera pas facilement.

"Je viens d'ecrire à Hogguer . . . Je lui ai dit de se concerter, en tout, avec les Ministres des Alliés, et de se preter à toutes leur démarches, en autant que la Republique ne soit pas compromise ou engagée audelà de ses Instructions générales."

*French.*

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, May 5, Dublin Castle.—"The official letter of this evening will acquaint you with the prorogation of Parliament. At the advice and earnest intercession of the Chancellor and Speaker, I delayed from day to day for a week in expectation that the Tipperary Committee would make a report. A great sum of money has been spent in the contest for that county, and in the petition; and the absence of one member at the next session would annihilate their proceedings. Seeing, however, no prospect of a period to the Committee, I thought it improper to delay any longer. Have the goodness to send his Majesty's pleasure about the commissions vacated by the independent companies; I trust he will give the recommendation to me."

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

1791, May 5, St. James's Square.—“The hurry of the present moment prevents me from doing more than just informing you that His Majesty does not object to the two Marquisates and the two Viscountcies recommended by your Excellency; and that when the recommendation of Captain Henniker to succeed to Major Allen comes over, no difficulty will be made.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, May 6, St. James's Square.—“As a few hours may be material with respect to the object of the despatches which accompany this, I will beg you to delay the messenger as little as possible. You will see that your suggestion respecting the Russia trade has been adopted, or rather, indeed, anticipated. The measure is attended with some risk in one possible case, but I trust that is a very unlikely one. It is in order to remove almost the possibility of this case that the further alteration in the representation is now proposed. You judge perfectly right as to the reason of the omission adverted to by the Grand Pensionary. It is too long a task to discuss the speculations about the Niester; but my apprehensions of Russian influence in Poland, from that point being gained by her, are grounded on ideas the very reverse of her shutting up the commerce of that river.

“You have said nothing yet of the treaty of commerce.

“Redern was ordered to send his answer about the Emperor to the King himself, and not through any of his ministers. I suppose this points at Hertzberg. Whether the secrecy of the Berlin politics will be improved by their council remains to be seen. The famous French letter has been communicated here, and I mean to avoid giving any answer. I suppose this line will, if possible, be pursued in Holland.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Secret.

1791, May 6, Hague.—“I do not request you to do more than merely to read the enclosed letter. It would be matter of regret to me if you were to take the trouble either to return it or to give me any answer respecting it. *If* the instruction alluded to required what was done, I certainly have nothing to object to it, because there may be many possible reasons for it. If it did not, I ought, perhaps, to solicit your Lordship to direct, without referring to this particular incident, that the despatches may pass as usual through the Hague. I believe that there is not an instance in this century of any Minister in the German Courts, whatever might be his rank in the line, taking upon himself, whilst an Ambassador was resident here, to order away the packets; such a practice can never gain above half an hour in point of time (and in the present instance the messenger has remained above 36 hours wind-bound at Helvoet); exclusive also of the apparent slight, it leaves the Ambassador uncertain as to the course and conduct of the packet-boats, and it might often deprive him of occasions of forwarding important advices from other Courts to the Secretary of State. The mode, therefore, for which I contend will always be found eligible, though it may

sometimes happen that the despatches to be forwarded are of a nature not to pass under flying seal, nor to be opened by the Ambassador.

"I beg pardon for having said so much on a point so little worthy of your Lordship's attention. I have not entered into the subject with Mr. Ewart. He knows that I attribute all the present embarrassments to the fever and impetuosity of his mind; and he possibly may suspect that I regretted his late return to Berlin; but he also knows that I feel no prejudices so as to become knowingly unjust towards him on the one hand, or deficient in my duties on the other. He will not force me to lose sight of the latter sentiment, and I feel pleasure in giving full scope to it, subject to your Lordship's direction, during the short time that I may probably remain in this situation.

"I may be wrong in my conjecture as to Mr. Ewart's motive for eluding any remark of mine on the present occasion; but perhaps he is recurring to an idea perfectly consonant to the eagerness of his system; perhaps he is urging your Lordship and His Majesty's Ministers to send a fleet immediately into the Baltic. Such a proposition may be subject to considerations of which I am not informed; but if he had confided it to me I certainly should have answered that, to my apprehension, it would be incongruous in the extreme.

"The object of the measure of force, originally proposed, is in a great degree abandoned. Our present object cannot be either defined or appreciated; it is subject to a pending negotiation, which ought to have its fair and amicable course; otherwise it would have been more consistent and more dignified to have adhered to our original *projet*, and only to have modified it on the spot under the guns of our vessels, and under the advance of the Prussian army. In short, though the knowledge of our preparations and readiness, and even a naval exercise of our fleet in the northern ocean may possibly aid Messieurs Whitworth and Fawkener, it is certain that if we were to pass the Belt whilst the negotiation is going forwards, we should risk the failure of our whole measure. In submitting this (which however is perhaps superfluous) I beg leave to add that I offer the opinion also of the Grand Pensionary.

"Your Lordship does me the honour to ask whether it would have any bad effect if we suffered the subsidy treaty with the Landgrave of Hesse to expire (at the end, as I conceive, of) this year. I have a decided opinion that it is an expense which might be spared without danger or inconvenience. The Greffier has the same sentiment. The Pensionary thinks that it would be inexpedient at least to announce such an idea immediately, or till we are come to some settlement with the Emperor, or to some certainty as to the Austrian system. This will probably be attained within the next two months. Not having the treaty within my reach, I do not know what notice we are bound to give; but, if the time for the notice arrives, it surely might be risked; it will always be easy to recur to the renewal.

"The enclosed paper respecting the Society of the *Propagande* gives a terrible picture of the present madness of mankind. The Pensionary assures me that he obtained it from a good authority, and he had taken the trouble to copy it in his own handwriting. Your Lordship may, perhaps, wish to peruse it."

Enclosure Number 1.

J. EWART to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, April 30, Berlin.—"I am just come from having had a long and very satisfactory audience of the King of Prussia, who has agreed

to adopt the new representation to be made to Petersburg, and, in general, has entered into all the measures I proposed. I have scarcely had any conversation at all yet with his Ministers, but they seem all in very good trim, and indeed the King's conduct and everything else far surpasses my expectation.

"From what I have just learnt, I begin to think that even the Emperor's accession may be managed; but this affair is treated here with the greatest secrecy, and is concealed from the Ministers.

"As our principals directed me to transmit the result of my first audience with all possible expedition, I have been obliged to send the messenger with my hurried despatch straight to Helvoetsluys."

### *Enclosure Number 2. French.*

#### *Notions secretes sur la Société de la Propagande.*

1791, April 30.—"Le Club de la Propagande est bien different de celui des Jacobins que la plupart des personnes confondent. Les Jacobins sont les Instigateurs de l'Assemblée Nationale; et les Propagands sont les Instigateurs de l'Univers entier. Le Club existe depuis 1786; Messieurs de Rochefoucault, Condorcet, et l'Abbé Siéyes en font les principaux moteurs.

"Leur principes sont de former une société philosophique, qui devra gouverner les opinions de tous les hommes. Pour être de cette société il faut être philosophe, ambitieux, mécontent ou derangé. L'on s'engage par une simple parole donnée; mais cet engagement ne se fait qu'après l'exposition au recipiendaire du nombre des membres du club, qui, repandus sur toute la surface de la terre, usent de tous les moyens pour extirper les faux frères qui voudraient eventer le secret. Le recipiendaire donne sa parole de tout reveler à ses confrères, et de soutenir l'influence du peuple dans tous les Gouvernemens; de contrarier tout pouvoir arbitraire; et, enfin, de coopérer autant que possible à une tolérance parfaite. Tous ces engagements sont individuels; dans ce moment il ne s'agit que de propager la nouvelle doctrine. Les membres contribuant fournissent quatre louis par an: les riches donnent le double. Il y a environ 5,000 qui fournissent, et . . . 50,000 qui ne contribuent rien, mais qui sont dans tous les pays pour y répandre cette pretendue lumiere philosophique.

"La société se distingue en deux classes; aspirans et initiés. Les aspirans connoissent le but du Club; les initiés savent quels sont les moyens pour reussir. On ne devient d'aspirant initié qu'après avoir fait une mission philosophique, et avoir produit la preuve d'avoir recruté des proselytes. . . . Voici le premier principe; *La nécessité et l'opinion conduisent l'homme; faites en maitre la nécessité, ou maitrisez l'opinion, et vous changerez les systemes qui paroissent les plus solides.*

"Les Hollandois ont été très lents à se laisser seduire, mais l'idée d'une impulsion générale les a entraînés."

"Après vient un article non moins curieux, que voici: *L'effet de la propagande ne doit se tenter que lorsqu'on sera bien assuré de la nécessité, et il vaut encore mieux attendre cinquante années, que de manquer par trop de precipitation.*

"Une Société nombreuse qui n'agit que partiellement encore, qui amasse de l'argent, qui ne se presse en rien, qui ne veut tenter que des coups sûrs, paroît très dangereux; ses progrès peuvent être rapides, et sa destruction presque impossible.

"Les Hollandois fugitifs comptent sur la propagande comme une chose immanquable."

"Dans le Club des Amis du peuple . . . à Bruxelles, un harangueur a dit cette singulière phrase, qui fait voir à quel point ils sont entichés de la dangereuse nouveauté: *Par tout on forge des fers; mais la philosophie et la raison triompheront un jour, et la moment viendra que le Maître absolu de l'Empire Ottoman se couchera Despote pour se lever Citoyen.*"

*French.*

# LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 10, Hague.—"Dressin, after struggling 38 hours through an easterly wind, arrived here yesterday at 10 'clock, and proceeded with his despatches as soon as he was ready and had got the proper coins for the journey. He will arrive at Berlin early on the 14th, but Mr. Fawkenner will probably have set out from thence yesterday or even sooner. I repeated to Mr. Ewart your Lordship's recommendation to expedite the messenger, who certainly will arrive at Petersburg in good time for the important purposes of the dispatch, except only with respect to the change which was wished to be made in the Declaration. I apprehend that the *projet* will already have been transmitted to Copenhagen. It is however possible that the instruction sent to the Danish Minister at Petersburg may be discretionary. At the worst, the two other points, of not sending our armament pending the negotiation, and of allowing our merchant ships to proceed on their voyages, are so conciliatory in every sense that the other becomes less important.

"Your Lordship will have received a private letter from me of the same date with your despatch, in which I had the good fortune to urge the expediency of some ideas at that moment already adopted by you. It is flattering and encouraging to me beyond measure that this circumstance has happened to me repeatedly in the short course of our official correspondence.

Secret.

"I have not received any letter or despatch from Mr. Ewart on the subject of the change in the Prussian Ministry which took place on the 2nd and 3rd instant; but I have had the advantage of seeing all the letters both in and out of cipher which came on that occasion to M. Renfner, who has received a short letter to [from] the King to tell him that, in consideration of the talents and activity which he has lately shewn, he has appointed him first *Commis* of the new Department for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Ewart will of course have explained to your Lordship that the new Department consists of M. de Hertzberg, M. de Finckenstein, M. Schultenbergh, and M. D'Alvensleben. *Savez vous M. l'Ambassadeur (dit M. de Kalitcheff) que le Roi de Prusse, à fin de mieux conduire les grandes affaires de l'Europe, vient d'établir un Bureau, qui aura de l'esprit comme quatre.*

"It is quite impossible this new plan can go forwards, nor is it meant. M. Bishoffswerder means to force M. de Hertzberg to a resignation; and the latter (in a very confidential letter which I have seen) writes that he is only restrained by the private but earnest entreaty of the Prince of Prussia; in short, it is a curious scene of cabals. I am sincerely sorry that it will carry away Renfner from this place, for the Pensionary and I have had great reason to be satisfied with his conduct, in all respects,



from the time of some circumstances in which he thought himself under an obligation to us. He has discharged his duty faithfully, and so far as we have had occasion to trace, with perfect fairness. Schulemborg is said to have a good understanding; from what I have seen and heard I believe Alvensleben to be very moderately qualified for such a situation; but he is in great favour; and the salary now given to him is more than is given to M. de Hertzberg.

"The Dutch Ambassador at Constantinople applied some months ago to the Republic to sell some ships of war to the Porte. The Admiralties here are desirous to part with five or six vessels of the line for a fair price, having many more vessels than they can use or man. There is accordingly a wish to send some ships to Constantinople, but the difficulty is how to execute it. M. Rendorp came to-night to consult with me about it. I feel that such a measure might eventually prove of great consequence to the Turks, but I was unable to suggest any practicable mode. There is no difficulty as to the money. The embarrassment is how to send the ships; possibly it might be done as a mercantile transaction through some port in Spain.

"A plan is arranging here to send commissioners with very large appointments and powers to the Dutch East India Settlements.

"My first account of the severe check suffered by the Turks, though contradicted from Sistova, is since confirmed. There is also an account of a farther check to a Turkish detachment near Brailow.

"Your Lordship's remark respecting the influence over Poland which Russia might acquire by means of the Niester presents that object in a point of view which had not before occurred to me; the enclosed extract from M. de Reede's last despatch will throw some farther light on it.

"I postponed entering into your Lordship's question on the treaty of commerce, because you seemed to have a sufficient pressure of business. It is certain that the proposed *projet* would be of no use to us in the event of a war with Russia, but I am not aware that it could be of any dis-service to us in such an event. It does not occur to me that there are articles of importance likely to be sent as Russian property in Dutch vessels, and of a nature material to be prevented. And it would be creditable to give so hard a blow, as the treaty would give, to the system of the Armed Neutrality, and very desirable to establish so good a security to our alliance with the Republic.

"But my distress arises from another consideration; in my despatches during the last year on the commercial negotiation, I repeatedly and strongly urged the necessity of authorizing me to conclude whilst I had the assistance of certain individuals of weight here. I have gradually lost many of them, and, on the 31st March, I finally lost my respectable friend Van de Pol, who is out of the commission now, and reigning *Bourgeois maitre* at Amsterdam. The affair devolves, in great measure, on Messieurs Rendorp, Elias, Graafland . . . and I shall find it difficult to avoid having an unfriendly answer; but we are doing what we can, and your Lordship will see by the enclosed note that the Grand Pensionary does not despair. At any rate, I fear that we shall be urged not only to explain the point in the second article, which is a reasonable claim on their part, but to adopt some measure, however slight it may be, which may satisfy the *frondeurs* that, though we mean to maintain a free navigation through the Malaccas, we have no idea of interfering in the exclusive privileges which the Republic possesses within the islands by grants from the native Princes. I sometimes think that I shall best abridge the business by forcing the States-General to give me an answer to my letter, which has hitherto been suspended at my suggestion. Your Lordship is so fully master of the

subject, and of the difficulties, that you can relieve me, if the case is capable of being relieved."

"The affairs of the Netherlands are in a state of encreasing fermentation. I have certain information that M. de Mercy is beyond measure embarrassed. If the Austrian *morgue* would condescend to accept thankfully our ratification of the convention, and if it were accompanied or followed by some recommendation, on the part of the allies, to the several provinces to enjoy in tranquillity the blessings of their constitution thus guaranteed, the measure might become very important. I am surprised that M. de Stadion does not talk to your Lordship on the subject."

*Enclosure Number 1.*

A. W. VAN REEDE [to the GRAND PENSIONARY of HOLLAND].

1791, April 27, Warsaw.—Reporting the anxiety of the Poles to obtain an outlet for their commerce by the Black Sea; and the refusal of the Porte to accede to their overtures except on condition of an alliance against Russia.

*Enclosure Number 2.*

VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, May 10 [Hague].—Concerning the difficulty he finds in persuading the Dutch Ministers to accept the proposed commercial treaty with England.

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, May 13, Hague.—"Mr. Ewart, the impetuosity of whose mind cannot pardon an occasional difference of sentiment, seems decided to adopt a conduct towards me which would ill become him, even if our relative situations in life had been and were the reverse of what they happen to have been and to be. On this second occasion of sending a messenger with a positive order not to pass through the Hague, he again gave me a few lines of affected civility and attention, pleading great hurry, and taking no notice even of Mr. Hailes' and Mr. Whitworth's despatches which had come to him under flying seal directed to me, but which of course he forwarded by the messenger. The agent at the Brille came to me yesterday to know whether he is to obey these new orders and to what extent, particularly in the case which so frequently happens of there being only one packet boat on this side of the water. I avoided giving any answer, but must entreat your Lordship to protect me from the appearance of suffering under Mr. Ewart's ill graces, and (which is more material) to give your sanction for the business of the northern correspondence going on as it has hitherto done, which, I flatter myself, will be for your Lordship's satisfaction, and for his Majesty's service. At the same time, as I wish to avoid all *éclat* on these poor personalities, I submit the mode most implicitly to your Lordship.

"As I may be supposed not to be in charity with Mr. Ewart, which however I am, so far as private sentiment is concerned, it is painful to me to add what may seem like a criticism on the *projet* transmitted

from Berlin to be presented by Mr. Drake and the Prussian Minister at Copenhagen. But I greatly doubt whether it was expedient to commit ourselves by an official paper, in the position implied within the words, *le grand point étant de conserver aux Turcs la possession tranquille des deux bords du Niester*. On the one hand, it is possible that the intrinsic value of that great point to us may prove very inconsiderable; and, on the other, the instructions to Mr. Fawkener leave him some modes of adjusting the business according to which the boundary of Lake Telligoll is not to be insisted on. I also doubt the prudence of stating in a paper which the Court of Denmark will probably give to all Europe, and certainly to Russia, *qu'il paroit nécessaire d'établir un tel concert entre les différentes puissances, qui pourroit mettre les Turcs à l'abri de toute attaque future*. The reasoning is just, and is forcibly suggested in the instructions to Mr. Drake as important to be used in his conference; but I do not think that your Lordship meant it to be so set down in an official paper of conciliation towards the Court of Petersburg.

"In the correspondence from Warsaw, M. de Reede mentions an anecdote which I saw with concern. *Le Maréchal Malachowski vient de donner un spectacle très nouveau ici; c'est celui de voir un gentilhomme devenir bourgeois. Il en a prêté le serment, Vendredi. Cela à été reçu à merveille par le peuple. Plusieurs gentilshommes ont suivi cet exemple.*

"I look with horror to the propagation of these dangerous absurdities. Hitherto the French madness does not seem to make much progress in England, and the prosperity of the country will perhaps avert it, but the late debates in the House of Commons, and the nonsense talked by Lord Lansdowne and Lord Stanhope are of a dangerous tendency."

#### JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 13, Berlin.—"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's private letter of the 1st; and your very able instructions on the subject of the negotiation at Sistova, as well as your other despatches have already given this Court the highest confidence both in your abilities and punctuality, the want of which used formerly to be the great complaint here. Nothing can contribute so much to re-establish our influence at this Court, and to direct its proceedings, as such ample communications as those I have received from your Lordship.

"The new Cabinet here continues to transact business in a much better manner than was formerly done, though Count Hertzberg is very troublesome, reverting on every occasion to his projects of partition, which I am afraid he has again communicated secretly to Russia; but whatever inconsiderate steps he may take, with this view, their first effect will be to complete his own disgrace, without, I trust, doing much harm to public affairs.

"The King of Prussia is in daily expectation of receiving the Emperor's reply to his answer, and I hope the courier from Lord Elgin will soon arrive here. In the meantime, I have received, within the last few days, several private letters from Sir John McPherson, which state in strong terms His Imperial Majesty's determination to accede to the system of the Allies; that he had sent a new proposal of modification to the Empress of Russia, in conjunction with the King of Naples; and that he is determined to have an interview with the King of Prussia as soon as possible.

But, notwithstanding all these assurances, I confess I suspend forming any positive opinion on this affair till I hear from Lord Elgin; at the same time that I am more and more convinced the new state of things in Poland will be a strong additional motive for the Emperor's uniting cordially with the Allies.

"I need add nothing on the subject of the affair of Dantzic to what is stated in my despatches; but I conceive that a certain prospect of obtaining very extensive commercial advantages from an arrangement with the Emperor and Saxony, as well as with Poland, is offered by the new Polish Constitution."

LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 16, Aranjuez.—"It was no small mortification to me, after having observed your seal upon the outside of my last official packet, to learn from its contents that you had taken the Foreign Department only *ad interim*. However, I still indulge myself in the hope that the messenger will find you in full and established possession of it. I have only to observe, in addition to my No. 2, that the Spanish Minister is the more anxious that the British vessels now on their way to the South Seas should be effectually restrained from touching at any *bonâ fide* Spanish Settlement, as it is a matter in which he has himself a kind of personal interest; for, amongst the violent attacks made upon him as author of the late convention, it was particularly urged that he had thereby opened a door to an illegal intercourse between Great Britain and the Spanish Colonies, and that this would be the first and only real use which we should ever make of these rights to the fishery and fur trade that we had been seemingly so anxious to establish. For the rest, I am confident that, in consequence of the orders that he has sent to America, His Majesty's officers will meet with every kind of assistance in the execution of the service on which they are employed; and, indeed, I think that he has furnished a very strong proof of his dispositions in that respect, in the permitting me to carry away and copy the chart of the Gulf of Juan de Fuca, which I have included in my public letter.

"I hope that, if there should be any matter connected with this country or its colonies on which you should be desirous of obtaining particular information, you will not scruple employing me, as I shall always be happy to obey your commands."

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 17, Berlin.—"I trust your Lordship will not disapprove the contents of my separate letter No. 9, and I cannot sufficiently urge either the importance attached to the subject of it by this Court, or the decisive consequences your answer must have in confirming or destroying our credit and influence here. Supposing even that Russia should not be so obstinate as my information states (though I can tell your Lordship, in confidence, that I got it from Count Nesselrode) and that the Empress may be disposed to enter into discussion with Mr. Fawkeners, still the agreeing to the measure proposed would have a decisive effect both here and at Petersburg, while it would have a great influence upon the conduct of the Emperor. I am assured that Prince Potemkin treated with ridicule the idea of an English squadron going to the Black sea, after the sending one to the Baltic had been abandoned.

His conduct cannot be explained otherwise than that he is determined to sacrifice every consideration to his favourite object of procuring an independent principality for himself in the East, in which case, I was told, he would be very indifferent to what might happen to the Russian Empire in the North. Permit me only to repeat my conviction that everything here and elsewhere depends on your answer to the present proposal. I take the liberty of enclosing to your Lordship the copy of a private letter of mine to Colonel Bishofswerder on the subject of a conversation I had with the Saxon Minister, in consequence of which a letter has been written to him by his Prussian Majesty's order to the purport of what is proposed in the enclosed, that I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation."

*Enclosure.*

JOSEPH EWART to M. DE BISHOFSWERDER.

1791, May 15, Berlin.—“ Le Comte Zinzendorff vient de me lire la dépêche de sa Cour qui a accompagnée la réponse de l'Electeur au Roi dont vous aurez connoissance. Il me paroît évident par le contenu de ces deux pieces, que l'Electeur, quoique tres charmé du choix que les États de Pologne ont fait de lui, est extremément embarrassé sur le parti à prendre, par une suite de sa timidité naturelle, et qu'il est à apprehender que ses craintes et indecision pourroient le porter à ménager tout le monde, la Russie y comprise. J'ai fait cette observation au Comte Zinzendorff en y ajoutant que la moindre demarche de son maitre pour s'entendre ou se concerter avec la Cour de Petersbourg ne pouvoit manquer de relever, dans ce moment-ci, les esperances du parti Russe en Pologne, qui se trouvoit entierement écarté par le nouvel ordre de choses ; que, si cela arrivoit, il en resulteroit immanquablement des querelles entre les differens partis en Pologne, et bientôt la guerre civile ; qu'alors les Puissances voisines seroient forcées de s'en mêler, et les cartes seroient généralement brouillées. Que, de l'autre coté, si l'Electeur vouloit si concerter avec le Roi et l'Angleterre d'abord, pour donner de la consistance au parti préponderant en Pologne qui vient de frapper le grand coup, l'influence Russe seroit exclue, et le coup de grace donné à son parti. Zinzendorff est convenû de la justice de ce raisonnement, mais ayant parlé beaucoup d'autres Puissances voisines, je lui ai dit . . . qu'il étoit naturel que l'Electeur auroit fait des démarches pour s'entendre avec l'Empereur, et que, peut-être, dans ce moment-ci ses intérêts pourroient être conciliés avec ceux des Alliés et du parti dominant en Pologne, de maniere à assurer la nouvelle Constitution, et, en même tems, la tranquillité générale, pourvu toujours que la Russie fût entierement exclue, ou qu'il n'y eut que des ouvertures de simple forme et bienveillance faites par l'Electeur à l'Imperatrice. Zinzendorff est convenû qu'il y avoit lieu de croire que son maitre se seroit expliqué en termes généraux vis à vis de l'Empereur, mais qu'il pouvoit assurer qu'il n'auroit fait et ne feroit aucune demarche envers la Russie, sans la consentement du Roi. Dans cet état de choses, et vu l'indiscision de l'Electeur de Saxe, j'ose croire que ce seroit beaucoup gagner que de l'engager de prendre son parti de la maniere et par les motifs que je viens d'exposer, sans quoi le danger me paroît très éminent. Jugez encore quel intérêt nous avons de lier la partie à l'égard de la Pologne, dans la situation où nous trouvons vis à vis de la Russie. Quant à l'Empereur, il faut esperer que le courier du Lord Elgin arrivera incessamment, et alors, ou cas que la réponse soit

bonne, vous pourriez et devriez partir tout de suite, pour arranger cette grande affaire de la Pologne aussi bien que les autres, en passant par la Saxe. J'attends votre opinion sur tout ce qui est dessus, avec la plus grande impatience."

LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, May 17, Whitehall.—"As it is uncertain whether I shall be able to write to you by this mail on the points of public business now depending, I will confine myself in this letter to expressing the satisfaction which I feel from the general result of what has been done, reserving myself to write by another opportunity more particularly as to the several points of detail which occur.

"I am sorry that you have on the two last occasions adopted the measure of sending the messengers to England directly, without passing through the Hague. This deviation from the usual practice is productive of more than one inconvenience, and the difference in point of time is hardly ever sufficiently material to make it worth while. I was very happy to find by your letter to Mr. Pitt that your health has not suffered by the expedition of your journey."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, May 17, Whitehall.—"As it is uncertain whether I shall be able to write by this mail on the material points of public business depending, the object of this letter is only to acknowledge yours of the 13th, and to say that, before I received it, I had felt the necessity which there is for my writing to Ewart on the subject. I mean not to do it officially, because, if the point itself is settled, it is certainly desirable to avoid anything like *eclat*, and in this I am perfectly sure you agree with me.

"I feel the force of some of your criticisms, and I heartily wish that there was not a still more solid objection to the *projet* for the Russian declaration. On the whole, however, the business is, I think, in as good a train as we could have any reason to hope it could be by this time. Much, however, still remains to be done, and the interval is one of no small anxiety."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 17, Hague.—"Dressin having left this place on the 9th, about 30 hours before Mr. Fawkener left Berlin, will certainly overtake him before he arrives at Petersburg, and perhaps even at Warsaw. Mr. Fawkener cannot be expected to be at Petersburg before the 23rd or 24th, and his first despatches from that place will probably reach your Lordship about the middle of June. He seems to enter perfectly into his instructions; and the Polish event and general appearance of circumstances promise a good conclusion of the negotiation.

"It is impossible for Mr. Hailes's excursion to be otherwise than well meant, but I greatly doubt whether it is well judged. He quits the scene of action in the midst and at the height of its crisis, and the motive of his doing so is open to a mischievous construction at the two Imperial Courts.

"I have seen a copy of the King of Prussia's answer to Mr. Ewart, circulated to the Ministers of Prussia. It mentions flatly, and without disguise, Lord Elgin's journey, and its general object, respecting which the utmost secrecy had been maintained here by the Pensionary, and by me.

"I have not a copy of the instrument, but in your Lordship's office there is the guaranty of the three Courts to the Polish Constitution."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD FITZGIBBON.

1791, May 21, St. James's Square.—"The Duke of Gloucester has directed me to write to your Lordship on the subject of a dispute which has arisen in the College of Dublin, of which he is Chancellor. You are probably not unapprized of the nature of the points in question, which he understands can only be settled by a decision of the Vice-Chancellor, who is visitor of the College. The Primate has written to him from Bath, to state the great uncertainty of his being able to go over to Ireland, so as to hear and decide on this question, and has therefore proposed to resign the Vice-Chancellorship as soon as the Duke has determined on the nomination of a successor. No person appears so proper, on every account, as your Lordship, and the Duke has therefore directed me to express to you his wish that you would accept this office, either permanently, or *pro hac vice* until the matters now in dispute are finally settled. If you will have the goodness to acquaint me with your decision as to this request, I will take the earliest opportunity of submitting it to His Royal Highness, who is anxious to bring the business to a conclusion as soon as circumstances will allow."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Secret.

1791, May 24, Hague.—"I incline to believe that the report of the Empress's intention to demand Ackerman and the mouth of the Niester, which your Lordship will see stated from the Warsaw letters in the *Leyden Gazette* of this day, is without any foundation in truth; and that whatever M. de Bulzakow may have insinuated in order to maintain a falling credit at Warsaw, the Empress will, in no event, exceed her demand of Ockzakow and the district; and, possibly too, that she will give way to some modification. I am more uneasy respecting the designs of the other Imperial Court, and if Lord Elgin's despatches from Italy prove in any degree satisfactory, they will go far beyond my speculations. The enclosed short letter on this subject seems to merit a cursory perusal, and therefore I have the honour to transmit it.

"It appears by the last letters from Warsaw that the Grand Vizir had advanced towards Brailow, and had gained some small advantages against the Russians."

*Extrait.*

1791, May 17, Berlin.—“Vous serez, sans doute, informé en détail . . . du plan d'alliance entre l'Empereur, la Prusse, et l'Angleterre, auquel nous devons accéder. Cela se traite à l'insu du Comte de Hertzberg, et je ne sais guères, encore, la chose que par lambeaux. Je le crois l'idée du Duc [de Brunswick], et que ce Prince a dressé les instructions de M. de Bishoffswerder, quand il est parti pour Vienne en faire la proposition. L'Empereur paroissoit la goûter. Je le crois aisément, mais on m'assure que le Prince Kaunitz tient à ce que la Russie y soit comptée, ce qu'on ne veut pas. Je me tiens très passif sur tout ceci.”

“Je verrois puit-être, en mon particulier, ce plan avec regret, comme la perte de la Prusse, et le tombeau de l'alliance. Pour les premiers moments la paix seroit retablie par là, mais il est impossible que les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin vivent ensemble comme des vrais amis. Leurs Ministres tripoteront en Allemagne, et l'aigreur s'en suivra.”

“Voilà ce que je prédis des négociations actuelles qui tireront merveilleusement d'affaire, si elles réussissent, le Ministère Anglois. Mais la Cour de Berlin en sera la dupe.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, May 24, Whitehall.—“I have little to add to my public letters by this messenger, and write this chiefly for the purpose of repeating to you in this form what I have there said of the full satisfaction which is felt here in the general result of what has passed, and of the sincere concern which I should feel if the few observations which I have thought myself obliged to make on particular points of detail should convey to your mind any different impression. I earnestly hope that the new arrangement at Berlin may, among other beneficial effects, produce a much greater degree of secrecy than before in the conduct of business, and I must request you to give to this point a particular and unremitting attention, it being of indispensable necessity with a view to that system of entire confidence which it is so much my wish to keep up between the two Courts. You know how much reason we have had to complain on this subject, and the importance of a contrary line in the conduct of all business of this sort is sufficiently obvious; but its particular importance with a view to the situation of a Government in this country cannot be conceived by any person who has not been in a situation to feel it. In this point of view the mode of carrying on so much of the business at Berlin by written notes is particularly objectionable. I observe that your note and the Prussian answer to it have been sent to Count Lucchesini, and even to M. Knobelsdorff, and I cannot help fearing they may have gone further. Besides the delicate particulars respecting our situation, internal and external, into which those papers enter, they refer to the object of Lord Elgin's mission. So much reserve was thought necessary here on that subject that I said nothing of it to Count Stadion, or even to Count Redern or M. Nagell; nor was it communicated at the Hague except to the Grand Pensionary and Greffier. The mischief which has arisen and may still arise from a public discussion of measures still depending, grounded on information which gets out at Berlin, is inconceivable; and I must again entreat you never to lose sight of this point yourself,



and to omit no opportunity of impressing it upon the minds of the Prussian Ministers.

"In the case of a total rejection of all modification of the *status quo*, the Allied Courts could certainly not make themselves in any manner contracting parties to the conclusion of a peace on the ground of the entire cession demanded by the Empress. But it would still be desirable that the Turks should conclude on that basis, and look for their future security to the guaranties of other powers. Much would in that case depend on the skill and judgment of the persons employed by the two Courts to suggest to the Grand Vizir the measures which he ought to adopt. I have entertained the idea of sending from this country a person for that purpose, but I have hitherto been deterred by the fear of embarrassing the business by too many separate negotiations, though tending to the same point. I wish, however, to know from you whether any such person is to be sent from Berlin, or whether the business is to be entrusted to Knobelsdorff, and, in either case, what reliance is to be placed on the talents of the person so employed. You will readily see how desirable the conclusion of a separate peace would be, either on the ground of the modifications now in question, or if Russia refuse them, then on the ground of the entire cession of Okzahow and its district; and I trust therefore that you will keep this point in view.

"The conversations with Lord Elgin, however promising in appearance, go no further than words, and I am convinced nothing decisive will be done till the interview takes place. You will, I conclude, not think a formal order necessary to accompany the King of Prussia to that interview whenever it takes place."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. FAWKENER.

1791, May 24, Whitehall.—"Although I have nothing particular to add to my public letter by this messenger, I cannot let him go without acknowledging the receipt of your's, and expressing my satisfaction in the state of the business as far as it has hitherto gone. By what I learn with respect to Denmark, you have nothing to expect from that Court in the way of co-operation or support; and in truth what hopes I entertain of a successful issue of your negotiation are chiefly grounded on my knowing that whatever can be done will be done by you, and on my idea of the great reluctance which the Empress will feel to continue her present ruinous expense with so little prospect of deriving solid benefit from it, and so much uncertainty as to the advantage which Prussia may take of any incident unfavourable to her which may arise. In the meantime Poland seems now to have slipped out of her hands completely, and it is impossible not to rejoice at it."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, May 24, Whitehall.—"I have received yours of the 17th. Lord Elgin's despatches are so voluminous that they could not have been copied without delaying the messenger another day at least. Their result is stated in the despatch to Ewart, and is, on the whole,

favourable as far as words go ; but this has been so often the case that I suspend my opinion till I see the effects. I hear much from all quarters of the desperate attempt which the French *Aristocrates* are meditating. I wish you could learn for me whether this is encouraged or not by the Austrian Government in the Netherlands. Mr. Hailes's conduct is nothing less than judicious. The Polish event I am inclined to think very favourable."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1791, May 24, Whitehall.—"It having been determined to send a person to America without delay, who should be authorised to assume the character and deliver the credentials of Minister there on His Majesty's part, in certain cases which will be explained to you, I have had the honour of submitting to His Majesty your name for this mission, and the King has been pleased to approve of this nomination. It is therefore extremely important that you should use the utmost expedition in your return to this country, as the season is already so far advanced as to make it desirable that no time shall be lost in your proceeding to America."

*Copy.*

W. FAWKENER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 24, St. Petersburg.—"I arrived here this morning early, after having travelled fourteen nights and thirteen days, with all the expedition I could make. I was detained some hours at Riga, and at Narva, as it happened that I passed through both these places in the night; and I was detained at several posts for want of horses. I hope therefore your Lordship will not think I have been dilatory.

"Mr. Whitworth wrote this morning to the Vice-Chancellor to acquaint him with my arrival, and to desire he would be pleased to fix a time when I might deliver your Lordship's letter to him. He sent a verbal message to say he would soon return an answer, but we have not yet heard from him, and it is seven o'clock. I have waited as long as I could in hopes of being able to inform your Lordship of the hour he might appoint.

"I have had a long conversation with Count Goltz, who seems disposed to act in the fullest and most cordial concert with us; to-morrow the joint representation is to be delivered to the Vice-Chancellor.

"Nothing could be more friendly, or kinder, than Mr. Whitworth's reception of me; he has given me an apartment in his house, and shown me every mark of confidence and attention. I think I may venture to assure your Lordship that His Majesty's service will not suffer by any disagreement between us."

LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, May 25, Whitehall.—"I write this in answer to your letter marked private of the 17th instant. You will readily conceive how much we regret the necessity of incurring that risk, which you state as probable

in the event of our not complying with the request for sending a fleet into the Black Sea. But the same circumstances which compelled the departure from the original line adopted, operate with at least equal force against our recurring partially to it. I do not mean to give you a positive opinion which shall apply to every possible case that might be supposed; very exorbitant demands on the part of the Empress, very insolent language towards this country, or proof of a real disposition in other powers to act in order to prevent the too great progress of the Russian arms, might alter our situation. But, as we now stand, if we were to give assurances of active support, we must give them (to whatever case they applied) under the impression that it might be impossible to fulfil them. It is therefore extremely important that, whatever may be the effect of speaking plainly, we should do so and not have to reproach ourselves, or suffer Prussia to reproach us with any intentional deceit. To our defensive alliance, as such, we certainly can and will adhere, but the degree of active share which we may be able to take in those political measures which might be advantageous to our system, must depend on circumstances for which, as yet, it is impossible to answer. You will at once see how strongly this reasoning applies to the case of the revolution in Poland, and to the subject of your letter to Count Zinzendorff, upon which it is absolutely necessary that this country should not be pledged one step beyond assurances of good wishes and amicable dispositions, such as I have stated in my despatch to Mr. Hailes. I am indeed strongly of opinion that the Prussian Government should proceed with caution on that subject, and not commit themselves too far till there is more ground for reasoning on the probable issue of the business than they seem as yet to be in possession of. At the same time I entirely agree with you in thinking that the establishment of an hereditary monarchy in Poland on the footing now proposed, if it can be carried without involving Prussia in war with the Imperial Courts, is a point advantageous to our common interest."

JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 25, Berlin.—"The eagerness of the King of Prussia to have an interview with the Emperor, and to engage him to accede to the system of the Allies, seems to increase daily, though the measure, if public, would be by no means popular here; but this is of little consequence in this country, and I trust your Lordship will approve of the contents of my letter to Lord Elgin, and the other steps I have taken in regard to this business.

"The revolution in the Polish government is likewise far from being popular here, but the King having taken his resolution to support it, and the Polish nation being so unanimous, there seems to be little doubt of its succeeding, especially if Poland be combined in the system of guarantee and consequently alliance, which the Emperor seems so desirous to have accomplished. I say *consequently alliance*, as your Lordship told me there could be no objections in case the Emperor became a party.

"I thought it right to acquaint Mr. Hailes with the general state of what had been settled here, but I never expected he would make so official a use of the information I gave him as he has done, though it seems to have produced a good effect, and cannot do harm, I should

hope, as the overtures would be made at Petersburg and elsewhere before any intelligence on the subject could arrive from Warsaw.

"I need not observe to your Lordship that the same objections exist to the idea of a son of Prince Ferdinand of Prussia marrying the Infanta of Poland as to that of the King's son; and I can venture to assure, therefore, that it will never be listened to by his Prussian Majesty.

"I am extremely happy to acquaint your Lordship that it is impossible to behave better, in every respect, than the Duke of York does; and the King of Prussia, though much prejudiced against His Royal Highness at first, treats him with the greatest affection, which produces a very good effect. His Prussian Majesty has frequently spoke to him on business, but without mentioning any of the secret or delicate points; and His Royal Highness has shown great discretion on this and every other occasion; holding no party language."

#### JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 25, Berlin.—"I am very sorry to acquaint your Lordship that some English officers, who brought the official letters of recommendation, after a great deal of bad behaviour, sallied out drunk the night before last, attacked every person they met, particularly the military and the sentinels, and were with great difficulty restrained by a detachment of the guard, which happily behaved with so much coolness, in a very serious affray that ensued, as to prevent any lives from being lost. I need not observe to your Lordship what a serious thing such conduct in officers would be in any country, but especially in this, and what a disagreeable effect it must produce in the public opinion here. General Moellendorff and the other superior officers of the garrison have behaved remarkably well, and the King has been pleased to overlook this shameful business; but still it makes a great noise. The persons concerned are gone off, and I avoid giving their names; but I beg leave to represent to your Lordship how necessary it is that official letters should be given to none but proper people; and to suggest with respect to officers, of whom there is generally so many here, that they should bring a recommendation from their colonel or commanding officers, which would be, at the same time, a certificate of their good behaviour. I ask pardon for troubling your Lordship on such a subject, but it is really of great importance here, and my situation both public and private is very much affected by it.

"I am happy to acquaint your Lordship that the Duke of York's conduct on this occasion has been everything that could be wished. He left nothing undone, either in point of advice or example, to restrain the riotous English, whom he never allowed to come into his company."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD ST. HELENS.

Private.

1791, May 25, Whitehall.—"I am much obliged to you for your kind expressions, and rather believe that it is probable that the wishes you are so good as to form for my continuance here may be realised. I trust Count Florida Blanca will be satisfied with what is said on the subject of restraining our ships from touching at the Spanish Settlements, which is a point on which we are sincerely bent, as a matter of good faith.

"What are we to think of M. Galvez's conduct? Does Whitworth represent it too strongly, or is it in direct contradiction to the assurance you have received? The circumstances of the present moment make it extremely important to ascertain this point. The sincere co-operation of Spain might do much towards the conclusion of the peace on the terms we wish; and, without it, the Empress may go on till the Court of Madrid find that they have acquiesced too long.

"I regret sincerely everything that tends to the spreading of the calamities under which France now groans, and I heartily wish that the endeavours of Spain for that purpose may be effectual. There is a strong belief here that the Court of Madrid have contributed money towards the attempt which the Prince de Condé certainly means to make. No answer was returned by me to the communication of M. de Montmorin's famous letter, except a few words of civility, when the paper was delivered to me by M. de la Luzerne, expressing verbally the King's sincere wish for the happiness of the French King and people. God knows they are both far enough removed from it at present.

"What should you think of Gardiner for Hammond's successor. I should be sorry to send anybody who was disagreeable to you. He is now in the Netherlands with a sort of unavowed character, which must cease, and with it his allowance, when the inauguration takes place, and he is in no situation to bear the loss of that income."

*Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 26, Dublin Castle.—"I have, by this post, sent you the official recommendations for the promotion of Lords Donegal, Drogheda, Welles, and Harborton; and likewise for Mr. Boyd, who was second counsel to the Revenue, to succeed Sir Samuel Bradstreet on the King's Bench. The latter is an implied engagement of Government of long standing. Boyd is strongly recommended by the Chancellor, and spoken well of by the Attorney-General and other lawyers. Have the goodness to express how much I am flattered by his Majesty permitting me to convey the mark of his favour to the establishment in the promotion of officers to the vacancies made by the independent companies.

"You have, enclosed, the correspondence on the complaint of Montgomery. I should be obliged, if the King knows anything of the matter, if you would tell me what you think he would wish should be done; or if the King does not, what you think might suit his judgment in the business. I could not embrace your hint of compelling Kay to sell to the regiment, for Montgomery seems equally culpable in offering as Kay is in asking a price above the regulation. No dispensation has been given here to dispense with the usual certificates of paying no more than the regulated price on promotions, though both the culprits have pretended that excuse. I should, however, be very apprehensive, if a court-martial was held upon them, that a court composed of persons who have been concerned in similar transactions would adopt this excuse to acquit both parties; and that any public notice without punishment would tend to encrease these negotiations.

"In the hurry that you seem to have in England nothing can be more agreeable than an assurance of everything being quiet and peaceable here. Some money has been spent to circulate Paine's *Rights of Man* very cheap. A Monsieur Monbret, Consul from France, is gone to the north. I will have a close watch on his transactions.

"In the many changes talked of for political affairs, I hope I am not likely to lose my correspondent."

*Enclosing a copy of correspondence on the subject of a proposed sale of Lieutenant-Colonel Kay's commission to Major Montgomery, for a sum exceeding the price fixed by regulation.*

LORD FITZGIBBON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, May 27, Dublin.—"I request of you to present my duty to the Duke of Gloucester, and to assure him that I am highly sensible of the very honourable mark of His Royal Highness's confidence, which he has directed your Lordship to communicate to me.

"I cannot hesitate to comply with the Duke's desire that I should accept the office of Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dublin. But your Lordship will, I hope, have the goodness to represent to His Royal Highness that unless I receive his commands to act merely during the pendency of the present controversy between the Provost and Senior Fellows, I shall feel some reluctance in accepting a mere temporary appointment. Our college being a Royal foundation, the Keeper of the Great Seal is its natural visitor, and if I am to be appointed Vice-Chancellor of the University *pro tempore*, avowedly to make me a visitor for a particular purpose, I very much fear that it would be made a ground of complaint against my decision of the points now in dispute by the party against whom that decision may happen to be."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 27, Hague.—"I have received a letter from Lord Elgin, which accompanies the one in cipher that I have the honour to forward to your Lordship; but as it was neither practicable nor proper for him, by such a conveyance, to confide to me the detail of his conferences with the Emperor, I have a very imperfect notion of the result to be expected from that negotiation. I think however that your Lordship's sentiments respecting the Imperial assurances were not more sanguine than mine; and I fear that the event will not surpass our expectations. Little will be obtained beyond good words and vague phrases; and nothing will be specifically done that may facilitate and enforce the objects of Mr. Fawcner's mission. This conduct, under the circumstances of the moment, has the appearance and perhaps the effect of system and of deep policy; but I suspect it to be constitutional, and that it will characterize the whole of His Imperial Majesty's reign. And yet I do not despair of his acceding, at least, to the principles of our defensive alliance, and of his joining earnestly with Great Britain in maintaining the peace and the balance of Europe. But it must be distinct from the present difficulty, from which he will not help to extricate us; and separate also from whatever is connected with the conventions of Reichenbach, in respect to which he shares all the harsh and impracticable prejudices of his two Ministers, Prince Kaunitz and M. de Cobenzel. If this view of things is true, we have only to wait patiently till we hear from Petersburg.

"Exclusive of the Emperor's inclination to peace, and to the pursuits of political economy, he has other motives to be well with us. M. de Mercy now avows without scruple his conviction that *the perverseness*

of the Belgic provinces is such as to make it impossible to derive anything from them but expence and vexation, unless a general pacification can be accomplished, together with the goodwill and friendship of England and of this Republic. It is also probable that the Emperor is looking, though with great caution, for an opportunity of interfering in the affairs of France; it is even said that he is assembling a small body of troops in Brisgau, towards the frontiers of Alsace. The moment for such an interference may soon arrive, for the confusions of France seem to be drawing to their crisis, and a bankruptcy is coming within sight, in the shape of a depreciated paper money. In short, there are abundant and good reasons for the Emperor's acceding to our system; but I believe that our end would be better attained by a direct communication from your Lordship, through M. de Stadion and Lord Elgin, than through Colonel Bichoffsawerder, whose talents and judgment (if I am not greatly misinformed) are very unequal to the part which he is playing.

"I enclose the copy of a letter from the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires at Mayence; it is well written, and may afford a moment's amusement."

*Enclosed.*

GEORGE ERNEST LUISNES [to the Grand Pensionary].

1791, Mai 22, Mayence.—"L'Electeur a eu, du coté de Manheim, une conférence avec le Prince de Condé, l'Eveque de Spire, et le Cardinal de Rohan. L'endroit qu'ils avoient choisi pour leur congrès est très petit; ils étoient mal à leur aise; mais cet embarras rendoit leur effort plus glorieux, selon leur opinion. On ne seroit pas étonné de voir les Princes Allemans, lésés par les décrets de l'Assemblée Française, conférer ensemble sur les moyens de se faire justice; qu'ils fassent retentir de leurs plaintes tous les Cabinets de l'Europe. Il n'y a rien à dire. On leur a ravi leur propriété; ils ont été dépouillés de leurs droits; rien n'est plus juste que leur reclamations. Mais cette ligue avec les François mécontents, dont les intérêts n'ont rien de commun avec les leurs, est une absurdité. Il est vrai qu'il n'y a que l'Electeur de Mayence, et l'Evêque de Spire qui aient contracté cette fraternité. Mais les droits honorifiques, contestés, imaginaires, que reclame le premier, ne valent pas les fraix du voyage qu'il vient de faire.

"Le Comte d'Artois, et le Prince de Condé, ont envoyé leurs diamans au Lombard à Francfort; mais ils n'ont pas trouvé d'argent. De toutes les nouvelles de contre-revolution que j'ai recueillies depuis quelque tems, celle-ci est la plus authentique.

"On est accablé des François ici; tous gens de qualité. La crasse ignorance sur tout ce qui est étranger, caractérise encore cette nation. La plupart croient que l'Electeur est payé par l'Empereur; et ils ne cessent d'admirer la munificence de sa Majesté, qui donne de si gros appointemens à Monsieur l'Electeur. Une dame Bretonne, avec qui ce prelat septuagenaire est aux petits soins, étoit étonnée d'entendre quelqu'un parler Allemand; j'ai cru, disoit-elle, qu'il étoit Prussien.

"Le Comte de Repaire, un des Gardes du Corps qui se sacrifierent la nuit du cinq Octobre, est a Worms. L'Electeur desira voir cet homme respectable. On l'en informa, et quoique souffrant encore, il vint ici. Mais on n'avoit pas pensé à son rang. On fut embarrassé pour savoir s'il avoit le grade de capitaine. M. O'Kelly leva ce doute important, en attestant qu'il étoit Colonel. S'il n'avoit été que Lieutenant, il n'auroit pu manger avec l'Electeur, quand il auroit sauvé toutes les reines de l'Europe."

## LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, May 29, Aranjuez.—“I take the liberty of recommending to your Lordship's protection and good graces the bearer, M. las Heras, the new Spanish Consul-General. He appears to me to be very sensible, well-informed, and *right-headed*; so that I am persuaded that he will do his best in order to execute the commission with which he is charged, to the satisfaction of both Courts.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 30, Hague.—“I will not detain the departure of the messenger farther than to say that, on receiving your question respecting the views at present attributed so generally to the *Aristocrates*, I transcribed it on a slip of paper and sent it to the Grand Pensionary as a question from myself. The following is his answer :—

*“Je n'ai rien reçu relativement aux Aristocrates François que ce que vous trouverez dans l'incluse; et je ne crois pas que le Gouvernement Autrichien des Pays-Bas s'en mêle encore. Ce seroit le comble de témérité, si les Aristocrates avec une poignée d'hommes, osoient entamer les frontières de la France. Ils guetteront, peut être, le moment où le peuple, pressé par le besoin, se portera à des extrémités, et que le tout tombe un peu davantage en confusion. En ce cas là, ils pourroient augmenter le trouble. Toujours me semble-t-il que la bombe doit crêver dans le centre.”*

*“Mais une chose qui merite aussi attention est que M. Gouvernet sera accompagné de personages très remuants, comme les autres missions en sont également remplies, tout pour surveiller la conduite du Ministre, que pour propager la nouvelle doctrine.”*

“If the enclosed extract gives an account applicable to many of the *illustres réfugiés*, their exertions will not be very efficient; and yet, certainly, under a good leader, they might have a favourable concurrence of circumstances.

“I feel the justness of the opinion of His Majesty's Ministers that the Polish event is favourable; it certainly may contribute both to the immediate pacification and to the future balance of the several surrounding powers; but I doubt whether it can be considered as fortunate in its probable results to the Court of Berlin.

“It is impossible to conceive a more complete body of instructions than those of which the despatches by Brookes form a part; and if it were possible to diminish the ardour and increase the discretion of some of us who are concerned in them I should have no doubt of their complete success.”

*Extrait.*

1791, le 26 Mai, Mayence—“Quand l'Electeur étoit à Worms, les forestiers vinrent lui faire des plaintes très fortes de la dévastation de ses chasses, causée par les François. Ses bailiffs en firent de plus graves encore du dégât horrible que ces étrangers faisoient aux prés, et aux champs des laboureurs, en les parcourant à cheval par vingtaines. . . . L'Electeur irrité, en parla au Prince de Condé, qui fit des remontrances à son fils, le Duc de Bourbon, chasseur déterminé. Mais le Duc de Bourbon déclara, nettement, que si on l'empêchoit de chasser à son gré, il retourneroit en France, et se donneroit à la Nation.



"Le Duc d'Enghien, son fils, ne fait que courir les cabarets pour danser; et pour trouver des filles. Le Prince de Condé lui en fit, aussi, de remontrances; mais le Duc déclara, positivement, qui si on l'empêchoit de danser et d'avoir des filles, il retourneroit en France, et se donneroit à la Nation. Le malheureux grand-pere a dit, *si j'insiste, ils me haïront et m'abandonneront.*"

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, May 31, Berlin.—"I enclose to your Lordship an extract of the last dispatch received from the Prussian Minister at Stockholm, stating the terms in which General Armfeldt and the King of Sweden expressed themselves to him respecting the actual intentions of Russia, as the information is very similar to that stated in my dispatch No. 9, and advices to the same effect have been received here from different quarters.

"On the other hand, I am informed on pretty good authority that the Russian emissary, Lascarow, is returned to the Turkish camp; but I need not observe to your Lordship that this may be done to amuse the Turks till the preparations are completed on the Black Sea.

"The King of Prussia has received a letter from the King of Sweden, full of professions of friendship, and of his desire to cultivate the most cordial intimacy; but that his present situation made it necessary for him to be very cautious and not to give umbrage to Russia. He announces his visit to Germany in a manner that seems to indicate his readiness to receive proposals from hence. From all the late information from Stockholm, this Court conceives that there is not much danger of the King of Sweden's suddenly closing with Russia, but your Lordship will be best able to judge of this from Mr. Liston's letters."

*Enclosure 1.*

GENERAL ARMFELDT to M. DE BROCKHAUSEN.

"Voulez vous savoir ce que l'Imperatrice fera? Instruite de la vivacité de l'Opposition en Angleterre, de la repugnance de la nation Angloise pour cette guerre, elle ne réjettera point vos propositions, mais elle trainera la réponse, et tâchera de gagner du tems. En attendant, elle avancera vers le centre de l'Empire Ottoman; car je sais, de science certaine, que le plan du Prince Potemkin est d'agir defensivement par terre, et d'employer tous les moyens pour rendre la flotte dans la Mer Noire assez redoutable de pouvoir attaquer Constantinople, qu'elle prendra facilement, si elle l'attaque avec 20 à 30,000 hommes de troupes de débarquement, et si le Général Suvarow se trouve à la tête. Aucun arrangement, aucune mesure de defense pour garantir les Dardanelles! Tout y semble être abandonné au gré du destin. Les rapports de quelques officiers Suedois nous en donnent la confirmation. Au reste, le Comte Stakelberg arrivera sous peu. La base de ses instructions de détacher le Roi irrévocablement des intérêts de la Porte, et de lui faire adopter un autre système. On lui offrira en retour les avantages plus considérables."

*French.*

*... causé qu'à  
none with other*

*Enclosure 2.*

GUSTAVUS III., KING OF SWEDEN, to M. DE BROCKHAUSEN.

"Me garantirez vous ce subside dans tous les cas : c'est-à-dire, si Constantinople est prise, et les Turcs chassés de l'Europe ? Car voici ma prophétie. Tandis que l'Impératrice négociera avec les Cours Alliées, tandis qu'elle fera semblant de céder pour ne point provoquer une rupture subite, on se préparera sur la Mer Noire à la conquête de Constantinople. Rien ne s'y opposera du côté des Turcs fuyans et battus partout. Les Dardanelles sont dans le plus mauvais état de défense. Un de mes officiers nommé Rosenblad, excellent officier de génie, que j'y ai laissé même après la paix de Verela, m'en a fait tout récemment la description la plus pitoyable. Son conseil d'établir des batteries à fleur d'eau a été rejeté sous toute sorte de prétextes frivoles, et présentement tout est à depourvu. Une flotte Russe, quelque mauvaise qu'elle soit, n'a qu'à se présenter, et la confusion, et le desespoir qui s'emparera de cette masse incohérente de peuple fera le reste.

"Si M. Fawkenor qui se rend à Petersbourg demandera une réponse catégorique, je crains qu'on n'en sera choqué intérieurement, et que cela ne confirmera l'Impératrice dans sa résolution primitive de faire la paix sans intervention étrangère. La seule chose, à mon avis, qui puisse peut-être obvier à ces malheurs, c'est de proposer un armistice à la Russie. Peut-être, cet arrangement ne sera pas refusé, et alors, au moins, les Turcs pourront respirer.

"En attendant, je dois écouter les propositions que me portera le Comte Stakelberg, et je verrai si les Turcs succomberont sans ressource, ou si on pourra les sauver."

*French.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, May-July, Downing Street.]—"My only doubt is whether you should not state, more directly, the distinction between us and Prussia, arising from their treaty with the Porte. I should be inclined to say that His Majesty's *immediate* reasons for wishing the instructions to be sent to the Porte are his desire for peace, his persuasion that it is for the interest of the Porte to accept these terms, and his wish that there should be no appearance of England and Prussia not acting in concert. But that, in case of the continuance of the war, His Majesty can have no share in it, as he certainly means to fulfil the engagements which his Ministers have entered into with the Empress. That the Court of Berlin will necessarily adopt the same line, unless they disavow their Minister at Petersburg, which seems not probable, and that they are peculiarly interested in accelerating the pacification, as the only means of relieving them from the dilemma of choosing between their alliance with the Porte and the engagements now entered into with Russia.' I think it may be of consequence to prevail on the Court of Berlin to send *pressing* instructions to the Porte to agree, and something like this language seems to be the most probable way of doing so."

LORD HENRY JOHN SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

aux  
remontrances  
le Duc de Bourgne  
à son gré, il retournera.

June 3, Hague.—"Lord Auckland thinks that he ought to lay before your Lordship for your private perusal, on

account of the second paragraph. At the same time he desires me to mention that Mr. Hogguer's experience of a few days at the Court of Petersburg does not entitle his opinion to much serious regard, unless supported by other circumstances."

VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

*Enclosed.*

1791, June 3 [Hague].—"Il y a peu de nouvelles du dehors. Hogguer étoit encore dans l'attente de l'arrivée de Mr. Fawkenor; il n'augure rien de bon; et me dit en ce peu de mots; *la bonne foi n'existe point ici; ou veut faire perdre la campagne en negotiant.*"

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, June 4, St. James's Square.—"I inclose you a copy of the Roman Catholic Bill as it was amended last night in the Committee, as you may probably wish to have time to consider it before that day. I am inclined to hope that the amendments remove most of your objections; and, under these circumstances, I feel very anxious that it should pass this Session in its present shape.

"I should be glad of an opportunity of seeing your Lordship, whenever it may be convenient to you, in order to mention the present state of business in the House of Lords, which must, I fear, unavoidably go a day or two beyond what I had hoped; and will even require some exertion to bring it within that time. I shall be at your orders at any hour, to-morrow or Monday, that may suit your Lordship."

*Copy.*

LORD THURLOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, June 5-10].—"Not knowing when it is the intention of Government to prorogue, I don't know how to form any wish about the arrangement of business. I recollect but two, which seem to me of much importance. The first is the Roman Catholic Bill, which seems more exceptionable in shape than in substance. Many severe laws passed against them, not at the Reformation, nor soon after, but when they had taken advantage of circumstances to raise a ferment within and without the country. The popular odium they incurred was improvidently encouraged, because it produced often divisions in all respects but one equally pernicious, and in some more so. Laws passed by resentment and fear, inflamed by popular odium, perhaps, even then, bore the impression of passion; but in cooler times they seem to have much of that character. This consideration, duly weighed and found just, leads to take away those sanguinary and destructive laws, which inflict peculiar penalties on their priests and congregations, and would place them, like the Jews, in a state of connivance, but not of express toleration. Toleration, or exemption from the pains of recusancy, has been extended to other Dissenters upon the express terms of their setting forth the religion they profess, and conforming to it, and taking oaths of allegiance and supremacy; and all beyond this is connivance.

"This indulgence has never been thought of for Papists, *causâ quâ supra*; nor can it now be extended to them *pâri ratione* with other

Dissenters; because they cannot perform the condition imposed on others, by taking the oaths of allegiance and supremacy; nor are they inclined to set forth their religion.

"The terms proposed by this Bill are, 1, that they profess themselves Papists; the law professing to take notice and approve of a foreign religion, liable to be shaped by foreign authority, as a religion fit to be tolerated. This avows the supremacy of the Pope in *spiritualibus*, in discipline, doctrine, and worship; and consequently makes the oath of supremacy imprestable. 2. But they restrain the supremacy of the Pope from any point, which, in the conscience of the taker, may impinge on the laws and constitution of this country. This savours of prevarication; because supremacy is an express part of our constitution, and the laws of the Church directly affect the persons and civil rights of men. They are therefore called upon to swear a positive falsehood, with such secret reservations as each man's imagination may suggest; which seems to me an unwise and unworthy proceeding of Legislature. The true question therefore (to put it in what I think a wiser and manlier way) is this; whether our constitution and laws are not now become strong enough to maintain themselves by their own sanctions, under the circumstance of allowing even a numerous sect to profess the supremacy of a foreign Church in *spiritualibus*. If they are so, as I incline to think, their dissent is innocent, as well as conscientious; and should, upon principle, be tolerated; but the relief should be given more generously, by striking out the words *spiritual* and *ecclesiastical*; and substituting *directly or indirectly in civil or temporal*. This would strike out the load of nonsense which follows, disclaiming absurdities, which, whoever really holds, will not be bound by the disclaimer. This would give solid relief to the real and honest Papist; whereas the present form only affords a subterfuge and colour for those whose conscience is not the consideration which presses.

"At the same time, it is one thing to give toleration, that is exemption from penalties, and another to give magistratereal or other public situations; or even too great a latitude in propagating a Church so peculiarly circumstanced. In this the present Bill is (perhaps rightly) thought by some to go too far in certain instances, and not far enough in others; and even those who fancy it might safely go further in all, may reasonably doubt whether it should be done at once; either considering the nature of the measure itself, or the effect it may have upon public opinion in the different parts of this empire; or the consequences to be drawn from it by other sects, with whom the minority of Papists, who urge this measure, are apparently combined. These considerations are dust and ashes, when applied against doing the thing which is right, and safe, and wise; but they deserve attention in estimating the merit of the measure proposed.

"The form of the Bill is much involved, apparently for want of keeping close to its principle. It is difficult to comprehend what Acts are repealed; and many questions (without the aid of the connivance I mentioned before) must arise upon it. The execution of it also refers to a former Act. It was originally produced in a very different form. The shape has been continually changing, and it ought now to be new drawn, and lye within one-third of the present compass.

"I am not at all desirous to attend this Bill; because, being clear against rejecting the principle altogether, I am not prepared, nor can be at such short warning, to propose my method of executing it, and still less, to adopt that which is proposed. If I should find others as little acquainted with the subject, I should, as a member of Parliament,

move to put it off. To a Minister also my humble advice would be not to let a measure of this magnitude pass, without first making it his own; having concerted it with those he thinks fit to consult, and avowedly with the Established Church.

"There is another measure, upon which I have, and, if I can be present, shall give a more decided opinion; I mean the project for reforming trials in criminal suits. It seems to be the most desperate nonsense which has ever been thought of since the reveries of those eminent legislators Wat Tiler and Jack Cado. Before that wreck of matter obtains, I hope at least the Judges may be consulted, to know how the law stands in many particulars which have been overlooked by the drawers.

"I am going out of town this evening, but, if you will give me leave, I will call upon you at the Office on Monday, at twelve o'clock."

#### JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 6, Berlin.—"As I expect to have the opportunity of a messenger very soon, I shall wait for it to write to your Lordship fully in answer to your private letters of the 24th and 25th ultimo, and relative to the state of things here.

*In cipher.*

"When the situation of this country is considered, the enormous expense of its warlike preparations, in the avowed support of the strict *status quo*, and that it has actually an army of 90,000 men on the war establishment for the same purpose, I am persuaded your Lordship will not be surprised at the unfavourable impression produced by your last despatches, and that this Court should no longer have any confidence in England.

"I cannot yet determine to what extent this unfortunate change may go, or what steps this Court may take, in consequence of it. But, though the Prussian Ministers continue to treat me with the same apparent confidence, in communicating to me their official correspondence, yet it is now impossible for me to answer for the intentions and views of this Court, as I have been able to do for the last six months; or to have the influence I have possessed during that period. I am much afraid that the unfortunate turn which things have taken will make the King of Prussia lose confidence in himself, as well as in England; from which every bad consequence might be expected, as I shall state to your Lordship in my next.

"I could add many arguments to those stated in my despatch, to prove the difficulty, and even the impossibility, of bringing this Court to recommend to the Turks to make peace on the ground of the entire cession of Oczakow and its district, after all that has passed on this subject. As the Grand Vizir does everything, it would be necessary to have recourse to him in this business; and he is surrounded by Prussian officers encouraging him to act with vigour; but the circumstance of its being impossible for him to pass the Danube, whilst Wallachia is in the possession of the Emperor, and the apprehension of the designs of Russia on the Black Sea, combined with the knowledge of his having no support to expect from the Allies, would, I conceive, be sufficient to force him to accede to the Russian terms, without England and Prussia submitting to recommend them, after having supported a contrary principle.

"M. Knobelsdorff has always conducted himself with ability and prudence; but as everything is referred to the Grand Vizir, the vicinity of Orsova to his camp seems to make that the most natural method of communicating whatever may be judged most advisable."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, June 7, Hague.—"Whilst I was writing to you on the 30th May (by Dickens) I felt the first chill which often precedes a fever. . . I have since suffered much, and though now recovering as well as possible, am still confined to my room and considerably weakened by the attack."

"The success of the private negotiation with the Emperor appears less likely than ever; and I lament that the rapidity of the Prussian movements should give to the allies too much the appearance of soliciting what will certainly produce disappointment. It was also the essence of such a business to have maintained a degree of secrecy. It was accordingly commenced even with a degree of affected mystery; at present the particulars are circulated from Berlin through every post-office in Europe, accompanied even with translations of Lord Elgin's first despatch from Italy to your Lordship.

"In the propositions which Count Stadion will have opened respecting Orsova, and certain small districts of the Unne, there is much matter for reflection; perhaps the Imperial Court seeks only to put something in the opposite balance to Ochzakow and its district, and to have it to say that peace was not made on the principle of the *status quo* strict; but it is more consistent with all that we have seen to suppose that pretexts are seeking to prolong the conclusion of the negotiation, and possibly (though I do not think that the Emperor wishes to go quite so far) to renew the war. If the Turks grow warm on this new demand, and break out upon it, a new and curious question will arise. If I am not mistaken, in ratifying the convention of Reichenbach we guaranteed to the Porte the complete restitution of the provinces by the Emperor.

"Disputes are going forwards within this Republic between the seven Provinces as to the quotas, and the Admiralties as to the proportion of the naval equipments, and the Grand Pensionary is much harassed by them; and not well supported by the Prince Stadholder, who has too little exertion or system. On the 1st instant the Admiralty and Amsterdam put a ship of the line and three frigates suddenly out of pay; and certainly Holland has some cause to complain of being charged with the whole expense. The squadron to be relieved in the Mediterranean not being yet returned, and a part of it being ordered to remain to strengthen the new squadron which went a few weeks ago, the naval force still afloat is considerably above the ordinary establishment, and will I hope remain so till our negotiations are brought to some point."

"I hope that your Lordship will have found time to read the Abbé Raynal's letter to the National Assembly; it is a curious incident, and will probably have a wholesome effect both in France and in other countries, in which every possible exertion is using to create disturbances. The Abbé Raynal writes well when he mentions *les inconveniens terribles attachés aux abstractions lorsqu'on les investe de la force qui commande aux hommes and aux choses*; and he

deduces with great clearness the effects of that philosophy which has given to France *un Roi sans aucune autorité, et un peuple sans aucun frein*.

"Our prosperity is our great preservation against all that madness; if we suffer that prosperity to be interrupted in the pursuit of speculative advantages of politics, the torrent of the times will infallibly break in upon us."

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD FITZGIBBON.

1791, June 7, St. James's Square.—"I have had the honour of laying your Lordship's letter before His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, and am directed by him to express his satisfaction in your having accepted of the office of Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dublin. His Royal Highness sees no sort of objection to the appointment being permanent; and it is His Royal Highness's wish that you would take the trouble of directing the instrument to be prepared which it will be necessary for His Royal Highness to sign for that purpose, in consequence of the Primate's resignation, which he expects to receive immediately."

*Copy.*

JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 8, Berlin.—"I shall not fail to pay the utmost attention to what your Lordship mentions in your private letter of the 24th ultimo, on the subject of the want of secrecy in the conduct of business here, and the new arrangement of the Cabinet will certainly be of service in this respect. But though Count Hertzberg's indiscretion was frequently very great in the general course of business, I do not recollect a single instance in which he committed any communication made to him by me, notwithstanding the number has been so great. I confess I was the chief cause of introducing the practice of carrying on the business in writing, as I found it gave me great advantages, of which I can adduce many proofs, and the present or rather the late transactions here, that I found impossible to settle by any other means. My reason for not objecting to my note and the answer being sent to M. Lucchesini and M. Knobelsdorff was that, without being in possession of the information those papers contained, they would not have felt the necessity of their retracting what they had said to the Turks, which I conceived to be the great object. As to the particulars with regard to the situation of Government, I endeavoured to put them in as favourable a light as possible, and thought I had not gone beyond public facts. But I am sorry to acquaint your Lordship that I know the Austrian, Russian, Danish, and Swedish Ministers in London have all stated to their respective Courts that England was reduced to a state of perfect inactivity (*nullité*) with regard to foreign politics; and the present extraordinary conduct of the Emperor is ascribed here chiefly to this circumstance.

"The reference made to Lord Elgin's mission in the papers in question, relates solely to the official instruction on the affair of Sistova, and the prevailing on the Emperor to concur in the representations of the Allies at Petersburg. But I can prove to your Lordship that it has been almost solely owing to the want of secrecy at the Hague that any

"The ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> they profess the

"The [redacted] claiming who've say, that they profess, that [redacted]

4

1791, June 7, Hague.—“Whilst I was writing to you on the 30th May (by Dickens) I felt the first chill which often precedes a fever. . . I have since suffered much, and though now recovering as well as possible, am still confined to my room and considerably weakened by the attack.”

"In the propositions which Count Stadion will have opened at Orsova, and certain small districts, to give him an account of what had passed with Zinzendorf. I thought there could be no impropriety in acquainting Mr. Hailes with the general state of things, solely for his own information; but, though he took upon him to mention several circumstances to the King of Poland (as stated in his dispatch) he seems to proceed on principles directly opposite to those I communicated, and, in his dispatch which I forward by this messenger, he contradicts every thing contained in his former one.

**Private.**

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move to put it off. To a Minister who has been so long in the  
to let a measure of this magnitude pass without first making it to-  
having concerted it with those he thinks fit to consult, and who  
as we must thus necessarily be interrupted in the pursuit of  
lative advantages of politics, the interest of the state will  
break in upon us."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD FITZGERALD.

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your Lordship's letter before His Royal Highness the Duke of  
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having accepted of the office of Vice-Chancellor of the University of  
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ment being permanent; and it is His Royal Highness's wish that you  
would take the trouble of directing the instrument as he proposed, when  
it will be necessary for His Royal Highness to sign for that purpose, in  
consequence of the Primate's resignation, which he expects to receive  
immediately."

Copy.

JOSEPH SWART to LORD GRENVILLE.  
Private.

1791, June 11, ...  
in which I have lived for ...  
of my Office, and of Parliament, ...  
having found it absolutely impossible to write to announce to you before-  
hand the intended change in the Department with which you correspond.  
Having made my excuses to you for this very involuntary omission, I  
have only to add that I should think myself extremely wanting if I were  
to suffer the correspondence between us to close without expressing to  
you the great satisfaction with which I look back to the whole course of  
it, and to the manner in which every business has been conducted which  
we have had to transact together. If I could say as much of all (I  
might almost say of any) of my other correspondents, the office of  
Secretary of State would be a good deal more agreeable than it is. I  
know I need not say to you that you will find in my successor the same  
desire which I have sincerely entertained of conducting the business of  
Ireland in a manner personally agreeable to you; and it shall be my  
endeavour to impress him with the same sense with which my own  
experience has impressed me of the necessity of support to the person  
placed in your situation."

Copy.

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, June 12, Hague.—"By the sudden change of weather the  
packet boats are detained on this coast, and your Lordship will receive  
an accumulation of despatches from Sistove, the purport of which is  
unpleasant. I apprehend that your Lordship will find it difficult to  
write upon the subject till you hear farther. It certainly is not the  
intention of the Emperor to re-involve himself in the war, and possibly

demanded are of essential  
to be ceded with the best  
ifications and corrections  
to unmask the characters  
act in this world. There  
or later brings a day of  
of your Lordship's task is  
from M. de Reede to the

Swart a reçu d'amples  
sur les grandes affaires  
à Vienne et à Sistove;  
la Baltique, et on ne veut  
and on saura le resultat  
Enfin, on s'est redouté  
ce que l'on redoutoit si  
mé Iascaroff, emissaire  
nienne à se faire écouter;  
des deux Cours. Je benis  
faire dans la presente  
"

F. WESTMORELAND.

Almost undecipherable hurry  
in winding up the bottoms

my excuse to you for my

if the negotiation takes a serious turn, these new pretensions may be retracted with as bad a grace as that with which they have been advanced. I have no doubt that this will be the case, if we happen to have good news from Mr. Fawkener; but I am apprehensive either that the Empress will answer in gentle phrases that she cannot change her ultimatum, or that some proposition will be brought forwards (though of a modifying kind) that will procrastinate the conclusion. Our position upon the whole is very embarrassing; I would give more than I can describe for the advantage of one half-hour's conversation with your Lordship respecting it. I am afraid of submitting to you upon paper all that occurs to me; perhaps I already take the liberty to write too much. (Among the measures of secondary importance, I cannot help thinking that, without doing an injury to any individual, *much* advantage might be derived from some new arrangement in the stations of those who are employed in foreign Courts).

"May I recall your Lordship's recollection to a paragraph of no great consequence in my No. 36, respecting the co-adjutorship of Liege."

*Enclosed.*

[VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.]

[1791], June 11 [Hague].—"L'apostille du Roi de Prusie est vraiment plaisante pour vouloir encore, dans la situation présente, dénicher l'Autriche du reste de la haute Silesie.

"Je fis dernièrement la reflexion que la Prusse se trouve à peu près dans la même catégorie que Louis 14 à la fin de ses jours, lorsqu'après avoir vainement offert la paix, et manquant des ressources pour la guerre, il dit en plein conseil, *je ne puis donc faire ni la paix ni la guerre.*

*French.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, June 13, Hague.—"It is quite a shower of despatches from every quarter of the compass; but it is not a genial and beneficent shower.

"The courier who carries this came from Venice through Berlin, and, in plain truth, I am at a loss to trace the precise object of his mission.

"The letters from Berlin intimate that sort of rising dissatisfaction respecting the line of our conduct towards Russia which was easy to be foreseen, because it was not probable that due allowance would be made for the pressure and necessity of our circumstances. And with respect to the Sistove business, though the embarrassment is serious and likely to become more so, it will neither be remedied nor graced by the Prussian Government bringing forwards the unprincipled and undignified demand of a compensation from the Emperor for whatever His Imperial Majesty may think proper to extort from the Turks. That pretension, however, like many of its predecessors, will sink under better reflection, and the progress of affairs. In the meantime, till the expected answer arrives from Russia, and till farther accounts come from Sistove, it seems impossible to form a competent judgment, or to adopt any measure.

"The substance of Lord Elgin's despatch would be highly interesting if we might infer from it that the Emperor is really engaging in the

French projects of *contre-revolution*; but, till I see better evidence of it than a few conferences with the Comte d'Artois and a Spanish Ambassador, I must consider the intelligence as very vague. Such conferences only prove that disposition to give an easy and flattering access to all parties, of which we have had already too many proofs. At the same time it is probable that the Emperor feels a natural wish to relieve an unhappy sister from danger and distress, and also to re-establish a monarchy which may again form a counterbalance to England. But it by no means follows that His Imperial Majesty will at present rush into measures of force for those objects; more especially as, in that speculation, it would be inconsistent with common sense to suspend the ratification of the Hague convention, to risk the immediate revival of the war with the Turks, and to decline the opening which the allied Courts have recently given to him to form a sort of temporary connection with them.

"Lord Elgin has been led to lay too much stress on M. de Bombelle's conversation, because he did not know him, and found him admired and caressed in Italy as a voluntary martyr to the cause. But I happen to know him well, and do not recollect to have met with a more superficial or more loose-talking man; and if I were to speak of him to his friend M. de Calonne, I should say without fear of contradiction, *C'est un étourdi aimable du premier ordre*; to which he would perhaps answer, *cependant il a de l'esprit*. A *contre-revolution* must be composed of sterner stuff.

"After all, there are appearances that some great movement is forming in France; and I confess that I do not know what result to wish for. I heartily detest and abjure the whole system of the *Democrates* abstractedly considered; but I am not sure that the continued course of their struggles to maintain a disjointed and inefficient Government would not be beneficial to our political interests, and the best security to the permanence of our prosperity.

"At any rate, the whole is involved within the womb of time in so much obscurity, that it would surely be the part of wisdom for us, and for this Republic, to connect ourselves, both ostensibly and really, closer than ever; and at the same time to withdraw as well as we can from the *tourbillon* of continental politics, and to watch the result of circumstances and events.

"It would, however, be a great advantage to my reasonings and judgment if your Lordship would confide to me your general ideas on these great considerations."

LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, June 14, Whitehall.—"I have received your private letters up to the 31st ultimo. The King heard with much concern and displeasure the account of the disturbance which has happened at Berlin, and I am persuaded that if you had thought it necessary to make a formal complaint on the subject, and to mention the names of those who were principally concerned, His Majesty's displeasure would have been very pointedly shown. As it is, I hope the impression of that business is over, though, by a most unpardonable misrepresentation, an endeavour has been made use of here to render it subservient to political purposes, and to make it the ground of indisposing the public against the Court of Berlin. If I had been in possession of the details, I should under the circumstances (as I explained to Count Redern) have thought

myself bound to make them public, in order to contradict the falsehood circulated on the subject. I hope the whole affair is now blown over, and that the shame of this *écclat* will operate as some restraint hereafter. I shall be as careful about the letters of recommendation as the nature of the thing will admit, but a certificate from the commanding officer of the regiment would be looked upon as a thing of course, and would not operate as a check.

"I say nothing on the public matters to which my despatches relate, as I expect to write to you upon them by a courier in the course of the week."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, June 14, Whitehall.—"Our Vienna negotiations are not very promising. The delay of Count Stadion's communication is a curious circumstance, but one for which I cannot very well account. All the French *Aristocrates* are full of their hopes from that quarter, but we have seen too much of the style of the Emperor's conversation, and of the effects which follow it, not to distrust what they are so very eager to believe.

"The Abbé Raynal's paper is a curious one, and much the best thing he has ever written; if indeed he did write it, which is denied at Paris."

*Copy.*

#### LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 15, Aranjuez.—"The misunderstanding between Messrs. Whitworth and Galvez appears to me to have been owing solely to this circumstance, that Galvez, who is old and feeble, *res omnes timide gelideque ministrans*, was afraid to trust himself in the hands of a colleague of so opposite a character; and the ascendancy of whose superior talents he had the more reason to dread, having, on a former occasion, been impelled by him to talk to the Russian Ministers in a higher strain than his instructions really warranted. At any rate, I am almost certain that this Court have not acted a double part in the present instance, though they may have acted an insignificant one; and, in truth, I never rightly understood why their interposition in the business in question should have been deemed worth the soliciting, after their having declared, as they did from the first, that they would, in no event, support it by any demonstrations of vigour, either in word or deed.

"I have been busily employed, of late, in reducing into shape the voluminous bundle of private grievances which was brought me by Mr. Hammond; but there is one class of these complaints respecting which I find myself obliged to solicit your Lordship's opinion and special directions. The cases to which I allude are those of three southern whale-fishing vessels, the *Elizabeth* and *Margaret*, Hopper, and the *Astrea*, Harver, belonging to Messrs. Lucas and Spencer, and the *Sappho*, Middleton, belonging to Messrs. Ogle and Company; which ships were, in the year 1789 and 1790, driven from Port Desire in Patagonia by some Spanish cruisers, and thereby, as is alleged, prevented from completing their cargoes, for which loss they demand large damages."

"On perusing the cases in question, you will find that two of these vessels, the *Sappho* and the *Elizabeth and Margaret*, were prohibited by the Spanish captain from taking on board a quantity of oil and seal-skins, the property of their owners, which were then lying on shore at or near Port Desire. (*Nota Bene*, the number of seal-skins so left behind appears by the memorials to have been 7,000 belonging to each ship, but it will probably be found upon examination that 7,000 was the whole quantity left by *both*), and I presume that what led the officer in question to impose this prohibition was an over-strained interpretation of the 12th article of the treaty of 1667, which states that, whenever any of our vessels shall be driven by any urgent cause into a Spanish American harbour, they shall not disembark for sale any goods or merchandise, or receive any merchandise on board; for his conduct, in other respects, appears to have been sufficiently humane and generous, and he evidently did not convert those goods to his own profit, since they were found in the same spot by the *Astrea* near a twelvemonth afterwards. The order itself, however, was certainly unjustifiable; and I, therefore, beg leave humbly to submit whether it might not be advisable to confine the demand of indemnification to this *actual* loss, without entering upon the question of what damages may be due for the loss of the cargoes which those vessels *might* have obtained at or near Port Desire, had they not been thus ordered to depart.

"I shall not fail to recommend to M. de Florida Blanca's attention the case of your *protégé*, Mr. Pons, though I am afraid that the suit is almost hopeless; and, indeed, it must be admitted that his antagonists make out a very plausible defence.

"I am not sure whether I entirely agree with you in the *utter* dislike which you express towards the French Revolution; and, for this dissent, I have divers weighty political reasons, which, upon encouragement, I shall be ready to state. I heartily join issue, however, with this Government in their anxiety to prevent a similar fermentation in this kingdom, where, from the barbarous ignorance and fanaticism so universally prevalent, it could lead to nothing but mischief. Count Cifuentes's secret for restoring the good-humour of the people of Madrid was a trifling diminution in the price of bread, and the re-appearance on the *arena* of a celebrated and famous bull-fighter who had been absent for some years. *Panem et circenses*.

*Postscript.*—"The nomination of Colonel Gardiner, or of any other person whom you may destine to succeed Mr. Hammond, will be perfectly agreeable to me, but I am in no immediate want of a Secretary of Embassy, having an admirable assistant in the Consul-General, Mr. Merry, of whose talents for business, and other merits, I cannot speak in too high terms of commendation. If you can reconcile to your conscience therefore the permitting Colonel Gardiner to enjoy the salary of the office in England for any given or unlimited time, I have not the slightest objection. I have only to request upon this head, that, in case you should foresee that the person to be sent hither may be shortly removed to any other destination, he may be sent *merely* as Secretary of Embassy; as the managing the ceremonies of presentation and leave-taking for a Minister - Plenipotentiary give me some personal trouble; besides which, it has been maliciously observed here with regard to Mr. Fraser and Mr. Hammond, that they appeared to have been invested with that character, and sent hither, only for the purpose of obtaining a valuable present in diamonds."

## CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 17, St. Petersburg.—“During my mission in Poland, I had more than once the honour of receiving His Majesty’s most gracious approbation of my conduct there, and particularly for the intelligence I gave previous to the present rupture between Russia and the Porte. Three years ago it pleased His Majesty to appoint me to this post; for the manner in which I have conducted myself in it, I appeal to my correspondence. I can, with a safe conscience, declare that I have nothing to reproach myself with, and that I have always acted to the best of my judgment. In the course, however, of these unfortunate disputes, your Lordship may easily conceive that I must have been personally (although perfectly unmerited) in very disagreeable predicaments, and, indeed, so much so as to render my remaining here a matter extremely irksome to me. As soon as a change of measures was determined upon, I have adopted my sentiments to the spirit of my instructions, and although not very confident of success, I have endeavoured with the same ardour with which I had recommended other measures when I thought them necessary, to second the views of His Majesty, and co-operate in the most cordial manner with Mr. Fawkener. This is all the merit I can lay claim to, and I leave it to your Lordship to determine whether it is sufficient to justify the step I now take in addressing myself to you. What I have to request of your Lordship is that I may be destined to succeed Sir Robert Ainslie at Constantinople, whenever he shall think proper to quit his station, which I have reason to believe he proposes soon to do. Some other person, less mixed in this unpleasant business, may possibly serve His Majesty here in future more effectually than myself; but, certainly, not with more zeal for his interests, or affection for his person. And, if I may be allowed to say it, I think that from the long stay I have made in Courts so much connected with the Porte, I may be as well, if not better calculated than most people to fulfil the duties of that mission, likely to become one of the most interesting ones in Europe. I need not say how grateful I shall be for your Lordship’s protection, and how studious I shall be [to] make myself worthy of it.

“I will beg leave to add a few lines to acquaint your Lordship with a circumstance which appears to us somewhat suspicious. What I mean is the arrival at this moment of Mr. Richard Adair at St. Petersburg. The great expedition with which he has performed his journey, having been scarcely a month from London, although he came through Vienna, where he saw only the Russian Ambassador; and his having letters for, and indeed his being expected by most of the leading people here, gives me great reason to suspect that he may have views unfavourable to the success of our negotiation. It is by no means impossible, however unwarrantable such a proceeding would be on the part of those who may have employed him, that he may be come with a view of insinuating that if Her Imperial Majesty persists in refusing every modification we may have to propose, that in that case, the present Administration will become so unpopular, that it will be impossible for the King’s Ministers to maintain their ground, and that those must be called into His Majesty’s councils who have given such unequivocal proofs of their friendly sentiments towards Russia. I trust, however, that we shall be able to render his journey fruitless, and that the Empress’s desire of peace will prevent her giving ear to such dangerous doctrine.

*Postscript.*—"Mr. Adair writes by this messenger, and I have directed that his letters should be delivered to Mr. Aust, to be forwarded by him to their destination."

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 17, Dublin Castle.—"In returning my thanks for your very kind and flattering letter, I should be deficient to my own feelings as well as to you if I did not express myself particularly sensible of the constant attention and honourable and friendly support you have afforded me on every occasion; for which I must ever consider myself, both in my public situation and personally, indebted to you. Permit me to hope, that though our public communication is to close, our private one may be continued, and that you will now and then turn your thoughts to your correspondent in Ireland.

"Had you an opportunity of discovering what his Majesty might wish should be done upon the conduct of the officers of 12th regiment? I would not trouble you in the midst of your hurry upon more important matters, but that the business has been long on the *tapis*, and as the correspondence was private, Dundas may not be prepared upon the subject. The only feasible punishment seems to order Colonel Kay to sell at the regulation, and to put some officer from another regiment to his Majority."

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, June 17, Whitehall.—"I have just time to acknowledge the receipt of your private letters up to the 13th instant. I will write to you in a few days more at large, but, in the meantime, I only wish to say with respect to the hint you give relative to points on which you could converse with me but are afraid to write, that I should be seriously obliged to you if you would put me in possession of your ideas on that subject, which, I suspect beforehand, are not very different from my own impressions. I have never, in the public situations in which I have been, allowed myself to consider private correspondence as in any degree official, or to think that I had a right to exercise any discretion of making it so. What you have hitherto written to me in that way (though for the most part of little importance) I have communicated to no person, except now and then occasionally to Mr. Pitt, and you may rely with confidence on my observing the same caution in future.

"I was not blind to the difficulties of my situation when I undertook a task to which nothing but a sense of duty could have led me. The prospect has not brightened upon me, but I endeavour *to bear up, and steer right onward*. The assistance of an unreserved communication of such suggestions as occur to you would be of great gratification as well as advantage to me."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 17, Hague.—"The despatches which your Lordship will receive by this mail are, upon the whole, less unpleasant than any that

I have seen for many months ; and yet they leave the pacification almost as much in doubt as ever. But it is a great satisfaction to remark that the instructions given by your Lordship are perfectly understood, and, accordingly, that there is a right and cordial co-operation towards the same end at Sistove, at Berlin, and at Petersburg. I incline to believe, as I hope, that the possible case to which Mr. Ewart alludes will not happen ; but if it should, it seems desirable that he should prevail on the Berlin Cabinet to take the step which he describes. Your Lordship will, I think, be pleased with Mr. Fawkener's representation. The passages of the Berlin draft which had appeared to you exceptionable are fortunately corrected. I shall transcribe on the opposite page an extract of a letter from the Dutch Minister at Petersburg.

"There is a report here that the King of Sweden, before he left Stockholm, signed a secret treaty with Comte Slackelberg, according to which he is to receive, at a certain period, three millions of roubles, and the cession of Nyslot and some other place ; but I am unable to authenticate it ; nor is it easy to know what to believe or disbelieve respecting his Swedish Majesty."

#### W. FAWKENER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 18, St. Petersburg.—"I return your Lordship many thanks for the favour of your letter by Brooks ; and am very much flattered by the favourable opinion you are so good as to express of my zeal and activity. No exertions of mine have or shall be wanting ; but I am sure you will allow that I have a difficult part to act. Applications to too many of the people in power here excite jealousy and opposition ; and to neglect them might produce a still worse effect. Too much solicitude and anxiety carry an appearance of apprehension ; and might encourage the haughtiness of a Court naturally proud, and particularly so at this moment ; and would besides ill-become an English Minister. Too much remissness and indifference might indispose and offend ; and would very much assist any plan of delay. I shall endeavour to pursue a middle line, and I flatter myself, if Count Goltz's new instructions should arrive soon, and be such as we may reasonably expect, that, in a fortnight or three weeks' time at latest, the business may be brought to a conclusion, in one way or the other ; I rather hope in a pleasant one. I am not, however, without some apprehension of difficulty from Prince Potemkin, who is much attached to his great command and power, and particularly fond of Jassy and Moldavia, of all which he must take his leave at the peace. I have met with the most cordial and zealous support from Mr. Whitworth. nor has there been the slightest difference in opinion between us since my arrival here. I beg your Lordship to believe that it is not in return for his private attention and kindness to me, which I acknowledge however would most strongly dispose me to render him any service in my power, that I assure you it is impossible to be more generally beloved and respected than he is by all ranks of people here. They have separated the man from the business more in his case than they would have done in most others. I have seen him in every society of the place, except with the Empress and at Court, and have never observed that he has shown or been treated with the least ill-humour. With Prince Potemkin he is certainly better than any other of the foreign Ministers, not excepting the Imperial Ambassador. It would be impertinent in me to say that I never met with a man more zealous for His Majesty's service, or more firmly and conscientiously attached to his Administration.



"A young French officer, a Comte Charles de Sombreuil, son to the Governor of the Invalides, arrived here a few days ago. The Prince of Nassau, who is not yet gone to sea, has taken him under his protection; and it is believed that he has brought some message from the Prince de Condé to the Empress, relative to the projected attack on France, which I have no doubt will have her good wishes.

"Mr. Whitworth has mentioned to your Lordship the arrival here of Mr. Adair, son to the surgeon and Lady Caroline. His connections, as you know, are all in opposition, and he is himself a very warm and eager party man. I can hardly believe that he has any other object here than to satisfy his curiosity; and yet there is something extraordinary in the haste with which he has performed his journey, and the letters he has brought from Count Woronzow to all the leading Ministers here, and to Prince Potemkin, with whom Count Woronzow is very little connected. His only recommendations to Mr. Whitworth are from Colonel Gardiner, whom he saw in his way through Brussels, and from the Duchess of Devonshire, whose letter came, as he told us, in one from Mr. Fox, two or three days ago.

"May I take the liberty of begging your Lordship to present my best respects to Mr. Pitt, who I hope will permit me to congratulate him on our successes in India, of which the Vice-Chancellor wished me joy the other day, and on the flourishing state of our revenue."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 19 [Stowe].—"I had thought it possible that you might have come down to me yesterday, and therefore I did not sooner thank you for your letter, and for your kind attention in ordering the *gazette* to be transmitted to me. I think it appears singular that Lord Cornwallis should find it wise to attack Tippoo's country by a north-east circuit, which is, according to the proposed plan of operations, to communicate with the Malabar coast at a point not 50 miles from the scene of Floyd's action, and, consequently, infinitely nearer to our point of Coimbatour, which seems the great key to the communication of supplies and the junction of forces. It is, however, so impossible to make war upon paper, that I am very willing to surrender every idea of that sort, in the full confidence that we shall not be as much disappointed by the event of the next as we were by the last campaign. The accounts are (I see) full of the idea of a negotiation with Tippoo. I sincerely hope that no treaty will be made which is to leave him where he was when we undertook the war.

"The Russian messenger seems to have understood his business very well in not returning before your prorogation, but I begin to be a little impatient for the *denouement*; for, although I have not any very great doubt but that some *mezzo-terme* will be found, I shall still be extremely curious to know the Czarina's reception of Fawkener, and her first language. As to my own private wish, I acknowledge fairly that I wish mischief.

"I have not written to Pitt as we had settled, for I found it not very easy to write all I wished, and as difficult to leave part unsaid of what certainly ought to be explained. Perhaps another essay may be more successful. In the meantime I wish he would put Miss Verney's business forward so as to enable me to give any answer which he may direct whenever I am pushed by her upon the subject. I see by the papers that a batch of Baronets is in contemplation. You remember that Tristram Jervoise has a letter, written by Pitt to me four years

ago with the intention of being communicated to him, promising the creation with remainder to his brother.

*Postscript.*—"The Camelfords are to be here on Tuesday by dinner ; when do we expect you ? I have fought off all visitors that you may not be annoyed, but Lady Granard arrived four days ago most unexpectedly. We shall, however, (I hope) be able to pack her off. What hopes for Cleaver ?

JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 20, Berlin. *In cipher.*—"Your Lordship will have seen by my dispatch, in what a serious light the conduct of the Emperor is considered by the King of Prussia, and his Ministers, who look upon the very existence, as well as honour of the country, to be at stake. Besides the consequences which would result from the decided preponderance the Imperial courts would acquire, and from the other circumstances stated in the dispatch, I am convinced that, should his Prussian Majesty submit on the present occasion, he would lose all confidence in himself; the army, already extremely dissatisfied, would lose both its discipline and spirit; a general confusion would most probably ensue; and this country be certainly rendered a useless and burthensome ally. A war with Austria, especially in such circumstances, and with such motives as the present, would be extremely popular to the army and the nation in general, where the aversion to a war with Russia was always very great, and has increased much of late.

"Permit me to observe that in granting what the King of Prussia asks, there seems really little or no danger of His Majesty's being seriously committed in any case or put to any considerable expense, as I am perfectly satisfied that this country has no serious danger to fear from Russia, by sea or land. Neither can I have any doubt of His Prussian Majesty's soon making the Emperor repent of his perfidy.

"The vigour of our system would be thus not only restored, but increased; and I am convinced that, in the other alternative, it would soon be overturned, and with it the public tranquillity.

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791] June 23, Hollwood.—"The rain has given me leisure sooner than I wished to study your calculations. I can find no error in the figures. The only thing which occurs to me that can vary the result is that I conceive the account to shew the loss sustained from the time the first slave was put on board, and during the whole time the ship remains on the coast of Africa, as well as during the voyage. You have supposed the account to relate only to the time of the voyage. This, if I am right, will make a great difference, and it will be somewhat difficult to fix an average period on which to compute, as the slaves are taken on board successively, and more or less quickly, in different ships and on different parts of the coast. I rather suppose that the average of the time passed on the coast and that of the voyage together will not prove more in the whole than three months. If so the rate of mortality will still be more than at the rate twenty out of an hundred in a year. Does not the evidence state the duration of the

voyage and the time ships stay usually on the coast, enough for such a calculation.

"With respect to Demerary, I have no doubt that we ought to insist on stopping or at least strictly limiting the importation, by an Act of Council, if it is clear (as I conceive it to be) that we have the authority to do so. It ought, in that case, to be proposed to the Cabinet and the King as part of our general system on this subject, as soon as the Sierra Leone Bill is passed.

"On the subject of American ships I am rather in the dark, as King's note was not in your envelope, and I suspect a memorandum for Lord Thurlow had taken its place. I see, however, no possible objection to a separate Bill for preventing foreign ships clearing out from hence to Africa, and to imposing any penalty on the fraud you mention. But a separate Bill seems necessary, as we can introduce no new matter when the Bill is returned to us, unless by amendments to your amendments, and properly none but such as arise out of the consideration of yours."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 23 [Stowe].—"I was alarmed at hearing from the servants the accident which they magnified, but which your letter explained so much to our satisfaction. That which I received this morning was no less interesting to us, and I am in hopes that you will hear no more of it. I told Lord Camelford of it because it was known in the house, and, for the same reason, Mary told it to Lady Camelford and to Miss Pitt, and spoke of it as an immaterial accident of which neither they nor we have talked since. Lord Camelford is full of you, and of the most sanguine and flattering accounts of his daughter's mind: and Lady Camelford told me last night that she was perfectly satisfied that Annette preferred you, *at present*, to every other man, and liked the prospect of marrying you. It should seem, therefore, that you have every hopes that can be built upon so unpleasant a circumstance as that of their absence, which, I find from her, will be prolonged to the end of *April*. Every thing seems in every other particular exactly as you could wish it.

"Poor Cleaver! I am grieved for his disappointment, and more so because the filling Salisbury, and leaving Lichfield not only full but closed against him in all probability, by Vernon's competition on a future vacancy, cuts off very much of his prospects, by reducing his objects within a very narrow compass, namely, Worcester and Bath; for I hardly think it fair to press upon him so arduous an undertaking as Lincoln, for so trifling an increase of emolument, if he is expected to give up Chester and his Prebendal stall for Lincoln *alone*. However we must be content, and hope for better luck on some future occasion.

"Sir Tristram's name is T. Huddlestone Jervoise; that of the brother is the Rev. George Huddlestone Jervoise Purefoy. Be so good as to let me know whether I may write to apprise him of the mistake, and of the immediate intention to create him?

"The enclosed from a very old friend, Sir Corbet Corbet, will, I trust, cost you no trouble, and will much oblige me. Be so good therefore as to send the letters to me, or rather to him, as I mean to write to him to say that I have requested this kindness from you.

*Postscript.*—"Cannot you come for Sunday or Monday? I dare promise you a kind reception from your love."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 25, Hague.—“It may be some recommendation of this letter that it does not present itself in the form of a dispatch; the number of papers in that shape forwarded by this mail is beyond all example. I cannot felicitate your Lordship or their contents; the Russian business is neither advanced nor elucidated:—the Sistove congress is separated:—and his Prussian Majesty, who certainly has received much provocation, wishes to proceed immediately to a war against the Emperor.

“With respect to the Russian business, it is still possible that the Empress may not think it wise to exhaust herself farther in pursuit of advantages which she may be unable to maintain whatever may be her success or our presumed inability to oppose her. But, at any rate, we cannot judge till the answer comes to our representation, and that consideration seems to extend itself to the questions stated to us from Berlin.

“The little anecdote of the Empress's remark that dogs which bark do not bite, is well expressed in the enclosed note; but I have seen a letter from Petersburg which states it, *plutôt comme une remarque lâchée sans dessein, que comme une mauvaise plaisanterie*.

“With respect to Sistove, it is still possible that the Imperial Plenipotentiaries may have had discretionary orders to retreat; it is equally so that orders to that effect may have been sent from Vienna subsequent to the separation of the congress; and it is even probable that the Emperor, on a general view of the French business, on a foreknowledge of the new circumstances which have taken place there, and from his own disposition to avoid war, may, on better recollection, have sent a positive order to conclude the pacification. If all possibilities fail, the question comes forwards as to our guaranty; but though we have guaranteed the terms of the *status quo*, we have not guaranteed them within the limited period of the armistice. The question is still open to our representation:—perhaps it is open to some doubt whether the new requisitions so profligately brought forwards, might not be modified in our hands and made acceptable to both parties not inconsistently with the terms guaranteed. I confess that I look with anxiety for every distinction that may keep us out of extremes; because I establish it as a first principle of reasoning on all political subjects in the present circumstances and temper of nations, that it is the incontestable and essential interest of the maritime powers to remain at peace, and to stand aloof from the general confusions which seem likely to shake every existing government to its centre. It is difficult to feel this truth to its full extent, and not to reason subject to old prejudices of national *fierté* and dignity; but I hope and trust that it will be felt and will operate. M. de Reede's argument that a war may be necessary to prevent Prussia from falling into confusion and popular anarchy may be true, and I fear that it has some foundation, but a war would operate inversely as to us, and as to this Republic. All this, however, makes no objection to the present movement of the Prussian troops; it is the plan of His Prussian Majesty to strike his blow without notice; but some weeks are necessary before he can be ready, and, in the meantime, his advance and preparations will be more likely to do good than harm in every point of view.

“The Prince of Orange assures me that he has an absolute knowledge, in confidence, of a plan of *contre-revolution*. M. Thugut, an Imperial Minister, has been employed at Paris in this business, and

also probably in the escape of the Royal family. The Uhlans lately employed in the Netherlands have been ordered to march towards Treves; and are arrived at Luxembourg."

*Enclosed.*

"On me mande de Berlin une anecdote qui doit avoir eu lieu à Petersburg. L'Imperatrice etant avec Potemkin et Fawkener, une levrette qui l'accompagnoit, aboyoit contre un enfant, qui en eut peur. L'Imperatrice, après avoir rassuré l'enfant, se tourne vers Fawkener, et lui dit, le plus gracieusement du monde, *le pauvre enfant ! il ne sait pas encore que les chiens qui aboyent ne mordent point.*" French.

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

[1791], June 25.—"Lord Grenville has thought it his duty to lose no time in transmitting to your Majesty the account which has been just received from Lord Gower of the King and Queen having left Paris in the morning of the twenty-first instant. Lord Grenville understands that the messenger, in passing near Calais, heard a report, which was pretty strongly asserted, that they had been stopped by the national guard at a place called Quinault."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 25, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville has judged very properly in immediately transmitting the account of the King and Queen having left Paris; I feel thoroughly interested in whatever regards them, and, as such, fearful lest the messenger's intelligence of the supposed interruption to their escape at Quinault. Should they, providentially, get out of France, it will bring to the test whether the Nobility, Clergy, and Law will join the Regal cause."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, June 26, St. James's Square.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a note which he has this moment received from Sir Ralph Woodford whom he had sent yesterday to the French Ambassador in order to apprise him of the particulars contained in Lord Gower's despatch. If Lord Grenville should learn any further details that may be interesting to your Majesty, he will trouble your Majesty with another messenger."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, June 26, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty letters from Lord Gower and the French Ambassador, with the further accounts of what has happened in France.

"A courier is arrived from Lord Elgin this morning, with the account of M. Bischoffswerder's interview with the Emperor; but as these dispatches do not contain anything decisive, and are very voluminous, Lord Grenville imagines your Majesty would not chuse to be troubled with them till to-morrow morning."

*Copy.*

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 26 [Stowe].—"Your letter has delighted the whole of our *aristocrate* society. We will not suffer the report of the detention of the fugitives at Quesnoy (for that must be your messenger's Quinault) to interrupt the pleasure which we feel; at the same time I shall be most uneasy till I hear of their actual arrival. The neighbourhood, 12 miles, of this place to Valenciennes, where Esterhazy (the Queen's great friend) commands with much influence, and its vicinity to Mons, 25 miles, where the Emperor has a very large garrison, would, in all events, give a chance of rescuing them, even if they had been stopped; but the event of a scuffle, much more of a serious attempt of this sort, would be dreadfully uncertain. We will however suppose them escaped; and, if so, you will before this letter reaches you have received a letter in the French King's name, or perhaps one immediately from him to the King, disclaiming and protesting against the usurped government, and possibly desiring assistance. And, at the same time, La Luzerne will have delivered to you the declaration from the National Assembly. I conclude, from variety of considerations, that no one would advise that England should interfere by *voie de fait* in the troubles which must now begin; and, least of all, would it be advisable to pledge ourselves to any line whatsoever which is to engage us to decide the question between the King and the Government at Paris. It is essential, as we must hereafter be to treat for the interests of this country with the ruling powers of France, whether they be monarchical or republican, that we should not stand committed on either side by a premature step. Now it appears to me that we should undoubtedly commit ourselves to a recognition of the assumed powers of the Assembly by suffering Lord Gower (accredited to the King) to remain in communication with them; and we should equally commit ourselves in directing him or any other public Minister to attend the French King *out of France*. I should, therefore, advise that you should give to Luzerne a written answer (as soon as you know the French King to be out of the kingdom) informing him that the King has received with great concern the account that circumstances had occurred to induce His Christian Majesty to quit his dominions; that he heard with much satisfaction the assurances which had been so often repeated of the amicable dispositions of France towards this country; and that His Majesty's known equity and good faith would always induce him to adhere inviolably to the engagements into which he had entered; but that, in the present moment, he had judged it necessary to recall his Ambassador, who, being accredited to the Christian King, could no longer discharge that mission, whilst the King continued to absent himself from his usual residences. Lord Gower might be directed to give Montmorin a copy of this, and to come away. By this means you would have no step to tread back, either in the contingency of the tumult consequent upon this flight ending finally in a settled monarchy, or in a republic; and you would maintain the same high line of national dignity which I hold to be a very bright feature of the Government in her conduct towards France. The French King's notification, whenever it comes, might be answered in strong terms of congratulation upon his personal safety, and that of his family, and this might be detailed with particular civility, as I have understood that his language upon our King's recovery from his illness was in terms particularly studied and forcible. And, in the same letter, you should state that Lord Gower is recalled, as he can no longer discharge the duties for which he was accredited to His Majesty. This letter would answer the purposes of the French King, who would be extremely pleased with

the last communication, which must be particularly acceptable to him, as leading the way to the similar step which will certainly (whether we do it or not) be taken by the Emperor and King of Spain, and probably by all the other crowned heads; but explained upon grounds more detailed, and more decisive than you would think it prudent to adopt. For, in no case can I imagine that you could think it right to embroil England in such a quarrel, but least of all while your Russian business remains unaccommodated. Lord Camelford and I have talked the matter over in every shape, and this is very shortly the result of our reflections. It seems, however, eligible that you should endeavour, as soon as possible, to open verbal communication with the French King, so as not to commit yourselves, but to endeavour to learn the nature of the hopes which he may entertain of being replaced upon his throne; for, very much of your future line must be guided by the judgment which you must endeavour to form of the probable event of the struggle. But I very much advise that you should not send any public or accredited character to him. The struggle is, I think, now inevitable; the event still very doubtful; though the prospects are upon the whole, I should think, rather more favourable to the Royalists. But, whatever the result be, this country is, I hope, very little in a state to be immediately affected by any system of government which may arise out of these ashes to which the civil war now hanging over them must reduce everything. And as to any pacification or mediation such as humanity might suggest to us, I do not know whether I would pacify if I could; but I am very clear that every lip in France must taste still deeper of the cup before they will listen to any arrangement of government, or accommodation of interests. Pray make Goddard copy your next *précis* of particulars, for I shall be most anxious for them.

"Lord Camelford does not leave me till Tuesday. He had proposed to have gone to-morrow, but a matter more highly interesting to you than to any one else has detained them one day longer; in a word, Mary is painting Annette more like than any thing you ever saw, and very much more so than the *picture which is to be copied*."

*Postscript.*—"Since writing this it has occurred to me that you might avail yourself of Lord Camelford's route through Brussels (where he will be in a fortnight) to converse with the French King or his Ministers. I am sure this will please Lord Camelford most wonderfully; your business cannot be in better hands; and his journey, having been long settled, is not now suspicious."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, June 26, Whitehall.—"Lord Gower's messenger being just arrived, Lord Grenville has thought that your Majesty would chuse to see the dispatches from Paris immediately, and he has therefore taken the liberty to trouble your Majesty with another messenger. Dispatches are also arrived in cypher from Lord St. Helens by a messenger who had been sent to Madrid.

"Lord Grenville has also thought it right to send some papers which the messenger brought with him, though they do not contain much more than those which Lord Gower incloses."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 27, Windsor.—"I am much pleased at Lord Grenville's attention in sending me the intelligence he has received from Sir Robert

Woodford of the King of France being stopt by a *maitre des Postes* at St. Menchout. I owne I am much affected by this step, as I fear he will again fall into the hands from which he has escaped. I desire Lord Grenville will continue to send me every information he may receive till the King shall either be released by those who may effect that step, or that he be reconducted to Paris."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 27, Windsor.—"The second account transmitted this day by Lord Grenville of the detainment of the French King at Varenne gives but a gloomy aspect; it is yet to be seen whether Monsieur de Boullié and the garrison will come to his relief; if not the case seems desperate; but I am far from thinking any hazard was not eligible rather than remaining prisoners in Paris."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 27, Windsor.—"It is with infinite concern that I find by the letter of Lord Gower that the French King is not only in the hands of his enemies but on the road for Paris; it is but the common fate of all attempts to be blamed if not crowned with success. The situation at Paris was so horrid that no one can justly be surprised any attempt was made to get out of it.

"I trust I shall receive any further accounts that may arrive, for this business will occasion many strong measures and further restraints."

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 27, Berlin.—"I have received your Lordship's private letter of the 14th, on the subject of the affray in which some English officers were engaged here, that is happily now lost sight of, as I took care to satisfy the persons most injured. I avoided making an official report, or mentioning the names of those concerned, as they were chiefly young men misled by two or three bad companions. The only particulars I could specify were those contained in my letter to your Lordship, that, having got drunk, they sallied out and *attacked* every person, and especially the military and the sentinels, without the smallest provocation.

"I shall not fail to communicate to the King of Prussia, in a proper manner, His Majesty's and your Lordship's sentiments, relative to this disagreeable affair, as I know they will give him satisfaction."

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 27, Berlin.—"I have just learnt, from the best authority, that the Court of Petersburg has entered into a separate negotiation with the Dutch Minister there, and given him an answer to the note he delivered, under the promise of his concealing both from the Ministers of His Majesty and from Count Goltz. I only know the fact, without having any idea of the nature of the negotiation. This Court has no information whatever on the subject, and I have received mine in so secret a manner that I entreat your Lordship not to commit me. But



the Dutch Government certainly cannot think of concealing this transaction from His Majesty's Ambassador, nor of approving the conduct of their Minister in entering into negotiation with the Court of Petersburg, in such a manner.

"I likewise think it right to acquaint your Lordship that I have reason to believe that Count Woronzow is charged to make some overtures to you, though I am ignorant of their object; and I know that the two Russian Ministers here have received instructions, by the messenger of their Court who proceeds to London this day, to continue to support, when an opportunity offers with the Prussian Ministers, the former demands of Oczakow and its district, without any restriction or modification, which is conformable to the declaration made by M. Marcow to Mr. Fawkenor, mentioned in his separate dispatch. I know also that the Russian Ministers here have received private letters from Petersburg, by the same messenger, stating that the Empress will persist invariably in her demands, as she is assured by Count Woronzow in London, that there was no longer any possibility of England taking an active part, in any case."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, June 28, St. James's Square.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty letters from Colonel Gardiner and Mr. Wilson. The former contains some particulars respecting the manner of the King's escape from Paris; the information of his being arrived at Longwy must, Lord Grenville fears, by the dates be ill-founded, and was probably occasioned by some of the persons in the secret, who had gone forward when he was so near the frontier.

"Lord Grenville has also the honour to transmit to your Majesty the copy of a letter to your Majesty which he has received from M. Rigaud, late Syndic of Geneva. Lord Grenville humbly requests to know whether your Majesty would approve of M. Rigaud's having an audience to-morrow to present the original."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 28, Windsor.—"Had no account been received from Paris on Sunday last I should have rejoiced at the news from Brussels, but I agree with Lord Grenville in fearing that is impossible to be true.

"Lord Grenville may appoint Monsieur Rigaud to deliver the letter from the Republick of Geneva to-morrow."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, June 28, Milan.—"I hope your Lordship will pardon the extreme hurry in which I add, that the Emperor assured me he had received last night a messenger about the Sistovo congress; that it was by no means broke up; that he had the declaration of his Ministers to that effect; that the above messenger had brought him the Act of Ratification on the *status quo*, reserving to himself a right to discuss the further claims at a future negotiation.

*Postscript.*—"He had not received any accounts from Russia since Mr. Fawkenor having opened his negotiation. He was in daily expectation of a messenger with that intelligence."

## LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, June 28, Hague.—“I mentioned in mine of the 25th that the Dutch Minister at Berlin had desired instructions on the subject of his Prussian Majesty's note. I received the next morning a note from the Grand Pensionary in the following words; *J'ai écrit à Reede que Je n'ai rien de bien précis à lui dire ; qu'il est de toute nécessité de savoir de quel œil l'Angleterre envisagera cette mesure, et que probablement le Cabinet Anglois ne se decidera point avant de savoir à quoi s'en tenir relativement à la Russie ; mais que pour peu que je puisse juger de ses dispositions, elles tendront à rétablir le calme en Europe par tous les efforts possibles, afin d'assurer le tranquillité à son propre pays, à ses voisins, à ses alliés, et à toute l'Europe. Qu'au reste, ce qui vient d'arriver en France nous présente diverses chances qui pourroient bien obliger l'Empereur à finir vite avec les Turcs ; et que nous devons indispensablement attendre l'impression que cet événement fera, avant que de passer à des demarches dont on ne peut revenir que tres difficilement.*

“I do not write French news to your Lordship; we receive most voluminous details both from Brussels and from Paris, and especially from the French stock-jobbers at Amsterdam; but it is not probable that I can send particulars which will not already have been forwarded more directly. We talk of nothing else here. It remains to be seen what Republican notions will now be brought forwards at Paris; and what will be the effect of these strange scenes on the disposition of other countries. The *Comité Diplomatique* have a malignant jealousy, at present, respecting England; I almost wish that they had more reason for it.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, June 30 [Stowe].—“A thousand thanks to you for your very kind attention in the midst of your business to the impatience which you knew I must feel upon the details of the last anxious week. The scene seems closing very fast upon the King and Queen, but I cannot bring myself to believe that they will depose an animal so exactly suited to their purpose as this ‘King of shreds and patches.’ The life of the Queen seems in immediate danger. The Duke of Wirtemberg told me that the Emperor had repeatedly said to him, that nothing prevented him from venturing a blow but personal considerations respecting her safety; and he added that he was confident the Emperor would interfere if anything was attempted against her. I give you this as his language, but I have no confidence in the declaration, or in the wisdom or possibility of such interference by force. At the same time I cannot but wish you to consider the propriety of offering to him our assistance to his representations, in case we could induce other powers to adopt the same line. I am very far from having (even upon the very little which I know of your *carte du pais*) made up any opinion whatsoever upon this question, or upon the more important question of suffering the annihilation of the French monarchy; but it is very far from being clear to me that we are wise in sitting still with such a rod in our hands as we have, *supposing you succeed at St. Petersburg.*

“The habit which you give me of writing every thought which occurs makes me state this to you. I certainly do not mean to bestride

Burke's Rosinante ; but I feel that very much may be urged, in cool and politic reason, for not dismissing the consideration as one wholly out of the question. But it is impossible that the business should stop in its present shape ; for, either despair or some other consideration will bring forward some exertion, which may give another appearance to it. In the present moment it is probable that every exertion is stunned, and it is by no means clear that any interference either of Royalists or of foreign powers, by negotiation or by arms, may not accelerate the blow which hangs over this wretched Queen. My heart bleeds for her, and for her children ; but I hardly know how to pity the King.

"We sent you back your Annette in high good humour, and with a very decided wish, *explained to Mary and to me*, that she was to remain in England, *with all its consequences*, rather than to go abroad. Papa and mamma are equally satisfied that her preference is now decided. Perhaps I might be to ask a question or two upon that subject if I thought it could assist you ; but, in trying it, I found so little encouragement from him, that I dropped it ; and I fear that I have nothing to recommend to you but patience.

*Postscript.*—"The Duke of Wirtembergh told me, *à propos* to the Emperor's terms, that having personally been over the whole country, in which he lived for 20 months in high command, he could assure me that the district which he proposed to cede to the Turk by the change of boundary was very much more extensive and fertile than what he proposed to acquire ; but that the river was essential as a barrier. This he told me he would not have said if he could not assure me of the truth, *foi de gentilhomme*.

"Have you sent Sir Corbet Corbet his letters ?"

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, July 1, Whitehall.—"Our answer to the Prussian note will probably not be given till we hear the effect of the new overtures which Prince Reuss has been ordered to make at Berlin, and which have been made here by M. Stadion. We can hardly expect that the Austrian proposal, exactly in its present state, can be accepted either by the Turks or by the King of Prussia, but it may be made I think the ground of a practicable arrangement ; and the seeking for means of compromising the difference seems to indicate (what it is indeed evident must exist) a strong disinclination in the Cabinet of Vienna to see the war renewed ; though they would probably be glad enough even to enlarge their demands, if they thought it could be done without risk.

"Our system is certainly what the Grand Pensionary supposes, and no one is more convinced than I am, of the infinite mischief which would result from embarking this country in measures of war. Whatever therefore can be done to avoid those extremities without real national dishonour ought to be done, and I am sanguine in hoping that we may succeed in this.

"But, if our endeavours fail, I will fairly own to you, though I am not yet authorized to say so officially, that I do not see how it is possible for Great Britain or Holland, if Austria drives us to the wall, to avoid acknowledging that the engagements contracted at Reichenbach do certainly bear the sense which Prussia puts upon them ; and that we are bound, in the language of the Prussian note, *de faire valoir notre garantie*. Exactly to what extent this engagement goes, and what degree of exertion may be requisite for an honourable performance of it,

is a further question; but, even with a view to the maintenance of peace itself, supposing that our only object, I think nothing would be so mischievous as an avowal that we are unable or unwilling to perform our engagements to the full extent that they can be carried to, by just and fair interpretation. I think the difference is infinite between relaxing, as we do with respect to Russia, from demands that it was thought expedient to make, and the refusing (if ultimately it should come to that point) to fulfil the *engagements* which we have entered into. Much of the confusion which existed in the different papers which form what we have called the Reichenbach convention, is removed by the turn given to our instrument of ratification, to which if I remember right, that of the States General was made conformable; and the question is so clear, on the view of that instrument, that it is impossible to doubt a moment whether the present demands of Austria are not directly in contradiction to what we are bound to secure to Prussia, in consequence of our guaranty.

"The events in France will add to the Emperor's desire of peace with the Turks. The examples of the Queen of Denmark and the Princess of Orange are much talked of here, and it is to be wished that His Imperial Majesty should feel them in their full force. Will not the Arch-Duchess, or the Comte de Mercy think themselves authorized to interfere, in case of a public trial, which we understand to be intended. Our details from France are however very imperfect indeed. Lord Gower is not usually a very voluminous correspondent, and he may naturally enough feel particular, and wise reasons, for being less so now."

*Copy.*

#### W. FAWCENNER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, July 1, St. Petersburg. *In cipher.*—"Mr. Adair was presented to the Empress on Sunday last by the Vice-Chancellor, and she received him with infinitely more civility than she generally receives foreigners, even of the first distinction. She spoke to him of Lord Keppel and Mr. Fox, and treated him the whole day with the greatest attention. It was quite an event at Czarsko Zelo. M. Marcoff had assured me, not many days before, how special a mark of the Empress's favour it was that she had allowed me to be presented to her, while only on the footing of a traveller in the country. There is certainly something very much marked in the court which is paid to Mr. Adair here. He lives a great deal with M. Markoff and M. Woronzow, and with the Imperial Minister; and I cannot but believe that his conversation is calculated to impress them with a strong opinion of Mr. Pitt's unpopularity, and the impossibility of his taking vigorous measures against Russia. I met M. Woronzow at dinner to-day; but I cannot give your Lordship an idea of the insolence of his conversation. I accidentally said how much it was to be wished that peace should soon be made between Russia and the Porte, as, from the turn things were taking, all Europe might be otherwise in flames. I really did not mean any particular application; but he answered me in a tone of *reprimand*; '*that was not language likely to advance my business.*' I said little more than how desirous I was that everything might be settled to the Empress's satisfaction. His answer was that, if things were settled at all, it must be to her satisfaction, for that she would not submit to have

them settled in any other way. On my saying I hoped we should soon have the Empress's determination, he said much of the natural slowness that great bodies moved with in their own line, and by their own weight, and when not affected by foreign impulsions. He reproached me with attempts which had been made, he said, to seduce Austria from her alliance with them; but assured me, with a taunting manner, that no two Powers were ever more heartily united, and that no step had been taken by one of them but in concert with the other.

"This conversation was, however, carried on with the appearance of good humour on both sides, and ended with great civility, and his assuring me that he heartily wished for peace. I mention these circumstances only to give your Lordship some idea of the present temper of this Court."

LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD to the DUKE OF RICHMOND.

1791, July 1, Paris.—"The enclosed letter was delivered to me by Lord Gower, with many apologies on his part to your Grace for not sending it sooner to you, it having slipped by accident under some papers in his office, and lain there a considerable time unperceived. In England, I suppose, your fears for the safety of the King and Queen of France on their arrival at Paris even exceeded ours here; and your surprise could not be less considerable when you heard of the great tranquillity and good order that reigned here on that occasion. The people seemed really governed by some magic hand; no hat was taken off, no voice was heard as they passed, although all Paris was assembled to see the captive princes; the leaders of the people had previously taught them *que le silence des peuples est la leçon des rois*.

"I shall not pretend here to give you a detailed account of all these extraordinary proceedings, and the English papers will no doubt teem with these matters. The decree of the Assembly that followed the news of the King's being stopped, by which the charge of his person as well as that of the Queen and the rest of the royal family is given to Monsieur de la Fayette; his incapacity to accept or sanction any new law pronounced; the various branches of the Executive Power invested in the hands of the Ministers, now independent of the King, and responsible only to the National Assembly; the appointment of a governor for the Dauphin resolved on; will be given at length in the papers, as well as the other measures of the Assembly after the arrival of the royal prisoners at the Thuilleries. The appointment of Commissaries, chosen from the National Assembly, to receive the *declarations* of the King and Queen upon their late unsuccessful attempts, to avoid the undignified and humiliating circumstances attending a common examination and deposition in the ordinary course of justice, was the first step that was taken. The declarations of the King and Queen are simple enough, and correspond exactly. They both, humanely, take all blame on themselves, and endeavour to excuse their followers, whom they pretend were ignorant of what was going forward, and only obeyed their masters when they accompanied them without knowing their destination. They persist in its not having been the King's intention to quit France, but to take refuge at *Montmédy* a fortified town on the frontier; and although no mention is made of Monsieur de Bouillé, the Commandant of Metz, in these declarations, it appeared next day that the king sent again for the Commissaries to observe that he had omitted one circumstance in his declaration, which

was that he had given Monsieur de Bouillé orders to advance with troops and protect his retreat to *Montmédy*. I may here observe that as Monsieur de Bouillé was not seconded by the troops according to his expectations, and finding it impossible to rescue the king from the national guards, he was obliged to fly precipitately to Luxembourg for his own safety. The Duc de Choiseul and the Comte Charles Damas, who commanded detachments on the road, are taken prisoners with some other officers, and will stand a trial for the [their] lives; but the persons who were seized with the King, and who were at first supposed here to be people of the highest distinction, are three privates of the *garde du corps*, who were engaged to attend him as *couriers* on the journey. These are the heads of what passed since my last; and as, at the time I wrote that letter, I was not quite *au fait des événements*, I refer you to the printed accounts of the proceedings of the National Assembly, where you may observe Monsieur Drouet, the postmaster of Sainte Menchoud's account, at large, of the manner in which he stopped the royal family at Varennes. He enters into the particulars and is more circumstantial; but my hurried story of the affair was as near the truth as it was possible to collect from public report at the time, and corresponds pretty well with what Monsieur Drouet deposed in the National Assembly.

"Since the arrival of the King here last Saturday, the gardens of the Thuilleries have been closely shut and guarded, but none of the royal family have been yet suffered to walk out to take the air; and although they are permitted to see each other at meals, and in the daytime, at night they are closely confined within their apartments, with guards and sentinels at the outer doors, and officers in the next room to where they sleep with the doors open. Two waiting women sleep in the same room with the Queen, and two officers sit all night at the door, and are eye-witnesses to all that passes in her chamber. The King and his sister Madame Elizabeth are equally well watched; but they all shew the greatest firmness and patience in their sufferings, which are lamentably great. The two or three first days after their confinement very wicked and cruel reports were spread of the King. It was said that he often fell into fits of passion that bordered on madness; and that when he had vented his rage by breaking and striking at all that is near him, that he fell into a state of imbecility which lasted a considerable time. There is not the smallest foundation for these reports, which are only spread by those who are impatient to see him deposed in order to form a Republic of this fallen Monarchy; but their hopes and endeavours will be in vain, for that party is inconsiderable when compared with those who, with the majority of the Assembly, are for preserving the remnants and form of kingly government. It is true that the name of king alone remains now, and what will become of the present nominal king it is difficult to say; but prudence must suggest the idea, if no other consideration does, of keeping the family on the throne, although the sceptre has fallen from their hands. If one may listen to conjecture, the general supposition is that the King will remain a fast prisoner till the end of the Constitution, when it will be presented to him for his acceptance; and if he willingly adopts it, without proposing modification or condition whatever, he may be restored to liberty and that share of authority which is marked out for him in it. If not, he will be declared unfit to reign, the Dauphin will become king, and a council of regency appointed during his minority.

"At present, like a man in debt who has less than nothing, we have

less than no king here; for a king in prison is not so much as another man. In this point of view of the affair my own case presents itself to my thoughts, and I do not, I confess, feel easy as to my fate; but I trust to your affection and goodness to me, and hope you will endeavour to prevent my being laid totally aside if the different Courts of Europe should come to the resolution of recalling their Ambassadors from this Court while the present state of things last. If I may be allowed to speak my wishes, I will frankly own that I desire nothing better than to be left here charged with the correspondence; and although I can have no public character under such circumstances, and nothing certain to look to in point of emolument, I am ready to trust to the generosity of Government, which will no doubt reward me according to my exertions. I judge it prudent to acquaint you with my sentiments on this matter. As to what remains with you to be done, your Grace alone can judge how far you think me deserving your assistance, and how far it may be consistent with your own sentiments on this affair to exert yourself for me."

#### EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 1, Paris.—"I am going to write private truths which might be unpleasant to a royal eye. If this country ceases to be a monarchy it will be entirely the fault of Louis 16th. Blunder upon blunder, inconsequence upon inconsequence, a total want of energy of mind accompanied with personal cowardice, have been the destruction of his reign. In this last affair when he had undertaken to escape from Paris, or if you will, to go to Montmédi, he ought to have effected his plan or perished in the attempt. It will be difficult to persuade me that he intended to stay at Montmédi, especially after the hopes that Monsieur unwarily gave the emigrants in the Low Countries of his brother's speedy arrival among them.

"Monsieur de Bouillé's letter, if it be genuine, is a *fanfaronnade* unworthy of a man of his character, and is a strong proof how easily a Frenchman's head becomes *exaltée*.

"It has always been the fate of this unfortunate monarch that whenever the enemies of his government have begun to suffer in the public opinion, he has adopted some measure which has reinstated them. How he can extricate himself out of the present difficulty I know not. Foreign forces would, in my mind, serve only to unite the country still stronger against him, and would compel the French to form a good government; who, if left to themselves, would have frittered it away into a nondescript metaphysical permanent anarchy, or rather ochlocracy.

"The inclosed extract of a letter which was received, by mistake, by a member of the Assembly who happens to bear the name of one of the democratic journalists, will shew that the Propaganda are not inactive in England. I send also a paper of the other sort at the request of the author, Monsieur de Royoz.

"I beg to be remembered in the kindest manner to Mr. Pitt."

#### THE EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 3, Spa.—"I assure you I should not have waited for your answer to my last letters before I had written again, if I had been able to give you an account of my travels for some time past, but, towards the middle of April, when I had nearly seen everything at Rome, and was

meditating a grand traveller's epistle to you, I was attacked by a very alarming fever, which afterwards turned to an ague, and continued to distress me during almost the whole journey from Rome to this place. I believe I am to attribute this unfortunate illness to the unseasonable heat of the weather at Rome. Early in April, it was, beyond all comparison, more oppressively hot than I ever felt it in the middle of summer in England. I was taken ill at Tivoli, and so ill that I really thought it would have been to me *modus lasso maris, et viarum*. When I arrived at Verona, it was my intention to have gone to Venice; but the heat was so dreadful, and the attacks of my illness so frequent, that I was afraid to encounter the marshes and canals, and therefore I gave up Venice, and immediately continued my journey through the Tyrol. I since have had reason to think that I did right in giving up Venice, as some persons who passed the feast of the Ascension there have told me the heat and the stench of the canals were intolerable. Nothing can be finer than the country the whole way from Verona to Inspruck. I prefer it on the whole to the passage over the Alps of Savoy. From Inspruck we went to Munich, where, I think, the most remarkable circumstance was the power of Sir *Sodom* Thompson, Lord Sackville's *under* Secretary. He is quite omnipotent, and as might be expected, so oppressive that he has given disgust to the whole country, particularly to the best officers in the Elector's army. I should not be surprised if some confusion happened in that country soon. From Munich we went by Augsburg and Ulm to the great tun at Heidelberg; and then by Mannheim, Worms, Frankfurt, and Mayence; from which last place we followed the course of the Rhine to Cologne, and then passed by Aix la Chapelle to Spa. You will perceive by this route that we passed through the main body of the French exiles. I was at Mayence the day of their great meeting, and saw the preparations for the feast which the Elector gave to the Comte d'Artois and the other Princes. Calonne was with them, but, as you may suppose, I did not at such time attempt to renew my acquaintance. I do not believe, from the best intelligence I could collect, that they have a single soldier under their command; but the number of officers is very great; I think five or six thousand, perhaps more. It is a curious circumstance (and I know it to be a fact) that even the servants of the Princes and of their *suite* are *Democrats*; they made no scruple of declaring that they would leave their masters the instant they attempted any attack upon any part of the French territory. You may judge whether in such a herd of *valetaille*, so disposed, there must not be many spies. I daresay the National Assembly are perfectly well informed of every motion that is made by these unfortunate men; but I believe there is no reason to apprehend any danger from them, as they have neither money or credit, and as little prudence. Those whom I met spoke of nothing but revenge and retaliation upon those who had plundered their property; and I am convinced, if it were possible that they could return into France with sufficient force, we should be shocked with new scenes of blood; it would only be a change of actors, but the spirit would remain the same. Nothing would content the principal persons who have left France but a complete restoration of the ancient despotism in all its parts. This is so avowedly their principle that, at Rome and other places in Italy where several of them have been during the winter, they would not receive Lally Tollendal, because he had been so much opposed to the whole system, and had fled only in consequence of the late excesses both in the National Assembly and in the country. Perhaps therefore it is better, on the whole, for the people of France that the cause of the exiles is so weak.



"I see I have omitted mentioning to you that I am a passionate admirer of what I have seen of Germany. The greatest part of the country which I have passed through is very fine, and the inns and people are palaces and angels compared with the Italians. The famous egg soup and *frowsty frow* of the Burgh of Lauffen, which you must remember in our grand tour, had given me a great prejudice against Germany. I now desire to make an *amende honorable*, and to declare my respect for the Herrs and Frows. I really believe you would have been ill in Italy if your enthusiasm had not been a sufficient antidote against the effects of the dirt. I remember to have heard you say that one flea had kept you awake a whole night; in Italy they attack in armies. I assure you the first day we arrived at Rome we caught *thirty* in a quarter of an hour, and the floor was covered with their squadrons, who were exercising themselves in jumping over the crevices of the tiles with great agility. At the last post in the Campagna of Rome, the waiter insisted that his dog should sup in the room with us, and he served him from our table. We made some resistance, until our Italian courier advised us to submit as the only way of preventing a serious dispute, which would have ended in a *colpo di coltello*. When to dirt, stink, and vermin you have added the frequency of these *colpi di coltello* (which is a technical term for assassination both at Rome and Naples), you may judge that there are some drawbacks on the pleasures of Italy. At Rome while I was ill, I had the misfortune to see a murder committed under my window, in the middle of the day, by a servant belonging to the house where I lodged. The assassin escaped; nobody dared to pursue him, and he walked away very coolly to the house of Cardinal Albani, where he was received with open arms, and we never heard anything more of him, though we applied to the Governor for justice. Here you may quote at least a hundred verses from different parts of Horace and Virgil.

"You see that although I cannot now attempt to give you a regular history of what I saw at Rome and Naples after my last letters, I cannot entirely omit the subject; when we meet I think we shall have great pleasure in talking over these matters. I am afraid we had already exhausted almost all possible spoutations from Virgil, Horace, and most other such fellows, applicable to what I have seen. I have read Tasso, Ariosto, and parts of Dante since I have seen you, in each of which there are some very fine things, particularly in the two last; but on the whole I was rather disappointed in the Italian poets.

"I am quite grieved to hear that Virgil's bays do not grow. I guess by your letter that you also received some macaroni, which I sent to you. Did I mention to you that I met the eldest hope of the Great man in every respect whatsoever, at Naples and Rome? He lived a great deal with me, and I really feel quite a regard for him, although he is infinitely the greatest quizz I ever saw. He is also one of the best natured and best tempered men I know. He seems to me to have read a great deal, and if he is not too confident of his own powers, I think he will succeed in Parliament; I heartily wish he may. I also met Wallace at Rome, who appears to me to be a very sensible man, and very likely to come forward; he is a very good friend and ought to be cultivated. You will easily believe that I have received the greatest pleasure from the accounts which I have seen of your complete success in your new situation. These accounts have been confirmed by persons whom I have met here. I had no doubt that the change would answer both to yourself and to your friends; but I am persuaded you must feel that it has proved even more advantageous than it was possible to calculate when I

left England. I hope to hear more particulars from Ryder, who is soon expected here.

"My unfortunate illness at Rome has obliged me to alter the plan which I had formed of going to England about this time. Although I am at present very well, I think it prudent to take a dose of Spa water before my return. I certainly found great advantage from my visit to Spa last year, and although I have been here but a week, I have already felt that I have gained strength. My intention at present is to be in England the end of August or early in September; I should be glad to know where your villa is situated and where you are likely to be at that time.

"You have of course the best intelligence of the late strange event in France. The declaration of the King is the *coup de grace* to the cause of the Monarchy and all its friends; the Queen's seems to me to be very sensible and natural. There are a great many Erench here; the first account received was positive that the whole Royal Family had arrived safely at Mons. I never saw such joy. I must mention that Lady Wallace, who is here, wanted to persuade all the English to mount white cockades immediately; we were all fortunately too prudent to obey her orders; however she contrived to get several English to promise that they would meet a number of the French at dinner the next day to celebrate the event; I think the company was to have been forty; before dinner the news arrived of the capture of the King; of course she had but a thin attendance. You may conceive the dejection of the unfortunate French; I believe they now consider their cause to be quite desperate.

"I had the good fortune to meet Burke's pamphlet at Rome, and nobody can admire it more. I have also met his second pamphlet, which has some very fine passages; but it is not at all equal to the first. I wonder you did not hang that scoundrel Paine for his black-guard libel on King, Lords, and Commons. I suppose the extreme scurrility of the pamphlet, or the villainy of those who wish to disperse it amongst the common people, has carried it through so many editions. For it appears to me to have no merit whatever; but it may do mischief in ale-houses in England, and still more in whisky-houses in Ireland. I think it is by far the most treasonable book that ever went unpunished within my knowledge; so, pray, hang the fellow, if you can catch him. I assure you I did not write more, in a letter to which you allude, than I felt and than I still feel on the subject of your kindness. I am very happy to be able to retract the greatest part of what I had written relative to Pole in that letter, as he has materially altered his conduct since I wrote."

*Postscript.*—"I wrote a very long letter to Lord Buckingham a great while ago, and never received an answer; pray find out whether my letter reached him. I have this moment received your very kind letter of the 29th, which is an additional proof of your regard for me. Henry is the proposed diplomatic *commis*; he is at present at Brussels under the care of Colonel Gardiner, who has been very kind to him. As for preparation, he has been abroad some time; at Brunswick he learnt German, and he understands and speaks French tolerably well. I do not know whether this is the sort of preparation to which you allude. He has a commission in the Guards, and his age is nineteen.

"You will see by what I have written already that my late illness was not at all of the same nature of that which obliged me to leave England, the physicians all said it was a fever of the climate of Rome; the unusual heat brought on the *malaria* in a slight degree as early as

the middle of April, and many of the English were affected by it, though none so severely as myself. I never was better in my life than I am at present, and I remain here merely from precaution. As I have been led to speak of myself by a paragraph in your letter, I must mention to you that while I was at Florence I was exceedingly ill, and not able to go out. Lord Hervey, to whom I had no letter whatever, came immediately to see me, offered me anything I chose to have from his house, and sent me his physician; he continued to pay such attention to me during the whole time that I remained at Florence that, if he had been my dearest friend, I could not have expected more. I feel so much obliged to him that, if it was possible for you in any way to let him know that I have mentioned his kindness, you would do me a great favour. At all events, if you happen to know any of his family *with whom he is on good terms*, pray speak of the manner in which I feel his conduct."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 3, Hague.—"I am very sorry to hear that the packet which sailed yesterday from Helvoet, with the messenger from Petersburg, has been obliged by stress of weather to put back:—I take the occasion to forward three despatches for your Lordship from Vienna, and Sistove, and Berlin.

"M. de Kalitcheff called upon me yesterday and put into my hands a letter which he had received from Count Osterman, and which he is to communicate ministerially to-morrow to the Grand Pensionary and to the Greffier. It transmits copies of our representation and of the Empress's answer, and states that the latter being given to the two allied Courts may be considered as an answer to the memorial of the Republic. In other respects the whole is of a conciliatory turn, and goes over the same ground of indefinite reasoning, and almost in the same expressions as is used in the Russian answer. It was evident that M. de Kalitcheff had received a separate and more confidential dispatch, but he would not confide the purport of it; he merely repeated his confident belief that a pacification would soon be arranged. From the anxiety of the Russian courier to leave Helvoet in a separate boat, I think it probable that Count Woronzow receives some particular information. The agent at the Brielle very properly obliged the Russian courier to go in the same packet with ours.

"The Grand Pensionary, yesterday, communicated to me the whole of M. Hogguer's correspondence. It is very clear that he has no instruction but the general one of contributing cordially to the measures of the Allies. On his part, he expresses suspicions that we are pursuing some exclusive advantages of commerce. These idle jealousies very often prevail among foreign Ministers, and gradually find their own cure.

"There is a secret account here, through a very good channel, that his Prussian Majesty is desirous to find a pretext to take the field at the head of his troops against Austria, and thinks such a measure for his interest, in many points of view, even if England should dissent from it. One principal inducement is said to be the regard due to the discontents of the army, and the danger of leaving a military state too long without employment.

"The Emperor's conduct is unaccountable unless it should appear that, by desire of the Court of Petersburg, he is merely postponing the

close of the Congress till the Russian discussion is settled, and that he means to withdraw his new pretensions ; for, it cannot be supposed that he sees an interest in forcing a renewal of the war with the Turks upon a ground which would not only bring upon him the whole of the Prussian force, but which, from the terms of our guaranty, must, to a certain degree, engage Great Britain and even this Republic in the quarrel. For this reason I do not believe that he would persevere, even if the situation of France and of the Queen of France were less pressing. We have received accounts to day that Monsieur and the Comte d'Artois explicitly and avowedly declare it to be their object to use every means and to incur every risk to re-establish the monarchy. I have reason to believe that, in order to excite the King of Sardinia to stand forwards in the enterprise, it has been strongly intimated to him that all the leading powers in Europe would be disposed to acquiesce in his obtaining an aggrandizement of possessions and power at the expense of France. From the details which we have here of the plan of the late intended escape, it appears to be literally true that the Royal Family meant to have stopped at Mont-Médý ; to have fortified their standard by such means as M. de Bouillé hoped to furnish ; by troops also collected by the Prince of Condé ; by deserters from the French garrisons ; by friends to the royal cause ; and lastly, by some troops hired from the Swiss Cantons ;—and, in that position, to have sought farther aid from the Emperor, and from the Kings of Spain and Sardinia. It is difficult to say what success the plan might have had ; but it is very certain that the Garde Nationale, which makes so much noise in the French newspapers, was under extreme dismay in the rumour even of an attack from some unknown and distant quarter ; and the panic even extended itself to the Commissaries who conducted the return of the Royal prisoners.

“ There is a peculiar expression towards the close of the Russian answer, which mentions the advantages of an *indirect frontier*, as if there were a disposition to leave the district of Ockzakow in a state of neutrality.”

Secret.

“ It appears, from good intelligence, that the French Chargé d’Affaires is to make some communication here. Care will be taken to avoid giving any answer.”

Secret.

“ In a private letter by the last post to M. Bielfingeer (the Prussian Chargé d’Affaires) a zealous friend of Colonel Bischoffwerder informs him that the favourite lady (*La Denhoff* is the term in the letter) is supplanted by another lady, and *qu’elle ne tardera pas d’être tout doucement renvoyée*. This is stated as matter of triumph, and of importance. Bielfingeer is much in the confidence of Colonel Bischoffwerder, which is probably the true reason of the removal of Renfner to Berlin, under the pretext of promotion.

“ There is a report that the French princes wish to engage the several sovereigns of Europe to appoint a congress to consider the state and circumstances of France, and the measures proper to be adopted. It seems to be the best policy for us to stand aloof, and to watch the course of events. The embarrassments of the democratic leaders in France are multiplying every hour, and there is a great disunion among them, and no man of leading talents. The pressure of ruined finances

and of general mutiny and disorder is gaining ground ; and if other Governments can maintain their own tranquillity a few months longer, the completion of the French calamities will afford the best lesson against the abstractions of politics, and dispose mankind to exterminate the *Société de la propagande*.

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

1791, July 6, St. James's Square.—“His Majesty approves of the proposal you make respecting Kay's business, and has directed *me* to signify it to you as a less official mode than if I had transferred it to Dundas to do so, though by a private letter. This affords me an opportunity of assuring you how happy I shall always be in any occasion of renewing our correspondence.”

“Our Petersburg messenger is at last arrived. He brings nothing decisive, but the communication in answer to our declaration is civil, and affords, I think, some reasonable hopes of a favourable issue of the business.”

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, July 6, Whitehall.—“The despatches which you will receive with this so fully explain our line, under the present circumstances, that I have little, if anything, to add to them. You will see how hard we struggle to be allowed to remain quiet, which is in truth the great object of our wishes, and in which I cannot still help hoping that we shall succeed. I know too well how much the same wish is felt at the Hague not to be confident of receiving whatever assistance can be derived from that quarter towards the same object. I have no jealousy of M. Hogguer's separate negotiation at Petersburg, nor do I believe in it.

“If the Emperor does break faith with us at last, he does it in a manner so directly and personally disgraceful to himself, that it is hard to suppose how he can make up his mind to hear all that he must hear in such a case. It will however be a poor consolation to us to purchase so dearly the right of calling names.

“I, who am of a sanguine temper, cannot help auguring well from the despatches by Tims, though I must own they contain little ground for forming conjectures either way. If the plan is to amuse us, that must be with a view to Potemkin's plan of attack against Constantinople. Do the learned with you apprehend much from this boasted attack? I see nobody who does not say that with common management on the part of the Turks (but who shall say they will have common management?) it could not succeed.”

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private and Confidential.

1791, July 6, Whitehall.—“I have written to you so fully in my public despatches that little, if anything, remains to be communicated to you in this manner. Lord Auckland assures me that he knows

nothing of the transaction at Petersburg to which you allude, and that he is persuaded the Grand Pensionary is equally ignorant of it.

"I will fairly own to you that I entertain a strong persuasion that matters will not come to extremities with the Emperor. He has so many evident reasons to wish for peace that it would be little short of madness in him to renew the war for the *plus ou moins* on the Unna and at Orsova. The King of Prussia and we have little to gain by such a war, but the Emperor has everything to lose. I am not without hopes that his attention is more than ever turned towards France, and that the examples of the Queen of Denmark and the Princess of Orange, are felt by him as not inapplicable to what is passing at Paris. If that is the case, he certainly will not desire to draw the Porte and the Allies upon him. In what may pass on the subject of the possible case of war, pray advert to the distinction stated in one of my despatches between a direct war of England against Russia, and a war in which we should give to Prussia the stipulated succours, because it may be very material.

"It is a painful situation to be measuring one's expressions between the fear, on one hand, of holding out expectations to Prussia which *we could* not perform and *others would* not, and, on the other hand, of conveying an impression disadvantageous to our national good faith. The whole of our line is summed up in a few words. His Majesty's present servants will certainly advise him, at all risks, to perform the engagements of his alliance if the case exists; but there is every reason in the situation of this country, and quite independently of any motive personal to ourselves, to wish that the case may not exist. We can answer for our own conduct, but we cannot answer for our success. You cannot, therefore, render a more important service to this country, and to the system of the alliance, than by exerting yourself at Berlin so that ultimately this business may not lead to war, the consequences of which, do what we will, may be extremely injurious to the interests of Prussia, and to the maintenance of the alliance.

*Postscript.*—"I am very much struck with the Prussian note in answer to the overtures of Prince Reuss. It is very much the ablest paper that I ever saw coming from the Cabinet of Berlin. I am desirous of knowing whose production it is, and generally, in what manner and by whom the business is done in a department so singularly constituted as that which you have to treat with.

"I have stated to Comte Redern the general outlines and purport of what I have written. I understand from him that the account of the interview with the Emperor on the 18th was arrived, and I conclude it is to that you allude in your dispatch. But you say nothing of the letter which was to have been sent at the same time from the Emperor to the King of Prussia. If the contents are communicated to you, they may give an insight into the business which is involved in so strange and disgraceful a contradiction. Comte Woronzow has desired to see me, but I shall not know the nature of his business till after this messenger will have been dispatched."

JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 7, Berlin.—"Though I have no new information to make it necessary to write a dispatch, I cannot let this messenger go to England without stating to your Lordship some facts and observations relative to the present situation of affairs, and entreating your Lordship to give me some confidential instructions to regulate my conduct.

"I suppose the late intelligence you will have received from Milan and Vienna will have made no alteration in your sentiments respecting the Emperor, as expressed in your dispatch No. 11. I know, upon undoubted authority, that he continues to keep up the most confidential correspondence with the Empress of Russia, and that he communicates to her all the overtures made to him by England and Prussia, and has invited her to accede to the system into which he proposes to enter with them.

"I need not observe to your Lordship what a heterogenous combination this would form, and that the Allies would most probably be the dupes of their good faith; but I beg leave to ask you if, after the late conduct of the Emperor, his collusion with Russia might not be expected in every case, and if any reliance whatever can be placed in him. I have mentioned to your Lordship more than once, in my late letters, that this Court was now satisfied that the Emperor would not venture to persist in his unreasonable pretensions against the Turks; and it is thought probable that he will accept the arbitration on the principles proposed in the last answer from hence. But this is ascribed solely to the firmness with which His Prussian Majesty has acted; and it was upon the conviction that success would be rendered still more certain by the concurrence of England that I wrote my dispatch No. 22. I likewise thought that the prospect of restoring our influence here was a very powerful argument for engaging His Majesty and his Ministers to comply with the wishes of this Court, especially as this could be done without any serious risk, as the consequences have already proved. I, therefore, hope I shall soon receive such instructions from your Lordship as may enable me to satisfy the King of Prussia; for, should this not be the case, our influence here will receive another severe blow.

"I need say nothing more on this subject, as it will have been decided before your Lordship receives this letter.

"But I am very anxious to learn your sentiments respecting the conduct you may think most advisable to be observed by England and Prussia towards the Emperor, in the subsequent intercourse with him, and particularly during the interview at Pilnitz. I have great reason to suspect that His Imperial Majesty will settle nothing definitely, not even the peace with the Porte, till that period, as he seems to hope that through the means of Colonel Bischoffwerder, who appears to be his dupe, he will be able to cajole the King of Prussia into his views. I believe he will be disappointed, but as every artifice will be employed, I wish much to know precisely what line it is wished that His Prussian Majesty should adopt, and consequently what part or measures His Majesty and his Ministers would prefer, relative to the different objects which may come under consideration.

"I can add nothing on the subject of the Emperor's new pretensions against the Turks, and I trust your Lordship's instructions with regard to them are actually on the road. But as I am assured on good authority that His Imperial Majesty wrote to the Empress of Russia, so lately as the 19th of last month, to desire she would not conclude with the Porte without previously acquainting him, it seems to be his intention to have that negotiation likewise protracted, in which it may be expected that Russia will agree with him, to promote the execution of Prince Potemkin's plans.

"I acquainted your Lordship in my letter No. 26, that the sentiments of this Court agree perfectly with those stated in your dispatch No. 11 relative to the affairs of Poland, but I beg to know what would be

judged most advisable to be done should the Emperor and the Elector of Saxony join in requiring the guarantee of the Allies.

"It is certainly to be expected that His Imperial Majesty will have a secret, if not an avowed collusion with the Empress of Russia, in regard to Poland, and that their joint influence, with the assistance of His Polish Majesty, will prevail, especially if the Turks be obliged to accept the Russian terms, in which case both they and the Poles must lose all confidence in the Allies. It seems, therefore, much to be apprehended that, whatever precautions might be taken, and even supposing the accession of the Emperor to the system of the Allies, Poland will become a more fruitful source of contention among the neighbouring powers than it was formerly.

"I think I can venture to assure your Lordship that the King of Prussia has not, hitherto, committed himself respecting French affairs, either towards the Emperor or the emissaries of the royal party. But as His Imperial Majesty has the counter-revolution so much at heart, it may be expected that he will make some proposals to His Prussian Majesty on the subject, and I should therefore be happy to know if I ought to continue to endeavour to make him avoid committing himself.

"I trust your Lordship will admit the propriety of my being furnished with instructions as soon as possible on the points I have stated, as, if I may hope to have any influence, there is no time to be lost in preparing the King of Prussia and his Ministers.

"Permit me, likewise, to observe that the long delay of sending me instructions on many late important events, and on the frequent communications from hence, has made an unfavourable impression on the minds of His Prussian Majesty and his Ministers.

"Upon the whole, however, I have no reason to complain, hitherto, of Count Schulenburg, who now enjoys the unlimited confidence of the King his master. Count Hertzberg perceiving this, and that he was excluded from the most important affairs, has solicited and obtained his retreat from the Cabinet, but continues Minister of State, Curator of the Academy of Sciences, and retains the management of the cultivation of silk in the Prussian dominions, which has long been his favourite object. He has likewise obtained leave to have access to all the State papers to enable him to write the history of the reign of the late King."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 7, Padua.—"I have hazarded far too much to be able to express to your Lordship my anxiety for your opinion on my present conduct. I was perfectly aware of the delicacy of the step I took, but I did not conceive I should be pardonable to have let slip an opportunity, so favourable as this promised to be, for hastening the Emperor's final resolution on the system of general tranquility.

"It is somewhat singular that the Emperor did not hint at an opinion of the measures Great Britain might be likely to take, in regard to France. He was extremely agitated when he gave me the letter for the King. It was sealed before I was apprized of his intention of writing. And, indeed, I have reason to believe that that intention, if not the letter itself, was formed previous to my coming to Padua.

"Though I proceed from hence to Trieste, I shall avoid meeting the Emperor till his arrival at Vienna, unless any very particular business



should occur. Colonel Bischoffswerder has been on an excursion in Italy since the 25th ultimo. I don't expect to see him before the 15th instant at Vienna."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 7 [Stowe].—"I do not like your *no answer* from the Czarina, for, by gaining time she gains the summer, and puts off your operations to another year; before which period her allies in our Parliament may carry the war more unpleasantly into your quarters than you can into hers. And, in the meantime, the Turk seems to be left to his own exertions from which I do not augur much, though he seems to have done wisely in breaking off a negotiation for further cessions, trusting that Brabant and other considerations will ensure to him the continuation of the armistice; and this confidence seems indeed well-grounded, for I do not see how Leopold can form an army in Moldavia in the present moment. However, I trust that you will oblige the Russian to give you her answer time enough to ensure to you the option of your measures, unfettered by an increase of expenses, or by any other consideration which shall make it necessary to meet Parliament before January.

"I do not know when your travellers leave London, and till then I cannot hope to see you; but, after that event, I shall hope that you will think of Stowe, if it is only for your Saturday and Sunday nights."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1791, July 8, Whitehall.—"I have nothing to add to my public letters to your Lordship of this date except to repeat, in this manner, the assurances of the very strong impression which I feel of the ability which you have shewn in the execution of a very delicate commission. I am fully persuaded that it cannot be necessary for me to explain the motives of propriety which have necessarily led to the putting an end to that commission at a time when the object of it is still in suspense, but that you will see at once that, Sir Robert Keith being at Vienna, no other person could be employed to treat in the King's name. I can sincerely add that this necessity has been the occasion of some regret to me, not from any distrust of Sir Robert Keith, but because I feel the advantage which would have resulted from the experience which you have had of the Emperor's manner of conversing, and treating points of this nature, and from the talents which you have shewn on this occasion.

"Whenever the occasion shall offer itself for calling out the same talents into exertion, I am satisfied that the King's service will be materially benefited by it."

*Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 8 [Stowe].—"Many thanks to you for your two letters. I wish for many reasons that Riou's second letter had been more satisfactory, for, though nothing conclusive can be gathered from Peckover's account of the two boys, yet the knowledge that one of them is not Pitt can only distress Lord Camelford, and therefore I think Lord Chatham

is wise in concealing it, particularly as it is impossible from the very distant dates of the letters but that we must soon hear the circumstantial narrative which Riou promises, and which he certainly must soon transmit to England.

"I am happy that you should see a prospect, however difficult, of bringing to a conclusion, by the mode which I pointed out, the point which has hung so long upon our mind. I had written to you a very long letter which I meant to have sent by the General to you, and which I only reserve in case Pitt and you should not persist in *forcing* the arrangement which is in every point of view so much beyond *his* merits and pretensions; by arrangement I mean the three objects which we have so often discussed. The last of these three can be no object to me from the moment in which it can be so usefully applied, and the disposal of it in this mode relieves my mind from very many difficulties upon that head, therefore you may be (as I am) perfectly at ease.

"Pray remind Lord Chatham of his promise to commission Captain W. Pigott if the armament goes on; I see more ships of different classes have been brought forward.

"I understand that very unusual pains are taken to bring together to-day a very large meeting at Aylesbury of Lord Verney's friends, but I think his election begins to be unpopular.

"The assizes are on Monday next at Buckingham, and the quarter sessions are on the succeeding Saturday at Aylesbury. I wish you could find it convenient to attend either one or the other for a few hours. If you can come to me for Sunday next, you could pass muster at Buckingham; if you could come on Saturday I could meet you at Aylesbury on that day; but I think you owe that civility of attending on one of the days.

*Postscript.*—"I have seen Mr. Pitt, and concurred fully with him on business, and have at last the satisfaction of informing you that we are reconciled."

#### EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 8, Paris.—"I have to announce to you the departure of Mr. Paine, who is on his road for England, where he piously intends, if possible, to make confusions; from thence, he makes it no secret, he is to go to Ireland for the same charitable purpose. Monsieur la Fayette is his great friend, and has no use for him here.

"As Mr. Moore is of some assistance to me, and he assures me he cannot be wanted at present in England, I shall take the liberty of detaining him here for some days longer."

#### LORD FITZGIBBON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 9, Dublin.—"I trust you will excuse the liberty which I take in troubling you with the enclosed packet. I had received it from the Comte de Jarnac, and promised to send it to the French Ambassador by a man whom I was to have dispatched to London this night, in order to make the necessary proofs on the trial of some of the London printers whom I have prosecuted for libelling Lady FitzGibbon. I have, however, this moment received a letter from my solicitor that he will not be ready to bring them to trial till the next term, and as Jarnac expressed

very great anxiety that this packet should reach his brother in safety, I am now to request of your Lordship to relieve me from my present embarrassment, by sending it with your dispatches to the British resident at Brussels for the Duc de Chabot; or if you should not choose so to do, by putting it into the common post."

W. FAWKENER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, July 12, St. Petersburg. *In cipher*—"The Empress again distinguished Mr. Adair very much on Saturday at Peterhoff. The Vice-Chancellor placed him in her way, and she spoke to him for some time, though she did not speak to several of the Foreign Ministers who kissed her hand. But the most extraordinary thing is that, soon after she had spoken to him, she called the Vice-Chancellor to her across the circle, and sent him to ask Mr. Adair whether he had received any account of the English fleet having sailed. She watched him while the Vice-Chancellor was delivering this message, and put on a very significant smile. I must, however, do Mr. Adair the justice to add that he told us these circumstances himself. We saw the Vice-Chancellor receive and carry this message."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 13 [Stowe].—"I will immediately negotiate with Purefoy to endeavour to get the release from him by showing the impossibility of baronetting his mad brother, but I have some idea that he is himself most ambitious of this honour.

"I am most sensibly obliged to you for your very attentive kindness about Fremantle, for whom I certainly interest myself very warmly, and (as you will observe by the enclosed curious account of this business) have been warmly pressed to solicit you, which I meant to have done, *as far as was proper*, by this post, not knowing how kindly you had anticipated my wishes. May I beg you to let me know the result, that I may write to FitzGibbon about it, and make a civility of it to him.

"I am happy to hear of the Imperial dispositions, as I feared that the step was irrevocable, and that it might decide much with the Czarina in her temper and language. The Duke of Wirtembergh told me that she had hardly the means of raising another man, or a single rouble."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 13, Hague.—"I remarked with great pleasure the contents of the several despatches to Mr. Ewart, Lord Elgin, and Sir Robert Keith, which you permitted me to peruse in their passage. It is highly probable that the peace of Sistove will be signed before these new instructions can arrive there; but they were suited to the circumstances known in England at the time of their date, and will make a respectable and useful impression both at Berlin and Vienna.

"When I forwarded Prince Kaunitz's last proposal made through Prince Reuss (I ought to have said *the answer to it*, for the proposal itself was never communicated to us) I omitted to observe that, on an examination of dates, that proposal which approaches so nearly to the

terms of the *status quo* strict, was made before the Austrian Ministry had received the King of Prussia's answer to their prior proposal, which differed so widely from those terms. This can only be explained by supposing that, in the last instance, Prince Kaunitz acted under an immediate and positive order from the Emperor. With respect to those same Austrian Ministers, it would be important and desirable if any cordial communication should take place with the Emperor, to prevail on him to remove both Prince Kaunitz and Count Cobenzel from the conduct of foreign affairs, and to urge this as a proof of his sincerity. They are impracticable and insincere men, and ill-disposed both to English and Prussian interests. But I shall have little faith in our project of an Austrian alliance till I see it fairly established. I think it eligible for the Emperor and highly eligible for us; but it seems to be evidently against the Prussian interests, and yet His Prussian Majesty is, thus far, the active agent in promoting it.

"The new French Minister is expected to arrive here in the course of next week. He has secretly sounded the Dutch Ministers to know whether his servants will be protected against insult if they refuse to wear Orange cockades; the delicacy is a curious one at a moment when Louis XVI. is obliged to wear the cockades of the National Assembly. It was intimated in answer that he must conform to the custom of the Republic. But a more serious embarrassment is likely to arise; we have some fear that he will come with credentials not signed by his sovereign. The Dutch Ministers incline to think that, in that case, he ought not to be received. Before I quit this subject I will mention a doubt conceived by the Pensionary, whether it would not be a measure both political and becoming in the established Governments of Europe, to give a leave of absence to their Embassadors at Paris, and to bring them away till there is something settled which it might be thought right to acknowledge. In the present turn and tendency of affairs, it is probable that some mode of executive government may be brought forwards which would be embarrassing beyond measure to the Corps Diplomatique, either to countenance or to disavow. If your Lordship should form any sentiments on this subject we shall be glad to benefit by them.

"M. de Bouillé is said to be at Rheinsberg, consulting Prince Henry of Prussia.

"I find that in the ceremony of the inauguration in the Netherlands, the oath on the part of the Emperor was given, and received without remark in some of the provinces, according to the form of his reserve in his ratification of the Convention of the Hague. It appears to me, under this circumstance, that there could be no material objection to receiving his ratification with the additional clause, and the giving ours without that clause. The recognition of our guarantee of the constitution and possession, is certainly important both to England and to this Republic.

"I send the enclosed, which I received last night, for the sake of the postscript, which probably contains the purport of a private letter from Charlottenberg."

*Enclosing a note of no importance, from the Princess of Orange.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, July.] — "The answer was *no*, which I took as quite decisive, though there was a great disposition to argue again the whole subject, and I think visibly some disappointment and regret. Accounts

are just come from Breslaw, which are not decisive, but on the whole look pacific.

"Although the King of Prussia seems to continue desirous of going to extremities, Ewart's representations, which appear to have been very proper and explicit, had had great effect, and though the Austrian terms were not fully known, Ewart seems persuaded they would be conformable to the *status quis*, with some modifications approaching to the Prussian plan."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and most Secret.

1791, July 16, Hague.—"The secret paper which I have copied on the opposite page is curious; but I ought to give a short commentary on it. The writer is Charles Lameth; and the letter is addressed *de la part de la Clique des Enragés* to their friend the Comte de Ricé, a young Frenchman of pleasant manners (nephew of Jaucourt) who, two years ago, married a rich widow at this place, who is old enough to be more than his mother. M. de Ricé's correspondence has been strictly watched by the Pensionary, and shews a strong disposition to do everything in his power, both here and at Paris, conformably to the wild and innovating spirit of the leading *democrates*. From the letter subjoined, it appears that the embarrassment is at least as great as we suppose it to be. There is an expression also which countenances a suspicion entertained by many, that the King's escape was connived at and aided for the purpose of trying experiments, of gaining new influence, of driving the people more mad than ever, and lastly of prolonging the reign of the *Assemblée Nationale*. This letter also shews that there is a scheme to rescind M. de Gouvenet's appointment, and to send M. de Ricé to this place. The first part of that plan is not inconvenient, for we have been in daily expectation of the arrival of M. de Gouvenet with a credential signed by M. de Montmorin in the name of the National Assembly. The Republic would, I think, have rejected that credential; but we are not sorry to avoid the occasion of distinguishing ourselves. I should add, on this subject, that the affair of interceptions is more secret here even than in England; it is confined to the Grand Pensionary, and to the Prince Stadholder, and, in some cases, I believe solely to the latter; and yet I have sometimes thought that the two Governments might have some arrangements which would make it more useful. They are in possession here of most of the ciphers, and even of those which have been lately changed.

"The Spanish Declaration is a curious incident, and if I do not greatly mistake the character both of the King of Spain and of his Minister, will be followed in due time by some more serious measure.

"I have received the following note which I will transcribe:—'*M. de Reede n'écrit que le projet de mariage du Duc de York avec la princesse Frederique est certain, et que le roi, pere de la future, a donné son consentement; à la suite de cela, le Duc a envoyé un homme à lui pour demander l'agrément du roi son pere.*

"*Hogguer augure fort mal de la negociation de M. Fawkenner; J'espere que vos nouvelles du Nord sont plus favorables.*

"*Le pauvre Hertzberg a sa demission avec la charge d'écrire la vie du feu roi; il reste, par consequent, auteur, ne pouvant plus être acteur.*'

"The Princess of Orange speaks in most favourable terms of the *Princesse Frederique*.

"It is very true that all the last despatches from Petersburg are of a sombre cast, but they do not affect my speculations as to the result. At the time when those despatches were written, it was believed that the Emperor meant to renew the war against the Turks, which circumstance makes all the difference."

*Enclosure.*

CHARLES LAMETH to the COUNT DE RICÉ.

Paris, 10 Juillet 1791.—"En attendant une lettre qu' Alexandre va m'envoyer, et qui decide votre retour, puisque vous ne demandez qu'une lettre ostensible pour votre femme, je vais vous expliquer ce qui decide à vous prier de revenir. D'abord je vais vous dire que *vous vous trompez un peu en nous jugeant dans une si grande prosperité. Il est certain que nous sommes moins mal qu'au moment du depart du Roi* mais, en verité, quelque fois on est fâché de l'avoir repris, car qu'en faire ? . . . Vous voyez que tout cela est fort incertain, vous devez penser que tous leurs amis sont très necessaires dans ce moment. Et, puis, voilà ce que pensent Duport et Barnave ! Il n'est pas possible qu'un bon patriote soit oisif dans cette crise ; il faut qu'il fasse quelque chose, et voici leur projet pour vous. M. de Gouvernet ne peut plus être utile à la Haye ; ils veulent vous y envoyer ; ou si cela ne se peut pas, il faut que vous preniez un regiment. Je sais bien, et eux aussi, que ce dernier ne vous sera guères agréable ; mais il n'y a pas un pretexte pour ne rien faire. Vous voyez donc qu'il faut que vous arriviez ; car si l'on vous envoie à la Haye, vous ne pouvez pas vous charger d'une pareille commission sans avoir causé long tems avec nous, *de ce qu'il faudra y faire*. N'allez pas vous imaginer que vous pouvez refuser la Haye ou un regiment. Je vous le reitère ; dans ce moment il faut faire ce qu'on peut, et non pas ce qu'on aimeroit le mieux."

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 17, Berlin.—"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's two private letters of the 25th June and 6th July, but as the Prussian messenger is on the point of setting out, it is impossible for me to answer the latter as I could wish, and I must delay doing so till I dispatch Slater. However, I have nothing very essential to add to my dispatches, which I have been obliged to write in a great hurry. I need not say how anxious I shall be to receive your Lordship's instructions respecting many parts of their contents, as well as on those of my long private dispatch of the 7th. This Court is in high good humour with us at present, and I trust nothing will occur to interrupt it.

"Mr. Paget is a very fine young man. I give him employment, and shall say more to your Lordship about him, after some trial."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, July 18, St. James's Square.—"Lord Grenville has thought it his duty to lose no time in transmitting to your Majesty two letters which he has just received from Mr. Ewart, and on the subject [of] which Lord Grenville does not presume to add anything except the respectful

assurances of that dutiful and grateful attachment which I must ever feel towards your Majesty's Royal person and family, and of that joy which as a faithful subject and servant of your Majesty, he must derive from any event tending to add to your Majesty's domestic happiness, and still further to increase the public security for the continuance of the government of these kingdoms in your Majesty's illustrious house."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 18, Windsor.—"About an hour I have received the letter from my son the Duke of York to which those from Mr. Ewart refers; it is the first intimation I have ever had of his liking the King of Prussia's eldest daughter; in it he says 'the only delicacy which I felt was from not being informed of the sentiments of my elder brother the Prince of Wales, but having taken an opportunity of speaking to him very openly, he declared repeatedly his disinclination, at present, to matrimony, and *his wish that I should marry.*'"

"I desire Lord Grenville will communicate this to Mr. Pitt. It is impossible for me to make him a suitable establishment; but I should hope that Parliament would stand forth in settling what is proper for a jointure and a competency for his living, if it is known the elder declines marrying even for the present; till I have seen the Prince of Wales who means to come this day, and, by the message he has sent me, press for my consenting to his brother's marriage, I cannot say more, but hope to have Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt's opinion on Wednesday."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 19 [Stowe].—"I understand (from the Birmingham coachman, brother to my keeper) that, when he left it (Birmingham) last night at 7, all was quiet, and had been so since the light dragoons arrived; but there were reports of mischief towards Wolverhampton, in consequence of which some of the dragoons had marched. He says that the treasonable toast supposed to have been drunk is universally vouched and credited, and that he was assured the pamphlets found in Priestly's house (amounting to some thousands in number) ready for distribution, had done more to inflame the mob against Taylor (who it appeared had paid for the printing) than any other circumstance. I give you all this as report, but I wish you to know the mob-story. He is convinced that it is now all over; and, if so, I may say in confidence to you, that I am not sorry even for this *excess, excessive as it has been.* I hope now that nothing will hinder you coming on Saturday."

*Postscript.*—"I see many consequences from your Royal marriage of a pleasant nature rather than the contrary; but so much depends upon her character that any conjecture of that sort must be very premature. I look impatiently to the line to be adopted by Spain upon the French business; but I fear, if the National Assembly do not criminate the King, that Spain will slip her neck out of the collar, and leave the Prince of Condé and Bouillé to the wildness of an attempt which, I am persuaded, they will risk; and in which I do not see the least chance of success, if unsupported from Spain and the Emperor, of whose movements I wish to learn something."

## CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 21, St. Petersburg.—“I shall trouble your Lordship with very few words in addition to our dispatch of this date by Dæssings. The answer of the Empress is evidently drawn up in such terms as manifest her friendly disposition towards His Majesty, and the positive assurances it contains of molesting in no way the freedom of the navigation of the Dniester, the object His Prussian Majesty seems to have most at heart, is as much and indeed more than I had reason to expect. The preventing the further effusion of blood, and the obtaining a strong defensive barrier for the Turks, seems to contain the whole substance of our instructions, and to answer every purpose. These important objects have been obtained in as satisfactory a manner as the nature of the circumstances would admit, and I therefore take the liberty of congratulating your Lordship most sincerely upon the conclusion of the business.

“I took the liberty, in a private letter by the messenger Timms, to mention the arrival of Mr. Adair in this country and my suspicions of the nature of the business he might have in view. These suspicions were not, I believe, unfounded, as I have heard from various quarters that the language he holds is dictated by the most virulent opposition to His Majesty's Administration, and calculated evidently to counteract the effect of a negotiation. In this, however, he has failed, and I have every reason to believe that he will not be a little disappointed when he hears the manner in which the Empress has expressed herself on this occasion, and the modification she is willing to allow, in order, through the good offices of His Majesty and of his allies, to put an end to the war.

“Before I quit this subject I will beg to suggest to your Lordship the propriety of furnishing His Majesty's Ministers at foreign Courts with positive orders and instructions not to present any person to the Court where they reside unless they have been presented at their own, or are furnished with a letter from His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department to that purpose. This is the custom in almost every other Court but our own; but as it has been usual to present to Her Imperial Majesty all English travellers (the number of whom, however, is in general very small) I did not think myself authorised to reject Mr. Adair's request to be presented to the Empress, the more so as he was provided with such letters of recommendation, and particularly from Count Woronzow, to the different leading men in the country as could not have failed to procure him a most distinguished reception. I beg leave to submit this to your Lordship's consideration, and flatter myself that I shall, as well as my colleagues, receive positive instructions for our future guidance on this head.”

## LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 22, Madrid.—“It can hardly be doubted that the overture from this Court, which I have reported in my public letter, owes its rise, chiefly if not entirely, to their present misunderstanding with the National Assembly. However, I have not, for that reason, thought myself warranted in discouraging it, as I well recollect the favourable reception given to their last year's proposals to the same effect, though



proceeding avowedly from a similar source. In truth, our object being to engage this country to cancel the obnoxious stipulations of the Family Compact and revert to her ancient good understanding with Great Britain, it seems to me that, if we succeed in securing that transfer of her attachments, it is almost immaterial to enquire whether her motives to it be as flattering as we could wish.

I take her body, you her mind,  
Which has the better bargain?

“A more important question appears to be whether this Court be actually on the eve of a rupture with France, an event which, to judge from the *original edition* of their late remonstrance to the National Assembly, seems highly probable. However, I am still persuaded that it is not intended here to proceed to any such extremity, and it is hardly to be supposed that the leaders of the National Assembly would, under the present circumstances, voluntarily incur the risks of every kind attendant upon a foreign war. I therefore imagine that the two Governments will content themselves with fortifying the two sides of their frontiers and restraining the mutual intercourse of their subjects; for which last purpose an edict has just been published here which I hope to be able to forward to you by the next post.

“Adieu. I shall hope for your candid acceptance of my labours of these last three days; with regard to which I take the liberty of repeating that, if the proposal in question should no longer be deemed eligible, there is no kind of harm done, and things will only remain exactly as they were.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, July 22, Whitehall.—“I have a long list of private letters from you to acknowledge. Yours of the 9th instant I laid before the King as I conceived you wished. Things are still in a state of so much uncertainty, particularly with respect to the business at Vienna, that your continuance at the Hague may be of real importance for some time longer than the period you mention. This must, however, depend upon events which we shall soon be able to judge of. I am entirely persuaded that you would not wish to return to England under circumstances which would make your absence from the Hague really disadvantageous to the King's service, and I can truly assure you that I have no wish to detain you there unnecessarily, as I should, on the contrary, have much satisfaction in talking over with you many of the arduous points now depending. I guess that the King of Prussia begins to see that the projected extension of alliance would be less advantageous to him than you seem to agree with me in thinking it would be to the Maritime Powers. And yet even to his interests, rightly understood, a system of peace, and a security for the continuance of the present state of power in Europe would surely be beneficial; and such, I conceive, would be the effects of this scheme, supposing it to succeed to our most sanguine expectations. If it fails, I do not see how it alters the situation of Prussia for the worse, supposing we act with good faith towards him, which it is certainly our plan to do, and even our interest, for otherwise we should be the dupes of it. I should be obliged to you for your opinion what should be said, in case the accession of Russia is seriously proposed? Can we guarantee to her the Crimea by a defensive alliance? Can we, on the other hand, refuse the accession of any of the great

powers without breaking in upon our avowed and ostensible principle? Pray let me have in confidence your speculations on all this.

"Probably before I receive your answer to this letter, perhaps even before I send this, we shall have decided to make some answer to the letter from the Emperor to His Majesty on the subject of French politics, which open as wide a field for speculation as any subject that can be stated. I have an extremely bad opinion of any scheme the success of which is, in any the smallest degree, to depend on the exertions, or prudence, or means of the French *Aristocrates*.

"You will have seen that the popular turn here is not in favour of the Dissenters and *Democrats*. I have always imagined it to be as the event has shewn, but I do not admire riots in favour of Government much more than riots against it.

"I send you the description which I received from Lord Gower of certain persons said to be coming over here to fire our ships and dock-yards. The measures taken in consequence of this intelligence gave occasion to the alarm here which was not discouraged, as this is one of the cases where security arises out of a general impression of danger. But I strongly believe there was nothing in it. No such persons ever made their appearance anywhere in England where we could trace them. Perhaps the Dutch Government may be more fortunate.

"I have said nothing about the intimation in your letter of the 9th on the subject of returning to the Hague. When we meet, we may discuss this point fully, but I should have great regret in losing your assistance where it is still so much wanted.

"I am quite clear in my opinion that till the deposition of the King has been formally notified by the Assembly to foreign Courts, and the new system, in consequence of it, formally acknowledged by them, no French Minister should be received with any other credentials than those of the Sovereign. The giving Lord Gower leave of absence has been in contemplation, but, even in that case Lord Robert FitzGerald would remain there accredited to the King; and to withdraw them both would be an act of avowed indignity. This has hitherto prevented our taking the determination. If our negotiation at Vienna succeeds, we shall certainly not find any difficulty in arranging the business of the convention in some shape or other; and if not, it seems equally impossible and useless for us to give way on that point."

*Copy.*

*Autograph.*—"I do not well see how we could communicate with the Dutch Government on the most secret subject which you mention without incurring risks in the event of any unfavourable turn in the politics of that country; and yet such a communication would be most particularly useful to us in the present moment, where we are much behind hand. If you could find any good pretext for getting and sending me a copy of any of Comte Redern's *late* despatches, it would be singularly useful, and I would make use of it without letting *anybody* know how I procured it. The same thing applies to Comte Woronzow and Comte Stadion, but the first of the three is most material, and this perhaps might not be difficult."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, July 22, Whitehall.—"I have the honour to inclose you some papers relative to a transaction on the coast of Africa; and the draft of a despatch on the subject to Mr. Walpole, which had been read at the

Cabinet this evening before your Lordship came. If any suggestion occurs to you upon it, I shall be obliged to you for it, as the dispatch cannot go till Tuesday."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 23, Hague.—"In despite of the letters from Petersburg, and of the abominable project against our fleet and dockyards, perhaps justly attributed to the Russian Ministry, I continue to think that peace will be made, though, probably not by Mr. Fawkeners. Whitworth's intelligence is so important that I am astonished he did not send it by a messenger. There can be little doubt that the fire at Amsterdam was a part of the same diabolical measures.

"I am sorry that Mr. Fawkeners found it necessary to present all the propositions at once, and *in writing*; but it is impossible, at this distance, to say whether this mode was not unavoidable.

"It is to be hoped that if the Sistove arbitration takes place, it will be a work of 24 hours, for Sir Robert Keith's presence at Vienna may become very important.

"I regret that we have not copies or translations of all those Vienna letters to the court of Berlin. Your Lordship will observe in the enclosed that the same idea has struck the Grand Pensionary.

"Sir R. Ainslie's letter to the Reis Effendi is a strange one. But Knoblesdorff's paper is good, and they seem to have reasoned well with the Turks.

"I cannot see that there was any part of your Lordship's despatches by Wiffen which might not have been communicated with advantage to the Court of Berlin. Nor that the new incidents make it less necessary to send the proposed instructions to Sistove and Constantinople.

"Your Lordship has a troublesome office at present."

"It is to be regretted that the gentlemen who tell the Petersburg story, do not state the particulars of their intelligence, for so wicked a business requires good proofs to make it credible."

#### LORD THURLOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, July 23-24.] — "The complaint is that three English ships were driven by menace from a station on the coast of Africa, convenient for their trade; whereby they lost the opportunity of their market, as their cargoes were not so proper for any other place; that four other ships are at sea on a similar adventure, and are likely to be exposed to similar detriment; that a fifth is ready to sail, but is detained by apprehension of the like treatment. The Portuguese have moreover burnt the towns; slain many, and taken more of the inhabitants; and have driven the rest away; whereby the country is desolated, and indeed apparently annihilated, as a seat of trade; whereas, before, it was an open mart for all European nations.

"The object of Portugal is apparently to appropriate an exclusive trade on that part of the continent. Seizing the country, if they are allowed to hold it, will insure that object; and in that view, driving off other Europeans would be only an assertion of the dominion acquired by their conquest. But, as it was not thought likely that the rest of Europe would submit to that, it seems to have been thought more

effectual to depopulate the country. This, if not absolute destruction, will probably be an interruption of no short time; and consequently, for some period irreparable. In this view, driving off the Europeans seems to have been a gratuitous insult.

"In the proposed draught to Mr. Walpole, he is referred generally to the affidavit; and directed to ask what orders have been given, on what ground, and what return has been made.

"Does not the occasion require that he should point out all the extent and consequences of the injury, that the measure of the reparation may appear at once, unless the edge of the complaint can be avoided by some competent explanation?"

"Should not a suitable force go out to protect the rest of the trade, and give the inhabitants confidence and encouragement to deal with the English? This was the course by which France succeeded in 1784.

"Every sort of firmness which does not disappoint in our end, by raising unnecessary displeasure, seems best to promise the attainment of it. Whereas a negotiation, during which the trade is to be interrupted, must needs lose some part of its fruits."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 23, Hague.—"Amidst such a bustle as the present moment furnishes, I am sorry to feel it right to send the enclosed note which I received yesterday from the Grand Pensionary on the subject of the Treaty of Commerce; but the general ferment prevailing in Europe, and the malevolence of some principal powers, in which description I rank not only Russia but Spain, are certainly reasons for strengthening our union with this Republic, both really and ostensibly. And it is impossible for me not to observe that the failure of the commercial negotiation will have bad effects here, infinitely beyond the value of any of the points in dispute, at least according to my estimate of them. At the same time, I am aware that there are at home some strong and rooted opinions which create difficulties perhaps insurmountable; and here also, in the embarrassing forms of this Republic, the business is exposed to the embarrassments which every peevish or ill-disposed Regent of Amsterdam may think proper to give it."

*Enclosed.*

#### VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, July 22 [Hague].—"Voici . la substance de ce que j'avois l'honneur de vous dire ce matin; permettez que je vous le repète dans la style de langage, qu'à mon avis, l'Angleterre avoit dû tenir à la République, immédiatement après la révolution, afin de couronner un ouvrage, auquel elle avoit si glorieusement contribué.

"Mes amis (aurois-je dit à la République) une faction effrenée, à l'oppression de la quelle nous venons de vous soustraire, avoit réussi à rompre les liens qui unissoient les deux nations depuis plus d'un siècle; leurs procédés insultantes nous avoient forcés à nous opposer efficacement à leurs pernicious desseins; il en est résulté une guerre inévitable pour lors; mais dans ce tems même, comme notre déclaration le dit en termes exprès, nous eussions bien souhaité ne devoir tourner

nos armes que contre les coupables auteurs de cette disunion, qui étoient nos seuls ennemis, comme ils étoient les vôtres ; cependant il a été impossible que la reste de la nation Hollandaise ne partageât les calamités et les pertes de cette guerre ; la paix enfin est faite, mais encore pendant la domination de ce parti, et par l'entremise d'une Puissance jalouse de notre union. Maintenant que vous êtes rendus à vous mêmes, que votre système politique est redevenu tel que vos véritables intérêts l'exigent, que l'amitié et la confiance vont être rétablies, nous ne voulons profiter d'aucun avantage sur vous que nous avons crû devoir prendre pour notre propre sûreté contre la faction dominante ; nous vous remettons pleinement dans le même état, et dans les mêmes relations où vous étiez vis à vis de nous avant le commencement de la guerre ; nous sommes prêts à renouveler avec vous les mêmes traités qui nous lioient d'ancienneté ; seulement aidez nous à en retrancher ou corriger tout ce qui jusqu'ici a été une pierre d'achoppement, et qui dans l'avenir pourroit donner lieu à des nouvelles disputes.

“ Ces objets se réduisent à deux points ; 1<sup>o</sup>, Convenons de bonne foi, qu'en cas de guerre avec une autre puissance vous n'exercerez pas un commerce avec les colonies de nos ennemis que vous est défendu en tems de paix : et 2<sup>o</sup>, engagez-vous de ne pas fournir à une puissance ennemie des marchandises, au moyen desquelles elle pourra nous nuire ou prolonger la guerre.

“ Au reste, ayons toujours les mêmes amis, et les mêmes ennemis, autant que vos relations le permettront ; le monde est assez vaste pour que nous puissions avancer notre prospérité réciproque par l'industrie et le commerce, sans avoir besoin d'empiéter sur nos droits respectifs, et la réunion de nos forces sera suffisante pour les faire respecter par d'autres.

“ N'est ce pas là . le langage de la raison, et qu'une bonne Politique rend à jamais recommandable ? ”

*French.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, July 26, Hague.—“ I have received your letter of the 22nd instant. You do me the justice in believing that, however anxious I may be to make a visit to England, I do not wish for that indulgence under circumstances which would make my absence from my duty here disadvantageous to the King's service ; but I trust that a very little time will clear many principal objects of our present attention, and that I may then hope for the indulgence which I seek.

“ The King of Prussia's earnestness to add Austria to our alliance will not, I hope, diminish, and Colonel Bischoffswerder's ambition to be the prominent figure in a great negotiation affords good hopes that the measure will go forwards. If it should succeed, it probably will contribute to our system of peace, and to the continuance of the present state of power in Europe ; but it may be doubted whether those objects, however beneficial to other nations, are eligible for the Prussian Government which, being military in its composition and very essence, requires the heat and energy of war to maintain it. I have learnt some very curious particulars respecting the Court of Berlin from the Comte de Heyden, who knows its interior well, and is recently returned from his mission relative to the Hereditary Prince of Orange's marriage ; but those particulars are not of a nature to be trusted to a letter, and I must keep them till we meet.

"In my conferences with the Grand Pensionary, we have often speculated as to the line proper to be adopted if the Emperor's alliance should be effectuated, which we think highly desirable; and if the accession of Russia should at the same time seriously be proposed; together possibly with the guaranty of the Crimea. Under those suppositions (which however we do not expect to see speedily realized) it appears to us to be a great consideration, and worthy to be discussed, whether it might not be right to open, without limitation, the extended system of our alliance, and to admit other nations to enter into our stipulations of mutual guaranty and defence, upon a reciprocal renunciation of all new claims affecting the possessions of any power included within the system. This would, on a larger scale, be in the nature of the *ligue* subsisting among the several Princes of the German Empire, and though it may seem to embrace the visionary object of an universal peace, it probably would be attended, for a time at least, with great and salutary effects. I should be glad to know whether I have made the idea intelligible; because if your Lordship wishes it, we will state it in more detail.

"I shall much wish to know, when it may be thought proper, what is the general sentiment of His Majesty's ministers on the wide field of French politics. My personal opinion is, so far as the Emperor's present views are concerned, that, though we ought not to engage ourselves, we should not discourage him. If he advances in that pursuit, his system in other respects will become necessarily and solidly advantageous to us.

"I heartily adopt your Lordship's abhorrence of popular riots whatever may be their pretext or object; but under the present circumstances which unhappily prevail in Europe, I cannot lament the late scandalous scenes at Birmingham, though I am sorry for the distresses and losses to which many individuals have been exposed. It is the result of such distresses to strengthen the hands of executive government so long as the impression [lasts?]; and, besides, I am not without hopes that the disposition to wild and mischievous excesses in politics which affects so many countries at present, may occupy itself for a time in England in a religious difference of no farther or permanent effect, between the established Church and the Dissenters.

"We have traces here every day of the diabolical activity of the French zealots towards producing mischief in this country; and if your Lordship is well served in the Post Office, you will find good proofs of a similar kind. I believe that, in general, where the object of correspondence is so wicked, it is best to suppress the original letters; and not to forward them for the sake of getting further intelligence. Two or three days ago, a letter was intercepted here from a new comedian\* lately engaged from Paris at this theatre, which was addressed *au Président du Comité des Recherches de l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris*. The following is the postscript:—*Le 22 Juillet. Hier nous avons donné la tragédie de Charles IX; mais elle n'a pas fait l'effet qu'on pourroit en attendre. Les beaux morceaux sur le despotisme des prêtres and la Bastille ont été écouté en silence. On n'a saisi que le vers,*

*La pitié n'entre plus dans le coeur des François,*  
*qui a été applaudi avec transport; et sans le Prince, qui étoit à la représentation, je crois qui nous aurions sifflés.*

"The anecdote is good and fairly related; a second representation

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\* Query if this was not Collot d'Herbois? [In Lord Grenville's writing.]

was advertised, but it was intimated by the Prince's order to the *Directeur*, that the piece was offensive and disgusting ; and it is laid aside. The transaction is not the less profligate when it is remarked that the Prince subscribes above 600*l.*, and I above 160*l.* a year, to these instruments of the *Comité des Recherches*.

"I omitted to mention in my last that Comte Woronzow's account of his conference with your Lordship on the occasion of reading Comte Osterman's dispatch to you, passed in its way to Petersburg through the hand of M. de Kalitcheff, who shewed it to the Greffier. It was written in a peevish and mischievous tone ; and he piqued himself much on having said many severe things to your Lordship respecting the difficulties which he stated England to have brought on herself by her connection and friendship with Prussia. I do not guess what has changed Woronzow's style so much ; at the time of Mr. Fawkener's departure it was quite conciliatory.

"The Prussian cipher has lately been changed here. The Pensionary thinks that it will soon be discovered. I could furnish it to him but I have not thought it right to avail myself of some unguarded confidences which the late *Chargé d'Affaires* made to me, both of his own and of M. de Redern's letters ; and I observe the same good faith in respect to the Dutch ciphers which are passing through my hands every day. The French cipher has recently been discovered here after a long interval, and some of Caillard's letters, which I have seen, are amusing in respect to their extreme *mechanceté* and democratic absurdity ; but in other respects they contain nothing material."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, July 26, Whitehall.—"My public despatch of this date will convey the outline of the ideas of the King's servants on most of the points mentioned in your private letter of the 7th instant. Those points are, indeed, too important for me to give you instructions upon them in an unofficial correspondence. We continue, as you will observe in my public letter, desirous of proceeding in the negotiation for the alliance with the Emperor, because his present conduct and situation makes it so evidently his interest to be well with the allies, that we think we may safely trust to that consideration to supply, in great degree, the want of good faith. Many particulars of that negotiation, and especially what relates to Russia, must, of necessity, wait till circumstances bring them forward ; but I am far from thinking that the Maritime Powers and Prussia can, in any event of that negotiation, be made the dupes of their good faith. The only event by which mischievous consequences could, as it strikes me, be produced, would be if there was any want of good faith *between them* ; and I do not think that likely to happen. It is natural that both the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg should labour to disunite the allies, but it must be our own fault if they succeed ; while, on the other hand, the advantage of establishing (even for the shortest period, if it cannot be done for a longer one,) a good understanding between the triple alliance and the Emperor, would be infinite ; and we must therefore strongly wish that this idea should be kept up in the King of Prussia's mind, and joined with that of the security which he would derive, in any circumstances to which that negotiation could lead, from the perfect concert and good faith which has been established between him and his present allies.

"I see the danger respecting Poland which you state ; but that is not

increased, on the contrary rather diminished, by the idea of the alliance. We should be very averse here to any guaranty of the Constitution of Poland; but I do not like to put a direct negative upon it till the proposal is stated with all its circumstances; and till the issue of the Russian business enables us to see more clearly our way with respect to Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, so as to decide in what situation they are each of them to stand with respect to the allies.

"My public letter fully explains our ideas as to France, and the King of Prussia ought to be left *bonâ fide* to decide for himself the question there stated.

"I am very far indeed from pleading guilty to the accusation made by His Prussian Majesty and his Ministers, of delay in sending the instructions which have been necessary. It is easy for an absolute monarch, or a single Minister, to take his decision and send his orders in a few hours after despatches arrive; and yet I doubt whether such expedition is often very advantageous. But where points are to be deliberated upon by several persons, the delay of a week or ten days is unavoidable; and I am very sure I have nothing to reproach myself with on that head. What makes me particularly remark upon a slight expression in your letter on this subject is this; that unless the Prussian Ministers understand or feel the necessity of such delay as I have stated, they will often impute to negligence or indifference that which arises from particular anxiety and attention. And there are considerations of more weight than such as are personal, which would make me regret such an impression.

"You must allow me to remark on the subject of *private* letters that I am in the habit of considering them really as such; that they do not now go into the Office, nor do I mean they should remain there when I leave it; and that I hope you understand mine in the same manner. I mention this because of your desiring in your *private* letter instructions on these points; but I imagine it is probably unnecessary, and that you feel that your public conduct must be directed by official instructions, and that the ideas which I throw out in private letters are only meant to discuss more freely and confidentially the subjects on which I write officially."

CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 27, St. Petersburg.—"I will beg leave to add a few lines to our despatch of this date to congratulate your Lordship once more on the issue of this almost hopeless business. Your Lordship will have seen, by our letters from hence for some time past, the little success we ventured to promise ourselves; and it must be allowed that, after what has happened, and considering the favourable prospect the Empress has before her, we may esteem ourselves fortunate in having obtained such a modification as may serve at least to save the dignity of the allies, and prove that their intervention has not been entirely fruitless. That it has not been so is most evident from the important conquests which the Empress gives up, and without which, had it not been for the vigorous demonstration of the allies, she most assuredly never would have consented to peace. This is a fact which cannot be denied, and must even be acknowledged by those who have been the most forward in opposing the measures of Administration on this occasion. It is, I confess, no small satisfaction to me to witness the disappointment of Mr. Adair; the



language he has held has been calculated to produce a far different effect, and his expectations were considerably raised. His journey has, however, been ineffectual, and he will, I flatter myself, have but a bad report to make to his principals.

"May I be permitted, before I conclude this letter, once more to bespeak your Lordship's protection in my behalf. I will not, in order to obtain it, endeavour to exaggerate the services I may have rendered my most gracious master. I will rather rest upon what my zeal for his interests, and my affection for his royal person would have prompted me to, had an opportunity presented. How far both have been exerted in the present instance I will leave to your Lordship to decide. I flatter myself, however, that in the situation in which I find myself, and should my services be thought not unworthy of such a recompense, that your Lordship will lay me at His Majesty's feet, and join with me in requesting that he would be graciously pleased to bestow upon me, as an honourable testimony of his approbation of my conduct, one of the vacant red ribbons, of which I understand there are at this moment three undisposed of. I beg your Lordship will be assured that it is not so much to satisfy any personal vanity that I make this request, as to efface any impression which the appointment of Mr. Fawkener at this moment may have made on this Court or elsewhere, to my prejudice. I might further urge the propriety of conferring upon me some public mark of His Majesty's favour in order to give a greater *éclat* to the business we have concluded, to prove that His Majesty's expectations have been fulfilled, and that our most gracious master is not dissatisfied with the conduct of those whom he has thought proper to employ."

#### W. FAWKENER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 28, St. Petersburg.—"I hope I may, all circumstances considered, venture to congratulate your Lordship and Mr. Pitt on the issue of the negotiation with which you did me the honour, in so kind and flattering a manner, to entrust me. It has not indeed ended in so satisfactory a manner as for some reasons I could have wished, but I assure you that I have often despaired of bringing it to so favourable a conclusion. My apprehension was, as I have frequently stated to you, that the object of the Empress was to amuse us with fair words in order to gain time to pursue her advantages over the Turks; and that, if successful, as there was little doubt, she might reject our good offices, and determine, in concert with the Emperor, to make a most exorbitant peace for herself; *quidlibet impotens sperare, fortunæque dulci ebria*.

"Your Lordship may recollect that, on the occasion of her peace with the King of Sweden, she boasted in terms of great exultation that it had been brought about without the intervention of any third power. We have now obtained that she accepts and wishes to avail herself of our assistance; and she has consented not merely to an ostensible, but to a real and useful modification, in language so friendly and conciliating as will disappoint the expectation and hopes of our enemies at home and abroad.

"It must not be forgotten that the Empress's consent to this agreement was given the day after a *Te Deum* for the celebration of a great victory. I will only say of myself that I have exerted all the zeal

which so many circumstances have concurred to give me on this occasion.

"Mr. Adair's mission, I understand, closes with mine, and I hear he has applied through M. Markow to be presented to the Empress in order to take leave on Sunday next. I have given M. Markow, Count Woronzow, M. Besborodko, and the Vice-Chancellor a hint that the business of this gentleman is no secret to us, and cautioned them not to place too implicit faith in the professions of a friendship conceived for the occasion, and inspired by the interest of the moment. I availed myself too of the permission Mr. Pitt gave me to assure them of his sentiments towards this country, and of his respect and veneration for Her Imperial Majesty. They all appeared rather ashamed of themselves; and Count Besborodko and the Vice-Chancellor promised to repeat to the Empress what I had said.

"I find the Russian Ministers are extremely suspicious of Sir Robert Ainslie, and very apprehensive that, instead of exerting himself to dispose the Turks to peace, he will use every endeavour to persuade them to continue the war. They press strongly that his orders may be as positive and as precise as possible. The Vice-Chancellor told me on Saturday, and repeated to me and Mr. Whitworth yesterday, that their last accounts from Constantinople stated that he had just then given the Turkish Ministers the strongest assurances that two fleets would immediately sail from Great Britain, one for the Baltic and the other for the Black Sea; and that we had entered into an alliance with the King of Sweden, who was again immediately to attack Russia; and that he had been desired to give these assurances in writing, which, however, he had declined.

"I beg leave to join with Mr. Whitworth in recommending Mr. Lindsay in the strongest manner to your Lordship's protection. Your Lordship will find him perfectly well informed on every subject relating to this country on which you may wish to converse with him, and I am persuaded that from his zeal, activity, and talents he may be most usefully employed in any situation in His Majesty's service."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, July 29, Whitehall.—"It has struck me upon Whitworth's information that it might be very material if you could get the Pensionary to send to Aix la Chapelle some person on whom he can rely, in order to find out the persons mentioned, and to follow them either here or to Amsterdam, without losing sight of them, as that seems the only chance we have of knowing their persons. To hunt out two Irishmen in London, with no other clue than their names (and those possibly fictitious) is an undertaking perfectly desperate. The communication is certainly very imperfect, nor can I figure to myself what reason the Ministers at Petersburg have for not sending to their Courts all they knew, and how they knew it. But the subject is so very important, and what has happened at Amsterdam gives it so much probability, that we cannot take too much pains to trace it.

"What do you think of Fox's letter to Barnave? I cannot vouch for the words, but you may depend upon the fact of such a letter having been written. Is not the idea of Ministers from Opposition to the different Courts of Europe a new one in this country? I never heard of it before, and should think that if it could be proved, I mean legally proved, it would go very near to an impeachable misdemeanour. In the

meantime, I trust it will not fail to get out into the public here, and to make the impression it ought to do.

"I say nothing of our negotiations, on which indeed there is nothing to be said, or done by us, in the present moment. The question upon the next Petersburg despatches will be a very difficult one for us to decide, with respect to our armaments. I am occupying myself again about the treaty of commerce, but wish to know from you *confidentially* whether you think you could now conclude upon your article (L.). If the Molucca Islands mean those only of which Holland has a *bond fide* sovereignty, or occupation, perhaps there would be less difficulty in that point; but I suspect those words would include many to which we do now trade, and always have, and which the Dutch only *mean* to conquer.

"I should be much obliged to you if you could state, or procure to be stated for me, an accurate view of the differences of the constitutions now actually re-established in the Netherlands by the Acts of Inauguration, and those which would have been re-established if our convention had been ratified and duly executed."

*Copy.*

#### P. COLQUHOUN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 29, George Street, Adelphi.—"On the 15th of April I had the honor of conveying to your Lordship a message from Colonel Smith, expressive of the just sense he entertained of the politeness he had experienced by the detention of the packet until he should arrive at Falmouth. I have now the further satisfaction of enclosing your Lordship the extract of a letter which I have received from that gentleman announcing his safe arrival at Philadelphia, and stating the good consequences which resulted from the means he was authorized to use for destroying those false impressions, injurious to this country, which some busy emissaries who are hostile to our prosperity had been at pains to disseminate, principally with a view to advance the French interest in the United States, and to embarrass and render difficult every negotiation which Great Britain might, in future, think it expedient to enter upon for the purpose of extending and securing the consumption of our manufactures, protecting our merchants, or regulating advantageously the commercial intercourse between the two countries.

"Some papers and verbal facts have lately come into my possession which are explanatory of the views of a very formidable party in America, whose measures are directed to objects hostile to the interest of this country; and, it being of importance that these facts should be early known, I am impelled from a genuine desire to be useful to my country to solicit the honor of an interview, merely for the purpose of *stating these facts*, whenever your Lordship's convenience will permit me to wait upon you."

#### *Enclosure.*

Extract of a letter from Colonel WILLIAM STEPHEN SMITH, late Secretary of Legation at the Court of London from the United States of America, to P. COLQUHOUN.

1791, June 17, Philadelphia.—"I arrived at New York on the 5th instant, and immediately set off for this place, being convinced of the importance of an immediate communication of those friendly impressions

made by Lord Grenville on the 9th April; and I can assure you that never was anything more fortunately timely, for, from other quarters, other impressions were rapidly gaining ground, springing from other representations than those I was authorized to make, and which I flatter myself will overturn those false statements, and contribute to produce on our part every friendly disposition which our trans-Atlantic friends could wish America to nourish. It was surely a most critical period, and fully justified my decision and rapid movements, of which I shall say more to you hereafter."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, June-August] Somerset Place.—"Since my appointment [as Home Secretary] the Duke of Athole has renewed with earnestness his request of being appointed Governor of the Isle of Man. I have not yet given an answer to a second and a still more earnest letter on the same subject, but the receipt of it led me to give an attentive consideration of the whole subject. I thought it best before speaking to you and Mr. Pitt to put the idea I have formed into the shape of a detailed measure. I hope you may be able to look to it as contained in the accompanying papers, and in the evening we may talk it over; bring the papers to Wimbledon with you."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, July-August, Downing Street.]—"The answer was *no*, which I took as quite decisive, though there was a great disposition to argue again the whole subject, and I think visibly some disappointment and regret. Accounts are just come from Breslau, which are not decisive, but on the whole look pacific. Although the King of Prussia seems to continue desirous of going to extremities, Ewart's representations, which appear to have been very proper and explicit, had had great effect, and though the Austrian terms were not fully known, Ewart seems persuaded they would be conformable to the *status quo*, with some modifications approaching to the Prussian plan."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Secret.

1791, July 29, Hague.—"When the Grand Pensionary said to M. Caillard that he was not prepared to recognise in any shape the suspension of the French King's authority, as stated in my dispatch of this date, M. Caillard answered *that it was not a suspension, but only a stagnation, or dormant existence*. This fine-spun distinction led to some farther remarks, in the course of which the French *Chargé d'Affaires* said that many of his unfortunate sovereign's objections to the constitution were thought to merit attention; that an endeavour would be used to make the necessary corrections, and that, in the result, such a system of efficient executive power would be offered to the King as he certainly would accept. I have no doubt that this is now the wish of many of the leaders; but they are too far committed in republican doctrines, both with each other and with the people, to be able to extricate themselves, and the only prospect at present open to them is that of increasing confusions, bankruptcy, and a dismemberment of the

country and of its possessions. It has been intimated to me from Paris that a *modest* proposition is making to your Lordship for a mutual guaranty of the West India Islands.

"I must now advert (in confidence solely to your Lordship) to a circumstance on which I touch unwillingly; and yet the person to whom it relates cannot but know that I lamented his return to his present situation, without any ill-will to him, and even with a desire to have his interests promoted; but from a firm conviction that his mind is wedded to a system of misconceived energy and violence, ill suited to our position, and to the instructions under which he must act. It is possible that M. de Schulemberg had obtained, through this Government, a perusal of my private letter to the Greffier on the subject of the instructions to be sent to Baron de Haeften; but, either from that or from some other ground of suspicion, he wrote to M. de Bielfingeer by the last post, to learn secretly through the Pensionary whether Mr. Ewart had not, in his last memorial, deviated in many respects from the tenor of his instructions. The Pensionary turned aside the enquiry by a few general remarks, and the rapid current of new events will carry it soon out of recollection. But the incident threw the memorial into our hands, of which we had not before heard; and I feel it a duty incumbent on me not to conceal it. I will not attempt to decide how far it varies from the temper, style, and purport of the instructions on which it is founded. It certainly is not consonant to the sense which I had annexed to those instructions, and, in some points, it assigns reasons for not adhering to them. This business, like that of the minute sent a few weeks ago from Berlin to Copenhagen, and like to everything that has come from the same quarter for many months, convinces me, either that my own understanding is much at fault, or that the eagerness and zeal of Mr. Ewart's mind and opinions expose us to risks and inconvenience at every turn of the difficult scenes in which we are jointly concerned.

"This is the more material, because I have reason to believe that the Prince with whom we have to deal at the Court in question is infinitely weaker and more helpless than we have supposed; and the manner in which the essential interests of his empire are abandoned by him to those who gain an influence over him makes it more than ever important to us, and to our whole foreign system, to have that post properly filled. I, nevertheless, guess and feel the difficulties which may retard any better arrangement. I will not quit this paragraph without repeating that it is submitted solely in confidence to your Lordship."

*Enclosing a copy of Mr. Ewart's note of 16 July, 1791, to the Prussian Ministry.*

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, July 31, Berlin.—"Not wishing to detain this messenger a moment longer than his horses are ready, I shall defer writing fully to your Lordship till I send back the messenger announced in your despatch No. 16. I shall, therefore, only mention one or two circumstances which appear of too secret a nature to be inserted in an official despatch. In the first place, the Emperor's conduct continues to be more perfidious than ever, for he is using every means to excite jealousy and dissatisfaction in the mind of the King of Prussia against England; and, among other insinuations, has repeatedly represented to Colonel Bishofswerder that the Court of London had abandoned His Prussian

Majesty in the negotiation with Russia in a most unpardonable manner, and that this was a proof that the support of England never could be relied upon. This insinuation does not seem to have made any unfavourable impression on the King of Prussia; but it is the more dangerous that it is an argument on which much stress has always been laid by the persons here ill-inclined to our cause, and who would prefer seeing plans of partition arranged between Prussia, Austria, and Russia, as I shall explain to your Lordship by the next safe conveyance. I have only to add, at present, that nothing can exceed the eager desire His Prussian Majesty has to support the royal cause in France, and I have every reason to believe that if the Emperor were really to take an active part in the business, His Prussian Majesty would join him. But, from the character of His Imperial Majesty, and his declaration, contained in one of Prince Reuss's last despatches, that he would do nothing unless his Majesty and the King of Prussia concurred with him, it does not appear probable that any very serious interposition can take place. The Emperor, as well as the French Princes and their emissaries, will certainly be disappointed in their absurd expectation of making the King of Prussia act the first part, which has displeased His Majesty not a little."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, August], Wimbledon.—"My only doubt is whether you should not state more directly the distinction between us and Prussia, arising from their treaty with the Porte. I should be inclined to say 'that His Majesty's immediate reasons for writing the instructions to be sent to the Porte are his desire for peace, his persuasion that it is for the interest of the Porte to accept these terms, and his wish that there should be no appearance of England and Prussia not acting in concert; that, in case of the continuance of the war, His Majesty can have no share in it, as he certainly means to fulfil the engagements which his Ministers have entered into with the Empress. That the Court of Berlin will necessarily adopt the same line unless they disavow their Minister at Petersburg, which seems not probable, and that they are peculiarly interested in accelerating the pacification, as the only means of relieving them from the dilemma of choosing between their alliance with the Porte and the engagements now entered into with Russia.' I think it may be of consequence to prevail on the Court of Berlin to send *pressing* instructions to the Porte to agree, and something like this language seems to be the most probable way of doing so."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, August 1, Whitehall.—"The idea which you mention as having occurred to the Pensionary and yourself for an extended system of alliance and guaranty, seems to be much the same with that which I have sometimes entertained; but I should be extremely glad to see it stated more in detail. The principal objection which I foresee to it is that it tends to loosen our present connection with Prussia, without substituting anything in its place equally solid and permanent. This difficulty is not without its weight, and it would certainly require great confidence on the part of Prussia in our good faith, and great attention

to maintain that confidence, without which we might suffer materially in our political consideration and security.

"My late despatches to Ewart will have put you fully in possession of our ideas on the French business, which, as you will have seen, are exactly conformable to yours. We have every day more and more reason to believe that the Emperor is really in earnest in his intention of interfering there.

"I have long thought Woronzow decidedly and personally hostile to the present Government in England, and am persuaded that he suggested the idea of employing Mr. Adair as envoy from Mr. Fox to the Empress. I regret extremely that Fawkeners has thought it necessary to confine to his private correspondence with me the details of Adair's presentation and *representation* at Zarsko-Zeloe. Some trace of so extraordinary a transaction ought to remain in the Office.

"Since I wrote the above I have received your letter, private and secret, of the 29th ultimo, and feel sincerely obliged to you for transmitting to me the paper which was enclosed in it. I forbear making any remarks upon that paper because you will have seen that, in my letter of Friday last to Ewart, I had felt myself obliged to require an official communication of it; and I shall be under the necessity, which I sincerely regret, of making some official remarks upon it. Your letter stating what you say to be solely in confidence to me, I do not feel myself at liberty to communicate it even to Mr. Pitt, with whom, however, if you do not object to it, I should wish to converse upon the subject. I feel strongly with you that a new arrangement would be in many respects advantageous, and it may indeed possibly become necessary from the result of this very business; but my chief difficulty is to supply the place in a manner equal to its importance. I have not yet had time since I have been in this situation to become very much acquainted with the characters and talents of the persons now in that line; but I fairly own that I do not see any choice of that sort with which, as far as I am informed, I should be well satisfied; nor do I know who there is out of the line that is fit to be brought into it in such a situation. You will see that I write this in the strictest confidence, and, if any suggestion has occurred to you, I should be sincerely obliged to you to state it to me in the same confidence, which I trust you believe me incapable of abusing.

"Schulemburg's suspicion might very probably originate from the turn of Comte Redern's despatches. I had conversed with the latter pretty fully upon the subject, and the general impression of those conversations would certainly be different from that which is conveyed by Mr. Ewart's note. The late change of the Prussian cipher prevents me from being able ascertain this point, and is in many respects peculiarly unfortunate at this critical moment. You could not do me a more essential service than by putting it in my power to remove this inconvenience, if you should be able to do so. Whitworth's last despatch opens matter for much very curious speculation, and I am impatient to know the result of the contest between the two favourites. If it should have occasioned delay in our business, it will have had the best of all effects, because that would give time for the Emperor's new line to be known at Petersburg."

*Postscript.*—"I have a hint that Mercy is likely to come over here; the impression of his character which I have taken from the Hague business is not favourable to him."

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, August 2, Hague.—“This is an answer to yours of the 29th, as far as I am able, at the moment, to avail myself of such intimations as you may have the goodness to give to me.

“The first paragraph of the enclosed note from the Pensionary, to whom I wrote that you wished him to employ some proper person at Aix la Chapelle, will show that he had anticipated your Lordship's wish. In a subsequent note he remarks to me, *que jusqu' ici, ces scélérats n'ont passé ni par la Pologne ni per la Prusse, et que par le depart du Don Quichotte du Nord, il ne paroît pas que la scene sera à Aix la Chapelle.*

“The incident of Mr. Fox's letter to Barnave is curious if true; there is a similar report here; and it is also said that Mr. Wyndham of Norfolk is a great admirer of the present leaders of the National Assembly. If these opinions lead to a communication, and if the same system should extend itself to political discussions between England and other countries, as has been surmised in regard to Woronzow, and reported in some of the correspondence in respect to Mr. Adair's journey to Petersburg, it would become a very scandalous indiscretion; and, though it would not be easy to subject it to the animadversion of the law, it would, when known, make an impression at least as penal in regard to the parties as any legal judgment could be. But it is not fair to form any opinion as to the supposed letter to Barnave until we have seen it.

“The letters by this mail from Petersburg are not quite unpromising as to the issue of the negotiation. It will be, however, a whimsical circumstance if the Ministers of the Allies should bring forward a proposition according to which Russia is not only to maintain the possession of Ockzakow, but to repair the fortress; and yet, if a stipulation can be made that Russia shall have no fortress to the west of Ockzakow, I shall think that we have made a good bargain for the Turks. In the meantime, I am vexed to think of the long and continued expense of our large naval armament.

“I next come to your Lordship's question *whether I could now conclude the treaty of commerce upon the ground of the article marked L in my dispatch No. 18.* There was a moment in which I could perhaps have answered in the affirmative, but the Regency of Amsterdam has since been so much changed, and those who have the principal influence at this moment are so impracticable, that I expect nothing but new difficulties; and this leads me to the remaining part of the enclosed note from the Grand Pensionary, which is an answer to some expression used by me upon occasion of the circumstances mentioned in my dispatch of this day. It is certain that unless we correct the article which prohibits the Republic from bringing West India produce from her own ports to her own ports, and unless we give some explanation, in a ministerial letter or otherwise, of our intentions as to the *Isles Molucques*, there is not any prospect of a conclusion. In the meantime the conduct which I am observing here will bring forwards some further explanation. I wish, without seeming to give it out as a menace, that I could find some means of intimating that the advantages of the salpêtre and opium can no longer be continued if the negotiation breaks off.

“Your Lordship's question as to the changes, if any, which have been made in the constitutions of the Austrian provinces by the Acts



of Inauguration beyond what would have taken place if the convention had been regularly executed, is very material. I have understood that there is no material or explicable difference, and that circumstance tends to prove that by changing the word *Charles VI.* to the words *ses illustres prédécesseurs*, the Emperor would be induced to retract his clause of explanation, and the exchange of ratifications might take place; but I will endeavour to procure an answer to your Lordship's question. The Greffier, at my desire, has written to the Baron de Hon, and has stated it as a question from the *Besogne Secrete*, to which an answer is required.

"I do not know whether your Lordship recollects some papers which I sent in the beginning of this year on the subject of the neutrality of the Netherlands; both M. de Mercy and his sovereign shewed a strong disposition to adopt that idea, to which the Pensionary is warmly attached, because he considers it as forming the best possible barrier to this Republic. I can venture to say that, if it could be carried into execution in the form of an additional secret article to our convention, and if the Emperor should be disposed to draw off, immediately afterwards, a part of his troops, or the whole, for other services, the Republic would willingly furnish a quota of troops (and it could be done without any inconvenience from the frontier garrisons) to take the charge of the Netherlands. The current of events may possibly soon bring this speculation more into view.

Most secret.—"I enclose a copy of an interception, on account of some expressions in it which appeared not uninteresting.

"The letter is from M. Caillard.

"I enclose a letter from that very shrewd gentleman Mr. Henry Hope, on account of the two paragraphs marked 3 and 6. He expects a pacification, and certainly is better informed than anybody out of Russia."

#### *Enclosure A.*

#### VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, le 3 Aout [Hague].—"Quant à l'affaire moribunde du traité de commerce soyons justes . et convenons de bonne foi, que *Iliacos extra muros peccatur et intra*; cependant s'il n'y a rien de bon à faire, il faut bien que de part et d'autre nous mettions fin à un travail inutile. La fin de cette affaire ne sera pas une mortification personnelle ni pour vous, ni pour moi; mais voici comme la posterité la jugera. Les Anglois ont voulu profiter de l'ascendant bien décidé qu'ils avoient sur les Hollandois, et leur ont demandé des sacrifices en retour de leur amitié; les Hollandois y ont consenti en autant que ces sacrifices ne fussent pas nuisible à leur propres interets; les Anglois ont parlé en législateurs, exigeant la soumission aux paroles même qu'ils voulerent faire recevoir, et s'en reservant l'explication du sens; les Hollandois ont mieux aimé renoncer à plusieurs avantages offerts, que se resoudre à plier; après cela ils se sont boudé reciproquement. Je suis bien fâché pour la clôture de ce jugement, et cependant je ne la crois que trop vraie. La fin de cette affaire sera la tombeau de cette sincère confiance que tous les bons esprits ont taché d'établir entre les deux nations, et qui étoit en si bon train."

*French.*

*Enclosure B.*

MONSIEUR CAILLARD à MONSIEUR DE MONTMORIN.

1791, le 29 Juillet, La Haye.—*En claire.* “J’ai reçu la circulaire concernant le langage que je dois tenir ici depuis les derniers événements arrivés en France, et les mesures prises par l’Assemblée Nationale.

“La loi sur les écrits et discours séditieux a fait à la Haye autant plus d’effet, que l’on y étoit vivement choqué du discours insolent du Sieur Brissot de Warville, dans le quel cet écrivain insulte presque toutes les Puissances, et très particulièrement la République et la famille Stadhouderienne.

“On attend actuellement et avec impatience le resultat du travail du Comité de Revision, d’où la Constitution doit sortir, reduite à ses principes vraiment essentiels, et retablir le pouvoir exécutif dans son état naturel.

*En chiffre.*—“C’est . ce dernier cas qui embarrasse le ministère de la République. L’on ne sait actuellement comment se conduire, lorsque je fais une demande ou le nom de Roi n’est pas exprimé. Par exemple, votre dépêche concernant l’expédition de M. d’Entrecasteaux étant motivé seulement sur un décret de l’Assemblée Nationale, le Grand Pensionnaire me fit sentir poliment, mais assez franchement, que cette forme pouvoit donner lieu à des discussions désagréables. *Faites* (ajoutoit il) *la demande en votre nom, et comme Chargé reconnu des Affaires de France; si non, vous nous obligerez à nous expliquer sur l’état momentané du Pouvoir Exécutif en France.* Je ne crus pas devoir insister, d’autant plus que cette dernière réflexion étoit assez vraisemblable, et qu’il me paroit que dans une circonstance ou on avoit tant craint le rappel des Ambassadeurs, c’étoit encore beaucoup que de trouver un tempérament pour continuer la bonne correspondence. J’ai donc rétiré la copie de la dépêche; et ce fait vous donnera l’état au vrai des dispositions actuelles du Ministère Hollandois à notre égard.”

*French.**Enclosure C.*

H. HOPE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, July 30, Amsterdam.—“I have been sincerely vexed at the mis-carriage of our commercial treaty; much may be attributed to the spirit of the times, and the want of spirit in our well meaning men, for some we still have; and much to a tenaciousness on the other side of the water. I have not been forward in raising difficulties, for I wanted a treaty, in any form, to cover our trade in Europe, and cement the interests of the two nations, but I could not resist the force of the objection to the latitude in the prohibitive clause respecting the trade from colonies, which became, in effect, as much prohibited as that from the French islands. The word *indirectly* is indefinable; not one of our cargoes from St. Eustatius, St. Martins, Curaçao . . can escape its baneful influence. If you give up this word, the whole blame at least will lay at our door, and till then your Lordship will best know where it lays.

“The note of the 18-29 June, is very conciliatory; the difference is reduced to a refinement hardly perceptible. I mean that by it is inferred that an almost imperceptible concession, in lieu of what is demanded, will be acceptable, and I sincerely wish may be granted, and that your Lordship is actually in possession of His Imperial Majesty’s reply to this good issue.”

## JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 2, Berlin. *In cipher*.—"I have just made, with Mr. Jackson's assistance, such important discoveries with regard to the plans arranging or arranged between the King of Prussia and the Emperor relative to the French affairs, that I am sure your Lordship, when informed of them, will approve of his going himself to England immediately to make you fully acquainted with the particulars, many of which are of too secret a nature to be trusted to any other conveyance, besides the verbal explanations he is so well qualified to give."

## FRANCIS MOORE to JAMES BLAND BURGESS.

1791, August 4, Paris.—"I mentioned to you in my letter of Monday last, the alarming want of concert which appeared to exist among the Ministers here, even at this critical moment, in the instance of the orders given for the camp in the *plaine de Grenelle*; since which another nearly as remarkable has occurred, which M. Merlin took notice of in the Assembly. I shall quote you that gentleman's own words, to which no satisfactory answer was given.

*"Il y a un tems très considerable que la fabrication des pièces de 15 sols est ordonnée, et que les Ministres ont ordre de veiller à cette fabrication. Eh bien! que vient-il d'arriver? Il y a deux ou trois jours qu'il existoit des coins, à la faveur desquels on pouvoit commencer cette fabrication à l'Hotel des Monnoyes de Paris. En hier, Messieurs, des ordres venus de je ne sçais qui, mais transmis tres innocemment par le Ministre des contributions publiques, ont fait envoyer ces coins à la Monnoye de Limoges."*

"By the report of the Commissaries who were sent to the *Departments du Nord, du pas de Calais, and de l'Aine*, you will perceive the great distrust which the soldiers have for their officers, and consequently the want of subordination and discipline among the troops. You will also remark the dangerous influence which the *Clubocatrie* have acquired in those, as well as almost all the departments of the kingdom. This great engine of the Revolution, which was without much difficulty put in motion, no power in the constitution will be found competent to stop. Any such attempt indeed would be no less dangerous than unsuccessful, and the authors of that system, who have triumphed in its success, must now also submit to the inconveniences attendant upon it, which will probably be felt more and more every day, till at length the *Clubocatrie* become as odious as those of *Aristo* and *Demo*.

"It is reported, but I believe without foundation, that M. de Coigny is sent with secret instructions from the *Comité Diplomatique*, to negotiate with the fugitive princes. A discussion took place in the Assembly yesterday on the measures to be adopted relative to the Prince of Condé; but on M. Freteau's observing that the committee had taken this matter into consideration, and that several difficulties occurred in the *redaction* which could only be obviated by the *Charte Constitutionnelle*, the debate was postponed. The Assembly have decreed; 1st, *que la garde nationale soldée de Paris est supprimée*; 2<sup>d</sup>, *qu'elle est recrée à l'instant en troupe de ligne et gendarmerie*; 3<sup>rd</sup>, *que la solde sous cette nouvelle formation sera celle dont elle jouit à present, 17 sols per diem*. This decree is important, as it puts an end to the insinuations

which were thrown out to the *gardes soldées* against the disposition of the Assembly towards them. The troops who were encamped in the *plaine de Grenelle* set out at 5 o'clock this morning for the frontiers.

"I dined today in company with several members of the Committee of *Recherches*. M. Voidel (the President of that committee) informed me that the *Charte Constitutionnelle* would be printed and delivered to the members of the Assembly tomorrow, and promised, at the same time, to send me a copy of it. He thinks that the Constitution will have passed through the Assembly by the 20th or 25th instant at the latest; and in order to give as great an appearance of liberty as possible to the King's acceptance, that his Majesty will be permitted to go out of Paris, probably to Rambouillet. M. Voidel added, at the same time, that the King's answer must simply be *oui ou non*; as the last article of the Constitution states that he may accept or reject, but is not permitted to alter it in the smallest degree. The freedom which M. Voidel (who is President of the most secret department of Government) allowed himself in conversation, especially with one who was a total stranger to him as I was, surprised me very much. He did not hesitate to give it as his opinion (upon my asking him if he thought that the King would accept the Constitution) that he would certainly accept it, but that he would as certainly make his escape out of the country before two months elapsed. I asked him what he imagined would be done in that case; he answered, the Dauphin will be proclaimed King, and a *single Regent* appointed. He also explained to me the manner in which he had detected and caused to be taken up the forgers of *assignats* who have been hitherto discovered, several of whom are shortly to be executed. M. Dupont, whom I afterwards met, told me that one of the *Articles Constitutionnels* (not *Reglementaires* as I had imagined) is that the Ministers shall not be members of the Assembly. That gentleman is at present employed in drawing up a law respecting libels, and expressed a great desire to learn the ideas of Mr. Fox upon the subject.

"In consequence of your letter, I waited on M. Ocaris, the Spanish Consul-General, with whom I am acquainted. He told me that M. de las Heras is not yet arrived here; that he received a letter from him dated Bayonne, where he was confined by bad health about a month ago; that he had since that received a letter from him dated Bordeaux where he only proposed to stay a few days, and afterwards proceed to Paris, where, however, he is not yet arrived, but may be expected every hour. You may rely on my doing all in my power to render his stay here as short as possible.

August 5.—"I have been at the National Assembly all this morning, where I heard read the *Charte Constitutionnelle*, which was received with very great applause. I now send it you enclosed, together with the *portillon* which contains an accurate account of the *séance* of this morning."

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 4, Berlin.—"I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's private letter of the 26th ult., and shall not fail to pay due attention to its contents. What you will have received since, and what I send by Mr. Jackson, will, I trust, be found satisfactory respecting the most essential points. Agreeably to your Lordship's desire, I have

written the most secret information in my dispatch No. 41. My great object is to make your Lordship acquainted with the eventual views of this Court, in order that you may have it in your own power to take what measures you may judge necessary either to counteract or forward them; and, provided the preparatory steps be taken in time, I believe a great deal might still be done here in directing the proceedings of this Cabinet.

"I have already acquainted your Lordship that Count Schulenburg does all the business here, as you will have observed likewise from the transactions, and I have hitherto had every reason to be satisfied with him. But, though his influence with the King is very great, it is not always to be relied upon, as the present instance of Colonel Bishofswerder's negotiation at Vienna sufficiently proves. I leave Mr. Jackson to give your Lordship whatever further private details you may wish to learn on this or other subjects. Your Lordship will see that there is no doubt of the alliance with the Emperor going on, and of Russia and Saxony, or Poland being combined with it; but I think it would not be difficult, if you think it advisable, to prevent any mention from being made in the treaty of alliance with the maritime powers of the guarantee of the Polish Constitution.

"As the interview at Poelnitz is to take place so soon, I beg your Lordship will have the goodness to let me know your sentiments on that subject, as soon as possible."

#### JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 4, Berlin.—"I am sorry to be under the necessity of troubling your Lordship on the subject of my private affairs. On Mr. Pitt's proposing to me my sudden return to Berlin, last spring, during the interval between the Duke of Leed's resignation and your Lordship's appointment to the Foreign Department, I gave him in writing a representation respecting the state of my affairs, and the extraordinary expense I had been put to last year, in the King's service, particularly by my frequent journeys. I found I had been obliged, without any personal expense, to exceed my income in the sum of 840*l.*, and I was assured that this would be immediately refunded; but as this has not yet been done, I beg leave to have recourse to your Lordship, a liberty which I would have taken long ago had I not conceived that the affair had been settled before your Lordship came into the Department. But I am likewise obliged to acquaint you, as I did Mr. Pitt, that my expense here has always exceeded my appointments about 1,000*l.*, from the dearness of this place and the necessity I have been under, from the nature of the circumstances, of frequently seeing the people of the country, as well as the number of English who are constantly coming recommended to me. I therefore solicited an augmentation of appointments, which Mr. Pitt did not seem to think unreasonable, but nothing was then settled. Since my return here I have been put to much extraordinary expense on account of the presence of the Duke of York, and I need not observe to your Lordship that His Royal Highness's marriage, according to the usual practice on such occasions, must expose me to a great deal more, and I beg your Lordship will have the goodness to let me know what allowance I may expect for this purpose.

"I am sorry to be likewise under the necessity of troubling you on the subject of my health, which continues so bad that my physician assures

me I could not outlive the severity of a winter in this climate. As it appears probable that the most important affairs actually under consideration will be settled in the course of two months, I beg to be allowed a leave of absence about that time to spend the winter in Italy, as the only chance I have to restore a constitution, which I can say with the utmost truth, has been ruined by over anxiety and application to business. I beg leave to refer your Lordship to Mr. Jackson on this subject, and likewise to an assurance the Duke of Leeds sent me when I was so ill at Reichenbach, and to the justice of which Mr. Pitt assented last winter, that, in the event of my death, Mrs. Ewart might be allowed a pension. An assurance from your Lordship on this head would afford me inexpressible relief. I rely on your Lordship's goodness, and on the nature of the circumstances I have mentioned, for an apology for my intruding upon you with such subjects, and for being delivered from my present very disagreeable embarrassments and futuro apprehensions."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, August 4, Hague.—"I have said what I thought fair towards our friends at Petersburg and towards the business in question in my dispatch of this date. At the same time I doubt whether they have not acted under a degree of misapprehension; they seem to me to have looked only to the freedom of the navigation of the Dniester, and not to have adverted to the danger of conveying to Russia the means of giving new advantages to Poland; but I greatly doubt whether those advantages are material; and I hope that they are not, because I am sure that we cannot prevent them.

"I, this moment, receive your Lordship's private letter which I will answer by the first occasion. In the meantime I entreat your Lordship to understand that though I wish to retain the advantage of writing in *strict confidence* to you, that expression, under every sentiment of my mind, includes every communication that you may think agreeable or acceptable to Mr. Pitt. His occupations do not allow him to correspond with me; but my attachment to him is as implicit and as cordial as possible; and I wish to have no bounds to my confidence respecting him any more than with your Lordship, being sure that this plan will be agreeable to both of you.

"It is the ardency of Mr. Ewart's mind which is again influencing the Prussian councils as to the Empress's answer. I have not time to copy M. de Reède's private despatch. The two first pages relate to the King of Prussia's answer to the Emperor, and to the King of France's letter to the Emperor; after which follows—

*"La réponse que la Russie vient de donner, et l'avis que M. de Goltz ajoute que probablement les Négotiateurs Anglois signeront dans huit jours, est fort désapprouvée ici. On trouve que si ces Messieurs prennent cela sur eux, ils sont fort hardis; et que s'ils ont eu des ordres, ils auroient dû les communiquer ici. Au reste, comme tout le blame de cette paix retombera sur l'Angleterre; on me feroit décidé à ne se mêler de rien, et à laisser absolument faire la Cour de Londres, dont M. de Goltz suivra l'impulsion.*

*"Nous avons les nouvelles du retour des Plenipotentiaires Autrichiens à Sistove, le 17 de ce mois.*

*"Ce n'est que par un ami du Lord Grenville que le Duc de York est encore informé que le Roi son père consent à son mariage."*

## P. COLQUHOUN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 5, George Street, Adelphi.—“Permit me to convey to you through the medium of this letter certain interesting particulars which have recently come to my knowledge.

“The rising population of the United States and the increasing resource for the sale and consumption of our manufactures, with a prospect of augmenting these sales from *three million sterling annually* as at present, to *six* or even to ten millions and upwards in the course of from 20 to 30 years, has certainly attracted the notice of other European nations particularly the French who, notwithstanding their apparent convulsed state, I observed (in consequence of a recent visit to that country) were not only in the train of a progressive increase of the cotton and printing manufactures, but are also likely to be greatly assisted in their future exertions by means of legislative encouragements heretofore unknown in France, and also by means of a much larger proportion of the capital of the country being thrown into this line than formerly.

“I observed also, with a degree of regret calculated to excite jealousy, that several articles fit for the American market were even cheaper in France than in England; and that there appeared a tendency to a progressive improvement which, I confess, increased my anxiety for the establishment of such a system as would, if possible, defeat the favourite object of the present French Government, of opening by degrees a sale for their manufactures in America, and of obtaining from Congress such facilities as would accomplish their purpose; to effect which they derive, at present, considerable aid from what is called the French party in America, in which are Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and some other leading characters chiefly in the Southern States, who are zealously pursuing every measure that can tend to give them paramount influence in the councils of the United States, to be employed in favour of France and to the injury of this country.

“It was by means of the friends of this party in England that the erroneous statements were sent out which induced Mr. Washington to *believe*, and to represent in his message to Congress dated the 14th of last February (No. 5), *that there was no disposition in the Government of this country to enter upon any commercial arrangement with the United States*. It was the same spirit of misrepresentation which produced the subsequent report on this message (No. 2), which would have terminated in a law the most embarrassing and distressing to the commerce of this country with America, had not the moderate party (consisting of the vice-President Mr. Adams, General Knox Secretary at War, and others friendly to this country and with whom Colonel Smith is connected) procured a delay by a reference (No. 3) which was officially made to Mr. Jefferson as Secretary of State, a man of considerable abilities and personal weight, and known to be particularly hostile to this country and warmly attached to France.

“It has fortunately happened, however, that while the framing of this report was in progress, under an almost general impression in America, industriously disseminated by the French party, *that England would enter into no negotiation, and that she treated America with ineffable contempt*, Colonel Smith arrived at the critical moment; and, armed with the assurances your Lordship had given him relative to the *true* disposition of this country towards America, he exerted the influence he justly possesses in that country in preventing the mischief which had arisen and was likely to result from former

misrepresentations, by assuring the leaders of the Executive Government that *England would speedily manifest her good disposition to cultivate a friendly intercourse with America by the appointment of a Minister who, he hoped, would arrive (if possible) before the next meeting of Congress in October.* In this confidence the friends of the British interest in America have encreased, and they bowie [buoy?] themselves up with the hopes that they shall defeat the hostile party and prevent any embarrassing restrictions upon trade, at least until a friendly discussion shall intervene; but it seems at the same time to be the general opinion that their success in this respect will depend much on the appearance of a British Minister in America before Mr. Jefferson's report can be made in October next.

"Nothing could be more grateful to these leading members in the American Government who are favourable to the interest of this country than Colonel Smith's communications of the good dispositions of this country from such respectable authority; and it is supposed that the President and Mr. Secretary Hamilton are among the number who will feel satisfaction on the prospect of an opportunity being soon given for settling all matters of variance between the two countries by means of friendly discussion.

"If, however, any accident should prevent the appearance of a British Minister before the meeting of Congress in October, and that the party hostile to this country should prevail, there is scarcely any doubt but a law, similar to what is drafted in the Report No. 2, will be passed in Congress, which will probably produce a war of statutes between the two countries, of which foreign nations will take the advantage to the prejudice of Great Britain, and, by degrees, may accustom the Americans to their manufacturers.

"It is, however, the decided opinion of the friends of the British interest in America that, by sending over a prudent well-informed man upon those subjects which will fall to be discussed, of plain but conciliatory manners, and whose name and character had not been known in the transactions of the war, everything favourable to this country would be the result; and, although the Americans certainly do aim at privileges which it will be difficult if not impossible for this country to concede, that still, by prudent management, many useful arrangements may be made without any material sacrifice on the part of Great Britain. I expect daily some interesting intelligence from Colonel Smith, which, with some other particulars of importance, I hope to have the honour of communicating to your Lordship personally at any time you shall be pleased to appoint an audience after my return to town on Thursday next."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 8, Hague.—"I will now attempt to reply to some parts of your Lordship's letter of the 1st instant, though the circumstances of the tide at Helvoet do not allow me many minutes for that purpose.

"I had already heard of M. de Mercy's project of a journey to England; that he wished to have some diplomatic errand to gild it; but that there were difficulties as to M. de Stadion; and he lately sent a message to me through M. de Buol that he should, if possible, pass through the Hague. *Il a le ton un peu patelin*, but, as to the rest, your Lordship will not be sorry to see him. He certainly possesses very distinguished talents. He expresses himself peculiarly well; he knows



all the State secrets of the last thirty years ; and, with a little management, you will find him very communicative. I have reason to believe that he has lodged a considerable part of his fortune in England.

"The Persionary and I had anticipated your Lordship's wish by sending a more detailed statement of the idea of an extended alliance before I received your letter.

"It appears that this French business will turn the whole current of political ideas; and it is probable that both the Imperial Courts will enter into it. Your Lordship will see, in one of my enclosures of this day, that the Court of Berlin is allured by a speculation of dismemberment. We cannot prevent the bursting of this new storm; and it appears to me that we may watch its progress without any material danger or inconvenience. In the mean time, this very troubled state of Europe is a sufficient reason for our having a large fleet, and I apprehend that it may be necessary to continue to retain more seamen and ships than in strict economy we should wish. Would it not now be right to send a part of our fleet out to exercise, if it were only for the sake of forming the seamen, and of obviating the objection that they have passed the whole summer idly at anchor?

"In the French transaction it appears to be the plan for the powers who interfere to proceed on the principle of restoring the French King to his entire authority; such an avowal will on the one hand unite the whole French nation against them; but on the other it is difficult and dangerous for sovereigns possessing an absolute authority to become the armed mediators of a free Constitution or moderated Monarchy to France. The attacks on France will accelerate the bankruptcy.

"Your Lordship's letter to Berlin requiring an official communication of Mr. Ewart's *memoire* to that Court, happened not to pass under flying seal through my hands; but there certainly was a fair ground for such a requisition, because the answer from the King of Prussia expressly alludes to the *memoire*. Every circumstance from day to day strengthens the regret which I feel that means have not been found to recall both the gentlemen employed in that mission, without injury, however, to their interests and future fortunes. The violence and inconsiderate workings of their minds are not corrected by what has passed; and in all their reasonings as to foreign politics, they look only to the attainment of the object proposed, without any idea or means of appreciating the difficulty, the expense, the danger, and all the collateral circumstances which would occur to them, if they had any competent knowledge of the state and interests of their own country. But if the consequences resulting from this were not so visible as they are, and if it were not evident that every incident and every instruction will be twisted and tortured towards the system which those gentlemen prescribe to themselves and to all the world, I would nevertheless, if I had my will, remove them to other situations, and without delay, even if they were my brothers or my nearest friends; and precisely on the same reasoning that I meant to have recommended my own immediate removal from the Hague if the war had taken place. Besides, it is essential to the credit and consistency of Government in adopting a change of measures with respect to a particular Court or line of politics not to employ at that Court the same agents who had been so deeply committed in the line which is renounced. It was useful to Government, even if the Duke of Leeds had been a Minister of ability, that he should resign when he did; but the measure was left incomplete by sending back the same mission to Berlin, and by continuing it. But having said this, to which in a conversation I could add some stronger motives, I confess

that it is difficult to find a successor; at least it is very difficult to discuss a point which involves the position of so many individuals in a letter. In making an arrangement it would perhaps be useful to the service that Mr. Whitworth should be moved to some other Court, and it would, I presume, be agreeable to him, for he is on bad terms at Petersburg. It is impossible, I suppose, to prevail on Fawkener to go to Berlin. If your Lordship could frame to your own mind any arrangement, and would confide it to me, I will mention to you without reserve what occurs to me upon it from a personal knowledge of the parties concerned.

"I beg leave to remark on the Russian business that, though I think us far from unfortunate in the conclusion which we are likely to attain, I am not blind to the impertinence and *persiflage* of the answer, which is evidently the work of Monsieur Markof."

P. COLQUHOUN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 8, George Street, Adelphi.—"Since I had the honor of attending your Lordship on Saturday I have seen an American gentleman who is an intimate friend of Colonel Smith, and who I know to be a good deal in the confidence of the present Government of the United States, and whose sentiments with regard to this country are the same with those of Colonel Smith. This gentleman informs me that he is to embark for America next Wednesday evening, and that immediately on his arrival at New York, it is his intention to proceed to Philadelphia for the purpose of conveying to the President of the United States the earliest account of the occurrences of this country so far as they relate to America.

"With every possible regard to prudence and caution I have not failed to convey such impressions as I am sure will be useful to this country. But as this gentleman is extremely intelligent in the affairs of America, and most desirous that a closer connection should take place with this country, it has occurred to me that it might be of importance, at this particular crisis, that your Lordship had an opportunity of conversing with him previous to his departure, in which case I shall, with great pleasure, execute any commands you may be pleased to honor me with for the purpose of promoting an interview, if it shall be thought necessary. The gentleman's name is *Cutting*."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Most Secret.

1791, August 9, Hague.—"I send the enclosed because I am not sure whether it passed through the Post Office. It relates certainly to a conversation which M. de Redern had had on the 4th instant with your Lordship on the subject of the apparent diversity between Mr. Ewart and me, in our respective statements of the instruction sent to Sistove. I happen to know this from an idle letter written on the same subject by the Baron de Nagel to the Greffier. Nagel, with pleasant manners, is indiscreet and violent to an extreme; and his earnestness for every blind and implicit support to any measure suggested in the Prussian councils gives him a degree of confidence with Redern which will do no good to either of them, or to their employers.

"The decipherers here have not been able yet to discover this new

Prussian cipher; we have only ascertained that by a new arrangement, a different cipher has been sent to each Prussian mission, and, consequently, that the Prussian Ministers cannot correspond with each other in cipher."

*Enclosure not preserved.*

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 9, Hague.—"I have with the aid and *bonne volonté* of the Pensionary taken infinite pains to put this commercial negotiation once more into a fair train; or at least to abridge and simplify the consideration. In the *projet* of the three articles sent in my private-official dispatch, there are I know some expressions which when brought into friction with a famous pamphlet will electrify Lord Hawkesbury at the first perusal; but the largeness of the expression used in the leading article is of no importance if the exceptions used in the subsequent articles explicitly and clearly give every object for which we contest. And it will be found, I think, on a cool consideration of all the three articles, that they contain, in effect, all that was contained in our original project, certainly more than we can contend for and enforce by any Admiralty Courts if we leave the business to that adverse and fatal mode of settlement; and far more, than we have ever attempted to establish by treaty in respect to any other power in Europe. In short my object is to recommend the adoption of the 1st and 2nd article of the new *projet*, with the 3rd article of the old *projet*; the whole of course subject to such alterations as your Lordship and Mr. Pitt may think indispensable; and if those alterations are not very extensive, I think that by the measures which we are taking here, we could force an immediate conclusion of the treaty. I submit to your Lordship that the impression of such a treaty would at present be very useful to us, both here, and at home, and in foreign countries.

"The *agioteurs* at Amsterdam concerned for French houses are active in speculations on the sinking of our East India stock, to a degree which seems to imply that they have some intelligence; I hope that they are mistaken.

"The Pensionary has intelligence that the Prince of Condé has collected a considerable sum of money at Worms. It is to be regretted that we have not some good correspondent, on some fair pretext, in the residence of the French princes."

August 10.—"Mr. Jackson from Berlin is this moment arrived; he will breakfast with me and proceed immediately to England. I have not yet seen him. I fear that we are not yet at the end of the Imperial chicanes."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791] August 10 [Stowe].—"I am delighted that the confirmation is at length arrived, but I wish that you could have sent me a copy of the letter, or the information of Riou's further intentions, that I might be prepared to converse with Lord Camelford if he should come here. I have written this day to Lady Camelford (not knowing how he is) to congratulate and to beg that they will fix a day. You will believe that I am very anxious for the answer, and, if it is not

satisfactory, I shall endeavour to go to town that no time may be lost.

"I am happy that the German convention is signed, as that point seemed to me very material for your views of peace. I own that I am not very sanguine in my hopes of a speedy termination to your Spanish negotiation, and, in the meantime, this war upon our purse is very serious in its immediate bearings, and will, I think, materially embarrass you by indisposing the voice of the country to reasonable terms of accommodation. You know my text upon these questions, *that almost any peace is better than the most brilliant war*; but, if Spain protracts the treaty, you may be forced into a war.

"You say nothing upon *anything else*, so I suppose that *everything* sleeps.

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, August 11, Hague.—"I very sincerely congratulate you on the close of the Russian negotiation which took place on this day fortnight at Petersburg, of which you will, I hope to-morrow evening, receive the particulars from the hands of Mr. Lindsay. Every subsequent information having tended to satisfy me that what I stated five months ago to the Duke of Leeds with respect to Oczakow and the district was in substance accurate, I cannot persuade myself that we have, in effect, lost much to the Turks by not obtaining from Russia any of the modifications which were proposed in the instructions to our plenipotentiaries. I could have wished, however, that the whole detail of those modifications had not been brought forward in the *memoire* of the 29th June; and again, that, in the *replique* of the 22nd July, so much stress had not been laid on its being our object to secure the freedom of the navigation of the Dniester. What I have only hinted in my despatches occasionally on this subject is, I believe, strictly true; the Dneister above Bender is not navigable except for small craft. Its freedom was seldom restrained by the Turks with respect to Polish produce. If it were navigable for large vessels, it would be evidently contrary to our commercial interests to secure the freedom of the river; and, therefore, the clause in our *replique* which seems to impose on the Turks the necessity of stipulating that freedom would, to my apprehension, be undesirable in its import if it implied (what for the plain sense and dignity of the proceeding it ought to imply) that the navigation in question is a great and valuable object. This (if my reasoning and suppositions are well founded) is an unpleasant circumstance on which we must put the best face that we can. I am heartily glad that the result of the business is not worse than it is. Its completion in respect to the Turks still remains; the term of four months given to them is a sort of modification in itself. I am not sure that it will be a serviceable one; but, on this point, the Ministers of the allies have in the *replique* expressed the intention of the Courts with precision, and perhaps with harshness; possibly indeed with too much precision, because there are many imaginable contingencies under which we ought not to find ourselves chained by a *promise d'abandonner la termination de la guerre au seul cours des événemens qu'elle pourra amener*. Is any rectification necessary? I apprehend not, and that it is best to let the business rest on good faith.

"Indeed, I much fear that the Turks, in despite of their helplessness, will be (at least on the first communication) quite impracticable.

Nothing can contribute more to this than the *ton* which is encouraged on the occasion at Berlin, and the sentiments which Mr. Ewart attributes to M. de Schulemberg. I must here repeat what I have so often intimated, and so incessantly felt during several months, that it is of essential necessity to the conduct and whole impression of your Lordship's measures to make an entire change in that mission. My anxiety for the public service, my attachment to Mr. Pitt, and the friendship which I am desirous to cultivate in respect to your Lordship, all confirm me in this opinion. The public service suffers essentially under the present circumstances, and must continue to suffer by Mr. Ewart remaining at Berlin. His feelings are constitutionally too strong not to influence his language and conduct in despite of himself and of his instructions at every corner. The service suffers beyond measure already by that consideration. At the same time I feel the difficulty because of the want of a successor to him, but any alternative would be preferable to the present one. Mr. Lindsay or Colonel Gardiner might be sent as *chargé d'affaires* for three or four months till your Lordship can make a proper choice. In looking over the list on this subject, I naturally recollect my brother who is at Dresden. He possesses great discretion and a cool mind, and has the most conciliating manners possible for foreign life; but his establishment is what he likes at Dresden; his circumstances out of the line are good; and he would, I apprehend, be unwilling to change his station even for a temporary purpose, and would deprecate any proposition made to him. I do not know how far Mr. Whitworth is fit; but, as to all the others in the line, I see objections.

"The embarrassment in discussing such matters upon papers leads me back to the wish, which I have already expressed to your Lordship, to make a visit to England. If you think that, on the conclusion of the Sistove pacification, my absence would not be inconvenient materially, I should like to go in the beginning of September, and, if it should be my lot to return to this place, I would return to it in the beginning of January. But, in respect to this, I throw myself implicitly on your Lordship and on Mr. Pitt; entreating only to be apprized of your sentiments as soon as you may find it convenient. If I go I shall pass through the Netherlands and Calais; but it requires near a month for my preparations."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, January [August] 11, Hague.—"After sealing my letter, and whilst Mr. Lindsay was breakfasting, I had occasion to learn from him that he would not be sorry to be employed instantly in stating, and enforcing the success of this business at Constantinople, or in whatever line your Lordship might think best for effectuating its conclusion, by passing through Sistove. I have thought it right to add a line to mention this circumstance, as your Lordship will probably think it right to send some instruction instantly to Constantinople.

*Secret.*—"Mr. Lindsay has in his possession a specimen of that correspondence which we lately agreed to be so culpable if not criminal; and also some originals, which he will deliver, of course, at your Lordship's office."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 12, Hague.—“The wind has been unfavourable for Mr. Lindsay, but he will be able probably to arrive at Harwich in the course of to-morrow.

“On the first impression, I was startled by Mr. Fawkener’s determination not to wait for the possibility of farther instructions, but to take leave of the Court of Petersburg and to come away; and I was more particularly struck by the declaration that we will, in no event, take farther part in the contest, if the Turks do not accept the conditions offered; but on reflection I incline to think that this conduct (*quoiqu’un peu hazardé*) is best calculated both to avoid farther embarrassments, and to effect the pacification which we have in view. Certainly, when the clause signed by the Prussian Plenipotentiary at Petersburg to abandon the Turks to the event of the war, is opposed to the clause signed last year by the Prussian Plenipotentiary at Constantinople to oblige Russia to restore the Crimea, the contrast must be very grating to the Prussian Ministers; but their *école* was committed at Constantinople and not at Petersburg.

“No communication is yet received here of the purport of the *projet* in agitation between the King of Prussia and the Emperor; but it probably will have been transmitted to your Lordship from the Comte de Redern. M. de Reede has intimated a wish to accompany the King of Prussia to Pillnitz; the Pensionary discourages it, and also thinks that he will not be invited.

“I learn from some old Paris acquaintance who are passing a few days here with a large party of expatriated aristocrats, that the French Princes at Coblenz are little sensible of their situation, and are living in all the old style of *faste*, debauchery, extravagance, and idle vanity, which we remember at Versailles and at Fontainebleau. It is suspected that some secret compromise is settled between the leaders of the Assembly and the proposed King.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 14, Stowe.—“I have not thanked you for your Indian budget, which is very interesting, and solves the problem of inactivity by showing that Meadows’ numbers and means were inadequate to the object; and perhaps Mr. Holland may be able to solve the why and wherefore upon that head.

“I enclose to you a letter which will show you that I have not been idle, on my part, to an object which interests you for the future more than for the present. The 6,000*l.* for the house is too much, but you will remember that my mite will always be ready. Lady Camelford has written from Brussels to my wife that you probably have told us how *abundantly* you had reason to be *satisfied* before they left London; now as we have had no such communication from you, and as my wife does not yet understand how that is part of the Russian negotiation, she insists upon knowing this secret of *abundant satisfaction*; as yours cannot be more so than that which we both so warmly feel.

“As to your politics I will beg you occasionally to take pity upon me; but I will beg you most earnestly to consider very well (what cannot have escaped you) the difficulty of reconciling to the public feelings

the continuation of your armament, after Prussia has (in every *gazette* foreign and English) recalled her armament. You will see that I suppose that fact to be true; but it most certainly is believed, and gives room for conversation. Your congress at Sistova seems to end as you wish, but I fear that Russia will trifle with you till she can let loose upon you her Cicero and Demosthenes, *Karl Fox*. You have forgot to direct Bernard to send me the first data for my militia plan, which has occupied much of my thoughts."

EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 14, Spa.—"I am very much obliged to you for your kind letter relative to Henry. As I thought no time was to be lost I immediately sent for him from Brussels, and after having talked to him for some days on the subject of your letter, I think I can venture to say that there will be no risk in sending him either to the Hague or Berlin. I prefer the Hague if it should be equally convenient to you, because Lord Auckland is an acquaintance of my mother's, and because I think Lord H. Spencer's example might be very useful. I also happen to know Kempson, Lord Auckland's secretary. Henry will be ready to leave Brussels at the end of this month, if you can give him his letters by that time. I do not know whether you would choose to have them delivered by him, or whether you mean to send them yourself; at all events, I must beg you either to write or cause to be written as soon as possible, a few lines just to let me know whether you approve of the Hague finally, and whether I may write to Kempson, and set about obtaining letters from the Duke of Marlborough to Lord H. Spencer. My only remaining difficulty is that, during my absence, my mother has put Henry into the Guards, and I am apprehensive that I may not be able to get his leave of absence so prolonged from time to time as to enable him to retain his commission with whatever employment he may have abroad. This is a very material point to him, as he is not the richest man in the world; perhaps you could give some information on this subject.

"Ryder has been here some time, and I think he begins to get better; he would get well if he would follow my advice and example, and not fatigue himself too much. I have been really delighted to hear from him and many others a detail of the circumstances and events of the last session in the House of Lords, which every fresh enquiry gives me new reason to think well of. The Bishop Episcopal is arrived with Monsieur Finearse Pet, a name which would have highly diverted the French, but Finearse has disguised it, and calls himself *Pitt*. His Lordship wears a tail, to Frank North's great amusement, who, I should have mentioned, is here. The Bishop has given me an account of the opinion of the Bench on the subject of the conduct of the last session.

"On the 12th we had a great dinner at Lord Cholmondeley's, to celebrate the day. The company was very large, and curiously mixed. The *Countess of Dublin* and the Duke of Wirtemberg, General Smyth, Captain O'Byrne, Monsieur Cambis *neveu d'Ambassade*, Frank North, Lord Hardwicke, and myself were of this party; the two last in the King's uniform. I continue so well here that I think I shall remain a month longer, especially as there are holidays at the Treasury. I have not yet settled whether I shall return by Paris or go directly to London; if I go to Paris it will not be for more than ten days.

"Have you read an Irish pamphlet signed *Jaques Bourreau*? I think

it is incomparably good ; and have you seen Paine's preface to the French translation of his *Rights of Man* ? It is the most impudent of all his productions.

"The Countess of Dublin publicly attributes the riots of Birmingham to Government ; her general language on all public subjects (on all of which she talks without ceasing) is hostile and indecent in the highest degree. I wish I could send you the particulars of some of her conversations ; she has already met with some severe rebukes."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, August 14, St. Leonard's Hill.—"Lord Grenville thinks it his duty to lose no time in transmitting to your Majesty the despatches from Messires Whitworth and Fawkener, which have been received by Mr. Lindsay, who is just arrived here. Lord Grenville cannot help adding that although the termination of the business is less favourable than might have been wished, yet that he trusts it will be generally thought that the terms offered to the Porte are highly advantageous to them, when considered with a view to the relative situation of the two parties, and to the recent successes of Russia."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 14, Windsor.—"The dispatches arrived from Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener, which I have just received from Lord Grenville, shew that the Turks (whose miserable conduct this campaign gives too much reason for it) would not have had so good terms offered by Russia had not England and Prussia interested themselves on this occasion ; this I trust, with no farther expence arising from the measure of keeping up the fleet till this time, will make this nation view the conduct that has been held in the most favourable light."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, August 15, Hague.—"I congratulate you sincerely on the satisfactory news which I now transmit from Sistove ; the successful close of that negotiation was become very material in many points of view. If there was any intention, under cover of the new friendship between Berlin and Vienna, to throw the Ministers of the maritime powers out of the business, that intention has failed ; and your Lordship's wish that the separate convention might be accomplished without inducing the delay and difficulties of an arbitration is fully gratified. Sir Robert Keith will now be able to return immediately to his post, where his weight and experience may be very material amidst the new events which seem to be preparing. This Austrian peace may possibly have the effect of encouraging the obstinacy of the Turks with respect to the terms offered by Russia. It appears, however, from many circumstances, that they are heartily sick of the war ; as indeed they ought to be.

"Lord Elgin is gone to Berlin ; he and Mr. Ewart have good ground of joint complaint, personally and politically, against Colonel Bishoffswerder, whose temerity and vanity and absurdity will produce more



mischief than poor Hertzberg, with all his activity of penmanship, was able to accomplish; more especially as the former possesses an unbounded influence over the mind of the King of Prussia.

*Confidential.*—"It appears in M. de Reede's letters, from the manner in which the Duke of York talks about the different negotiations, that his Royal Highness does not contribute to promote a right understanding between the Court of Berlin and his Majesty's Ministers. This new event, added to other obvious considerations, seems to me to give a fair ground for a new arrangement of that Mission."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Secret.

1791, August 15, Hague.—"As I have not yet seen a copy of the Prussian and Austrian Convention, I am unable to enter into any remarks respecting it. But it will not escape your Lordship's observation that this transaction took place before any news was received of the result of the Russian negotiation, and at a time when the Court of Berlin professed to be cordially satisfied with the conduct of Great Britain. I consider the whole affair in a point of view which I cannot explain in writing, without saying more than perhaps ought to be said. I have frequently intimated the extreme weakness of his Prussian Majesty's character; the ascendancy which M. de Bischoffswerder possesses over his mind; the vanity, levity, and chimerical rashness of the latter; the small dependence to be placed on an Administration strangely composed as to the individuals, disjointed and distracted under the influence of male and female favourites; and that consideration was at all times a strong objection, if there had been no other, to our committing ourselves in a momentous enterprise, the success of which might depend on a Government so constituted. It is farther evident that our position and interests at Berlin are greatly affected by another consideration to which I have repeatedly adverted in confidence. As it is very late, I will not risk the loss of the tide by pursuing this subject farther at present."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Secret.

1791, August 18, Hague.—"I write a very hasty line to congratulate you on the final completion of the Sistove business. I have no letters from England of a later date than the 12th instant. Mr. Lindsay was not then arrived; and I wait with impatience to learn your Lordship's sentiments of the new era which is opening to us.

"The Grand Pensionary would be personally much obliged to you for the confidence of the Prussian treaty with Vienna; he has received only a statement of the substance; he expects that the copy will speedily find its way to him from Berlin, but he does not choose to ask for it; and I think that your Lordship may find his sentiments upon it not uninteresting to you. His first impression on the imperfect knowledge which he has of the transaction is, that it ultimately tends to the interests of England infinitely more than to those of our inconsiderate ally. The French history, however, may produce troubles beyond all calculation. History shews that offensive leagues against a particular people have seldom succeeded; and for this obvious reason, that the party attacked immediately acquires an union of interests, and the attacking parties have adverse interests of every description.

"With respect to England, we conceive that it will be your Lordship's policy to remain quiet if possible, and to watch the course of the storm. Perhaps, however, the moment may come for England to express her sentiments in a state paper on the subject of France of a nature to form an epoch in history; perhaps even such a moment may be very near. If the King of Prussia throws himself, in the course of all this, into the arms of Austria, I have no doubt that he will be duped, and that, at the first occasion, Austria will leave him for England; but his puzzle, in the meantime, will be infinite with respect to this Republic, into which his sister and daughter are married. The Pensionary has only one serious uneasiness on the subject. He thinks it possible (though not probable) that in the course of the transaction, such exchanges of territory may be made as may envelope this Republic too much within the grasp of Austria.

"I will take another occasion to recur to these subjects."

"We understand that Monsieur de Mercy is gone to England; your Lordship will learn many curious matters from him. Very voluminous despatches are also gone to M. de Stadion."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCLAND.

Private.

1791, August 19, Whitehall.—"It is a great mortification to me to find myself so much hurried as to make it impossible for me to write to you more than a few lines to acknowledge your interesting and confidential correspondence for the last fortnight. With respect to the Petersburg business, it is *une affaire faite*, and I consider it is one of the first duties of my situation not to shift the blame of transactions which have not entirely succeeded on those who have acted honourably, and to the best of their judgment, in the execution of their instructions. To you, in full confidence, I will say, that there are points on which, reasoning at a distance from the spot, I could have wished they had acted otherwise; but I would not, on any account, say even as much as that where I thought it would be repeated; and, after all, much must be allowed for circumstances of situation of which we cannot judge. On the whole, I am rejoiced the thing is over, and perfectly convinced that every attempt at mending it would only have added to our embarrassment while it prolonged our expence.

"I hope to write to you next week about the commercial business. I am most puzzled about the East India article, on which I cannot help thinking that the Pensionary is under some misapprehension or misinformation of the present and past state of the trade from Bengal to the Molucca Islands. But I have not time to go into that subject now."

"It does not occur to me that there can be any objections to your leaving the Hague at the time you mention, and for the time you mention, unless any should arise from this said commercial negotiation, which, however, does not seem probable, as I guess our next answer will bring it to a point one way or other.

"There is a young man, a brother of Lord Mornington's, whom I wish to bring into the diplomatic line. But he is, as yet, almost too young even for a Secretary of Legation; and, besides, I think it would be better that he should get a little the habit of that sort of business before he is put into any situation. I have therefore desired him to fix himself at the Hague, and should be particularly obliged to you if you would, in some degree, take him under your protection, and employ

him, as far as you may find him fit to be employed, and put him in the way of rendering himself more so. I believe you will find him perfectly docile, and that he will conduct himself with propriety. At least I hope so, for his sake, for I have explained to him that it is only on those terms that he can have any idea of looking forward to that line. He will wait upon you when he comes to the Hague, which will be before the time you mention for leaving it. I have a long and sincere friendship for his brother, and should be very glad to be able to be of use to him, as his situation requires some addition to his profession. I hope therefore you will excuse the liberty I take of recommending him so particularly to your protection."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, August 19, Hague.—"The businesses mentioned in the first page of my dispatch of this date give serious trouble to the Dutch Ministers, who hitherto find it impossible to reconcile the contradictory pretensions of Holland and Guelderland; and the patriots in both provinces are glad of the occasion to foment a spirit of disunion.

"We have not yet had any accounts of the impression made in England by the arrangement with the Court of Petersburg. The public recollection of it will probably be much enfeebled before the meeting of Parliament. It may however furnish matter for one or two debates rather teasing to Government. But the resulting and permanent sentiment will be, that we have saved the Turkish Empire from the destruction with which it was menaced by the combination and superior force of the two Imperial Courts. It is rather late to commence such an enquiry; but I conceive that it might be of considerable use in the probable course of circumstances secretly to employ a proper person to go from Poland to Choezim; from thence to pursue the course of the Dniester to Bender; to ascertain the nature of the navigation; the existing, and probable, and possible commerce in the several articles of timber, grain, hemp, minerals. Afterwards from Bender to proceed to Akierman, with a due attention to the eastern banks; from Akierman, if it is a safe attempt, to look into the Liman and as far as Chersem; and then to proceed to Constantinople, and to return through the sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles to England. Captain Sydney Smyth is well suited to such an expedition; its whole expence might be reduced within 1,000*l.*; and if he had good instructions, and would execute them with discretion and minute fidelity, his report might be very important both at present and in future; nor would it be difficult, through our different Turkish connections, to obtain ample protection and facilities for him.

"Your Lordship probably has good accounts of the nature and extent of the disagreement between the Emperor and the King of Sardinia. It is believed here that such a disagreement exists, and their respective Ministers are withdrawn under a pretext of giving long leaves of absence on account of private affairs.

"I trust that the next mail will bring me your Lordship's sentiments on the subject of the commercial negotiation with this country, and that I shall also know your sentiments as to the properest time for making a short visit to England. Exclusive of my personal convenience, it would be very useful to me, in every public point of view, to have the

advantage of some communication with your Lordship in some better mode than by letter writing, previous to the opening of the new scenes and new fermentations which are about to take place upon the borders of France and in the different Courts of Europe.

"The following extracts are from M. de Reede's last secret letter.

*Berlin, le 13 Aout.*—"On a ouvert ici un credit pour M. de Calonne; le Baron de Rolle vient du recevoir un courier de Comte d'Artois. (Note.—We have accounts from Coblenz that both the Comte d'Artois and M. de Calonne were gone from there suddenly.)

"Quant aux menées entre M. de Bischoffwerder et le Cour de Vienne, je me trouve encore très imparfaitement instruit, et M. Ewart, quoiqu'il en sache apparemment plus que moi, ne sait pas tout. Il est question d'une convention déjà signée à Vienne, mais non ratifiée ici, quoiqu'elle y soit déjà arrivée. Celle-ci sera suivie d'une alliance qui, conclue, sera, dit-on, présentée à toutes les Puissances de l'Europe pour y accéder, si elles le veulent. Le fait est, que M. de Bischoffwerder, autrefois bon Anglois, et qui est un peu piqué de ce que l'Angleterre l'a planté dans cette dernière occasion, aidé de M. de Hoothenlo, a persuadé au Roi qu'il falloit s'attacher à l'Autriche, et consentir à jouer avec elle le second rôle. Ce sera là le principe de la belle alliance. Nous sommes hors de cours et de proies. Je crois que les nouveaux amis conviendront de quelques arrangemens relatifs à la Lusace et aux Margraviats; que, surtout, il sera question d'un partage ou indemnisation pour les affaires de France, et d'assurer l'intégrité de la Pologne. Enfin, le Roi est complètement dupe de tout ceci; pourtant la chose est très vraie, et nous ne tarderons pas d'en voir les bases, et les resultats. On se tue! pour empêcher ce secret de voyager à la Haye; on me le cache soigneusement; on l'aurait caché aussi à M. Ewart, et on ne lui a donné des éclaircissements que parceque Lord Elgin lui a fourni les premiers renseignements. Mais on ne lui a pas tout dit; et une note qu'il a présenté avant hier pour réclamer les assurances que le Roi lui avoit données de se tenir constamment au système, ne doit pas avoir été répondu d'une manière flatteuse. Voilà donc le grand système du Nord, et d'alliance qui s'écroule comme un château de cartes."

#### F. J. JACKSON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 19, Parliament Street.—"By a letter I received this day from Berlin, I find the King of Prussia has actually granted Baron Rolle a loan of 500,000 crowns, about 80,000*l.* sterling, with a promise of farther support on his return from Silesia. This your Lordship may depend upon as certain information, though the affair was transacted with the greatest secrecy, and Count Schulenburg pretends to be using all his endeavours to engage the King to put off the accomplishment of his promise, or to get the Emperor to guaranty the loan. But I will venture to say he will find insurmountable difficulty in carrying the first point, and I don't imagine he will (though I believe his endeavours will be more zealous) be more successful in the second.

"It should likewise appear that the intended allies have been in negotiation at Petersburg and Stockholm upon their new counter-revolution plan, and that the Empress and the King of Sweden have agreed to give between them 60,000 men upon the general crusade. My correspondent likewise informs me that it is not at all unlikely that His

Prussian Majesty will take M. de Heyman into his service. If anything can incline the Prussians to democratic ideas and principles, this will do it."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, August 23, Whitehall.—"I should have great pleasure in furnishing to the Grand Pensionary the communication which he desires of the convention signed at Vienna, both because I should be glad to shew a mark of attention to him personally, and because I shall be very desirous of knowing his sentiments on a subject so interesting to the two countries. But I will state to you exactly how I stand circumstanced. A copy of that convention has been communicated to me by the Court of Berlin, but with the express condition of my confining the communication of it to His Majesty and his confidential servants here. I have written to Berlin to complain of this mode of communication, which restrains me from instructing his Majesty's Ministers abroad on points of so much importance to the public interests; and to state that I shall be under the necessity of sending instructions on this subject both to you and to Sir Robert Keith. I might indeed perhaps be justified in doing so immediately, because M. Stadion was authorized to make a similar communication without any such reserve. But I imagine that you will think that it is better on such an occasion even to carry the delicacy too far than to give a pretext for withholding future communications. I feel, however, no difficulty in saying, that M. de Reede seems very well and very amply informed upon the subject. I shall have my answer from Berlin in the course of next week, and will then write to you more fully. I have directed Mr. Ewart not to go to Pilsnitz unless he is very strongly pressed, which he certainly will not be.

"The conclusion of the Sistovo business has removed every difficulty which there was in the way of our speaking out, and avowing our determination of the most scrupulous neutrality in the French business; and I now hold this language to all the Foreign Ministers in order that it may be clearly understood that we are no parties to any step the King of Prussia may take on this subject. I am uneasy about the Netherlands. Every information I have concurs to shew that the discontents there are gaining ground; and I have pretty strong grounds to believe that the discontented party will seize the first moment of the Emperor's interference in French affairs to raise their standard again, and to connect themselves openly and intimately with the National Assembly. This union of the Netherlands with France is the very thing that this country and the Republic have most to apprehend. If the Emperor's conduct had been wise, and if he had known how to avail himself of his own situation, the measures we had taken to prevent this union would have been successful. But as it is, I fear the game is no longer in our hands. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps fortunate for us that the Hague Convention was not ratified, and I think we shall do wisely to shew a great degree of reserve on that point at present. In all other respects it appears to me that the maritime powers may look with great indifference and security at the new scenes which are arising. Some of the principal powers of Europe seem not yet to have learnt that lesson which we have been taught by a severe experience, that no acquisition is worth the expence of conquering and maintaining it. If, while they are gaining this experience, they will

leave Great Britain and Holland to the undisturbed enjoyment of their external and *internal* tranquillity, I know not what more we can wish. Our only danger (to either of us) is at home, and for averting that danger peace and economy are our best resources; and with them I flatter myself *we* have not, and I hope Holland has not, much to fear. Excuse this long dissertation to which your last letter has given rise."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, August 23, Whitehall.—"I have just received the letter from Mr. Dundas which I forward to you by this mail. I have not time to write much upon it, but I conclude you will, of course, not give any assurance of that nature without official communication. I agree with Dundas in many of his ideas, but they do not seem to me to lead to his conclusion that your answer would be a safe one. I am persuaded we never can bring this question to a satisfactory issue till Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas, and myself have had the opportunity of talking it over fully with you. This opportunity I hope we shall soon have, and I should therefore be sorry the negotiation was finally broke off before you leave the Hague. I will write more fully on this subject on Friday."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 24, Hague.—"The enclosed, being the copy of a mere private letter, is proper to be transmitted only in that character. I do not know whether M. de Reede has got possession of the whole secret; I even greatly doubt whether the whole is known either to him or to Mr. Ewart, or perhaps even to M. de Schulemberg, even upon the statement here given. I cannot agree with M. de Reede in thinking it a transaction of small moment, when this transaction is coupled with the offensive treaty of alliance which was so lightly concluded with the Turks, and has since been so lightly evaded; and when we recollect that in last March the same packet-boat which carried M. de Hertzberg's reasonings, in the name of his Prussian Majesty, to shew that the war with Russia was not merely ruinous but impracticable, carried M. Bischoffswerder's paper, signed by his Prussian Majesty, to say that it was indispensable, and certain to be successful, it becomes difficult to retain the respect and confidence which ought to be retained for an ally and for a friend. Besides there are circumstances very offensive in this business. The instructions respectively given to Lord Elgin and to Colonel Bischoffswerder were communicated between the two Courts; and the joint negotiation was set afoot upon a principle of perfect mutuality: either therefore there was a separate instruction to Bischoffswerder which ought to have been communicated, or Bischoffswerder acted without instructions and ought to have been disavowed. I do not enter into the principle and substance of the measure, because I am not yet sure that I know the whole of it; but I have little doubt that his Prussian Majesty, fairly delivered into the hands of the Emperor, will to a certain point be led like a child; and will

not discover his *egarement* till it is too late to remedy it. I should mention that Comte Hohenloe, who is concerned in this business, is as violent an *illuminé* as Bischoffswerder, and that those absurdities are known, beyond a doubt, to have great weight; though Mr. Ewart and Mr. Jackson, who heretofore lived much in friendship with Colonel Bischoffswerder, will not perhaps allow it. M. de Reede, in another private letter, remarks that though M. de Schulemberg talks as if he disapproved Bischoffswerder's proceeding, they are in the present moment on the best terms possible with each other, and that the former is authorized to receive and open every letter addressed to the latter during his absence. I shall be curious to know the point of view in which your Lordship sees all this affair. It appears to me to give a furious shock to the alliance.

"I was very glad to see the ciphered dispatch from your Lordship to Sir Robert Ainslie; for there is every reason to suspect that the Prussian Ministers at the Porte will pretend that their sovereign is for the moment forcibly restrained by Great Britain, and will privately encourage the Turks to persevere in the war. This suspicion is strengthened by a private letter which the Grand Pensionary has received from M. de Renfuér, desiring his assistance towards promoting a loan for the Turks at Amsterdam, to be reimbursed by cargoes of merchandise at stipulated periods. The Pensionary drily answered that such matters were out of his sphere of action.

"There is the following paragraph in another of M. de Reede's letters. *Une compagnie d'artillerie à cheval revenu de la Prusse, avoit vendu de ses chevaux et comptait rentrer sur l'état de paix; elle vient d'avoir ordre de se compléter, et de se rester sur celui de guerre.*

"300 horses are going from this place (they are in part gone) to Coblenz, purchased under an agreement signed between the horse-dealer and Monsieur and the Comte d'Artois.

"It is now said that Comte d'Artois is gone to Vienna and not to Berlin; but your Lordship will have the best intelligence on this and on many other subjects from M. de Mercy; whose authority is good except when he sees, or thinks that he sees, an interest for his Court in changing or disguising the truth. In that case he is more artificial and less scrupulous than any man that I have ever met with; and unhappily he is very often in that case.

"A question is privately discussing here as to the expediency of renewing the treaty with the Brunswic troops; so far as I can influence the decision, I encourage the renewal of the treaty; which, I take the occasion to remark, is said to be on much better terms than ours with Hesse Cassel, and yet that they are both said to be on very unreasonable terms. I should be very unwilling to be quoted for this remark to General Faucitt, but it may deserve a moment's attention in finally discussing the question as to the renewal of the Hessian subsidy.

"I have availed myself of your Lordship's encouragement to address myself officially to you for a leave of absence. I flatter myself that by the mail which sails this day I shall receive your final instructions on the subject of the commercial treaty. It will be an object of considerable importance if that business can be successfully concluded. It will be a convenience to me to receive soon your Lordship's answer as to my leave of absence, on account of the many arrangements which I am previously obliged to make.

"I see that a Minister is naming to North America. It always appears to me an object of great consequence to adjust in North

America some counterbalance to the Russian commerce in such of the naval articles as can be produced either in our own colonies or in the United States."

*Enclosure.*

[M. DE REEDE à M. VAN DE SPIEGEL.]

*Extrait.*

1791, le 16 Aout, Berlin.—"La convention dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler, et qui est déjà signée, renferme cinq articles.

"Le premier . . . annonce que celui-ci est défensif. Dans le second, on se promet . . . les secours pour s'assurer mutuellement. Le troisième est un engagement, plus particulier, relatif aux circonstances présentes de la garantie, le forme de gouvernement, et de se secourir dans tous les cas de revolte intérieure. *Nota Bene.*—On a fait observer au Roi qu'il ne devoit pas perdre de vue la convention de la Haye, relativement aux Belges, et qui si ceux-ci venoient à se revolter, si l'Empereur enfreignoit la capitulation faite à eux, le Roi qui l'avoit moyennée, pourroit se trouver dans l'embarras de faire accorder ses engagements, pris dans ce troisième article, avec ceux qu'il a comme partie de la convention de la Haye. Cette observation a paru juste, et sa Majesté a dit qu'il n'y avoit qu'à excepter les Pays Bas."

"Dans le quatrième article on assure l'intégrité de l'alliance, et celle de la Pologne, et on rappelle le traité de Hubertsbourg et de Teschen. Par des articles secrets on établit que dans le cas d'extinction de la Maison de Saxe, actuellement régnante, la Lusace ne pourra jamais être réunie à l'Autriche. . . Ensuite, que la couronne de Pologne ne passera point à un Prince de la Maison d'Autriche ou de Prusse. M. Ewart, qui continue de me faire un secret de ces articles, en est piqué, mais je ne vois pas qu'ils renferment rien de bien alarmant."

"Le dernier courier du Comte d'Artois à M. de Rolle étoit pour demander au Roi qu'il pût assister à Pilnitz. Le Roi a répondu que, n'étant pas chez lui, il ne pouvoit dire ni oui ni non."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

*Private.*

1791, August 25, Whitehall.—"I am to acknowledge the receipt of your private letter of the 4th instant, relative to the state of your private affairs. With respect to the sum of 840*l.* which you mention, there will be no difficulty in its being allowed on your transmitting to the office an application for it in the usual form, under the head of extra-extraordinaries.

"Any increase of the permanent allowance of the station in which you now serve would be attended with so much difficulty that I see little probability of my being able to hold out any expectation of that sort. In the present moment it would be utterly impossible to do it.

"I have mentioned to Mr. Pitt that part of your letter which relates to a provision being made for Mrs. Ewart in the event of your death. I trust that event is far from being likely to happen soon, but, in that case, Mr. Pitt has authorised me to say that he certainly should feel it right to recommend Mrs. Ewart to His Majesty for a pension.

"I desired Mr. Jackson to write to you respecting your own views. His account of the state of your health is such that it appears very doubtful whether even the leave of absence which you solicit would



enable you to resume your post at Berlin without great risk of your suffering again from the climate. On the other hand, you must, I am sure, feel how prejudicial it must be to the King's affairs at Berlin, particularly under all the circumstances which appear likely to arise, if a considerable time were to elapse without His Majesty's having a Minister there of proper rank and experience. It appears, therefore, better for me to speak to you with openness on the subject, and that without any further delay. I had an arrangement in contemplation which would have enabled me to offer you one of the Italian Courts. If I should find it impossible to bring this to bear, and I see more difficulty in it than I did, I certainly never should think of proposing to you to quit your present situation, without having at the same time His Majesty's permission to offer you such provision as might be in some degree adequate to the rank you have held in the King's service, and to the sense which I entertain of the services you have rendered in that station. But I am also persuaded that you are equally incapable of wishing to retain that station, if the circumstances should be such as that your continuance in it could no longer be advantageous to His Majesty's service, at a place where it is so important that His Majesty should have a person on the spot, equal in point of health, as well as in every other respect, to the discharge of the duties of it. I should therefore be glad if you would write to me without reserve upon the subject, and it certainly will be my sincere desire to consult your wishes in every arrangement in which you may be at all concerned.

"With respect to the allowance to be made you for extraordinary expenses on the occasion of the Duke of York's marriage, I shall endeavour to inform myself of what has been done in similar instances. But as His Majesty has not yet signified to me His pleasure as to the time when the marriage is to take place, I am unable to judge whether this event may probably happen at the time when you may be still at Berlin."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ST. HELENS.

1791, August 26, Whitehall.—"I return by your servant a much greater and more difficult piece of work than you probably expected. I cannot say that I am very sanguine in the hopes of success, but there was no possibility of resisting what was urged on the subject of our commercial grievances, and of the prodigious clamour that we should have raised against us here, if we had appeared, by concluding the alliance separately, or even with only the general article, to acquiesce in all the infractions of the former treaties. I send you an extract of a dissertation on the subject which was drawn up on this occasion. The extract contains the facts; the inference is sufficiently manifest, and formed the remainder of the paper. The catalogue of complaints is certainly a formidable one, and how we should have stood it I do not know, if, after all, we had signed the alliance, and Spain had afterwards, as probably she would, refused to hear reason about the commerce.

"I am sorry for the necessity we are under, because the re-establishing our union with Spain has always been a very favourite idea with me. If the commercial stumbling-block was out of the way, I should hope the other point would not make much difficulty, and that the real object of Spain would as well be answered by our articles of amity as by stipulations for mutual succour, which could only serve as

plausible grounds of objection to the measure in present, and which, when the occasions arise, would be executed or not exactly according to the views of the two Courts at the time.

"The sending M. Las Heras at last, without any instructions, is really abominable; and would be reason enough, if we were so disposed, to refuse to hear of alliance or anything else. It is hard that this should be added to the long list of crimes I shall have to answer for in the untoward events of the last six months, but I must arm myself with patience, as you used, when the King's illness was reason enough to prove Lord Buckingham and you guilty of all the abominations imaginable. I shall have much the same degree of guilt in this business, and yet I do not know how it will be possible for me to make a plausible excuse. And so goes the world.

"If I was not, fortunately for you, hurried this evening, you would have more of this political morality, of which I have instances enough every day. Relieve me, at least, from one occasion more of applying it, and make these slow Spaniards send instructions and powers, and above all liberty to refer the matter to arbitration, by which the Ministers of both Courts will get it off their hands. If you can do still more, and persuade them to receive duties upon our manufactures, instead of paying an army not to prevent their being smuggled, *eris mihi magnus Apollo*. But that, I fear, is a trait of wisdom far beyond their comprehension, at least if we are to judge by the good sense of their late edicts about strangers, which, in point of political sagacity, are about contemporary with the days of our Edwards and Henrys.

*Postscript.*—"The Emperor certainly appears in earnest in his design of interfering in the affairs of France, and it seems as if he would be supported from other quarters. All I fear is that the armies which go to France to prevent this infection from spreading, will catch it themselves, and circulate it all over Europe. But the speculation is so wide a one that it is hardly possible to conjecture what the result will be."

*Copy.*

#### EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 26th, Paris.—"Although I don't think that the manner of distributing incendiary papers, as mentioned in the inclosed letter, would be extremely efficacious, yet I look upon it as my duty to send it for your information. I shall not be surprised if I receive your instructions to deliver to Monsieur Montmorin the same paper that the Marquis de Noailles delivered to our Court, changing *Etats-unis* for *St. Dominique*. I desire my best compliments to Mr. Pitt."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, August 26, Whitehall.—"I am persuaded that we might, though reluctantly, conclude upon the article of the commercial treaty respecting the navigation in time of war, if this business of the 6th article of the peace was not one of great and increasing difficulty. Pray let me know by the earliest possible opportunity whether you think it possible to suspend the thing with a tolerable good grace till your return to the Hague; or, at least, till we have had the means of conversing upon it; for I despair of settling it by writing.

"The Vienna convention is ratified. We have thought it infinitely the best way to take the thing with a good grace, keeping ourselves out of the complicated difficulties into which His Prussian Majesty is plunging himself. What I mentioned to you about the Netherlands in my last letter is continually striking me with fresh anxiety. It would, I fear, be very difficult to prevent the flame from spreading to Holland. If it did, France would play the same game there as in the Netherlands. We must interfere, and what a scene does that open? The utmost attention is, I am persuaded, given at the Hague to these circumstances, but they cannot be too much attended to.

"We have not renewed our Hessian subsidy. We could have no inducement to incur such an expense, but with a view to Holland; and, notwithstanding all the reports that reach me, I have heard nothing officially of any serious danger there; and from that circumstance I am inclined to hope that other reports are exaggerated.

"I have already written to you about the time of your coming over here. I should be glad to know the precise day, as I have an idea of being absent from town for some weeks."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 27, Hague.—"I have received your letters of the 23rd, and feel the full force of what you say on the subject of the Vienna convention. Your Lordship's farther remarks on our position and relative interests with respect to the interference of foreign powers in the French business are so consonant to the best judgment that I can form, and carry such conviction to my mind, that I have perused them with extreme pleasure. I thought myself at liberty to confide to our friend the Grand Pensionary the King of Sweden's letter and His Majesty's answer, and I enclose the note which I received from him in consequence. There is something very laughable in that phrase of the Swedish letter which speaks *d'une sorte de similitude dans nos positions réciproques*. As to the proposed crusade against France, I suspect that it will halt grievously in the execution; but great activity is using to bring forwards the armed interposition of the whole Continent; Spain, Savoy, Switzerland, the German Princes, and the Austrian Netherlands are to attack the frontiers on every side; the Emperor and the King of Prussia are to send 120,000 men; and the Empress of Russia and the King of Sweden two fleets and two armies. In the meantime the autumn is begun, and winter, the great truce-maker, is approaching.

"What your Lordship mentions concerning the probability of a new revolt of the Austrian Netherlands is more immediately interesting to us. It may happen even without drawing off the troops to other services, if they are not soon in part changed for new corps. Thus far the whole of the Emperor's conduct has appeared to me that of an artificial schemer, possessing neither wisdom nor scruples. I shall be glad to find that this opinion is injurious, because he possesses the means of bringing much calamity upon the age in which we live.

"The Prussian Cabinet means to propose to us to recur to the idea of an unilateral guaranty to the Turks upon the conclusion of their peace with Russia; M. Bilsinger has already mentioned it to the Grand Pensionary. The same person has also, in the strictest confidence, shewn to me a letter from M. de Schulemberg, to say that whatever

indisposition may have taken place at Berlin with respect to England, and whatever may have been done elsewhere that may seem to shake the alliance, he (Schulemberg) remains firmly attached to it. The rest of his letter contains reasons for transmitting everything through M. de Redern, and for communicating as little as possible with Mr. Ewart. It is superfluous, however, to enter farther on this subject, as I understand that Mr. Ewart is very desirous, on account of health and of every other consideration, to quit that scene. Your Lordship will learn the particulars from Lord Elgin, who leaves this place to-night.

"Whatever may become of the alliance, I sincerely wish for your sake, as well as for that of the public service, that your Lordship may be able to find a successor for the post of Berlin possessing zeal and activity, together with due weight, and dignity, and conciliation, and discretion. It is of great importance to the right discharge of your Lordship's measures and to their effect in Europe that the Ministers employed at Vienna, at the Hague, and at Berlin, should have a right understanding and proper confidence with each other; and this strikes me very strongly on the perusal of two jaundiced and peevish despatches which I forward to you by this mail.

"The anecdote of the present made to Mr. Adair is excellent, and will have a most wholesome impression in the course of some of the debates at the opening of the Session.

"I will write on the subject of Mr. Dundas's letter by the next mail. I am very solicitous to hear from your Lordship on the subject of the three first articles of the *projet*; and am not without hopes that I shall have that advantage by the mail which leaves Harwich to-day."

*Enclosed.*

VAN DE SPIEGEL TO LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, le 25 Aout [Hague].—"Je reconnois avec gratitude l'effet de votre confiance dans la communication des papiers intéressants, que j'ai l'honneur de vous restituer. La reponse du Roi d'Angleterre porte l'empreinte de la sagesse, de la dignité, et de la loyauté la plus complete. J'ai remarqué que sa Majesté a laissé tomber le parallele que sa Majesté Suedoise sembloit tirer entre les deux positions reciproques; aussi le contraste de la demande et de la reponse sert suffisamment de preuve que *omne simile claudicat*.

"Je suis tout à fait glorieux de me recontrer avec Lord Grenville dans la manière de voir et de juger les nouvelles scènes qui se préparent; il y a long tems que j'avois consigné ma façon de penser à ce sujet dans un memoire, que je vous communiquerois s'il n'étoit pas en Hollandois; mais j'ose vous assurer qu'il est pleinement conforme à l'opinion du digne et sage Ministre, dont j'ambitionne le suffrage et l'estime."

*French.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 28, Wotton.—"I have been here for the last four days, and, as usual, find myself more at home than at any other place; but I leave it very soon for the delights of copper-sales. My brother Tom has agreed to meet me at Woodstock, and to make the western tour with me, by which arrangement it is possible that we may bear up your quarters at Weymouth. (*A propos*, let me know

by line directed to me under a cover to R. Camplin, at Stowey, Bridgewater, the day of your departure for Weymouth, that I may order game for you from Eastbury) and after that we shall return home by Neville's; but it is possible that we may stretch from Doddington to Castle-hill before we return to Dorset.

"As to your purchase, it is impossible to think of it as a money transaction, for, in that point of view, it cannot be entertained. But I think you fully justified to yourself in determining to pay largely (on the scale of your property) for your comfort; and it should seem impossible, if you determine to pay 2,000*l.* for the *place and for your comfort* over and above the 2,000*l.* which you allow me to add to the same object, that the remaining part of the purchase money can be very ill laid out; though I think that it probably will not be *very advantageously* expended. Still, however, if the purchase pays you 3½ per cent. for your money, it cannot be said to be a very ruinous undertaking. You have now more of the data before you than I have, but the whole information is too imperfect to build upon. If, however, you wish to proceed, I think you cannot do better than to direct Frogatt, who lives within four miles of it, to call, *dans toutes les formes*, for the particulars of acres, rent, timber, and purchase money; and for the particulars of the title, which, you remember, has been doubted, and seems slippery. Your name need not be mentioned; but it should be clearly known whether Frogatt is to have the refusal of the estate upon the terms demanded, as it is not unusual to attempt a paltry trick if care is not taken. As soon as this is done, I will send Parrott to view it for you, and the final decision may then be made.

"*I have collected* that your peace is most ignominious, being less advantageous than what was offered in February, and that the King of Prussia publicly disclaims any share in the original interference, or in the subsequent management. You will, however, be amused to know *de science certaine* that the Prince of Wales has been asked whether he means to marry, and has answered that, as he expects to find in the Duchess of York the affection, society, and attentions which alone could induce him to marry, so he shall be less likely to look elsewhere for those essentials to his happiness, unless he should be so unfortunate as to be disappointed in these particulars either from his brother or the Duchess. This singular question and answer my informer tells me he knows actually to have passed; my only reason for doubting is built upon the good sense of the answer."

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 29, Berlin.—"I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's private letter of the 19th, and having communicated its contents to the Duke of York, His Royal Highness has again desired me to express to your Lordship how sensible he is of all your obliging attention.

"Permit me to beg your acceptance of my grateful acknowledgments for the favourable dispositions you have had the goodness to mention to Mr. Jackson with respect to my prospects. I only wait for your Lordship's answer to the letter I took the liberty of writing to you on this subject, to express my sentiments more fully. In the meantime, as the season is so far advanced, the climate here so bad, and my health so very indifferent, may I entreat your Lordship to enable me to quit this place by the middle of October."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, August 31, Hague.—“Major passed through this place on the 28th, with your Lordship’s despatches of the 26th to Mr. Ewart; it appears to me that the considerations detailed in those despatches are as perfect as possible with respect to the circumstance in question. At the same time, it is impossible not to feel, to private conviction, that the alliance between Austria and Prussia suspends in a great degree the cordiality and, in some measure, the effect of our alliance with the latter. For example, there is an instruction to our Ministers to live in confidence and communication with the Prussian Ministers, who are now to have a similar instruction with regard to the Austrian Ministers, who are ordered to communicate fully with the Russian Ministers. There are some good remarks upon the subject in the enclosed letter from M. de Reede, but it will not be so easy as he supposes for the Prussian Government to recede from this inconsiderate step, which rather mortifies than surprises me, as it results naturally from the opinion which I have so long and so repeatedly expressed respecting the parties concerned. As to England, I confess that I cannot see any material cause to regret what has happened. It is better for us that, if the King of Prussia was determined to take this matter, he should take it without consulting us; we retain a perfect liberty as to its consequences, and also with respect to any separate connections which it may eventually become eligible to us to form. It is curious that Schulemberg on the 16th should have talked doubtfully with Mr. Ewart as to the ratification, though it now appears that the instrument for that purpose had been despatched from Berlin to Vienna on the 10th, and was notified to M. de Redern in Count Schulemberg’s dispatch of the 16th.

“I feel strongly with your Lordship the mischiefs which might ensue, if the conduct of the Austrian Government in the Netherlands should enable the malcontents to accomplish a new revolt upon French principles; but we do not here trace any *immediate* reason to apprehend such an event, and your Lordship will have had occasion to awaken Monsieur de Mercy’s alarms wholesomely respecting it.

“I hope that your Lordship will approve the commercial paper which I send in a dispatch of this date. I trust that it will not only suspend for the moment the business with a good grace, but I incline even to hope that it will produce an answer to enable us to complete the treaty whilst I am in England, in a manner conformable to your Lordship’s wishes, reserving the whole business of the Eastern seas, Trincomalé, the China trade . . . to some subsequent and separate discussion. The Grand Pensionary and the Greffier are contributing to this very cordially, and it will solidly unite the two countries if we can accomplish it.

“I hope by the next mail to receive officially from your Lordship His Majesty’s permission for my return to England. In the meantime, as I may in substance consider that permission as already given by your Lordship’s private letters, I am preparing, and hope to set out within a fortnight. As I go by Calais, subject to the delays of the equinox, I cannot expect to be less than a week upon the road. It is a great mortification to me (though I am glad of it for your sake) that you are going to absent yourself for some weeks. If your absence is likely to take place before the 20th September, I will do impossible things to arrive before that time.”

*Enclosures.*

A. W. VAN REEDE to [the GRAND PENSIONARY].

*Extrait.*

1791, le 23 Aout, Berlyn.—“Lord Elgin vient de passer. Nous attendons un second negociateur, M. Fawkener, qu'on dit plus content de sa besogne; mais à qui on ne decernera la couronne ici. Un troisième, le Sieur Adair, passa hier par cette ville, mais sans se faire voir à personne. C'est une circonstance assez plaisante que les gens de l'auberge l'ont cru fol, parceque il se promenoit à grands pas dans sa chambre, en repetant haut, *resterai-je, ou ne resterai-je pas?* Il a pris le dernier parti.”

*En chiffre.*—“M. Ewart a le projet de quitter cette mission; et il fait bien, tant pour sa santé que pour les affaires. M. de Bischoffswerder le rend responsable de tout ce qui est arrivé; quoique cela soit injuste, cela est vrai. Peut-être qu'un ministre patient, sage, et habile, pourra ramener les esprits. Ils sont cependant prodigieusement aigris contre l'Angleterre. L'empereur a su profiter d'un moment de crise et de fermentation, mais l'alliance est trop contre nature.”

“En attendant, on discutera à Pilnitz des mesures vigoureuses contre la France; et aussi il y sera question d'un dedommagement de fraix, et meme d'un démembrement.”

*Extrait, en chiffre.*

1791, le <sup>29 Juillet</sup>/<sub>9 Aout</sub> St. Petersburg.—“Je suis persuadé que cette Cour se melera des affaires de la France, si l'Angleterre en laisse faire.

“Potemkin ne tombera pas, quoique il n'ait pas autant de credit; il n'a pu renverser le favori; et meme les derniers jours de son depart, il lui a fait beaucoup d'avances, et lui a recommandé ses intérêts auprès de l'Imperatrice—Orlof est nul.”

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL GOWER at Paris.

*Private.*

1791, August 31, Whitehall.—“I have not much apprehension of the vessel freighted with libels; I have however taken the necessary steps that if any such cargo arrives, the person charged with it may pay for his folly.

“We are all extremely anxious for the event of the presentation of the French Constitution, though I am very fully persuaded that it will be accepted. You may rest assured that we have not the least thoughts of the retaliation you mention, and that we are fully persuaded that the islands in the West Indies are not worth to us one year of that invaluable tranquillity which we are now enjoying. Whether Spain would be quite so indifferent to the possession of the other half of St. Domingue I cannot say.

“I am very curious to see the statement of finance with which the Assembly are to close their labours. If it would not be giving you too much trouble, I should be extremely obliged to you to send me, for my private use, the different reports of the *Comité des Finances* which have been printed, supposing that they are still to be got.

“I beg my best respects to Lady Sutherland.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 2, Hague.—“Though the enclosed private letter from M. de Reede to the Grand Pensionary is somewhat long, it contains matters which may entitle it to your Lordship’s perusal. M. de Reede is susceptible of flattery, and M. de Schulemberg seems to have administered a considerable dose to him, by the operation of which he no longer sees that the Republic is slighted; or that the alliance is affected by the new engagements with the Emperor; or even that those engagements are likely to be followed by farther projects between the parties. It was remarked with some degree of wit by the Russian Minister here, on learning that his Prussian Majesty had ratified Colonel Bischoffswerder’s treaty, *Il faut avouer cependant, qu’il n’y a pas de Roi dans l’univers qui, dans le cours de quatre ans, a eu tant de femmes et tant d’alliances.* As to the wives, *ce n’est pas notre affaire; mais la liste des alliances est passablement longue; d’abord la Grande Bretagne et la Republique; la Suede; plusieurs princes d’Allemagne; la Porte; la Pologne; l’Empereur.* On se propose d’y ajouter la Russie et la Saxe. It is a good line in the *Misanthrope*; *l’ami du genre humain n’est pas le mien.*

“We are not sufficiently informed here respecting the circumstances of the Turkish pacification to form a judgment upon it. On the first perusal of the bulletin, it struck me that the Turks had obtained better terms for themselves than are included in the last note to our Plenipotentiaries; but I see, on reverting to that note, that the Empress expressed a readiness to grant the armistice in the event of the acceptance of what she calls *les bases du traité.* This transaction probably took place in consequence of your Lordship’s private recommendation through Sistove.”

“I hope to be ready to proceed towards Calais in about ten days. If the newspapers are to be depended on, your Lordship and Mr. Pitt will be absent from the neighbourhood of London till the beginning of October.”

*Enclosure.*

A. W. VAN REEDE [to VAN DE SPIEGEL].

1791, le 27 Aout, Berlin.—“La société de Pilnitz sera plus nombreuse qu’on ne l’avoit crue . . . le Comte d’Artois et M. de Bouillé ayant été invités de s’y rendre . . . l’Empereur . . . a jugé à propos de mener M. de Lascey avec lui . . . pour concerter les opérations militaires. On veut ici que le Roi ait absolument ignoré ce projet; que sa Majesté eut, sans cela, pris le General de Mollendorff avec elle. Au défaut de celui-ci, c’est le Prince de Hohenlohe qui accompagne le Roi. Il est très en faveur, et grand ami de M. de Bischoffswerder. Si Messieurs les Francois sont d’accord entr’eux, ce dont je doute, les raisonnables disent qu’une contre-revolution est aussi impossible, qu’il est aisé d’effectuer une coalition raisonnable; que tout le monde est contre l’ancien régime; et sur cent personnes quatre vingt dix contre l’actuel; mais que les sept-huitiemes de la nation demandent une constitution : qu’en le promettant par un manifeste soutenu de troupes, on réussira très facilement, et sera reçu à bras ouverts.”



*En chiffre.*

"Depuis la reception de votre lettre du 18, j'ai eu deux conversations . avec M. de Schulemberg, qui m'assure . que quoique depuis le depart du Roi, il n'avoit point eu de ses nouvelles, et qu'il ne fut pas informé positivement des engagemens qui seroient pris à Pilnitz . qu'il n'étoit question d'aucune échange d'états entre le Roi et l'Empereur . qu'il ne se cachoit pas être contraire à tout ce que se faisoit avec l'Empereur, et même n'en être qu'imparfaitement instruit, mais . qu'il ne s'agissoit que des affaires de France, relativement aux quelles il craignoit . qu'on ne prit des engagemens trop positifs; qu'il n'avoit pas negligé au depart du Roi de le prevenir contre l'Empereur. Il m'assure être décidé, ainsi que M. d'Alvensleben, à maintenir le systeme d'alliance avec nous et l'Angleterre. . Ainsi je crois . nous pourrions être tranquils sur l'article d'échange qu'on a confondu avec ce que je vous ai mandé . sur Juliers et Bergue, qui dans le cas d'un démembrement de la France, devoient revenir au Roi; projet qui peut bien encore exister, depuis que . le Prince de Hohenlohe qui en a été le createur, accompagne le Roi à Pilnitz. M. de Bischoffswerder, depuis son retour, s'explique fort librement sur le compte de l'Empereur, le representant comme un Prince faux et faible. Comment, après cela, expliquer les démarches qu'il conseille à son maître? Le mot d'énigme est pour moi que ce n'est point un système, mais qu'on peut faire des sottises qui, n'étant pas les suites d'un plan arrêté, ne seront pas d'une grande conséquence; ainsi je crois tout ceci une simple intrigue de Cour. Le Prince de Hohenlohe est aussi ambitieux qu'il est miné; pour satisfaire ses besoins, il faut le mettre à la tête d'un corps. Les affaires de France présentent une occasion trop favorable pour la negliger . Pour l'exécution de tout ceci il falloit que la paix fût assurée, et que le Roi eut l'apparence d'être à merveille avec l'Empereur. Voila . l'explication d'une negociation qui, dans les premiers tems, m'a fort inquiété, mais que je ne crois plus dangereuse."

*French. Copy.*

## JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, September 2, Berlin. — "I lose not a moment in entreating your Lordship to accept of my grateful thanks for your obliging private letter of the 25th ultimo, which I shall answer fully by the return of Major; and I only beg leave to mention at present that my ideas coincide perfectly with your Lordship's respecting the principal point.

"The Duke of York is extremely distressed at not having received any positive accounts relative to the time his marriage may take place. I acquainted your Lordship in a former letter that the King of Prussia is very desirous the ceremony should be performed in a few days before that of the Prince of Orange, for different reasons, and among others that, by this means, much trouble and expense would be avoided. I know that his Prussian Majesty is extremely impatient at the delay, which circumstance tends much to increase the Duke's uneasiness; and it is at the desire of His Royal Highness that I state these particulars to your Lordship, though I have repeatedly explained your situation in regard to business of this nature."

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 4, Spa.—“I write a few lines merely to let you know that I delivered your letter safely to Lord Camelford; he is since gone towards Italy. Henry set off for the Hague last Sunday, and I hope is arrived some days; he was not to write to me before he had looked a little about him.

“A most alarming report of an event in England has been circulated here; the quarter from whence it comes bears the name of *Dublin*; the post having missed last night, we are left in uncertainty. You may guess the nature of the report, when I tell you that the event supposed is the most dreadful, excepting one, which could happen to the country.”

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 4, Wimbledon.—“I received your letter last night. It accidentally happens that I have already had occasion to advert to both the subjects of your letter. Sir John Parnell called upon me yesterday forenoon at this place in return to my leaving my name at his door, and sending to him an invitation to dine with me to-day. I did the same to the Archbishop of Cashell. Sir John’s visit was a short one, but our conversation turned almost solely upon the Roman Catholics of Ireland. He seems to think that nothing mischievous is to be dreaded from the Catholics in consequence of the principles resulting from the French Revolution, for that they are in general bigotted, and are, of course, sensibly affected by the outrages committed against the clergy of France.

“So impressed a publication of the nature you describe will certainly meet their feelings, and rivet them in the apprehensions under which they labour. I shall not fail to bring on with Hobart, and the Archbishop and Sir John Parnell, a discussion at large upon the subject of Ireland, and possess myself of their ideas upon the views and pretensions of the Catholics.

“With regard to Lord Elgin, I rather suspect Burges has officed on that chapter more than the circumstances justified; for, from his conversation with me on Friday when he came to Wimbledon, I do not think Lord Elgin has made up his mind to any exact point, and certainly has no anxiety to be abroad next winter. His wish certainly is to be employed in business. In that view he may naturally have thought of Berlin; in all other respects he seems to think it a disagreeable place to be resident at. From what the King told me of your views with regard to Brussels, I was led to sound him on that score. The opinion I formed was, that if it was not the dearth of business at that place, he would rather relish it from the circumstance of not preventing his attendance on Parliament. In short, although not very rich, he is easy in his circumstances; and would not, with a view to emolument only, wish for employment; but if he can be, creditably to himself, employed in the public service, it would give him pleasure to be so. He thinks himself perfectly safe in that respect in the hands of the present Government. He will never urge you to anything, nor will he ever bring forward any pretensions; but you will, at any time, find him ready to obey any call made upon the grounds I have stated. This I can take upon me to answer for as the real state of his mind, so that you can have no difficulty how to act upon it.

“Since writing the above Lord Elgin is come in, and I thought it best to read what I have wrote regarding him. He thanked me very earnestly for having so exactly delineated his sentiments.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 5, Whitehall.—“I send you a copy of a private letter I have thought right to write to Sir George Yonge in addition to my official one. I was induced to do it from feeling that such a corps is not likely to be popular at the War Office, and I am apprehensive that there may be difficulty in obtaining the draughts of a few soldiers to answer for non-commissioned officers. I explained fully to the King the utility and importance of this corps, and he was impressed with the propriety of it. My reason of writing is that, in case it should come in your way or he gives you an opening to it, you would encourage in him the sentiments I left with him, for if he refuses to allow the draughts for the non-commissioned officers I really do not see how the corps can get on at all. You need not urge the argument which weighs most with us, I mean the prospect of a reduction of the regular force to be grafted upon it. I am afraid if that feature of the measure is made too prominent, it would not decrease the difficulties at the War Office, or anywhere else.”

*Enclosing* copy of letter to the Secretary at War on the subject of an army corps for foreign service, to be employed permanently in Upper Canada.

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 7, Whitehall.—“I have just received a letter from Mr. Baring, and, as it is very pleasing, I send you a copy of it.

“As the country were bringing in provisions for Lord Cornwallis's army, and the defection from Tippe would probably encrease every hour, I still flatter myself, notwithstanding Lord Cornwallis's doubt, we shall hear of his possessing himself of Seringapatam before the rains. It is, however, of less moment, because we have now no reason to be apprehensive either of money or provisions, and we will have Seringapatam before the meeting of Parliament.”

*Enclosure.*

## F. BARING to HENRY DUNDAS.

1791, September 7, East India House.—“In addition to the numerous brilliant circumstances announced to the public, the advices relative to the finances are no less flattering.

“When Lord Cornwallis marched he took with him forty or fifty lacs of rupees in money.

“12 lacs remained in the Treasury of Madras when the *Hawke* sailed.

“40 lacs more were preparing at Bengal to be forwarded.

“Before these sums could be expended fifty lacs, or 500,000*l.*, sent from hence in silver last season, will have arrived.

“The Company's bonds at Madras have fallen from 18 to 10 per cent. discount.

“And the exchange on Bengal, which was 410 Arcot rupees for 100 pagodas, has been reduced to 365; [so] that I trust you will be as well satisfied with the Government at Madras as you have reason to be with the conduct of affairs in the field.

"My letters mention that when Moorhouse fell, General Medows stepped forward and helped to drag the gun which forced open the gate of the Pittah."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 7, Hague.—"The state of Europe is happily such that I cannot find any materials for a despatch. The Declaration signed at Pilnitz seems equally ill-conceived and undignified; but it may at least be inferred from it that no forcible interposition of foreign powers will at present take place with respect to France; and I see good ground to be pleased with that result, to which your Lordship's intimations with respect to the safety of the Austrian Flanders are said to have essentially contributed. The reasonings of the Pensionary's paper on the whole of this subject appeared to me solid and unanswerable.

"The Dutch are encouraged by the high price of our funds to sell out to a considerable amount for the sake of placing their money with other countries, and in the East India loans of the Dutch Company, at higher interest. There is no harm in this; we have more money in England than we want, and shall have a permanent benefit in diminishing our debt to foreigners.

"The commercial negotiation with this country will be suspended exactly as your Lordship wished, without offence here; my proposition to separate the question of the Eastern seas from the other discussions gives the fairest pretext for delay; and it is possible that this proposition may ultimately be accepted, though the patriots at Amsterdam are doing everything possible to embarrass it. There is a curious set of papers in your Lordship's office on the subject of the Eastern seas, one of which I have found in the document of the States General; it is a representation delivered by Lord Sandwich, 17th June 1748; if your Lordship will have the goodness to order copies of the whole of those papers, they may be material to us.

"When the Dutch, in their proposition as to the 2nd article, desire to participate in whatever relaxations may hereafter be made to other nations, they cannot mean to extend that to the Russian treaty, where the relaxation is upon a different principle, and is also the continuance in some sort of an old treaty."

*Secret.*—"Caillard, the French *Chargé d'Affaires*, has written a letter to M. de Montmorin, on the occasion of my leave of absence, in which, with great malignancy, he describes this mission as a vice-royalty, and the Republic as an English province, and the Stadtholder as a *commis* of the vice-Roy. The Grand Pensionary, who confides these papers to me, has sense enough to laugh at them; but they affect the feelings of the other personage.

"We hope to set out in the beginning of next week."

THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 7, Dublin Castle.—"In consequence of your private communication of his Majesty's pleasure, I have recommended Major Bowes of 64th to succeed Colonel Kay in the majority of 12th. Major Montgomery sends a memorial, nothing new or justificatory.

"Mrs. Davie, widow of Mr. Joseph Davie, late vice-consul at Corunna, has desired me to remind you of her case, and I should be obliged to you for attention to her. Her husband was twelve years vice-consul at Corunna, and died last December. She states that the Duke of Leeds promised her a pension, and that the Duke had obtained a promise of a similar nature from you; but as she has heard nothing lately and the vice-consul died in great distress, she is much alarmed and pinched for want.

"What a terrible cabal we have had about the Adjutant General? I had always apprehension that the unprovoked epistle of General Pitt had some deep laid plot at bottom. Did you find any trace whilst you was in office?

"We got over 14th of July more peaceably than you did in England; so much, for once, for the honour of Ireland. Accept my congratulations on the success of your negotiations in the north."

#### JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 8, Berlin.—"Agreeably to your Lordship's desire, expressed in your friendly letter of the 25th August, I shall write to you, without reserve, on the subject of my private affairs. From the state of my health, and some other circumstances, I am convinced it would be most advisable that I should quit my station here. As your Lordship seems to have no objections to my leaving this place next month, which I am very desirous of doing as early as possible on account of my health and the advanced season of the year, and as I could not arrange my affairs before that time, I should wish to have my recall postponed till next spring. Mr. Jackson's return would, I presume, prevent this delay from being attended with any inconvenience, but I submit this and everything else to your decision.

"With regard to the alternative your Lordship has the goodness to propose to me, between a southern mission and a pension, I should prefer the latter under certain circumstances, and especially with a reversion to Mrs. Ewart. As I feel a great reluctance to make any specific request on this head, I beg leave to refer your Lordship to Mr. Jackson, particularly as he has mentioned to me a supposition which, if realized, would make me completely happy and fill me with the most heartfelt gratitude. After the obliging manner in which your Lordship has been pleased to express yourself on this subject, I should think it a great indiscretion to trouble you with a recapitulation of the services which it may have been my lot to render, and I rely entirely on your friendship. Permit me only to observe that your predecessor conveyed to me, in the King's name as well as his own, the strongest testimonies of approbation and assurances of favour on various occasions. Allow me to add that my constitution has been so much impaired, solely, I believe, by the anxious and laborious life I have led here, especially for the last five years, that it seems doubtful if I can ever expect a complete recovery, and I have been frequently threatened with immediate death. Your Lordship knows I was obliged to watch, day and night, the inconsistencies of this fluctuating Government, and I trust you will have the goodness to recollect the principal results. With regard to my extraordinary expenses, I take the liberty of enclosing the copy of a note I gave to Mr. Pitt before your Lordship came into office.

"I mentioned in a former letter that my journey hither from London, in which I sacrificed everything to expedition, and the expenses I have been put to on account of the Duke of York's stay here, have very considerably surpassed my appointments for the last four months. But should I be allowed the sum Mr. Jackson alluded to in his last letter, in consequence of a conversation with your Lordship, for the Duke of York's marriage, I should endeavour to regulate my expenses accordingly. Your Lordship would oblige me much by making my extraordinary allowance be paid soon, as I am much in debt to my banker.

"I have only to add that, should I recover my health, I should be happy to receive the commands of His Majesty and his Ministers, whenever it might be thought that my services could be of any use."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 9, London.—"I think it right to send you the enclosed letter from Colonel Simcoe, understanding that Sir George Yonge is to be at Weymouth in two days, so that you will have an opportunity of conversing with him on the subject of Colonel Simcoe. What depends on me is done respecting that government. In case, however, you should take occasion to show the letter to the King, which is probably what Colonel Simcoe wishes, it is right to apprise you that when his Majesty mentioned to me his negative to the rank of Brigadier-General, he did not put it on the circumstance of Prince Edward, but as a general military question; and although I may guess that to have been one of his Majesty's reasons, I doubt much if Simcoe has authority enough to state that, unless he was told so by Sir William Fawcitt. As to the promise which he mentions, you know how that stands, as it was before my intercourse with him began."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 10, Hague.—"The calm of politics is equally sudden and complete, and, if it continues, Lord H. Spencer will with difficulty find matter for a dispatch.

"Exclusive of the paragraph sent in my official letter of this date as a Berlin extract, there is the following:—

*"Je puis me tromper; mais d'après ma connoissance des personnages et du tout ensemble, je doute beaucoup qu'il se soit fait ou fasse quelque chose d'essentiel entre le Roi et l'Empereur; d'autant que Bischoffswerder a dit à ses filles, qui l'ont répété à tout le monde, son opinion sur l'Empereur, qu'il donne pour un ASSEZ BON HOMME MAIS TRÈS FOIBLE; opinion qu'il fait publier, je suppose, pour détruire l'accusation qu'il vient d'être dupe de ce Prince. Cela seroit assez insignifiant, s'il n'en resuetoit que si M. de Bischoffswerder veut faire cultiver à son maître des relations vraiment intimes avec l'Empereur, et en être l'agent, il seroit peu convenable de tenir de pareils propos."*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ST. HELENS.

Private. Cipher.

1791, September 12th, Weymouth.—"It is really become absolutely necessary to bring that business to a point, and to do so before we disarm. Some impertinent expressions of Del Campo's upon the subject,

expressing the determination of his Court to do nothing upon it, have been stated to me by some of the people concerned, as having been used by him publicly at his table. Whether this is true or not, the effect is the same in present on these people, and you will judge what it will be on the public when they come to repeat their story, as they certainly will do, if they are not soon satisfied. I need hardly state to you the folly of such a conduct, which only tends to make our task more difficult in doing what we have always been disposed to do, to moderate the demands of Mr. Meares and his associates, and confine them within reasonable limits. I attribute much of it to the mischievous and tricking disposition of Del Campo, and was therefore rejoiced when I found the negotiation was to be taken out of his hands. But I apprehend this very circumstance has made him more jealous on the subject, and more desirous of obstructing the conclusion of it. If we cannot succeed in obtaining a full, express, and conclusive agreement on both sides to abide by some fixed mode of arbitration, you may depend upon it that we shall have some serious difficulty on the subject before it ends, and that the two countries may perhaps be again put to the necessity of arming, which would be at least as inconvenient, I apprehend, to Spain as to us, though we should certainly much wish to avoid it. But, if the case occurs, it is evident that we should have no alternative. I have said nothing of all this in my public dispatch, which is written so as that you may, if you think it necessary, shew it to Count Florida Blanca; because I was determined to delay to the last saying anything that could have the appearance of menace; but surely these considerations might afford you, in conversation, such arguments as could not but be successful."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 12, Hague.—"I send the enclosed extracts from some official letters with which the Pensionary has furnished me; and I forward his note at the same time, as the readiest mode of executing the commission with which he charges me.

"I am very sorry that Mr. Wesley is not yet arrived. I much wished to have seen him here sometime before my departure; it might have contributed to establish him in the society of the Hague with some advantages; but Lord Henry Spencer from respect for your Lordship's wishes, and from other motives, will shew every possible attention to him, and if he appears to have (as I have no doubt he will) a due sense of the discretion necessary in the line to which he is destined, will confide to him the perusal of some of the papers of the mission of some years ago, and will employ him also occasionally in copying. I will explain, however, when I see your Lordship, that this place is not the best calculated for Mr. Wesley's views. I hope to leave this place to-day."

*Enclosing a note from Van de Spiegel, with extracts] from the despatches of Dutch envoys at Mayence, Munich, and Berlin.*

F. J. JACKSON to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 13, Sidmouth.—"The point on] which Mr. Ewart actually lays the most stress is the being permitted to quit Berlin by or before the middle of October, as he is assured on all hands that his life

almost depends upon the not being exposed to the inconveniences of bad roads and severe season. He therefore hopes that the person intended to reside this winter at Berlin will be directed to repair thither by the above time. I should imagine Mr. Ewart's answer, in regard to his own affairs, will in some measure determine your Lordship on this head as well as on the subject of the general arrangement of the missions you mentioned to me; at all events I hope I do not presume too much in relying on the prospects which the event of Sir F. Vincent's death might afford me in Spain. I shall, however, pass a few days at Weymouth of the beginning of next week, and shall then wait upon your Lordship in order to receive your orders on this and other subjects. I am truly concerned to find that affairs at Berlin bear so untoward an appearance, though I am still convinced that the Prussian Government will be the first to repent what is doing. My accounts, though they contain no very interesting particulars, prove pretty positively that the opinions are much divided at Berlin and Potsdam, and that, particularly, the individual interests of those about His Prussian Majesty are likely to be so affected as to afford us great advantages in whatever may be done or agitated in the course of the winter.

"I have likewise some authentic information from Poland, which represents that country as likely to be much divided by the different factions in the Diet. The Russian influence increases very fast, and, if united to that of the Courts of Berlin and Vienna, will carry all before it in spite of the efforts of Marshall Potocki and some other well-intentioned persons to establish the independence of their Government. It is also evident that the number of these latter decreases every day, as even the conduct of Prince Adam Czartorisky, one of the most zealous advocates and supporter of the new system, becomes daily more suspicious."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 13, Whitehall.—"The warrant is prepared for the appointment of Mr. Hayman to the Lieutenant-Governorship of St. Kitts, but I have kept it back from going by this day's coach, as Mr. Nepean has no recollection of your having mentioned it to him. I therefore suppose it has never yet been mentioned to the King. It would be awkward, therefore, to send him the warrant to sign without the subject having ever been mentioned to him. Be so good, therefore, as to mention it to his Majesty, either as a thing fixed by yourself before you left the office, or as now recommended by me, as you please.

"I, some time ago, gave to his Majesty that late publication of the sheet of Reynell's map which contains the Carnatick, Malabar coast, and Mysore country. Perhaps his Majesty has it not with him, and therefore I have sent one directed to you, to be laid before his Majesty when he has occasion for it. I hope he may soon have more."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 13, Whitehall.—"This accompanies a long and elaborate letter I have received from young Burke. I suspect it has been wrote at different times, for at the beginning of the letter he and his friends seem perfectly satisfied, and rejoiced with the neutrality of this country; the end of the letter assumes a different tone of reasoning. If you think his Majesty will find any amusement in it to compensate



the trouble of reading it, you may put it into his hands, and likewise convey it to Mr. Pitt. My answer, as you may believe, will be a general and civil acknowledgment of the receipt of it, without discussing the solidity of its reasoning. I do not think he wants talents; there are now and then strokes in it which mark his father's son."

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 13, London.—"I send you the draft of a despatch for India which I wish you carefully to consider, and in my name convey to his Majesty. I would not, for the sake of transmitting my ideas to Lord Cornwallis, put the public to any inconvenience or unreasonable expense, but upon stating to Lord Chatham, and by his desire conversing with Lord Hood, I find it will be productive of so little of either that I cannot resist the inclination I feel to put his Lordship in possession of my opinion, collected together under the most important heads of consideration. Probably it may come too late for many of the topics, perhaps it may not, but, at any rate, there are some of the particulars I have urged will not arrive too late at any time before he leaves India, and are subjects for the consideration of his successor. After receiving it back from his Majesty, I wish you to forward it to Mr. Pitt that I may receive any suggestions which, after talking with his Majesty, either of you may think proper to give to me.

"Once in conversation with the King, and more than once in conversation with Mr. Pitt, the idea was started of his Majesty bestowing the vacant red ribbons as marks of his favour for meritorious services in the present Indian war. The conversation I had with the King was on the occasion of the complete successes of General Abercrombie on the Malabar coast, but the objection to giving it to him before General Medows was unsurmountable. General Medows, in a variety of ways, has now most honourably earned it, and it would not be improper for you again to bring the subject under his Majesty's view, because, perhaps, he may think this a proper time to bestow upon Generals Medows and Abercrombie the ribbons wore by Generals Haldimand and Sir Archibald Campbell. If his Majesty is of that opinion, it would perhaps be right to convey it to them through Lord Cornwallis, under whose command they are serving. In case that should be his Majesty's opinion, I send you the proper instrument for the purpose, as the vessel is to sail this week, and it is only destroying it if not used. If this proposition meets with his Majesty's approbation, there will be no occasion after the vessel is sailed to keep her destination a secret, because it will pass for her conveying these marks of approbation from his Majesty, which, in place of creating jealousies in the Directors, will rather be popular with them.

"As to Lord Cornwallis himself, there is certainly no mark of approbation nor no honour his sovereign or his country can bestow which, both in his civil and military character, he does not merit. He has the blue ribbon already, and, therefore, if his Majesty ever casts his eyes towards him in that way, there is nothing for him but an additional step in the order of peerage."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, September 14, Weymouth.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to [your] Majesty a letter from Mr. Burke junior to Mr. Dundas, which Lord Grenville has received this morning. The latter

part consists entirely of reasoning, and may perhaps hardly be worth your Majesty's taking the trouble of reading so much writing in so bad a hand, but the first part seems curious, as it states the reason of the Court d'Artois's late journey to Vienna, and the wavering and uncertain conduct of the French King."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1791, September 14, Weymouth.—“I am much obliged to you or your attention about Hayman. If you will send the warrant to me, I will take a proper opportunity of laying it before the King, and mentioning the circumstances of it to him. I have sent him young Burke's letter, but I do not expect to receive it again time enough for the mail, as he is going to Portland. The letter is not ill written, except that the same number of ideas might have been conveyed in, at most, half the space. But I suspect that either he is the dupe of those he converses with, or that they are completely deceived by the eagerness of their own wishes. *Valde quod cupit esse putat*. Surely it is impossible to read the Declaration signed at Pilnitz and not to see that these great Princes are desirous of saying much, and of appearing to have a great influence in the course of events, but that they are quite determined to do nothing. Such at least is my construction of their conduct. It is certainly very possible that, if we were so far to alter our line as to adopt the resolution of active interference, they might be willing enough to join in an enterprise of which we should, in that case, run the hazards. And it is by no means unlikely that they may be glad to hold out our neutrality, and all the consequences of it such as Burke states them, as an excuse for their own unwillingness to fulfil the expectations they have given to the French Princes and the other partisans of a counter-revolution. But that they will do nothing if we do not is my fixed opinion, and that we ought to do nothing is a determination which we have deliberately taken, and solemnly notified, and I believe that you agree with me in being fully satisfied with it. As mere matter of curiosity, I should be glad to know what the language of these people was when they returned from Pilnitz to Coblenz; but if you ask from Burke even that information, it would, I think, be right to accompany it with an intimation of your opinion that we shall adhere to the line we have taken. The saying about as much as that might tend to restrain him from holding out hopes, which, you see from his letter, he is sufficiently inclined to do. And it can hardly be conceived what stress is laid by those people even on the language of an individual so perfectly unauthorised as he is. I happen to know that he has been represented by some of them as a person charged with a secret commission from our Government. And in all probability those who gave that account believed it. So much for French politics.

“I expect Pitt here to-morrow to dinner, and have therefore delayed sending your other papers to the King till I can show them to him, that we may agree in what manner to talk about them, particularly on that delicate point of the army with respect to which there is one expression in your draft to Lord Cornwallis which might alarm his Majesty. I cannot help thinking that the ribbons to Medows and Abercrombie cannot possibly be given except accompanied with a Marquisate to Lord Cornwallis, and that the whole had much better be reserved till the conclusion of the business by the capture of Seringapatam at least, if not

till the restoration of peace. It is a trifling thing, but how is Lord Cornwallis to invest Abercrombie, who will, of course, on the signature of peace, return to Bombay."

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 15, London.—"I sent you a letter I have been entrusted with by Mr. Burke. He urged the introduction of his friend to talk over the business with me, but that I declined as civilly as I could, saying it was of no avail to talk with me, and, in the conclusion, I could only forward the letter to you to be disposed of as you thought proper. I suspect their friend the Emperor has, as usual, first encouraged and then left them in the lurch; and, if I can collect accurately from Mr. Burke in the conversation he held with me, the supposed indisposition of this country, and of the King personally, is used as a pretext. Poor Burke himself seems in sad agitation on the subject. He says if the French Revolution goes off undisturbed, he would not give twenty years' purchase for an annuity on the existence of this country.

"I understand Mr. Burke is gone to the country, but has left a note of introduction of his friend to me. I would rather avoid the interview, and I hope the mode in which you return your answer, with that of his Majesty, will not render it necessary."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, September 15, London.—"I wrote to you this morning, and have since received yours. I agree entirely with you in your view of the French politics, as you will perceive by the letter I wrote to you this morning. It is perfectly apparent that the Emperor, and of course the King of Prussia, mean to do nothing, and that those exiled Princes are miserably duped and used by them. Our line is decidedly taken, and, if we were to deliberate an age upon the subject, we could do nothing else than what we have done.

"Nothing could give me greater pleasure than that the King should give the Marquisate to Lord Cornwallis immediately, and unasked, and even unknown to him. My chief reason of wishing the ribbons at this time was to take the chance of their reaching India before Lord Cornwallis left it, that he might invest them at the head of the army; and I think there is no doubt but Lord Cornwallis will not, at any rate, leave India without visiting the Malabar coast. All this, however, I leave to Mr. Pitt and you to decide as you please.

"With regard to the part of the letter which you think might alarm the King, it can be left out without any prejudice to the objects I have chiefly in view. At the same time I think it would be wrong not to give him a hint as early as possible of our ultimate views in that respect, because it would undoubtedly influence his arrangements on the conclusion of the war. There is no reason, however, for putting it in the draft now in your hand, for I can do it by another private letter unnecessary to be sent to Weymouth.

"I find that Mr. Hayman's warrant was sent off by Mr. Nepean

yesterday, thinking I only wished it to be kept back from the King for one day that you might speak to his Majesty. Be so good as explain the mistake to the King.

"It does not occur to me that I have anything further to trouble you with."

#### F. J. JACKSON to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 15, Sidmouth.—"Uncertain as to the nature and extent of the information your Lordship may have received with respect to what passed at the late interview at Pilnitz, I think it right to lay before you some circumstances which have come to my knowledge since I had last the honour of writing to you. It should appear that, upon further reflection, the Austrian and Prussian monarchs have found it advisable to use more precaution and reserve in their interference in French affairs than had been at first intended. They now declare that they will only furnish their contingent, both in money and troops, *in case* other Powers (whom I do not find to be specified) should take an active part, and furnish a like contingent. I should not, however, suppose that this condition extends to England, as it seems to be much the wish of both the crowned heads to exclude us from a participation in what they call their own private concerns; and I know that the King of Prussia now says that, by his separate negotiation with the Emperor, *qu'il est quitte envers l'Angleterre qui lui a joué de si mauvais tours*. Such a satisfaction, if he considers it as such, may surely be allowed an ally without repining!

"In the meanwhile, I am told some very violent scenes passed, even in the presence of the Emperor, between MM. de Calonne and Spielman. The former even went so far as to say, *qu'il avoit crû Sa Majesté Imperiale maître, mais qu'il voyoit bien que c'étoit Spielman*. This specimen will convince your Lordship that the fugitive Princes and their adherents are not much satisfied with what has been done, particularly as Count d'Artois has not yet received the money promised him by the King of Prussia, and that the latter now talks of furnishing only 12,000 men, which your Lordship will recollect was the original advice of the Duke of Brunswick. The refugees, however, go on with their preparations, and make every effort to obtain assistance. The manifesto, as agreed to by the Emperor and his Prussian Majesty, is sent off to Petersburg for the approbation of the Empress, and Prince Esterhazy [is] gone to support it; and, among other *vigorous measures*, Prince Nassau has sold *all his estates* to supply M. d'Artois with money. A circumstance more worthy of attention is that the latter declares that General Luckner has promised to quit France, and to lead a strong reinforcement to the allied army when assembled.

"Such appears to be the present state of this affair, the probable success of which time only can develop. The King of Prussia is returned in high good humour from Saxony; though, as all transactions cannot so easily be carried on *in petto*, the difference of opinions alluded to in my last is likely to have a great influence on whatever passes at Berlin. In the meanwhile a considerable change is about to take place in the *domestic establishment* of his Prussian Majesty, which affords much speculation to the Berlin politicians."

## EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 16, Paris.—“The enclosed *État des dépenses publiques*, to which I have added two *Rapports* of the Committee, is all that I can send for your information with regard to the finances of this country by this day's courier; by the next week Monsieur de Montesquiou's last Report will be printed; and as the public begin to be clamorous for an account of the state of the finances, the Assembly will probably soon gratify them in that respect.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

Private.

1791, September 17, Weymouth.—“I have, agreeably to your request, made immediate enquiry into the case of Mrs. Davie, widow of the late vice-consul at Corunna, and find that there will not be any difficulty in my recommending her for the small pension she asks.

“I understand that General Pitt does not return to Ireland, so that you will have no more difficulty on that subject. I had heard nothing of Dundas's intention to resign his office of Adjutant-General till after I had left the Home Office.

“You will not be sorry to hear that the air of this place and the bathing agree remarkably well with His Majesty, and that I never remember to have seen him better than he is.”

*Copy.*

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1791, September 1-24, Downing Street.]—“I am not sure whether, as your letter stands, the Chancellor may not choose to construe it, as if you thought that Mr. Ewart had acted under private instructions from me. It would be as well to express that all he received from me was a private letter stating, by the King's order, the outline of his intentions, in order to procure such explanations as might enable His Majesty to form his ultimate decision relative to the establishment; and I think it would be right to send a copy of that letter and of all the correspondence. I sent them yesterday to Lord Camden, but Mr. Cottrell will, I daresay, bring them back in the course of a few hours.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, September 20, Weymouth.—“I have to acknowledge your three private letters of the 29th of August and the 2nd and 8th instant. I have since conversed with Mr. Pitt upon the subject, and I am authorized by him to say that he concurs with me in the propriety of recommending to His Majesty to grant you a pension of 1,000*l. per annum net*, to commence from the date when your appointments at Berlin will cease, and with a reversion of 500*l. per annum* to Mrs. Ewart in case of your death, and that this arrangement will accordingly be immediately submitted to the King. With respect to the time of the appointment of your successor, I can say nothing precise upon that

subject, because my arrangements relative to it are not yet decided. But it seems to me, under the present circumstances, to be extremely material to have at Berlin, as soon as possible after your quitting it, a person of sufficient diplomatic rank to talk on a footing of perfect equality with the Ministers, and even, if necessary, to have access to the King; and I shall therefore be anxious to make the appointment with as little delay as I can, and I think it will certainly take place before the spring. There is, however, hardly any probability that the new Minister, whoever he may be, will be able to go there by the middle of October, and I feel that it would be cruel to keep you there after that time at so much hazard to your health. I have therefore sent you by this post His Majesty's leave of absence, and Mr. Jackson will return in about ten days to Berlin in order to take charge of His Majesty's affairs during the interval. As soon as he arrives, there will be no difficulty in your quitting Berlin.

"I cannot close this letter without repeating to you the assurances of the sense which I entertain of your services there, and expressing the pleasure I shall feel if the arrangement which we have been able to make is agreeable to you."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO JOSEPH EWART.

*Private.*

1791, September 23, Whitehall.—"I have nothing to add to my official letter of this date on the subject of the steps which have been taken relative to His Royal Highness the Duke of York's marriage, except to request that you will take some proper opportunity to express to His Royal Highness on my part, in the most respectful manner, the very great concern which I feel at the difficulties which have arisen, and particularly at the omission of those official steps which it would have been my duty to have taken the King's pleasure upon, as soon as I had understood that, in consequence of the previous communications, the business was in such a state as to admit of the formal proceedings usual on such occasions. I trust that His Royal Highness will feel that this has been occasioned by the circumstances which have arisen without my being aware of them, and that it cannot be necessary for me to assure His Royal Highness that nothing could give me more concern than the appearance of any inattention or want of respect on my part towards His Royal Highness, and particularly on such an occasion as the present. I have been unwilling to trouble His Royal Highness with any letter on this subject, but I shall be very anxious to know that you have explained it in its true light."

#### JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, September 23, Berlin.—"As it appears doubtful, from Mr. Jackson's last letters, whether or not he returns here, and as I have the worst consequences to apprehend for my health, and even life, should I remain here till winter sets in, it has occurred to me that Mr. Eliot, who has been some time with me, could be charged with the management of His Majesty's affairs here till such time as another person be appointed. Your Lordship being acquainted with Mr. Eliot he requires no recommendation from me; but I only beg leave to say

that I never met with a man of a sounder judgment or better capacity."

"I should leave my private secretary, who is well acquainted with the detail of the business, and in whom entire confidence can be placed for the use of the ciphers."

WILLIAM ELIOT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 24, Berlin.—"Mr. Ewart's bad state of health making it an object of importance to him to leave this place before the setting in of the winter, he has expressed a desire that I should offer to undertake the business here till a proper person should be sent from home. As this undertaking is very great for me, who am so absolutely inexperienced in affairs of this kind, it is with the utmost diffidence that I make the proposal. But if after this avowal (not merely as words of course, but as real fact) you should think fit to employ me till such time as somebody acquainted with business may be sent, I shall accept the charge with equal diffidence and gratitude."

P. COLQUHOUN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 24, Glasgow.—"I availed myself of what personal influence I possessed with some leading characters in America, and particularly with the Honorable Robert Morris (the most intimate friend of the President, and in the confidence of the present Executive Government of the United States) in order to prevent the mischiefs which were likely to result from any step on the part of the Congress arising from erroneous and unfriendly information sent from this country. And in consequence of the wishes which your Lordship expressed to be informed of every piece of correct intelligence I might receive from leading characters in America, I have now the honor to enclose you the extracts of two letters which I have received from Mr. Morris."

*Enclosure.*

Extract Number 2.

ROBERT MORRIS TO P. COLQUHOUN.

1791, July 28, Philadelphia.—"I communicated to the President of the United States and to the Ministers that paragraph of your letter relative to the President's message, and the determination of your Court to send a Minister, with which they are well pleased; and, for my own part, as a friend to both countries, I wish it were done. A Minister will be sent to Britain in consequence."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, September 25, Whitehall.—"I inclose to your Lordship copies of a private letter received this morning by Mr. Pitt from Mr. Ewart, and of a paper inclosed therein, being the original of a preliminary Act relative to the Duke of York's marriage, signed and sealed by Mr. Ewart and the Prussian Ministers, with an additional article, signed and sealed by his Royal Highness and the Princess Frederique.

"Mr. Ewart has not transmitted this paper officially, and has taken upon him to negotiate and conclude it, without one word of authority or instruction from the Office, and on no other foundation than a private letter from Mr. Pitt, stating, by the King's order, the outline of his intentions, in order to procure such explanations as might enable his Majesty to form his ultimate decision relative to the establishment to be proposed to Parliament for his Royal Highness; and the instrument now concluded differs, in some respects, even from those ideas so stated.

"As there appears to be considerable difficulty and delicacy, under these circumstances, with regard to the conduct to be observed by his Majesty on this occasion, and particularly with respect to the form and manner of framing any instrument or treaty of marriage to be concluded, as must now be the case, subsequent to the marriage itself, I have written to his Majesty's Advocate, Attorney, and Solicitor-General, to request their attendance in town. I should be much obliged to your Lordship to inform me when it is probable that your Lordship may be in town, as I cannot but be extremely anxious not to take any step in a matter of this nature, and of so much public importance, without having the advantage of your Lordship's advice and approbation."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 26, Beckenham.—"I am at last arrived with all my numerous caravan safe at this place, after a pleasant journey through Zealand and Flanders to Calais. I shall go to your Lordship's Office in a day or two to inform myself as to the probable time of your return to town, that I may wait on you as soon as possible.

"If his Majesty's stay at Weymouth is likely to be such as to make it becoming for me to go to that place to pay my duty there, I rely on your Lordship's goodness and indulgence to give me an intimation; but if I hear nothing from you, I shall persuade myself that I may without impropriety wait for the first *levée* at St. James's, which in many points of view would be preferable to me.

"I do not trouble Mr. Pitt with a line, because I presume that he is with your Lordship."

#### LORD THURLOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 27, —.—"As I had never heard except from rumour, which I took to be frivolous, a syllable of such a business as his Royal [Highness's] marriage being in agitation, it now comes somewhat by surprise; and I am afraid that I do not perfectly comprehend it; because I do not see the difficulties which seem to have occurred to those who have treated it from the beginning and consequently know more of the matter. The ceremony will have been performed; and, as the King's consent was sealed and sent off yesterday, I have no doubt but it will have arrived at Weymouth time enough to legalise the celebration. If even this should not have happened, the mere point of legality may be secured, though not in so becoming a manner as between such parties would be desirable. For all the rest, it appears to be little more than indifferent whether the ancillary contracts were post- or antenuptial; and the form, I think, will be of easy conception, when the



terms are once settled. As it is not likely that I should be consulted on the last, if my thoughts on the first should be thought requisite I will have the honour to attend you the moment the first are settled. It would have been matter of private satisfaction to me if I had known of this business in time, from the interest which I take in his Royal Highness's situation, to have prepared my thoughts on the conduct of it from the beginning; because I should have hoped that, putting the business properly in train, it would not have cost three months to have arrived (preserving all the forms) to the conclusion of the business. Whereas now, the forms seem not sufficiently attended to, even in the instruments under the Marriage Act. . But I think those are questions chiefly of form. As it is, I shall attend on the receipt of your Lordship's further commands."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 27, Beckenham.—"I have, by this night's post, sent to my brother a full statement of all that passed to-day between us respecting him. I have informed him that, though I had not used the discretionary power which he had confided to me so far as to give an absolute acceptance, I was clearly of opinion that he ought to accept cheerfully and gratefully and without a moment's delay; and that your Lordship wished the arrangement to be adjusted and declared as soon as possible:—that, undoubtedly, it might be attended both with expense and inconvenience to him to quit his present establishments and households at and near Dresden, for a situation locally less pleasant, and without any advance in Ministerial rank or emolument; but that all these objections were, in my opinion, counter-balanced by the greater efficiency and importance of the new mission proposed to him; which considerations ought to be decisive when there is no material difference in respect to climate. As, however, he had seemed to lay much stress on the connection between the Berlin mission and my embassy, I thought it fair to apprise him that I was, not from levity or caprice but from cool reflection, desirous to quit the life of Foreign Representation whenever circumstances might make it practicable.

"I next mentioned that your Lordship, in conversation, had marked a disposition to add any mark of attention which might add a degree of *éclat* to this new mission; and that I had reason to believe, if he would write and express properly to you a wish to have one of the vacant red ribbons, you would submit the wish to His Majesty with good hopes of its being gratified. Lastly, with respect to Mr. Gray, I said that you were disposed already, with respect to that gentleman, to make him a *Secrétaire de Légation* at Dresden or some other Court; but that, with respect to Berlin, there were ideas respecting a young man of family and very promising talents, which, so far as I could conjecture, would be highly acceptable, because the person, if I am not mistaken, is known to me and merits your good opinion. To these statements I added a general recommendation to come to an immediate decision. It is probable that the answer to your Lordship's letter of the 11th will arrive in a few days and will authorize me to decide.

"With respect to the *Chargé d'Affaires ad interim*, if your Lordship has any other view in respect of Mr. Lindsay, or would wish to avoid any delay of a person to be despatched from England, you could, without difficulty, send Colonel Gardiner for the moment, and it would be

a fair pretext to help his pecuniary embarrassment; or even Mr. Gray might be sent for the moment; upon an explanation that he is not to stay."

F. J. JACKSON to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 28, Yarlinton.—"I had the honour of receiving yesterday, by a letter from Mr. Aust, your Lordship's commands for repairing to London without delay. Uncertain whether you will have been informed by him of the reason which obliges me to postpone my attendance to your Lordship's wishes, I take the liberty of addressing this to Weymouth. On my return from that place I was attacked a second time with an aguish fever, with such effect that my physician assures me I cannot with safety undertake a foreign journey within ten or twelve days. I beg you to be assured I shall not lose a moment in hastening to receive your Lordship's commands, as soon as I can with safety set out on my journey to Berlin. I am the more concerned at this delay, as I find Mr. Ewart's health is daily worse and worse.

"My letters from Berlin only mention that 500,000 crowns had actually been paid to Baron Rolle, and go to prove that the whole *projet* is more than ever likely to fall away. Prince Hohenloe made the last attempt to engage the Emperor to march his troops during his embassy to Prague, but having failed there, they have now no longer any hopes left.

"Your Lordship will of course be informed that, at the departure of the last letters, it was the Duke of York's intention to set off for England the 15th October."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, September 28, Whitehall.—"I have just been honoured with your Lordship's letter, upon the tenor and expressions of which I must decline to make any observations.

"My duty to his Majesty's service, and my desire that nothing may be omitted on my part to expedite the regular conclusion of a business so interesting to his Majesty's royal family, and to the public, oblige me to repeat to your Lordship my anxiety for your Lordship's speedy return to town, in order that no official or ministerial step may be taken upon it, without my having the advantage of your Lordship's opinion with regard to such parts of it as must, in the course of business, pass through my Office."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, September 28, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville hopes that your Majesty will have the goodness to excuse the liberty he takes in humbly laying before your Majesty the inclosed correspondence, which has passed between the Lord Chancellor and him, relative to the business of the marriage of his Royal Highness the Duke of York. Lord Grenville is much too sensible of all the gracious and unmerited favour which he has on every occasion experienced from your Majesty, and of the

obligations of his duty, both public and personal, not to feel with the utmost regret the necessity of troubling your Majesty at all with a business of this nature. Whatever occasion he may have had to see with concern the conduct of the Lord Chancellor towards him in very many instances connected with your Majesty's service, he has always felt himself bound to observe that line of conduct which he knew would be most consonant to your Majesty's wishes, and, above all, to refrain from breaking in upon your Majesty's ease and quiet by presuming to make your Majesty, in any manner, a party to anything of this sort. Nor has he the least idea of departing in the present instance from the same line, or of suffering any private feelings of his own ever to interfere with objects of such infinitely greater importance. But as Lord Grenville could not help being apprehensive that some representation may have been made to your Majesty on this occasion by the Lord Chancellor of a similar tendency with the complaints in his letter to Lord Grenville, and as he is above all things anxious to stand right in your Majesty's opinion on such an occasion as the present, he has ventured to submit to your Majesty all the letters which have passed on this occasion, and to assure your Majesty that he shall have nothing more to wish with respect to it, if he can flatter himself that your Majesty, to whom all the circumstances of the business are fully known, is pleased not to disapprove of his conduct."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 29, Weymouth.—"I could not without concern collect from the Lord Chancellor's letter to Lord Grenville that he seemed to feel some degree of inattention at not having had prior information of the marriage to take place this day between my son the Duke of York and the eldest daughter of the King of Prussia, and that Lord Grenville attributes the soreness of the Lord Chancellor to some inclination to take offence, particularly where he is concerned. I know the value and faults of the Lord Chancellor, and that the latter are constitutional, and, therefore, I commend Lord Grenville's resolution of passing them over.

"Lord Grenville deserves to be acquainted with my thorough approbation of his conduct in this business, though, perhaps, I might have wished he had not, in his last letter, averted [adverted?] to the Chancellor's manner of agreeing to the mode of putting the Great Seal, from thinking that may encrease an altercation that, for my service, I wish put an end to. I enclose the letter I have received this morning from the Lord Chancellor, which does not show any ill humour, as he certainly means to excuse his being at a distance by mentioning his ignorance of the transaction."

*Enclosure.*

#### LORD CHANCELLOR THURLOW to GEORGE III.

1791, September 26, Hawkestone, Shropshire.—"In obedience to your Majesty's commands, the Chancellor has forthwith affixed the Great Seal to your Majesty's consent to His Royal Highness's marriage with the eldest Princess of Prussia. If he had known that such a business was so immediately in agitation, he would not have been absent from London. Perhaps, considering the nature and application of the statute,

the preamble might have been more conveniently omitted. But the difference is certainly not considerable enough to warrant any delay under all the circumstances. As to the settlement, he presumes to think that the King of Prussia has acted not less wisely than gallantly in trusting implicitly to the generosity of your Majesty and your Parliament."

*Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF STAFFORD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 29, Trentham.—"I received the honour of your letter of the twenty-sixth, and am sorry that Mr. Ewart's act has thrown so much embarrassment on the measures which were necessarily to be taken previous to the conclusion of the Duke of York's marriage. I fear the difficulty may make it expedient to apply to Parliament; if even such application should not be necessary, still this embarrassment may give an opportunity to Fox to bring on the discussion of that Act again, which I am sure some time ago he would willingly have embraced; the agitating that question may produce many inconveniences.

"I fear, by the letters which I saw from Berlin since the conclusion of the Russian business, that Court seems not to be in good humour with us; whether the Duke of York's now intimate connection there will be of advantage, uninformed as I am, I pretend not to judge."

LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, September 30, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville begs leave to acknowledge with the utmost gratitude your Majesty's goodness in the expression of your Majesty's gracious approbation of his conduct in the business on which he ventured to trouble your Majesty. He would not have done so at all, if the letter of the Lord Chancellor had not appeared to him to convey a charge of inattention to his duty towards your Majesty, which he should be deeply concerned that your Majesty should think well-founded on any occasion, but more particularly on such a one as the present. Your Majesty's goodness has relieved Lord Grenville from all uneasiness on that head, and, with respect to anything else, he has only to assure your Majesty of his fixed determination to avoid all altercation upon the subject, and to prevent, as far as in him lies, your Majesty's ever having any further trouble respecting it.

"Lord Grenville has the honour to return the Lord Chancellor's letter to your Majesty, and begs to express his sense of your Majesty's gracious condescension in communicating it to him.

"Lord Grenville hopes that your Majesty will approve of his having taken steps for sending Mr. Lindsay to Berlin to relieve Mr. Ewart, as Mr. Jackson was too ill to go."

*Copy.*

LORD THURLOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, September 30, Gredington.—"Upon any part of the publick business which Ministry has been pleased to communicate to me, I have always, with great readiness, endeavoured to give all the assistance which the degree of communication enabled me. As your Lordship is

now pleased to inform me that my opinion will be expected upon some part of the business which is to be arranged in consequence of his Royal Highness's marriage, the importance of the occasion will bring me, forthwith, to town."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, October] Downing Street.—"The King has fixed that the jointure shall be 8,000*l*. He settled that it would be best for you to write to the Duke of York, apprizing him that you are to send the messenger to Berlin on the subject of the treaty, in case he should have any letters to send; and mentioning, at the same time, that His Majesty has approved of 8,000*l*. for the jointure."

EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, September 30, Paris.—"I send you some observations upon Monsieur de Montesquieu's statement of the finances of this country which are worth your attention. I send, at the same time, Monsieur de Montesquieu's answer, and political observations upon Tobago, written by the advocate employed by the British creditors. The reason why the report upon that business was not made in the Assembly is simply this: the inviolable legislators of France are not incorruptible; they demanded a bribe of 10,000 pounds, *faute de quoi point de decret*."

LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 3, Madrid.—"In conformity to what I mentioned to your Lordship in my last, I have had another conference with Count Florida Blanca on the subject of M. Las Heras's negotiation. He told me that, since our last meeting, he had found, on looking back to his correspondence, that the instruction which he had sent to that gentleman early in the last month (in consequence of my first representations) was as precise and clear as possible; that he could not therefore doubt of his having proceeded instantly to business on the receipt of it, and consequently that, having nothing further to communicate to him on the subject at present, he thought it would be better to defer the departure of his intended messenger till he could be charged with His Catholic Majesty's final decision, either as to the payment of any sum that might have been provisionally settled by the respective Commissioners, or as to the choice of a referee.

*Cipher.*

"The Spanish Minister has since sent me the enclosed copy of the above-mentioned instruction, which seems in fact to be sufficiently conformable to your Lordship's ideas, excepting only that it does not authorize M. de Las Heras to settle the business definitely, without waiting for a special permission to that effect. Count Florida Blanca contends that the investing him with such a power would be absolutely unprecedented; but he assures me that as soon as M. de Las Heras's report shall have been received, His Catholic Majesty's determination upon it shall be transmitted without loss of time; and I am inclined to think, considering the present state of affairs in Europe, that he will, in this instance, be true to his promise.

"It seems that the last French messenger was charged with a letter from His Most Christian Majesty to the King of Spain, written in his own hand, and as in his personal capacity, containing a long apology for his having laid aside the ensigns of his several orders of knighthood, and particularly those of the Golden Fleece. M. de Florida Blanca's language respecting this letter has hitherto been, that it merits no kind of attention, having been evidently extorted from the French Monarch by the threats of his oppressors; but the general tenour and style of the letter seem to contradict this assertion, and it is, besides, conceived in terms of such warmth and cordiality of affection towards His Catholic Majesty, that it is difficult to suppose that that Prince's personal feelings can permit him to leave it entirely unanswered. Hitherto he has contented himself with replying to it verbally through the channel of the Spanish Chargé d' Affaires at Paris, who has, at the same time, been instructed to declare to M. de Montmorin, with regard to His Most Christian Majesty's pretended acceptance of the new Constitution, that this Court cannot acknowledge the validity of that, or any other act of the French monarch, whilst he remained deprived, as at present, of his moral and physical free agency."

*Enclosure.*

M. DE FLORIDA BLANCA to M. DE LAS HERAS.

1791, September 8, St. Ildefonso.—"The English Ambassador here has informed me that you decline treating upon the liquidation of the damages claimed by the English merchants concerned in the affair of Nootka, alleging as a reason that you have no positive orders to that effect. As you acquired here all the insight and information that could be given upon the business, together with suitable directions, and it being in London that the pretensions set up are to be brought forward and established, I have the King's command to acquaint you that his Majesty authorizes you to settle and liquidate those damages, with the concurrence of the Marquis del Campo, his Ambassador, making a report of what may be agreed upon for his Royal approbation; and that you are to understand that, in case of any difference, his Majesty is ready that a person of whom both Courts may approve, should be chosen as arbitrator upon the occasion."

*Copy.*

WILLIAM GARDINER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 4, Brussels.—"A succession of contrary winds prevented me from having the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 24th of September till Sunday last, the 1st of this month.

"The particular attention your Lordship has had the kindness to shew to my situation calls for my utmost acknowledgments, and I entreat you to receive them with the gratitude which on my part they merit. If I have a regret it is that of the possibility of having subjected your Lordship to importunities, which my indecision may have prolonged.

"In a letter of more recent date than that of your Lordship, from the Duke of Dorset, I find that his Grace has accepted, in my name, of the Secretaryship of Spain, and this has been corroborated by the same

intelligence from Lord Auckland, who has also given to that choice his approbation. I cannot, therefore, but be perfectly satisfied, and shall attend your Lordship's further commands.

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, October 5, Whitehall.—“Lord Grenville has the honour to submit to your Majesty for signature, in case it should be honoured with your Majesty's approbation, the form of an answer to the letter of the French King.

“Lord Grenville has received an answer from Mr. Morton Eden accepting the offer which your Majesty permitted Lord Grenville to make to him of the mission to Berlin. If your Majesty approves of it, Lord Grenville will propose to Mr. Elliot to succeed him at Dresden.”

*Copy.*

#### JOSEPH EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, October 5, Berlin.—“I have received your Lordship's private letter of the 22nd ultimo relative to my private affairs, and beg you will accept of my grateful thanks for the friendly dispositions you have had the goodness to shew me on this occasion.

“The reversion of 500*l.* *per annum* to Mrs. Ewart, in the event of my death, affords me more comfort than I can express; and I am far from complaining of the amount of the pension which your Lordship and Mr. Pitt have been pleased to fix for me, though the assurances I received, on several occasions, of the favourable intentions to give some extraordinary reward to my services, added to the circumstance of my health having been sacrificed, had encouraged me to hope for an allowance somewhat more considerable, which I flatter myself your Lordship may still be disposed to give.

“As your Lordship intends appointing my successor soon, I beg leave to observe that conceiving, in the year 1788, that I had the prospect of remaining long here, I expended above 3,000*l.* in fitting up the house I now inhabit, the greatest part of which I must expect to lose. I took the liberty of mentioning to your Lordship, in my last letter on this subject, that my expenses here had always exceeded my appointments very considerably, owing to the circumstances which made me think it necessary to entertain the leading people here, and the number of English who brought me letters of recommendation. Permit me to add that I have employed the thousand pounds, allowed me for the extraordinary expenses attending the Duke of York's marriage, within the last fortnight; and that his Royal Highness's previous long stay here had occasioned the addition of about 500*l.* to my usual expense.

“Nothing but my embarrassments and apprehensions on account of my family could induce me to importune your Lordship in this manner; but I rely on your candour for an excuse, and flatter myself you and Mr. Pitt will have the goodness to take the circumstances I have mentioned into consideration.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 5, Beckenham.—“You will find M. de Montesquieu’s Report in the enclosed papers as far as it has hitherto appeared in the *Logographe*. The last sheet admits two very material statements. The one that the general expense of 1792 cannot be calculated at less than 538 millions (exclusive of all unforeseen emergencies and extra demands). The other that the *dette exigible* still remaining to be paid from the produce of the Church lands is not less than between two and three milliards, or about 100 millions sterling; after which, on a supposition that ways and means can be found equal to such a pressure, a regular revenue will be requisite of about 500 millions, or twenty millions sterling. In the opposite scale to this immense weight we are to place the efficiency and executive force of the new Government, with all the circumstances and passions which are likely to affect it.

“I go to-morrow to Lambeth, and shall stay there till Sunday morning. If your Lordship should have any commands I shall be happy at any time to wait on you. I attended at your office on Tuesday, but you happened not to be there, and I had no business of importance sufficient to authorise me to interrupt you in St. James’s Square.

“My house here is beginning to be tolerably arranged, and will be not uncomfortable; and there is in it a large and quiet apartment to the south-west, in which I should be truly happy to see your Lordship, if at the hours when you might quit it, you could bear the noise of my young troop with the same indulgence which you did formerly.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, October 6], Lambeth Palace.—“I am sincerely glad that my brother shews a proper sense of your Lordship’s wish to remove him to Berlin, and I will write to him by this night’s post to urge his departure. I know, however, by repeated experience, that it is very difficult to break up a numerous establishment and to change quarters at a moment’s warning, in the month of November too; but I will be responsible for his being as quick as possible.

“Your Lordship will, I hope, have the goodness to intimate to Mr. Lindsay to send his letters, as usual, under flying seal, through the Hague; though he will probably do so [of] course.

“I will take the chance of finding your Lordship at your Office for a moment at some hour in the course of to-morrow.

“I have a private letter from Paris, which says that M. de Montmorin retires, and that it is intended to offer his place to *Barthélemi*!”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 6, Weymouth.—“The answer Lord Grenville has prepared to the notification of the French King is highly proper, as it undoubtedly does not convey any commendation of the step.

“Mr. Morton Eden, in the present moment, seems a fit person for being employed at Berlin, and I cannot doubt of Mr. Elliot’s preferring the court of Dresden to that of Munich. Mr. Lindsay will I trust, as proposed, leave London to-morrow.”



## LORD GRENVILLE TO MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1791, October 7, Whitehall.—“I have received your letter of the 25th ultimo and have a very great pleasure in the disposition which you express to take upon you the situation which I had proposed to you. Lord Auckland will have acquainted you with what has passed between us on the subject since his arrival here. The arrangements for Mr. Ewart's retiring are finally settled, and I have this day informed Count Redern, the Prussian Minister here, of His Majesty's destination of you for that post.

“Mr. Ewart leaves Berlin immediately on account of his health which will not admit of his remaining there till your arrival. Mr. Lindsay, His Majesty's secretary of Legation at Petersburg, sets off by this packet, in order to take charge of the King's affairs at Berlin, Mr. Jackson being too ill to return there immediately. The circumstances of the present moment naturally make me anxious that you should be there as soon as is consistent with those previous arrangements which are necessary for you to make on such an occasion, and which I am sensible must require some time. I am persuaded that you will feel the same wish as I do on the subject, and I will therefore say no more to you upon it, than to request that you will let me know as soon as you are able to fix the time, as some other arrangements will depend upon it.

“I cannot close this letter without repeating to you the satisfaction which I feel in the prospect of the advantage which, I am persuaded, His Majesty's service will derive from your taking upon you the duties of this situation.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE TO JOSEPH EWART.

Private.

1791, October 7, Whitehall.—“Mr. Lindsay goes by this packet to take charge of His Majesty's affairs at Berlin, during the interval of your leaving it and of the arrival of your successor. This arrangement was made before I received your letter (private) of the 23rd ultimo. The opinion which I entertain of Mr. Eliot, from the degree of personal knowledge which I have of him, and from what I have always heard of his character, would have made me feel no difficulty in reposing in him any degree of confidence, but, upon the whole, I am inclined to think that, under the present circumstances, it is perhaps not less advantageous for him that the arrangement is made as it is.

“The King has determined on the appointment of Mr. Eden, His Majesty's present Minister at Dresden, to succeed you at Berlin; and I have acquainted Count Redern with this destination, though it cannot yet be formally notified. I am not yet informed how soon it will be possible for him to take upon him the duties of his new mission, and his formal appointment is delayed in order that you may not be exposed to the fatigue of the ceremonies of formally taking leave. Your letters of recall will therefore be sent to Mr. Lindsay, and your pension will commence, as I have already mentioned, from the day on which your appointments will cease. I sincerely hope that ease, and a better climate, will restore your health, and that you will receive that benefit from them of which I am sorry to hear you stand so much in need.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1791, October 9,] Beckenham.—“I enclose a part of M. de Montesquieu's Report which I could not find when I sent the others; and it is material, because it states the *quantum* of *demaines territoriaux* pretended to be applicable to the discharge of the *dette exigible*; and also because it appears from that statement that an interest of nearly four millions sterling is, in the meantime, payable on this new debt.

“I also send a letter from Mr. Elliot, which I found at this place on arriving here yesterday evening; and I beg leave to say that I send it in confidence because I do not know that it was meant to be ostensible, and I am not sufficiently informed of the particulars of Mr. Elliot's situation to understand the allusions. I did not suggest to him to ask the Dresden appointment as a favour; but I remarked to him the mission was likely to be open, and was apparently more suitable to him than any other probable and attainable vacancy could be. I shall merely reply to him *that I continue of this opinion, but that without meaning or desiring to influence his sentiments, I have taken occasion to mention to your Lordship the substance of his letter.*”

*Enclosed.*

## THOMAS ELLIOT to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, October 7, Bath.—“I ought to have answered yours of the 3rd instant two days ago, but I could not make up my mind upon its contents. For, although I agree with you in thinking Dresden a good *canonicat*, yet I have various difficulties in applying for it as a favour. It is almost impossible for me to give up the claim of promotion either upon the grounds of long service, or of having, in some instances, merited peculiar reward. I have however finally settled with myself, that if either Munich or Dresden is offered to me, I shall accept without hesitation and express my obligations to Lord Grenville, because I am certain he will have done all in his power for me. As to a choice between those two situations, I think they have each particular advantages and inconveniences, and I would rather that my superiors should decide for me as may best suit their other arrangements.

“Had I the option, I imagine I should prefer Munich and the diet to Saxony. Bavaria is the best climate, and is, I recollect, a cheap country. Dresden is colder, the Court is more pompous, *ergo*, more expensive.

“If I thought that my application would be of any use, I would ask for Brussels even, as a *reward* highly agreeable to me. Flanders is not without *real* political consequence to this country; and Brussels would, in many instances, afford advantages to my daughter which she could not meet with in the Gothic Empire. I shall wait for your answer to this before I write to Lord Grenville, and, in the mean time, beg that you will do whatever you think best. I am certain I shall ratify the propriety *de toutes vos demarches*.

“Brussels is my sole ambition, and I am persuaded that, in the present situation of political interests upon the Continent, that mission ought to be treated as one of no small importance to this country.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 9, Weymouth.—“The 29th Regiment of Foot may now receive orders to go into quarters as soon as the Commanding

Officer, with the concurrence of the Surveyor General, shall judge it expedient.

"I desire Lord Grenville will also give directions that no messenger or boxes should be sent here later than by the mail coach that will arrive here on Friday, and that, on Sunday morning, papers may as usual be sent to Windsor."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 9, [Stowe].—"Many thanks for your very early and kind communications of Lord Cornwallis's correspondence. I own that I do not despond from it as much as you appear to do; for I think I know that his style (from his American correspondence) is never sanguine, and least of all is he likely, as he advances in age and military experience, to *promise* where so much depends upon chance. On the contrary, I think part of his letter to you is peculiarly *sanguine*; and I hope that we shall not hear of any physical obstruction to his passage of the river; and, if he is once safely over it, I shall fear very little for the capture of Seringapatam. I wish he had not been quite as explicit as he has been upon the necessity of concluding the war, from the state of the Company's finances.

"Perhaps my eager and earnest aristocratic wishes mix with my reflections upon French politics; but I own that I conceive the question of perfect neutrality on our side may begin to be doubtful if it seems probable that France may advance rapidly to the amelioration of her present state, which seems now to be less unlikely than I could have imagined; and, particularly if Spain catches the flame, I doubt whether our internal and external security can be of long duration. If Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Sardinia, and Sweden shew a wish to engage with the assistance of a little English *money*, is such a game entirely out of the question? I own that I never expected to see the new system even thus far advanced, and thus far secured; and I begin to apprehend from it certainly not all that mischief which French patriotism wishes to us, but I am sure that (if not checked) it will spread rapidly, and ultimately must affect us.

"I am now alone, and shall be most happy to see Mornington and you, whenever you can come to me. I have spoken to Chaplin, and have drawn the line of his enquiries from Rickmansworth to Maidenhead through Chalfont. I should hope that you may soon be accommodated; but my wishes still lean to Burnham."

#### MORTON EDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 12, Dresden.—"In my private letter of the 25th past I had the honour to assure your Lordship of my perfect devotion to His Majesty's service, and of the readiness and gratitude with which I should accept the post of Berlin, if His Majesty should be pleased to approve of your Lordship's recommendation. I am fully aware of the great importance of that station, and as such I flatter myself that your Lordship may think that some mark of the Royal favour, particularly if now conferred, would give me a relief and éclat at a Court with which our political connexion, whatever temporary misunderstanding may affect it, cannot fail to be intimate and essential, and with which we have

acquired a new connexion by marriage. May I therefore presume to beg of your Lordship to lay me most humbly at His Majesty's feet, to represent these circumstances, and to move His Majesty to confer upon me one of the vacant red ribbons. Your Lordship is, I trust, already so well convinced of my zeal that it would be superfluous to add further professions. I shall only, therefore, observe that my constant wish during the space of more than fifteen years, which I have had the honour to serve His Majesty, has been to prove myself not unworthy of the confidence that he has deigned to repose in me."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1791, October 12, Whitehall.—"In considering the enclosed papers, it has struck me that the best way of bringing them under the deliberation of the King's servants would be that which your Lordship mentioned of drawing out a *projet* of the treaty, as it would stand according to the proposals now made. Perhaps you will be so good as to undertake this trouble, being so much more *au fait* than anybody else of the different parts of the business. It is for that purpose that I return you the enclosed, as you may not have copies of them here.

"One of the main objections which are urged against concessions on the subject of the 2nd and 3rd articles, is the difference which exists between our alliance now, which goes only to limited succours, and what it was formerly, when the Republic was obliged to declare war if we were attacked. It is therefore stated that there existed no danger in our former stipulations on the point of navigation, because they could have had any operation only in the case of an offensive war undertaken by this country. But that, under the present circumstances, they would apply to the case of our being attacked, and even when the Republic furnished her succours. I feel that there is a considerable degree of weight in this argument, and wish to know what occurs to you upon it.

"If you see no objection, I will write to Elliot referring to his having stated to you *an inclination to accept the Dresden Mission*, and expressing my readiness to recommend him to the King for it, if agreeable to him."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 12, Beckenham.—"I will with great pleasure undertake the task which you propose to me, and will endeavour to state the *projet* of the treaty in detail, conformably to what I really believe to be the ultimatum of the Republic. And if that ultimatum is compared not only with what has been offered and urged by every successive Ministry of the last fifty years down to the present Administration, but also with the different *projets* given to the States-General by Lord Malmsbury, we shall be found to have obtained an ultimatum infinitely better than could be expected, and, so far as I am capable of understanding the points in question, as good as we ought to urge.

"I must entreat a delay of four or five days; because the necessary papers are not immediately within my reach, and the *projet* is long, and I am here (thank God) without any secretaries. I hope to send the draft to your Lordship on Sunday or Monday. I presume that you

will have the goodness to present me to His Majesty on Wednesday, and I shall then learn your sentiments farther.

"When it is made an objection to our concessions (assuming them to be such which may well be disputed) that *we formerly had an offensive alliance, but that under the present circumstances the Republic is only to declare war in case of our being attacked, and may consequently enjoy the navigation proposed even after furnishing the stipulated succours*; it might be sufficient to answer that we never derived any advantage from the offensive alliance; at least that it never restrained the contraband trade which we are now to regulate within such bounds as may prevent it from producing material inconvenience hereafter. During the period of that offensive alliance, the Republic had a treaty with us which gave the whole principle of free ship free goods, and the Dutch always denied the stipulated succours, and insisted on the articles for the free navigation. At present we have brought them to a disposition to renounce the whole clandestine trade, and a great part of the legal trade in the West Indies; and, in Europe, to renounce the *cabotage*, and also the commerce of all the principal classes and descriptions of naval stores, ammunition, *et cetera*. I confess that, under these considerations, with the recent recollection of the armed neutrality, it surprises me that we hesitate; and I should feel this, if we had no more connection with the Dutch than we have with the Danes or Swedes; but we happen to have with them a close connection, and the only alliance that is, perhaps, of great and solid value in Europe. Our influence in the Republic is highly important to us; and, at present, it is as great as it is in Ireland or in any part of the King's dominions; and the adjusting of the treaty in question is the one thing needful both for cordiality in time of peace, and for the maintenance of a good understanding and friendly conduct in the event of a war with other Powers.

"I do not know whether I have expressed this with sufficient clearness.

"If your Lordship should think it best, I have no objection to your writing to Mr. Elliot that *I have communicated the substance of his letter to me on the subject of the Dresden Mission, and that you are ready to recommend him for that mission, if agreeable to him*. Perhaps he would like this better than the saying that *I have mentioned his inclination to have that mission*.

"With respect to Brussels, it might deserve consideration whether your Lordship would immediately name a successor to Lord Torrington, supposing (which is much to be wished) that he could be disposed of. A few months farther vacancy in that mission would not produce any inconvenience, and would be more calculated than any other measure to bring the Imperial Court to a right line of conduct on the subject of our half-ratified convention, respecting which there is much to be said."

J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 13, Dover.—"By the best information I can obtain here, Mr. Adair is probably still at Paris. If he comes over by this passage, I am sure of obtaining an exact list of his books, by which I shall probably be enabled to make out his cipher. It is, however, not unlikely that he may come over by the way of Brighthelmstone, and the interest I take in the complete discovery of this business induces me to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of employing a proper person at that port for the same purpose. Here and at Harwich our own agents, who may absolutely be depended upon, have enabled me to take such

measures as cannot be either defeated or discovered. At Brighthelmstoue, however, the business must be done by the Treasury, which cannot be at a loss to find a confidential person; and I confess I think it a matter of such importance, as very well to merit every exertion which can be made thoroughly to investigate it."

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM LINDSAY.

Private.

1791, October 14, Whitehall.—"I have written by this post to Lord Uxbridge to mention to him my intention of recommending to His Majesty the appointment of Mr. Paget (who is now at Berlin) to succeed you as Secretary of Legation at Petersburg. The actual appointment cannot, of course, take place till you are named to Venice, and that cannot be with propriety till Mr. Eden's arrival at Berlin, the precise time of which I have not yet learnt. It has, however, occurred to me that it would in many respects be useful that Mr. Paget should go to Petersburg as soon as he conveniently can, and I have desired Lord Uxbridge to mention this to him. If he should, in consequence of this, proceed there, I will trouble you to give him a letter to Mr. Whitworth, apprising him of his destination, and also any other assistance and information that may be in your power.

"Mr. Eliot, who is also at Berlin, is destined to succeed Mr. Jackson, and the knowledge of this circumstance will of course lead you to employ him in anything in which he can be useful while you remain there."

*Copy.*

EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 14, Paris.—"I send you the *pieces justificatives* which belong to Monsieur de Montesquiou's report *sur les finances*, and a letter against a congress in Germany, which I believe to be written by Monsieur de Calonne. I understand that *Monsieur* is as much a prisoner out of France as his brother is in it. His wish is to return *dans le sein de sa famille*; but his *entours* will not permit him to do so."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 17, Stirling.—"I send you two letters, with an official one respecting the Adjutant-General, from Lord Westmoreland. General Dundas is now appointed to the staff, and therefore nothing stands in the way of Colonel Hewitt's appointment if the King has no reason for postponing it. I know he has no objection to Hewitt, but I recollect his having said that it and the Commander-in-Chief might remain till I returned. That was probably from his not having made up his mind to the Commander-in-Chief's appointment, or, perhaps, it proceeded from a desire to let General Pitt be out of the way before the Adjutant-Generalship should be appointed contrary to his recommendation. I submit to you if the best thing for you to do will not be to mention to the King that I had transmitted to you the Lord Lieutenant's official recommendation of Colonel Hewitt, and had requested of you to mention to his Majesty that it was in your possession, and that you only

waited his pleasure when it would be most agreeable to him that it should be officially laid before him. You will perceive that Lord Westmoreland wishes for General Ward. As he is the next on the staff, it may, perhaps, occur to his Majesty. Of course you may suppose I cannot have any other wish than what is best for the general strength of the Government of Ireland, and, if possible, to prevent such disagreeable interferences in time to come.

"I was at the Council, as was likewise Mr. Pitt, when the Attorney and Solicitor-General's opinion (at least that of the first) was read. I confess it did [not] strike me that we took the business up very critically, but it seemed to be thought that we must follow our law opinions without using any latitude in our discretion. If it will be attended with any real inconvenience in Ireland I think still that opinion ought to be re-considered.

"The business of the Catholics will certainly be an unpleasant one whenever it comes forward, not so much, in my judgment, from the difficulty of the business upon its own abstract merits, as from the circumstances of the Irish being actuated more from their panics and apprehensions than from any exercise of their reason. Sir John Parnell is the only person I have met with from Ireland who appears to me to talk soundly and dispassionately on the subject."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, October 20], Lambeth Palace.—"As I presume that you have no commands for me, I am returning this morning to my farm. I was sorry that I missed the occasion of seeing you yesterday. Mr. Pitt said something to me about the Jassy rupture, but the circumstances of the Drawing-room did not allow him to mention any particulars.

"He told me that he would send some papers to your Lordship which you probably would have the goodness to confide to me. I wish much at your leisure to have the advantage of talking with you on that tithe question, which, I consider, as possibly of essential importance both in this country and in Ireland.

"I believe that Captain Sydney Smith is to wait on you to-day. He was solicitous with me that I should say what I know of him. I have long known him in Spain, in England, at the Hague, and I really believe him to be a most honourable man. With respect to his zeal and activity, my testimony is not wanting. His eccentric turn might, perhaps, with little or no expense, be employed to good purpose, and particularly in acquiring knowledge useful to Government in places proper to be explored. In order, however, to give weight to his reports, and to prevent the suspicion of their being influenced by the aridency of his mind, he should be accompanied by some officers in his vessel (if he should be any where employed) who might, at the same time, make their report. I do not know what can be done with him if he is not employed; for this country is not big enough for him in the epoch of peace which is, I hope, commencing."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

Private.

1791, October 20, Whitehall.—"In the absence of Mr. Dundas, I mentioned yesterday to the King the subject of the succession to the Adjutancy-General of Ireland, of which you speak in your private

letter to Dundas. I find that Colonel Hewitt will be perfectly agreeable to his Majesty, but that he wishes the formal recommendation to be delayed till a successor is appointed to General Pitt, in order that his retiring may not have the appearance of being occasioned by the other appointment. I imagine the delay cannot be productive of any inconvenience to you.

"I had some conversation with Hobart, and some with Parnell, when they were here, on the subject of the Irish Catholics. I am very sensible how imperfect my ideas are likely to be on a subject on which so much more local and personal knowledge than I possess are required, in order to enable anyone to form a correct judgment. But I cannot help feeling a very great anxiety that such measures may be taken as may effectually counteract the union between the Catholics and the Dissenters, at which the latter are evidently aiming. I may be a false prophet, but there is no evil that I should not prophesy if that union takes place in the present moment, and on the principles on which it is endeavoured to bring it about."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to MORTON EDEN.

*Private.*

1791, October 21, Whitehall.—"I think it right to lose no time in mentioning to you that an arrangement is made for Mr. Jackson's quitting the post of Secretary of Legation at Berlin, and that Mr. Eliot (son of Lord Eliot) who is now at Berlin, is destined to succeed him. I have every reason to be persuaded, from my knowledge of Mr. Eliot's character, that his conduct in that situation will be such as you would wish it. Lord Auckland mentioned to me your wishes in favour of Mr. Grey. There were circumstances which did not permit his being appointed to Berlin, but in order to remove any difficulty which you might feel on the subject, it is my intention, whenever Mr. Eliot's appointment is announced, to recommend Mr. Grey to his Majesty at the same time, as his Secretary of Legation at Dresden."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 23, Burton Pynsent.—"I understand from Sir G. Yonge that the King had settled that Sir J. Stuart's appointment should not be notified till we had learnt whether the Lord Lieutenant could acquiesce in our filling up the majority; and if he did, the majority was to be given to some officer whom Lord Elphinstone's son might succeed. The object, therefore, for him was not the Guards, but the majority which would be vacated. I wrote to Westmorland, and have for some time expected his answer. In this situation the arrangement must rest for the present; and it may be as well if it can be deferred till Sir G. Yonge returns. With regard to Major Walpole, the merit he states seems little more than negative, and as all his connections are hostile, I should think, unless his pretensions from standing in the service are stronger than I take them to be, the Lieutenant-Colonelcy might be better disposed of. At least it could not be decided in his favour without knowing whether, in this case, Lord Elphinstone's son could succeed him; as Lord Elphinstone has had repeated assurances, and has been too often disappointed.



"In brooding over the last news you told me, I am inclined to think, that whenever we know sufficiently the particulars of what has passed, we ought to lose no time in communicating our sentiments explicitly to the Porte, and those sentiments probably must be that they ought immediately to close, almost *at any rate*; at least that they must expect nothing from us. This, of course, cannot be done without a Cabinet, and I suppose you have not yet information particular enough to take any step upon it. If this strikes you in the same manner, and there is nothing to delay the business but my absence, I can, without much difficulty, be in town the end of the week, but I wish rather to stay till the time I mentioned. I have desired Long to speak to you respecting some information for Mackenzie, on the subject of the Dutch business in 1787.

*Postscript.*—"The King gave me an account of what the Chancellor had been impudent and foolish enough to say about the marriage, but did not mention the Prussian business. Lord Auckland told me he had spoken less favourably than usual of the Chancellor, but we had not time for the particulars."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Private.

1791, October 24, St. James's Square.—"I had before I received your letter spoken to the King about Colonel Hewitt, in consequence of the Lord Lieutenant's private letter. His Majesty entirely agrees to Hewitt's appointment, but wishes the thing to be delayed from delicacy to General Pitt. I have informed the Lord Lieutenant of this, and have directed Bernard to keep the official recommendation till you return.

"The corn business is in a train of re-consideration; I have no doubt that it ought to be decided in the way the Lord Lieutenant solicits.

"Nepean has mentioned to me a conversation of which he has probably given you an account, relative to the Catholics, which increases my anxiety that the Irish Government would form their opinion speedily on the subject. I much fear that it will end in their giving way too late, and without either having the credit of liberality, or deriving the benefit of attaching to English government that body which composes the effective mass of the people of Ireland. Perhaps you could, with advantage, send from Scotland some person into the north of Ireland to collect the general turn and impression of the middling and lower classes. I fear it is much less favourable than they believe in Dublin."

*Copy.*

#### WILLIAM LINDSAY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 25, Berlin.—"I received on Sunday last your Lordship's private letter concerning Mr. Paget, Mr. Eliot, and myself. I mentioned to Mr. Paget your Lordship's intentions with respect to him, in consequence of which he set off yesterday morning for Petersburg. I wrote by him to Mr. Whitworth, and gave him every information that I thought could be of use to him in the situation he is destined to fill. I also committed to his care the paper I was desired to forward to

Petersburg, and, as Mr. Paget passes through Warsaw, I thought it right to beg him to leave a copy of it with Mr. Hailes.

"Mr. Eliot left this place on Saturday last with Mr. Ewart, whom he intended to accompany as far as Paris. Mr. Ewart, however, having desired me to send an *estafette* after him with his letters, I took that opportunity of informing Mr. Eliot of the probability of his future destination, and am in hopes of seeing him back here in a few days.

"I have to offer your Lordship my most sincere acknowledgments for your kind intention of nominating me to Venice. I trust you are too well acquainted with my dispositions to make any professions on my part necessary. I shall, therefore, only say that I have the fullest confidence in the promise you were so good to make that my being at Venice should not prevent you from remembering that my only wish is to be of use to you and your cause, and I can with truth assure your Lordship that you will not easily find anyone who will serve you with more zeal, attention, and fidelity."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, October 26, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to lay before your Majesty, for your Majesty's signature, the answers to the letters of notification of the marriages of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and of the Hereditary Prince of Orange.

"The letter from the Stadtholder was written in his own hand, and Lord Grenville finds that on the occasion of the marriage of the Stadtholder, your Majesty was pleased to answer his letter of notification in your Majesty's own hand; but, as Lord Grenville was uncertain whether your Majesty might think proper to do so on the present occasion, he has sent the answer in the usual form for your Majesty's signature."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 27, Windsor.—"I am obliged to Lord Grenville for his information that the answer to the notification of the Prince of Orange's marriage was in my own hand; I have, therefore, followed this precedent on the present occasion."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 28, Beckenham.—"I beg leave to lay before you the enclosed letter which I have received from the Princess of Orange; it is, I presume, advantageous to us to promote the advancement and influence of the Stadholder's family, which, by necessity as well as by inclination, is attached to English interests. But I suspect that the good Princess, in despite of all her prudence, is driving this business too fast, and that the difficulties will be greater than she seems to expect; and this also is the sentiment of the Grand Pensionary who writes; '*Quoi-que j'approuve fortement la chose, je crains néanmoins qu'on aille trop vite en besogne; apparemment que des circonstances relatives au lieu ou aux individus ont haté la publicité. Jusqu'ici il n'y a rien de communiqué aux Etats-Generaux, ce qui devra se faire sous peu, de peur qu'on n'apprenne la chose d'autre part.*'

"I collect from the Grand Pensionary that the Court at Brussels is drawing the Republic into some arrangements of precaution against France. The Pensionary's phrase is remarkable; *On a fait des ouvertures ici pour des mesures de voisinage contre le mal François ; on a répondu par la démonstration d'une velléité réciproque A mon avis, il falloit répondre par une bouderie.*

"I have not had an opportunity of talking with your Lordship on the subject of the Austrian Netherlands, and I should be glad to correct my own opinions on that subject by yours. Hitherto I remain strongly persuaded that, upon the whole, it would be eligible for us to induce the Emperor to accept our ratification of the convention of last December.

"The emigrations from France, the bad news from the French colonies, and various other circumstances afford too much reason to apprehend that we shall soon see new troubles in Europe. According to the answer which Bergasse has published to Montesquieu's Report, the produce of all the Church and *wood* lands, and Crown lands when sold, will be forty millions sterling less than the amount of the new debts created. That answer contains many other curious circumstances."

*Enclosed.*

WILHELMINA, PRINCESS OF ORANGE, to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, October 14, Berlin.—"Vous m'avez si souvent témoigné l'intérêt que vous preniez à ma famille, et vous êtes vous-même si bon père, que je crois ne pouvoir mieux m'adresser qu'à vous au sujet d'une affaire qui m'intéresse particulièrement, et qui concerne mon fils cadet. Il est question de lui procurer un jour la succession au Duché de Courlande. La Cour de Berlin prend cette affaire à cœur; et la Duchesse de Courlande, qui se trouve actuellement ici, la désire beaucoup, ainsi que le Duc son époux. Il est question, en même temps, de lui donner en mariage une des filles de ce Duc, lorsqu'elle aura l'âge, à condition que l'inclination de cette jeune princesse, ou celle de mon fils, n'y mettent point obstacle. Cet établissement est si beau, si considérable pour un cadet de famille, que vous sentirez combien je dois désirer son accomplissement. Je me flatte que votre Cour voudra bien concourir aux démarches que celle de Berlin se propose de faire à Varsovie et à Petersbourg. Je sais qu'elle va s'en expliquer avec elle confidentiellement, et je souhaiterais que vous voulussiez bien me faire connoître les dispositions du Cabinet de St. James à cet égard. Jusqu'ici cette affaire n'étoit qu'une idée très vague; il eût été déplacé d'en occuper votre Cour; mais présentement qu'elle commence à prendre quelque consistance, je ne doute point que le Prince ne s'empresse d'en écrire lui-même au Roi, et je me flatte que Sa Majesté me permettra également de lui recommander les intérêts de mon fils, et de lui demander sa protection pour lui. Je m'acquitterai de ce devoir à mon retour dans la République, qui aura lieu incessamment."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, October 29, St. James's Square.—"Just as I received your Lordship's letter I was sitting down to write to you on the subject of that part of it which relates to the proposed arrangement with the Austrian Government in the Netherlands. Lord Henry Spencer sent over a communication of one part of this *projet*, which was officially communicated to him on the part of the States, and some secret articles which had been confided to him. Both, in my opinion, but

very particularly the latter, 'go a great deal too far, and may produce very serious inconvenience. In truth, if my opinion had been asked on the subject, it would have been given very nearly in the Pensionary's words which you mention to me. I think nothing can be more undignified than the stand which we have made against the Emperor's ratification of the Hague convention, if we are now, any of us, to acknowledge *that* as a subsisting convention, which the resolution of the States does in express terms. But, when it is proposed to go further, and to engage for reciprocal succours between the Austrian government and that of the Republic in case of any opposition to the present government in the latter, or to government in the Netherlands *que L'Empereur y a établi*, it seems to me that the States-General first acknowledge the propriety of the Emperor's conduct, which we have (both the Republic and we) always hitherto condemned; secondly, that they gratuitously embark in a very dangerous and serious business likely very soon to break out; and lastly, that the reciprocal stipulation is in itself highly dangerous to the present system of the government and constitution in the Republic. That system is connected with, and forms a part of, the political system in which the three allies are embarked. The Emperor cannot in his heart be very friendly either to the one or the other, and this stipulation will, as it seems to me, give him a right, in case of any disturbance (much more of any constitutional dispute between the members of the confederacy, as was the case in 1787) to decide which party are rebels, and to which his assistance is, in the execution of this treaty, to be given.

"I have written very hastily, and I fear hardly intelligibly, but I was anxious to put you on considering this point, which seems to me of infinite importance. I have ordered the two *projets* to be copied for you, as soon as they return from the King, and you will receive them with this letter. I shall be very anxious to converse with you on the subject between this and Tuesday, and as I shall remain in town the whole time, I will beg you to fix your own hour. If it would suit you to take a quiet dinner here either of the days, I shall be very glad to see you.

"I also send the famous manifesto about our treaty on which we will talk when you have read it."

*Copy.*

LOED AUCLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 29, Beckenham.—"I have this moment received your Lordship's letter and the papers which you had directed to be sent with it. I propose, in consequence of it, to consign to Lady Auckland and and to my daughters the whole duty of attending our parish church to-morrow morning, and to wait upon your Lordship in St. James's Square about ten o'clock. Under this speculation, I will not interrupt your Lordship farther at present on the subject of the proposed convention; farther than to remark that the first article of the *projet*, which takes the convention of the 10th of December for the basis of the new agreement, implies, or may be made to imply the ratification of that convention. My individual creed is that it would be for our advantage to accomplish the ratification; but as I remarked yesterday, I never have had the advantage of conversing either with your Lordship or Mr. Pitt on the subject, and I have an unaffected diffidence as to my own ideas respecting it. My general impression on the point is that the

convention of the 10th December, if duly ratified, would give us contingently a fair ground to interfere in the affairs of the Low Countries whenever and to whatever extent we might find convenient, without committing us against our inclination and policy in any possible case. I cannot apply this description to some of the articles of the new Dutch *projet*; but there is full time for your Lordship to give such direction to the business as you may judge expedient.

"Your Lordship will be glad to remark, and to mention to Lord Mornington, the cordial esteem which Lord H. Spencer has conceived for Mr. Wesley; the word *destination* in Lord Henry's letter refers to my having said that Lord Mornington meant to send his brother soon to Berlin to prosecute his travels.

"I also enclose a private letter from my brother. It is hardly worth perusal except in a moment of perfect leisure; farther than to certify that he is ready to proceed to his post immediately, and perhaps it may be material to expedite him.

"I will trouble your Lordship for these letters to-morrow.

"I cannot avail myself of your Lordship's hospitality farther than for a breakfast to-morrow; I have long been engaged to dine and sleep at Hayes; where we are to have a meeting of children."

"Our friend Welckeren, who is placed forwards in this Dutch business, is a great Imperialist. The Prince Stadthonder has no opinions, but a disposition to accede to anything proposed from any quarter; especially if it tends to embarrass any existing system, however good or advantageous."

#### WILLIAM LINDSAY TO LORD GREENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, October 29, Berlin.—"I take the opportunity of a Russian merchant who is just setting out for England, to send your Lordship this letter. If you should find its contents either tedious or uninteresting I hope you will impute my conduct to the only motive which actuates it, a desire to be of as much use to you as possible, and to communicate to you in the most confidential manner, not only the truth, but the whole truth, as far as I can discover it. I do this the more readily as I am convinced your Lordship will not abuse any confidence I may place in you. From everything I have seen and heard since my arrival here, it appears most evidently that the ill-humour which has been represented as so strong against England, was more levelled against the persons of those who were employed in the English mission than against the British nation in general; and however strange your Lordship may think it, it is not the less true that Mr. Ewart, ever since he has been invested with the character of Minister Plenipotentiary, has been universally detested at this Court on account of the haughtiness and arrogance with which he has carried himself towards all ranks of men. The best informed people here talk with the utmost candour of the conduct of the King's confidential servants, and they do not impute any part of the failure of the business last spring to their want of zeal or ill-will; but they think Messires Ewart and Hertberg misrepresented everything to their respective principals in order to promote their own private views and interests. On the same principle, it is very generally thought that if the two Courts had rightly understood each other, every disagreeable circumstance would have been avoided, and much treasure saved. I shall not pretend to say how far these opinions are founded, but I own that an attentive

perusal of the correspondence convinces me most perfectly that the public judgment is not very far from the truth. I have the pleasure to assure your Lordship that the nomination of Mr. Eden to this mission has given very general content, principally because his character is supposed to be very different from that of his predecessor; and as he is a gentleman, they say, they expect to hear the real truth from him; these are the very words of some of the leading people.

"When I arrived here, I found Mr. Ewart very much out of humour; he complained of being treated *like a dog* at being ordered away on so short a notice, and not being permitted to stay to sign the contract of the Duke of York's marriage which he expected I should have brought out ready to be concluded. He said he could trace *this plot* to my Lord Auckland, who he thinks his implacable enemy; and when I happened to say, by chance, that it was reported in London that Lord Auckland would not return to the Hague, but was likely to get some employment at home, he was near fainting with passion, and used the strongest expressions tending to criminate the character of Lord Auckland. Mr. Jackson also has left a bad name behind him. It seems that during his residence here he paid his court to a daughter of Mr. Bishoffwerder, and it is said that, through the means of that gentleman, the King of Prussia was persuaded to write to England in favour of Mr. Jackson, desiring that he might have a mission. In the meantime, in order to continue his intimacy at the house of Mr. Bishoffwerder (which politically was supposed to be useful to him) Mr. Jackson promised the daughter marriage, and is said to have gone such lengths as to render a marriage necessary in order to re-establish the reputation of the young lady, who is of one of the best families here, and is *dame d'honneur* to the Queen. Mr. Jackson, notwithstanding his promise, has written from England to say that his friends are against his marrying, and that, of course, he cannot act contrary to their wishes. This story which, I confess, does no honour to the character of an Englishman, makes a great noise here, and has indisposed exceedingly Mr. Bishoffwerder against everything that is English. Your Lordship will, perhaps, be surprised that a German young lady of great rank, and daughter to the King's favourite, should have wished to connect herself for life with a son of Dr. Jackson, but it must be observed, on the other hand, it was reported here that he was a near relation of the Duke of Leeds. Your Lordship will excuse my mentioning these trivial circumstances, but the most disagreeable effects often arise from causes not more essential. The late *patriot* Pensionary of Holland conceived (though a very clever man) the most inveterate hatred against the whole English nation, on account of a trivial slight he thought he had received (30 years before the revolution took place in '87) at the table of Lord Dover. The gentleman's name who I mentioned to your Lordship *as the friend* of the Duke of York, is Schâc.

"In perusing the correspondence, I find a very curious paragraph in one of Mr. Fox's despatches. He says he 'leans to an alliance with Prussia and Russia rather than with Austria *because he thinks the keeping the key of all the European naval stores a very great and important object.*' Your Lordship will judge how far his late conduct in Parliament agrees with the above opinion, as he has certainly done everything in his power to forge another key, and to give it to the natural enemies of his country. I do not find that Lord Malmsbury's journey hither had any other object than the ostensible one of congratulating the Duke of York on his marriage, which, he said, was an event so consonant to all his public as well as private feelings that he thought it both a duty and a pleasure to compliment His Royal Highness in person."

## CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, October 29, St. Petersburg.—“Mr. Lindsay has mentioned to me what your Lordship has been so good as to say with respect to my remaining in this country, and that, under the present circumstances, it would not be expected that I should continue in this post longer than might be agreeable to myself. It is, however, with much satisfaction, both on my own account and on that of my mission, that I am enabled to assure your Lordship that, since those obstacles to the good harmony of the two Courts have been removed, my situation here is become infinitely less irksome, Her Imperial Majesty having, for some time past, treated me again with the same kindness to which I had been accustomed, and which has always been shown to His Majesty's Ministers at her Court. What I have therefore to request of your Lordship is, that my services and the unpleasant situation in which I have found myself in the course of them, may be taken into consideration at a future period, and that your Lordship will, when a fit opportunity offers, lay me most humbly at His Majesty's feet, as one most sincerely and zealously devoted to his person and service.

“I shall, when I think that I can do it without indiscretion, entreat your Lordship to obtain for me a leave of absence, but I feel it incumbent upon me at this moment to remain upon my post, in order to avail myself of any favourable circumstances which the present critical period may produce.

“In a former letter I took the liberty of mentioning the subject of a red riband, which I confess, in the present situation of affairs, as well as with respect to what is past, would be a circumstance infinitely agreeable to me; and the more so as Her Imperial Majesty has thought proper to confer a distinction of the same nature on her Minister in London, since the conclusion of the business.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Private.

1791, October 29, Whitehall.—“I have had two conversations with young Mr. Burke upon the subject of the Irish Catholics, and particularly (in consequence of the Lord Lieutenant's request) I have desired information with respect to the nature of the body by which he is authorised. He has, this morning, put into my hands several papers, copies of which you will receive by Monday's post. They all serve to confirm the apprehensions which I entertain of danger from the attempts the Dissenters are making to form a union with the Catholics; and I think they sufficiently show that the Committee, to which Mr. Keogh belongs, are persons of weight and responsibility, though it may perhaps be impossible for any persons to answer completely for the whole body. What I said to Mr. Burke was confined to general assurances of the favourable disposition of Government to do all that should, on consideration, appear to be reasonable and practicable; but I thought it material to go so far as that, in order that they might not think that their application was rejected, and turn their attention elsewhere. I am sorry to see some marks of jealousy on the subject in the Irish Government, and much disposition in its supporters to fear a danger which I take to be much the smaller and more remote, and to overlook one which seems to be greater and more pressing.

“I wish you would write to Hobart to desire him not only to come over himself at the time he talked of, but also to collect all the informa-

tion he possibly can on this point, and to endeavour to prevail on the Irish Chancellor and any one else whose opinion he thinks material, to come immediately after the Michaelmas term, in order that the subject may be well and deliberately considered, with all the advantages we can procure for forming a decision upon it. If I am not very much mistaken, it is one of the most important questions in its consequences that could possibly occur."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1791, October 31, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty the copy of a letter from the States General, and humbly requests to know whether your Majesty would approve of Baron Nagell's having an audience on Wednesday to deliver the original.

"As Mr. Eden's appointment to Berlin will be notified in the *Gazette* to-morrow, Lord Grenville takes the liberty of submitting to your Majesty the name of Mr. William Eliot, son of Lord Eliot, as Secretary of Legation to that mission. Lord Grenville believes that he has already had the honour of mentioning this appointment to your Majesty, but, as he is not quite sure of it, he has taken the liberty to trouble your Majesty with it in this manner."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO CHARLES WHITWORTH.

*Private.*

1791, November 1, Whitehall.—"If I have hitherto delayed answering your private letters of the 17th June, and 21st and 27th of July, I hope you have not thought it has been owing to any want of personal attention towards you. Different circumstances have prevented my writing, but particularly the expectations which I have had from time to time of a means of conveyance which would have allowed me to write more fully to you than I can do in this manner; and the feeling myself unable, as I still am, to say anything decisive to you on the principal point stated in your first letter. I send this only for the purpose of assuring you that I have not been inattentive to what you have mentioned, and that it will always be a real pleasure to me, whenever circumstances may enable me to mark in a proper manner the sense which I entertain of your zeal for the King's service; although it is impossible for me as yet to determine how far it may, or may not, be in my power to do it in the manner which you have pointed out."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO MORTON EDEN.

*Private.*

1791, November 1, Whitehall,—"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters, marked private, of the 12th and 19th ultimo. I send by this messenger your letters of credence and instructions, and I have great satisfaction in learning that you will be able to leave Dresden so soon. I have not failed to mention to his Majesty this proof of your zeal for his service.

"I have also laid before the King your request that his Majesty would confer upon you one of the vacant red ribbons, and I have the



pleasure to acquaint you that his Majesty has been pleased to comply with the request. The riband will be sent to you after your arrival at Berlin."

*Copy.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, November 1, Philadelphia.—"In addition to the account of my conversation with Mr. Jefferson contained in my dispatch No. 2, I think it necessary to observe to your Lordship that, as that gentleman dwelt so much upon the delay (of even two months) that must necessarily take place if the President should fix upon any gentleman who might be at a very considerable distance, I informed him that, in that case, which is not a very probable one, I should consider an assurance from the President of his having offered the appointment to a gentleman at a distance, and of his waiting only for the account of his acceptance to make it public, as a sufficient justification for me to present my credentials. I flatter myself that your Lordship will not regard this as a material deviation from my instructions, not only as I conceived that such a latitude might be fairly given to the term nomination, but as I concluded that the existence of such a cause of delay could not be in your Lordship's contemplation at the time of giving me those instructions, and as I was unwilling to impress the public with an opinion either that I entertained any distrust of this Government, or that I was too scrupulously tenacious in my adherence to forms.

"Since my arrival in this country I have received every mark of politeness and respect from the persons of consideration in this Government. As far as I have hitherto been able to learn, a majority of the leading characters in the country is not only well inclined, but solicitous, to promote a good understanding between Great Britain and America, in preference to a connection with any other European power.

"Your Lordship will readily imagine that the French Revolution has attracted a considerable degree of attention in this country; but it does not appear to have excited so much admiration and applause as might perhaps have been expected. Paine's pamphlet, though it has not added to the popularity of that writer, has produced a very open diversity of sentiment between Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Adams. The latter gentleman in conversations (and I understand also in writing) is very warm in his animadversions upon that event, and in his defence of the English Constitution."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1791, November 1], Beckenham.—"I hope that the enclosed will be conformable to the instructions which I received from you yesterday. I think that it will prevent the Republic from doing anything precipitate, and at the same time avoid giving any ill-humour to our friends there. In the mean time, Lord Henry must exert himself in obtaining a regular communication. A confidential line, in cipher, from your Lordship to Sir Robert Keith (who has great influence with M. de Haefen) would effectually prevent any improper step from being taken at Vienna.

"I shall wait on your Lordship on Friday at the Office, at half-past 12, or at any time sooner, if you have any commands. I shall write fully to my brother by your Lordship's messenger of to-night, respecting M. de Reede and various other characters at Berlin.

"If your Lordship should not disapprove the enclosed, you will have the goodness to direct it to be sent with your despatches."

WILLIAM LINDSAY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1791, November 2, Berlin.—"In my public letter, No. 5, I mentioned having heard a good deal of complaint from a certain quarter; this, however, I have the pleasure to assure your Lordship was not made against the English nation in general, or the King's confidential servants in particular, but merely against the person of the late Minister, who everybody here seems to take delight in abusing; all the coolness which has lately subsisted between the two Courts being attributed to the misrepresentations and bad conduct of that gentleman, and of his friend and patron here.

"I heard yesterday from Mr. M. Eden, who informed me he was waiting for His Majesty's orders, which he expected to receive in a few days. His letter was dated October 29; he had not then settled any day for his departure from Dresden, but said he believed he should set out in about three weeks.

"Monsieur de St. Priest is just arrived here from Warsaw in his way to Sweden. He gave me a detail of Potemkin's death, the immediate cause of which, it seems, was an indigestion. He was recovering from a violent fever, and was nearly in a state of convalescence when he took it into his head to eat almost a whole turkey stuffed with truffles, which his stomach, as yet very weak from his late illness, was totally unable to digest. Finding himself much oppressed, he grew frightened at his situation, and desired to be removed from Yassy into the country. During the journey, however, the weight on his stomach increased so much that he was obliged to stop the carriage, and to have his bed prepared for him in the open air; he died immediately after being put to bed. I beg your Lordship's pardon for troubling you with so long a history, but the circumstances appeared to me curious, and this ridiculous manner of going out of the world is so consonant to the character of Potemkin that I think it very likely to be true. It is thought here that Count Besborodko will now become the leading man at Petersburg. I can venture to assure your Lordship, however, that there is nobody now at the Empress's Court who has abilities or industry sufficient to make himself much distinguished; and it is probable that the influence at Petersburg will be a good deal divided, especially as *divide et impera* is a very favourite maxim of the Empress; and her deviation from this principle in the instance of Potemkin is said to have cost her many bitter moments.

"Prince Alexis Orloff is the person in whom the Empress has the greatest confidence, and he is certainly the most likely man to come forward; and, as he is universally adored in Russia, the Empress might regain much popularity by replacing him in her good graces. His sentiments, your Lordship knows, are perfectly English.

"This Court, for the last two years, seems to have been very imperfectly informed with respect to Russia. Mr. Whitworth as well as myself knowing the sources from which they derived their intelligence, and not being able to make Mr. Ewart's letters to us coincide

with the truth, often suspected that things had been misrepresented here, and an attentive perusal of the correspondence has confirmed my suspicions on this head.

"Every thing here is in a state of tranquillity."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, November 6, Beckenham.—"I send the enclosed because they relate to sundry businesses within your Lordship's view, though I doubt whether they are worth even your most hasty perusal. Will you have the goodness to desire Mr. Goddard to put them into a blank cover and to return them to me by the post.

"As to Mr. Merry's letters, the transaction is handsome on the part of the Spanish Minister and his lady; and the sheep, if disposed of at Mr. Christie's, would produce infinitely more than the value of the present alluded to by Mr. Merry; yet I doubt how far that suggestion will be relished, and presume that it will be best to leave it to the management of Sir J. Banks, His Majesty's *Ministre des affaires philosophiques*.

"As it does not appear with certainty whether the last page of Lord Henry's letter has been communicated, I send it.

"My brother's letter shows that Mr. Ewart, having marred the Berlin situation for himself, is very desirous to make it unacceptable to his successors.

"If your Lordship and Mr. Pitt think proper to go to the bottom of the question discussed in Lord Henry's paper, and to decide upon it after a full consultation with Mr. Wynne and Mr. Scott, I will endeavour to prepare a statement of the several essential questions within the smallest compass."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, November 7, St. James's Square.—"I am much obliged to you for the perusal of the enclosed, which I return. I have long thought. Ewart exaggerated the indisposition of the people at Berlin towards us, and Lindsay's account to me of his reception confirms the supposition. I hope Ewart's letter will not have had too much impression upon your brother, as, sometimes, the expectation of being ill received is apt to make one think that one is so, when it is not intended.

"Lord St. Helens has written me a private letter to the same effect. with Merry's to you. I thought I could not do otherwise than send it to the King, as Merry, in his letter to Banks, does not mention the proposed return. Perhaps it might be right for you to send Merry's letter to you to Sir Joseph, *without observation upon it*.

"The extract from Petersburg had been sent here, and I infer from it interference in Polish affairs. I think you cannot do better towards bringing the affairs of the treaty to a point than make out the questions in the manner you propose. Pray let me know when you come to town again, for I am desirous to have an opportunity of talking tithe and East India over with you; and also to mention to you the idea of a *concio ad clerum* from the Archbishop, which is I think extremely wanted."

Copy.

A 78290.

P

## CHARLES WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, November 7, St. Petersburg.—“I beg leave to trouble your Lordship with a few words on the subject of Mr. Paget's appointment to succeed Mr. Lindsay at this Court, and to represent to your Lordship that I cannot help thinking that it would be infinitely more eligible for him to be considered as merely attached to the mission without any character, than to be put upon the footing of Secretary of Legation, which at this Court is a post very little regarded. Feeling for the awkward situations to which I have been witness, without being able to remedy, in the cases of Mr. Fraser and Mr. Lindsay, I have frequently thought of mentioning this subject, and to propose that some young man of fashion and fortune, such as Mr. Paget, might be attached to the mission; and, at the same time that he forms himself by a free communication to the archives, and by a constant attention to the current business, he may be upon a proper footing in society, from which as Secretary he is in a great measure excluded. These are advantages which certainly more than counterbalance the stipend which he might receive as Secretary, of which he would not stand so much in need, as he, of course, would live in my house, where he is supplied with every thing he may have occasion for; and I would wish to be at liberty to retain a very valuable and deserving man as Secretary, without any particular commission from His Majesty, but enjoying either the whole or at least two-thirds of the salary allotted hitherto to the Secretary of Legation. The person for whom I solicit this favour is a Mr. Eton, formerly the head of a very considerable trading house at Constantinople, but who, through the treachery of his partner, failed, and was obliged to accept of Prince Potemkin's invitation to come to Russia.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 10, Stowe.—“I should be very seriously alarmed at your intelligence if I could think it deserved credit; but a retreat to Bangalore on the 15th May must have been known both at Madras and at Bombay by the 1st June, and must have been known in England by the 9th November (upwards of 22 weeks) sooner than by the circuitous route of Pondicherry and the Isle de France. At the same time it is not impossible that Tippoo (who could not know the Spanish convention) might have sent such an account to the French Government in India, in hopes of their assistance. The retreat, covered by *Mahratta* horse, cannot be true, as every step of that retreat would be out of their route, even if any of the *Mahratta* cavalry had joined, which does not, I believe, appear by any information to have been the case. However, a few days must decide, and I thank you for the kindness of your early attention to me.

“I have heard often from Hobart, whose accounts of Ireland are most unpleasant. I find that all their advisers are unanimous in their wish to resist any concessions to the Catholics, and the consequence of such a resistance is, to my conception, most obvious.”

*Seal of arms.*

## LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM LINDSAY.

Private.

1791, November 11, Whitehall.—“I have only time to thank you for your private letter of the 29th ultimo which confirms the impression

I had received on the subject of it. There is one sentence in it which alludes to something which is gone out of my mind, where you mention to me the name of a person whom you say you had mentioned to me before. Perhaps it is of no consequence, but, if it is, I should be obliged to you to let me know what it relates to.

"The best-informed people give no credit to the news from Pondicherry. It makes me however very anxious to hear directly from Lord Cornwallis. I have not said anything more in my public letters on the subject of the contract on the marriage of the Duke of York, because it is now in the lawyers' hands. I shall press them as much as possible to hasten it, but the motions of lawyers in this country, where every thing is obliged to be done with so much attention to form, are a little apt to be slow.

"I shall omit nothing that depends on me to bring that business to its conclusion without delay.

*Postscript.*—"I have just received your private letter of the 2nd instant, and am obliged to you for the information it contains. I think it however right to suggest to you that a part of it might, perhaps, have been better in cipher."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, November 12, Beckenham.—"I understand from Lord Henry Spencer that, pursuant to your Lordship's instruction, he has obtained from the Grand Pensionary an official communication of the secret articles sent to M. de Haeften. He adds that as those articles turn on some points which the Pensionary considers as advantageous to the Republic, and *as they are the work of his own hand*, a considerable degree of management may be necessary in giving the turn which His Majesty's Minister may wish to give to the negotiation. As Lord Henry adds that my private letter to the Pensionary has had a good effect, I suppose I shall receive an answer to it either from him or from the Greffier by the next mail.

"Lord Henry remarks on some despatches which Mr. Lindsay has sent to your Lordship on the subject of the Russian and Swedish treaty, that *it appears as if Mr. Ewart had given him a few lessons in politics before he quitted Berlin*. I know too little of that Swedish transaction to reason about it, but I do not incline to lay much stress on any measure that His Swedish Majesty in his present circumstances may take. Nor do I believe that the Empress will acquire either glory or advantage from this new alliance which must tend to weaken her present connection with Denmark, and will last no longer than it is paid for. In the extravagant disposition of the parties however there is one possible consequence which might embarrass us; if they were to issue some Quixotish declaration that the Baltic, in respect to the armaments of foreign powers, shall be considered as *mare clausum*. I doubt whether either we or the Dutch could or ought to submit to it; but so gratuitous a scrape on their part, though possible, is not probable.

"I really am sorry, under all the circumstances and speculations of the times, that Lord Hawkesbury's manifesto is likely to impede the rivetting of our friendship with the Republic; I think that it will do so. If his reasonings are well founded (which I do not believe they are) they ought to prevail; and if they are ill founded, they necessarily

induce a pause and more caution and doubt than otherwise have been used. I am prevented from preparing the questions which your Lordship directed me to put upon paper on this subject, because Mr. Pitt has taken away Lord Hawkesbury's dissertation, in order to its being exchanged for another which is said to be more correct.

"We are kept now in a state of great uneasiness as to East India affairs; and also as to news from the West. It is never otherwise; there are always abundant objects of anxiety in the world.

"I send this scrawl by the Archbishop, who has passed three days here."

#### P. COLQUHOUN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 15, George Street, Adelphi.—"As your Lordship was pleased to suggest that it would not be disagreeable to you to be informed of any authentic intelligence I might receive from America through the channel of persons of rank and weight in the affairs of that country, I presume to lay before you the enclosed letters."

*Two enclosures.*

#### 1. ROBERT MORRIS to P. COLQUHOUN.

1791, August 27, Philadelphia.—"I have learnt through the channel of a friend some particulars relative to the report of the Privy Council for trade in your nation relative to this country, and it seems a sentiment founded thereon that your Government want better information from this country than they possess. Let a Minister therefore be sent out as soon as possible. He should be a man of sense, family, *and weight of character*, or your nation will not do herself justice by an inferior representative."

#### 2. JOHN BROWN CUTTING to P. COLQUHOUN.

1791, October 12, New York.—"Yesterday I arrived here. I despatch this merely to tell you so. I have already seen and conversed with many persons here. Much as I had anticipated concerning the credit and even opulence of the United States, and the consequent improvements in agriculture, arts, and commerce, I had no adequate conception of either till I came on the spot.

"The Secretary of Finance had the whole 12 millions of Bank stock subscribed within half-an-hour. Offers of four millions of dollars extra subscription were refused. Bank stock is selling current five hundred dollars a share. The six per cents, to be delivered next January, sell here for 17. 1s. 10d. the pound; the other species of stock higher in proportion. The people feel themselves free and happy. I regret to add that most of those with whom I converse express an utter indifference, and even a repugnancy to a commercial treaty with Great Britain. I hope to find a different disposition elsewhere. But I much fear Mr. Hammond will come out too late. It would have been very advantageous to the two countries, in my opinion, if he had arrived long since. I hope I may find reasons at Philadelphia to distrust this opinion."

*Copy.*

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, November 16, Philadelphia.—“Although I am fearful of trespassing upon your Lordship's goodness, I am too solicitous of being justified in your opinion from the imputation of having either misunderstood or exceeded your instructions, not to take the liberty of troubling you once more on the subject of presenting my credentials.

“In addition to the motives which I have had the honour of stating to your Lordship in my despatch of this day as having influenced my conduct upon this occasion, there were others, resulting from a consideration of the actual political state of this country, which weighed not less forcibly upon my mind, in inducing me to assign some latitude (if in fact I have assigned any) to the interpretation of your Lordship's instructions.

“The Congress has been assembled ever since my arrival, and the circumstances that delayed my appearance in my public character could be not secret to any individual in it. As my communications have necessarily been with Mr. Jefferson, to whose political principles your Lordship is not a stranger, I had no reason to expect from that gentle man a favourable, perhaps not a faithful or candid exposition of the motives by which I had been actuated. His adherents in the two Houses might not, to answer their purposes, have hesitated to throw out insinuations in regard to my scruples which the friends of a British interest might have found it difficult to repel, or to which they themselves might in some measure have become converts. This is not merely a speculative opinion of mine, as I know that one or two Senators, sincerely desirous of cultivating a good understanding with Great Britain, have expressed apprehensions nearly to this effect, should I have manifested a more than necessary attention to punctilio and form.

“There is another consideration of, perhaps, not less moment. Mr. Jefferson, in conformity to the order of last session, is expected shortly to make his report upon the relative commercial situation in which this country stands to the respective nations of Europe. It is said that he has uniformly encouraged the belief that England would never send a Minister to this country, nor evince a desire to enter into a fair commercial arrangement with it. If such is or was intended to have been the foundation of his reasoning on the subject of Great Britain, there is perhaps nothing that can be more embarrassing to him in the prosecution of such a mode of reasoning, or furnish a more satisfactory answer to it if urged, than my actual appearance in a public character, prepared by your Lordship's instructions to enter into the immediate discussion of arrangements, commercial as well as political, upon fair and honourable principles of mutual benefit.

“I could, my Lord, add other observations of a similar tendency if I were not unwilling to swell this letter to a greater length. I will therefore conclude it by expressing my hope that they are unnecessary, and that I shall have the honour of having your Lordship's sanction to my opinion that the President's offer of an appointment, under the circumstances of delay and distance which I have mentioned, is a nomination, or if not so literally, is as nearly equivalent to it as can be conceived.”

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM LINDSAY.

Private.

1791, November 18, Whitehall. *In cipher*.—“I could wish that the explanation given in your private letter of what you say in your despatch

relative to Count Schulenburg's complaints, had been in some manner stated in your public correspondence, though, of course, with the delicacy due to Mr. Ewart. As it now stands, the public letter conveys an impression different from what I understand from you to be the fact with regard to the dispositions of the Prussian Ministers towards this country. Probably, however, this letter may not reach you till after Mr. Eden's arrival, and it will then be too late to do anything about it."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, November 19, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville presents his compliments to the Lord Chancellor, and has the honour to inclose the draught of a warrant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and of the report accompanying it, which he has just received from Sir William Scott. If this form appears to the Lord Chancellor to be unexceptionable, Lord Grenville will lose no time in submitting it to his Majesty, as his Majesty expressed to Lord Grenville his wish that the marriage might be solemnized as soon as possible after the arrival of his Royal Highness, who, as Lord Grenville understands, is expected in town this day."

*Copy.*

LORD THURLOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 19, Dulwich.—"Thinking it possible that, in a business of this nature, I might be called upon for that purpose, I had prepared the form of a warrant to the Archbishop, which was necessarily the first step; and also the form of a licence, which I meant to communicate to his Grace, that this also might be well considered.

"But observing at our last meeting that your Lordship, who was to hold the pen, and all the King's confidential servants thought it safer to take the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General on the licence (if I remember right) which, though the Archbishop's concern, would be to contain the warrant, and the marriage articles or settlements, as I think they were called, I did not presume to trouble you with my formulary or sentiments till you were prepared with the information which was thought so essential; and the rather, because I supposed the answer to these questions, as I understood them, would be returned in 24 hours; and the rather, as I imagined the answer to those questions, if I remember them right, would have such as would have afforded me a very early opportunity of submitting my poor thoughts to his Majesty's confidential servants.

"Instead of that, your Lordship, I perceive, was pleased by your order of last Wednesday, to direct them to consider whether the old form of warrant were proper on the present occasion; or whether the same should be varied in any, and what respects.

"The old form, it was obvious, was wholly improper for the present occasion, and they have varied it.

"I am now honoured with your Lordship's commands to give my opinion on the form they have proposed, which I should be loth to do without first conversing with them who have considered the subject, which I propose to do on Monday.

"In the meantime I trouble your Lordship with a copy, which I happen to have here, of the formulary I had proposed; and which still, speaking on the sudden, I prefer in some respects to that prepared by



the Attorney and Solicitor-General. This I do because your Lordship informs me that his Majesty wishes the ceremony to proceed immediately. But if the occasion will wait for it, I should be glad to converse with those gentlemen, both on the form of the warrant and on the licence to issue in pursuance of it. I do not trouble your Lordship with the form I had proposed of the last, because, I suppose, that is chiefly the Archbishop's concern."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, November 20, St. James's Square.—"I had, last night, the honour to receive your Lordship's letter, inclosing the draft of a warrant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, which I now return to your Lordship,

"The mode of reference adopted on the present occasion was, as I conceive, strictly regulated by what was settled at the last meeting of His Majesty's confidential servants on the subject, at which meeting your Lordship was present; and was conformable to the minute then taken, read, and approved; and which it was agreed that I should lay before his Majesty. If we had at that time been apprised that this mode appeared to your Lordship in any respect exceptionable, or if we had received any intimation that your Lordship was yourself willing to undertake the business of preparing the drafts of the official instruments necessary on this occasion, the delay of the reference to the King's Law Servants might have been avoided.

"As I now understand that your Lordship wishes to converse with those gentlemen, both on the form of the warrant, and on that of the licence, before your Lordship gives your opinion thereupon, I shall certainly suspend laying the warrant before the King, being persuaded that, notwithstanding the wish which his Majesty was pleased to express that the business might proceed with all convenient expedition, his Majesty will approve of my delaying it on this account. But as your Lordship mentions that you expect to be able to converse with the King's Law Servants on this subject on Monday, I take the liberty of requesting your Lordship to inform me whether it will be convenient to your Lordship to meet the rest of the King's confidential servants on Monday evening, in order that we may then finally settle this business."

*Copy.*

LORD THURLOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 20.—"The letter your Lordship was pleased to honour me with this afternoon observes that 'if you had received any intimation that I was myself willing to undertake the business of preparing the drafts of the official instruments necessary on this occasion, the delay of the reference to the King's Law Servants might have been avoided.'

"If this was meant seriously (of which I have some doubt) surely it was not possible, in my situation, to obtrude an offer on the Secretary of State to draw the instruments which were to flow from his Office, and which he had proposed to employ others to draw. I certainly felt that to be impossible at any rate; and more particularly, because I am afraid my poor ideas upon some articles would not have the good fortune to tally with your Lordship's judgment. Before presuming to make such an offer I must have been honoured with your Lordship's sentiments on points which never have been, and, therefore, I suppose, were never meant to be, referred to my consideration.

"Nor is it easier to guess what delay has been occasioned by my fear to give that intimation, which seems to be thought so natural. It is ten days, I believe, or a fortnight, since the reference was made. The probable answer to it might have been expected in a short time. What it was, or when it came, I do not know at this hour; though it is suggested that I was a party, or *conformable*, to the minute of reference. I now presume it was at least received before the 17th instant, when your Lordship desired the Law Officers to consider whether the old form of warrant to the Archbishop would do, or what variations should be made in it.

"If it was determined that the marriage should be celebrated, it was manifest this warrant must be the first step. It was equally manifest that the old form would not do since the statute, and after the marriage. I could not know there was any difficulty found in adapting the instrument to the occasion. It seems in no degree implied in the general reference to draw all the instruments for which there appeared to me a different reason, applicable to a different instrument. If any difficulty had arisen in preparing the warrant before the last meeting, or before the 17th instant, it might have been stated to the Cabinet and solved there; or by the King's Law Servants on a private reference, in the manner now justly preferred by your Lordship.

"But your Lordship *now* understands that I want to converse with those gentlemen. That is *now* true, because they have used a different form than I had thought of; and it would not be decent in me to dispose of their opinions, referred to and reported, without even enquiring into the grounds and reasons of them.

"Hearing that His Majesty was desirous of expedition, I took the freedom of troubling your Lordship with the scroll of a warrant I accidentally found here; that, either with or without the King's Law Servants, your Lordship might take which, in part, or in the whole, your Lordship might think fit. But as your Lordship was pleased to send it back again, I will communicate it to-morrow to the Attorney and Solicitor-General."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 20, Queen's House.—"I think it right to acquaint Lord Grenville that the Duke of York had supposed that it would be necessary the marriage ceremony should be re-performed here, and before he left Berlin apprised the King of Prussia of it, so that no difficulty on the subject remains; and I desire Lord Grenville will, as soon as he receives an answer from the lawyers as to the form of warrant to the Archbishop of Canterbury for the licence, have one prepared.

"That there may be no disputes as to precedence, I desire Lord Grenville will examine the Act of King Henry VIII., which is the foundation of all precedence in this country, whether the Duchess of York does not take rank after the Princess Royal in preference to my second daughter, Princess Augusta, as [or] whether my younger daughters take rank of her."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1791, November 20, St. James's Square.—"Lord Grenville has just been honoured with your Majesty's commands, and begs leave humbly

to acquaint your Majesty that he received yesterday from your Majesty's Advocate, Attorney, and Solicitor-General, the draft of a warrant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and sent it to the Lord Chancellor for his consideration. By the Lord Chancellor's answer, which Lord Grenville received last night, he understands that the Lord Chancellor has some doubts with respect to the form prepared by your Majesty's Law Servants, and that he is to converse with them on the subject in the course of to-morrow. Lord Grenville, therefore, hopes to be able to submit the warrant to your Majesty to-morrow night or Tuesday morning.

"Lord Grenville is inclined to think, as far as he is able to judge of the point of rank, that the same rule takes place with respect to the different branches of your Majesty's Royal Family as applies to individuals of inferior rank, between whom it is laid down by Judge Blackstone that unmarried women are entitled to the same rank as their eldest brothers would bear during the lives of their fathers, and that married women are entitled to the rank of their husbands. If this rule applies to the present case, as Lord Grenville apprehends it does, her Royal Highness the Dutchess of York would rank after her Royal Highness the Princess Augusta and the other Princesses, your Majesty's daughters."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 20, Beckenham.—"Be so good as to burn the enclosed after perusing the third and fourth pages.

"I do not interrupt you by visits in town because I presume that you have no commands for me; but I should be very glad to find you at your breakfast some morning when it might not be troublesome, in order to mention such small matters as may have occurred to me since we last met, and to rectify my own ideas on the general situation of affairs by such confidences as you may be pleased to make to me. If, however, I hear nothing from you, I do not believe that I shall go to town before the 30th.

"I have reason to believe, through a very good channel of information, that my brother will be favourably and cordially received at Berlin. Your Lordship seemed to think, and I was under the same supposition, that it was necessary to have a chapter in order to send him the ribbon. I learn accidentally from Sir Ralph Payne, who was here this week, that this is not the case when the decoration is made at a foreign court; and I believe that your Lordship's letter with the order is sufficient.

"The Princess of Orange would, I presume, feel very grateful if your Lordship would authorise Lord Henry Spencer to say to her that you have instructed Mr. Whitworth and Mr. Hailes to take any proper occasion to facilitate her wishes in the Courland business, in concert with the Prussian and Dutch Ministers. I have, however, strong suspicions that difficulties will arise far beyond her speculations."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791] November 21 [Stowe].—"You will easily conceive my disappointment at reading your letter, though you will as easily believe me fully sensible to your wishes (for your own sake as well as mine) to relieve me from these uncertainties. At present, however, I should guess

that no alteration is likely to take place before Parliament meets ; and if so, it is likely that the consideration will be put off till you bring it forward again. This, at least, is my present speculation from the very uncertain *data* of which I am possessed, not being master of any other fact *save that the Mastership of the Horse is filled*. But, I cannot avoid repeating my earnest hopes that the arrangement respecting the *Mint* may not be delayed by being referred to the same chapter of uncertainties, for such a delay may materially alter the remote object which I have in this business. I only mention this *to you*, and certainly shall not to any other person, but, when I last spoke to you upon it, you seemed to agree with me ; however, we can talk upon all these points when we meet.

"At present, my only object is to know from you *for certain* on what day the address will be moved in the House of Lords, as I certainly do not mean to come one moment sooner than is necessary, and, as certainly, should not come at all but for your sake. Let me know therefore by the return of the post (in one line) what day is fixed for business ; and upon what day *you* will want your pike of twenty pounds, and its accompaniment of doe venison.

"Simcoe is just returned from Lord Rawdon's. The creed of that house is that we have gained by the convention nothing but the seeds and certainty of constant litigation ; no one boundary being ascertained either north or south, or even west, save that of the twelve marine leagues."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 21, Queen's House.—"I fear Lord Grenville will think me punctilious to an extreme in writing a second letter for information on the subject of precedence of my six younger daughters, or of the Duchess of York ; it is alone from a wish that my determination may be correct. It seems to me, therefore, that Lord Grenville should send for Garter King-at-Arms [King of Arms] and, in his absence, for the senior of the College of Heralds, and state that information is required as to the regular precedence of the Princesses, that certainly the Princess Royal ranks next to a Princess of Wales, but that it should be stated whether the younger daughters of the Crown or the wives of younger sons of the Crown have the precedence."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, November 21, St. James's Square.—"I was this morning honoured with your Lordship's letter of yesterday's date.

"The contents of your Lordship's former letter made it necessary for me to state to your Lordship distinctly that my conduct on the occasion in question had been regulated by the decision of a Cabinet at which your Lordship was present, and that it had been conformable to the minute then taken, read, and approved.

"The subject matter to which this correspondence relates appearing to be now finally arranged, my sense of duty to the King's service prevents me from prolonging the discussion ; and more especially from making any of those observations which could not but suggest themselves to me on the particulars contained in your Lordship's last letter."

*Copy.*

## LORD THURLOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 21, Westminster Hall.—“I have laid the form which your Lordship returned before the Attorney and Solicitor General, who have approved it. To prevent delay, they have signed the scroll in the state it was. I now transmit to your Lordship both copies for your consideration.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [THURLOW].

1791, November 21, St. James's Square.—“Lord Grenville presents his compliments to the Lord Chancellor, and has just received his Lordships letter inclosing the draft of the warrant to the Archbishop of Canterbury, signed by the Attorney and Solicitor General. As Lord Grenville understands that the Lord Chancellor approves of this form, Lord Grenville will lose no time in submitting it to his Majesty for his signature. As the Cabinet are to meet this evening only for the purpose of settling this business, which appears now to be as far arranged as it can be till the report of the King's Law servants respecting the treaty to be concluded upon the marriage shall be received, Lord Grenville has desired that notes might be sent to put off the meeting.”

*Copy.*

## The EARL OF WESTMORLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1791, November 21, Dublin Castle.—“Upon the presumption that Mr. Dundas is returned to town I have by this post sent him the resolutions of a new Catholic Association; if he should not be arrived, my letter will be taken to you. I wish this publication may not make some difficulty in the question, either by raising a ferment amongst the Catholics, or give an alarm to the Protestant interest. This Association, as far as I can yet learn, consists of a few violent agitators, and no correspondence through the country has yet appeared; but it is very difficult to obtain intelligence of Catholic motions. The considerable and moderate Catholics express their disapprobation at these appeals. I have some hopes they may be prevailed on publicly to discountenance this Association, though I fear they will not publicly manifest a schism in their body. I am requested by Lord Fingal (who had considerable influence in the Catholic body when aristocracy was part of the creed, and has now some influence) to obtain letters of introduction to our Residents in the Italian Courts for his son Lord Killeen and his lady. The favour does not seem much, would be very gratifying to Lord Fingal, and useful to us in the present moment.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, November 22, Beckenham.—“I enclose a letter from the Greffier which seems to be worth your Lordship's perusal; I request the favour of you to direct it to be returned to me.

“The Greffier's letter is a good specimen of his talents, judgment, and right disposition.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

1791, November 25, St. James's Square.—“Dundas is returned to town, and will write to you on the Catholic question. I should be very

happy to oblige Lord Fingal, but I am afraid I cannot with propriety introduce his son as *Lord Killeen* to the King's ministers abroad. I will, however, enquire whether this has ever been done in similar cases."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1791, November 25, St. James's Square.—"I have read the letter from Mr. Durno to you which you put into my hands yesterday. With respect to the subject of it, I can only say that, in the event of Mr. Hailes quitting Warsaw, it would be impossible for me to recommend to his Majesty the appointment of Mr. Durno to that situation. It certainly cannot but be satisfactory to know that his conduct in his present station has gained the approbation of the Polish Government."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, November 25, St. James's Square.—"I am going out of town for a day or two, but I shall be very glad to see you either Tuesday or Wednesday morning. I return you the letters you were so good as to send me. The Greffier's is sensible and well written. It is singular that no enquiry appears to be made how the resolution of the States came into the hands of the Sieur Middleton, who had no more to do with it than the *Harlem Gazetteer*."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

"1791, December 1, Whitehall.—"I am extremely sorry to have missed you by being detained in the country longer than I expected. If it suits you to call upon me about ten on Sunday morning, I shall be very happy to talk over with you the different points to which you allude.

"The despatches from India contain little more than you will have already seen in the extracts from the Madras papers, except perhaps a more favourable state of their finance than we could have hoped."

*Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 6 [Stowe].—"I am sorry that your motions towards Stowe seem so uncertain, and the more as I fear that the approach of Parliament will, of course, confine you still further. Where is Mornington? will he come with you? where am I to write to him? I had heard from Tom of your Burnham purchase. I fear, from your account of it, that it is hardly extensive enough in land, which I hold to be an object to you, as 3,000*l.* will hardly give you there more than about 70 acres; and I should fear that, whenever you resided there *permanently*, you would feel cramped with a domain so small. As to a house, I am sure that you will do better by adding occasionally (though upon regular plan) *as you want room*, than by purchasing a large and perhaps ill-arranged house."

"Have you seen Bishop Watson's charge? Cleaver gave it me and vouches for it; you will judge of his horrors."

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 11 [Stowe].—"I enclose to you a letter upon which you will, of course, do all that ought to be done, which, perhaps, is exactly nothing; except to watch the Lord Chancellor, whose negotiations with Carlton House have been felt in more than one election business. I know not the course of charters, but I presume that they *originate* in the Secretary's Office; but you know how much Lord Camelford looked to this object, and I wish that you would write to him upon it; and in the mean time you will of course watch."

"I was surprised to find from your letters that the Parks were rated so low as 1,000*l.*; they were (I very well remember) estimated to Lord Sandwich, in 1783, at 1,500*l.* The bulk of the profits arises from the farming the grass for cows and horses, but I believe that the King defrauds the Ranger (of late) of the lawn in St. James's Park. However, I am ready to say that, even if it barely pays 1,000*l.*, you are a gainer by the arrangement; and, as it is in every shape so very negotiable a commodity, you must, in the course of time, have either from friends or foes facilities of further arrangements.

"It is no longer a question in Ireland whether you will give the Catholics the English benefits, for it is not possible to refuse that extension; and, in point of fact, they have for several years been mixed by connivance upon juries, and have practised by partners as solicitors. But the question is whether they will stop in their demands short of unqualified toleration; whether it is wise to give them any part of their demands, or the whole of them; and whether it is politic or possible to lead the minds of people in Ireland to such a proposition. It is clear that the Dissenters will offer them everything, provided they will assist in the reformation of elections and of Parliament; and it seems very difficult to draw any line by which you can exactly attempt to define the exact confidence to be reposed in the Catholics, whom you agree to be entitled to certain privileges. But, if the great object of their wishes leads (as it does) to the privilege of voting at county elections, I profess to see no ground of policy on which you can refuse it; as the refusal will certainly interest them to support any struggle for any new system by which they can hope to gain it. And the ground-work of your proceedings is the conviction that, from the change in their political tenets, they are entitled to an interest in their Government, and that their opinions will assist you in your hopes of maintaining the Irish Legislature against the new projected Republic, or French mode of government. If all this is true, it might seem eligible to put them upon the footing of the Dissenters in Great Britain; namely, right of voting for counties but not for corporations, and restricted by the Test from offices, army and navy, and from the magistracy, and from serving in Parliament. Juries would of course be open to them, and with their votes for county members, added to the assistance from barristers and solicitors of their own persuasion, and, of course, strengthened by the repeal of the act which makes it penal for them to have arms, they would seem to have a complete system of personal security, and of influence. But I have no idea that the Irish Parliament will give the right of voting, which is the *sine quâ non* in this system (to which, however, I have forgot to add that Government must name and pay their bishops) or that they will understand that Great Britain has no longer the inducements to support the Protestant interest by the same system of force and of expense which supported it as the mode of carrying on the English Government from the time of Queen Elizabeth to the present moment. As far as I can collect opinions, I much doubt

whether such a measure, if proposed by Government, could be carried ; for I understand that the universal cry from Ireland is for assistance from England of men and means to make a stand upon the English Catholic Bill, as the model for theirs ; and it is by no means clear but that the Dissenters would join in Parliament to defeat it. Hobart's last letter evidently goes to the idea of temporizing, and of gaining time. It is possible that time and the nearer approach of danger may operate, but I leave you to judge whether it is wise to wait for such a moment. In a word, the difficulty seems to arise from the great misfortune that, though we see the danger on one side and the advantages on the other, Ireland never will believe but that Great Britain must fight the battle instead of their doing it themselves. Hobart has no faith in their negotiators Lord Kenmare and Lord Fingall, and believes that, from treachery or timidity, they betrayed and did mischief last year. I acquit them of the first, but it is perfectly consonant to my ideas to mistrust their influence ; and you will remember how earnestly I pressed that you should negotiate through their clergy, and bribe them by the prospect of an annual allowance, not given in gross to be divided by them (as is the case with the allowance from Government to the Dissenters) but given in detail by Government according to an arrangement to be settled with them. I have *always* found that wherever their prelates would interfere, they had unbounded influence. They can look to no advantage from following French patterns ; and this alone would operate to attach them strongly to a Government negotiating through them ; and it is clear that the bulk of their clergy, who are a very numerous body, certainly not less than 3,500 regulars as well as seculars, would implicitly follow them. But I throw out these reflections with a view rather that you should consider them, than as a digested system ; for everything must depend upon the practicability of reconciling this or any other system to the Irish Parliament ; and until I hear Hobart (who promises to call here) I dare not make up my mind. For God's sake let the matter be uppermost in yours, and do not let Lord Westmorland and Hobart put by the discussion of it unless some material advantage is clear and palpable ; and I can conceive none such which can counterbalance the risk of postponing it to a moment in which Great Britain is more (less ?) equal to a firm tone and countenance than in the present."

*Postscript.*—"You say nothing of foreign news ; do you not think that the Princes will make the trial even though unsupported ?

"Coote, who is here, tells me of the answer on these points from Napper Tandy to G. Ponsonby, who said, *at the Whig Club*, that any attempt to introduce French systems, and the coalition between Catholic and Dissenter for those purposes, would oblige the Opposition to throw themselves into the arms of Government, and press an immediate union with Great Britain ; to which Napper replied, with the greatest and marked violence, that he would be the man to head the volunteers, or even the mob of Dublin, and tear from either House of Parliament the man who dared throw out the idea of an union, and hang him on the palisades before the portico.

"Surely this trait should not be lost."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 13-15, [Oxford].—"Your messenger followed me to Oxford, where I have passed the two last days, having at length



settled my boy at Brazenose. I have therefore only had an hour to consider the idea which you have opened to me, but I do not see any consideration likely to alter my ideas, or that could justify me in detaining your messenger, or checking an arrangement which, for every reason, *if it were should indeed be done quickly*. I will not disguise to you my belief that such a destination of an office for which every lord and commoner think themselves peculiarly fit, and which is attended with some distinctions, to you not worth a farthing, contributing to make it more eligible, cannot be grateful to the persons soliciting; and that the newspaper dissatisfaction will be very flippantly, and perhaps repeatedly, expressed. But as to any real apprehensions of a real and respectable dissatisfaction to be entertained by the public at large, or by your supporters in Parliament, and which is to operate upon the confidence to be reposed in the King's servants, or in you individually, I should laugh to scorn the man who gravely conceived such an alarm. It is, however, possible that the expectant of court favour who will be loudest upon his disappointment exactly perhaps in proportion as he had least claim to it, I point at nobody, may be exactly as ridiculously offended as the Duke of Roxburgh was at the appointment of the Duke of Montrose. And this, with the exception of newspaper abuse, will be nearly the sum of real mischief.

"The advantages are indeed so many and so capital that I really think the moment is decisive upon your future prospects of comfort and ease. The tenure of the best property in Ireland seems every hour more precarious. Yours is of a nature that the slight thread which holds it would be eternally liable to be broken by the national or the party disturbances which will (I fear very shortly) explode; and, in all events, the misery of having one's name and merits daily canvassed by party foes and party friends (I know not which are worst in Ireland) is to my feelings so irksome that I should, even if I were in possession of your reversionary office, pay severely for the advantages, whatever they may be, from it. But, when the proposition goes to the immediate possession of what is estimated at 1,500*l.* *per annum*, in exchange for a reversion of what will not pay to you in England above 1,700*l.* at furthest, and that reversion to be productive only upon the termination of a life as likely to live seven, eight, or ten years longer, you will not, I am sure, waste time upon such a calculation. As to the mode of doing it, I should think it were to be wished that the public should be reminded that this is an exchange and not a measure entirely new, as far as it gives you a pension for life; and therefore it might be to be wished that the reversion of Lord Clanbrassil's office should be given away immediately; but I conceive that this may not so easily be done. I throw it out, however, as a thing worthy your consideration.

"*A propos* to Ireland, I have heard several times from Hobart and find, what I always expected, that the supporters of the Royalist Government will see no safety except in the idea of supporting the Protestant monopoly of government and privileges, by the force of Great Britain, upon the footing upon which it has been created by Queen Elizabeth and maintained ever since, without adverting to the very wide differences of the present hour in the political state of Ireland, and without adverting to the truth of one proposition which I have stated to him roundly, namely, that Great Britain is mad if she sends a man or a guinea to Ireland for such a contest. The subject is indeed most interesting. I certainly do not want to advise where it is

not called for, but perhaps I might assist you; and, in all events, I am too deeply interested, in every point of view, in the question to be indifferent to it; and I am convinced that you cannot procrastinate, but that you must make up your minds to an opinion and to measures upon the question which we discussed at Weymouth. I am therefore really sorry that we are not likely to meet till the end of January."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 15 [Stowe].—"I shall be ready to contribute my mite to your purchase, but I must do it by the ridiculous mode of desiring you to advance it for a few weeks or months; for when I found Chalfont closed against you I listened to a Somerset tempter, and have engaged to pay 3,000*l.* in the course of January; and, therefore, I must leave you (under the assurances that it is not inconvenient to you) to your own resources, of which I am delighted to find that you speak and feel so pleasantly. I had attacked Price's tables with the same view that you have done, but, not knowing the exact value, I was much in the dark; but it seems clear that 1,100*l.* in *présenti* is well worth 1,500*l.* upon Lord Clanbrassil's death, even putting out of the question the delights of an Irish tenure, upon which I feel inclined to croak most deeply.

"As to your buildings, I will beg you not to be in a hurry, for you will rob me of much amusement if you deny to me *voir au chapitre* in cobbling an old house."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, December 17, Whitehall.—"The despatches from Lord Henry received this morning seemed to indicate so much perseverance and obstinacy on the part of the Pensionary, and such impatience for receiving our answer, that I really begin to be extremely apprehensive of the consequences. My despatch to Lord Henry was much stronger than the note sent by me to Nagell, and I conclude that it will be communicated to the Pensionary as well as to the Greffier and the Prince of Orange. But Lord Henry writes me word that he has communicated to him the former despatches on the same subject, and it does not appear by the Grand Pensionary's answer which he sends me, that they have produced the least impression. If you have any further intelligence from Lord Henry I should be extremely obliged to you for it.

"I really begin to think that it may be very necessary for you to be there without a moment's delay, as we could none of us answer it to ourselves or the country if this thing were to come to any disagreeable *éclat* during your absence, as it seems to threaten.

"Lord Henry's letter to the Pensionary is as proper as anything could be, but your being there would certainly enable you to state with more force and weight that, if the thing comes to the point, we are determined at all hazards to abide by our decision, and to claim from the Republic the right which we have to insist upon their not departing from a convention to which we are joint parties. I have always told you that my own desire to hold a conciliatory language towards the Pensionary has made me soften the tone of the communications, and I greatly fear I have done so too much."

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, December 17, Beckenham.—“Your letter of this evening throws a gloom over the comforts and cheerfulness of my Christmas.

“Undoubtedly, if it is thought right that I should make as sudden a return to the Hague as may be possible in this season, I shall not flinch from the duties of my lot in life, and shall go without any avoidable delay.

“I am unwilling to reason upon a subject in which I may suspect my judgment to be biassed by feelings of personal convenience; for certainly, it is a sort of calamity to me to be obliged to tear all my plans and arrangements to pieces, and, in the depth of winter, to transport myself and family and a large domestic establishment to an unprepared hotel, through the pains of such a journey and such a voyage.

“Nor is the cup rendered less unpalatable to me by the view of what is at the bottom of it. For I cannot flatter myself that my being on the spot will now make any difference in the affair in question; though, as I remarked yesterday to Lord Henry, *if our alliances are to grow sick, it is decent that I should be at their bed side; if they are to be destroyed, it is proper that I should be in at the death.*

“I shall immediately put my affairs in forwardness for such an extremity. I presume that there cannot be a wish to take a final resolution previous to the reply to the despatches which went last night, and which, with this wind, will arrive tomorrow at the Hague. That reply will probably be received here on Thursday or Friday next.

“I know nothing of what has passed except from the second page of the enclosed letter; the other parts relate to private matters of no consequence. According to that letter, I have strong hopes that your Lordship’s forcible remonstrance will effectually prevail.

“I confess (to you personally) that I now, from the bottom of my heart, regret the not having desired permission to retire, as I intimated to you some months ago. And if the wrongheadedness of the Pensionary (contrary to the opinion which I had formed of him) should be such as to force the strange measure in question, my next wish would be, under the misfortune of such a separation between the two countries in their political line, still to find an early moment to retire. I shall equally do this if (as I expect) the affair should take a right turn; but all this has nothing to do with the present emergency, and therefore I am sorry to have inserted this paragraph.

“I am sorry that your hurry put it out of my power yesterday to ask you whether I might not, without impropriety, write private and serious letters to the Prince and Princess of Orange and to Weldenren. Under the terms on which we are, I could have done it with great effect, and I saw no objection to it except that it might seem to bear too much against the Pensionary; but I felt a delicacy and unwillingness to do it without your previous approbation.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 19, Windsor.—“The strange step the Margrave of Anspach has taken of marrying Lady Craven makes it necessary for me to be explicit on that business previous to my receiving him; I therefore desire Lord Grenville will see Count Redern and express my

willingness of seeing the Margrave to-morrow at two; but that I wish Count Redern should understand that this is not [to] lead to my receiving that lady, which he must feel that the misfortunes in my own family, and my declining receiving Countess Hohenheim when brought here three years since by the Duke of Wirtemburgh, who had married her, renders impossible."

#### EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, December 19, Paris.—"I dined to-day at Madame de Stael's in company with Monsieur de Narbonne, Monsieur Mathieu de Montmorency (who is to accompany him to the frontiers as his *aid-de-camp*) and three or four other *very young* General officers; he sets off to-morrow morning, and expects to have an interview with Rochambeau and Luckner at Metz on Monday. Monsieur de Ségur, who keeps the title of Ambassador at Rome, is to go to Berlin on Wednesday; they seem to fear that he will arrive there too late. The Swedish Ambassador has received letters from Stockholm of as late a date as the 29th of last month, and confesses his astonishment that he is not yet recalled.

"They have decreed the emission of three hundred millions of *assignats*, which make, in all, two thousand one hundred millions already emitted. The national property, according to the best calculations, is valued at but a few hundred millions more.

"The King has given his veto to the decree against the refractory priests; which the Assembly received with *douces murmures*."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1791, December 19, St. James's Square.—"I return you Lord Henry Spencer's letter, from which I should be inclined to augur rather better than from the tenor of his despatches. I cannot help thinking that it would, at all events, be right for you to pursue your idea of writing fully and strongly to the Prince of Orange and Count Welden. You will be at no loss with respect to the topics to be pressed, particularly the uniform duplicity of the Emperor, the danger of admitting him to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Republic, he having an evident interest to overturn the present system there; and the impudent *persiflage* of his referring to a future negotiation all the advantageous points of commerce, and still urging this as an arrangement highly beneficial to the Republic, whose Government is in no present danger, while his, in the Low Countries, hardly supports itself from hour to hour by the aid of his 50,000 men.

"These points were urged in my letters to Lord Henry and your brother by the messenger, but I shall write again upon them to-morrow, and am clear you should do the same to the Prince and Count Welden. I sincerely lament the apparent necessity of your hastening your return, and hope the account of next week will be more agreeable."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 19, Beckenham.—"I have too just a sense both of your official situation and of your friendly disposition towards me, to

send the enclosed to Mr. Pitt, without at the same time communicating it to you. I beg the favour of you either to direct it to be sent back, or to return it on the first occasion that I may have to wait on you.

"I think that Lord Henry Spencer will feel himself at liberty to confide the contents of your Lordship's dispatch to the Pensionary, to the Greffier, and to the Prince. I have, however, by this post intimated to him that there can be no objection to his doing so; and that he will do right to make an equal confidence to the Princess of Orange, who is probably with us, but is sufficiently acute to be convinced by it, if she is not."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1791, December 21], Beckenham.—"I will avail myself of your permission to write fully and strongly to-morrow both to the Prince and to the Princess of Orange, and a few private lines to M. de Welderen; and I will send my letters to the Office in time to accompany the despatches, reserving a minute of them for your Lordship's perusal. I think that I cannot mistake as to the manner of stating the business; and I have nothing to manage except the circumstance of the Pensionary, with whom, for every private and public consideration, I should be sorry to have any shyness or coldness.

"Your Lordship will receive a letter from me by this night's post which will shew that this business amply occupies my thoughts."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 25, Windsor.—"There is a certain earnestness in the note from M. Barthélemy to Lord Grenville that shews he is really anxious to see me and the Queen before his departure; and, as he has no letter of re-credence, it removes the objection I might then have had to receiving him without ceremony. His conduct, personally, has ever been as attentive as could be expected from a Frenchman; I, therefore, authorise Lord Grenville to send him here at to-morrow at two, when he can certainly see the Queen as well as me."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, December 27, London.—"I send you a letter I have received from Mr. Durno. I wrote once to him already on some similar subject, and enclosed your answer to him. I cannot continue to be the neutral port of correspondence, and, therefore, when I receive your answer, shall write *once* more and shut the port."

(*Two enclosures.*)

#### Enclosure Number 1.

#### JAMES DURNO to HENRY DUNDAS.

1791, November 8, Warsaw.—"Having resolved, for reasons already stated to my Lord Grenville, to make an excursion to Berlin, and having had the honour to dine with the King at the Prince Primate's a few days ago, I took that opportunity of communicating my intention to his Majesty, and of taking leave. Instead of taking leave, his Majesty expressed a desire of seeing me in his closet at nine o'clock of the

morning of Sunday last, the 6th instant. I attended accordingly, and was immediately admitted. There was nobody else present but Count Dzieduszycki, who is the second Minister in the Department for foreign affairs, Chief Secretary of the Council *de Surveillance*, and Postmaster-General. It would be indecent in me to repeat the many gracious things I then heard; and so much the less proper, the more conscious I am of having no pretence to the merit which they pre-supposed. Suffice it, therefore, to say that his Majesty took this occasion to confirm all the particulars of Count Chroptowitz's overtures of the 10th, as stated in my last letter of the 20th of the last month. And to add that he thought my proceeding without loss of time from Berlin to London might answer two good purposes; it might be of service to both countries and to myself: to both countries in as far as it might contribute something, perhaps even more than the extraordinary mission sometime ago mentioned to my Lord Grenville as in contemplation on the part of Poland, towards the furtherance of the business in agitation; and to myself, because I would then have an opportunity of personally soliciting the eventual succession to the place in question. And that, on the supposition that I would actually proceed from Berlin to London, he desired me to take charge of a packet (then handed me) for his Minister at London, by which he had enjoined him to do everything in his power to support me in both cases.

"This passed on the 6th, and coming, yesterday the 7th, to take leave of one of His Majesty's most confidential friends, then confined by indisposition, this gentleman first shewed me, and then desired me to accept of a note which he had received from the King, of His Majesty's own handwriting, on this subject, and of which what follows is an exact copy: 6th November, 1791.—*Je viens de parler à Durno et je lui ai remis un paquet pour Bukaty, dans lequel je lui prescrit d'aider Durno en tout, autant qu'il pourra.* I would have herewith handed you the original of this note was it not that I should be sorry to lose it, and yet cannot presume to trouble a person so much occupied, with preserving it until an opportunity might offer of receiving it back again.

"Considering candour as the best policy, the sum of my answer consisted simply in this, that I would communicate the whole matter to you in a private and confidential manner, but could go no further without your previous advice and consent—a mode of proceeding which, the motives explained, was highly approved of.

"As for the rest, I flatter myself that I will be honoured with an answer, whether affirmative or negative, conceived in such terms as may be communicated in original to the King; because I know His Majesty will be expecting it; and, besides, expecting it with impatience.

"I intend to proceed for Berlin to-morrow or next day, and to be there on the 15th or 16th instant."

#### Enclosure Number 2.

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1791, December 22, Broom Hall.—"I return you a thousand thanks for the interest you have taken in the small matter I lately recommended to your care, and which, I am sorry to think, has occasioned you so much trouble. I should have deferred mentioning my obligation to you till my arrival in London but that I have just received the enclosed, with a request to forward it to you.

"I am at a loss to know why Mr. Durno should have chosen me as the channel of his communication with you. I never saw him, and never had any connection with him further than official correspondence, in which, I own, he furnished me with a good deal of interesting intelligence in the course of last summer. But, on the score of his merits, and pretensions, I plead total ignorance."

LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWAERT.

1791, December 28, Whitehall.—"Having, by His Majesty's commands, referred it to His Majesty's Advocate, Attorney, and Solicitor General to prepare articles of a treaty to be concluded in consequence of the happy event of the marriage of their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of York, and in conformity to the Provisional Act signed by you at Berlin on the 15th of September last, I have received from His Majesty's Attorney General a letter stating certain doubts with respect to the sense of some of the articles of that Act, and desiring to be informed how the same are understood by those who framed the articles. And as it may be material for His Majesty's decision, with respect to some of the points mentioned in the letter of the Attorney General, that His Majesty should be acquainted with the sense in which those articles were understood by you, and by the Ministers of His Prussian Majesty, at the time of your framing and signing the said Act, I transmit to you a copy of that letter, and must request that you will, with all convenient expedition, inform me of the manner in which the several points therein stated were understood by you at that time, and also of the manner in which you conceive them to have been understood by the Prussian Ministers."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, December 31, Berlin.—"I cannot let the messenger return to England without troubling your Lordship with a few lines to renew the assurances of my unfeigned gratitude for the very distinguished mark of the King's favour which, through your Lordship's protection, is now conferred upon me. If any incentive were wanting to stimulate me to acquit myself in such a manner as may justify your Lordship's recommendation, none could be more effectual.

"Indeed I feel properly anxious on this score, and am not a little vexed at the conduct of this Court in the first stage of this business; yet I cannot take any blame to myself, nor will any, I trust, be attributed to me. Their precipitation rendered it, as your Lordship has seen by my despatches, totally impossible for me to propose any concert. Indeed a proposal of this nature ought not to have been necessary; a sense of what they owe to their own interests, and to the alliance, ought to have dictated it. Their present conduct however will, I hope, make amends, and prove satisfactory upon the whole. From the wretched and dirty intrigues that pervade this Court, the transaction of all business becomes, I am sorry to say, every day more difficult. The most able of the Ministers have no weight but through the favourite, the sect of *Illuminés*, or the tribe of mistresses past and present. They are indeed almost null, and though they very forcibly feel the pernicious tendency of the favourite's politics, and know even how unpopular they are, yet they have not virtue sufficient to risk the loss of their places by resistance. Count Schulenburg is, I am sure, fully sensible how humiliating his situation is. He feels that nothing can be done in either of his depart-

ments without the concurrence of the favourite, and his opposition to him seldom extends beyond the pouting of a few days.

"The Sovereign is immersed in pleasure, and by all accounts becomes every day more adverse to business. General Bischoffswerder's favour is unbounded. His friends feel that, by his interference in foreign politics, he is got beyond his depth, and justly apprehend the consequences. He is, as I have repeatedly mentioned, most eagerly bent on the accomplishment of his Austrian treaty, and has hopes of Russia's becoming a contracting party. I have avoided entering deeply into this subject. It is an affair of such importance that I cannot venture to bring on a formal explanation without your Lordship's particular instructions.

"A new actress is now appearing whose influence is very great. It is a Madame de Pinto, sister to Madame de Lucchesini. If she can retain her power over her lover General Bischoffswerder, and does not fear the Marquis's intriguing spirit, she may possibly pave the way to his rising to some considerable employment in the country. Madame de Dönhof is near her time. Her Royal lover's attentions are unremitting. She is removed to the Duchess of York's apartments in the Palace, and will lie in there. She has private parties every evening, at which the King is generally present, and sometimes the Prince Royal is obliged to be there.

"Such is a hasty outline of this Court, where there are not fewer intrigues going on than in those of the East. Your Lordship will see the difficulties and disgust that must often attend a foreign Minister's situation. Formerly the transaction of business was open and undisguised. Now the dread of having their words and expressions conveyed to the favourite and mistresses pervades even the ordinary intercourse of society, and has introduced formality and distrust where freedom of sentiment and expression (as I am informed) formerly prevailed.

"I have, with great pleasure, seen your Lordship's name in the *Gazette* of the 13th. Allow me to offer your Lordship my most cordial congratulations on this honourable testimony of our gracious sovereign's approbation of your important services."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, January 1, St. James's Square.—"I have received your letter of the 27th ultimo enclosing me one from Mr. Durno, transmitted to you by Lord Elgin. It does not occur to me that I can add anything to what I stated to you in my former letter on this subject, especially as Mr. Durno will have learnt before this that the King has actually named Colonel Gardiner to succeed Mr. Hailes at Warsaw."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, January 1, St. James's Square.—"The Dutch mail has brought me to-day two letters from Lord Henry, which are very unsatisfactory in their result.

"I shall be at my Office to-morrow between twelve and one, and should be very glad to see you there if it would not be inconvenient to you."

*Copy.*



## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Most secret and private.

1792, January 2, Beckenham. — "In addition to the papers sent in my short despatch of this date, I feel it incumbent on me to put into your hands a most confidential letter from the Greffier, which seems to throw great light on the present state of the business in question. That letter, though dictated by the most honourable and friendly sentiments towards his Majesty's Government, and at the same time by a zealous desire to promote the service of the Republic, is evidently of a private nature. Feeling, therefore, the delicacy of such a correspondence, which on other occasions may become of great eventual importance, I flatter myself that your Lordship will approve of my not sending this inclosure as an official paper, though I submit it to you to make such use of it as you may think right."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, January 3 [Beckenham]. — "In the hope that your Lordship will approve my letter to Lord Henry Spencer, and that you will have the goodness to forward it, I will not detain you farther, because it expresses all that occurs to me on the paper which you have had the goodness to send, and in which Mr. Pitt most entirely concurs, as the best means of conciliation and procrastination which, in the present business, are principal objects. We could not find anything to add to your Lordship's ideas; and I have, in fact, only repeated some of the same sentiments and, I fear, in worse words."

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, January 4 [Stowe]. — "I wished before I wrote to you upon the subject of your purchase, and of your proposed sale at Stoke, to inform myself a little about the value of it, which I find to be very improbable indeed, so much so that I cannot but earnestly wish you to keep it till you can determine to join me in the project of an enclosure, or till I am able to buy it, which my Somerset purchase at present prevents me from doing. But, as it is fitting that you should not suffer one iota in your purse or your projects for my wishes, I must desire you to feel that an account is open upon these heads, which we must settle upon my arrival in London. I have no difficulty in stating this, as I understand from your letter that the only question arises from the value of the stocks, and not from the want of the money; if I am mistaken you will let me know.

"The *sullen delay* given to your patent does not give me much surprise, and certainly not the smallest alarm. The character of the man makes him equally incapable of doing anything of this sort handsomely, and of persisting whenever he is grappled. I certainly know nothing of the interior, or of the momentary impulse which operates upon his jaundiced mind; but, although this may be the first instance in which you have personally felt it, yet we know that the principle is not new, and we know what the result (except in Eden's case which Lord Kenyon decided) has uniformly been. I repeat, therefore, that I have not the smallest alarm, but I am most decidedly clear that he should be called upon to digest his Christmas pies and his bile together, by the most explicit and positive declaration, first conveyed in the most civil,

and ultimately in the roughest terms, if he makes them necessary. For I do not consider this as a simple question to be considered without looking to its numerous bearings and consequences. If I thought so, I should not advise you to risk the public service upon a question personal to yourself; but I consider you tied to the stake without the means of retreat by a measure of the most hostile nature personally to you, inasmuch as it is an appeal to the clamour of newspapers against you; and, certainly, of the most dangerous consequences to the public service by disgracing you in the public opinion, and by asserting, not only an independence, but a control over Pitt and you which cannot (*be the consequences what they may*) be submitted to. It is not improbable that this is done in concert with two persons who have talked very loudly against your appointment, and to whom *you know* that he has talked of late very improperly. I mean the two Princes. If so, the necessity of pushing the point to the extremity is most obvious, not as a measure of revenge, or of acrimony, but as a measure of wisdom and of absolute propriety, looking only to the consequences of your acquiescence under a blow so guided and so struck. I do not like to say all I feel upon these points, but I have said enough to show you my opinions, and the grounds of them; and if I am right, you will (I am sure) agree that any delay is unwise, and can only operate to strengthen him in these habits which he must forego, or you and he cannot (from duty and from sentiments so irreconcilable) draw in the same system. At the same time I again repeat that I do not expect the smallest ill consequence from grappling with this bear, who will as surely concede in this as in every former instance.

"I do not understand the Emperor's adherence to his Diet, which rejects all compensation from France for the German fiefs; and his very lukewarm language, which seems almost to recommend a negotiation for this very object; and as little do I comprehend the delay of the enterprise of the Princes, unless they hope for assistance, for it appears that France increases every day in military preparation, though their confusion seems worse confounded than ever."

*Postscript.*—"I was delighted to hear from Hobart that the Catholic clergy had given him the most explicit assurances that they would repress the Irish frenzy as much as they could; still, however, I doubt very much as to the wisdom of stopping at the English bill, though I think it clear that the Irish Parliament could not be induced to go further, and probably will not even accede to this proposal without very real and great difficulties. I am very seriously alarmed at the prospect."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1792, January 4, St. James's Square. *In cipher.*—"I have received your private letters relative to your own situation, which, from the circumstances of the present crisis, I have felt some difficulty in answering. If the circumstances which you state are such as make you finally desirous of withdrawing yourself immediately from the diplomatic line, I shall certainly not delay to receive the King's commands for your having permission to quit Berlin, though I should, on many accounts, see such a resolution with regret, particularly as I see no probability of making such an arrangement on your quitting the line as you allude to. If, on the other hand, you still continue desirous of succeeding to the mission at Vienna, the circumstances are such as would

now allow me to recommend that appointment to His Majesty. But I could not do this without previously writing to you on the subject, to know what your wishes would be."

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, January 5, London.—"I think you once intimated to me that although from your embarrassments with the present Consul-General of America you could not appoint Colquhoun to that situation, it was not so much out of the question appointing him to some of the provincial consulships, if that was a thing he would consider as an object. Since I last saw you the mercantile house in which Colquhoun was concerned has failed, and of course that will likewise involve his private fortune and separate estate. I understand from all quarters that his conduct on the occasion has been so uncommonly upright and honourable as to have excited the esteem, and insured him the affection of the whole mercantile interest of Glasgow. As such is the case, it becomes matter of policy as well as inclination with me to extend to him any protection I can. I send you the perusal of a letter I have received from him, but, before I see him, I would wish to talk with you. The names who sign the address to him are certainly the first mercantile names in Glasgow."

*Enclosing* a letter from Mr. Colquhoun, with testimonials from Glasgow merchants.

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, January 6, St. James's Square.—"I have received your letter with its enclosures respecting Mr. Colquhoun, and the circumstances there mentioned would certainly make me desirous of bringing Mr. Colquhoun forward in the line of American consuls if I saw a proper opening for it; but I doubt whether I can with propriety add another appointment to that list, which is already a numerous and expensive one. With respect to the situation of Consul-General, I am not aware of any probability of a vacancy of that office, nor, even if it were vacant, do I think that circumstances would allow me to name Mr. Colquhoun to it."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1792, January 6.—"If you go to the levée to-day, it may be useful that you should speak to the King about the Duchess of York's jointure, as that may save the necessity of our waiting till Wednesday to send off the treaty, which I am promised from the lawyers to-morrow.

"Less than 7,500*l.*, I think, it certainly cannot well be; whether more or not you must judge. If it is to be augmented, there will be some amusement in doing it in the absence of *Ursa Major*.

"I suppose you have seen Ewart's note on this subject."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792, January 6, Downing Street.]—"The King has fixed that the jointure shall be 8,000*l.* He settled that it would be best for you to write to the Duke of York, apprising him that you are to send the

messenger to Berlin on the subject of the treaty, in case he should have any letters to send; and mentioning, at the same time, that His Majesty has approved of 8,000*l.* for the jointure."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, January 9, Philadelphia.—"As the information contained in the letter marked 'separate' was communicated to me in the strictest secrecy, and under the most unbounded confidence, I have judged it expedient to transmit it to your Lordship in the form of a separate letter rather than in that of a numbered dispatch. Those persons of this country who are desirous of promoting and preserving a good understanding and harmony with Great Britain are extremely well satisfied with Mr. Pinckney's appointment, as they consider the circumstance of his education at Westminster School, and of his having passed a great part of his life in England, as having a natural tendency to inspire him with a predilection for the country, and a desire of rendering his conduct satisfactory."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, January 9, Beckenham.—"I yesterday sent my very voluminous dispatch on the marine and commercial questions to your Lordship's Office.

"I shall be at Lambeth Palace from the 16th to the 19th. If your Lordship should have commands for me in the meantime, I can wait upon you any morning that you may happen to appoint.

"I have lent to Mr. Pitt one of the best printed statements of the French finance for 1792 that I have seen. It states the whole with great perspicuity, though with an anxiety to lessen the general opinion of the present difficulties. The inference which I draw from it is that they will struggle some time longer against an insolvency, and this perhaps is what we ought to wish. The pamphlet is well worth your Lordship's perusal; but, possibly, you have already received it from Lord Gower."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

[1792, January 12-15, Beckenham.]—"I send you all the letters which I have received by these mails, except one from the Princess of Orange to Lady Auckland (chiefly relative to the D[uchess] P[rincess] of Y[ork]) in which she takes occasion to introduce a mention of her uneasiness respecting this Austrian business in terms less managed than she uses in her letter to me.

"There is some good writing in both the Pensionary's letters; and he is withdrawing from the scrape dexterously enough, and with better temper than I expected. I ground this opinion, however, less upon his letter than on the confidential letter of the Greffier, which chiefly merits your Lordship's perusal. It may be inferred from that letter that the business is now in your hands to receive such direction as you may choose to give to it; but I suspend all further sentiment on the subject till I wait on you, which I will not fail to do at Whitehall to-morrow at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 12.

"Your Lordship will best judge how far it may be proper to communicate the confidential packet, and whether it ought to go farther than to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas."

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, January 15, Stowe.—“I have not written to ask more upon the subject of your explanation, as I knew you would not delay any communication upon a point so essential to us all; but I wish for one word (if any word has passed) before I set off to Bridgwater, which I am now obliged to do on Thursday next. I shall reach it on Friday, and shall probably be back on Tuesday.

“William Pitt, to whom I wrote about R. Williams’ attendance, earnestly presses me to attend on the 31st, and therefore, very inconveniently to myself, I acquiesce, and bag and baggage move for that purpose. I heard at Aylesbury that you have got an addition of four acres to your chateau; I am very anxious to see it.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, January 17, St. James’s Square.—“I return you Lord Henry Spencer’s letter. It is not possible to have acted with more judgment and good sense than he has done. I conceive all the real difficulty of the business to be now at an end, and I certainly apprehend very little from the separate negotiation whatever turn it may take; but I still own my doubts as to the prudence of our mixing ourselves in such a scene of folly and bad conduct as the Austrian Government in the Netherlands. Surely, if mere military force is sufficient to maintain the Emperor’s sovereignty, his 50, or 60,000 men will answer that purpose, without trouble or expense on our part, and without committing the Republic and us with the *Enragés* of France. If there is such a rooted hatred to the Emperor’s Government there that not even that army can keep them quiet, will 20, or 30,000 men from England and Holland do it? Or, if not, why should we have the disgrace of being involved in his failure? That we should not give them support or countenance I readily agree; and even that we should avow that determination whenever he will make it possible for us to do so; but I feel very strongly that this is not a time for embarking in gratuitous and unnecessary guaranties, particularly of forms of government, and still more particularly in the case of a Government wholly destitute both of wisdom and honesty.

“*Apropos* to this, I have reason to believe that the Austrian Minister here has received from M. Buol a copy of my ministerial letter to Nagell. There is no great harm in this, but I should still be anxious to ascertain, if possible, whether the communication was made to the Austrian Mission at the Hague, or at Berlin. From the date of its transmission here, I guess the latter.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792, January 17] Lambeth Palace.—“I suppose that the enclosed does not contain so much as is in the despatches to your Lordship; but I send it on account of the remark, *that though the Pensionary has handsomely discharged the disagreeable office of changing his opinion, he is discontented with the conduct of England, and also angry with the Prince.* As you have made him retract his whole plan to the full extent of our wishes, your Lordship will now be disposed to say everything to him that may be soothing; and possibly one of the best modes would be to ask his confidential opinion as to what would be most eligible with respect to the points which are postponed for the concert of the allies. I confess that I see the advantages of ratifying the Hague Convention (if it could be done with a saving of our punctilio) in a point of view

far above the possible inconveniences. I do not conceive any case in which it would not be eligible for us to maintain the Austrian Provinces as a barrier between the Republic and France, whatever may be the fate of the latter power; and I know no means so good for this purpose as the sovereignty of the Emperor. At any rate a mere *pour-parler* on the subject commits us to nothing, and may subsequently receive whatever turn may be thought best.

"The expression of *autorité légitime actuellement établie*, in the answer to Buol, will not have escaped your Lordship's remark.

"I will try in the course of the day to write to the Pensionary what he calls a *letter of conversation*; and in order to turn his attention to other matters, I propose also to ask him some confidential question on the subject of the commercial negotiation, merely to learn what are now the wishes or speculation of the parties at Amsterdam on that subject.

"I collect from some Paris letters that the uneasiness of the Revolutionists is great. The *Evêque d'Autun*, who is detached to this country with some secret propositions, is an unprincipled man of considerable talents.

"Your Lordship had the goodness to say that you would direct either copies or the originals of my letters from the Prince of Orange and the Dutch Ministers to be returned to me. Your idea of pressing the Prince into our cause in this business seems to have been very material."

#### SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, January 21, Berlin.—"The messenger arrived here late yesterday evening. This morning early I sent to Count Finckenstein to inform him of the purpose of his coming, and to beg of him to appoint an hour for me to wait upon him. He fixed six this evening, adding; *en attendant je me concerterai avec mes collègues sur le jour et l'heure ou nous pourrons, Monsieur, entrer en conférence sur ce sujet, and je pourrai vous en informer dès aujourd'hui si vous voulez me faire l'honneur de passer chez moi vers les six heures du soir*. As I thought it might facilitate the prompt termination of the business if he were to receive sooner the project, I immediately transmitted it to him, and, having observed that the messenger had been unexpectedly delayed on the road, I added that he would confer on me a very sensible pleasure if he would prevail on his colleagues to fix an early meeting, as I was anxious for the conclusion of the business, that your Lordship might receive the treaty either before the meeting of Parliament or immediately after it.

"I shall not fail to observe to the Prussian Ministers what is enjoined to me in your Lordship's private letter."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, January 25, Beckenham.—"The enclosed from Count Bruhl relates to a *small* subject which I presume will frequently have entered into his conferences with you. About five years ago I proposed to him at St. James's, in the presence of Mr. Pitt, to receive our Staffordshire ware into Saxony, upon condition of our admitting the Dresden china on a moderate duty (I think 12 per cent.) into this country. He transmitted the suggestion to his Court, and afterwards reported that the Elector was disposed to adopt it. The Staffordshire manufacturers

thought it, at the time, highly desirable, not so much on account of the Saxon consumption, but because it would give facilities to the transit and vent of their wares into Poland, Austria, Prussia. I do not know how the negotiation failed, nor whether there is any circumstance which would disincline your Lordship to the signing a short convention with Count Bruhl if it could be completed."

#### JOHN EWART TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, January 28, Bath.—"Yesterday I communicated the death of my brother to Mr. Aust, in order that he might acquaint your Lordship of that melancholy event. Among his numerous papers, I find many copies of his official correspondence with the Secretary of State's Office, during the fatiguing and anxious public services which have unfortunately cost him his life. I think it necessary to inform your Lordship that these despatches are in my possession, and I have Mrs. Ewart's approbation to apply to your Lordship for such directions upon this subject as may be most agreeable to His Majesty's Ministers.

"Should you be pleased to desire that they are to be returned to the Office, I shall take care to separate them from my brother's private papers, as soon as the painful duty I have at present to fulfil permits me to look over the numerous trunks and packages through which they are dispersed. And, in the meantime, your Lordship may rest assured that no improper use whatever shall be made of them."

#### H. ELLIOT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, January 29, Bath.—"Mr. Ewart has shown me a letter which he has written to your Lordship, and which is to be sent by this evening's mail. I trust it will meet with your Lordship's approbation, and I am happy to have it in my power to add, that he is perfectly inclined to do everything that is right upon this occasion, notwithstanding all attempts to give him a contrary bias.

"There was an idea at first suggested to him, that his late brother's letters were to be considered as the property of his nephew; but he coincided in opinion with me, that the copies of a recent official correspondence with the Secretary of State's Office ought to be considered as the property of that Office, and that to make any private or personal use of them would, in fact, be a breach of public trust.

"Your Lordship will have learnt that some part of the late Mr. Ewart's copies of his correspondence are already in Mr. Aust's hands; but the remainder, which is, I am told, exceedingly voluminous, is still here, and mixed with other matters which are packed at the bottom of large cases of books that have not yet been opened. This circumstance will occasion an unnecessary delay in their collection and arrangement. Mr. Ewart is also desirous of receiving a letter from your Lordship upon the subject, as it will serve as a full justification for his giving them up to the Office.

"The late Mr. Ewart has left no will, nor any property, but, on the contrary, appears to have spent the whole of the little fortune his wife gave him. Her situation is, at this moment, peculiarly distressing, and I think it incumbent upon me to give her and her children every assistance in my power. I shall therefore, with your Lordship's approbation, remain here till after the funeral which I shall attend, and perhaps also the greatest part of this week, as it will be some days before Mrs. Ewart and her family can move to London.

"The last days of the deceased's life were spent in a state of violent phrensy, and, as his situation required that he should be numerously attended, I shall not be surprised if various accounts are propagated concerning his agitated and incoherent language.

"It is some satisfaction upon this melancholy occasion that his brother was present, who has acted with uncommon tenderness and discretion, and whose profession enables him to pronounce, with certainty, that the immediate cause of the late Mr. Ewart's death was an attack of the gout upon the brain and other vital parts of his debilitated frame.

"I beg leave to suggest that a few words in a complimentary letter to Mrs. Ewart, and an offer of your protection, would be considered by her as a mark of favour, and would contribute to alleviate some of the painful sensations of her present state."

#### GEORGE HAMMOND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, February 2, Philadelphia.—"I take the liberty of recalling your Lordship's attention to that part of the definitive treaty in which the westernmost boundary of the British territory in North America is described by a line drawn from the most north-western point of the Lake of the Woods, in a due west course to the Mississippi.

"This line is unquestionably ideal in every sense of the word; for, from the best information I can obtain in this country, as well as from a very accurate map which I have received from Montreal, it is evident that a line, however extended in this direction, would never strike the Mississippi, of which river the source is (and I believe correctly) stated to be within the American territory. I trust that this Government will not endeavour to take advantage of this accidental geographical error, which, if not rectified, will not only leave the limits between the two countries undefined, but also render entirely nugatory the eighth article of the treaty, which stipulates that the navigation of the Mississippi from its source to the ocean is to remain free and open to the subjects of the two countries respectively. It will, however, be extremely important for me to receive your Lordship's instructions as to the manner in which I am to treat this point, whenever the negotiation may be sufficiently advanced to admit of its being discussed.

"The rapid progress in improvement and population of the settlements formed along the banks of the Mississippi undoubtedly renders the free navigation of that river an object highly desirable, since it will open a new, extensive, and unrivalled market for British manufactures, with which the inhabitants of those settlements can be more reasonably and plentifully supplied by the means of the water-communications of Canada than through the United States.

"This subject is at present, perhaps, somewhat more deserving of attention in consequence of Commissioners having been nominated by this Government to negotiate with the Court of Madrid the power or permission of navigating the Mississippi to its mouth into the ocean. On this head I must not omit mentioning, that the words marked with inverted commas in my despatch No. 8 are those which the Secretary of the Senate has used in announcing to the public the appointment of these Commissioners. That officer, I understand from a member of the Senate, has rather transgressed the strict line of his duty in the terms of this public notification, as the object of the commission was intended to have been kept secret."



## LORD GRENVILLE to R. HOBART.

Private and secret.

1792, February 8, Whitehall.—“I have not thought it right to refuse M. de Roveray’s request for a letter of recommendation to you which he will deliver on his arrival in Dublin. It is, at the same time, very necessary that I should suggest to you the propriety of his being very narrowly and carefully watched during his residence there. He is extremely connected with the present rulers of France (if any men deserve that name) and has, by his own confession to me, been applied to by them for the assistance they think they want in giving us trouble in Ireland, by the same intrigues which they are carrying on in Savoy and the Netherlands. I hope he says true when he adds that he has rejected this application with indignation; but you will probably think that the circumstance makes it very necessary for you to observe him pretty carefully.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, February 11, St. James’s Square.—“I return you Count Bruhl’s letter. I see no obstacle to the renewal of the proposed plan; and some time ago when he mentioned the subject to me, I suggested the propriety of his giving in some sort of official note upon it, in order that it might be put into the usual course of examination. He promised to do this, but I have never heard any more of it.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Private.

1792, February 11, Whitehall.—“I have received your letter marked private of the 7th November and am sorry that I cannot carry into execution the arrangement you propose, it being inconsistent with the plan which has been adopted of bringing young men of family and character into the foreign line by their nomination to the situation of Secretary of Legation at the principal Courts in Europe where His Majesty has not Ambassadors. Whatever may have been the practice hitherto prevalent at St. Petersburg with respect to persons in these situations, it is impossible for me to doubt that, by a proper representation to the Russian Government, you will procure to Mr. Paget all the regard and attention which is so much due to his birth, rank, and prospects, as well as to his personal character.”

*Copy.*

## R. HOBART to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, February 12, Dublin Castle.—“This day I received your letter of the 8th instant, and shall take every means in my power carefully to watch the gentleman in question.

“Our session is going on smoothly, notwithstanding the storm which impended. Our Bill for the Relief of the Catholics will, I think, certainly be carried; but I have too much reason to believe that some words will be introduced into the preamble pledging Parliament against further concessions. The impolicy and wildness of such a measure is too obvious to need a comment; but knowing as much of this country

as you do, and, of course, acquainted with the ferment that has arisen upon this business, you will not be surprised at it. We are to debate it on Saturday. Mr. Grattan brings forward a question on the China trade again on Tuesday."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, February 14, Beckenham.—"There are passages in the enclosed letters which may make them worth your perusal. I beg the favour of you to order them to be returned to me either at Lambeth Palace, where I shall be to-morrow evening till Friday morning, or at this place.

"Perregaux's despondency as to the French affairs is a very serious symptom. He is well informed, of a cool judgment, and hitherto has been disposed to disbelieve our prophecies of bankruptcy and farther confusions."

"I understand that the Princess of Orange has written to the Emperor respecting the abominable libel published at Brussels, and neither disapproved nor disavowed by the Austrian Regency."

LORD GRENVILLE to MRS. EWART.

Private.

1792, February 17, Whitehall.—"Having had the honour of laying before the King your letter of the 9th instant, I have His Majesty's permission to inform you that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of a pension of one hundred pounds per annum being granted to each of your children, in addition to the pension already settled on yourself. I have great satisfaction in conveying to you the information of this mark of His Majesty's favour and approbation of your late husband's services."

*Copy.*

CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, February 18, St. Petersburg.—"This will be delivered to your Lordship by Count Browne, son of the General-in-Chief Count Browne, Governor-General of Livonia and Estonia, an Irish gentleman in the service of Russia since many years, and who stands particularly high in the estimation of Her Imperial Majesty. The object of his journey is, as I understand, to prosecute a claim his family pretends to have to an Irish peerage, in the pursuit of which I have been desired to assist him. All I can do, being perfectly ignorant of the merits of the case, is to recommend him to your Lordship, and it is for that purpose that I trouble your Lordship with this letter."

LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, February 28, Madrid.—"I believe that Count Florida-Blanca little dreamt when he was writing me the long letter that I received from him yesterday that it would be the last act of his political life, as he seems to have had no kind of forewarning of his dismissal; and, of the few people whom I have seen this evening since the news arrived, nobody can guess the reason of it. It is indeed reported that he is under an arrest, in which case he must, of course, be charged with some heavy crime; but this circumstance was mentioned to me on such

doubtful authority, that I have not ventured to speak of it in my despatch. It is, as yet, impossible to foresee what conduct his successor will pursue in the line of foreign politics ; but he will certainly be more enterprising, and, to judge from his habits and opinions when he was before in business, more anti-Anglican. At any rate, I have not the smallest hopes of drawing from him anything more satisfactory on commercial subjects than what is contained in Count Florida-Blanca's papers, so that there seems to be no reason for delaying, in consequence of this change, the answer which our Court may think fit to return to those proposals. In fact, I am afraid that nothing short of a commercial declaration of war can bring these people to a just way of thinking on the subject of their trade with England ; as they are either ignorant of the immense advantages which the southern provinces derive from the sale of their wines and fruit, or imagine that those articles are with us a kind of necessary of life, which we must therefore continue to purchase under every disadvantage.

"You are perhaps not aware that you have not taken any notice, in your letters to me, of the American intelligence that I sent you some months ago. I could wish to have something to communicate on that subject to Mr. Carmichael, merely as a mark of personal attention to him, as he is very well meaning, and has been, upon many occasions, materially useful to us.

"Mr. Jackson has written us word of his being arrived at Lisbon, and that he means to be here about a fortnight hence. I am still extremely anxious to be permitted to appoint him my *locum tenens* during the summer months, but I have no thoughts of setting out before the return of the bearer ; and, in the meantime, I shall use my utmost endeavours to ascertain the *trim* of the new Ministry.

"I have just learnt from good authority that Count Florida-Blanca is *exiled* (to use an Irish expression) into his *native* province of Murcia ; and that he is already set out upon his journey under a guard of soldiers. Though I was heartily angry with him this morning while I was writing my despatches, I confess that this sudden *peripetoea* in his fortunes has quite melted me, and that I am more than half inclined to forget all his faults and foibles. By Thursday's post I shall probably be able to send you the detail of what has passed at Aranjuez during this eventful day."

SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, March 3, Berlin.—"The Prussian Ministers informed me this morning that the 50,000 dollars are already deposited in the bank, and they requested that a full power to give the proper acquittance may be sent to whomsoever the commission to receive them may be entrusted. The payment for the other moiety is fixed for the 26th of July.

"I have, in my several despatches and in two of my private letters, entered so very fully into the state of this Court and the different important matters now in agitation, that I have nothing of consequence to transmit to your Lordship by this messenger. I believe my intelligence to be accurate, though it might be fuller if the Prussian Ministers were less reserved. It is with concern that I find my endeavours to establish a free and confidential intercourse are not more successful. This arises, in a great measure, from the impression which he novelty of the late alliance has made upon the King and his

favourite, and from their attention being solely turned that way. The time, however, must come when the insidious politics of the Emperor will be seen through, and the obstacles to confidential communication of consequence removed. But there will still exist a difficulty in the principles and apprehensions of Count Schulenburg, who, to avoid the imputation of the too great communicativeness of his predecessor Count Hertzberg, runs into an extreme equally unworthy of his good sense and talents. Some allowance, indeed, must be made for his situation; every day's experience more and more evinces his entire dependence, both in the foreign and war departments, on the will of General Bischoffswerder. This reserve renders my situation less pleasant, but your Lordship may be assured that I will persevere in the conciliating line of conduct that I have hitherto pursued, and will not let slip any opportunity to merit the confidence reposed in me by His Majesty, through your Lordship's protection."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, March 4, Beckenham.—"I am glad to collect from the two enclosed letters that Sir Watkin Williams will receive every attention and advantage during his stay in Brussels. I send them because they make due mention of your Lordship, and I beg that you will not take the trouble to return them to me.

"There is something amusing in Monsieur de Mercy's phrase respecting his short visit to this country: *Je n'ai pu qu'entrevoir ce que la superbe et immense Capitale présente de frappant tant au physique qu'au moral. On y aperçoit pourtant les effets de l'ordre et de la sagesse. L'un et l'autre sont devenus un attribut national qui porte l'observateur étranger à rendre le plus juste hommage aux choses et aux personnes.*

"I attended the several Levées and Drawing-rooms of last week, but had not the good fortune to see your Lordship at any of them. I have not attempted to interrupt you in St. James's Square since the opening of the Sessions, because I know that you have been more than sufficiently occupied.

"The advance of the season will probably soon induce your Lordship to direct me to prepare for my return to my post; and, if I am destined to go once more to the Hague in the quieted and stagnant state of our foreign politics, at which I cordially rejoice, I certainly cannot be desirous to absent myself longer than may seem reasonable from the duties which continue to be incumbent on me."

*Enclosing* letters from Count Mercy and Baron Defurz, offering their services at Brussels to Sir Watkin Williams.

#### HUGH CLEGHORN to HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, March 6, London.—"I have been informed that Colonel Braun, the English Agent in Switzerland, is dead; he was long in a bad state of health, and, being near ninety years of age, I am inclined to believe that my information is true.

"I presume on this occasion to recall myself to your recollection, and most respectfully to solicit your aid. The papers which, upon my return to Britain, I presented to his Grace the Duke of Leeds, are perhaps known to Lord Grenville. Of late I have been employed in

collecting and arranging materials from which I flatter myself that considerable commercial advantages may be derived to this country, and the market of its manufacturers extended by arrangements which it may not be difficult to form with Switzerland.

"The desire of more accurate information than could be obtained here concerning some mercantile details, has reluctantly obliged me to delay presenting to Lord Grenville my ideas on this subject.

"But although my entire plan is not formed, I still flatter myself that I may be able to satisfy Lord Grenville and you that my enquiries are directed to objects of national consequence, and which may probably lead to national emolument.

"I have long resided in Switzerland, and I hope you will not think it presumption if I venture to appeal to you, in proof of the confidential information I can there acquire.

"I have no kind of pretensions from connections or established character to public employment. But I hope and trust that I can procure respectable friends to vouch for me, that I would at least act in a manner not to disgrace it."

#### J. PETRIE to [LORD GRENVILLE].

:Secret.

1792, March 13, Soho Square.—"In pursuance of my promise, I have now the honour to lay before your Lordship the following circumstances, well assured that, knowing my particular situation, your Lordship will not suffer my letters to go into the Office.

"Upon the most pointed enquiries I find that what I had the honour of telling your Lordship was precisely the fact. Monsieur de Talleyrand Périgord came over with the perfect and complete approbation of the *Comité Diplomatique* of the present Assembly, and that of the French Cabinet. Under these circumstances they did not foresee the objection which has arisen to his want of public diplomatic powers. I think they will find some difficulty to get over the self-denying law of the Constituant Assembly, with respect to Monsieur Périgord. But I presume that he is gone to France on that subject, and that they will either evade the law in his favour or name some other person for the purpose.

"With respect to your Lordship's question about *his* influence, the answer is in these words: *There certainly are points that neither Monsieur Perigord's nor any other influence can carry. But as he will not propose anything without the sanction of the Comité Diplomatique and the Cabinet, there can be little doubt of his carrying any points agreed on with your Ministry.*

"When Monsieur Périgord's mission was agitated in the *Comité Diplomatique*, it was confessed that an alliance or treaty with England was sanctioned by the tone of the nation, not only as most congenial to their present feelings, but also as the only certain mode of preserving the peace of Europe for ages. And some most extraordinary propositions were brought forward under that idea.

"It was, however, urged by some members that there was another treaty of alliance which might eventually be of more consequence to the parties than the one proposed. That was an alliance between France and Russia, which, by giving France the navigation of the Black Sea and of the immense rivers which fall into it, would not only take off vast quantities of their manufactures, but might in the end raise a maritime power equal to that of the whole world besides. Although the justice of this reasoning was admitted, the idea was overruled as being in the

spirit of the old politics, and as tending more to destroy than to preserve the peace of Europe.

"I do not pretend to do more than state the facts; your Lordship will weigh them as the probabilities may deserve.

"Independent of the treaty of guarantee proposed by Monsieur Périgord, the cession of Tobago has lately been discussed under another point of view which, I have at present reason to believe, will be laid before your Lordship as soon as a proper person has been nominated with the proper powers for that end.

"Their ablest financiers are decidedly of opinion that a loan negotiated in England would, like magic, restore the exchanges to an equilibrium; and enable them not only to destroy a great part of their present vicious circulation, but also to draw forth the hidden specie of the ancient circulation of the kingdom. It is, therefore, in contemplation to propose to your Lordship and His Majesty's other Ministers to raise a loan in England, for which they will pledge security to the lenders, and the faith of the nation to the English Government, without whose guarantee they know they cannot effect the loan; and, in return for such guarantee, they are ready to cede Tobago and its dependencies.

"From my knowledge of the vast resources of the French nation I hesitate not to say that this loan will be repaid, principal and interest, with scrupulous exactitude; and, consequently, that Tobago would be a cheap purchase indeed for such a guarantee, that would not cost the nation one shilling.

"By my letters from Tobago in January last there is every reason to expect that the island will this year produce five thousand hogsheds of sugar and two thousand bales of cotton; an inestimable treasure to this country in the present scarcity of these two articles, and in [an] incalculable advantage to the suffering inhabitants and creditors of the island if brought to England this year. The duties alone would yield to the nation forty thousand pounds for this year, and perhaps double the sum hereafter. In the present overflow of money such a loan might prove eminently beneficial to those who merit the attention of Government on such occasions, the monied men of the city and kingdom. Thus I conceive the plan to be popular under every point of view. But, strong as these arguments may be, I should hardly have ventured to state them to your Lordship were they not supported by others of a very different complexion.

"To superficial observers it has appeared advantageous to England that the exchange should be, and continue, depressed against France to the utmost possible point; but to your Lordship I am sure I have only to point out the reverse to enable you to see the extent of the danger to England, and to induce you to provide a remedy for it as speedily as possible.

*"The present depression of the exchange may eventually prove highly beneficial to France, and extremely prejudicial to the commerce of Great Britain."*

"The lower the exchanges go, the more the *assignats* must be depreciated, and, consequently, the national lands must sell the higher; which, though a present inconvenience, must in the end prove an advantage to France beyond all calculation.

"The lower the exchanges go, the higher must the price of all foreign commodities rise, which may in the end force France to become in a manner *isolé*; to desert all foreign commerce and manufactures, and to look to herself only for these things which she now takes from us.

"These arguments, I conceive, to be well founded with respect to France. But, with respect to the danger to England, I conceive them to be almost capable of mathematical demonstration.

"The wisdom of the Commutation Act has deservedly been the theme of every nation in Europe. But at this moment the state of the exchange between France and England not only completely counteracts its beneficial operation, but has also precisely the effect of a bounty paid by the British Government on smuggling. *For a man can buy tea in France at their highest rates, sell it in England fifty per cent. under the Company's prices, and by the operation of the exchange, gain more profit than he did before the Commutation Act was passed.* And so of every article of contraband trade; *since it is an acknowledged fact that the exchange has fallen four times as much as the price of commodities has risen in France.*

"The advantages of the treaty of commerce with France have been universally acknowledged, but, by the operation of the exchange, these advantages are not only lost at present, but there is much reason to fear that, if a remedy is not speedily applied to the evil, they may be lost never to be regained.

"A piece of English cotton cloth which cost the merchant in France 20 livres two years ago, and which he then sold for 25, will now cost him above 42, and he cannot sell it for above 30. Thus this trade is utterly at an end under the present circumstances.

"As I am certain that these facts will bear the most minute investigation, I am founded in saying that, in sound policy, and independent of every other consideration, England ought to support the exchanges, and endeavour to bring them back to their proper and natural level.

"A loan to France, guaranteed by the English Government, will inevitably effect this without loss or convulsion. Consequently the cession of Tobago would be a clear and unincumbered advantage to this nation; and, if it should have paved the way to such a general benefit, that island will have acquired a new claim to the gratitude of England."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, March 14, Beckenham.—"If I were out of office I should endeavour to avoid all thought, or at least all solicitude, respecting political occurrences and speculations, and should content myself with a silent wish and prayer that those who administer the country in which I live might long maintain its peace and prosperity. As, however, I am not yet quite sequestered, I feel myself disquieted by the great events which at present occupy every Court in Europe, and lament much that your Lordship's occupations have so long deprived me of the advantage of seeing you and of receiving your sentiments.

"The change of the Spanish Ministry, and the sudden death of the Emperor, are circumstances which, in various points of view, must have a great effect. I know too little of the character of the young King of Hungary to guess what line of measures he will pursue; but it is fair to presume for the moment that he will be advised to do what is best for his own interests, though, in the multiplicity of embarrassments which surround him, it is difficult to decide what that *best* may be. I presume, however, that he will immediately ratify the new treaty with Prussia, and endeavour to maintain a good understanding with that Court and with Petersburg; and, indeed, for obvious reasons, with every other power. It is not probable that he will commence any hostility against France, nor do I believe that the Emperor, if he had lived, would have gone beyond a position of menace. And yet there are well-informed persons who, though they feel the general wisdom

and rectitude of the pacific system, doubt whether the military Governments of Germany might not best be supported through the present dangerous crisis by engaging the people to a certain degree in war.

"I presume that we shall soon receive a joint invitation from the Emperor's successor and the King of Prussia to accede to such articles of their treaty as may be agreeable to us and compatible with our system. It will rest with your Lordship to decide whether it may not be sufficient to give a civil and indefinite answer.

"It becomes interesting to learn the impression which the Emperor's death may have made in Flanders and Brabant. If no new explosion should take place there, the new sovereign may be able to tread back some of the ill-judged steps of his predecessors. I shall not be surprised if he should offer to us an unqualified ratification of the Hague convention. This at least is so far possible as to merit a previous consideration in order to be prepared for it.

"In the general state and impression of the moment, the Empress of Russia may, perhaps, in despite of the ill-humour which has so long subsisted, be found disposed to draw nearer towards us, or at least to conclude the commercial treaty in some mode acceptable to us. She certainly feels uneasiness respecting her own situation, and would not be sorry to be apparently well with a country which has kept so clear of the madness of the times as England has done hitherto.

"It appears to me that such a *rapprochement* would be eligible to us, both commercially and politically. Under the palsied composition of the Prussian Ministry we have, in effect, no Continental alliance, and, perhaps, *so much the better*; but it would be of great importance to us towards maintaining the general peace of Europe, to have some better hold and communication at Petersburg than we have had during the last twenty years.

"As to the disgrace of Comte Florida Blanca, I am totally ignorant of the circumstances, but I presume that the opposition of that country has gained the victory, and that we shall hear soon of the promotions of Messieurs O'Reilly, Rubi, Borghese, and their friends.

"It has happened to me to live and converse with the Comte d'Aranda, at Paris and at Madrid, more perhaps than any person not born a Spaniard except M. de Mercy. He is naturally a liberal-minded man, of a very hard temper though with polite manners, versed through life in business both at home and abroad, and certainly possessing great political courage. But he appears to me too old to retain activity equal to his undertaking; and, even in the year 1788 and 1789, I thought him occasionally in a state of *radotage*.

"Though the French wretchedness seems to increase more rapidly than the utmost malignancy of national hostility could ever have wished, I confess myself anxious to see their fate brought to a period one way or other. The extravagance and profligacy of their doctrines have not yet infected us materially; but I dread them as I would the plague in my neighbourhood, and think it within a reasonable probability that I may live to see all Europe in a state of frenzy and ferocity tending fast to the ancient barbarism. I hope that this is a gloomy and exaggerated speculation; but great and unwearied vigilance is necessary. Many of the present habits and usages of English society, and much of the Parliamentary language and measures, appear to me to be calculated for the levelling system. The *soidisants vainqueurs de la Bastille* told the *Assemblée Nationale* last week, *que, jusqu'ici, la Revolution si vantée n'a fait que substituer l'aristocratie des richesses au pouvoir de la naissance; qu'on ne restera pas là; enfin que les courtisans, les rois, les*



*ministres, et la liste civile passeront, mais que les droits de l'homme, la souveraineté nationale, et les piques ne passeront jamais.*

"The next step is to an agrarian law, and the next to general nakedness and savageness. Nor would it be difficult to show that many of the doctrines bringing forwards in this country, under cover of the slave question and of religious toleration, are in unison with those *des vainqueurs de la Bastille.*"

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1792, March 16, St. James's Square.—"I am extremely obliged to you for your letter, and for the information it contains respecting the curious events of which we have received the account in the course of the last week. They will, I hope, at least lead to delay, and even the suspension, though but temporary, of actual hostilities I hold to be advantageous to us.

"I understand from Mr. Pitt that he wished for an opportunity of conversing with you on the subject of your former note. Whenever you have arranged anything with respect to your return, I shall be happy to talk with you upon it."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, April 1, St. James's Square.—"I believe I mentioned to you some time since that Mr. Baldwin, the consul at Cairo, receives annually more than 1,400*l.* of the public money, and that, as far as I am able to judge of the services which he performs, or of the advantage which results to the public from his residence there, they do not appear to me to justify this expense. I wish, therefore, to know your opinion how far the interests of this country in its connexion with the East Indies are promoted by his being continued in Egypt, and whether you think he ought on that ground to remain there, and at his present allowance."

*Copy.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, April 5, Philadelphia.—"In addition to my dispatch, No. 15, I think it necessary to inform your Lordship that I am fully persuaded of the truth of those assurances which Mr. Carmichael gave to Mr. Merry of his desire to withhold, as long as he decently could, the communication of the offers that had been made to his country by the Spanish Minister. For, about six weeks ago, in an accidental conversation with Mr. Jefferson, that gentleman animadverted with no little asperity on the jealous caution of the Court of Spain, to which alone he said he could ascribe the circumstance of his not having heard from Mr. Carmichael for some weeks past. Since that time several American vessels have arrived from Cadiz (one or two of which have had passages remarkably short) and, I presume, from Mr. Hamilton's communications, that by some of them the Spanish propositions have been transmitted to this Government.

"Colonel Smith, whom your Lordship saw in London, having conceived some disgust against Mr. Jefferson and the President, and imagining that his communications had not been treated with the

respect which they merited, has resigned a very lucrative situation under this Government, and is now on his voyage to England. As he may probably endeavour to throw himself in your Lordship's way, I take the liberty of apprising you that, although his abilities are rather contracted, and he is not untinctured with vanity and affectation, I firmly believe him to be a man of unimpeachable integrity, and possessing a strong predilection for England. He is the son-in-law of the Vice-President of the United States (John Adams) and much in his confidence."

LORD H. J. SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, April 6, Hague.—"The enclosed private letter from M. de Reede contains some particulars which coincide in a remarkable manner with those hinted at in the paper which I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship with my last despatch, from the Dutch Minister at Manheim.

"Letters from Brussels mention that M. Brillet and M. Corbesier are returned there highly satisfied with their success at Vienna; that they had had two conferences during their stay with His Hungarian Majesty; and that there is every reason to hope that, if the States of Brabant will agree to furnish the subsidies, a perfect reconciliation of all parties will soon take place."

*Enclosure.*

*Extrait.*

1792, 31 Mars, Berlin.—"On ne s'occupe ici que de l'attentat commis contre le Roi de Suede, et dont on craint . . . que ce Monarque ne soit la victime. Le Roi en a été profondément affecté. . . Les Emmissaires des Princes en sont très peînés. Ils comptoient beaucoup sur ce Monarque . . . L'opinion connue aujourd'hui est que tous les moyens de conciliation étant presque épuisés, la guerre devient inevitable . . . On m'assure que Roi de Prusse a reçu, depuis quelque tems, différens avis d'être sur ses gardes, et qu'on médite un attentat contre sa personne. Sa majesté a pris ceci comme un moyen de la porter à ne pas se mêler des affaires de France, et n'en tient aucun compte, persuadé que l'amour de ses peuples le met à l'abri de tout danger."

*En chiffre.*—"M. de Mollendorff m'a dit qu'on avoit des avis, et meme des signalemens des personnes qu'on disoit parties pour l'étranger, avec la commission de se defaire des personnes qui pourroient nuire au succès de la Revolution Francaise."

"Il y a lieu de croire qu'on travaille à corriger ou changer la nouvelle constitution de Pologne par une seconde revolution plus au gré d'Electeur de Saxe . . . et que l'entreprise sera appuyée par un corps de troupes qu'on porte de huit à dix mille hommes, et que l'on feroit venir sous prétexte de la fête pour célébrer la Revolution."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL GOWER.

Private.

1792, April 6, Whitehall.—"I have very little to add to my public despatches which contain the full accounts of the business between the two frigates, and which I think will appear to take it up in such a manner that nothing but a disposition to quarrel with us can raise any

difficulty on the subject. You will observe that my despatch is drawn with a view to public discussion, as I imagine that, considering the present state of things in France, *that* can hardly be avoided however desirable it would have been. I conceive, therefore, that the best way will be for you to turn it into an *office*, with as little change as possible, and to deliver such *office* to Monsieur Dumourier. I have made it full with that view, as I thought you would naturally be desirous of knowing as precisely as possible the terms in which we wished you to express yourself on so delicate a business.

"The articles of the commercial treaty to which I refer are those from the 20th to the 28th, but particularly the 26th, which regulates the mode of visiting both on the coasts *and on the high seas*. You will, of course, observe that it is impracticable to carry this article into effect by visiting in the mode prescribed, unless the merchant ship, in compliance with the signal, lays to for that purpose."

*Copy.*

#### EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, April 11, Paris.—"I took the first opportunity, that of the post, of sending a copy of a paper which the King put into my hands last Sunday; in case, by any accident, that letter should not have arrived, I enclose another copy. The interest that His Most Christian Majesty takes in Monsieur de la Peyrouse is extremely natural and pleasing. There cannot be a stronger proof of his anxiety upon that subject than the manner in which he applied to me for information from England. He began by saying to me, I have a favour to desire of Lord Chatham; he then told me that there were hopes that Monsieur de la Peyrouse and his crew were alive, and explained to me the grounds for those hopes. But lest I should forget the particulars, he gave me the paper of which I send you a second copy. In truth, the letter which I wrote on Monday was intended for Lord Chatham; but it was, through a mistake, directed to you."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1792, April 20, St James's Square.—"Since I saw you this morning, I learn that Lord Robert Fitzgerald is actually in town, and ready to set out (as I imagine) to Switzerland. This makes me anxious that you should express without delay to Lord Henry Spencer my desire of consulting his wishes, supposing that he should prefer the Secretaryship of Embassy at Paris to a continuance of his present situation, under the different circumstances which a new appointment might occasion. I do not add anything, as I naturally should do, respecting my opinion of the manner in which Lord Henry has conducted himself at the Hague during your absence, because I know you are not ignorant of my sentiments on that subject.

"There is a subject entirely unconnected with European politics which I wished to mention to you before you go. It is not worth your coming to town for, but, as I suppose you must be in London on Thursday, I should be glad to see you here for a few minutes in the morning."

*Copy.*

## EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, April 27, Paris.—“It appears that this Government is determined to make up in number what it may be deficient in in other points. You have, or rather will have, the whole batch of negotiators—Monsieur de Chauvelin the first in point of credentials; Monsieur de Périgord in point of abilities; and perhaps his equal in that respect for negotiation, Monsieur Du Roveray, whose former conduct in regard to his own country, *Geneve*, renders him with the rest *sujet à caution*. I understand some underlings are gone with them; upon the whole, they form a formidable negotiating body.

“I think it proper to inform you that, in the decent and praiseworthy procession of the *fête* of Chateaufieux, the English flag, *proh pudor!* was carried by two worthy deputies from the Society of Manchester in correspondence with that of the *Jacobines*, Mr. Watts and Mr. Cooper.

“With regard to Thomas Pain, I have been informed, from very respectable authority, that it was in agitation to gain him over to write for monarchy in this country; but as Lord Elgin was present when that was mentioned, I beg leave to refer you to him for all the information I could write to you upon that subject.

“I find that Mr. Crosby has solicited his friends to intercede with you in order that he may be appointed to succeed Lord Robert. I can only say that, in case that appointment should take place, I shall be very happy to have so agreeable a diplomatic companion. I am conscious that, in this day's dispatch, I have not said so much as some people may expect about the army on the frontiers; but I am, at the same time, conscious that I have said all that I know upon that subject, and all that is to be known, for it is irksome to hazard lies.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1792, April 28, Whitehall.—“Lord Grenville has the honour humbly to acquaint your Majesty that he has this morning seen M. de Chauvelin, who has delivered to him the enclosed copy of his credential letter to your Majesty, with a request to be informed when your Majesty will be pleased to allow him the honour of an audience to present it. He at the same time informed Lord Grenville that he had another letter to present to your Majesty from the French King, which having been sealed by His Most Christian Majesty, he could not furnish him with a copy of it, but that he could apprise him of the contents, which were to return thanks to your Majesty for the conduct which your Majesty has observed with respect to France, and to express his desire to maintain the most perfect friendship with your Majesty, and even to increase it by a formal alliance. This, as far as Lord Grenville recollects it, was the substance of what M. de Chauvelin mentioned to him, as contained in His Most Christian Majesty's letter; and as M. de Chauvelin is furnished, besides this, with a regular letter of credence, Lord Grenville did not think it right to make any difficulty with respect to his being allowed to present this other letter to your Majesty.

“M. de Chauvelin also delivered to Lord Grenville the enclosed letter from M. Dumouriez. On reading it, Lord Grenville thought it necessary to ask whether M. Talleyrand and M. du Roveray were in any manner accredited to your Majesty; in answer to which he was told by

M. Chauvelin that they were not, '*mais qu'ils lui étoient adjoints, comme attachés à la mission Francoise*'; that M. Talleyrand's age and talents would naturally have entitled him to a more distinguished situation, but that his character of member of the last Assembly not allowing this, he could only be to converse on the state of France and the dispositions of its Government with Lord Grenville. M. Chauvelin did not enter on any point of business in this interview."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, April 28, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville's box arrived here at half hour past six. I authorize him to appoint M. de Chauvelin to deliver his letters on Wednesday. I am very happy however M. de Talleyrand and du Roveray may be directed by the French Secretary of State to Lord Grenville, that they have no credence to me, and therefore may receive the contempt their characters entitle them to. I know I need not recommend the greatest caution to Lord Grenville in conversing with persons much fitter to be employed with the new club in St. James's Street than with any servants of the Crown."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1792, May 4, Hill Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty an account which he has just received from Mr. Pybus of the disgraceful and shocking conduct of the French troops on the occasion of the first commencement of hostilities."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, May 4, Windsor.—"The brutality and cowardice that has attended the outset of the French hostilities does not augur either a successful or honourable issue of their warlike furor, but indeed, from the commencement of the Revolution, more acts of barbarity have been committed than by the most savage people."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, May 7, Harwich.—"I arrived here early yesterday morning and proposed to have dined at the Hague to day; but the wind is adverse and strong, and there is not at present any prospect of a change for the better. We bear the irksomeness of such a situation with that sort of patience which the necessity of the case requires, but we shall lose our full moon."

"A French gentleman, who called himself *Monsieur de Roche Jaquelin, Maréchal de Camp*, landed here yesterday with a part of his family. He expects the remaining part to land about this time at Calais. He made me a visit of half an hour, and proceeded last night to Colchester."

"His story is, that he has remained near to the person of the French King till about three weeks ago; that he has since been at Brussels on some secret commission connected with the breaking out of the war; that he is in correspondence with the French Princes, and sent on a secret commission to St. Domingo. His secret he confided to me, though he never saw me before. It is that the Court of Spain has

privately undertaken to interfere in the affairs of St. Domingo, to acquire a possession of the French part, and to hold it for the Regents of France; *provided* that England should not appear indisposed to such a measure. I heard his story, without making farther remarks than were necessary for the current of his communications. He related many circumstances also relative to the late affairs between the Austrian and French troops, with which I do not trouble your Lordship, as you will have had better accounts.

"The Princess of Orange writes : *Mon absence ne sera que de 4 à 5 semaines, tout au plus. Les circonstances dans lesquelles ma fille s'est trouvées les derniers tems de son séjour à la Haye, m'ont engagée à la ramener moi-même à Brunswick. Si j'ai l'honneur de vous expliquer tout cela, je suis persuadée que vous m'approuverez d'avoir pris cette résolution.* I do not guess the meaning of this; but I suppose that it is some family circumstance."

#### LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 14, Aranjuez.—"The Nootka arbitration business is still *en bon train*, and, though it goes on more slowly than I had at first expected, I hope to send away Slater with my despatches upon it in a very few days. In the meantime, I trouble you with these five lines just to show that I have not *deserted*, which you would perhaps have been inclined to suspect on receiving two succeeding Spanish mails without any letter from me."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to EARL GOWER.

Private.

1792, May 15, Whitehall.—"I had intended writing to you last Friday on the subject of the Secretaryship to the Embassy, but was prevented. On Crosbie's application, made some time since through the Duke of Montrose, I stated to him without reserve the objections which I felt to bringing into that situation a person not now in the diplomatic line, especially when he must have come over the heads of two or three young men of merit whom I wish to bring forward into situations where their talents and activity may be of use. I have since given the same answer to other applications on the same subject. My wish would be to appoint Lindsay, who is now named for the Residentsip at Venice, and who has served with considerable diligence and ability in the mission at Petersburg. But I feel that I owe it to you not actually to make this appointment without first mentioning it to you, and desiring to know whether there is any circumstance which would make it disagreeable to you. I flatter myself, however, that this will not be the case, and that you will find him a man of merit and good dispositions."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 15, Hague.—"I found great uneasiness in the minds of the Dutch Ministers respecting the associations in London, Norwich, Sheffield, for the pretended purposes of constitutional reform. They learnt from me with great pleasure that the English nation, collectively

considered, is fully sensible of the unexampled prosperity which it enjoys under its laws, sovereign, and government; and particularly that the late *Address to the people* is regarded by all those to whom the country looks for right opinions, as a measure of puerile indiscretion and vanity on the part of some who are placed the most forward in it, though certainly instigated and supported by others whose views are wicked and malignant. The anxiety of our Dutch friends on these subjects is not quite disinterested, for they feel that, in the present circumstances of Europe, the Republic is safe from any external attack, and from any interior commotion, so long as England maintains her tranquillity.

"The Grand Pensionary mentioned to me the supposed objects of Lord Macartney's mission with great liberality of sentiment, and I think it probable that he will write to me on the part of the Dutch East India Company to entreat your Lordship, in that mission, to favour their commercial interests, so far as they may not affect our own. I mentioned to him the manuscript relative to the interior of Japan, which is supposed to be in the possession of the Stadthonder. He had never heard of it, and seemed to doubt its existence, or at least its importance. He assured me that the late reports of the distresses of the Dutch Company on the coast of Ceylon have been much exaggerated, and that he felt more alarm respecting the direct intercourse which is opening between Russia and China.

"So far as I have been able to learn concerning the Princess of Orange's absence, it is partly occasioned by her desire to accompany the Princess of Brunswick, in order to soften her reception by the Duke, who had written some very angry letters to say that her stay at the Hague with the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick had been too long prolonged. But the Pensionary confided to me that Her Royal Highness hopes to have an interview with her brother at Magdebourg to discuss many subjects, and particularly to settle the marriage of her second son with the daughter of the Duke of Courland, renouncing all views of succession to that sovereignty, but taking for the portion an independent Dutchy in Silesia.

"The Comte de Mercy has desired, privately, to remove his valuable property from the Netherlands to one of the Dutch garrisons. It may be hoped that this is a superfluous precaution."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, May 15, Hague.—"When I prefix the above word your Lordship permits me to understand that my letter is merely to yourself, and (when the occasion may seem to merit his attention) to Mr. Pitt.

"Under the circumstance of the Princess of Orange's absence, I may find it difficult to keep the Grand Pensionary within due bounds in adjusting our answers to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna; and therefore, in my despatch of this morning, I bespoke your Lordship's indulgence if I should fail to a certain degree. I have since confided to him the perusal of your Lordship's dispatch, and to-night I have received from him the enclosed note. I will endeavour to obtain and to forward his paper by the next post; and I shall be glad if your Lordship should receive it before your next instruction is despatched to me. Possibly it may contain useful and satisfactory ideas, for he has had a conversation upon it with the Stadthonder and Greffier, each of whom sees the matter as we wish.

"His solitary system of life makes him brood over ideas in which he has been crossed; but there is another circumstance which affects his temper, and which I ought to mention. The leading party in the town of Amsterdam, which in effect is the province of Holland, was often troublesome to him, and is lately become avowedly hostile in several measures, both in the States and in the towns. Some of our friends who understand the Dutch cabals doubt whether at this moment the Pensionary could be re-chosen. Fortunately there remain two years previous to a re-election.

"The Greffier is steadily and honourably attached to us, and his influence is increasing:

"The Prince takes great merit for having baffled the Austrian propositions in December last, and enlarges with complacency on the scrape in which the Republic would now have found herself if a different conduct had been pursued. But, in truth, His Serene Highness possesses so little energy and steadiness of mind that it is impossible to rely on him in any measure from one day to another.

"I cannot trace any disposition here to take or encourage any measure that may tend to abolish or even to lessen the Dutch proportion of the slave trade.

"I do not know whether your Lordship has the means of perusing the correspondence between Messieurs de Stadion and De Buol; but I have reason to believe that it is petulant and mischievous."

"If, instead of Lord Henry's tour to Berlin, it happened to be more convenient to your Lordship's arrangements to send him for two or three months with a *lettre de créance* to Brussels, his correspondence might be well employed there till you have time to make your arrangements; but I have not put this idea into his head, and I do not think that it will occur to him.

"Perhaps it would be very useful if we could contrive to have some means of good intelligence from the armies. If your Lordship and his Majesty's Ministers should think it worth any moderate expense, I will try to arrange some good plan with the Greffier and Pensionary."

*Enclosed.*

VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

"Je viens d'accoucher de quelques idées qui pourroient servir de matériaux à une reponse pour Vienne: ce n'est jusqu'ici qu'une *rudis indigestaque moles*; mais j'ai prié le Greffier de le mettre en Francois pour vous être communiqué; ce qui lui est beaucoup plus facile qu'à moi."

*French.*

LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, May 16, Park Lane.—"The Duke of Richmond suggested to me the notion of having Geneva inserted in my credentials as well as the Swiss cantons, and I trust your Lordship will not think it unreasonable of me if I submit the expediency of the measure to your consideration. The extension of my rank to that Republic will be attended with no additional expense to Government, and may be of advantage to me in securing me a good reception there."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, May 17 [Stowe].—"I own that I am surprised at the last attack made by that person from whom you have always expected,



and generally received, every indirect mischief; but, for reasons which we have often discussed, I did not expect an overt act so very strongly and personally marked as that which your letter of yesterday announced. If I could have found a moment's time yesterday, I should have written to have recommended, not as a measure of resentment, but as a step indispensably necessary to your future situations (whatever they may be) the immediate communication which I find has been made, as the preliminary to the struggle which must take place. What the event is to be is, I am sure, very much beyond your speculation. I can foresee many most improbable, and, amongst them, the possibility of the most abject submission, if he has any reason to think that such a line would assist him in *any quarter*. But I principally write to state to you at once that it is not fit that any views of mine should stand in the way of great and material arrangements, and, therefore, the old shoes to which I have looked are at the service of the negotiators most cheerfully, and would be so if I had them at this moment on my feet. You know my wishes for his successor, but I doubt very much whether he can disengage himself; and if not, I do not see room enough for any suite whom he may wish to include. In all events, I take it for granted that your first experiment will be made in that quarter; and, till you see a little into that mill-stone, all further speculation is idle.

"The refusal of the Duke of Portland to attend the Council is of a piece with much of his undecided conduct, unless you imagine that he looks to the possibility of something arising out of the state of the country more flattering to his hopes; but it is not impossible that the last declaration of Mr. Grey's club *versus* T. Paine's may have been drawn by Mr. Fox with a view to the influence which I told you I had reason to believe that he was exerting in this moment. But I highly approve the idea of proceeding in your Council, and the rather now because they have refused to accede to it.

"I find from Box, who has been ten days in town, that Government is much blamed by the commercial people for its total supineness and inattention to measures which, he says, certainly give great alarm. I mention this, because I think his accounts, which are much detailed, may be depended upon. In this country we are, as usual, very loyal; but all the accounts from Birmingham agree that the verdicts have, in general, more than repaid the damages to the Dissenters, and that their language has risen in the same proportion. Captain Badcock passed a week there, and from him, as well as from our Buckingham tradesmen, I learn that the Association is determined, in all events, to meet on the 14th of July; and that their numbers have increased so as to irritate the minds of the mob and of the tradespeople to a very alarming degree."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, May 18, Hague.—"The enclosed extract of a long letter from the Prince of Orange is hardly worth communicating to you, and yet I ought not, perhaps, to put it aside unnoticed. I know nothing of the circumstance in the Hanoverian Chancery relative to the election of the Emperor, except that it seems to engage the attention of the German politicians of the Hague; but I have generally observed that, in the result, the Hanoverian Chancery proves right in its proceedings. As to the rest of the letter, I have reason to believe that it was communicated to the Grand Pensionary before it was sent to me, and that

it is well meant to convey to the latter the idea that the Prince adopts and wishes to support your Lordship's sentiments respecting the Austrian alliance."

*Enclosing* an extract of a letter from the Prince of Orange.

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, May 19 [Stowe].—"You will easily believe that before I wrote to you so decidedly upon my wish to sacrifice my objects for facilitating arrangements which, in my letter to you, I conceived necessarily to go beyond the one Department now vacant, I certainly had fully considered the *pour et contre*; and have, as certainly, made my mind completely up to the foregoing what, I will not conceal from you, is a very material object to me from considerations which we have often discussed, and to the gratifying my own feelings by doing it in the handsomest manner towards Pitt, by not endeavouring to load him with the appearance of an obligation beyond the real value of it; and the real value at which I estimate this surrender is the continuance of those regards to which, I am vain enough to think, I have had some claim. With these views, I did wish and still desire that the communication of my wishes may go to him through you; and those wishes are necessarily expressed in my last letter in very general terms, because I cannot possibly foresee the manner and the moment in which an arrangement for those old shoes may assist you. I am, however, sure that Pitt will not accept this offer, unless it can assist him in arrangements *consequent to the difficulty* in which I wish it to be useful to him.

"Your idea of the commission is undoubtedly wise, and indeed is the only alternative at the present period of the session; but, with the option left to the Lord Chancellor, I should not wonder if he wished to retain his office for some weeks longer, under an idea of winding up his judgments, which are very much in arrears; and, in that case, he will probably be less troublesome in the House of Lords than he would be if setting upon the Opposition benches; but very much of all this depends upon the part taken by Lords Stafford, Bath, and those who usually live with him, and of their motions or opinions you say nothing; from which, and from my own speculations, I conceive that they have made up their minds to let him drink the wine *qu'il a tiré*.

"Your labours are indeed increased, but that is the least part of my uneasiness, as this uncertainty can only last for a short time; and, whenever the point is ascertained by the event of your summer negotiation, your mind will be made up; and is fully equal to any result. I am curious to see your proclamation because, if it is well drawn, it will be a very useful and a very essential manifesto. I depend upon your notice of the day of the address, as I am very little inclined to come up for any other object.

"As I have determined from all this not to write to Pitt, you will, of course, state all this to him immediately."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, May 20, Hague.—"It is equally difficult to discover why Basilico has been detained so long, and why he is now sent. The sum total of his despatches seems to be that the Grand Vizir has had a transitory fit of the colic, and the Queen of Hungary a miscarriage.

"I enclose a note from the Grand Pensionary, who, upon the whole, is practicable, and in good temper, and acts conformably to your Lord-

ship's views and wishes. It is very possible that the project of his own retreat, to which he alludes, may some fine morning take place; though there is no immediate danger of it. When he accepted the office, an eventual, though small, provision was made for him, and for his family after him. He would be a great loss to us in every point of view. I do not know any individual in this province fit to succeed him.

"I also enclose a private letter from my old friend Keith, which your Lordship will have the goodness to direct to be returned to me. I will add to it part of a confidential letter from my brother, which has some connection with the same subject.

"Your Lordship is in danger of having too much diplomatic patronage. The arrangements to be made by it are, in my humble opinion, of far more importance to the essential interests of England, than they are in general supposed to be. It would, however, be an abuse of your indulgence if I were to enter more particularly into this subject.

"We are impatient here for news from the Austrian Netherlands. If the French do not use the present interval of advantage before the arrival of the allied armies to exert themselves with effect, I shall begin to think that a *contre-revolution* is no absurd speculation."

*Enclosure.*

SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD AUCKLAND.

[1792, May, Berlin.]—"In these worse than Arabian sands, I have neither honour nor pleasure; on the contrary, much disgust and discomfort, and my establishment is at the rate of five thousand a year. I will never ask for an increase; nor do I even wish for it, as it would imply an obligation to remain here. If Keith gives up, or succeeds you, I would willingly fix myself for life at Vienna with his present appointments. Lord Elgin, last summer, would have preferred this place. I mention him as I conclude that he is desirous of entering into the line, and will soon be placed.

"Hugh Elliot is here, and is very cheerful and pleasant. I have, however, intimated my wishes that he should not give the most distant hints about Doctors' Commons business, but he says that what he does is in compliance with the wishes of some female friends in the neighbourhood of our old school, where poor Bernard presided. He gives me a delightful account of your young family.

"William Eliot is also returned. He is perfectly accommodating but too silent."

*Mutilated.*

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, May 20, Hague.—"After closing my despatches of this date, I received a note from the Grand Pensionary on some private matters, to which he subjoins the following paragraph: *Voici encore des avis de M. de Haefsten ! Nous avons à attendre une circulaire adressée par la Cour de Vienne afin d'intéresser toutes les Puissances de l'Europe dans la croisade contre les Jacobins. En attendant, l'Impératrice de Russie va jouer son rôle en Pologne, ce que je ne croirai jamais être sans concert préalable avec Vienne. Les Princes Français sollicitent vivement la permission de se mettre en mouvement ; et c'est (comme on prétend) par une principe d'humanité qu'on veut arrêter leur fougue, par la crainte des horreurs aux quelles la haine des François, et leur acharnement, les livreroient.*

"The nature of civil war is such, that the sabre of the Uhlán may possibly be used with less rancour and cruelty than that of the Frenchman; but it requires great candour to believe that the Austrian Ministers are influenced by that consideration so far as to restrain any means of force that may tend to bring their enterprise to a rapid and successful issue.

"M. de Kalitcheff is perhaps ill-informed; but he seems unaffectedly to treat the whole report of the intended attack on Poland as without any immediate foundation in truth."

EARL GOWER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 21, Paris.—"I am very glad that you purpose to send Lindsay here. Your good opinion of him, joined to my former acquaintance with him, makes that appointment perfectly agreeable to me. Having known that Crosbie had applied to you through the Duke of Montrose I thought I owed it to him to make a favourable mention of him, and I make no doubt he feels as strongly as I do the force of your objection to his appointment. I cannot conclude without thanking you for the obliging manner in which you have communicated to me Lindsay's nomination."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 26, Hague.—"The Grand Pensionary seems to adopt your Lordship's opinions respecting the Austrian invitation with more frankness and cheerfulness than I expected. He reverted, however, to the transaction of last December, and said that he continued to think himself right under the then existing circumstances; but he added, with good humour, that it was fortunate for the Republic to have followed our opinion in that business in preference to his, which eventually would have produced a serious embarrassment. M. de Welderen does not show the same candour, and affects on all occasions to say not only that the Republic ought to accept the Austrian invitation, but that it would be for her true interest to engage in the present *croisade* against France. In this strange policy he makes no proselytes, and will therefore, by degrees, return to his good sense and good temper.

"Many ridiculous anecdotes are current here on the subject of M. de Maulde, who certainly furnishes some ground for them. His notes to his tradesmen are counter-signed by the little secretary who, at his presentation, wore no hat and carried an enormous *portefeuille*. The enclosed note, beginning with the words *Emmanuel de Maulde*, and ending with *quatrième année de la liberté*, is no bad specimen of his *bizarres*. It was unprovoked too; Lady Auckland receives the Stadholder's Court and all the Hague to an assembly and supper every Wednesday, and he had merely been told this when he was presented to her.

"Lord Galway has been here in a state of continued intoxication, which must soon put an end to him. His understanding (such as it was) is quite gone; he lives in the streets, and is incessantly in quarrels with the lower people. He came to me at two o'clock in the morning to desire protection against a Jew whom he had taken by the beard, and by whom in return he had been treated with an unchristian severity. His

servants had requested me to have him by some means sent back to his friends in England; luckily the want of money (for he spent 150*l.* here in two days) has forced him back.

"The Chevalier de Revel leaves this place to-morrow. I have given him a letter of introduction to M. de Calonne, and he promises to send to me from Coblenz such remarks and information as he may be able to collect at that place. There are accounts here through a good channel that A. Lameth and some others are trying to enter into some negotiation with M. de Mercy. Individuals may negotiate for themselves; but it seems to be impossible to negotiate for a great and populous country in a state of armed anarchy."

*Enclosing a short note from M. de Maulde to Lady Auckland.*

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 29, Hague.—"The application from the Grand Duke of Tuscany will be more or less embarrassing. I am surprised that my old friend Keith, with all his experience, should have volunteered in placing the request in its best point of view; it might probably have been parried with a better grace if M. de Manfredini had been left to his own pen.

"M. de Semonville's paper, as transmitted by Mr. Trevor, is an execrable piece of wickedness and folly. If it were better authenticated, it would be useful to publish it.

"Five Dutch ships of war belonging to the Admiralty of Friesland are now selling in the port of Harling to private purchasers. It is a curious circumstance that two of them (74 gun ships) built in 1785 by the patriot Government for France, were made too large to be got out of the port over the bar by any of the machines in use for that purpose; and the whole being in bad condition will be sold for an inconsiderable sum. The Pensionary has confided to me a circumstance not less curious, and which he says is certainly true, though it is necessary to deny it. The canal (or *ecluse*) leading from the basin at Flushing having required a great repair, the Admiralty of Zealand have inadvertently suffered the workmen to break up the frame of the canal previous to taking the vessels out of the basin; and it is supposed to be impossible to complete the repair in less than a twelvemonth.

"The Grand Pensionary is very solicitous to know whether His Majesty's Ministers will not think it expedient to have a squadron early at sea, and at least as large as has been usual in time of peace. Orders are given here for completing the guardships to the war establishment."

LORD ST. HELENS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 29, Madrid.—"I cannot but hope that the proposal which goes by this messenger for settling what Count D'Aranda terms the *fastidious* business of the Nootka claims, by the payment of a round sum of money as a discharge in full, will strike your fancy as much as it does his and mine. If you should think the sum too little, I am confident that, rather than that the expedient should fail, he would go as far as 10, 15, or even 20,000 dollars more; as, on the other hand, should you scout the idea altogether, and insist upon reverting to that of the arbitration, I am equally certain that you will find in him all the facilities held out in my despatch, both as to the place of meeting of the arbitrators, and their mode of proceeding, so that they may hold their

first sitting within a month of the time originally proposed. I am the more anxious that you should give credit to these assurances, as it would give me the greatest pain to be suspected, even for a moment, of having left an important public business like this at sixes and sevens, for the sake of any personal consideration whatsoever."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 29, Berlin.—"The expulsion of M. de Leuschering, which I mentioned in my dispatch of Saturday last, without any form of trial, has given rise to many reflections. From his age and figure he could not inspire any tender passion, but he had made amongst the fair sex many proselytes to his exalted notions of liberty, and amongst others of Mademoiselle de Bielefeld, a young lady who was governess to His Prussian Majesty's youngest daughter. On hearing of his being arrested she immediately went to his lodgings, and it was in consequence of her arrival and behaviour that the *Lieutenant de Police* sent for Count Schulenburg. The Count met, as he himself relates, with many severe invectives both from the young lady and her preceptor, and it was with some difficulty that he prevailed upon her to return to the Palace. She has, of course, been turned out of her place, and orders have been received from Madgebourg that the ladies of the Court shall have no intercourse with the other ladies involved in this affair. Mademoiselle de Bielefeld, by her extravagant eulogy of Mirabeau and the principal demagogues, had given offence to Baron Rolle and others of the French agents here, who have been long seeking to effect her disgrace. Her present imprudent conduct, indeed, most fully justifies her removal. The attention of the French agents to do prejudice to anybody that stands at all in the way of their views is frequently manifested, and gives room to much discontent. These circumstances are too trifling to enter into my dispatch, and I merely mention them as they will, in all probability, soon find their way with much exaggeration into all the French papers."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, May 31, Berlin.—"I avail myself of the passage through this place of Mr. Whitworth's messenger to inform your Lordship of the disgrace of the Countess of Dönhoff. The intelligence has just come to my knowledge, and I can scarce entertain a doubt of its authenticity. Various are the reasons alleged for this unexpected rupture, and particularly that some papers have been found amongst those of M. de Leuschering which prove a connexion with the Jacobin party. The event, however, is too recent for the particulars to have transpired, but the cause must be weighty, as she is said to be again pregnant. She has long been at open variance with the favourite. He doubtless has kept a close watch over all her actions, and will carefully exert all his endeavours to prevent a reconciliation. Yet His Prussian Majesty's tenderness for her is so great that I should not be surprised if he forgives her. It is confidently said that, on the discovery, she declared her readiness to leave her royal lover, and her intention to retire to Switzerland; and thither it is thought she will immediately go. I cannot but rejoice at her disgrace since she is of a violent and unrelenting temper, and, besides her repeated insults to the Queen of Prussia, she has ever been

eager to alienate His Prussian Majesty's affections from his children, and was moreover an avowed enemy to England. M. de Bischoffswerder's influence will now, for a time at least, be uncontrolled."

SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 2, Berlin.—*In cipher*.—"The rupture between the Countess Dönhoff and her royal lover is very certain, and the circumstances are nearly the same as I related. Certain it is that she was in correspondence with Monsieur de Lenschering; but His Prussian Majesty rather attributes her wishes to prevent his interposing in the affairs of France to tenderness for his person, than a desire to thwart the schemes of the favourite, or promote the destructive doctrines of the French demagogues. The determination to leave him was her own, and was declared with great violence. It is thought she will not return unless General Bischoffswerder be sacrificed. If this is to be the price of the reconciliation it will fail, after the farce here two years ago by the favourite. People are afraid to speak on the present subject, lest it should turn out to be of the same nature."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 5, Hague.—"I do not know how far the suggestion of the Dutch Ministers, in my dispatch of this date, may be practicable; but it is given with good intentions on their part. They feel no serious alarm respecting the menaced attack from Dunkirk, and probably would have immediate means to repel any mad attempt which might be made; but they think that, in a moment so disturbed and so critical, it would have an excellent effect in respect to France, to Austria and Prussia, to the Dutch patriots, and above all, in respect to the internal cabals here, to take the occasion of returning the Spithead visit, and of showing that the two countries are in perfect intelligence with each other.

"The measure in England of the proclamation, and the debates in consequence, have had the happiest and most creditable effect.

"I see to-day in the *Moniteur* your Lordship's answer to M. de Chauvelin's *memoire*. The dextrous mention of *allies* will give great satisfaction here. I am glad that you adhere to the old title of *Sa Majesté tres Chrétienne*.

"M. de Feltz writes to Buol, *que l'armée Française se réplie vers Cambrai, à cause du désordre affreux qui regne à Paris; effectivement ce désordre surpasse toute croyance. Il a fallu électriser le peuple pour faire prendre ces décrets, par lesquels le pauvre Roi est livré impitoyablement au premier scélérat qui, pour le bien de la Patrie, voudra l'immoler.*

"Since closing my dispatch I have received a note from the Pensionary with the following paragraph: *Je viens de recevoir la confirmation de l'érection d'une Légion Batave, dont la nomination du chef et des officiers sera laissé au choix des patriotes Hollandais établis en France.*

"We yesterday gave a ball and supper here, in honour of His Majesty's birthday, to the Prince Stadtholder, the Hereditary Prince and Princess, the Prince of Weimar, and above 300 others. It is customary on this occasion for everybody to appear in Court dresses, and this was

done with as much splendour as at St. James's; but M. de Maulde came in a strange dress between a frock and a full dress coat. He made an awkward apology about his trunks not being arrived; but we have reason to suspect that these singularities are for the sake of introducing impertinent paragraphs into his correspondence with the Jacobins. The English here at present are Lord Berington, Lord Granville Leveson, Mr. Moore, Mr. Markham, Mr. Powys."

# LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 8, Hague.—"I am glad to lay before you the enclosed letter from the Chevalier de Revel. He writes from an interesting scene, with the advantage of possessing much general information, and an excellent judgement. I cannot, however, implicitly credit M. de Calonne's intimation to us that, in the event of a *contre-revolution*, France would not make a bankruptcy, but would continue to struggle against her debt.

"The Prince Stadtholder informs us, *qu'il vient de recevoir des lettres de Berlin dans lesquelles on lui assure la disgrâce de Mademoiselle Dönhoff comme très réelle, et même pour des causes assez graves; étant soupçonnée et presque convaincue d'avoir trempé dans les conspirations contre l'état.*

"M. de Maulde has delivered a memorial to the States-General on the restoration of the Dutch vessel which was taken in the Channel. It concludes in the following words:—'*Les sentimens de la Nation Française et de son Roi à l'égard de la République, sont d'une unité indivisible. Trop d'intérêts unissent les deux nations pour que le soupçon puisse et doive jamais l'atteindre.*'—*C'est comme cela qu'on se forme un style diplomatique?* But this nonsense is respectable in comparison of the *memoire* presented to your Lordship on the 18th or 19th of May by M. de Chauvelin, if the copy is exact which I have just seen in the *Moniteur*.

"M de Maulde made a long visit yesterday to the Grand Pensionary, and uttered nothing but classical phrases, natural philosophy, and *belles lettres*. He said at my hotel, before a large circle, that his great occupation and amusement here would be the completion of a small cabinet of natural history which engrosses his whole mind. It may be presumed that Messieurs Le Marchand and Du Cange, who are now both arrived, are to assist in this branch of science. They were heretofore employed by M. de la Vauguyon, and with good success, as able and active libellers. They are now instructed by M. Du Mourier to propagate the doctrines of the modern political philosophy; but we hope to shorten their mission.

"Several reports state (what I mentioned to your Lordship some time ago) that La Fayette is negotiating, through one of the Lameths, with the Governor-General at Brussels; but what can he in his present circumstances negotiate or execute? Others insist that he is trying to quit the command; but that is not easily to be done. He probably begins to feel that his neck is placed between two halts; I hardly have charity enough to wish him a good deliverance.

"The present state of Europe makes on my mind the impression of a wild romance of which I have as yet only perused enough to have a painful impatience to see its conclusion."

*Post-Script.*—"Since writing the above I have received the following note from the Pensionary: *Je viens d'avoir une explication très précise*



*avec M. de Maulde au sujet de Marchand, dans laquelle il ne m'a pas caché son indignation de ce qu'on lui avoit adjoint un homme qui, certainement, ne pouvoit que lui attirer des désagrémens. D'ailleurs, suis-je informé de bonne main qu'il a assez mal reçu son collaborateur."*

The enclosure has not been preserved.

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 12, Hague.—“Your intention in favour of Lord Henry Spencer is so honourable to him, that I felt great pleasure in forwarding your letter to Utrecht. I now enclose his answer expressive of obligations which, I am sure, will never be erased from his memory. I have also apprised the Duke of Marlborough of your goodness to his son.”

*Most secret.*—“I shall not interrupt your Lordship with more particulars respecting M. de Maulde; we continue to obtain through a secret channel farther proofs of his being *un très méchant personnage*. He is guarded and plausible in society, but so incessantly and so malignantly occupied in conferences and correspondences with malcontents, libellers, and printers, whenever we lose sight of him, that it becomes necessary to make this place disagreeable to him. And I sometimes doubt whether I ought not to forbid his admission into my house, into which he comes at present under cover of its being open to everybody. In addition to Messieurs Le Marchand and Du Cange and his original Secretary, a fourth is arrived of the name of Gilbal or Jubal; and so much stress is laid (in an intercepted letter) on this man's knowledge of the English language, that we suspect him to be here for the purpose of some correspondence with England. I mention this that your Lordship may, if you think proper, direct letters under any of the above addresses to be examined. These people are occupied in visiting individuals and obscure clubs, in writing paragraphs for newspapers, and in preparing for any more material mischief that the course of circumstances may bring within their reach.

“With respect to the larger politics, it is pleasant to observe how providentially the conduct of the Prussian and Austrian Cabinets has tended to separate us with credit from any participation in their troubled concerns. When, in 1790, I intimated such repeated and earnest objections to the project of a Polish alliance, I apprehended that there were many risks in that project and no adequate advantages to compensate them: but I certainly did not foresee the inextricable scrapes into which a Polish alliance might so soon have led us.

“Lord Newborough has delivered your Lordship's letter to me; he has been repeatedly asked to my house, but I see no means of extending attentions to Lady Newborough.”

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 15, Hague.—“If our intended squadron, in the course of its exercise, should happen to make a visit either to Flushing or to Texel, or even to appear off this coast, it would have a good effect. I do not think, however, that the Republic is exposed to any foreign or domestic dangers sufficient to interrupt the general plan and arrangements of our naval service.

"The Dutch Legion in black uniforms, with Mynheer Abema for their Paymaster, will probably have exhausted M. Abema's resources long before they can be formed into any regular and disciplined corps. In the meantime, the Governor-General at Brussels has again admonished the Dutch Ministers to be on their guard towards Dunkirk; and the Baron de Hon, as usual, expresses the utmost anxiety and alarm.

"I sincerely admire the dignified and tolerant spirit of your Lordship's answer to M. de Chauvelin; but at the same time that I acknowledge its wisdom, I must confess that the mixed malignancy and impertinence of such a correspondent would draw from me an intimation to his employers that he has rendered himself disagreeable, and that it is become impossible to treat him with any farther confidence. There are some curious expressions in the *Moniteur* of the 11th instant respecting *M. de Chauvelin, M. de Talleyrand, et les divers agens de la diplomatie Française en Angleterre.*

"De Maulde and his associates continue to be mischievous; but he is become more circumspect, and every step in his intrigues among the Patriots is accompanied by solemn protestations to the Pensionary and to me against the line of conduct which he is pursuing. He makes frequent excursions to Haerlem and Rotterdam, and is totally excluded from the Hague society.

"It is a curious circumstance that, although the French expenses are enormously multiplied, and the receipts of the revenue reduced almost to nothing, the value of the *assignats*, of the exchange, and of the several funds, has lately risen; and that, too, at a moment when the desertions of the army are increasing, and when the reinforcements of the allied troops are arriving upon the frontiers.

*Confidential.*—"I have received a note respecting an incident which your Lordship will hear from Berlin, in the following words: *Si la nouvelle de la disgrâce de la Sultane se confirme, votre Excellence va voir un singulier révisement d'idées et d'opérations à une Cour entièrement livrée aux intrigues de favoris et des filles. Cependant je ne serai pas surpris que cette disgrâce fut une feinte pour sonder les esprits; quoiqu'on sache que la Demoiselle se soit permise des incartades, qui, de l'autre côté, lui ont attiré souvent des désagremens, et même des ruptures momentanées. Nous connaissons une Personne illustre\* qui ne sera pas fâchée de ce dénouement.*"

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 17, Hague.—"I send these few lines by a Russian messenger who arrived here this afternoon with orders to proceed to London with all possible expedition. I do not understand that he carries any despatches from Mr. Whitworth, and I believe that he is a person belonging to the family of M. de Woronzow. The letters in regular course for your Lordship from Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, and Russia are arrived at this Post Office, but I think it safer to retain them for the ordinary mode of conveyance.

"It does not appear that any material events have taken place anywhere since my last. The Amsterdam patriots and the French missionaries had yesterday circulated a strong report of the deposition and imprisonment of the King of Prussia. It was believed to be as groundless as it has since been proved to be; but the report was dictated

\* Madame la Princesse d'Orange.

by that spirit of wickedness which is at work to familiarise the minds of mankind to wild and desperate speculations.

"According to the advices received to-day from Warsaw, Prince Joseph Poniatowski has orders to make no resistance to the Russian troops; and the leaders of the late revolution are retiring from the country of Poland."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1792, June 19, Whitehall.—"I return you the letter from M. de Revel, which is very curious, and gives, as I guess, a very exact picture of the scene passing at Coblenz, for it tallies very much with all the best accounts I have.

"I have given no opinion in my despatch of this date as to the propriety of our entering into any explanations with France about the views and probable conduct of the Republic. In truth I feel that it is a point on which the Dutch Government ought to decide, and therefore have left it absolutely to them; but the inclination of my own opinion is, that it would be wise to make use of this opening in order to take away from them every ground or pretence of uncertainty as to the dispositions of the States-General.

"I perceive from your last letter that you think me too tolerant of the ignorance and absurdity of the French Mission here, and you hint at the propriety of my making application at Paris for the removal of M. de Chauvelin, and of your forbidding M. de Maulde your house. I own that my persuasion is extremely strong of the propriety of avoiding any sort of *éclat* on this subject. The quarrelling with France would give encouragement to the persons in both countries who wish to introduce French maxims of government amongst us, and would give to them the command and direction of that very prevailing wish for peace which I take to be the ruling sentiment both here and in Holland. And the shewing pique and ill humour where it can be avoided, without meaning to go further, would certainly be undignified and hazardous.

"Nothing can be more unsettled than the state of things at Paris. The Court is manœuvring to gain time, and the rest are quarrelling among themselves. It has been hinted to Lord Gower that if M. Talleyrand is disagreeable here he may be recalled; but I very much doubt whether I shall avail myself even of this hint. If the French have still any hopes of making mischief here they will easily find instruments for it without M. Talleyrand; and the taking measures to get rid of him would give to him and his projects a consequence which I trust they have not. As soon as the German troops arrive, whatever is the ruling party at Paris must apply to us to mediate for them. Such at least is my speculation. Even in that case, it would, I think, be right to hold back, and to show no anxiety for that sort of interference, but rather the contrary.

"But, if the opportunity presents itself, I know no end of this troubled scene so advantageous as the bringing about, by our assistance, an agreement which, I am quite convinced, all the parties will equally wish."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, June 20 [London].—"I begin to grow a little impatient for the answer of the Republic relative to the King's letter to the King of

Hungary. It seems high time that answer should be sent, otherwise the delay will give more offence than all the civil words will palliate."

*Copy.*

### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, June 20, Kew.—"Lord Grenville may appoint M. de Nagell to have his audience of leave this day.

"I cannot help expressing at the same time my surprise at the fresh memorial from the French Court; it seems calculated for no one good purpose but to keep up a constant intercourse of papers which cannot affect any good, and may prove inconvenient. The more coldly and shortly it is answered the better to prevent a continuance of it.

### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, June 20 [Stowe].—"Drake has agreed to *second* our address, and we shall probably make him move it, but has bargained with me that I shall draw it upon the model of that from London. I have, therefore, obeyed, only varying it by sentences taken from the address of Parliament; and I enclose it to you that you may criticise, but, at all events, return it to me by the post; and, if you approve it, some steps ought to be taken to communicate it to the Duke of Portland; and this may be done by communication through Tom, or any other channel, or by a direct letter from me to him; but I prefer the giving it to Tom. However, you will act in it as you think wisest, only let me hear from you what step you take. I wish that you could make it convenient to attend in *case* Lord Lansdowne should give us the meeting; which I understand is not entirely out of the cards, though I can hardly persuade myself that he will crown his insanity by so complete an act of madness. In no other contingency would I wish you to risk, even by the absence of a day, any delay of a meeting which occupies every thought of your mind. I have not told you all that I have felt for you in seeing your prospects crowd upon you faster than we had expected, but you know the anxious wishes I entertain for your happiness, and I will say no more upon the subject, except that I shall lay in my claim very early with Lord Camelford to transfer your Arcadia and your courtship to the cooler climate of Stowe (where, by the bye, I am writing by a fireside) for the remainder of the dog-days; for I fancy you would not choose to run backwards and forwards from Boconnoc, and I am persuaded that he will not continue in London. However, on all these points you will command, and I will beg accordingly. It is possible that I may be obliged to come to town, not for Lady Berkeley, for she is not dying immediately, but to assist in presenting our address, and in presenting (through the medium of my wife) a certain *Lady Fermanagh* who has particularly desired it. Pray send down Bernard, and any Buckinghamshire addressers whom you may think of, to our meeting on the 23th, for every one seems so unanimous that I fear it will be thinly attended."

### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 21, Hague.—"Though it is more than probable that Sir Robert Keith's dispatch of the 11th instant, through Ostend, will have already been received by your Lordship, and will have announced

to you the glorious and decisive successes of His Majesty's army in India, I think it my duty to forward the enclosed packet by an extra boat, more especially as it contains original advices to the Directors of the India Company, and may consequently furnish some farther particulars of information. I do not lose a moment; but I am sorry to observe that the wind is at present high and unfavourable.

"We continue without news from the frontiers; and there are no accounts yet of the French mail which ought to have arrived here two days ago.

"Mr. Hope writes to me that the failure in the house of Tourton and Ravel at Paris (whose circulation was immense) must produce many disasters among commercial people both in Paris and other places. The dealings of Tourton and Ravel with the moneyed houses at Amsterdam happened to be inconsiderable.

"I understand from the Princess of Orange that the Duke of Brunswick is to leave Brunswick on the 1st July and to go to Coblenz; at which place His Prussian Majesty proposes to arrive on the 9th of the same month.

"A Mr. Short is arrived here with the character of Minister Resident from the United States in North America. His credentials having omitted the words *Hauts et Puissans Seigneurs*, are returned for correction, but he is admitted to reside *ad interim*.

"A *chambellan* from the Prince de Nassau Weilbourg arrived at this place yesterday, and waited on me in form, with the enclosed letter from the Prince to His Majesty.

"The Comte de Staremborg is expected here as immediately as possible after the coronation at Frankfort, in his way to England with the Emperor's letter to His Majesty. He is immediately afterwards to settle at this place as Imperial Minister."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, June 22, Hague.—"I hope that my official answer to your Number 7 will convey the sentiments of this Government on the present position and complication of political affairs and political interests unequivocally, and conformably to your views and wishes. I enclose my vouchers on the part of the two Dutch Ministers for their respective creeds; if they had been less complimentary I would have annexed them to my dispatch *in rei memoriam*. I also enclose a minute written by the Pensionary last night after perusing Chauvelin's paper; for though the same ideas are fully stated in my report, they are too well expressed by him to be thrown aside.

"Your Lordship has allowed too much meaning to a phrase of mine, if you infer from it that I doubt in the smallest degree the expediency of avoiding any appearance at this moment of a quarrel with France, or even of any marked disagreement in ministerial transactions with her. But, it is so much the interest of the French managers to send Ministers to England whose conduct is inoffensive there, and the wrong-headedness of Chauvelin is so notorious, that both he and his tutor might be removed without *éclat*, and without giving to them an importance which is not due to their persons, and (happily) as little due to their doctrines.

"I believe it to be a good practical rule in public as well as in private life, to avoid dealings with wrong-headed men even for right purposes; and not to temporise with them under the idea that the forbearance may for the moment be unimportant. As to M. de Maulde, my doubt was

only as to the propriety of forbidding his admission except at times when my house is open to all the Hague. I have not, however, done it. In the meantime he continues to be most indecently active in his cabals with individuals disaffected to this Government. But bad as he is his manners are not unpleasant, and we have some fears that he may be soon and suddenly recalled; in which case he would propose Le Marchand as *Chargé d'affaires*; and I do not believe that (whatever might be the *éclat*) it would be possible to induce the Grand Pensionary to accept Le Marchand, who was the agent between the Duc de la Vauguyon and Abema, Van Berkell, Paulus, and the various patriots exiled in 1788. In the greatness of the London scene an offensive individual is easily overlooked, or soon lost in the crowd; but that is not the case here, and the effect would be bad. We are however not without hopes that in the present confusions and under the precarious circumstances of M. du Mourier, Le Marchand also may be recalled.

"M. de Maulde's advertisement in this days *Leyden Gazette* is very laughable. It first appeared in the *Harlem Gazette* some days ago without the words *le hazard*, which were added in capitals on his being reminded that he had committed a breach of the constitution. *Par le hazard de la naissance! Effectivement (à ce qu'on dit) sa naissance étoit bien hasardée.*

"Dr. Reede's letter, transmitted in my dispatch, is well worth your Lordship's perusal.

"The rise of exchange in favour of France under her present circumstances has been thought a strange circumstance. I understand from Amsterdam that numerous orders have been sent, in the course of the last two months, to different parts of Europe for considerable remittances of money, to be collected at Paris to provide for the approaching difficulties. Those sums, which are furnished on the security of commercial houses, make an impression for the moment; but the tide will soon turn again, and with increased force."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, June 22 [Stowe].—"I return you the address, with the sentence in question altered (I trust) to your wish. I have no objection to move it, but having written to Mr. Drake, he must second it; and, upon the whole, I think it as well that he should, because we should be diffculted in selecting a proper person from amongst so many of equal pretensions; and Drake having signed the requisition, that circumstance points him out as the person who ought to come immediately forward. I have written to Lord Chesterfield, but have not enclosed him a copy of the address least any alteration should be wished, and I have written likewise to Drake. I take your attendance very kindly; the day is advertised in the *Star*, in the London and St. James's evening papers, and in the Oxford and Northampton papers; and a circular letter of notice is written in Pigott's name to all the acting magistrates. I [have] likewise written to some of our friends. I highly wish for a presentment from the Grand Jury, but this can only be done by previous communication with the foreman of the Grand Jury, who will be Lord Titchfield; the rest of the jury may easily be secured, but it is essential to prepare the presentment, which I must leave to your legal knowledge; and you must inquire and inform me whether the general notoriety is sufficient evidence to them of the seditious publications, or whether we must bring forward any proofs;

for I cannot find that any of Payn's pamphlets have been distributed in this county. Still, however, I am most anxious that this very constitutional step should be taken. But you must settle it by communication with the Duke of Portland; and if Lord Inchiquin, Lord G. Caveudish, and Burke will attend the assizes, I will take care that they shall be summoned. I will be very civil to Lord Loughborough for the reasons which you will explain to me, and for his conduct this last sessions, which I think very handsome."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, June 26 [Stowe].—"My parental fondness for my production would not (as you well know) have given me one moment's anxiety for the inhuman murder of it, and for the substitution of one which, of course, has not one-tenth part of its beauties, but I have been put to a very awkward inconvenience by having transmitted it to Drake in consequence of your *fiat*; and I have therefore been obliged to write the enclosed letter which, for fear of any possible accident, I enclose to you and will beg you to seal and to send to him, trusting that Tom will have better success in defending his production against corrections from the Duke of Portland and company, than I have in defending mine against you and him. Seriously, however, I hope and beg that it may not be again altered, and that you will write me a line by *Wednesday's post* to inform me that the Duke of Portland has agreed to it; for, till I receive it on *Thursday*, I cannot send it to Chaplin to engross it for *Friday*; so that you see that we have not a moment to spare.

"A thousand joys upon the arrivals announced in your Deal list. I write a few words to him, but I purposely avoid every thing that can interfere with the arrangements which you may have made for planting your arcadian bower in the secluded and solitary angle formed by Oxford Street and Park Lane.

"The East India news seems not to admit of a doubt, as the information for the Bombay *Gazette* appears to come not only from the Nizam's Court but from Madras, and yet it is most extraordinary that no immediate communication should have reached you from either of these Presidencies. Who is the Lieutenant-General Stewart at the Nizam's court? What a scene is this of France! Surely La Fayette must feel this to be the crisis of his fate, for it seems clear that the Jacobins are triumphant in Paris to their hearts' content. The King's letter to the Assembly is singularly worded, as it is (I believe) the only public paper in which by claiming *security and liberty* he appears to countenance the manifesto and the declarations of the Princes."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, July [June] 26, Hague.—"The States of Holland adjourned about three weeks ago, before we had adjusted any answer to the King of Hungary's letter, and, by the terms of the original reference to the several Provinces, that answer cannot be given (as the Pensionary remarks in the enclosed note) till the States are reassembled, which will be on the 18th of next month. Monsieur de Buol is aware of this, and indeed we have reason to believe that he is not earnest for the answer; but possibly your Lordship may think proper to say something on the subject to Monsieur de Stadion. In the mean time, I hope to receive your commands on my dispatch No. 12.

"The several Princes and Princesses of Orange are going next week, to Breda for the month of July. The Princess is unhappy and reserved respecting the Berlin Cabinet. We passed the evening with her yesterday in very private society, and she is to sup with us to-morrow; but she seems to avoid political subjects which formerly occupied her attention; she talks however with great admiration of the conduct and prosperity of England. The King of Prussia has refused permission to Prince Frederic of Orange to serve in the allied armies, otherwise than in his regimental rank, which (I believe) is only that of Captain; he is therefore not to go; and this is a great mortification.

"The *Gazette de Leyde* has at last published your Lordship's answer to Monsieur de Chauvelin, but has stated that it was an answer to a memorial to you. It is in this way that every transaction in Europe is now falsified by that paper; and Du Cange (one of De Mankle's people) is now openly employed by the Editor."

*Enclosing a note from Van de Spiegel, Grand Pensionary of Holland.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, July 3, Hague.—"After sending off the mail on Saturday last, I went to Haarlem to dine with Mr. Hope; but, thinking it probable that a messenger might arrive, I left my Secretary on the watch here, and Sir Robert Keith's servant was forwarded without a moment's delay. The wind and weather however have been such, that I fear your Lordship will not have received the despatches till this morning. I sincerely congratulate you on their contents, which afford every reason to believe that the war in India has had a most satisfactory and most glorious termination. Our good old island now possesses an accumulation and completion of prosperity beyond any example in the history of the world; and I trust that she will have wisdom (under the aid of Providence) long to maintain so enviable a position.

"She has escaped in good time from the disease of reform, and of French philosophy. If the infection had seized her, I am convinced that the immorality, irreligion, calamities, and horrors, which are now confined to France, would have run like a torrent of fire through every Government and State in Europe.

"I received handsome letters from the Prince of Orange and the Dutch ministers on our India news. The Pensionary adds, *nous avons aussi de bonnes nouvelles de l'Inde, quoiqu' infiniment moins importantes. Le Gouverneur de Ceylon s'est cru assez en force contre le Roi de Candie pour envoyer des troupes au secours de Cochin, lesquelles ont achevé à mettre ce dernier Prince à la raison.*

"Your Lordship having mentioned to me your anxiety to contribute in every way to the success of Lord Macartney's mission, I took occasion some time ago to ask the Dutch Ministers if they had anything suggest to us relative to it. The President and Advocate of the Committee for the China trade of the Dutch East India Company were accordingly deputed to me on Friday last. They expressed a due sense of the civility of the intimation; they had nothing to ask; but they added that they would give immediate orders to their several factories to show to Lord Macartney all the attentions belonging to his personal and public character.

"Mr. Hope is of opinion that the Dutch Company must ultimately sink under their defective system. They are all this time carrying on a



losing trade to an immense extent; and, not having territorial revenues equal to the deficiency, the balance is made good by annual loans from the province of Holland.

"Mr. Hope explained to me a circumstance which, in some degree, accounts for the present scarcity of money in these Provinces, and for the momentary rise of exchange in France. Much of the produce of the French colonies, and also of the French continent, has been sold and sent to Amsterdam, for the purpose of safety, and to raise money. The same thing has been done (though in a less extent) with respect to corn and the Baltic produce; and at this hour, the storehouses at Amsterdam are full beyond any example.

"I understand that the Empress of Russia has failed in her late attempt to procure a new loan, and has not obtained any money here since February, when she got, through Mr. Hope's house, about six millions of florins. The Polish loan has also failed, though high interest was offered.

"In the last despatch from M. de Haeften at Vienna, he gives an account of a conference with Prince Kaunitz, at the close of which the Prince said, *vous n'avez donc, Monsieur, aucune réponse à me donner, et vous ne voulez pas de notre alliance. Eh bien! Nous ne savons que trop que l'Angleterre vous lie les mains et les pieds; cependant vous êtes de très bonnes gens.*

"The Prince and the Grand Pensionary seem to be mortified more than was necessary by this impertinent *sortie*; for they have not mentioned it to me. Haeften was flung off his guard, and gave no answer.

"Monsieur le Marchand is at last recalled; Monsieur de Maulde applied to day for a passport for him, and I understand that he is sent to Bonn. The mention of this gentleman leads me to copy for your Lordship's amusement a note which he sent yesterday to the Greffier, and which deserves to be registered. '*M. de Maulde a l'honneur de demander à M. le Greffier Fagel, la permission d'aller voir, le plutot possible, son jardin, qu'on lui dit être d'un gout exquis. Il faut bien se séparer quelquefois des vapeurs de la diplomatie, pour jaser avec la belle nature, si simple, si vraie, si touchante dans ses productions!*'

*Voilà ce que c'est d'être naïf.*

"The letters received to-day from Brussels mention the retreat of the French from Contray in consequence of an attack by General Beaulieu; the burning of a part of that town; and on the other hand, a loss on the part of the Austrians near Mons, where a detachment had fallen into an ambuscade, and had suffered to the extent of fifty or sixty killed or taken prisoners.

"There are also reports (but very vague) that La Fayette is returned to Paris with a part of the *garde nationale*; and that 2,000 Austrian cavalry are arrived in Brabant.

"Lord Henry Spencer intends to avail himself of your Lordship's permission to go, in a few days, from Berlin to Vienna; at which place he will wait for farther orders."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, July 5 [Whitehall].—"Pitt tells me you think the East India Company may take the Nootka furs, agreeably to the proposal of the parties. Will you be so good as to let somebody inform themselves from Sir R. Woodford of the quantities and prices or mode of valuation, and speak to the chairman about it, in order that we may be quite sure not to have any unforeseen obstacle arise, as the parties have made their

acceptance of the other terms depend on this point. If you will let me know when this is done, I will proceed in the rest of the business."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Most Secret.

1792, July 6, Hague.—"Though Monsieur de Maulde has, during some weeks, sent his own correspondence by private boats to Dunkirk, the Pensionary continues to obtain from the Post Office ample proofs of the righteous endeavours of this Jacobin mission to create confusion of every kind within the Republic. We have some reason to believe that, under the prevalence of the *Feuillans* at Paris, De Maulde may soon be recalled; in the mean time he is a dangerous fellow, notwithstanding his ridiculous *patélinage* and indiscretion.

"The Monsieur Joubirt for whom he interests himself is an avowed *Predicateur de la Propagande*; and concluded one of his coffee-house discourses upon the beauty of equalized ranks and perfect liberty by the following gentle hint respecting the Prince and Princess; *il n'y a que le Poignard enfin, pour morigener ces gens-là.*

"I have received this evening the following note from the Grand Pensionary. '*L'on me mande de Paris que M. La Fayette, lors de son séjour dans cette capitale, a eu une très longue conférence avec le Roi et le Ministère Feuillant. Les uns disent qu'il avoit fortement insisté sur des moyens de conciliation avec l'Autriche, laquelle il a représenté comme très aisée. D'autres prétendent que le but de son voyage est de changer le plan des opérations de la guerre dont il voudroit porter la principale force vers le côté du Rhin.*

*'Une lettre très privée de Paris (apparemment pour M. de Maulde) dit; 'Le sort de la France est entre les mains de la Fayette. Il n'attend que l'occasion pour marcher avec son armée, et pour protéger un des partis que se font actuellement la guerre. Je ne fais des vœux ni pour l'un ni pour l'autre, pourvu qu'on nous tire d'affaire; mais je regarde la guerre civile comme inévitable. Luckner a reçu ordre de retrogarder; si cela est, nous sommes trahis et perdus.'*

"I have seen some letters which say that La Fayette is become what they call *Bi-camariste* (disposed to have two Houses of Legislature) and that he will propose to compromise the business by a full adoption of the English Constitution. France however is much too mad at present to admit any compromise."

EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret and Private.

1792, July 6, Paris.—"I have had a long conference this morning with Monsieur Bonne-Carrère, whose name I mention, having promised him to desire you to burn this letter. He told me that he was sensible that, in the present distracted state of this country, it was not to be supposed that the British Ministry would be inclined to enter into any negotiation with this Government; that he professed himself to belong to no party; but that from his situation in office, for he still holds the place of *Directeur du Bureau des Affaires Etrangères*, he was able to facilitate, whenever an opportunity should offer, any negotiation that might be for the reciprocal interest of England and France. His *means*, as far as political knowledge and talents extend, are sufficiently adequate, but he must be put into the way of other *means*; or rather I must be *authorized* to put him into that way before we can have another

political conference. With regard to these *ways and means*, I beg to have your instructions. As far as my knowledge of the person goes, if you do not intend to remain always *sur les bras* with regard to this country, he is the most proper man to be employed. I wish to have your Lordship's answer as soon as possible, as it is necessary to strike the iron while it is hot. If I had not the satisfaction of having you for my correspondent I should have written this letter to Mr. Pitt, to whom I beg my best compliments. I congratulate you most heartily upon the good news from the East Indies."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Private.

1792, July 7, Whitehall.—"I have directed such a communication as you mention relative to the Nootka furs. But I do not recollect that there is anything in Hammond's correspondence relative to the debts that could be separated from the other points which could not with propriety be communicated to the creditors. There is indeed less necessity for such a communication as they were, as I recollect, directed to appoint agents in America with whom Hammond might communicate directly, on any occasion that required it."

*Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, July 7, Priory.—"I have just received yours. I am afraid I cannot immediately take any steps in the business of Nootka, for Baring has been very ill, and has gone a short tour on the coast of Devonshire for his health; he is not to be home sooner than Tuesday sennight, and it would be fruitless to agitate that or any other business of much moment in his absence. In the meantime, I think you should cause a short official *précis* to be made out, and transmitted to me officially by you, with a request that I would communicate with the East India Company on the subject; and I will put it into the hands of the Chairman with my recommendation that they would consider it with a proper attention to the accommodation of Government.

"In some of the despatches I have recently read in circulation from your Office, I have observed a great deal of information respecting the steps taking relative to the debts due by the Americans to British subjects. I think it would be right that you should send me extracts of all that has been wrote on that subject by Mr. Hammond, or any of the consuls; and continue to do so from time to time, that I may transmit them to the committee appointed by the creditors for the management of their business. If they are furnished constantly with all that information in detail, they cannot afterwards complain that they have been kept in the dark, and thereby prevented from taking any measures, or giving any explanations they might think useful for their final accommodation."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, July 9, Cold Harbour.—"I received yours here yesterday. I am aware that there is a good deal of Mr. Hammond's correspondence relative to the debts intermixed with discussion on the subject of the disputed posts in America, which it would be improper to communicate to the Committee of British creditors; but there are others, if my

recollection serves me right, and particularly some of the most recent which, without any such intermixture, mention barely what of the federal courts are open and in the course of decision upon the debts; and in what provinces, and for what reasons, they hold a different course."

"I forgot, when I saw you last, to mention to you the Duke of Buccleugh's wishes that you would write recommendatory letters for his son, to wait for him at Copenhagen and Stockholm, in case he should direct his *tour* to those places, of which he did not seem to be certain."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, July 10, Hague.—"The enclosed may be worth your perusal, though it was not intended for it. The anecdotes and the language which it records are not unimportant, inasmuch as they exhibit the sentiments and character of persons who have and may have great influence in the affairs of Europe. This is not a favourable age either for vice or indiscretion in such persons; *Je n'y vois que l'étoffe dont on fait des révolutions*. Your Lordship will perhaps have the goodness to return the letter to me.

"The Princess of Orange is much affected by her brother's refusal to allow Prince Frederic to serve as a volunteer. On the evening before she left the Hague she was earnest either to send her son to the Austrian army or to give him some additional promotion here. The unkindness in this instance is attributed to M. de Bishoffswerder, who has heated the King of Prussia's mind on the subject of what he calls the English preponderance in the councils of the Hague.

"I am perplexed by the deadness with which our countrymen seem to receive the East India news, which, so far as it is yet explained, seems to me to be highly creditable and essentially important.

"I believe that I have not yet mentioned the young Mr. Rose. He seems to be industrious and discreet, with good sense and with the advantage of speaking French fluently. He promises fair to do well."

#### Enclosure.

#### LORD H. R. SPENCER to LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, July 1, Berlin.—"I send this letter by a Monsieur Richards a gentleman of Switzerland, who means to stay a day at the Hague on his way to Helvoet Sluys. I have not seen much of him myself, but have heard him well spoken of, and I give him this recommendation to your Lordship at the particular request of Dalkeith and Garthshore.

"I had yesterday a long visit from our old friend Renfner. He is in high feather here, and full of importance. He is going to Coblenz in a few days, and is to be the only Secretary there. He enquired about Mademoiselle Welin, and I had the ill nature to tell him that she had devolved to Baron Buol. He exclaimed *Mon Dieu! Quel dommage! Elle qui étoit si modeste autrefois!* I learnt from him the true reason of the young Prince of Orange not being permitted to serve on the present occasion, a circumstance which is much talked of here, and is supposed to indicate the declining influence of the Princess of Orange at this Court. It seems that at the interview at Magdeburg, Her Royal Highness, at the same time that she made the application, insisted on

Colonel Stamford's accompanying the Prince. This was refused, as the King of Hungary and His Prussian Majesty had entered into an agreement not to allow any officer in a foreign service to join them, and had already refused many persons of high rank on that account.

"Sir Morton Eden lives in the handsomest style possible here, and much more like an Ambassador than an envoy. But he seems so completely disgusted with his political situation, that I can hardly conceive his bearing it much longer with patience.

"The King is coming here to-day very privately from Potsdam, for no other purpose but to toy a young girl who has been provided for him by Madame de Ritz, a lady much celebrated in that line. I believe that I shall be presented to His Majesty to-morrow or next day. The Prince Royal, of whom I have seen a good deal, seems more in opposition than ever the Prince of Wales was; and the present preparations are publicly talked of here in the same style as the armament against Russia may be supposed to have been in England. I lately supped with the old Queen-Dowager at her house in the country, and the Prince Royal took us all out to the neighbouring village, with a parcel of maids of honour. All at once I saw him dancing about in a most extravagant style, with all sorts of gestures, which the company present seemed perfectly to understand and enjoy. I found upon enquiry that he was mimicking His Serene Highness the Prince Stadholder, and I could not help admiring the exactness of the resemblance, though I thought it impossible that he should really mean it for his uncle.

"Reede has said many civil things to me, and assures me that the Pensionary talks much of me in his letters. I, of course, was not behind-hand in fine expressions."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL GOWER.

1792, July 13, Whitehall.—"I have received your private and secret letter, and have communicated with Mr. Pitt on the subject of it. We are inclined to think that it would be advantageous to encourage the offers of the person in question, but it would be very material to know to what point his services would go, whether merely to giving assistance in forwarding objects we might wish to carry, or whether he would be disposed to give such information as might be useful with respect to what may be passing in the line of his observation; and to what sort of reward (and to what extent) he would look. You will know best how to obtain for us what we want to know on these points, which must necessarily influence our ultimate decision.

"I feel now thoroughly persuaded that your line respecting the tumults and disturbances announced for this week was the just and proper one; and I feel no anxiety for the event as far as respects yourself, because I think your conduct must secure you from the slightest unpleasant circumstance. But I am very anxious to see the issue of the crisis which seems to be approaching so fast. My speculations are that the first entrance of the foreign troops will be followed by negotiations; but how they are to end, or what possibility there is to establish any form of government, or any order in France, is far beyond any conjectures I can form."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, July 13, Hague.—"Sir Robert Keith has communicated to me under flying seal his private letter to your Lordship by this mail, and it

is painful to me to see him pursuing impracticable points at the close of long and respectable services. If I do not misunderstand him, he means to convey a wish to be charged with His Majesty's complimentary message to the Emperor. I believe that there is no instance of this being done otherwise than by some person of rank separately and specially appointed. Such a commission indeed seems necessary in order (according to the diplomatic phrase) *to reciprocate*. Your Lordship seems to have pursued a similar reasoning when you proposed Lord Henry Spencer as the *pendant* to M. de Stahremberg. Sir Robert Keith will now have learnt your Lordship's intention, as I mentioned it to him about a fortnight ago, in a letter to recommend Lord Henry to friendly attentions during his proposed stay at Vienna.

"I have seen in a very private letter from Berlin, *that M. de Bischoffswerder is sending for Mademoiselle de Vieroc from England*. The letter adds (with what truth I know not) *that a transitory preference having been formerly shewn to that lady, it is thought her influence may contribute to prevent the recall of the other, who, in the meantime, has opened a correspondence tending to a reconciliation*.

"The treaty of alliance between the courts of Petersburg and Berlin is a new incident in the varying politics of the day. It is possible that the new constitution of Poland (if it could have been completely and efficiently established) might have afforded just cause of uneasiness to Prussia: but that risk was surely of small moment when compared to the danger of suffering Poland to fall within the absolute dependence of the Empress.

"If the bustle increases, as is probable, towards France and the borders of the Rhine, I think that your Lordship will, under the new plan, be well informed from Brussels. It is a great advantage to Colonel Gardiner, or to whatever Minister may be there, to be free from the restraints of writing through the Austrian Post Office."

EARL GOWER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, July 16, Paris.—"Give me leave to offer you my sincere congratulations on your marriage.

"The ceremony of the 14th concluded without the least disturbance; it is to be wished more than it is to be expected that Paris will continue to enjoy its present tranquillity. The Maréchal Luckner arrived here last Friday. I understand that he does not scruple to declare publicly that he despairs of being able to carry on even a defensive war."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, July 17, Hague.—"In the course of a long conference to-day with the Pensionary, he entrusted to me an anecdote which I think proper to mention to your Lordship, though it was given to him in the utmost secrecy by the Princess of Orange. A little before she left Brunswick, she had some conversation with the Duke on the probability of an immediate treaty of alliance between the Courts of Petersburg and Berlin. The Duke suddenly exclaimed, *ce n'est pas tout; il en resultera quelque chose qui étonnera tout le monde*. The Princess felt that it would be in vain to urge for any explanation of this expression; and when the closeness of the Duke of Brunswick's character is considered, it is surprising that he should have said so much. The Pensionary

thinks that the words in question relate to some great project of partition *dont la Pologne et la France devoient fournir les frais*; but words so general, in times like the present, are open to conjectures without end."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, July 17, Hague.—"Newspapers are fallible authority, and we have no better respecting your marriage: but if they speak truth (as I hope they do), I beg you to accept Lady Auckland's wishes and mine for long and uninterrupted happiness to you and to yours.

"I think Mr. Hope's information in general good, and therefore I enclose an extract of a letter from him in which he makes some remarks on the apparent deadness of the public funds, upon the arrival of the late news from India.

"The States of Holland meet to-morrow; and the Grand Pensionary has desired the Greffier to prepare a draft of the proposed answer to the Emperor. We suppose, therefore, that he will tacitly acquiesce in our omitting the exceptionable phrases which were in his original draft. I hope to send the result to your Lordship's satisfaction, in a few days."

*Enclosure.*

H. HOPE to LORD AUCKLAND.

*Extract.*

1792, July 16, Amsterdam.—"It is thought an inexplicable circumstance by many that, since the good news from India, the funds are rather lower than they were before. I believe that may be plausibly accounted for. Every degree of alarm as to the result of the war had already been removed; the event in India had been calculated on, and people had speculated in the stock from 180 up to 220, with the resolution to realize when that event should take place. When therefore it did take place, the majority in London, where the great speculation for the rise concentrated, were sellers, while the people here, who were for the most part *without stock*, not aware of the above circumstance, took the alarm, drove up the prices by their hasty purchases to 221, expecting that the prices in London would have gone up to 230; and I am persuaded that if the speculators in India stock in London had been on the spot, the rise would have been considerable; but I am informed by a very observing merchant in London, that the chief of the buyers on speculation for the event in question were Nabobs, or East Indian people, who being gone into the country, and having made their calculation that the greatest rise would be on the first news of the event, and that the news of it was hourly expected, had given orders to their brokers to sell out immediately as soon as it should come to hand; which instructions were fulfilled with the rigour observed in stock-dealings, and, of course, produced a majority of sellers instead of buyers."

*Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, July 18 [Stowe].—"I cannot suffer this day to pass over without endeavouring to express to my dearest brother, and to my no less dear sister, my happiness in the completion of their union, to which I have looked with an anxiety and eagerness proportioned to the affection

I have borne to them, and to the fullest persuasion that they are formed for their mutual happiness. They both know the cordial interest which my good wife has taken in this event; it is therefore needless for me to add more than that I look for my share of happiness from the marriage of the two persons I love best, and that they will always command every anxious and affectionate wish, and every attention of the truest kindness and esteem.

"God Almighty bless you both with health and length of life; every other blessing is in your power, and in your prospects."

LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL GOWER.

1792, July 19, Whitehall.—"I beg to return my best thanks for your obliging congratulations to me on my marriage.

"It seems to me as if the crisis of the French business was drawing very near indeed. I should fear that, in the moment, the Thuilleries would be the scene of some fresh horrors. We have nothing here but peace and prosperity at home, and no other concern in the miseries and misfortunes of other countries than what humanity calls for. I am sure you will have seen with particular pleasure the effect of the proclamation."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, July 20, Hague.—"I take the liberty to submit my wish to receive an instruction from you to express in proper terms the thanks due to the *chambre présidiale* of the Dutch East India Company, for their obliging attention on the subject of Lord Macartney's mission.

"The enclosed paper contains two or three paragraphs of a letter from the Princess of Orange to the Greffier. Her ideas are always correct and well expressed.

"The Dutch Minister at Ratisbon mentions as a singular circumstance that the English *Chargé d'Affaires* at that place is a Roman Catholic priest. I do not know what this alludes to; probably it is some misapprehension."

*Enclosing an extract from a letter of the Princess of Orange.*

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792] July 22, The Grange.—"I imagine, out of delicacy to Lord Guildford, there should be some caution in giving opinions about his successor; but I think it will clearly be best to give a decided support to the Duke of Portland when the vacancy happens, and there can be no harm in informing your correspondent beforehand. The King gave me full authority to offer the Duke of Portland the blue ribbon, and expressed great readiness to shew any marks of distinction to the respectable part of the party, provided it was not accompanied with too much power.

"I hope you have found Hollwood habitable. Lord Buckingham presses me so much to meet you at Stowe, that I think our rendezvous must be there instead of at Burton. Pray let me know when you have fixed your time exactly. I think I can arrive by the 7th or 8th."



## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, July 24, Hague.—“I understand that you are passing some weeks at Holwood. I wish to remind you that I have a good garden in tolerable condition at Beckenham, and that my steward has directions, and will be glad to obey any orders from you relative to its produce. It will give us pleasure to hear from him that Lady Grenville and you take occasion in your airings to walk round the place. You will believe me when I add that we are sincerely sorry not to be there to receive you.

“The Grand Pensionary has got some secret intelligence of certain supposed conferences between Mr. Elliot and General Bischoffswerder, which he thinks the latter is turning to his own purposes. He has not communicated the particulars to me, probably because he thinks that I am mysterious on the subject; whereas the fact is that I have not heard one syllable about it either from Mr. Elliot or my brother.

“Your Lordship mentioned Lord Henry Spencer’s letter as enclosed in yours; but it was not there. It is not material.

“There is a strange story circulating of an attempt to poison the Emperor at Frankfort. I understand that His Imperial Majesty, at a great dinner there, apparently declined almost everything that was presented to him, and retired from table with more suddenness than was expected; and this circumstance was coupled with the subsequent arrest of a Comte de Witginstein. That arrest however was on some charge of a criminal correspondence with the Jacobins.

“The Comte de Stahremberg arrived here yesterday; he sent immediately to ask when we would receive him, and he dined here to-day with General O’Hara, M. de Welderen, and others. He has too much the manners of a young Parisian with the appearance of a German *petit-maitre*; but his conversation is easy and pleasant, and he will be a good acquisition to the *corps diplomatique*. He is detained here a day or two by some arrangements relative to his establishment and hotel. He will embark in the packet of Saturday next, and will, I suppose, present his letter on the Wednesday following, if your Lordship should choose it.

“The *projet de réponse* which I forward by this mail, differs from that which I sent by the last post. The second paragraph of the first *projet* is omitted in the second; there is also towards the close an omission of the words, *jusqu’à ce que cet heureux moment arrive*.

“I believe that poor Gardiner, who leaves Brussels with great reluctance at this interesting moment, and with inconvenience as to his family, would feel happy in a line of approbation from your Lordship.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Private and Secret.

1792, July 26, St. James’s Square.—“I understood from the King yesterday that Sir James Murray was setting out for Coblenz. I had mentioned him to His Majesty as one of the persons whose name had occurred to me as the most proper, if it had been deemed right to have any agent or person authorised on the part of this country to appear there. This idea is, on the whole, judged inexpedient, but if he was [spoken to] before going to the army, he might probably be easily put

into the way of informing us of what is passing there; and I am persuaded his zeal would induce him to be of service in any manner he could. Can you tell me where he is, or what would be the best place for me to send to him, so that I might see him before he goes."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, July 27, Hague.—"Elliot's despatches did not pass through the Hague; and I certainly should be glad to see such parts of them as relate to the Prussian system, or to the political intrigues of that Court; for it is only by combining every phrase and particle of good intelligence that we can hope to arrive at an early discovery of the objects which the great and expensive movements of the three powers are meant to effectuate. *L'appetit vient en mangeant*; and it is probable that in the course of events those powers may be led to views of which they have no idea at present; but still I have little doubt that they have some preliminary agreement. My brother suspected Elliot, during the stay that he made at Berlin, of stepping beyond the line of a visitor into the functions of the Mission; but he thought that the activity exerted would do neither good nor harm, and it gave him neither umbrage nor jealousy. The Pensionary (as I have already observed) knows something on this subject which he does not yet choose to mention. I have observed on this and on a former occasion, that he has a channel of communication at the Court of Berlin which he does not confide either to the Greffier or to me, I believe that it is some secret correspondence of the Princess. With regard to M. Bischoffswerder's menace that the States General *shall* accede to his new system of alliances, he is likely enough, in the heat of his temper, to have recourse to violent means; but I trust that our prevalence over the councils of the Republic has a sounder foundation, and will last longer than M. Bischoffswerder's influence at Potsdam.

"I hope that your Lordship has taken the trouble to read the Hague article in the *Moniteur* of the 23rd instant. It is written by M. de Maulde, and shews that I have not exaggerated the extreme ridicule of his character and conduct.

"I have just received a most kind and affecting message from poor Lord Guildford in the handwriting of Lady Catherine Douglas. I fear from the turn of the expressions that he feels himself going."

#### SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, July 28, Berlin.—"Impressed with the liveliest sense of gratitude for the favours already conferred upon me through your Lordship's protection, and conscious of my earnest endeavours by a zealous discharge of my duty to justify, in some degree at least, your Lordship's recommendation, I venture once more to solicit your good offices. Sir Robert Keith is, I understand, on the point of retiring from Vienna; my utmost ambition would be gratified by that appointment. If, therefore, your Lordship should have no prior engagement, may I humbly request of you to recommend me to His Majesty for that purpose. I will not intrude further upon your Lordship's time but will only add that, let my application fail or be successful, I shall ever retain a grateful remembrance of what I already owe you."

## LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1792, August 2, Stowe.—“I have received your letter mentioning your wish to succeed Sir Robert Keith at Vienna. It will afford me much pleasure if I should, ultimately, be enabled to promote what you wish in this instance; but I am so circumstanced respecting this vacancy as to be under the necessity of postponing for the present any decision as to the person to be submitted to His Majesty for filling it up.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, August 4, St. James's Square.—“The enclosed was put into my hands by Lord Camelford, who is related to Sir James Cockburne, and has taken an interest in the situation of his family. The idea of a private recommendation to the Governor to enforce this claim on the Nabob is, of course, entirely out of the question; but I think it might be material to the family if they were put into [a] way of bringing the business so far to a point as to know whether they can place any reliance on this resource, or whether they must abandon it entirely.

“Sir James Cockburne's son is a Lieutenant in Lord Cornwallis's army, but I suppose is totally unacquainted with the mode of proceeding on this occasion; and I apprehend advice in this respect would be more useful to them than any assistance that could properly be given.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, August 4, Whitehall.—“Understanding that it is probable the answer to be received from the Court of Directors on Wednesday will be favourable, I have desired Sir. R. Woodford to inform the Nootka claimants that they will then be called upon to give a final answer whether they will accept the offer of the Court of Spain to pay 200,000 hard dollars here, or whether they wish a further application and reference to Madrid in the hope of increasing the sum. I guess they will accept the former, and in that case Woodford and Las Heras should have full powers to sign an agreement to that effect. If you will direct such an instrument to be prepared and sent me to Stowe, I can sign it. If they prefer further negotiation, Lord St. Helens can best explain to you the most advantageous ground for you to direct Jackson to take, in order to succeed in the negotiation; but D'Aranda's political existence is so precarious that we ought, if possible, to avoid further delays.

“The American Minister is come, and I must trouble you to introduce him on Wednesday, if the King has a levée fixed that day for seeing him.

“When you have done with the last American despatches, I should be obliged to you to put them into Mr. Bond's hands in order that he may consider Jefferson's paper.”

*Copy.*

## HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 5, Wimbledon.—“I have received your letter enclosing Sir James Cockburn's statement of debt due by the Nabob to him. I believe Sir James was the unfortunate dupe of others and therefore to be pitied. I should rather think Sir John Macpherson responsible for the two dishonoured bills endorsed by Sir James upon his assurance of

payment. As to the large debt in which Maclean was the instrument of the loan, I am sorry to be able to give very little comfort. In short, without entering into a minute detail, you are aware enough of the general history of the Carnatick intrigues to know that these very transactions, in which Sir James Cockburn appears to have lent his credit, are the foundations of all that mischievous system which created so much wickedness and anarchy at Madras, against which we have been constantly struggling, and the seeds of which I hope are nearly, although not as yet quite, destroyed. It was wrong in Sir George Yonge to write the letter he did to General Medows, and I trust General Medows paid no regard to it. You truly say that any recommendation to the Governor on the subject is out of the question. The utmost, I think, that can be expected is that, upon an application made by Sir James's son to Lord Cornwallis, he should permit him to remain some time at Madras (if he belongs to the Bengal establishment) to transact his father's business with the Nabob; and I have no objection to write privately to Lord Cornwallis explaining the matter to him, and informing him that I know such an application will be made. I do not think it improbable that the young man may succeed. I trust Lord Cornwallis, before he leaves the Carnatick, will finally arrange every thing with the Nabob, so as to put an end to all further altercations with him. I have put Lord Cornwallis in possession of all my ideas on that subject, in various views, and I flatter myself some of them will be successful. If that was once accomplished, I think any who have private claims upon him would be more likely to succeed, for, at present, he denies strictly and obstinately the treasures which he has certainly amassed, thinking that the acknowledgment of that fact would weaken the statements which he is at all times endeavouring to bring forward both to the Government in India and to the Government at home. You will observe in all I have stated I am taking it for granted Sir James Cockburn is able to produce some good evidence that the money in question was actually borrowed for, or applied to, the uses of the Nabob. The mere assertion of Mr. McLean is rather too feeble a document for that purpose; and it is as likely that he employed it for the purpose of accomplishing the project he had, most unquestionably, at one time formed of purchasing up and becoming the proprietor of the whole stock of the East India Company. He used to boast that the day would come when he would be pointed at in the street, '*there walks the East India Company.*'

"I return you the paper, in case there is no copy of it, and if I am to write to Lord Cornwallis, I must have either it or a copy of it returned to me, that Lord Cornwallis may know the whole as it really is. Give my best respects to Lord Camelford, and express my regret that in a business where he interests himself it is not in my power to return a more satisfactory answer.

"I shall attend to the other official matters upon which you have wrote to me."

*Enclosing a statement of Sir James Cockburn's claim on the Nabob of Arcot.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 6, Wimbledon.—"I have this moment a note from the King with a letter to Mr. Pitt, which His Majesty desires me to forward to him. It is intimating to him that he has conferred upon him the Warden of the Cinque Ports; and he adds, '*Mr. Dundas will*

*'accompany the letter with a few lines from himself expressing that 'I will not admit this favour being declined.'* And the King desires me to acquaint Lord Chatham and you with the step he had taken."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 8, Wimbledon.—"The enclosed is the answer I have received from Mr. Pitt to the letter I wrote to him accompanying the one from the King.

"I presented to-day the American Minister. He is rather a gentlemanlike man, and the King's conversation to him was highly proper."

#### *Enclosure.*

#### W. PITT to HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, August 7, Burton Pynsent.—"I enclose an answer to the King. In the way in which the offer comes I have no difficulty in accepting, and do so very gladly. Many thanks to you."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 9, Wimbledon.—"I received your letter, with the proposed draft to Lord Gower, here this morning. I had a long conversation with the King on the subject yesterday at St. James's, and therefore have no scruple, without further consultation, to forward your letter. I had drawn one in case you had not sent one, but I like yours better than my own.

"I have seen Lord Loughborough here this morning, and gave him the copy of your letter to the Bishop of Chester, that he might show it to the Duke of Portland. He told me he had seen the Duke yesterday, who, through some other channel, had learnt the tenor of the letter you had wrote to the Bishop; and that he was much impressed with your behaviour to him, and had mentioned it to Lord Loughborough in the strongest terms. I desired Lord Loughborough to return me the copy, in order that I might take an opportunity of showing it to the King, that His Majesty may feel how much disposed his servants are to forego their individual predilections when it tends to aid the general strength of his Government.

"I did Mr. Ross's business yesterday, and shall present him next Wednesday to ———? I do not recollect anything else to write to you upon at present, except to inform you that the East India Company have agreed to purchase the furs, provided, upon being permitted to inspect them, they are in good condition, and the price not an unfair one. I shall give the proper directions as to that inspection, and shall then proceed to conclude the business as you directed."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 9, Burton Pynsent.—"I have not written to you about myself, as you will have heard all that has passed from my brother. I hope he has also told you how much my mother depends on having the pleasure of seeing you and Lady Grenville. I assure you it will be a

real satisfaction to her and no sort of inconvenience. It is a great disappointment to me that any one should shew you Burton but myself. Mrs. Stapleton, however, will do the honours of it as well as most people.

"I see by a copy of Lord Gower's dispatch of the 4th that he desires instructions with a view to the situation of the King and Queen, which, however, will probably be decided either by the Assembly or the mob before any instructions could reach him. Even if this were not so, I see no step that could be taken that would not do more harm than good. Is anything yet known as to the Chancellorship of Oxford? I have seen many persons named in the papers as candidates, but nothing said of the Duke of Portland."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 9, 9 p.m., Burton Pynsent.—"Since I wrote to you this morning by way of London, I received the enclosed from Lord Worcester, which I think it best to send you with a copy of my answer, as you are so near the scene of contest. I am not without hopes that my letter may induce the Duke of Beaufort to decline, though I did not think myself at liberty to ask it. I send the messenger to Badminton, and from thence to Stowe.

"Pray keep or rather return me my answer, as it may be useful to shew what passed."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, August 14, Hague.—"I cannot express my sentiments on your despatch of the 5th instant and its enclosures better than by sending the Grand Pensionary's note. Elliot certainly merited, and the public service required, the strictures which are conveyed to him with equal force and delicacy. I have seen some particulars relative to a supposed correspondence between him and the King of Poland (through a certain Abbé Piattoli and M. Mastowski) previous to the meeting at Count Lindenau's. But they are no longer worth adverting to. The discouragement which your Lordship has given to *indirect negotiations for indefinite purposes* will have its effect, and the activity in question, which arises from zeal and right meaning, will, for a time at least, be confined within proper bounds.

"Your Lordship not having taken any farther notice of the corrected draft of the answer from the States General to the Emperor, I have presumed that you were satisfied with it, and have desired the Dutch Ministers to forward the answer to Vienna.

"I am not so clear that the combined armies will advance towards Paris without resistance; but I believe that they will be victorious in all considerable engagements. If any efficient power of restraint can be obtained over the country, I incline to think that the wisest plan for those who are interested in the re-settlement would be to abolish all acts, purchases *et cetera* from the commencement of the Revolution, and to restore the old government, with such separate modifications hereafter as may be judged expedient. Any attempt to create a new constitution will be found *une mer à boire*."

*Enclosing a note from Van de Spiegel, the Grand Pensionary.*

## J. B. BURGESS TO LORD GREENVILLE.

1792, August 15, Whitehall.—“As the account of the enormities committed at Paris which I have had from the messenger Morley is much more circumstantial than what Lord Gower gives in his despatch, I think some particulars may not be uninteresting to your Lordship, though indeed they are so very horrid that I almost scruple to give you any detail of them.

“The guard at the Thuilleries consisted of at least 1,500 men, 800 of whom were Swiss soldiers, and the remaining 700 were gentlemen of rank, whose attachment to their sovereign and their knowledge of his danger had induced them to put on the Swiss uniform, and to run the risk of defending him. The whole of this number was killed. The name of one only, the Duc de Clermont Tonnerre, is known; but, though it seems certain that the rest were of a similar description, it will perhaps be for ever impossible to identify them with any degree of accuracy, as the mob industriously disfigured their faces by roasting them in the fires they had made with the wood torn from the apartments of the Chateau. The messenger saw hundreds of them lying in the fires, with uniform coats on, but with embroidered waistcoats, laced shirts, and various ornaments of rings and other jewels. When the mob broke into the palace, they massacred indiscriminately, without distinction of age or sex, every person they found there. Only four ladies, who had waited on the Queen, escaped by accident; all the rest were slaughtered. Of the mob themselves, by the fire from the poor people in the Chateau, but still more from the wanton manner in which they discharged their cannon in every direction, not less than 4,000 were killed in the course of four hours; and the messenger declared that, in the course of his walks about the town, the number of dead bodies he saw could not be less than six or seven thousand, though he thinks there must have been many more.

“On Saturday, detachments of mob paraded through the streets, and forced their way into every house where it was known that a Swiss was to be found. They brought them out, and cut off their heads at the doors. They even visited Lord Gower’s, where there was known to be a Swiss; but luckily he had been disguised and put out of the way. Such was their inveteracy against these unhappy people that, recollecting on Sunday morning that a detachment of a hundred of the Swiss guards had been sent into the neighbourhood of Paris to protect the harvest, a vast mob, well armed, went in search of them; and, as the messenger was travelling on Sunday night, he heard a great firing of musketry. On enquiring what it might be, he was informed that the Parisians had driven the Swiss into a wood, where they surrounded them, and were then killing them. The King and his family were suffered to remain in a small room adjoining to the Hall of the Assembly, without beds and without food. They slept, on Friday and Saturday nights, on the bare benches which were placed along the wall; and, after fasting for more than twelve hours, they were indebted to the charity of a poor *huissier* for some biscuits and a glass of wine.

“The preceding particulars, which I have hastily put down, will give your Lordship some idea of the present situation of things at Paris. I confess I tremble for the safety of Lord Gower and family, many of whose friends and relations have been with me this morning in the utmost anxiety and distress. Perhaps, as the authority of the King is declared to be suspended, little attention may be paid to his public character. Your Lordship is the best judge how far it may be necessary

for him, in the existing circumstances, to remain at Paris. If you should think it right to have any person in France to give intelligence of what passes in consequence of this business, Captain Monro is now in town, and will set off at a moment's warning. He is an excellent man, and I am sure may be depended upon both in point of integrity and of talents."

J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 17, Whitehall.—"As Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas write to your Lordship by this conveyance, I shall not trouble you with any account of the result of two Cabinets which have been held on the subject of the present crisis at Paris; but will satisfy myself with informing your Lordship that Captain Monro, having been approved of as a proper person to reside at Paris for the purpose of transmitting any intelligence of importance, I have despatched him with an ordinary passport and letter of recommendation to Lord Gower, and with a letter respecting an ideal business to Lindsay; and have instructed him to communicate verbally to them the object of his present journey. I have also sent (with Captain Monro) the messenger Mason, who is an intelligent man, has been at Paris, and talks and writes French very well; and who, as being only an extra messenger, has never been sent abroad from the Office and cannot be known. He will bring any thing which may be more particularly interesting; and I have supplied Captain Monro with a private cipher and an hundred pounds.

"I have just been assured that intelligence is arrived in town of a general rising in Normandy, whence a large force is marching to Paris in order to reinstate the King. We have no intelligence relative to the Austrian and Prussian armies, neither the Dutch nor Flanders mails being yet arrived."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 17, Downing Street.—"You will see, by the copy of the despatch sent to-day to Lord Gower, the line which we have thought it necessary to take after the late events in France. I wish we could have had time to know your sentiments first, but that seemed impossible. The Duke of Richmond, my brother, Lord Hawkesbury, Dundas, and myself, all concurred in thinking it absolutely necessary to lose no time in bringing Lord Gower from Paris. We also thought it on every account becoming and proper to express what was felt on the subject of the French King's personal situation, and the more so in consequence of the application from M. de Breteuil which I send you. I took the liberty of opening the letter to you, as it might, by possibility, have contained some additional particulars. The *Evêque*, who seems very much a man to be depended upon, verbally assured me that M. de Breteuil took this step in consequence of the express desire of the French King himself.

"I am to see the *Evêque* to-day, and mean to read to him our despatch to Lord Gower. The way in which it is thought the expression of our sentiments may have some chance of being of use, is by cutting off the hopes of an asylum in this country to any of those who might be concerned in further attempts against the King. It seems just possible that this may be the case, and it was, at all events, desirable to attend as far as possible to a wish expressed under such calamitous circumstances."



## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 17 [London].—"Mr. Pitt writes you an account of the meeting we have had, and what has been the result, and therefore I need not trouble you on that score. You will receive, along with this, a copy of the note I have this morning received from Monsieur Chauvelin. As it goes this day to the King, no notice can be taken of it till it returns from Weymouth; and I should think the best answer would be to give him either the substance or a copy of the despatch to Lord Gower.

"I wish you would give directions to make out the consulship of Malaga for Mr. Brodie. It is not my common practice to be importunate in matters of that kind, but his uncle seems extremely solicitous to be enabled to inform his family of it when he returns to Scotland, which he does in a few days.

"I go this evening to Bob Smith's, where I shall be till Monday."

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 18, Hamels.—"If you have leisure for criticism, you will probably find matter for it in most of the pages which I enclose, and I should like much to know what occurs to you upon them before I let them be published. They were taken from the notes of a shorthand writer, and I have corrected them as well as I could from memory. There is nothing new since I wrote to you, except Chauvelin's coming to me with much agitation to beg that his note might be returned to him and never mentioned. It seemed impossible to refuse his request, which he urged on the ground that it might injure the King if the contents transpired, but which proceeded, I believe, at least as much from fear for himself. I hear the Duke of Portland will probably carry his election.

*Postscript.*—"I can hardly judge yet whether I can contrive to meet you at Burton, but I do not quite despair."

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792 [August 18] Hamels.—"On the question of recalling Lindsay, I should much rather trust your judgment than my own. I doubt whether any passport of his could now be of use, and I think it more consistent with the line we have taken, not to leave any person with a public character at Paris. But after stating this, Dundas and I both wish to leave it to you to decide.

"I have felt a great inclination to come to town to-morrow morning, but it would break up the party here, and whatever you decide will be satisfactory. I shall, at all events, be in town on Monday."

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1792, August 20, St. James's Square.—"Lord Grenville has the honour humbly to acquaint your Majesty that M. de Chauvelin set off from his house very early yesterday morning in a post-chaise, with only one person accompanying him. Mr. Nepean, from whom Lord Grenville has this information, had not been able to learn what route he took; but Lord Grenville has desired him to send both to Dover and Margate, to know whether M. de Chauvelin has embarked at either of those places."

*Copy.*

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 21, Weymouth.—“Considering the attention shewn M. Chauvelin of letting him retract the memorial he had delivered, it seems rather extraordinary, if he has absented himself from this kingdom, that he did not give some intimation of such an intention. Lord Grenville has judged very properly in directing that information should be acquired whether he has embarked for the Continent.

“I approve of Mr. Brodie succeeding to the vacant consulship at Malaga.

“Should any material news come from France or the combined army I trust Lord Grenville will leave directions for its being transmitted most expeditiously to me.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1792, August 21, Whitehall.—“Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty the despatch, with its enclosures, received this morning from Lord Gower. The accounts do not appear to contain any new event of much importance, except the circumstance that the three Commissioners sent by the National Assembly to M. de la Fayette's army have been arrested, and detained prisoners by the municipality of Sedan.

“Lord Grenville learns that M. Chauvelin is expected at his house again this evening; and he is said to have been at Brighthelmstone, with a view, as Lord Grenville supposes, to meet some person coming over to him from France

“Lord Grenville begs leave to mention that, as he returned to town only on account of the French business, it is his intention, if the next despatches from Lord Gower should bring an account of his having executed your Majesty's orders without interruption or difficulty, to avail himself again of your Majesty's gracious leave of absence from London.”

*Copy.*

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 22, Weymouth.—“The event of the commissaries sent by the National Assembly to M. de la Fayette's army being arrested and detained by the municipality of Sedan may prove of consequence, as it will probably be out of the power of the Assembly to release them, which will shew the want of authority in a most glaring light to the whole kingdom and give rise to farther insults.

“I trust, as Lord Grenville has been brought unexpectedly to London, that he will understand that as soon as he thinks he can proceed on his journey to Devonshire and Cornwall, that he will add to his leave of absence the time this has curtailed of his respite from business.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 22, Hague.—“I have this evening received letters from Lord Elgin and Colonel Gardiner by an *estaffette* from Baron Hon to the States General. They confirm the report alluded to in this morning's despatches relative to La Fayette and several of his officers. They contrived to throw themselves into the possession of a party of the

*volontaires Limbourgeois*, and were made prisoners. This is a subject of great exultation at Brussels; but though, on the one hand, it leaves the army less officered than ever, on the other it shews that the troops are attached to the Jacobin cause. The list of the officers is, *La Fayette, Alexander Lameth, De Launois, Victor Manbourg, Manbourg l'aîné, Charles Manbourg, Masson, Soubejrains, les deux Romens, Cadignan, Gouvion, Sionville, Bureaux de Pusy*, with their servants and other attendants. As I am not sure whether the packet-boats have sailed in this stormy weather, I send these few lines by the post to Helvoet to take their chance, and reserve farther particulars to the 24th."

J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 23, Whitehall.—"Nothing but some newspapers have been received to-day from Lord Gower; though it is probable that a messenger will speedily arrive, as his recall must have reached him on Monday morning, long before the post left Paris. It appears (through the channel of the Post-Office) that the trials of the unfortunate people who were taken up were to commence immediately, and that the Prince de Poix would be the first victim. It was supposed he would be executed. Mesdames de Lamballe, Toursel, and de Luynes were imprisoned, and were to be tried. A reward for bringing in La Fayette's head, it was imagined, would soon be offered. In the mean time, Paris was in a state of tranquility, though the gates were still kept shut.

"I am just informed that M. de Chauvelin returned home yesterday evening."

G. AUST to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August [Whitehall].—"We are still without any direct news of Lord Gower, but it may be material to mention to your Lordship the *positive assurance* of M. de Noailles to Captain Woodford that M. de Narbonne (who has been so fortunate as to escape with the Prince de Poix) left his Lordship windbound at Calais, last Wednesday.

"Lord W. Gordon has this moment informed Mr. Aust that he is informed some of Lord Gower's servants were stopped at Amiens."

W. PITT to G. AUST.

1792, August 22, Wimbledon.—"Monsieur Chauvelin having desired to see Mr. Pitt again, Mr. Pitt begs to know whether the note which he presented has yet been returned to him. If not, Mr. Pitt wishes to have it sent that he may give it him, and wishes also to be able to inform him that no copy has been taken of it, or at least that none is kept."

J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 28, Whitehall.—"I have forborne from troubling your Lordship with any of the reports which have been brought to the Office about Lord Gower, as they seemed to carry on their face their contradiction. One, received this morning from a Mr. Heaviside, seems deserving of little attention, as he is a very suspicious person, being a furious democrat, and most probably a spy from the Jacobin Club. It, however, appears singular that he should have had a passport on the 23rd from Lord Gower, when (as appears from the Journal of the

National Assembly) he must already have signified his recall. The only sensible conclusion I can draw from the many contradictory accounts which have reached us is, that there is no difficulty attending Lord Gower's leaving Paris, and that the passage through the country is perfectly free. I have taken the liberty of stating my idea on this subject, as I am concerned to think your Lordship should have been detained so long by this business, which certainly might have been explained some days ago had Lord Gower dispatched one of his messengers."

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 29, Downing Street.—"On coming to town to-day I find the account which you will receive from the Office, of the Venetian Ambassador's arrival at Calais, and of Lord Gower being expected to quit Paris on Sunday. This seems fully sufficient to determine you to prosecute your journey, if you have not done so already in consequence of the account yesterday. Pray let me know whether the time you have lost will make any difference in that of your arrival at Weymouth. I must give up meeting you at Burton, as the business of India will find full employment for all the time I can spare, but I think I can reach Weymouth by the 12th September.

*Postscript.*—"I have just seen Thelussan, who has had letters from Paris dated Sunday, saying that Lord Gower had got his passport the night before, and was to set out that day."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 30, London.—"Not only on account of Mr. Nepean's situation, but on account of King's awkward situation and several other circumstances, I feel it very necessary for me not to delay an arrangement of the Office of Secretary of State. The physicians seem positive that Nepean must go abroad again. Mr. Pitt has promised me to go through the report of the Commissioners so as to concert with me the terms of the report to Council. I have made a provision for Chapman which pressed very much upon me, and was indeed become absolutely necessary, or he must have gone to ruin. The only thing of a similar nature that presses upon me at present is Mr. Bruce, who has been employed by me writing an authentic history of India for these two years. I mean to continue him employed under me in various ways of compilation, and perhaps ultimately in arranging or aiding to arrange the records laying unknown at the India House. He is one of the professors of philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, which it is necessary for me to cause him to resign. It has been always in my contemplation to provide for him through the means of the offices which the Commissioners have foolishly reported to be abolished. There are four of them, as you will see by the enclosed note. The first you know about, the other three are said to be vacant. The two first of them, you will observe, are somewhat more valuable jointly than the fourth one. I wish therefore to know from you whether you would wish me to dispose of the 400*l.* one, leaving the other two to you; or if you would wish me to give the two smaller ones to Mr. Bruce, leaving the larger one at your disposal. I cheerfully acquiesce in any arrangement most convenient for you, only I would wish to know as soon as convenient."

"Of course you will attend that the salaries in the enclosed note is with the usual deductions."

## J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 1, Whitehall.—“I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Lord Gower and his family arrived here about half an hour ago, in perfect health. He left Paris last Tuesday, and arrived yesterday morning at Dover; but, as he did not write or send any one here with this information, I was unable to give you this intelligence sooner. I learn from him that every thing was quiet when he left Paris; that the necessary steps for bringing on the Queen's trial were taking; that there was ample proof against her, and that her condemnation and execution were looked upon as certain and immediate. He also says that Mr. Lindsay remains at Paris, because he has not yet been able to procure a passport. The Venetian Ambassador is in the same situation, as well as the various persons attached to the other foreign missions still remaining in the capital. The reason assigned for refusing them permission to depart is the intention they profess of coming over to England, which they style the *foyer d'une contre-Révolution*. Monsieur Lally de Tollendal is committed a prisoner to the Abbaye. Lord Gower talks of going to Mr. Pitt at Mr. Caswell's to-morrow; and, on his return, he appears to have an intention of going to Weymouth. As there is no other way of informing the King of Lord Gower's arrival (both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas being out of town) I mean to write an account of it to Lord Chesterfield, who, of course, will communicate it to His Majesty. I requested the favour of Lord Gower to write a few lines himself, in any way or to any person he chose, for the same purpose; but I am in some doubt whether he will do so. I also told him I was about to send a messenger immediately to Trentham with intelligence of his arrival; but he declined writing, and said a letter from me would be sufficient.”

*Postscript.*—“We have sent a messenger with an account of Lord Gower's arrival to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, who are together at Mr. Caswell's.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 2, Cold Harbour.—“I received yours of the 31st at this place this morning. I do not imagine Chauvelin will attempt any communication with the Office, but it is evident that the line followed by the States General is the proper one. Lord Gower, who was here this morning, says it was understood at Paris that he had wrote to be recalled. Lord Gower is gone to Weymouth. He went from this. He gives a sad picture of every thing. He seems to think that for the last week Santerre was the ruler, and Pethion losing ground, but every thing is the result of passion and unbridled fury. The case of the Queen he seems to think desperate. He thinks it was the plan of the National Assembly to have gone southward on the approach of the German armies, but that the mob, under whose control they completely are, will not permit them. They are in great alarm from the foreign troops.

“The Nootka business I take it for granted will get on, but it hangs rather unaccountably; I suspect both sides are in some degree to blame.

“We are going to send out Mr. Shore immediately to take the chair on Lord Cornwallis's departure. It is in every view an excellent measure, and will, I know, be a wonderful relief to Lord Cornwallis's mind.

"I saw the advertisements sometime ago for the sale of the cheap editions of Mr. Payne's book, and immediately took the proper steps upon it.

"The new magistrates are doing exceedingly well. Their own zeal will make them do so at first; it must be the business of the Secretary of State's Office to take care that it continues, and there is no difficulty in establishing such arrangements as must ensure it.

"Lord Auckland shall be wrote to in the manner you suggest. I did not understand your letter when I received it, but Mr. Pitt explained it to me, and the box with the papers themselves arrived here about an hour ago.

"Give my best respects to Lady Grenville; don't allow either yourself or her to return a moment sooner than is perfectly agreeable. It would have been no inconvenience to me, at any rate, to have remained in London a week longer; and [I] would have done it with great pleasure to prolong your recess which was so much interrupted; but I am not entitled to take any merit with you on the subject, for I daresay Mr. Shore's appointment will lead me to have business with him that will occupy a week."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 3, Weymouth.—"I am much pleased with Lord Grenville's attention in sending me the information of Lord Gower's safe arrival in London least Mr. Burges should have omitted forwarding that intelligence; but it is but justice to Mr. Burges in me to acquaint Lord Grenville that he had been careful to apprise of the event, and that Lord Gower meant yesterday to set out from London for this place. I may, therefore, hourly expect him. The idea of trying the French Queen and adding her death to their many other crimes is most shocking, and must alienate the minds of all who have the least sentiments of humanity, and does not add much lustre to their having decreed the rights of a French citizen to Mr. Wilberforce."

#### J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 3, Whitehall.—"The account Mr. Jenkinson gave me in a pretty long conversation I had with him of the Prussian and Austrian armies, and of the general state of affairs in the country he has just quitted, corresponds very much with what your Lordship has already received, and has little of what you do not know. He tells me, however, that a very remarkable animosity subsists between the Austrians and Prussians, of which he saw various instances which have satisfied him that, whatever harmony may subsist between the two monarchs, their respective subjects will on every occasion catch at any opportunity which may present itself of quarrelling. When Mr. Jenkinson left England he appeared perfectly satisfied that the Duke of Brunswick would meet with neither difficulty nor delay in getting to Paris; that what he had to do there would speedily be effected; and that the Prussian army would return safely at the end of the campaign. On every one of these points his opinion now appears to be completely changed. He says that a formal proposition has been made by the Duke of Brunswick to the Baron de Breteuil for an indemnification for the expenses of this expedition, and that it was proposed that he should enter into a written engagement for the payment of a sum of money,

*the amount of which was not specified.* To this the Baron made no objection; and he signed the paper, in consequence of the full powers he had from the King of France.

"Lord Gower went yesterday to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas in Hertfordshire; and I understand he means afterwards to go to Weymouth.

*Postscript.*—"The messenger Morley, who by some means contrived to get a passport (though Mr. Lindsay and the rest of the mission have hitherto been unsuccessful) is just arrived. He says that, from an inspection of the books of the police, it appears that eleven thousand persons lost their lives on the 10th of last month, and that from the careless way in which many of them were buried, namely, in cellars and other subterraneous places, the smell in many of the streets is so offensive as to make walking through them nearly impracticable. He tells me that on that day so great a slaughter of the *poissardes* took place as to have left hardly enough for the business of the *Halles*. He also says that Paine is at Paris, and is just appointed to a post in the Government. Dr. Priestley is also there, and is consulted on all occasions by the new Ministers; a Mr. Wilson from Manchester, a Mr. Oswald from Scotland, Mr. Mackintosh, Mr. Stone, and some others are busily engaged in the fabrication of democratic papers, which are to be printed at Paris, and sent over to England and Ireland."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 4, Weymouth.—"Lord Grenville may be desirous of knowing that Lord Gower arrived here about eight this morning. His language conveys nothing different from what the various former accounts have contained; that the desire of destroying all religion, law, and subordination seem to be the only prevailing idea, without the smallest inclination after this destruction to build up anything; that Pethion has lost all consideration and has now a guard of honour, but in reality that it is for his personal security; that Santerre, a man void of talents, had the most weight when Lord Gower left Paris; but that there is now no dependence for an hour what may next arise."

#### SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, September 4, Berlin.—"By Sunday's post I was honoured with your Lordship's private letter of the 21st past, and, in consequence of your directions, I have given to Mr. Itzig a draft at two months' sight on my agent Mr. Goddard for 5,601*l.* 12*s.*, the amount of His Royal Highness's debt to that gentleman. I transmit to Mr. Rose the state of the account, requesting of him to place the money in Mr. Goddard's hands before the expiration of the term. His Royal Highness's notes I will, by the first safe opportunity, transmit to General Grenville, or to Mr. Rose.

"Allow me to avail myself of this occasion to offer you my very sincere acknowledgments for your readiness to promote my wishes to succeed Sir Robert Keith at Vienna. I, indeed, anxiously desire my removal from hence, but, whatever may be the issue of my application, my gratitude to your Lordship will be the same."

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 7, Wimbledon.—“You will have learned from Dundas that he means to stay here long enough to give you time to spare in all your schemes. I therefore conclude you will take Weymouth in your way from Burton; I cannot well contrive to meet you at Burton, but at Weymouth I probably shall, as I mean to be there about the 14th or 15th, and stay for a couple days. I think you talked of staying only one day at Burton, in which case you will most likely be at Weymouth on the 16th, but when you have decided exactly I should like to know, as I should be sorry to miss you.

“The 800*l.* about which you enquire was for Miranda, and Smith has his receipt, which I have mentioned this morning to Burges. I will let you know as soon as I can what arrangement I can make respecting Whitworth. You will learn from the Office the shocking accounts which have been received this morning of fresh horrors at Paris. They are probably near their term from the approach of the Duke of Brunswick, but the last paroxysm of fear and rage will be dreadful.

“We have desired Burges to write to Lindsay, repeating our wish that he should come away as soon as he can get his passport, but leaving it to his discretion not to press for it unless he thinks it will be useful.

*Postscript.*—“Since I wrote this we have a little changed our mind about the letter to Lindsay, and Dundas has written him one with a view of its being opened, as of course it will. You will have a copy of it from the Office.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 8, Weymouth.—“On Thursday I received Lord Grenville's letter accompanied with the private letters he had received from Lord Elgin and Sir James Murray; I thought it best to keep them till another messenger passed through this place for Boconnoc.

“As the Duke of Brunswick is anxious that we should make a declaration to France that certainly is not consonant with the system adopted here, it may give Sir James Murray a natural occasion to explain our sentiments; but I should fear if he did it, not answering to what is wished by the Duke, it may render him less communicative than whilst ignorant whether his reasoning has not some weight.”

## G. AUST to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 8, Whitehall.—“Mr. Lindsay's arrival to-day, which your Lordship will learn from his despatch in the box from the King, removes all apprehensions on his account. He reports that the horrid massacres had not ceased on Wednesday morning when he left Paris; that the number of victims in the prisons were computed at six or seven thousand; that a deputation from the mob with the head and heart of the Princesse de Lamballe had attempted to enter the Temple, but were repulsed by the guard, which had been doubled; and that it was supposed the Duke of Brunswick meant to approach Paris on the south side, in order to meet the King, in case of his being carried off that way.”



## J. B. BURGESS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 8, Whitehall.—“Mr. Lindsay arrived here safely this morning, having left Paris on Wednesday night, at which time the mob still continued to exercise its fury, though from the circumstance of time having been given to many of their devoted victims to conceal themselves, the number of murders of course was not so great as it had been at first.

“In addition to what Mr. Lindsay has mentioned in his letter to your Lordship, he communicates to me several circumstances, which, though extremely horrible and disgusting, are of an interesting nature, and tend to exemplify the temper of the people he has quitted.

“Madame de Lamballe was literally torn to pieces in the most cruel and indecent manner. Her head and heart were paraded on pikes through the streets. Your Lordship knows she was sister-in-law to the Duke of Orleans, and had once been his mistress. It happened when this murder was committed on Monday, that Lindsay and some other Englishmen were at the Duke of Orleans in the Palais Royal. As they were waiting for dinner, they heard the outcries of a vast mob, and, going to the window, they saw the spectacle of Madame de Lamballe's head passing by in its way to the Temple, where they were taking it to show it to the Queen. Struck with the horror of such a sight, they returned to the further end of the room, where the Duke of Orleans was sitting. He asked what was the matter. They told him the mob was carrying a head on a pike. Oh, said he, is that all? Let us go to dinner. As they were at table, he made some enquiries whether the women who had been imprisoned were killed; and being informed that many of them were, ‘pray,’ said he, ‘what is become of Madame de Lamballe?’ M. Walkiers, who was sitting near him, made a sign of her having been killed by passing his hand across his throat. ‘I understand you,’ said the Duke; and immediately began to converse on different topics.

“The mode of conducting the trials of these poor people was curious. When the mob came to the prisons, and had liberated the debtors, they formed hasty courts of justice, consisting of three judges and twelve jurymen selected from the bystanders. After a mock trial, if they thought proper to acquit the prisoner, one of the judges said to the jury, *Messieurs, croyez vous qu'on puisse le déclarer innocent?* They answered *vive la nation*, and immediately the fortunate person was mounted on the shoulders of some in the crowd, and was carried off in triumph. If it was intended to condemn a prisoner, a judge asked the jury *Peut-on l'elargir?* They answered in the affirmative; the doors were thrown open; the prisoner was obliged to go out, when a number of persons, placed there for the purpose, killed him in such manner as they thought proper.

“I feel it so unpleasant to enter into more of these details, and I am sure your Lordship will be satisfied with this specimen, that I will not mention some other circumstances of a similar nature. The manner in which Mr. Lindsay at length obtained a passport is however so creditable to him, and so demonstrative of the opinion entertained of this country at Paris, that it deserves being mentioned to your Lordship. Finding that every attempt he had made for that purpose was fruitless, he waited last Tuesday on M. le Brun; and, after recapitulating every thing he had done, and forcibly stating his order to return and his intention of complying with it, he told him that if a passport could not be procured, he was determined to set off without it; that he was aware of what might be the consequences of such a step; that he might be

brought back, be imprisoned, or even be liable to further violences; that he was prepared to run the risk; but he advised M. le Brun to reflect upon the consequences of such an event, and upon the character and firmness of the British Cabinet, whose determination upon it it could not be difficult for him to foresee. After some deliberation, M. le Brun promised that he should have a passport the next morning; and it was delivered to him accordingly."

[Enclosure.]

THOMAS BOWDLER to J. B. BURGESS.

1792, September, Basle.—"The 10th of August was the cause of an extraordinary diet, and the decree respecting the Swiss regiments occasioned its being held a week sooner than was intended. As this happened to coincide exactly with my departure from Berne, I thought it worth while to pass two days at Arow. The Diet met at that place on the 3rd, and as strangers are admitted to the first sessions, I had an opportunity of being present. I had already perceived at Berne that the fate of the Swiss on the 10th ultimo had occasioned a great alteration in the sentiments of even the most moderate persons in that canton, and I found at Arow that the other cantons appear to have been equally affected. In these two cities the principles of the Jacobins appear to have made considerable progress. The rest of the Swiss, instead of looking up to the French as to the first nation of Europe, which I thought they did when I formerly visited this country in 1779, now speak of them with a great degree of aversion. This change was in some measure occasioned by the loss which most of those who had money sustained from their having placed it in the French funds; the treatment which the Swiss have lately received in France has completed it. As the proceedings of the Diet after the first session are secret, it is not in my power to tell you with any certainty what is done, or what will be done; but from the conversation of some of the deputies I think I could form a general idea of what is likely to be their method of proceeding.

"In the first emotions which were excited by the massacre of the Swiss, many persons at Berne spoke of an immediate declaration of war. I believe there is no probability of such a proposal being made or being adopted if made. The first object seems to be the safety of the Swiss who are still in France, and many persons think that violent measures on the part of the cantons would be prejudicial instead of being advantageous to them."

"One of the most sensible and well informed men that I saw told me, that he thought . . . a firm, but not offensive language towards France was most likely to be of use to his countrymen; and he added, I believe that our conduct will be finally determined by that of England. Most of the Swiss tell me that their militia (if attacked) would fight as bravely as their ancestors, or would march into an enemy's country and behave as well in a battle; but that they would not submit to the discipline and tedious operations of a campaign.

"While the Diet was sitting on the 4th, an officer arrived express with an account of one of the Swiss regiments having been disembodied, agreeably to the decree of the National Assembly. He said that the whole was conducted *bien indignement*, both with respect to the insults offered to the officers, and the bribes and threats held out to the soldiers to induce them to enlist in other regiments. The regiment of Chateau Vieux, which made its escape in a body, is expected here in a few days.

Monsieur Barthélemy continues in Baden, but talks of leaving it very soon. The Solernois, who refused him the house usually occupied by the French Ambassador, say that they do not wish to see any other Ambassador of that nation reside in their canton."

[HENRY DUNDAS] to SIR JAMES MURRAY.

1792, September 12, Whitehall.—"Your letter of the 25th ultimo from Longwy having gone to Lord Grenville who is still in the country, and from him to the King, it is only now that I have an opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of it. Lord Grenville, at the same time that he transmitted to me your letter, put me in possession of his ideas. I have likewise had an opportunity of consulting with Mr. Pitt, so that I can with more confidence suggest to you what has occurred to us for your direction.

"When the Duke of Brunswick again introduces any conversation of the nature he has lately done in his interviews with you, it will be easy for you to convey to him that the system of neutrality which His Majesty has adopted respecting the affairs of France, would, of course, have precluded him from obtruding his opinion on the subjects which might probably occur for the consideration of those powers whose armies had entered France under the command of the Duke of Brunswick. But His Majesty could have no wish to avoid any intercourse which His Royal Highness might be desirous of opening, on a subject so interesting to all the powers in Europe. At present, and uninformed as to the particular objects in view, it is impossible for me to say more than, in general, to express the hopes of His Majesty that the result of the present interference of the powers of Germany may be the re-establishment of such a Government in France as, on the one hand, would protect other powers from a renewal of that spirit of restlessness and intrigue which had so often been fatal to the tranquillity of Europe; and, on the other hand, secure to the Executive Government such a degree of energy and vigour as might enable it to extirpate those seeds of anarchy and misrule which had, so peculiarly of late, characterised the whole transactions of that distracted country.

"These are the general principles which His Majesty feels on the subject; but it is impossible to discuss it with more precision without knowing, more in detail, what is meant by those more immediately interested.

"Long before this can reach you, the Duke of Brunswick is in possession of the note which Lord Gower left with the French Minister previous to his departure from Paris. It was done with a view of affording such protection to the Royal Family of France as was compatible with the system of neutrality which His Majesty has adopted, and I shall be happy if, in that respect, it shall appear that this country has anticipated the wishes which the Duke of Brunswick has expressed to you in the interview you have had with him.

"You will not fail to continue the punctuality of your correspondence, as every moment is full of anxiety in this interesting crisis."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, September 12, Hague.—"I write merely to say that I am better than I was, and that Mr. Farquhar and Mr. Robertson give me

reason to expect to be able to follow my duties here through the winter months. As this however may still be exposed to uncertainties, I do right in applying to you for a leave of absence to be used only in a case of necessity.

Confidential.—“I see, in some private letters which pass here under my eye, that exclusive of the sum lately paid for the Duke of York at Berlin, he continues to have debts there of a pressing nature, to the amount, it is said, of about 15,000*l*. The same letters say that Mademoiselle de Vierac is coming to the Continent upon a capitulation, amounting in substance to an entire surrender.

“There is great soreness at present respecting our position in politics, both at Berlin and at the Duke of Brunswick's quarters. The impression at the latter is that all the risk and expense falls on the allied force; and that the solid benefit resulting from the enterprise belongs to Great Britain. *Cela peut être; cependant ce n'est pas notre faute.* M. de Keller, in his letter to the King of Prussia on the instructions lately given to Lord Gower and M. de Berhenrode says, *voici encore une preuve de la basse et entière complaisance de la République pour le Ministère Britannique.*

“Lady Auckland and I are quite sickened by the late accounts from Paris; besides the poor Montmorins and Madame de Lamballe, we have reason to believe that there were several others in the list of victims with whom we have lived during the last five or six years in friendship and correspondence.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 12, London.—“The circuit of your correspondence with the King prevented my receiving Sir James Murray's letter to you till yesterday morning, but that is not the only accident that has occurred relative to that business. When I received your private letter with the draft of your answer to Sir James, I laid it aside till the letter should arrive to which it was to be an answer, but it has so happened that it is so carefully laid by that I cannot lay my hands upon it. I suspect I have locked it up in one of my drawers at Wimbledon, for Mr. Aust, to whom I thought I had given it, says I did not. I did not choose to delay longer writing to Sir James Murray, and therefore thought it best, from a recollection of your ideas, to make a new draft of my own, which Mr. Pitt having approved of I have sent it off, and I now send you a copy of it. If you wish me to enlarge further on any of the topics you can send me your ideas, but I think I have gone far enough for a first opening, especially as it is rather the business of Sir James to hear than to be communicative.

“The influx of foreigners since the late outrages at Paris is immense, and daily increasing. It will become very inconvenient to have the country, especially this metropolis, filled with so many strangers of whom we know nothing except that they are starving, if they [we] do not take some means to prevent it; but what is at present only an inconvenience will, in a short time, become truly dangerous. Those that are likely to come after this will be of a very different description. I send for your perusal a letter I have this day wrote to Lord Kenyon and the Chief Baron, and I have likewise sent it with a private letter to Lord Loughborough to say that he may either answer it or no as he feels convenient; but that considering the sincere anxiety he had shown on this subject, I thought it right for me to bring the subject

under his eye, understanding, as I hoped he would do, that it was a communication personal to himself.

"Lindsay's arrival the day after I wrote to him put an end to all our anxieties on that subject. The same idea occurred to me as what you state concerning Mr. Pitt's idea of Burges writing to Mr. Lindsay. I stated my objection to Mr. Pitt who was satisfied with it; and I accordingly wrote to Lindsay myself in such a style as, when opened, would tend to facilitate his departure, and that of other English subjects.

"You will, I suppose, meet Mr. Pitt at Weymouth, and will give him your sentiments what occurs to you on our meeting next Wednesday, as it does not seem necessary for you in any degree to precipitate your motions on that account."

#### J. B. BURGES to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 14, Whitehall.—"I had the honour of writing to your Lordship a few hasty lines yesterday while the mail coach was standing at the door, enclosing a letter from the messenger Mason, which I thought better written than might have been expected from one in his station. I received another from him by the post of this morning, which I likewise enclose, with some French papers he sent me, which may perhaps contain some particulars that have not reached your Lordship through other channels.

"The amazing number of French emigrants already arrived in London surpasses any idea that could have been formed of it; and I understand the people in general consider them as very unwelcome visitors, and already express great discontent at the subscriptions which are going on for their support. By what I can learn, the majority of these people are of a suspicious description, and very likely either to do mischief of their own accord, or to be fit tools for those who may be desirous of creating confusion. I am just told that Mr. Burke has subscribed 100*l.* for them."

#### *Enclosure 1.*

#### J. MASON to J. B. BURGES.

1792, September 12, Dover.—"Four packets I received of Mr. Monro, one of which [contained] 2 letters to be franked, the others despatches, which he seemed rather apprehensive of being found. At the first station of guards, leaving Paris, they searched the chaise to seek for arms, and narrowly; but afterwards only required my passport, which was done in 14 places I think, and signed in three towns at the *Hotel de Ville*, now *Maison de la Commune*, which delays time.

"There has arrived here in the course of the last fortnight nearly 500 Frenchmen, who are called priests; a great many are so doubtless, but I should suppose not more than half of the numbers who arrive. I had occasion to go to the Collector of the Customs this morning, and he assured me there was about 500, in the time I mention, as it is known there better than by the mere report of the town; thirteen arrived this morning, declared at the Custom-house from St. Vallery on the coast of Normandy. A few of these people go to Ostend, but the greater part take refuge in London.

"You perhaps know that Lord Lauderdale, Lord Stair, and Colonel Tarleton are at Paris yet, I believe; Dr. Moore I saw the day after we

arrived, and several times afterwards in the town. I believe he was a constant attendant on the Jacobins; twice I saw him there with two other gentlemen, English seemingly, and one like a clergyman."

*Enclosure 2.*

J. MASON to J. B. BURGESS.

[1792, September 13, Calais].—"In the packet which brought me from Dover here this evening, came Mr. Thomas Paine the great patriot, accompanied by a Mr. Audibert a merchant of this place, who, by the accounts before I left Paris, was sent to London to fetch him; a Mr. Frost, an attorney of electioneering memory if I mistake not, accompanied them, and is going to Paris with them. They arrived at Dover at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 10 this morning, and as Mr. Audibert said, were followed from London by a post-chaise all the way. When they got to the inn the officers of the Customs came and insisted on searching them, which, after some objections on their part, was submitted to, as force was threatened in case of refusal. The officers said they had an information which Mr. Audibert wanted them to produce, but they did not. They were kept an hour and 5 minutes in the room, with the door locked a great part of the time. Mr. Frost (I heard him) said he wanted to go to the necessary, and they refused to let him go. They examined their papers very strictly, and opened some of their letters, the most suspected no doubt, and took the directions of the others, even asked what money they had. Mr. Paine told that in the packet he had about 25 guineas; I believe they made him count them. I think, but am not positive as to this. Mr. Audibert said he tore a letter that their curiosity might not be satisfied in reading it, notwithstanding it was of no consequence according to his account.

"Mr. Audibert complains violently of the ill-treatment they received, and being kept in prison an hour and 5 minutes, after his having been so serviceable to numbers of English at Calais; threatens he will publish it in all the English papers; if they will not put it in, he says he will have bills posted up at his expense in London, to publish it to the nation. This group of 3 set off to-morrow, I believe, for Paris, therefore the National Assembly will be informed of it in the course of a few days. This company went on board the packet immediately on being liberated. The packet was followed till out of the pier, which might be a quarter of an hour, by numbers of people to stare at Tom Paine as they called him. He was hissed a great deal, and a many ridiculous speeches made relative to his trade (he has been a stay-maker at Dover). The crowd increased very much: the wind being slack the packet was obliged to be towed out: I believe had we remained much longer they would have pelted him with stones from the beach. Personally he is a very mean looking man. It is in my opinion a disgrace to them, rather than a merit, that a better representative cannot be found at home without having recourse to a foreigner like him. He is the very picture of a journeyman tailor who has been drunk and playing at nine-pins for the 3 first days of the week, and is returning to his work on Thursday. We arrived at Calais, and, as soon as he was known to be on the shore, the people flocked to see him, and it was talked of saluting him with the guards as he passed the Place d'Armes. It rained hard, and I left him.

"He has had an interview this evening with Lord Lauderdale, who, I believe, was desirous of seeing him, and has been also at the assembly

of the Jacobins here, which, I believe, is held 3 times a week. Mr. Paine made a very short speech there (in English) *en quatre mots*, saying that he was proud of the honour the citizens of the *Pas de Calais* had done him in electing him, that he had ever been a friend to the rights of man, and hoped he should continue to be so; nearly these words."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, September 16, Brussels.—"I solicit your indulgence in considering my *secret* letter of this date. I feel that I have hazarded more than I should venture to have done in a case less pressing in point of time, and of interest, than the present. But I really have gone not one iota beyond what I have stated; and I trust you will believe me to have been actuated by no other motive than an earnest wish of putting into your Lordship's hand what means may present themselves of saving the Royal Family of France, and securing that most essential merit to England.

"I have presumed to mention myself in that public letter, wishing that my services, if by any means they should be desired for going to Paris, or any particular momentary purpose, should be used on the only ground on which I offer them—that of their being, by possibility, convenient or beneficial."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1792, September 21, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a note which he has received from the Austrian and Neapolitan ministers, and the draft of the answer which, on consultation with the rest of your Majesty's confidential servants, appeared best to be returned to it. The note delivered by the two ministers was framed at Lord Grenville's suggestion, in order to give occasion for the assurance given in answer to it; as, on the fullest consideration, this appeared the only mode by which, without departing from the line hitherto adopted by your Majesty, there might be some hope of producing a favourable effect. As the time pressed so much Lord Grenville has ventured to take upon himself to return this answer, hoping, from his general knowledge of your Majesty's wish to contribute, as far as circumstances will allow, to the safety of their most Christian Majesties, that your Majesty will not disapprove the step he has taken."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 22, Weymouth.—"The answer to the joint note of the Austrian and Neapolitan ministers which Lord Grenville has made is perfectly consonant with my sentiments. Undoubtedly there is no step that I should not willingly take for the personal safety of the French King and his family that does not draw this country into meddling with the internal disturbances of that ill-fated kingdom: the taking every step not to shelter assassins is what we owe to our own characters."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 23 [Stowe].—"I have received your letter in the midst of such a vortex of mud, clay, and water as I never saw before, for the rain of the last six weeks is beyond what has ever been remembered. I fear very much for the late harvests in the north and in the west, where I fear that the grain will be essentially injured; and in these times, a plentiful harvest is a most important point towards the preservation of good order and general tranquillity.

"The picture of the French massacres is indeed so revolting that every man turns from it with the most painful disgust; and looks only to the progress of the Duke of Brunswick, which I am sorry to see wholly unassisted by any internal commotion or armed attempt in favour of the Crown. In this particular, the emigrants seem to have deceived themselves and the Duke, and his progress is necessarily and proportionally more slow. Still, however, as it seems clear that both Spain and Sardinia are actually added to the list of enemies, and that the Empire and Switzerland are everything but avowed enemies, I will hope that this winter will put the combined armies in Paris; and, at that period, the real difficulties commence. As to your note respecting the persons who may be concerned in the murder of the Royal Family, I do not expect much good from it. I am however glad that some time will elapse before it is necessary or possible to frame an Act of Parliament, as it seems absolutely necessary to provide against the very alarming influx of every sort of banditti, which must take place if the combined armies should approach from the southward of Paris, and, by that step, drive not only the ostensible democrats (in themselves a sufficient curse) but all the murderers and plunderers of that devoted country towards England, which is, at this moment, the only resource for emigrants of that description. I have thought much upon this. I am confident that the grievance will be of sufficient magnitude to call for some extraordinary measure, and (as far as can be judged at this moment) it will be expected from Government. You see my name and subscription to Burke's committee for the French clergy; we have been flirting of late in a correspondence of great mutual flattery, but I know nothing of our future intentions or resolutions respecting these unfortunate people.

"I gave up the hopes of the autumnal visit which you promised me when I saw you forced up to London after the 10th August, but, as I conclude that you will be at Dropmore as soon as you can put up your bed, I shall give you notice of your cargo of plants as soon as the season serves for it."

*Postscript.*—"I grow very uneasy about Ireland; every information I receive shows that the proceedings of the Catholics are very systematic. The delegates are chosen in the counties of Clare, Longford, and Westmeath (where my estates lie) and, I believe, in every other county; and it seems clear that they will struggle for equal franchises, which *equality* necessarily must be *superiority*. My ideas have long since been made up as to the impracticability of any struggle on behalf of the Protestants without help from Great Britain, and upon the folly of our interference; but, if the Parliament of Ireland are to be in earnest, not a moment should be lost in augmenting *their* army. I have read and considered much upon these subjects since we parted, and I am confident that no one in that kingdom has ever thought over the military questions, which ought to be very fully considered and ascertained. There is not a post in Ireland which could hold out for 24 hours, nor is there any precaution which can prevent, at this moment,



the Protestants from being driven into the sea from the four corners of Ireland. Surely if their Parliament are in earnest (and I should suppose that they were) an immediate augmentation to 20,000 rank and file is the wisest plan to prevent mischief; that augmentation of 7,000 men to be made by adding 300 men, or 30 per cent., to each of the 24 regiments of infantry, would cost 140,000*l.* annually, exclusive of barracks and arms. I state this that you may have it at your fingers' ends; but I wish you would tell me whether you see the same grounds for alarm as I do, and the same wisdom in Great Britain remaining neuter under the certainty that, whether the Government be Protestant, Catholic, or Turkish we cannot get worse terms for the protection and advantages we give than we have now got; and that an expenditure of millions would only be thrown away, as no possible advantages would ever repay the interest."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1792, September 25, Whitehall.—"We have this morning received your letters of the 21st with their enclosures. The letter which you mentioned in your No. 12, as sent in that packet, was *not in it*. Though its contents, and those of Sir James Murray's former letters, are now a little out of date, the King takes so strong an interest in the details of those operations, that I should (if you will allow me) recommend your sending them *all* by a safe conveyance, with a map which, I suppose, you could easily get executed at Brussels, tracing the course of the armies as far as they have gone. I mention this in a private letter in order that the suggestion may appear to come from you, and that His Majesty may continue as much satisfied as he has hitherto been with the full information contained in your correspondence.

"I fear more from this weather in retarding the Duke of Brunswick's operations than from any resistance he seems likely to meet with from Dumourier's troops, if we may judge of them by the late specimens of their conduct."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 29, Weymouth.—"The letter Lord Grenville has communicated to me is very curious, as every intelligence from France is desirable at this time.

"I have met Baron Noleken this morning; he is much hurt at the idea of being removed from hence, and says he is clear one word in his favour from me may avert the blow intended him. I desire you will therefore by the next post write to Mr. Wesley that, having heard there is some intention of recalling Baron Noleken, I would have him speak to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to express my approbation of the Baron's conduct during a residence of 28 years, and desire he may not be removed. I think it right to acquaint Lord Grenville that the person intended to succeed the Baron is a gentleman of very indifferent private character, and not one that could be agreeable here."

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, October 5, Windsor.—“The account given by Lord Grenville of M. de Ste. Croix makes me decidedly approve of Lord Grenville's bringing him on Wednesday to St. James's. I think there can be but one line adopted as to the multitude of French that are now arrived here: to present none at Court but such whose characters are known, or are brought by some person who can answer for them.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, October 7 [Stowe].—“You do not talk in your letter of any stay at Dropmore, and Woodward is anxious not to risk planting so early, and therefore I say nothing to you about your plants from my nursery till the last week of October. Before that period the Duke of Brunswick will be a man or a very little mouse. I have great faith in him, but his civil and military history since his very able movement on the 26th seems inexplicable, and even the ability of that movement vanishes from the moment in which it appears to be undertaken without a *certainly* of provisions. In all events, it appears that the French army have recovered their panic, and, though they are as low as ever in my estimation, yet their new ally the month of October will operate very powerfully in their favour. I cannot describe to you the anxiety I feel, and my obligation to you for constant information.

“My *daily* accounts from Ireland agree with the opinions which I have long since formed. Many reasons make me very anxious upon the event, for very much may be lost or gained to this country by the event of a *struggle*. All my accounts are clear that the Government (I mean the Irish Legislature) will risk every thing on the issue; and they certainly are deceived in their means of resistance unless they increase their army instantly; and, even then, I am confident that they will fail unless they are supported in their exertions by the force and purse of this country. I have wished to know your sentiments upon the present appearances which, as far as I can collect, threaten the storm even sooner than I imagined when we last conversed. You are, I doubt not, fully aware that your name and those of Pitt and Dundas are quoted by the Catholics as well disposed to them. The harvest in that country has failed, but there is a sufficiency for their consumption. That of England grows hourly more alarming: all our Buckinghamshire markets are looking up, and yet bread is now risen to a height which is scarcely to be borne. I am persuaded that Government have turned their thoughts to this subject, but I fear that it may be productive of serious difficulties.”

## The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, October 9, Brussels.—“I feel very essentially indebted to your Lordship for the advice you give me relative to a plan and a narrative of the Duke of Brunswick's campaign. I thank you particularly for the manner in which you suggest it to me. I am in hopes to have it in my power to offer what may correspond with your Lordship's idea; though, for the sake of accuracy, I may be led to some delay in the execution of it.

“It was my wish, on the present occasion, to have submitted to your Lordship some further general notions connected with the present state of affairs. But, in truth, I am obliged to collect my information from

sources so various, and in many respects so suspicious, that I cannot venture, without much examination, to report what I hear, especially in this very critical moment. I can, however, assure your Lordship that, as far as my investigations have gone, I have not yet seen grounds to alter those opinions which are contained in my late, and particularly in my last public letter.

"Your Lordship may recollect the obligation you conferred on me when I had last the honour of seeing you, by offering to mention my brother's name to Lord Cornwallis. Mr. Shore's nomination induces me to renew my solicitations in favour of my brother. I really wish nothing [more] than that Mr. Shore should be aware of *his* being in so far known, and protected by your Lordship. He expects [not], and I certainly would not ask, any protection beyond what he may be entitled to by Act of Parliament. But you will pardon me for adding that the uniform tenor of his conduct in India is a strong claim to every exertion I can make for him, and the grounds upon which his friends wish to bring him into notice."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, October 14, [Stowe].—"Your letter, which I received yesterday, would give me much uneasiness, both as a public and as a private man, if I could conceive your mind to be made up to the very dangerous measure of encouraging the Government of Ireland to hope, *in any possible contingency*, for assistance from the purse or strength of this country in their struggle with the Catholics. It is possible that my alarms may be founded upon exaggerated reports, and that the national character of running headlong into extremes may have increased the clamours and apprehensions which this struggle has suggested to all (whatever may be their parties or dispositions) who have a stake in that country. All I can say upon this head is, that I have great variety of means of gathering that information; that I have had more means than any one of forming general opinions; that I have had this question long, very long (and very painfully at times) upon my mind; and I think I could convince you that the Government of Ireland (I do not mean Lord Westmoreland and Hobart) cannot command those resources which, I agree with you, are very great in that country, but that they will inevitably be compelled to yield to the demands of the Catholics (most improperly timed and worded) unless they are supported by the money and force of Great Britain. I think I could convince you that the present form of their Government is so outrageously defective that it cannot long exist, or answer purposes in the new situation of Ireland since 1792 [1782?] for which it never was intended under the old system; and you would probably equally agree with me that the event of any struggle, even if Great Britain should interfere, would be very doubtful; and most certainly, in the chapter of debtor and creditor, *le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*, if you can get, without risk or expense, everything that you could hope for by engaging in this business. Many reasons occur for convincing me that the convention of 1793, or '94 at furthest, cannot end like that of 1783-4; and, when you recollect the manner in which the Legislature and Government of Ireland (I do not mean the Lords-Lieutenants) ran from the challenge given them by the Dungannon Convention, you will not expect very great things from their struggles; though perfectly natural to retain the monopoly of power which we were formerly so much interested to retain in their hands, and which, at present, must be

matter of the most perfect indifference to us, except only as this struggle may be understood to originate in the new French code, and to be a part of the system adopted by the Republicans of France to extend their principles to these islands. I do not expect that the Government of Ireland will abandon the question without a struggle, or that they could be induced by any recommendations from hence to relax or to negotiate with the Catholics. I know that their two Houses will not hear of any other language than that which their fathers have held, with the purse and army of England at their backs. But I must ever deprecate, with the most earnest and anxious solicitude, any encouragement to them to hope for assistance from this country, in which past experience of ages teaches us the expense and risk, and in a struggle in which (so long as it can be kept separate from French politics and connexion) we have nothing to fear, and nothing to gain by the result. Unless indeed, and here ends my Irish chapter, the Protestants would give us for our interference and for our expenses, or the Catholics would give us for our neutrality, and for our no-expenses, the one thing which alone can secure those real and solid advantages to the empire, which would maintain a real Protestant ascendancy in Ireland even if every elector and every elected were Catholics, I mean an union. As to the augmentation, unless it is done immediately I do not expect any one good consequence from it; nor can I imagine how it can be done, at least to any extent, without new taxes. If it is to be battled in Parliament *before it is done*, I will prophecy the result; and the only real use will be that of intimidation to the Catholics before the meeting of Parliament; and I am free to own that I expect very little real advantage from it, though, if I were in the Government, I should most certainly adopt it.

"Your winter campaign is indeed but cold comfort for the disappointment of the Duke of Brunswick. The delay of every hour is invaluable to the French; and I can see many contingencies in which they will be comparatively stronger next spring than they are now. I conclude the siege of Lisle to be raised, and that of Thionville in *statu quo*, and the whole frontier to remain perfect save in the one point of Verdun; and, in this statement of things, I am not very sanguine in my expectations of the very long duration of this most expensive confederacy, or of very rapid successes in the spring, even if the army of the Empire and 20,000 Russians should profess to co-operate. Adieu. I will, if my nursery is not carried away by our deluges of yesterday and this morning, look out for your Dropmore assortment, for I fancy that Mr. Woodward will at length be convinced that his plants have not much to fear from a dry October."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, October 16, Walmer Castle.—"I have returned the draft to Count Front to the Office as you desired, with the only alteration which occurred to me, but I am not sure that the phrase I have used may not need further correction. The original had an awkwardness in point of expression from coupling *intéressant* and *intérets*. In substance my reason for changing it was to make the Declaration more general, and leave it clearly to ourselves to determine what consequences are too important to let us remain spectators. The French retaining Savoy, or any other acquisition great or small, might be argued to come within the description of *un nouvel ordre de choses*."

*Postscript.*—"I wrote fully to Westmorland on Sunday as we had agreed. I have had a letter from him to-day with some account of the Catholics, and some information respecting corn, both of which I have sent to Nepean."

[J. B. BURGESS] to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792] October 16.—"Between six and seven o'clock this evening I received from Baring the letter No. 1 with its inclosures, together with a letter from Mr. Pitt; and, as the mail for Deal was just setting out, I forwarded the letter to him by that conveyance. I had just before sent off a messenger to Mr. Pitt with some of the Irish letters of last winter, so that he may, if he thinks fit, return an answer to Mr. Baring to-morrow by that messenger. I do not know whether your Lordship has had any conversation with Mr. Pitt or not on the subject of Sir John Shore's appointment, but lest you should not, I think it right to apprise your Lordship that, last Wednesday, a letter was brought to the office from Mr. Burke (addressed to Mr. Dundas) protesting, as he has done in his letter to Mr. Baring, against the sending Sir John Shore to India. Mr. Pitt thought it right that, without acknowledging the receipt of that letter, I should forward it immediately to Mr. Dundas, and which was accordingly done.

"In my answer to Mr. Baring's letter, I mentioned to him that your Lordship was in the neighbourhood of Windsor, and would be in town to-morrow morning; and, in reply to that letter, I received his No. 2.

"This morning I received a message from Hussey, chaplain to the Spanish Embassy, expressing a wish to see me, and, supposing that his business related to Ireland, I went to his house from whence I am this moment returned. He is certainly alarmed at what is going on, and I firmly believe would do anything in his power to prevent mischief. He has repeated to me this evening the purport of his letters to Mr. Keogh, advising moderation in as strong terms as he could possibly express. But it seems (he says) that the Catholics are determined that a meeting of the delegates shall take place as soon as possible. Not only Mr. Keogh's letter but other accounts indicate an expectation that some step will be taken by Government to interrupt their proceedings at the meeting. If that should happen, Hussey is decidedly of opinion that resistance would follow, and that as most of the Catholics are armed, and ripe to assert what they term their rights, the consequences would be dreadful.

"I find they have dismissed Dr. McKenna from their confidence entirely. Keogh does not enter into particulars about it, but I understand it has arisen from some connexion which he had formed, in contradiction to the wishes of his brethren, with the Dissenters in the North, of what nature I cannot tell. Young Burke, your Lordship will see by Keogh's letter, is likewise no longer of the party; so much the better.

"The wishes of the Catholics are confined to two points, namely, the right of sitting on juries, and of voting for representatives in Parliament, such representatives being *Protestants*. These privileges they will require, not through Lord Lieutenant, nor through the Parliament. But though Hussey did not speak out, I am disposed to think, by what dropped from him, that they will send over a committee of their body with a petition to the King expressing their expectations of these concessions.

"I have promised to return Hussey's letter to him to-morrow, and, that your Lordship may have time to consider whether any, and what message should be given to him, and of what steps should be taken on Mr. Burke's representation, I have sent down a messenger to you, who will be at Dropmore by the time your Lordship is likely to get up to-morrow morning."

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, October 24, Ramsgate.—"On Monday I dined at Walmer, and was delighted with the situation; about a hundred sail of ships were lying in the Downs, and the day was quite clear. Whenever I quit my retreat you may be assured of seeing me. I cannot tell you with how much pleasure I saw your *ménage*. I told Pitt that matrimony had made three very important changes in you, which could not but affect your old friends. 1st, a brown lappelled coat instead of the eternal blue single-breasted; 2nd, strings in your shoes; 3rd, very good perfume in your hair powder. All the rest remained the same, particularly quiz drawing, which Lady Grenville seemed to be studying with great application.

"I wish you could find Lord Camelford's dialogue on the actual state of Parliament among your stores, and send it to me. Yesterday I was at the turning out of a *basketed hare*. The Minister and Long followed the hounds. I maintained a strong post on the high grounds, but I was so much amused with the sight that I really believe I shall become a hunter, in this country at least, where there are no leaps."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1792, October 26, Whitehall.—"In compliance with the wish expressed by your Lordship respecting Mr. Bruce, I lost no time in writing to Sir John Shore to mention to him the pleasure I should derive from any mark of attention he could shew to Mr. Bruce, consistently with his public duty. I was lucky enough to catch him at Falmouth, and have this day received a very satisfactory answer from him on the subject.

"I say nothing to you on the inexplicable event of so many great expectations. My public despatches will authorize you to contradict the foolish reports of our having contributed to this event, which, on the contrary, we cannot but regret. Your own knowledge of the principles and conduct of this Government were already sufficient to enable you to speak decidedly on that point."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, October 27, Hague.—"It would be superfluous to tell you that I should be much gratified by the private knowledge of your Lordship's sentiments on the new order of things which has taken place on this continent. In the meantime I think it right to address to you in my despatches all the information that I can collect.

"M. de Maulde has received a long letter from M. le Brun, to tell him that the muskets which he has bought for the French Republic are

bad, and the horses too small for service; and that commissaries will be sent to do such businesses, that M. de Maulde may no longer be interrupted in his political exertions. He, at the same time, encloses a complaint of the Dutch Government made by a merchant of Amsterdam who is become a French citizen, and desires M. de Maulde to enquire into it, that, if necessary, France may procure justice to her citizens *even by stopping the vessels of Holland in her ports.*

"The Greffier Fagel has had a letter from the Prince de Béthune Charost desiring that a person may meet him at Calais to receive a communication of the highest importance, and of the most secret nature. The Greffier has a bad opinion of his correspondent, but thinks it right to send his brother (James Fagel) from London to Calais.

"The Grand Pensionary has received an account of a reconciliation having taken place between the King of Prussia and Mademoiselle Denhoff. I presume that this circumstance retards the journey of Mademoiselle de Vierac, for whom there are many packets arrived at my hotel here."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792] October 30, Stowe.—"Not having heard of you for near a month, I should not have known your destination or arrangements if the newspapers had not informed me that you was returned to Dropmore; in consequence of which I have this day marked out an assortment of 2,000 beech, and about 500 other trees, which will be ready on Saturday night, and proceed on Monday in a cart which will reach you on Tuesday. I am sorry that the quantity of elms and birch is so small, but my great alteration on the west side of the house has already swallowed up so many that my nursery is much stripped; but another season will increase my stock, and your works will probably last beyond that period.

"I should certainly complain of your entire silence and dereliction of all communication with me, at a moment so interesting to this country from every external and domestic consideration, if I was not persuaded that I owe much of it to your wife; notwithstanding which I beg my kindest love to her."

#### J. B. BURGESS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 4, Whitehall.—"Though your Lordship's knowledge of the character of the Prince de Béthune de Charost will probably not incline you to pay any great attention to information coming from him, I think it, on every account, right to let you know what I have just heard from M. Fagel, who has been employed in a sort of negotiation with him.

"The Greffier having received a letter from the Prince, stating that he had some very important matters to communicate, and desiring that a confidential person on his part might be sent to Calais to confer with him, he wrote to his brother in London, desiring him to cross the water for that purpose. Baron Nagell, conceiving such an expedition might be both improper and unsafe for M. Fagel to execute at this moment, called upon me to ask whether I could assist them in executing the orders they had received, by lending them some person to be depended on, who might convey a letter from M. Fagel (who proposed to remain at Dover) to M. de Béthune at Calais. As this was a matter which they appeared very earnestly to desire, and as I did not perceive that

any inconvenience could arise from my compliance with their request, I directed Mason, who I knew was a man to be depended upon for discretion, and who is not known as a messenger, to go with M. Fagel.

"M. Fagel has just been with me, and gave me M. de Béthune's letter to read. It is, on the whole, extremely extravagant, and very much such as might have been expected from him. The following are the principal points of it, and of a separate note.

"He asserts that, notwithstanding what has happened, a close connection subsists between the Jacobin leaders and the court of Vienna; that there is a plan, not only formed but in a state of great preparation, for bringing about a revolution in Holland, for the murder of the Stadtholder and his family, and for making M. Polus Grand Pensionary; that for this purpose M. Genest, late French *Chargé d'Affaires* at Petersburg, is on his journey to the Hague; that a similar design prevails with regard to England where, under various pretences, both fire-arms and daggers are fabricating, and where many Jacobin emissaries, under the pretence of being emigrants, are busily employed in exciting sedition. Among these he particularly names a M. Chèpy, who is one of the Secretaries of the Jacobin Club, and a Madame de Saubardiere. He mentions No. 80 in Gerard Street as the place where these persons hold their meetings; and he says similar emissaries are equally busy in Scotland and Ireland; that two of these Jacobins, Messieurs Albite and St. Jean de Brie, are just returned from London to Paris, and that a M. Du Perronet, *Secrétaire-Général des subsistances militaires*, is just crossed the channel for the purpose of carrying on the great work of fomenting disturbances in London.

"Such is the amount of the secrets which M. de Béthune was so desirous to communicate. In addition to them, he enclosed to M. Fagel a letter which he requested to be delivered to your Lordship, and which I now enclose."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 8, Stowe.—"I am very glad that the plants arrived safe, and, though I feel hurt at the real insignificance of a parcel so very young, yet I am not sure but that in some parts of your hill the extreme youth of the plants will give them a better chance. You positively forbid the whole tribe of firs, or I could have increased my bundle with them. But I take it for granted that you do not proscribe them in your plantation, because, in the very shallow soil of your hill, the Scot fir-larch and stone-pine will be your best friends, and will nurse the birch and beech to which you must trust. We had a great question whether to send fowls and birds for your good woman, but we voted that your buildings were not sufficiently advanced. If, however, she has the means of disposing of them, I will contrive to send them.

"Your political picture is most gloomy, and perfectly accords with the opinions which I had formed upon the mysterious end of a campaign which I have solved to myself by the very natural solution of great misconduct, great dupery, and great jealousies in the combination formed against France. I would venture to prophecy that Prussia will consummate her disgrace by abandoning its allies to themselves; and I am not sure that the cause will be worse conducted, or even essentially weaker, for such a dereliction. I understand that General Clairfayt is open-mouthed and most violent in his censures of the Duke of Brunswick; and those parts of the enclosed letter which I send you which speak of Clairfayt were stated to me by Lord Carleton, who had heard





the story told at a table where he dined in company with that General when he was at Brussels for one day to settle with the Minister the plan for the defence of Brabant. I have seen a long letter from Metz, October 28th, which speaks of Custine's army as the most licentious and worst body of troops even of that miserable force that has been collected to make head against the first troops in Europe; and that letter speaks of the ease with which the Prussians might cut off the whole of that body from their present position. But it is clear that this will not be, and, in the meantime, the infection is gaining ground in every quarter; and it is a painful reflexion for us to know that there is not in this country a military force which can effectually check the first burst of the fire, if it should catch here with the same rapidity with which it spreads in other parts of Europe. Much undoubtedly is to be done by watching, and by attending carefully to such objects as may reconcile the lower ranks of people to our Constitution, and to their situation under it. I am not quite sure that the advance of labourers' wages is the wisest mode of doing this; but it most certainly ought to be accompanied by some concessions on the part of Parliament. The repeal of some of the most oppressive taxes must depend upon circumstances to which I cannot speak. They would be relieved by a reduction in the price of leather, salt (for bacon), and candles beyond most other points. The tax upon hats of the lowest class would greatly help, and would hardly alter the amount of your collection; but I should hold them to be essentially relieved by the repeal of the 35 section, cap. 78, 13 George IIIrd, which compels every labourer between 18 and 60 to work six days on the roads; and by extending to all labourers of every description those advantages which by 2 George IIIrd, cap. 20, section 79, are given to all who have served during the war in the militia, and by 22 George IIInd, cap. 44, are given to all mariners and soldiers, of setting up and exercising any trade in any town or place, *irremovable until they become actually chargeable*. These are of small importance to the public, but very valuable boons to the lowest ranks; and I know that both points, and particularly the latter, are most extremely felt; for, at the disbanding my militia, those who were entitled to the certificates were most earnest to obtain them. I mention these points because I know you wish me to do so, and, from the same reason, I wish you to consider the repeal of the small duty upon registries, which is always grievously complained of.

"But though much must depend upon the pains taken to make the people feel happy, I am not sure that your Government have been *doing* enough; for I think you will find yourselves much charged with neglect, or with a mistaken line of conduct, in suffering these various and outrageous publications and overt acts to remain unpunished, which certainly have called loudly for the attention and exertions of the Crown servants. The various libels, Jockey Club, Walker's letter, Major Cartwright's, Payne's, Cooper's, surely ought to be prosecuted. The overt acts at Sheffield and at Nottingham, and, last though not least, at *Perth*, ought not to remain unnoticed. I do not really understand after the appeal made to the people, and after the clear and decided pledge of their support given to you, why the appeal to the oaths of a jury upon such outrages should be mistrusted; and be assured these are not my opinions only, but I have heard them from all ranks of people, with great dissatisfaction, and with increasing alarm from the increasing contempt of all those checks which have hitherto professed to guard our Government. You must have heard of the procession of the crowned jack-ass, and of Walker's speech to the mob of Sheffield, and of the same

ceremony and speech at Cooper's near Manchester, *in the presence of the officers of the Scotch Greys*, who are stated to be *disaffected*. Pray think this well over, and, as I am most anxious upon these points, pray let me know upon what principle you pass them over in silence.

"As to Ireland, I am afraid from every account that *the game is irrecoverably gone*. If the Irish Government (I mean Fitz-Gibbon, Foster, Parnell) are in earnest they ought to have increased the army to 20,000 men, at any risk of expense, three months ago. But I doubt whether even that exertion would have put off the evil day longer than one year. Surely they should be called upon to state what they can and will do, instead of trusting as they do, and constantly stating in all companies, that Great Britain is to pay all, and fight all, for the Protestant ascendancy!

"I am now to request you to attend very particularly at the nomination of Sheriffs on Monday, in the Exchequer Chamber. I told you of Lord Loughborough's attack upon me, and of the very handsome conduct of our Grand Jury. I have, in the usual mode, recommended Colonel Badcock, who has been three years on the roll, Mr. Freeman of Fawley Court, and Mr. Mallett (of very large property) of Chalfont St. Peter's; and have stated that James Oldham Oldham, having signified to me his desire to be struck off, as he meant to continue in trade which I had understood him to have quitted, I have therefore proposed to leave out his name. I mention all this as I should be much mortified to find my list altered by Lord Loughborough after what has passed, and therefore I put you on your guard. The list was sent, as usual, to Mr. Bury, the Clerk of Assize.

"To the latter part of your letter I have nothing to say, save what I have so often repeated; for you know that my warmest affections and feelings of pride, and even of ambition, are centred in you; and whatever moments Providence may have in store for us either of quiet and happy repose, or of severe trial, I trust that we shall equally share them, and mutually contribute either to increase the one, or to enable us to support the latter."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792, November 5-12] Downing Street.—"I have just had time to look hastily over these dispatches, and have seen Nagell, who has had no instructions, but expresses great anxiety that we should without delay either find a way of conveying some intimation to France, or send some ostensible instruction to Lord Auckland, which may serve, to deter the French from any attempt against Holland. The latter seems quite conformable to what we talked over, and it seems to press so much in point of time, that I am in hopes you will be able to come to town for the purpose to-morrow.

"The accounts from South Shields are not pleasant, and the want of force may make it necessary to call out the militia before long."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, November, Brussels.—"I am in the utmost embarrassment whether to follow the Court or to remain here, feeling, on the one hand, that His Majesty's dignity may appear committed by my joining in this

flight, and that my person is much more exposed to insult by that measure than by remaining here.

"On the other, my continuing at Brussels may give some species of sanction to the opinion still subsisting of His Majesty having influenced the Duke of Brunswick's retreat. The Government are not going out of the Austrian dominion. They have solicited my attending them. And, at this moment, every other Minister here is actually set out.

"Such are my doubts—but unless the communication is intercepted, I shall be guided by the considerations which lead to following the Court."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, November 9, Hague.—"Your private letter of the 7th arrived late to-night after I had finished and sealed all my despatches of this date. I wish to examine it *à tête reposée*, and to read and discuss it with the Pensionary and the Greffier; and I am sure that we shall all profit by the perspicuity with which your Lordship has stated the whole consideration, and your views and system. What you have said, however, respecting the same system being applicable to the two countries, notwithstanding the diversity of their positions, will be contested by my friend the Pensionary, and perhaps with some force under the new circumstances which have taken place. At any rate, I think that I may venture to forward without alteration the despatches to your Lordship which I had already prepared. I am flattered to think that they are dictated by a view of affairs similar to that which guides your Lordship. In one of the various questions which I have stated as meriting consideration I have introduced the words *conciliation or negotiation*. In despite of the strange success of the rebel rabble I have no doubt that they are under great and increasing difficulties, particularly respecting their pecuniary arrangements; besides, reverses in the war may happen to them any day, and they are distracted at home by personal discord and civil rage, which would soon have effects that would afford a most useful lesson to the admirers of *equality* if we could procure for other nations an interval of tranquillity. It is under these considerations that I conceive it might be good policy to acknowledge the Republic universally, on the principle of the *status quo* as to possessions; and of the preserving (if possible) the unfortunate King and Queen from the extremity which menaces them. I see many means and probabilities of your Lordship being able to bring forward such an attempt, and at any rate I feel that I can do no harm in suggesting the consideration.

"I have hinted at another subject in my despatch—the supply of bread. I receive information from various quarters which give me serious anxieties on that subject. Our crop at home was certainly scarce: the French agents are purchasing with us, and in this country, and everywhere, with a profusion of money which destroys all fair competition in the markets of Europe, and may bring the effects at least of a scarcity among us. It is said that wheat is plentiful and cheap in America; and I hope that means are taken, by the merchants at least, to bring large quantities into Europe. I have a doubt however whether it would not be a good measure for Government, as an article of secret service, to make a provisional purchase in this country, leaving it for the present in the warehouses here; employing for the purpose such confidential men as Mr. Rich and Mr. Crauford, and taking all the necessary precautions to avoid every possible

imputation of a job ; carrying the balance of loss or gain, if the corn should not be wanted at home, to the public account. It would have one good effect also in checking the French abundance at the expense and risk of other countries, which certainly is a part of their policy of the day.

"We are living in serious times, every sense of security is much shaken for the moment ; but vigilance and a due mixture of activity and forbearance may do much ; and I am not without hope that the storm may still be weathered.

"Could it have a bad effect if my brother received instructions from your Lordship of the *most secret* nature, to exact from the Prussian Government a fair and complete opening of their views and wishes relative to the manner of closing the war ; and to proceed afterwards privately to Vienna to obtain an audience of the Emperor (who is prejudiced in his favour) to talk over the object equally with the Emperor's confidential Ministers ; to have proper letters to authorize and execute such a step ; to return immediately to Berlin after despatching the whole result to your Lordship, who, in the meantime, will have received new lights both from Paris and from the course of events ? The idea has occurred to me whilst I was writing. I see some good in the appearance even of such a preparatory negotiation ; and, improved and guarded as it would be under the instructions with which you would accompany it, I see no possible harm."

#### EARL OF WESTMORLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, November 10, Dublin Castle.—"I should be much obliged if you would give letters of recommendation to Sir Wm. Hamilton at Naples, to Lord Hervey at Florence, at ? [and to] Mr. Trevor at Turin, to Mr. Blair and Lady Mary Blair, relations and very particular friends of mine, who have for some time resided near Geneva, but have been compelled to move by the disturbances in the French dominions that make every person insecure. You probably can explain, but we, out of the secret, await with opened ears some development of the campaign of the combined armies. If one might venture to comment upon the King of Prussia's own account, his words '*weighty reasons that prevented him from gaining a complete victory,*' would afford much scope.

"The different sects in this country are waging a war of words. I trust it will not go farther, though it may require our firm mediation to prevent ; the alarm, anger, and agitation is not very easily described. The Republicans and anarchy-men are likewise very busy, and we imagine they are not less so in England. The mob of Dublin seem in great good humour, and do not yet show any specimen of having caught the Parisian infection ; notwithstanding all the threats of Napper Tandy and his coadjutors. not the least incivility to King William or his processionists on the 5th of November.

"Will you have the goodness to direct the introductory letters to Lady Mary Blair, *à la poste restante*, Leghorn, Italy. Have you been kind enough to give Mrs. Davie, widow of the Corunna consul, her pension ? I should be obliged if you would acquaint me, that I may inform her."

## J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1782, November 11, Dartmouth Street.—“I have just had the honour of a visit from M. Vandernoot, accompanied by his friend Colonel Bath. He was anxious to know my opinion of his plan; and when he found I had not opened his letter he entered into a long detail of his project, with all his reasons for bringing it forward at this moment. As the plan itself was a very old acquaintance of mine, being one of those which had been originally proposed in 1789, I gave much less attention to it than to the investigation of another point which I thought of more importance; namely, whether M. Vandernoot was not at present engaged as a Jacobin emissary in England, for the purpose of bringing forward, under a new aspect, the plan so long ago attempted by the leaders of the French Revolution, of having their new Constitution and their Republic formally acknowledged by this country. As I was perfectly acquainted with M. Vandernoot's character, and knew him to be very ignorant, presumptuous, and unguarded, I had little difficulty in obtaining all the information I wanted, and in satisfying myself that my conjecture was perfectly well founded.

“Without troubling your Lordship with an unnecessary detail, I beg leave shortly to state the particulars I drew from him.

“He has been in England above three months, under the borrowed name of Gobelsoire, and has been admitted into the confidence and councils of M. Chauvelin, Abbé Noel, and a Monsieur Bomet, who, I find from him, came over some time ago as an auxiliary, and returned to Paris within these ten days. He told me, as a strong reason why his proposal to your Lordship was likely to succeed, that it had been framed not only with the concurrence but with the assistance of these gentlemen; and that I might depend upon it the Prussians and French had now so good an understanding together, that the acquiescence of the former might be depended upon; and he gave strong hints (though he affected mystery on this point) that the King of Prussia and Du Mourier had gone great lengths in settling this among the other important matters which formed the subject of their conferences near Ste. Ménéhould. He also avowed to me, confidentially, though evidently as a matter on which he prided himself, that he had had a considerable share in Du Mourier's invasion of Brabant, which he justified by saying it was the only method by which the dominion of the House of Austria could be overturned. As he grew warm on this subject, which soon happened as I chose to appear incredulous, he repeated his assertion with great vehemence, and told me that he would fairly let me know what he had done in the business.

“‘When,’ said he, ‘we knew at M. Chauvelin's what had been passing between the Duke of Brunswick and M. Du Mourier, I immediately saw all the advantages of an invasion of Brabant. We lost no time in writing to Paris and to the army; and our courier brought us back the plan of the projected campaign, and a copy of the manifesto which it was intended Du Mourier should publish on his entrance into the Low Countries. From these papers it was evident that the same steps were to be taken there, and the same system of contributions was to be adopted as had been followed by M. de Custine in Germany. I saw directly all the bad consequences of such measures, and I declared my opinion that the attempt would be unsuccessful, as it would infallibly unite the whole people against the French. Whereas, were my sentiments to prevail, I would engage for it M. Du Mourier's invasion

would be popular, and, of course, successful. Upon this, M. Chauvelin and Abbé Noel desired me to put my thoughts upon paper. I did so accordingly. I altered the project considerably; and I wrote a manifesto which, from my local knowledge and experience, I was certain would be acceptable. We lost no time in sending this over to Paris, where, I have the satisfaction to tell you, it was immediately adopted; and, *pour ma gloire*, the manifesto published by M. Du Mourier is word for word that which I wrote in Portman Square.'

"Such are the essential points of this gentleman's communication. I have no doubt that I could easily have drawn from him every circumstance he knows relative to the French cabals in this country, had I not been unwilling to appear at all curious about them when Colonel Bath was present. As for M. Vandernoot himself, he is such a sponge, and such a mixture of vanity, absurdity, and indiscretion, that the smallest effort throws him off his guard, and leads him into any detail one wishes to put him upon."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private and most Secret.

1792, November 13, Whitehall.—"Having so lately written to you so much at large, both in my public and private letters, on the present strange state of affairs, I have little to add to my despatch of this date. You will see that I have adopted your idea of calling upon the two Courts for an explanation of their views, but the sending your brother to Vienna for that purpose would, I think, have been liable to objection. I trust the declaration to the States will produce its effect both in Holland and in France. If not, we are committed, and must make the best of it. The increased activity and boldness of our Republicans since the Duke of Brunswick's retreat is certainly very striking, and still more of the same sort must be apprehended from the conquest of Flanders.

"The same spirit is attempting to be raised at Berlin. I know with certainty that this train is directed from Hamburg by a M. Broa, a French agent there, who receives money for that purpose under the pretext of operations in the corn trade. I much wish to put the Government of Prussia on their guard, and to intimate to them that, if they could get at the papers of this man, they would probably acquire possession of the whole conspiracy, with the names of those concerned at Berlin, some of whom are stated to be in the interior of the Palace. But I cannot discover the source of my intelligence, nor give any clue which may lead to that discovery. Pray consider whether you have any *quite safe* way of giving this intelligence to Keller, or letting it go through your brother as coming to him from some indirect quarter. If you can do this without any risk of discovery of the real source, it may be very useful. I should not be sorry that this Government had the merit of giving the intelligence, but I am afraid of letting the channel be traced through which we acquire it. If you can do what I suggest, lose no time in it.

"Our declaration must be published in our papers. In order to avoid bad translations into English of the French translation of the original, I wish you would either deliver it in English alone, or in English and French as the Dutch do their papers in Dutch and French."

*Copy.*

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 15 [Stowe].—"Your letter makes me very uneasy because the style of it shows me that your apprehensions keep pace with mine, but I am glad to find that we do not differ as to our ideas of the duties of the Ministers, or of the people at large, on this occasion. I certainly thought the apparent inattention of Government to the libellous publications which constantly poison the minds of the public, and to the violent and overt acts (upon which you are certainly better informed, but which are in the mouths of every one) proceeded from some system, because I knew that (as far as you was concerned) they could not proceed from neglect. And I still think that it is much to be lamented that the Attorney General has not been able to make up his mind or his evidence on the subject of Payne's, Cooper's, and Pigott's Jockey Club publications, so as to file the informations even on the first day of the term. But it is certain that the real exertions must be ultimately made by the magistrates and by the people; it is however to be remembered that libellous publications in the newspapers, or by pamphlets, are supposed to be peculiarly within the province of the executive government. In this county I cannot find that any pains have been taken by the Reformers, nor do I know any one point in which I can be useful to a cause in which you well know that I do not wish to spare any personal trouble or expense. Or, if by coming to town I could in any manner either serve the public cause, or personally assist you, I am equally ready. I am very glad to hear of your prosecutions at the quarter-sessions, but, as unfortunately the forms of law will allow of a traverse which cannot be tried till April, I fear that the remedy will hardly operate soon enough to serve us essentially. Can you point at any mode of strengthening the executive government? I protest I see none which can operate to any great extent, though there certainly are points in which you are constitutionally too weak; and there are most certainly many most important reasons against the meeting of Parliament at a moment like the present.

"As to the progress of this phrensy on the Continent, it is difficult to say, not where it may reach, but where it can stop; and I fear that you will be forced to some immediate and decisive measure if you hope to retain Holland in its present situation. I take for granted that Antwerp is not long defensible, and of Ruremond I know nothing but its local. Under these circumstances I conclude that the Austrians must abandon, and for ever, the whole, save the Duchy of Luxembourg for the present; and this alone presents to us a new and most interesting question directly affecting us in a most essential point. Italy and several of the German states will probably be very soon in the same situation, but do not so immediately attract our attention or affect our interests, more than as they will add their weight to the torrent. My mind is so uneasy that I feel relief in writing to you, though I feel that I break in upon your moments more anxiously and more fully employed; but, if you still continue to go to Dropmore on the Saturdays, I have some thoughts of endeavouring to make you a visit at the end of next week, to converse fully with you upon points which are, indeed, brought more nearly to an issue than could have been expected a few weeks ago. Write me therefore a few lines in answer.

"Talbot is just returned from Ireland, and describes that country to be more altered in the course of a few weeks than could have been conceived. The subscription from the Catholics will raise a most enormous sum, for it is general and extends to the very lowest classes. The

priests are universally tendering in the chapels the Catholic oath of allegiance to their flocks, and are collecting very accurate lists in pursuance of the orders of the Committee. *This you may depend upon.* You, of course, take no official information on those points except from Lord Westmoreland, but, if you wish any other sort of information, his connexions and his character would give him the means of serving you *usefully and safely.*"

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, November 15, Hague.—"I have received no farther news in the night. It is said that a cannonade was heard at this place during some hours on the 13th in the afternoon, towards the quarter of Brabant; and the wind being then at the south-east, the fact is not impossible.

"I am doing everything in my power here to remove fears, as far as may be consistent with useful precautions. But I feel, at the same time, that our situation is critical both from within and from without. The patriotic party at Amsterdam has laid aside all reserves, and is become noisy and impudent; and there is scarce a village or an alehouse in this province in which the language is not seditious at the clubs, and frequently with the accession of a travelling Jacobin. As to the danger from without, the Pensionary has (I suspect) some secret communication with Clavière and Le Brun, which satisfies him that nothing offensive is to be apprehended from the *Conseil Exécutif*. But he justly remarks that the means of doing mischief have passed out of their hands into those of Dumourier, who, as soon as his business is arranged in Brabant, may be capable of tendering some unreasonable proposition to these Provinces, and of backing it by an armed force. It is a suspicious circumstance connected with this speculation that De Maulde (as appears in the interceptions) is to have the rank of Lieutenant-General, and to be sent from Paris to Dumourier. I did not think it likely that we should ever be sorry to lose De Maulde from this place, where he has been incessantly active and mischievous; but we were beginning to gain an insight into means of purchasing him, and I had meant to have written to your Lordship in the course of this week upon the subject. I have reason to believe (for we have good intelligence within his household) that he went off last night.

"In short, under all the circumstances, my principal hope rests on the severity of the season, which may be expected to take place for three months; and the prospect of that interval is an additional motive with me for recurring to the consideration stated in my last, *whether your Lordship might not, with a probable good effect, and without any possible inconvenience, immediately use means to ascertain how far it is possible to effectuate an entire cessation of hostilities, and to leave France to the internal pursuit of her own inventions.* I conceive that this might be promoted not only by directing Sir Morton Eden to inform himself directly and explicitly, respecting the means, speculations, and wishes of the Ministries of Berlin and Vienna, in which I could have M. de Reede instructed to assist if it were thought useful; but also to have openings avowedly between His Majesty's Ministers and the *Conseil Exécutif* at Paris, and even (indirectly) with Dumourier. It appears to me perfectly consistent with our dignity in the present circumstances of armies overrunning the whole continent, of fleets destined to commit piracies in every corner of the Mediterranean, and of squadrons fitting out for Guadaloupe and the West Indies, that we should have an amicable explanation; and I conceive it to be equally consistent with the main-



tenance of our neutrality. It had hitherto been an objection to this that there existed no constituted and responsible body of administration in France; but there can be no doubt that the late successes will give a great (transitory) power to the *Conseil Exécutif*. Your Lordship will excuse me for dwelling so much on a subject which goes rather beyond the line of my duties; but I feel it right to say to you in confidence whatever occurs. Query—Whether, if the eventual circumstances make it practicable, our communication with France may not be *motivée* by an humane interference respecting the unfortunate Royal family. It might be done by sending some proper person avowedly and openly, though without a public character, to Paris; and at the same time that the explanation takes place at Berlin and Vienna. With respect to the Low Countries, I suspect that the Emperor will, in the result, abandon them altogether; but that would lead to a new and wide consideration, which may be postponed.”

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1791, November 16, Hague.—“The businesses which I have done to-day, and the interruptions to which I have been subject, prevent me from writing so particularly as I could have wished.

“I think the measure of the Declaration excellent: it will also feel the pulse of England, which I hope beats right, though with some slight symptoms of fever. I wish, in addition to our foreign measures, that we could have some access to the *Conseil Exécutif*, and perhaps their naval measures entitle us to seek it. The Pensionary has good information that De Maulde may be accessible to money, and means to sound him as to the embarrassments mentioned in his note. It would, however, be to no purpose to purchase De Maulde otherwise than as a channel to Dumourier, with whom he is connected.

“I thought it best to mention, in the strictest confidence, to the Princess of Orange, the substance of your Lordship’s intelligence from Hamburg. I gave it a turn which leads her to imagine that the intelligence was obtained here, but confided to her by your Lordship’s desire. She sent a servant to the King of Prussia, who is at Coblenz. I enclose her note. I also confided it in the most guarded terms to my brother, to be used only as the occasion may serve; and his discretion may be perfectly relied on. I desired him not have the same reserves as to the Emsden secret, which, however, was in the interceptions.”

“I submit to your Lordship that the Declaration and answer should be immediately sent in *English* to the papers.”

*Enclosing a note from the Princess of Orange.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 18.—“Lord Loughborough’s language was that he was himself indifferent as to his situation, but had always stated that he would take it whenever the Duke of Portland and his friends thought it would be useful that he should; and he therefore declined (as we expected) giving his answer till he should have seen the Duke. In the course of conversation he confirmed the account of the disposition of the party to support without making terms, mentioned Lord Fitzwilliam,

the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Egremont, Lord Carlisle, and Lord Portchester as all likely to be so disposed, and stated his own clear opinion that it was the only line for them to adopt. I found that Windham and Burke came from his house to us the other evening, and he said that he had since received a letter from the Duke of Portland, to whom Burke had given an account of their language, of which the Duke entirely approved. He expressed himself somewhat in the same manner as Windham did, as knowing very little about Mr. Fox and still less about Grey; but said that the Duke of Portland had spoken of the former as strongly disapproving the French measures for some time past. The rest of our conversation was general, respecting prosecutions *et cetera*, but, in the manner of it, friendly and cordial. The Duke of Portland and some others of the party are to be in town in the course of to-morrow and Tuesday, and he told me he would call upon me in a few days."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 18 [Stowe].—"I enclose to you a letter (probably written to me for your perusal) from Lord Camelford; it smells most violently of his emigrant society, but much of it is alas! too true. I am uneasy about his motions, both from the time of year and the peculiar difficulties of a winter journey at this time to Rome; and from the chance of his finding a flame in every corner of Italy as fierce and as unexpected as that from which he is running in the Netherlands. Surely he will wait the result of Clairfayt's second stand, if indeed any second stand be made; and if the whole game is up by municipalizing the Low Countries, it will not be very wise to expect peace and quiet in the Emperor's Italian states, or in the more vigorous and immaculate governments of the Pope.

"I dare not trust my hopes, but if (as I collect from Dumourier's strange letters) Clairfayt had not joined the Duke of Saxe Teschen before the action at Jemappes, it is possible that more may be done by that body, who were the *elite* of the Austrian army, than by the Duke's army, who were certainly neither strong in numbers nor in quality, and appear by the same letters to be only 20,000 men; but it is indeed most clear that the whole of the Low Countries depends upon this second stand. I am very glad that you have taken your line as to Holland, not that I am blind to the many difficulties attending it if we are called upon to take our part, but that I think it probable that you will be forced, in case of the conquest of the Netherlands, to interfere; and you cannot do it more wisely than by choosing for the ground of the quarrel one so very essential to us, and upon which the minds of the people of England have been so lately made up.

"As to your clubs, it is hopeless to endeavour to restrain them, unless it should be practicable to declare them all so far incorporated as to make every member liable to the fine which the court may inflict for the publication by a secretary or chairman of any seditious libel; but even this is a paltry and inadequate remedy. Your banishment I highly approve, and surely it might extend beyond the author or printer to the publisher by gratuitous distribution. As to militia regulations, I despair of anything being done that can cure the evils where they exist, without throwing the most unpleasant and real difficulties in the way of those who mean to do their duty: I fear, from what I have heard, that some of them are tainted; particularly I have heard named the Westminster, the Warwick, the Cumberland, the Derby, and, above all, the Duke of Norfolk's, who are under no one control whatsoever. The Nottingham

have been as ill spoken of, and owe very much to the Duke of Newcastle's negligence in suffering Major Cartwright to continue so long in the regiment without taking the King's pleasure upon his removal, without recurring to the unusual mode which has at length been adopted. I will, however, give my best assistance and consideration to any ideas which may have occurred to you, or to others, upon this subject.

"As to Ireland, I have read a most voluminous cargo of all that has been written, and particularly the debates to which you allude. I do not believe one word of any settled union of the Catholic with the Dissenter of the north; but I firmly believe, and know, that it must happen as things are now going on, unless the Catholics think themselves strong enough to play their game without that assistance, which, from particular circumstances, I think more than possible. But, in no contingency can I see salvation to the present system; and I must say that, differing as I know Hobart differed from me five months ago upon this subject, it was unpardonable not to have strengthened the army, and the power of the Protestant Government, by meeting Parliament in October. When I say this, I argue upon his opinions; mine led me to think the game irrecoverably gone from the moment in which Parliament told the Catholic that, in no contingency, would they agree to share the existing monopoly of power. I have very much to say upon these points. I have considered them long and anxiously. I have read everything that can be collected upon the very many points of that question, and I am sure that you, who have felt so strongly the advantage of caution respecting the French fire, will hear and think much before you will dip in the Irish furnace. Keogh is shrewd and clever; he has bought above 2,000*l.* *per annum* in the county of Roscommon, where his family have much influence; he is a very bigotted religionist. Have you heard of Lord Downshire's conciliatory ejections to every Catholic (above 500) upon his estate? As yet his example is not copied, but it is spoken of as a wise measure by his neighbours, and matches well with Foster's projects of disarming them at a moment when, so far from having an army adequate to such a project, you have hardly infantry sufficient to garrison the different points from whence any offensive operations are to begin or to be supported. I cannot say how much my mind suffers from seeing the extent of this Irish evil, and no means of preventing it; and from seeing, at the same time, that nothing short of a miracle will prevent us from catching that contagion, even if we escape the French infection. If I hear nothing more from you I will be at Dropmore by dinner on Saturday, happy to embrace you and your dear little woman.

"My accounts of this country are all perfectly quiet, notwithstanding the enormous price of bread and bacon; I have raised my labourers' wages, and the Duke of Grafton (as I hear) follows me. I had many reasons for doing it without any communication with neighbours, and I am sure that I have made the measure easier by that means. We can have no difficulty about the association; but as the quarter-sessions are so late, not till the 2nd week in January, I should think that, after it has been circulated for a fortnight in the London papers, it may be advisable to get a certain number of gentlemen's and yeomen's names to an association in the same words, in the *Buckinghamshire Herald*."

SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, November 23, Berlin.—"After my request of the 28th of July, and your Lordship's very kind answer, the annexed letter may justly

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occasion you some surprise. Nothing indeed but what I look upon to be an indispensable duty could induce me thus to forego the flattering hopes of attaining a post which has ever been the great object of my wishes; but it is a sacrifice due to Lady Elizabeth Eden, whose weak state has long rendered her unequal to the fatigues of public life, and to the rigours of a German climate. She, however, has borne them without repining, and is still indeed, from her regard to me, ready to encounter them. This is the real motive that actuates me. Your goodness will I trust excuse my troubling you with the detail, and prompt your Lordship to second my most humble petition to His Majesty. If my private fortune was sufficient to enable me to live with becoming ease, I certainly would not prefer a petition for a pension, but it is not so. I have ever, as my countrymen can witness, lived with the splendour due to my rank. My own private fortune has long since been spent, and part of my present income is precarious, depending on one life in the Hanaper. I cannot therefore, with three children to educate, but be anxious for a pension. It will be no small satisfaction to me to owe it to your Lordship's recommendation. I fully feel how greatly I am already indebted to your protection, and, indeed, shall never forget my obligations to your Lordship."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, November 23, Berlin.—"Requesting leave to retire from the diplomatic service, and soliciting a pension."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 24 [Stowe].—"Your messenger was a real relief to me, for, from the wish of not breaking in upon your arrangements which I know are now most severely pressed upon you, I had ordered my chaise for Dropmore, though I have been confined to my room for the last two days by James's powders and the severest cold I ever felt. I am however better, and hope that nothing will prevent us meeting on Saturday next. I see that your Dutch declaration has (as might be expected) sunk our stocks very much. I own that I do not quite like the style either of our declaration, or of their answer; you will not suppose me to wish to engage us in hostilities, but I cannot help thinking your managements with regard to France are much too tame in language, though *fortiter in re*. I wish, if you have a moment to spare, that you would let me know where the Prussian and where the Austrian armies actually are: for, ridiculous as it may appear, I have wholly lost sight of the latter, and (had it not been for a partial movement towards Coblenz) almost so of the former. I conclude that you imagine the Austrian government of the Low Countries irrecoverably lost, as it appears clear that their army did not venture to interfere even for the object of saving Brussels; but I cannot yet understand how the States of Brabant, formed as they were when the Austrians were driven out of Brussels three years ago, will like the French creed of equality and no religion.

"At home I own I see a gloomy prospect, for I cannot help thinking that there is a disposition to give way upon points of reform, which, evidently, are only stepping stones to more important innovations. I

know the abuses which have crept into our Parliamentary elections, and feel them strongly; but I shall certainly consider the first Bill which passes for a change in our present system as a tocsin (under our present circumstances) for what will inevitably follow. I wish that some mode might be devised, by association or otherwise, to assist Government by information of seditious libellers and disturbers of the public peace; but before this can be done, some pains must be taken to do away the odium of *information*, by marking clearly the difference between informations under the revenue laws, and those informations which are enjoined by law and meritorious; but, in truth, the great multiplication of the former class have made the latter so obnoxious, that much pains must be bestowed upon this point if you are to hope for assistance from the body of the people. You will see what I feel upon this point by reading the enclosed letter from my son, and my answer to it, which I will beg you to wafer and to send by the post."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1792, November 25, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville thinks it his duty to lay before your Majesty without delay the letters which he has this day received from Lord Auckland in addition to the official despatches. He has communicated them to Mr. Pitt, who agrees with him in opinion that no time ought to be lost in transmitting to Lord Auckland the authority which he desires. Lord Grenville trusts that, under these circumstances, your Majesty will not disapprove of his writing this evening to Lord Auckland a letter to that effect, the draft of which Lord Grenville has also the honour to lay before your Majesty. From the very secret and delicate nature of these papers, Lord Grenville has not made any other communication of them except to Mr. Pitt, nor has he suffered them to go into the Office."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 25, Windsor.—"It is extremely difficult for me to convey correctly my ideas to Lord Grenville on the immediate receipt of the secret despatches received from Lord Auckland, as I feel the advantage of a general peace if it can be effected to the *real* satisfaction of the various parties concerned, but at the same time not less forcibly a disinclination to France gaining her point, and perhaps laying a foundation to encourage other countries to attempt the same game; for it is peace alone that can place the French Revolution on a permanent ground, as, then, all the European States must acknowledge this new Republic.

"Having stated thus far my sentiments, I do not object to Lord Grenville's authorising Lord Auckland as far as the sum proposed, if an end can be put to the present evils: though I am far from sanguine either that the French General will venture to speak out, or that, if he would, we can manage the business in a manner to satisfy the various Courts concerned, or even escape blame from an appearance of being the first to acknowledge the French Revolution. Though Lord Grenville might wish to have my sentiments more explicitly, yet I am certain he must foresee the many evils on both sides of the question which naturally must occur, and that require much deliberation before they can be solved."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GREENVILLE.

1792, November 25 [Stowe].—"I like your circular letter extremely, and enclose to you my office answer, where you will smile to see the caution with which the Custos Rotulorum of the county and the High Steward of Buckingham treats the important question in which his right hand fights his left. Nothing can be more essential than that it should be clearly understood that Government are doing (what I am fully persuaded of) all they can, and these letters, with the proceedings which will doubtless be followed up in some of the most turbulent parts, will have a full and satisfactory effect. Still, I understand that the coffee-house language of moderate men holds out the necessity of some Parliamentary reform, and I impatiently wait for some alteration in that language, which will probably vary from the activity with which I understand that individuals now meet the seditious violence which, ten days ago, remained unnoticed. The person who took Mr. Frost by the nose, and kicked him out of the Percy Coffee-house, is Mr. Butler, who is husband to Freemantle's aunt. I understand that the expressions were treasonable; if you are anxious to know them with a view of prosecuting Frost, I will endeavour to ascertain them, and get for you the names of the persons present. Frost came down into the coffee-room from a dinner room upstairs, and probably was drunk. I am very impatient to hear your details respecting the *ci-devant*, probably by Saturday you will know more; and although I am vexed that the Kennington Common nonsense kept you (as it ought) in town, yet I was so unwell all yesterday that I should have only been a plague to you and to myself. I am much better this morning, and a few days will set me quite up.

"I forgot to ask you whether your good woman has any room for birds which we promised to supply? If she has place for them my chaise is a good higler's cart to bring them, and some poultry if she likes them.

"I have received three letters this morning from persons all unconnected with each other, expressing the universal indignation of all London at the names of the officers who subscribe to the French cause, and the universal expectation that they will be dismissed. Both Lord Sempill and Lord E. FitzGerald have long before this been mentioned to me as speaking openly the most direct treason. They subscribe 2*l.* 1*l.*s.; the sum excited my curiosity, as I found several others had done the same, and I directed Freemantle to enquire; and he was told that the sum was meant to cover two muskets at 25*s.* each, and one shilling for the expenses to Ostend, where the subscription is to be delivered in brass cannon and muskets. Lord E. FitzGerald came away from Canada (as you know how) without leave, and because the King would not give him the Lieutenant-Colonelcy of his regiment, the 54th, now returned to England, he never has joined it, and declares to every one in coffee-houses that he never will.

"Lord Sempill is senior Lieutenant in the 3rd of Foot Guards, and if General Guadichens is forced out of the regiment by his conviction or by his affairs, both of which matters are equally in a bad way, [Lord Sempill will succeed to the Lieutenant-Colonelcy without purchase as a reward for his loyalty! Pray enquire into this, for you feel upon it (I am sure) as I do. Why should not (as has been done in so many cases of late) the prices of their commissions be lodged for them by the King's commands, and their commissions cancelled?"

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 26, Windsor.—“I return the dispatch received this morning from the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and also the one arrived on Friday last. The prospect is not pleasant, but I cannot help saying that, in the present state of this kingdom, I cannot think it advisable farther to diminish our military force by sending any troops to Ireland; the adding five dismounted men to each troop of cavalry in Ireland may deserve consideration, and the permitting the Irish regiments of infantry to enlist additional men to complete them to the numbers they are permitted by law to keep up, even by their recruiting them in Britain. As to draughts from hence, that is impossible.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Most Secret and Confidential.

1792, November 26, Whitehall.—“I am afraid from all that has passed relative to the negotiation of which you speak, as well as from other circumstances, that there is too much reason to believe the French are determined to drive us to extremities. A very few days must now probably decide this question, and we feel very unwilling to afford anything like a pretext which could diminish the strong impression to be expected here from so unprovoked an attack. In the meantime our situation is sufficiently uneasy, particularly from the great difficulty of getting *accurate* intelligence of what is really doing at Brest, the accounts of which are various and contradictory. I have always been told that the commerce which Brest carries on with the Dutch ports for naval stores, affords to that Government a facility of acquiring such intelligence infinitely better than we can. I wish therefore that you would urge the Pensionary both to communicate a *précis* of what he does know, and, if necessary, to increase his means of information on this very essential object.

“I trust and hope that we shall remain quite quiet in our interior. The activity and insolence of the French emissaries and their allies in this country have certainly increased much with Dumourier's success; but I think the loyalty of the people at large, and its attachment to our established Government, has increased with the efforts of those who wished to destroy those sentiments.

“This letter was written (as well as my despatch) previous to my receiving my Paris account. I can add nothing to what I have said on the subject officially; but the circumstance makes me of course still more anxious on the subject of the naval stores, to which I have adverted in my despatch.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1792, November 26, Hague.—“My brother remarks well on the King of Prussia's strange measure of detaching his troops in pursuit of new acquisitions of Polish territory, that *such iniquitous projects, in so awful a moment, seem to bid defiance to God and to man.*

“With respect to the awfulness of that moment, I take infinite pains with my own mind neither to over-rate nor to undervalue its dangers. If

by the courage, judgment, resources, and energy of the King's Ministers, and above all, if by the general disposition and good sense of our countrymen, we can struggle through the storm so as to land at a pacification *almost on any terms*, I think that the whole is recoverable. In an interval of calm, and upon a further experience of the distresses accumulating against France, the reflux of men's minds from the unnatural height of popular enthusiasm to which they are now raised, would be rapid and decisive. They would once more feel the necessity and the benefit of subordination, of morality, and of religion; and be convinced that this nonsense of universal fraternity tends to throw us all back into the state of naked, ignorant, distressed, and bloody barbarians. I conceive that we have four principal objects of attention.

1. "To keep down disturbances and sedition in the interior.
2. "To make some respectable naval preparation, accompanied by the most explicit, unequivocal declarations of our disposition to peace, and of our resolution, at the same time, to repel and chastise all unjust provocations.
3. "To ascertain whether there are any possible means to effectuate a pacification, and to use every effort for that purpose.
4. "To bring the minds of His Majesty's subjects of every class to a serious reflection on the blessings which they are risking in pursuit of a bubble. I should incline to meet this discussion in every possible form of proclamations to the people, orders for fast days, speeches from the throne, discourses from the pulpit, discussions in Parliament. I am sure that we should gain ground by this. The prosperity and opulence of England are such that, except the lowest and most destitute class, and men of undone fortunes and desperate pursuits, there are none who would not suffer essentially in their fortunes, occupations, comfort; in the glory, strength, and well-being of their country; but above all, in that sense of security which forms the sole happiness of life, by this new species of French disease which is spreading its contagion amongst us. I have not time to look much into newspapers; but so far as I have been able to observe, the French make war in that field with the same superior energy and activity which they are using in all other respects. If, however, the country were well awakened to its danger, I think that all the endeavours to do mischief would be treated both with contempt and with resentment.

"The first and leading principle of the *Société de la propagande*, which now avows itself to have laboured in this plan of destruction during a period of near thirty years, is the abolition of all established religion. It appears to me essential to call the attention of the country to that point in all the modes above mentioned. I am more than ever convinced that the abandoning of religion is a certain step towards anarchy and all its consequences.

"I do not know why I interrupt your Lordship with remarks which must have already occurred to you; but the subject is incessantly before my mind. Our friend the Grand Pensionary affects in the enclosed note (A) to think me ~~too serious~~ respecting it; but I do not think that I am so. The danger is certainly great; but the means of averting it are good if well exerted.

"I apprehend that the King of Prussia's absence from Berlin will put it out of our power to obtain the explanation that was wished from him. I trust however that we may obtain materials, and a proper moment, in the course of December, to state solemnly and explicitly (perhaps even it might be done in a manifesto) our wishes to see tran-



quillity restored to mankind ; to see a period put to the desolations and violence which prevail ; and to see every country adopt the principles of our neutrality, and abstain from interfering, internally or externally, with the affairs of others.

"I enclose an extract from a curious paper, B ; your Lordship will see by the note attached to it that it is of the most secret nature possible. We have good intelligence here from various quarters, but obtained by means which always leave a diffidence as to the credit to be given to it.

"I am overwhelmed, in all senses of the word, by the arrival, visits, letters, and distresses of *émigrés* ; and if this state of things continues, I believe I must emigrate also, and from motives of prudence, for I am subjected to expenses of different kinds which I can neither limit nor bring to any possible claim of indemnity."

#### *Enclosures.*

A.—[VAN DE SPIEGEL TO LORD AUCKLAND.]

"Vos calculs et vos principes . sur les affaires du tems ne diffèrent en rien des miens. Oûi, il faut tacher de faire la paix, la paix à tout prix."

"La conduite du Cabinet de Berlin est telle qu'on n'ose presque pas la nommer par son vrai nom ; peu s'en faut que nous ne devenions tous patriotes et *monarchomachi*, si les Souverains tiennent une marche pareille à celle là."

*French.*

#### B.—*Secret.*

[1792] Novembre 24, Amsterdam.—"Dumourier, que l'on presse continuellement pour venir dans ce pays-ci, a écrit encore dans le sens de ses deux dernières lettres. Il exhorte toujours d'attendre patiemment ; assure du désir qu'il a de faire naître les occasions de leur apporter la liberté, mais que le moment n'est pas venu. . Ils sont très mécontents de ses lettres, ainsi que de celles de leurs députés auprès de lui. Ils le croient en négociation avec l'Angleterre, qui s'entend avec la Hollande, pour le détourner à force d'argent. Ils disent même que ce guerrier intrigant ne se soucie point de s'exposer à une nouvelle conquête, qui pourroit lui faire perdre l'honneur et le fruit de celle de Brabant ; que, redoutant l'ingratitude de ses chers concitoyens, il ne cherche qu'à se faire un sort brillant dans le Pays Bas, et, en attendant, à amasser des grandes sommes pour vivre indépendant, n'importe dans quel pays.

"Nous voilà donc très mécontents de ces tristes nouvelles, et très peu disposés à nous montrer avant l'arrivée de Dumourier ; mais ne cessant pour cela de nous mettre en mesure d'effectuer nos projets. La liste de nos enrôlés . est au delà de 20,000, prêts à prendre les armes. Une grande partie est payée sur le pied de trois florins par semaine. L'on a, aussi, au delà de 60,000 fusils, dispersés partout où on pourroit en avoir besoin."

"Je souffre cruellement de jouer un rôle qui rébute à mon cœur et à mon ame ; mais l'utilité qu'il peut avoir me fait dévorer mes regrets."

[The Grand Pensionary adds] "Lisez ce bulletin à votre aise, serrez le bien, car il y va de la vie de l'écrivain."

*French.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1792, November 27, Whitehall.—“As it has struck me as barely possible that you may not have received from France the account of the resolution of the Executive Council read in the National Convention relative to opening the Scheld, I send you by this mail the *Moniteur* that contains it. There is, I am afraid, little doubt that the whole is a concerted plan to drive us to extremities, with a view of producing an impression in the interior of the country, which I trust and hope will completely fail. I shall be very anxious to know what Dumourier has done in pursuance of his orders.”

*Copy.*

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 27 [Stowe].—“I have thought much since yesterday upon our association, and I have some doubts whether the latter clause of the subscription might not check, in many instances, the lower yeomanry and tradesmen whose good opinion and support you wish for, but who might not like to put down five shillings for an object which many might not clearly comprehend; and I wish you to consider the danger of entrusting to some rogue of an attorney, who in these country towns would inevitably get the ascendancy, and would conduct any prosecution that he might select in such a manner as might do the most essential mischief to the public cause. Might it not answer our purpose to raise subscriptions payable to some general committee in London who might manage the prosecutions properly, and might, for this purpose, receive communications of evidence from the country committees; for certainly in this business we may have much to fear from the mistaken zeal of our friends if any serious attempt is made.

“I wish you to turn your thoughts to a circular letter to be directed to all the Lieutenants of counties, requiring from them an account (for the Secretary's Office) where the Militia arms are deposited, and recommending a strict attention to the 91st clause, which orders one-third of our sergeants, corporals, and drummers to be always present with the arms; unless you should think it (as I do) more advisable to order them all to remain with the arms at present, and in this case you must give us the orders; and it would then be highly necessary to send a barrel of powder to each militia regiment, for not one of us at present have a single ball cartridge. It is likewise worth your attention in the present moment to enquire into the numbers and state of the persons resident in the Tower, for both Colonel Nugent and Colonel Fremantle have told me last winter that, in their opinion, nothing could me more easy than an attempt upon the small arms there from the immense number of persons who, in different ways, have fixed themselves there, and of whom the garrison, of course, know nothing. Of course, you will not commit their names in your enquiries.

“Still, however, I have so much confidence in the good sense of the people to hope the best; but I perfectly approve everything that can frighten John Bull out of his apathy.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 27 [Stowe].—“I am very sorry to find by your letter that all your hopes from Opposition have vanished, because it is clearly the strongest proof of the influence which Fox retains over

their minds, and which he will use to the worst purposes. I have no doubt, from my general confidence in Pitt and you, that you have offered all that could be given with credit to yourselves and with any hope of advantage to the public service, and, after that, there is no room for reproach to yourselves.

"My opinions upon certain regiments of militia were founded, as all such must be, upon very different degrees of information, chiefly originating in the accounts given me by my sergeants and soldiers at our last meeting, except with respect to the Duke of Norfolk, and the Nottingham. The Duke of Norfolk, talking in the House of Lords last winter in the presence of three or four militia officers about our 28 days' exercise, said he never could make it more than 18 days' real exercise, for that he was obliged to allow his men 5 or 6 days to join the regiment, and as many for their return home. Upon some astonishment being expressed, he said that he had so many manufacturers and Sheffield men in the corps that his regiment was upon a different footing from ours, and, therefore, that he was glad to keep all quiet by acquiescence. I thought no more about this till, many weeks afterwards, Scrope Bernard, talking with me about the militia, told me again this same story, which had (as I understood) been stated to him or his colleague in the Office by the Duke as a reason for applying to Government for an allowance for the journies, so as to leave the 28 days complete. Upon Captain Badcock's return from his mustering tour, I conversed with him upon these two corps, he having been at Nottingham and in Yorkshire, and I found him fully impressed with the same opinion as to the Duke of Norfolk's regiment; and, while I was in London for six days in June, I met an old music-master to my regiment whom I had discharged, and whom the Duke had taken, who confirmed to me the total want of control, *and the little books which many of them had got from Sheffield*. Of the Nottingham I had heard from a sergeant of mine that there was no control in the regiment, and that many of them had got from a club at Nottingham some of their major's writings, and I found that Captain Badcock had the same impressions given him on the spot. The Warwick I had heard from the same sort of information last spring, had had some of *the little books* given to them, and were very mutinous and disorderly at their last year meeting; they are just separated, and I have not heard of their conduct or appearance this year. Of the Westminster I heard more, because many of my soldiers had served in the regiment, and had mixed with them; and made the most extraordinary reports of their conduct, and of the materials of which the regiment was composed, both officers and men; the latter are *all of them* from the very refuse of London, the former not much better, and I was particularly told that some of the men had *little books* which they brought from London. I have been longer on this matter as you seemed to wish to know my grounds; they are, as you see, very different, but with respect to the Duke of Norfolk and the Nottingham they are very strong.

"I have had very little time to consider your militia idea, but the general principle is certainly sound and may be very useful; but I wish you to consider that, in case of any sudden call, we shall be obliged to discipline so many raw men (in all events one-third of our whole number) and, by your plan, so many raw companies, that our miserable peace allowance of 2 sergeants and 2 corporals per company is totally inadequate to it. This establishment was formed when the army was reduced to the same; since that time you have, from necessity, after the Dutch armament, added two sergeants to each regiment of infantry, and

not to us. Now I cannot help thinking that it deserves your attention to consider whether in the next pay bill, or in your volunteer company bill, you will not, as a temporary measure, give us that establishment now, which we are entitled to by law the very moment that we are embodied: namely, one sergeant and one corporal per company. You will remember that the whole number of companies amount to 496 or 499, I forget which; the estimate would be:

|  |   |   |                 |                   |
|--|---|---|-----------------|-------------------|
| 500 Sergeants at 1s. per diem              | - | - | 9125 <i>l</i> . |                   |
| Clothing 3 <i>l</i> . 10s. once in 2 years | - | - | 750 <i>l</i> .  |                   |
|  |   |   | <hr/>           | 9875 <i>l</i> .   |
| 500 Corporals at 8 <i>d</i> . per diem     | - | - | 6084 <i>l</i> . |                   |
| Clothing 2 <i>l</i> . once in 2 years      | - | - | 500 <i>l</i> .  |                   |
|  |   |   | <hr/>           | 6584 <i>l</i> .   |
|  |   |   |                 | <hr/>             |
|  |   |   |                 | 16,459 <i>l</i> . |

"Now, if you think the expense of this is too heavy, let me recommend to you the giving us the corporals; they cost no levy or bounty money, their pay is actually less than what you now give (with the new allowances) to the common soldier, their clothing is half the same expense, and their value to us would be inestimable if the mischief should actually take place. At present you must know that there are very great abuses in this part of the establishment, for I fear that the bands of music have in most corps drawn very much from what ought to be the actual right arm of the institution. I will, however, think all this over further, but I am very eager that you should consider this last idea of giving us our war corporals as soon as Parliament meets, together with the right of *quarters* instead of *lodging*."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, November 28, Hague.—"I have received the note subjoined from the Pensionary in time to forward it together with a copy of the *projet* which accompanied it. I should be glad to receive your Lordship's sentiments on the contents, though it is possible that the supposed incident may in the meantime take place and require a decision.

"With respect to the affair of the *Escout*, the conduct of France is offensive, and is certainly meant to be so; and the rights of the Republic are indisputable, and I think it a point likely to awaken the people to a just sense of injury. But I do not believe that the navigation contended for is a point of much real importance: the channel of the river has long been bad for navigation, and it is secretly supposed that the Republic could at any time totally spoil it.

"I hear from Paris that Beaumarchais, who is here, will become a victim in his fortunes to the Revolution to which his talents so much contributed. It is said that on some charge his house and papers are seized. I cannot pity him."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, November 29, Hague.—"I think it right to confide a private letter which I have received by this messenger from my brother. If he

had previously consulted me respecting the step which he desires to take, I should have recommended to him those sentiments of public duty which have led me during more than two years to bear much inconvenience with cheerfulness, and to suspend my earnest wish to be settled quietly at home.

"The truth is that he has evidently written in a moment of low spirits. He suffers under the sense of the encreasing calamities of the times. He is disgusted by the nullity of the Ministry at Berlin with which he is acting. He is tired of the sands and of the society of Berlin; but, above all, he is affected by the declining state of Lady Elizabeth's health, and by the ill-health of one of the children.

"I have no guess as to your Lordship's plan respecting the foreign missions. It is certainly to be wished that at such a moment they could all be efficiently filled and by persons resident in their stations. Besides, this is not a good time for giving new pensions, whatever may be the merit, or length of service. Sir Morton has the good sense and the candour to feel these truths, if stated to him. As to all this, however, as to the time of his having leave to come home, as to his having a successor, your Lordship will best decide. I am only solicitous for his sake to explain that he has no motive but that which he has fairly stated."

*Enclosure.*

SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, November 23, Berlin.—"Schaw did not reach this place till Wednesday afternoon. My public despatch will show the manner in which I have executed my orders. If M. de Torcy himself could have risen from the dead, and have taken charge of them, he could not have done more with the Prussian Ministers, for they know about as much, and have as much influence in public affairs as my boy. Messieurs Bischoffswerder, Haugwitz, and Lucchesini, with their female appendices, have the whole sway, and to a dismal state they have reduced the country, and even Europe, for to the former gentleman and his fellow-*illuminé* Leopold all the mischief must be ascribed.

"I have lost all relish for a public life, and have, from the considerations mentioned in my last, determined to retire. This messenger carries my resignation. I enclose you copies of my two letters to Lord Grenville on the occasion. I trust that the pension will be granted me; if not, I must confine my expenses and the education of my children to my means.

"I have written a few words to Mr. Straton to tell him, for I can tell him no more, that I have delivered the papers, and that the impulsion must come from Vienna.

"I know not what sentiments I should entertain relative to the step that we have taken. Heads so much wiser than mine have directed it, that I conclude it to be right. To reduce France I look upon as altogether impracticable; that the step may check the torrent I most devoutly wish rather than expect. I do (I think) right not to detain the messenger. The Princess of Orange had announced his arrival to Baron Reede. He is pleased with the declaration; how far may I entrust him with what is going on? Our communication has ever been so fair and open that I should be sorry to appear mysterious. I have told him, under injunctions of secrecy even to the Princess and the

Grand Pensionary, that, as a suite of the declaration, I was ordered to enquire what were the sentiments of His Prussian Majesty relative to the present unhappy crisis. Pray answer me on this point; I should understand you *à demi-mot*.

"I return you with many thanks your papers. I was obliged to read through to-day a copy of the treaty shewn me by Count Finck, to prove that I have it not in my possession.

"Now to the two great articles of information for this Government. You know my sentiments of the Ministers that compose it; and, of course, will conclude that it was an earnest desire to check the spirit of Jacobinism, not a particular confidence in them, that made me determine to impart the information, particularly *as I knew* that the late incendiary papers scattered here came from Hamburg. It was however to M. de Schulenburg alone that I communicated it, and under the most solemn injunctions that he should make use of it with the utmost discretion. He gave me hopes that B[roa's] papers may be got at; as to Embden, he said if the *bas fonds* and the fears of the maritime powers did not defend it, His Prussian Majesty could not. He however is aware of the triumph such an attack would be to the different zealots. I hope that you will not think that I have done wrong in this important business.

"On Wednesday, I translated for Count Schulenburg two English letters, dated October 15th, and signed by William Carmichael; the place from whence they were written is not mentioned. One of these letters was addressed to M. de Schulenburg, and says that the writer has stopped a conspiracy against the life of His Prussian Majesty, but that, if La Fayette be not released, the King of Prussia will soon fall by the hand of some friend of liberty. The other is to La Fayette; it was unsealed. The writer calls himself an American, and says that he and many of his countrymen are ready to risk their lives in his favour; and it finishes by inviting him to come over to America. If Carmichael really wrote the letters, M. de Schulenburg suspects that it? [he] was the emissary employed here during the American war; and, as the date is but barely sufficient for the letters to come from America, he has requested me to enquire in England and Holland what has become of him. (\*Note.—He is at Madrid.) I have written to Burgess to enquire in England, and beg that you would let any of your gentlemen do it in Holland.

"Elizabeth is very weak, though certainly not worse. She is happy with the idea of a pleasant country retirement, and more particularly with the thoughts of attending herself her poor little boy to England. He will be proud to be your godson, and to bear your name; but it never was my intention that it should be a tax on you. I shall follow Mr. Robinson's advice about him, and am very grateful for it."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, December 2 [Stowe].—"I have been in a constant exertion both of body and mind ever since I received your letter, to prepare myself to answer your call; and I am not quite sure that you are right in omitting to call out the counties in the immediate vicinity of London, and adjoining to the county of Middlesex; this would have added Surrey, Hertford, Berks, and Bucks to your list. Nor do I quite approve

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\* Interpolated by Lord Auckland.

of your circular letter (which I have answered) respecting the sergeants ; they ought *all* to be assembled immediately with a view of making them, as far as their number goes, assist the civil power, and with a view of keeping them ready to assemble the militia at a moment's warning if they are wanted. Pray reconsider this, for the order will not cost you one farthing, and will give you (including, however, the sergeants of the regiments now assembled) 2500 men ; and if we should unfortunately want the whole militia, a preparatory drill of six weeks to the sergeants, *et cetera*, will be very useful in bringing that body forward for service.

"The difference between *lodging* and *quarters* will be explained by referring to the 78th clause, where you will see that the sergeants are only entitled, *when the militia is not embodied, to convenient lodging*, which ought to be altered for very obvious reasons. In my answer I have purposely stated the orders given to my people to assist the civil power in the county, that you may consider how far it would be wise to *direct*, or, if you doubt that word, to *recommend* the same to other Lord Lieutenants.

"Some few days ago, from a jealousy of our good town of Olney, I took some pains to enquire into the state of it, and I am sorry to say that the accounts which I have received of it are very unpleasant, and the absolute want of magistrates in that town and neighbourhood, which is separated almost entirely from the rest of the county, makes it difficult to know what to do. My accounts of the towns and the farmers at large are still very favourable.

"Colonel Fremantle (who must not be quoted) tells me that the two adjutants of the 3rd Guards (who must not be quoted) told him that some hint ought to be given to Major-General Grinfield, now commanding (during General Guydicken's suspension) the 3rd Guards, not to persevere in a most brutal and oppressive plan of discipline, which he has taken up precisely at the period when the Dukes of Gloucester and York have laid down all the little superfluous martinetism which had discontented the 1st and the Coldstream regiments last spring ; that General Grinfield's severities and very *unprecedented* martinetism had discontented the whole regiment, officers, sergeants, and men, to a very unpleasant degree. Freemantle says that the Duke of Argyll or the Duke of Norfolk are the only people who can hint this to him. I do not know what you can do, but the fact stands upon very certain authority.

"I am very glad that the Tower is secured, for I own I did not like the state of it under the accustomed system of the guard stationed in it. Box gives me a most satisfactory account of the dispositions of the merchants and traders in London, and says that he is confident that in the City any attempt at a rising would be instantly crushed. You say nothing of any further negotiation with Lord Loughborough ; I therefore conclude that it is at an end, and I collect from the style of my brother Tom's last letter to me that he thought you were not exerting yourselves enough. Last night's *Gazette* may comfort him, but he seems very thoroughly alarmed.

"I am delighted with your dismissal of Lord Sempill and Lord E. FitzGerald. I hope that it has been done in the manner the most marked, for I understand that, in the Guards, some of the younger officers have held the most improper language ; Dr. Warren's son particularly, who has been checked by the order of the Prince of Wales, to whom he is equerry, but that he perseveres.

"Before I determine upon my motions I must hear again from you

whether you proceed to business on Thursday; for, as Pitt must be re-elected, it had occurred to me that the King's Speech might advert to the very short period as a reason for delaying for a few days the notification of 'causes and reasons'; and, by this means, Pitt might be re-elected in time for the debate; you will therefore be so good as to let me know this in two lines, that I may make my arrangements accordingly. I am not sure whether I shall bring up my family or not, and you probably are very little able to judge whether we shall sit through the Christmas holidays, as I earnestly wish we may, so as to get through our business with as little delay as possible before the season for exertion recommences; for although much must happen 'of all sorts' during the winter, I have no faith in any negotiation with France; and consequently I look to some new experiment in making a government (an operation which in these days does not seem to require quite so long an apprenticeship as the science of making a joint-stool) and to some internal ferment which may induce them to leave Europe quiet. Their finances, as far as it is possible to speculate, seem to promise them full employment; and yet at no time were the orders from France for English commodities so brisk, or the payments so regular, for our people are usually paid beforehand. Box tells me that 400,000 pair of woollen stockings have been sent into the French and Austrian Netherlands in the last month; 25,000 pair of blankets were contracted for last week; soldiers' cloth has been long since bought up to such a degree that, when he conversed at the sealing-board for army clothing with the other clothiers, they all agreed that there was not soldiers' cloth in London sufficient for one thousand men."

*Postscript.*—"I am not quite sure that the number called out is sufficient to give the impression of perfect security; and, if so, one great part of your aim is missed, and the impression upon the funds is equal whether you had called out more or less."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private and Secret.

1792, December 2, Whitehall.—"I find myself under very considerable difficulties with respect to the communication which you made me on the subject of the private negotiation begun by the Grand Pensionary. The scrupulous attention which I feel to be due to engagements of secrecy has prevented my making any communication of those papers except where the Grand Pensionary knew they were to be communicated. But in discussing the measures and probabilities of this anxious moment, I cannot well continue to limit the confidence so far, although I am very unwilling to commit names where such consequences might follow from indiscretion. What I therefore wish is that you would send an official and public communication of the fact of such negotiation having been set on foot with persons of weight and influence, without naming them; as this would enable me to let the fact be known where it ought (that is, by all my colleagues) without, at the same time, incurring any risk to individuals."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1792, December 3, Hague.—"I shall have occasion to write again to-morrow or Wednesday by Dressing. In the meantime I have only



to add to my very voluminous despatches that the negotiation which I lately mentioned remains in the same suspicious and doubtful circumstances. I entertain the worst opinion possible of the person employed and have therefore been deaf to an intimation conveyed to me through the Pensionary of a wish to have a conference with me; and I shall continue so till the return at least of the person sent to Paris, which is expected in three or four days. He continues to call on the Pensionary, and affects to be communicative; but it is impossible to trust him. When, however, he asked some time ago if English ships were coming to these ports, he certainly meant to convey an intimation that there might be an occasion for them. He has since asked if, in the approaching frosts, it is easy to march over many of the flooded districts and rivers; this also is intelligible. He has received a letter from Le Brun, who affects to lament the military successes as dangerous to the Republican spirit and to liberty.

"The loyalty and right-headedness of our countrymen will have more effect in France than anything; but I have not a doubt that they mean to prepare fleets and to try their strength at sea; and I incline to think that that an ostensible small squadron would do no harm on our part, both at home and abroad; but better judgments will decide. We ought perhaps to have three or four frigates ready in the event of any attack being made in Zealand."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, December 3, Windsor.—"The account stated to me by the note I have received this morning from Lord Grenville, that the departure of Mr. Long for Paris has been deferred from a conversation Mr. Pitt has had with a French agent, who supposes that some private communication will be made here similar to the object of Mr. Long's journey, is most satisfactory; it keeps the staff in our hands instead of [in] a degree placing it in their hands; I mean Mr. Pitt's prudence will make him with temper hear the proposal, and not open himself so as to give them an handle to say we would have gone farther lengths than on the negotiation failing (which it probably must) would be desirable. The intercepted letters that accompany this convince me that the French are hardy enough to attempt opening the Scheld, which we can never allow."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private and Secret.

1792, December 4, Whitehall.—"My eyes and hands are both so much tired that I am obliged to send you these few lines in another handwriting than my own. The tenour of my despatch will sufficiently shew to you that I think the Pensionary's draft goes a great deal too far in its expressions of a disposition to recognize the present French Government, under all the circumstances of insult and offence of which the Republic has to complain. It is clear to me that the French rely, in the present moment, on their intrigues in the interior of both countries, and that they imagine they have brought us to a condition of inability to resist any demands which they may make. This is above all others a reason for firmness in the present moment, and for resisting, while the power of resistance is yet in our hands. For, the success of their unfounded claims would not only give rise to new pretensions, but would

give them additional influence to support them. I hope the Republic has as little to fear by land, as, I am confident, she has by sea. I have not expressed in my despatch all the security which we feel respecting the comparative state of our preparations with those of France, because it is unwise, in a public paper, so to commit oneself. But to you privately I may say, that our confidence on that head is very great indeed. The spirit of the country seems rising, though there still prevails an apparent dread of the events which all the new circumstances of the present moment may bring forward. But every hour's exertion gives vigour to people's minds, which were dispirited while nothing was apparently done; and I trust that the meeting of Parliament, on which all depends, will be very satisfactory."

*Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, December 8 [Stowe].—"As my attendance here may be more useful than my appearance at your meeting of Wednesday night, I shall hardly be in town till Thursday morning. I am very sanguine, from the silence of the National Convention as late as the 3rd December, that nothing has been done towards the Scheld; and, if so, the weather must, I think, clearly force Dumourier's army and his co-operating forces to set still. I cannot say how impatient I am to hear and to see on Thursday; and how delighted I am with the spirit which is so universally spreading. Our Buckingham association meets to-morrow, and I shall suggest the same at Aylesbury and elsewhere. I have been constantly engaged in the different details which are thrown upon me, but the season of the year hinders the circulation of the orders and warrants as I could wish. You should (for this is not in Sir G. Yonge's Department) decide what should be done with the remaining one-third of the arms which will be left in every county town by the march of the militia whenever they are ordered to move; the number is, as you see, too considerable to be abandoned to the chance of a mob in every county, and, yet, they ought to be ready in case the other third is to be called out; and the expense and trouble of moving them to the King's armories, and of bringing them back if they are wanted, will be very great. I would recommend an order to the Lord-Lieutenants that, whenever the militia move from the towns where the arms are deposited, they carefully take off and carry with the regiment the locks and bayonets of the muskets which they leave behind. This will at least make them useless to a mob, and will leave them in a complete state of service for their real destination if they are wanted."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792, December, Stowe].—"I can suggest very little to you, except the necessity of directing specifically that only the two-thirds usually drilled shall be called out, for the embodying the *whole* would add most enormously to the expense, and not to the real strength. Immediate care should be taken to supply us with powder and ball for our sergeants, and to order clothing, for you know that the clothing voted for the militia is not either of the quality or quantity given to the army, and the men must be instantly new clothed as they were when embodied last war; you must therefore direct the necessary letters to go

(I think from the Pay Office) to inform the Colonels that, as soon as their agents are appointed, they may draw for the sums. You know that this is indispensable to prevent the very unpleasant consequences of meeting men who are [likely] to mutiny at such a period, if they are differently treated from what they have been.

"You will observe, by clause 63 of the Act, that when the militia is drawn out, an addition shall be made of 1 sergeant, 1 corporal to every 20 men, and of 1 drummer per company. I mention this that you may be aware of it, because, even if you embody only the two-thirds, I hold it absolutely necessary that we should be prepared by these most essential of our implements to drill the whole number or additional volunteer companies on the shortest notice; but if you embody only the two-thirds as I earnestly recommend (22,000 rank and file) it will be necessary to explain this matter in your letter. I have stated that, by calling out the whole, you will add to the expense of the guinea, the clothing, and the subsistence which you must issue, and not to your real strength; for the bulk of the third not drilled are really not forthcoming, and therefore must be immediately balloted all over England, which will totally ruin your recruiting service for the army."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1792, December 8, Hague.—"I send an ostensible *confidential* letter with my despatches of the kind which you wish: the person alluded to is the secretary of our other negotiator (M. de Maulde). His principal has desired to send him to arrange some details; and the Pensionary means explicitly to offer him a provision for life if he will disclose all the particulars of the conspiracies which have been going forwards here, and which we suspect to have extended not only to the patriots and mob, but to the military and to the dockyards.

"I hope that in the Speech sufficient stress will be laid on religion: it never was more necessary to bring it home to men's minds.

"I shall be curious to see the war of eloquence which will now take place between the Parliament and the Convention.

"What can be done with all these crowds of French in England: are there no means of sending some ship loads to the islands which are in a state of *contre-revolution*? It will be dangerous to keep them.

"We are here at the height of our crisis; but I have hopes that it will end well. The English example and weight have saved us; and if the French movement can be stopped, I think that the whole machine will sink into nothingness and derision."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Confidential.

1792, December 10, Hague.—"I annex a line to say that it rests entirely in your judgment how far, and to whom, you will communicate the enclosed. I incline to think that it tends to nothing but an increase of the means of secret intelligence, and to disconcert the patriots here. In other respects the business is grown too great for the grasp even of Dumourier. I think it likely to slip out of his hands; and I see no means of pacification but in the total convulsion of France.

"I have this day drawn on Drummond for 640*l.* for the enclosed transaction, and other extra disbursements of a similar nature. It

would be a convenience to me if your Lordship would direct 1000*l.* to be paid to my name at Drummond's, either by Mr. Goddard or by Mr. Rose. I certainly shall make no disbursements in this line beyond what are necessary, nor any that I think you will not approve; and I am not without hopes that the present crisis and my mission may be at an end without carrying me beyond the sum above mentioned.

"I am subjected to extra-expenses of various kinds by the present circumstances, as well as by my unexpected detention here; but I am perfectly content to bear them, and even to sacrifice a part of my constitution and life in the hope of concurring with you in bringing order out of the present desolation."

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, December 10, Elton.—"As you wished, when I saw you in town, to receive accounts of the manner in which the late measures of Government were received by different descriptions of men, and as I promised to transmit whatever I could collect upon that head, I shall give you a short journal of what has passed since I came into the country. I set out on Thursday morning, after writing to all the persons in the hundred, whose influence I thought might be of service, and to whom I had not yet applied, in order to confer with Powys upon the measures to be taken in that part of Northamptonshire which is in our neighbourhood. I found him at Oundle in his way to me, and I learned from him that a declaration of attachment and determination to support the Government had been already circulated at Kettering, the only place in this neighbourhood supposed to be disaffected, and cheerfully signed by all the householders, three excepted. Mr. Walcot, a gentleman of Oundle much beloved, and whose zeal on all occasions merits the thanks of Government, then came in with a paper signed by every inhabitant of Oundle, and by all the farmers and yeomanry of the neighbourhood who happened then to be in the town, and who all declared themselves willing and ready, with purse and with arms, to support their country; and in going round to the different clubs the night before (clubs formed by the lower ranks for the purpose of assisting such of their members as are disabled by sickness) though he was not expected, he found they had already taken up the business among themselves, and were eager to testify their loyalty. In this hundred all that I have seen, and all that I have heard of, are in the same dispositions. I have met with three or four who are timid, but I know them to be as well affected as myself. I asked Powys what he had observed as to the opinion of people upon the proclamations, which I thought must appear strange to those who, living at a distance from all disturbances, were ignorant of any necessity upon which they were founded. He said he had heard but one voice upon the subject, and that of approbation; that the country had been long alarmed, and long expecting some vigorous measures from Government. I have heard from Lord Exeter, who says the country is much obliged to Administration; but there is a party, though a very small one, of Foxites among my constituents, who ridicule the proclamations, and some who talk of Parliamentary reform. I was rather surprised the other day, in talking with a very sensible farmer in this neighbourhood, from whom I had desired to know what grievances were complained of among his class, to hear the privilege of franking mentioned. I do not know what additional revenue might be obtained by abolishing it, but if it would in any considerable degree facilitate the taking off or diminishing the taxes on leather, soap, and candles, which are all that

are felt by the poor, I am sure it would be worth thinking of. I would also, if I dared, propose the taking away the personal freedom from arrests of members of Parliament, which is an odious distinction, and I am sure very much lessens instead of establishing the dignity of both Houses. As I know I can be of no service but by using the utmost freedom in giving you any opinion of mine, I cannot conclude without saying that, after considering maturely what we talked of on the subject of treasons, I think there would be danger in extending the penalties of treason to attempts against the Parliament as well as against the Crown; notwithstanding the manifest absurdity of making, in a free government, the natural guardian of the public liberty less sacred than the natural object of their jealousy, and notwithstanding the popularity with which, in better times, arguments upon that ground would have been attended.

"I have not heard of any association yet formed at Peterborough, though it has been talked of. However, I know the town to be well disposed, and two or three tradesmen having shewn a factious disposition, a great part of the town determined to withdraw their custom, which produced a most humble supplication, upon promise of future good behaviour, for forgiveness. I shall meet a good many of the yeomanry of this hundred at Hilton on Wednesday in my way to town, and though I mean at present to go no farther than an enrolment of names, and the appointment of a Committee, I have not the least doubt that, whenever occasion requires, a good body of cavalry, armed and well mounted at their own expense, may be formed without difficulty. The sentiments of every parish in the hundred have been already collected separately. The magistrates in the adjacent parts of Northamptonshire had taken measures (Powys and Walcot at their head) for circulating by people of their own rank the same form of association among the yeomanry as has been signed already at Oundle and Kettering. I have been too much taken up with my own hundred to learn particulars, but have no doubt of the success."

#### BARON KUTZLEBEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, December 11, London.—"A young man whose name is Morque, a most violent democrat and Jacobin, has been here something more than two months, and very often with Madame d'Eon he expressed himself there in the manner how happy he should be to bring about a revolution here similar to that in France; he had not the least doubt that it would be effected. After this conversation he mentioned that he expected his brother here from Paris. The person answered him, *Mais votre frere est aristocrate. Quoi, répondit-il, j'ai toujours un poignard dans ma poche. Si mon frere ou mon pere étoient aristocrates, je les poignarderais dans l'instant.* As this young man aims to be in time Minister here, or, if not, he had expressed that if M. Sémonville (who at this present time was in Corsica to settle some disturbances broken out there) would be chosen by the Convention to be the Minister here, as it had been promised to him, he, M. Morque, had likewise a promise to be his Secretary; as these two people and their sentiments might be very dangerous, I think it my duty your Lordship should be acquainted with the above.

"Morque has been very often to Paris, and I was informed yesterday that since these very loyal associations have been formed, and the sentiments for this glorious constitution have been so unanimously expressed and known, he went over to Paris immediately again (but is

not come back yet), probably to acquaint the Republican leaders what has passed here. As to Madame d'Eon, she encourages all the most violent democrats, as likewise the aristocrats if no democrats are present. Her sentiments are, *je me range du côté des plus forts*. I told the person who informed me about Morque that I was very curious to know of what party in reality Madame d'Eon was, as I always had thought her to be of the ancient system. She promised me to find it out, and dined with her on Sunday, where a M. André, a member of the first National Assembly, had been present, as likewise a Mademoiselle Bertin, a great favourite with the Queen of France and the Princesse de Lamballe. She took an opportunity to say, *Permettez-moi, Madame d'Eon, de vous dire que si vous allez à l'armée de Dumourier que c'est à vous et dans votre pouvoir de rendre votre nom immortel. À comment? c'est de persuader, de convaincre de la justice, et même d'obliger Dumourier (lequel est haï de la Convention qui se méfie de lui) de mettre le Roi de France sur son trône (ou en cas que ce Prince malheureux n'existoit plus) de mettre un de Bourbon sur le trône de France; Dumourier gagneroit la charge de Connétable de France. Madame d'Eon répondit, je n'ai pas besoin de dire mes sentimens; mais si je serai à l'armée de Dumourier, vous entendrez parler de moi, et le monde s'en étonnera*. All this may be French gasconades, but as there happens so many strange and extraordinary things in this times, I would not fail to acquaint you with this."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1792, December 13, Hague.—"The enclosed notes make parts of a transaction already sufficiently explained. We shall make good use of the person who signs the note to Mr. Craufurd. I send that note because, in sums of any magnitude, I think it right that receipts should be given however secret the business may be in its nature. I have a daily detail of other small expenses of the same description, and I probably shall have some farther small sums to pay to Joubert for particular informations which he can furnish, and for a journey to Brussels and perhaps to Liege; but the whole will come within a very reasonable limit.

"Pursuant to your Lordship's letter on this subject, I have thought it right to throw the result of this communication into the official channel; but I entreat your Lordship to possess yourself immediately of my confidential despatches of this date, and to keep them in your possession after such a communication as you may think right.

"If by any turn of affairs M. de Maulde should recover any material influence, your Lordship will of course approve of our obtaining the use of it at any reasonable expense. I understand that he affects to know nothing of the sum given to Joubert; but professes to give his assistance from a just horror of the Convention, and a desire to promote peace."

#### Enclosure 1.

JAMES CRAUFURD to LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, December 12, Rotterdam.—"Having been called upon to-day for the money you wrote to me about, I enclose you a receipt for it. I also enclose you a paper I received to-day intended for you, the writer of which appears both by it, and by the conversation I had with him, to

be very sanguine with respect to his plan, the probable success of which you will be the best judge of. I have only to observe upon it, that whatever communications upon the subject may pass through me will be kept inviolably secret, as well as every other matter that requires it."

A receipt, in French, for 5,125 florins, signed G. de Joubert, annexed:

*Enclosure 2.*

VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

[1792] Decembre 13 [Hague].—"J'ai vu Maulde un instant ce soir, mais il me venoit du monde, et comme il préféreroit à n'être pas trouvé avec moi, il s'en est allé. Il avoit envoyé son secrétaire à Dumourier pour le prévenir de son arrivée prochaine, et il attendoit cet homme demain, ou après demain, de retour; après quoi il se mettroit en route Samedi matin, à moins que nous ne jugeons nécessaire qu'il partît plutôt.

"Il me paroît craindre la présence des Commissaires de la Convention actuellement à Bruxelles; ou bien, il veut voir l'issue des affaires de Dumourier avec ces Messieurs, car il compte le Général aussi bien perdu que lui-même.

"Je lui demandois s'il avoit des nouvelles du procès du Roi, outre ce que nous avons vu dans les papiers publics; et non seulement a-t-il confirmé ces horribles desseins, mais il a ajouté que peut-être le monarque n'existe plus.

"Il est arrivé hier un exprès à Amsterdam apportant que l'armée de Custine est battue à platte couture, et que des bataillons entiers sont chassés dans le Rhin; aussi ce peuple qui sembloit sortir de dessous terre, pourroit bien s'en retourner par eau.

"Le discours de Robespierre dans le *Moniteur* fera époque dans l'histoire des méchancetés de l'espèce humaine. Conservez cette feuille."

*French.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1792, December 14, Hague.—"It was lately confided to me by the Portuguese *Ministre* that Madame de Balbi (who is residing here with a considerable suite of ladies under the pretext of proceeding to England) had opened to him a wish on the part of *Monsieur* (*frère du Roi très Chrétien*) to pass some months at the Court of Lisbon. It was a part of the plan to pass some weeks in London and to embark at Falmouth. *Monieur d'Arango* answered by my suggestion, that it was impossible for him to give any encouragement or facility to such an idea without previously consulting his Court; that, considering the high and marked situation of *Monsieur* as the standard of resort to all the emigrants, he did not believe that the States-General would permit his coming to the Hague, or that the English Ambassador would, in any shape, authorize his embarking for England; and, finally, that if he were arrived at Falmouth, and embarked there, his person might be exposed to risks in passing the Bay of Biscay; that he might fall into the hands of his countrymen. The lady seems to persist in the project: *M. d'Arango* expects to be authorized to offer money on condition only that it shall be renounced.

"These crowds of *émigrés* add greatly to the uncomfortable circumstances of the time. They are, and will be, a severe tax in every sense

on those who knew many of them in the prosperous days of France; and, though many of the individuals, and, still more, many of the families now wandering from place to place, are objects highly worthy both of respect and of compassion, it must be allowed that, in general, the levity and dangerous talents of the nation have not been corrected in the school of misfortune. Besides, in the crowds who are come, there are many who are detached and paid by the Jacobin leaders to do mischief, and to prepare and promote revolutions. That mad incendiary, St. Huruge, was a few days ago at Rotterdam, in which town there are said to be near 1,500 *émigrés*. Beaumarchais lately went from this place to England, where, though proscribed by his countrymen, he will do all possible mischief to us. There are others of the same description of exiles who are highly dangerous, and are now said to be in London; such as Messieurs de Bailly, de Chapellier, de Liancourt, de Narbonne, de Noailles; and, in addition to these, there are 200 or 300 emissaries from the *Propagande*, with allowances to live in taverns, coffee-houses, and ale-houses, and to promote disorder. These considerations have induced me lately to say to many of the emigrants that, however ungenerous it may sound, I foresee that it will become necessary to turn them out of London, and, possibly, a great proportion of them out of England.

"The Empress of Russia has sent a small supply of money to the Comte d'Artois, and has negatived the journey to Petersburg.

"You will never find time to read what I write, and yet I find it a duty to write so much as I have lately done. Luckily for me my constitution and health, which were deranged, seem to be re-established.

"There is not much in the enclosed letters except that they come from a banking-house employed by the *Conseil Exécutif*."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, December 15, Hague.—"The enclosed will explain itself. I think it right to confide it without reserve, both from affection to its writer and from regard to the public service, from which I shall be sorry to [see] him retire at present."

#### Enclosure.

#### SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, December 8, Berlin.—"You cannot doubt of my unfeigned regard and attachment, and perfect deference for your opinion; I am consequently distressed that the very important step which I have taken does not seem to meet with your entire approbation. *Mais le vin est versé, and il faut le boire, jusqu'à la lie même si on ne refuse la pension.* I was urged to it from various circumstances; from the gloomy prospect of public affairs, from my unpleasant situation here, and above all, from Elizabeth's weak state of health, which, notwithstanding her efforts to conceal it, is such that any exertion in public is always attended with great fatigue. This, of course, in this line of life is of all circumstances the most irksome.

"As to myself, having since the age of manhood lived abroad, my habits are become so foreign that, exclusive of the pleasure of sometimes seeing you and my Lambeth friends were I settled in England, I certainly should prefer Vienna with the advanced appointments to a country village. As to the not having preferably asked a leave of



absence, I avoided it purposely and from the most honourable motives, thinking it fairer to resign at once than to go home and enjoy the appointments for a length of time though previously determined never to return to my post. From a desire likewise of accommodating Government, I did not specify the time of my quitting, wishing to leave that entirely to Lord Grenville. Such are the motives that actuated me, and, of course, I wait with no small impatience for Lord Grenville's answer. If a pension be granted me I shall be very happy, and Elizabeth still more so; if my resignation be accepted without a pension, I shall be sorry for myself, my family, and some old servants who have a just claim on me. In this case I shall retire to Switzerland. If a leave of absence be proposed to me, I will accept it, and, in the spring, I will carry her to Spa or Prymont and the sea; but in this latter case I will respectfully urge my removal to Vienna or Madrid.

"On public affairs I can only add my groans to yours. If the French persevere in their mad and unjust attack on Holland, we must, I conclude, inevitably be drawn into the war; for, without such a determination, the Declaration of the 16th may be classed with the Duke's Manifesto and the Austrian Proclamation. As what we do is merely in support of a treaty approved of by all parties, I trust that the chiefs of Opposition will concur with His Majesty's Ministers, particularly as the late Decrees of the French Assembly are a declaration of war against all civil society, and certainly their—both of honours and wealth is great. I fear Mr. Fox, as I have heard that his sentiments are more favourable to the French and Democracy. If we can make it a popular war, France must rue the forcing us into it."

#### THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, December 17, Bath.—"I cannot resist the pleasure of wishing you joy of the manner in which you acquitted yourself on the day of the meeting of Parliament. I have heard the same opinion from every body that you surpassed anything you have yet done; so I hope you will begin to be satisfied. A letter which was read to me from one of your audience mentioned your speech in the very highest terms.

"I begin to recover my strength and spirits; if no new attack should interrupt my progress, I hope to be able to come to town next week."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1792, December 18, Whitehall.—"I have taken the necessary steps for issuing 1000*l.* to Goddard for your use; but you have long enough been used to the way of doing business in the Offices here not to be surprised if some delay intervenes. I have not written to your brother yet, because in truth I hardly find moments for anything, and I should not like to write hastily. The giving him a pension now is, I believe, most entirely out of the question, and I should on many accounts be sorry at his retiring, particularly at such a crisis as the present.

"Nothing can exceed the good dispositions of this country in the present moment. The change within the last three weeks is little less than miraculous. God grant that it may last long enough to enable us to act with that vigour which can alone preserve us. If this disposition flags, and the country relapses into indifference or fear, we shall still be

municipalized ; but if we can maintain the present spirit, it will enable us to talk to France in the tone which British Ministers ought to use under such circumstances as the present, and to crush the seditious disposition here. Everything now depends on vigorous preparations in Holland, and even what cannot be done in fact should be done in appearance. If things come to extremities, the land forces of the Republic will, as it seems to me, be most miserably deficient, and it is the part in which we can least help her. I should be sorry that the whole reliance should be on Prussia."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Confidential.

1792, December 25, Hague.—"As my private ostensible letter of this date relates to points which may essentially affect the interests of this Republic, I thought proper to confide the perusal of it to the Grand Pensionary, more especially as we had conversed yesterday on the idea suggested in the first paragraph. I enclose his answer.

"Joubert's explanation of De Maulde's intercepted letters is perhaps true. Orders are given to imprison closely M. Michault and the others who wrote from Amsterdam. With respect to Tainville and De Maulde it is meant carefully to re-seal their letters and to return them to them. It is possible that we may be able to make good use of the latter of those gentlemen."

*Enclosure.*

VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

[1792] December 25 [Hague].—"Joubert . m'a conté qu'on venoit d'arrêter un jeune homme, porteur de plusieurs lettres à Dumourier ; entre autres une de Du Maulde ; que celui-ci en avoit ri de tout son coeur, parce que cette lettre étoit faite à la requisition de Du Maulde, afin d'avoir quelque chose en mains pour prouver la patriotisme de Du Maulde. Au reste, il m'a dit savoir pour certain que le Roi seroit exécuté demain, et que tous les ci-devants devront être expulsés de la France ; enfin qu'il savoit aussi, à n'en point douter, que ce Pays seroit attaqué dans un mois d'ici, malgré les grands armemens de l'Angleterre, et que Maulde avoit fait une dernière tentative pour parer le coup dans une dépêche à Le Brun, qu'il me feroit lire."

*French.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1792, December 19-31, Downing Street].—"Lord Guildford, Lord Lauderdale, Lord Lansdown, opposed the 3rd reading of the Bill. Lord Hawkesbury made a very good short speech ; Lord Carlisle a very fair and explicit one, not only in support of the Bill, but on general grounds ; and Lord Loughborough made one of the best speeches I ever heard, which concluded with a decided declaration of *full support* in the strongest terms we could wish. Lord Carlisle, Lord Bute, Lord Malmesbury seemed by their manner to concur to the full extent. The Duke of Portland said nothing and looked embarrassed. Lord Rawdon said a few words only to declare himself in favour of the Bill, and disposed to

give support to Government, but in terms that seemed to be against his inclination.

"Of course there was no division. I look on the day to be a very important and useful one. We have had no notice yet of a Cabinet to-morrow. Pray fix it for twelve. If your cold is not better you should have it at your house : I will return your drafts presently."

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL GOWER.

1792, December 26, St. James's Square.—"There seems so little prospect of our having soon again an Ambassador at Paris that I feel it would, on many accounts, be wrong any longer to continue the name and appearance of any one having that function and character. At the same time, considering the manner in which you left Paris, and the expense to which you must have been subjected on that account, I have not thought it right to propose to His Majesty to determine your appointment till the end of this quarter, nor to do it at all without previously apprising you of it. You will, I am persuaded, feel with me the propriety and necessity of the step, and will, I hope, believe my sincere assurances of the pleasure I have always received from the manner in which our correspondence has uniformly been carried on."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, December 29, Whitehall.—"I send you the report of the officer to whom I allude in my despatch. It is sufficiently circumstantial to enable you to know with certainty what the fact really is as to the points he mentions. There is no objection to your making any use of it, concealing his name. Whatever the question may be as to the policy of putting off the war, if it were in our power, surely we see enough to be sensible that it may come upon us every day, and that it is very little likely to be long delayed. I am very uneasy about the Republic, from the impression I have received of its want of preparation; especially when I see the time which preparation requires even here, where we are in the habit of it. With respect to our frigates sent to Flushing, I may say to you, in confidence, that we cannot press so effectually as we ought till they return, and that a press may become absolutely necessary within ten days or a fortnight. The overture from Russia appears to me a very important event, and one which may, well improved, lead to the happiest consequences. I have time only to add one point, to which it is necessary for me to advert in this very private manner. From *some means of information* I suspect that it enters into the head of some of the Dutch Ministers that England can be made the principal in this war, and Holland the ally, furnishing her contingent, and *carrying on her commerce* with France. The extravagance of such an idea can only be equalled by its want of all good faith. You will, of course, not hint that you have any such suspicion, but you will endeavour soon and explicitly to bring it to its point. The Government here could not stand the reproach of such duplicity; and if there is such an idea, the sooner we wash our hands of it the better; and Holland will then last as a country about three weeks more."

"You will send Whitworth's despatches under flying seal to your brother. I have not written yet any answer to Sir Morton's private letter, and, in truth, hardly know what to write."

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1793, January 1, Whitehall.—“As so many circumstances seem to point at the great probability of things being speedily brought to a crisis with France, it seems extremely desirable that the Dutch Government should come to some determination which they may formally communicate to His Majesty's Ministers (either for advice, or simply as a notification) respecting the line which they mean to follow on the subject of the Scheld.

“I have already in my public despatches intimated the opinion of this Government that further infraction or violation of the rights and territory of the Republic ought not to be permitted; but the precise mode and time of bringing forward a question which, in the first instance at least, concerns the Republic most directly, should, as you will easily see, be suggested from thence and not originate here.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private and secret.

1793, January 1st, Whitehall.—“I have received information on which I can rely that Abbé Noel sets out this evening for Holland, and that his object is to press forward the execution of the revolutionary schemes in that country.

“We have some idea of laying before a secret committee of the two Houses (very small in number) some particulars of the designs which have been in agitation here, enough to enable them without reporting particular facts, and still less names or papers (names indeed they need not know) to say that they are satisfied that such plans have been in agitation. Could you supply us with anything that might tend to the same object? It might be very useful in the view of embarking the nation heartily in the support of a war, if unavoidable.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and most secret.

1793, January 2, Hague.—“I shall mention a circumstance in this letter which I hope will never go farther than to Mr. Pitt. You will find in the enclosed note a paragraph beginning with ‘*Hogguer de Petersbourg.*’ Hogguer positively writes that D'Osterman in the earnestness of conversation said that the Empress had ‘directed Woronzow to require her friends in Parliament to support the question of the war.’ The Pensionary combines that circumstance with the remarkable *revivement* of two speakers after the three first days of the session, and with the time when the dispatch to Woronzow arrived in London. This idea opens a suspicion too degrading and too bad to be adopted; but it may merit farther attention.

“*Monsieur (frère du Roi très Chrétien)* talks now of applying to the King for a frigate to escort him to England; I presume that I shall do right in declining as far as I decently can to transmit an application.

“I feel very positive that neither the Dutch Ministers nor indeed any of the leading people in the States here ever entertained the most distant speculation of furnishing a contingent in the case of a war and carrying on commerce. They are fully sensible that these Provinces would be the great object of attack; and, in truth, as far as their crippled means go, honourably and zealously disposed.”

*Enclosure.*

VAN DE SPIEGEL to LORD AUCKLAND.

1792, December 31.—“Hogguer de Petersbourg me manda par une voye sure, les propositions que la Russie avoit résolu de faire en Angleterre et (si elles y étoient accueillies) en Hollande. Il m'assure aussi que l'Impératrice avoit faire insinuer à ses partisans dans l'Opposition chez vous, de ne pas gêner les opérations du Ministère au cas qu'elles tendassent à la guerre.”

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1793, January 2, Whitehall.—“Lord Grenville humbly begs leave to mention to your Majesty, that your Majesty's servants have thought that it may be particularly advantageous, in the present circumstances, that Sir James Murray should proceed to the Prussian Army, with a commission to negotiate with the Minister of His Prussian Majesty there such points as are connected with the late despatches. As the time presses for this purpose, Sir James Murray will, with your Majesty's permission, have the honour of taking leave this day and tomorrow.”

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 2, Queen's House.—“The King of Prussia being still with the army and, however accounts seem to suppose he will go to Berlin, yet it appears more probable that he will remain with his troops; I therefore approve of Sir James Murray being sent to him, as it may give us a more explicit information as to the line of conduct he means to adopt.”

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

*Private.*

1793, January 5, Whitehall.—“I received this morning your private letter. The circumstance there mentioned is curious, but I believe the *revivement* of which you speak may be sufficiently accounted for by considerations of domestic politics.

“The other paragraph of your letter gave me much satisfaction, but we are awkwardly situated about the Scheld till we hear something officially and formally from the Republic upon the subject.

“I mentioned some time ago the request that the Dutch Ministers would transmit to us any intelligence they have of the state of the French navy at the different ports; not having received any answer, I conclude they have none, or none worth sending. If they have any it would be useful to compare it with ours. It would also be desirable to know the amount of any force, naval or military, which the Republic have in the West Indies. If the war goes on, our East India fleets must sail under joint convoys.”

*Copy.*

## CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, January 5, St. Petersburg.—“I avail myself of a private opportunity of troubling your Lordship with a few lines upon a subject which I am persuaded will be more indifferent to the character whom it chiefly concerns than to me, who am happy to have such an opportunity of professing my most sincere attachment to him, as well as to perceive that those prejudices which have been so long and so unjustly entertained here, begin to give way to sentiments more worthy of him who is the object of them. The opinion of the Empress on the subject of Mr. Fox seems, in consequence of the part he has taken in Parliament relative to French affairs, to have totally changed. The remark she made upon reading one of that gentleman's late speeches was, *voilà un beau lustre se gâté*; and she added that she should be obliged to imitate the National Convention, however much she despised it, in covering with a veil that which now served only to reproach her with a misplaced predilection. I had myself an opportunity of paying my respects to Her Imperial Majesty two days ago, when she told me in the most gracious manner that she could not sufficiently admire the wise and steady conduct of Mr. Pitt, to which was principally to be attributed the favourable turn which affairs had taken in England. I replied that nothing upon earth could give me more pleasure than to find Her Imperial Majesty in such sentiments, and that I already promised myself from them the most salutary effects to both countries.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792 [1793] January 6, Hague.—“At the particular desire of the Baron de Grovestein, who will be presented to your Lordship by M. de Nagel, I give him these few lines. He is appointed to the Government of Demarary. He is a member of the States General of these Provinces. Circumstances have obliged us to detain here the frigate appointed to convey him. He goes through England therefore. Your Lordship will find him very intelligent and particularly informed as to all matters respecting the West Indies; and sensible of the advantage of giving useful information, and of contributing to the common cause.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 8, Windsor.—“Lord Grenville would not have acted with his usual propriety had he delayed returning the extraordinary memorial of Monsieur Chauvelin as inadmissible, he taking the title of Minister Plenipotentiary which, on the receipt of the former one, he had been clearly told he had no claim to.

“I approve of Mr. Drake being appointed Resident at Venice.

“As I find Lord and Lady Grenville are invited to a ball here on Thursday evening, I am desirous at this season of the year that Lady Grenville should not run any risk of catching cold. I have, therefore, directed a well-aired apartment to be prepared for them in Windsor Castle.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, January 11, Hague.—“I hope that you will have been satisfied with the answer given on the part of the States General by the Greffier to my note; it certainly speaks out. There is no objection to the printing a translation of it, together with a proper extract of mine; I have reason even to believe that the Dutch Ministers would be glad to see those papers come to Holland in our newspapers. We gain ground here in the great points of heartening the well-disposed, and of intimidating the factious; but we are still obliged to proceed *en tatonnant*. We are trying to arrive at something like a declaration to all the world of the system, principles, and firmness of this Republic. It would be highly important if we could do this with the cordial approbation of the leading people; but in such matters, though evidently right, there are difficulties in this interior beyond what I think it necessary or expedient to display in my despatches. And though we are slow, we generally arrive at the just point at last.

“It is a severe piece of duty for Lord St. Helens, but I am glad to hear that he is returning to Spain; a Minister of weight may do much there. I might make the same remark as to Portugal. The means of the latter country are diminutive enough; but if we arrive at war, it might not be difficult perhaps to induce Portugal to concur with us, or at least to shut her ports against French vessels. I do not know whether a strange minute printed by the Spanish *Chargé d'affaires* at Paris has fallen into your Lordship's hands; it came to me under a blank cover; and I inadvertently gave it to the Baron de Breteuil, who put it into his pocket book with the following remark: *Diable! mais ces Messieurs sont très fiers de leur poltronnerie*. The minute states that the declaration of neutrality and disarmament are independent of the representation on behalf of the King, which is to be considered as unconditional.”

“I enclose a note from the Princess of Orange on your Lordship's answer to M. de Chauvelin. Our language, conduct, and preparations make a great impression in Europe, both in rousing the right spirit of other nations, and in lowering the tone of the *Convention Nationale*. I heartily wish however (though I do not say it) that we may be able to avoid the war; and it is still probable that we may be able to gain all our points most creditably without the expense and risks of a war.

“It is the wish of Count de Starhemberg to have M. de Stadion removed to Madrid or to some other Court, in order to be himself appointed to London. He has no attachment to Germany, having been educated in France; and he wishes to settle with his family in England with the advantages of the foreign mission. I think him likely enough under the influence of his father to succeed in this speculation, and I mention it because it may explain some circumstances. I believe in other respects that it would be a good change; he is well disposed.

*Postscript*.—“It is possible that the war may become inevitable, or at least clearly expedient, and yet that the time of commencing it may in some degree depend on us. If such a predicament should take place I think it highly eligible, so far as the safety of this Republic is in question, to postpone the explosion till the Austrian and Prussian reinforcements are advanced to this side of the Rhine, and till the fermentations in Brabant are more ripened. In the meantime this Republic would be better prepared, probably as to the disposition of the

interior, but certainly as to naval and military preparations, than she is at present. I open my letter to submit this remark, which I believe merits a very serious attention in the case supposed."

*Enclosing* a short note from the Princess of Orange to Lord Auckland.

#### SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, January 15, Berlin.—*In cipher*. "Your Lordship's letter of the fourth reached me yesterday. I fully feel that this is no longer a moment for gentlemen to think of retiring from their posts, and readily and gratefully accept your Lordship's kind offer. Vienna, indeed, has ever been the object of my wishes, and nothing but the consideration mentioned to your Lordship could have made me for a moment renounce the hope of attaining it. If the change of climate, the approaching spring, or the use of some mineral waters removes that objection, I shall have no other wish than to justify your Lordship's recommendation, and to evince my gratitude. One thing alone is wanting to render my satisfaction complete; that is, the certainty of enjoying the same appointments as Sir Robert Keith. The Court of Vienna is expensive. My removal hither has cost me considerably, and will make the expense of my new establishment fall heavier on me. But I will say nothing further on the subject, relying most implicitly on your Lordship's protection in this, as well as in every other point. I will, therefore, only add that, immediately on the receipt of your Lordship's commands, I will make myself ready to set out for Vienna."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1793, January 15, Whitehall.—"There can now be no impropriety in your contriving that my answer to M. Chauvelin should be inserted in the foreign papers, but it would not be right as yet to publish his reply. I had given directions for publishing the Greffier's letter to you, but upon reconsidering that paper, I am afraid the publication would do more harm than good here. It is, I doubt not, adapted to the present temper of the Republic, but the expressions of still hoping to preserve peace by adhering to neutrality would be construed here to exclude all measures to be taken on the general view of affairs, and for the object of restraining the progress of French arms and French principles, even though we should not be the immediate objects of attack.

"In truth the Republic ought to convince herself of the impossibility of our acquiescing in all that has happened, with no better security against its recurring than a tacit disavowal, or even an express assurance. By the very messenger which brought Chauvelin's last humble paper, a sort of confidential despatch was sent to be communicated to us through a private agent. We disliked the mode of intercourse, and have stopped it for the future. But it gave us then the previous knowledge of the substance and tone of Chauvelin's communication. And in this despatch (unquestionably authentic) it is expressly said that if England perseveres in expecting too much from France, the latter will attack her where she is vulnerable, namely, in Holland. The general language of our opponents here is that after having engaged ourselves so far for the Republic, she will leave us in the lurch. I know the principles of the



Dutch Ministers too well to have the least alarm respecting their intentions or conduct, but it is of the utmost importance to give a just impression in the Republic at large of the danger to which she would inevitably be exposed from smothering again, without extinguishing, the fire which had so nearly consumed all the countries in Europe, if a barrier had not been found here to its progress.

"If we were to desist now without providing some effectual security for the future I would not answer for raising again here the same spirit which has enabled us to act so effectually. You will know, and so do the Dutch Ministers, my personal and sincere abhorrence of war where it can be avoided. But I am satisfied that nothing but vigorous and extensive and systematic measures can save us now. If we are compelled to engage in them without the ostensible support of the Republic, I should still have no doubt of our success, but the attachment to a Dutch alliance in this country would be wholly destroyed. I write this without reserve, and in too much haste to be very careful about particular expressions. You will see that the communication which is to be made of my answer to Chauvelin's last paper is intended fairly to try our ground in Holland, and to see what can be done. Whatever can, I am persuaded will be done."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1793, January 15, Hague.—"You will see in my despatch of this date that I have found myself under the necessity of writing more explicitly than ever to the Prince of Orange, relative to the lameness of the Admiralty exertions. The result is that he has taken fright; and wishing to throw the responsibility off his own shoulders, he has required the Admiralties, who are all assembled here, to state with precision what they will undertake to do in different early periods. I will drive this matter as fast as I can with due temper and propriety.

"The Polish incident is vexatious. It will however exempt us possibly from some delicacies towards the Imperial Courts and His Prussian Majesty in the mode of concluding our share in these disturbances."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1792 [1793], January 19, Hague.—"The enclosed copy of a despatch from Madrid may be worth your Lordship's perusal, but I have not thought it proper to be transmitted otherwise than in a private letter.

"I am curious to know whether the Princess of Orange is in her brother's confidence respecting the French affairs. I passed near an hour this morning with her; but Lady Auckland was with me, and no political subject was mentioned. She has written to the Pensionary, who is still indisposed, that she has many matters of importance to confide to him.

"The Duke of Buccleugh and Mr. R. Dundas arrived here to-day. Lord Boringdon and Lord Granville Leveson, who have been sometime with us, proceed towards Dresden in three or four days."

*Enclosure.*

Secret.

Substance d'une dépêche datée Madrid, le 21 Mars, 1792.—“ On a attribué le changement survenu en dernier lieu dans la Ministère . . au système suivi par le Comte de Florida Blanca, relativement aux affaires de France, et à sa conduite politique à cet égard. Cependant il étoit probable . que le Ministre, n'ayant pas fait un pas sans l'aveu de leurs Majestés, n'a pu être disgracié par cette raison. On s'est seulement servi de ce prétexte pour déguiser aux yeux du Roi, qui aimoit le Ministre, les vraies causes du mécontentement qu'on avoit contre lui. Voici quelles sont ces véritables causes. Depuis la mort du feu Roi on a taché de culbuter ce Ministre; plusieurs fois sa chute a été prochaine; mais sa sagacité a toujours déjoué les intrigues qui se formoient contre lui, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin elles ont acquis un tel degré de force qu'il y a succombé. La vraie cause est, que n'étant pas assez dévoué au Sieur Godoi, et ne le ménageant assez, il déplaisoit par là à la Reine, qui prétendoit avoir tous les emplois, et l'administration entière de finances à sa disposition. Le Comte de Florida Blanca la contrarioit sans cesse dans son projet; et les affaires intérieures du Royaume, que la Reine vouloit diriger avec un pouvoir absolu, se traitant dans la *Junta de Estado* présidé par le Ministre, échappoient dans le fait à sa surveillance. La haine s'accrût encore par l'opposition du Ministre au don excessif projeté depuis long-tems, et qui vient de se réaliser en faveur de Sieur Godoi. On a vu, sous la ministère du Comte de Florida Blanca, l'amant s'élever du grade de simple garde du corps au commandement suprême, mais ces promotions ne s'étendoient pas au civil, parcequ' il falloit pour cela des biens fonds que la Reine étoit prête à lui donner, mais qui devant être aliénés des domaines royaux, étoient regardés avec raison par le Comte de Florida Blanca comme restant sujets aux réclamations du fixe, de manière que leur cession seroit nulle, et pourroit exciter des murmures dangereux, en tant qu'elle impliqueroit une violation des loix fondamentales du Royaume. . La chute du Comte de Florida Blanca fut résolue. On trouva le prétexte dans sa conduite relativement aux affaires de France, et surtout, dans sa négociation avec l'Angleterre, au sujet de Nootka Sound. Les matériaux nécessaires pour le premier de ces deux chefs d'accusation avoient été rassemblés par certain *Marquis de Valle de St. Jean*, qui aura pour recompense l'ambassade de France. Ils ont été fournis par le Chargé d'Affaires de France . qui, pour venger sa nation de l'extrême animosité du Comte de Florida Blanca, avoit communiqué . à ce confident du Favori les manéges, secrets et détournés du Ministre, ses projets d'invasion, et ses menaces imprudentes contre la nation Française. Quant à la seconde accusation, il suffisoit de représenter la convention conclue avec l'Angleterre sous son véritable point de vue. L'on découvre d'ailleurs dans tout le cours de cette négociation un Ministre qui veut se rendre nécessaire, quoique ce soit la Reine qui a voulu, à tout prix, la paix, pour ne pas se voir privée de ses ressources. Pour rendre le tableau encore plus frappant, on s'est bien servi avec succès de l'agitation intérieure, et du manque d'argent, de credit, de défiance, et de troupes. . Le Roi, qui est le meilleur monarque de la terre, et qui est toujours de l'avis de la Reine, trouva aussi que des raisons d'état exigeoient qu'on renvoyât un pareil Ministre. Il applaudit au choix du Comte d'Aranda, sans s'apercevoir que ce seigneur qui, regardé comme un Argus, étoit aussi peu du gout de la Reine que l'autre, n'avoit été choisi que pour imposer silence aux mécontents, au moyen de l'estime publique dont il jouit. La popularité,

la stricte probité, et la grande reputation du Comte d'Aranda ayant beintot fait oublier la Comte de Florida Blanca . on pensera beintot à un autre, et son age avancé y contribuera. Pour attendre . le but qu'on avoit en vue, il falloit supprimer la *Junta d'Estado* . . On crea le conseil d'état, et on plaça le lieu de ses séances dans les appartemens de la Reine et de son amant. Il n'y a que deux bonnes têtes dans ce conseil, le Comte d'Aranda, et le Sieur Campomanes ; les autres opinent du bonnet, mais les membres actifs sont derrière la toile. La Reine, l'Amant, et les deux confesseurs gouvernent avec un pouvoir absolu . Le Ministre des Finances, crée par l'ex-Ministre pour etre un machine, l'est encore ; et passe la journée à monter et à descendre l'escalier du palais, pour recevoir les ordres qui émanent à chaque instant, et qui sont concertés et arrêtés par les quatre personnes ci-dessus nommées."

*Copy. French.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 20 [Stowe].—"Do not think me inattentive, that I have not acknowledged the very frequent letters which you have written to me ; but you whose time is so fully occupied upon important objects, hardly know how to make sufficient allowances for those whose time is as fully employed upon subjects wholly unimportant. I will not describe to you the satisfaction I have felt at the universal testimony borne to the paper delivered by you to Chauvelin. The style, the argument, and the language will certainly place it very high in the catalogue of State Papers, and, if it wanted a foil, the answer to it by Le Brun must gratify you to your heart's content, as well as the second production of Chauvelin on the 7th, respecting the Bill *then pending* in Parliament. If I could have been tempted to differ from you upon any point of your answer, it would have been upon the menaced appeal to the English nation, which I rather think is not treated as forcibly as it might, particularly as you were avowedly fencing for advantages in a contest which (I know) you thought inevitable, nor is any notice taken of the indecent omission of the King's name in Chauvelin's paper on every occasion where it ought to have been inserted. The war seems now as fairly brought home to the comprehension of every one as any thing of the kind can be ; and is certainly not objected to ; at the same time I understand that our commercial people are afraid that the Dunkirk and Channel privateers will be manned very much by smugglers and banditti from England, who will attempt the same game as that in which they succeeded last war, from the laudable anxiety of Lord Sandwich not to hang an American seaman. This I trust will be very particularly attended to in the very *first* instance, for it is most material. I am likewise very anxious that you should raise in Ireland (by Irish vote) 4 battalions of Catholics to serve as marines ; the field officers will be jobs for the principal Catholics, and they may have temporary rank only, and cannot serve on board ; the captains and companies to be embarked, and recruiting parties left in Ireland with the staff. I am confident they would be completed in six weeks, and, as the nature of their service will not require them to be perfectly drilled in the marching and manœuvres, they might be trained to the use of their arms in about one month. I believe I have once before proposed this idea to you ; if you wish it upon paper I will give it in detail.

"I am delighted at Lord Loughborough's decision, which of course includes Lord Carlisle, *cum multis aliis*. Pitt knows, of course, and I

repeat for fear of mistakes, that I stand in the way of no one arrangement for office whatsoever. At the same time, if I could forget for a moment that you was Minister, I could wish to converse with you *very coolly* upon some ideas which have kindled a spark or two from embers which I have endeavoured to smother, and which, in truth, are almost dead.

"As to the Prince of Wales, I sincerely condole with any Ministry whom he may join, though I think it essential that the whole Royal family should appear united at this moment; and, if he keeps his noisy banditti in order, we shall at least have the comfort of withdrawing from Mr. Fox some of the most desperate and dangerous of his mob-leaders. You do not say in your letter what day is fixed for real business, and therefore I am under the necessity of troubling you to write exactly the one word, by the return of the post, that can enable me to fix my arrangements for leaving Stowe."

"I cannot understand why, with the majority in their hands, the Jacobins have deferred the King's sentence, unless for some object with Spain, which I rather suspect from Le Brun's ostentatious reference (in his answer to your paper) to the conduct of that power. How goes on the communication so unexpectedly made to you while I was last in London?"

#### LOD AUCKLAND to LOD GREENVILLE.

Private.

1793, January 21, Hague.—"I perfectly conceive that in the near approach and prospect of war, the return of our whole squadron from Flushing may have been advisable and even urgent. My late letters and the copies of what I have written to Commodore Murray will have shewn to your Lordship that I had not even a wish to keep more (though strongly solicited by the Prince) than one frigate and one or two sloops, merely to give some little encouragement and emulation, to mark our communion of interest; and chiefly indeed to shew to the French that the *Escout* remained shut by us in concert with our allies. Possibly it may be consistent with the general service to let another frigate or two very soon pay us a visit; in the meantime I have communicated the recall to the Pensionary, who answers somewhat dryly, *Tous les raisonnements de Votre Excellence et du Ministère tournent sur la probabilité (malheureusement grande) que dans le cas d'une guerre la Republique sera le premier objet d'attaque; et en même tems, vous retirerez d'ici tous les bâtimens de guerre Anglois qui sont en Zelande; en effet, il auroit mieux valu qu'ils n'y eussent pas été du tout.*

"With respect to your Lordship's negotiation with Chauvelin, if we can maintain our vantage ground, and the right disposition of England, I conceive it to be of most essential importance to drag it on for three or four or five weeks more at least; every hour is an age in the violent state of the French; and some great explosion may be expected to happen in their interior from day to day. In the meantime their overwhelming expense continues; our preparations, and peculiarly those of this country go forwards; but above all things the armies on the Rhine come towards the Meuse, and we gain the means of covering these Provinces completely. I conceive this to be of great importance.

"My brother has communicated to me, with a due sense of gratitude and attachment, your Lordship's goodness to him, and his answer which

seems [to] be proper and becoming. I am sure that he will do well at Vienna, and that he will be favourably received there; and I conceive that the more immediately he goes the better; as we are likely to have most interesting negotiations with the Austrian Ministers. His own fortune is about 12 or 1300*l.* a year; and Sir Robert Keith will tell your Lordship that he will be obliged to expend the whole of it at Vienna, in addition to Sir Robert Keith's appointments."

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1793, January 22, Whitehall.—"I am almost tired of harping on the same string of urging the Dutch Government to energy and exertion, but it is your duty and mine which we must not neglect. I have no doubt that if the war takes place, Dumourier's plan will be adopted, and that some attempt will be made against the Republic. The only real obstacles which can be opposed to him, independent of what the Republic can do by her own exertions, are the arrival of the Austrian and Prussian armies on the different parts of the Rhine, which nothing that we can do will hasten, and the raising difficulties in the interior of the Netherlands, which may alarm the French for their communications. From what you state, and also from other information which I receive, I am inclined to hope that it would not be impossible to bring the Austrian Government and the *Vandernoolistes* to a complete good understanding, and to co-operate in a plan for expelling the French."

"The Governors General having already in the Emperor's name offered the *joyeuse entrée in toto*, no further difficulty occurs on this subject.

"Ought not the Dutch Government to make an immediate and formal application to the King of Prussia that, in case of alarm, his troops collecting at Wesel and the neighbourhood may march to protect the Republic. If any such step is taken, you will of course write to Sir James Murray, whose instructions already authorise him to support such an application."

*Copy.*

NECKER, BARONNE STAËL DE HOLSTEIN, to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 22, Juniper Hall, Leatherhead.—"L'horreur qu'inspire la France dans le plus atroce moment de l'histoire des hommes ne m'a pas permis de rester sur cette terre à jamais déshonorée, et sans pouvoir attendre l'arrivée de M. de Stael je me suis hâtée de chercher un asyle dans ce pays glorieuse, dont les vertus seuls font encore croire aux bienfaits de la vraie liberté. Le caractère diplomatique dont M. de Stael est revêtu me fait un devoir de vous prévenir de mon séjour dans la retraite de Juniper Hall. J'ai besoin de ce motif pour triompher de la peine que j'éprouve à parler de moi dans une époque ou l'on est si affligée de vivre, qu'il en coûte de se nommer."

*French.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 23, Downing Street.—"I rather think you ought to propose to the King to put off the Drawing Room, and to have a

council at the Queen's House for the purpose of making the order for Chauvelin's departure. The King told me yesterday he would be ready to have the Council whenever the news came. Your idea about the communication of the note, and the Bill in consequence, seems quite right. If you bring the note with you to dinner, we may settle the Bill with the lawyers to-day.

"Dundas and I are to be with the Prince of Wales at two. Perhaps this will be a reason for proposing the council between three and four."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 24, Queen's House.—"I have received Lord Grenville's note enclosing that from the post-office at Dover confirming the shocking account but too certain from the news arrived yesterday. I trust the Privy Council will be ready immediately after the Drawing Room this day for giving the necessary order that Monsieur Chauvelin may instantly leave the kingdom."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1793, January 24, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty a further account from Paris, though it contains scarcely anything more than what Your Majesty has seen.

"Lord Grenville takes the liberty to add that Mr. Pitt and himself upon further consideration think that it would be right, if Your Majesty sees no objection to it, that the Drawing Room of to-day should be put off.

"Lord Grenville also requests to be honoured with Your Majesty's commands respecting the Council to be held for Your Majesty's approving the order to M. Chauvelin to depart the kingdom. Lord Grenville hopes Your Majesty will excuse his presuming to mention that His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has appointed Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas to attend His Royal Highness at two. But if Your Majesty should be pleased to fix that time for the Council, they will of course apprise His Royal Highness of it."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 24, Queen's House.—"I have sent orders to St. James's that there will be no Drawing Room. I think the Privy Council cannot be held too soon here concerning Monsieur Chauvelin, and therefore desire Lord Grenville will assemble it here as soon as convenient after two. A note from Mr. Pitt or Mr. Dundas to the Prince of Wales may acquaint him that they will wait on him as soon as they leave me this day."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

*Private.*

1793, January 24, Whitehall.—"The business is now brought to its crisis, and I imagine that the next despatch to you, or, the next but one, will announce the commencement of hostilities. Probably the French

will commence them; but if not, after all lines of communication are interrupted of necessity, and after all hope of satisfactory explanation is over, I do not see how we can remain any longer *les bras croisés*, with a great force ready for action, that force avowedly meant against France, and the language and conduct of that power giving every day more instead of less ground of offence to us and all the world.

"This last horrible act of unnecessary cruelty and outrage on all men's feelings will have its effect. I cannot describe to you the universal indignation it has excited here, but you may collect it, amongst other circumstances, from the audience at one of the playhouses stopping the play, and ordering the curtain to be dropped, as soon as the news was announced to them."

*Copy.*

#### CABINET MINUTE.

1793, January 25.

##### PRESENT :

Lord Privy Seal.  
Duke of Richmond.  
Earl of Chatham.  
Lord Amherst.  
Mr. Pitt.  
Mr. Dundas.  
Lord Grenville.

"It is agreed to submit to His Majesty that it may be expedient;

"To authorise Lord St. Helens to express the King's readiness to discuss with the Court of Madrid the means of establishing a permanent system of alliance with Spain, including in it the consideration of the commercial intercourse between the two countries.

"But, to obviate the delay which must arise in such a discussion, Lord St. Helens should be directed to propose a preliminary agreement applicable to the present object.

"In such an agreement it should be mentioned that the circumstances are such as to induce Great Britain and Spain to establish a concert to prevent the progress of French arms and principles. That if, in the course of such a concert, either party should be engaged in war, both parties agree to make common cause, and not to make peace until France shall have restored any conquests which she may have made on either party in the course of the war."

*Draft.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1793, January 25, Whitehall.—"Having this day had occasion to sign another bill of Mr. Baldwin's, I cannot help repeating to you that a yearly expense of near 2,000*l.* is incurred on his account from the Civil List, without any service being done for it, as far as I can judge, in this Office.

"If his residence is really advantageous to the East India Company, of which you are the best judge, surely they ought to pay the expense of it.

"I would not, however, take any step upon it without your concurrence."

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, January 25, Hague. — "Though I am overwhelmed with assurances very flattering to the contents and style of the *mémoire* which I presented to-day (probably because it was in unison with the sentiments of horror and indignation which now fill every honest man's mind) I must say it in perfect sincerity that I should have been better pleased if a *projet* had been sent to me ready drawn by your Lordship. Your French State papers are so much superior to what we have hitherto seen, that both the Dutch Minister and I now take the pen in that line with diffidence and anxiety. As to the effect of the *mémoire*, I continue to think that His Majesty will ultimately have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of these Provinces; but they certainly are in great danger, unless they receive a present and efficient support.

"I communicated to-night to the Pensionary your Lordship's despatch No. 11, and its enclosure. He answers in the following words: *Les nouvelles que Votre Excellence vient de me communiquer sont allarmantes mais pas effrayantes; au reste nous comptons avec assurance sur un prompt secours de troupes Angloises, sans quoi je ne vois pas jour de faire une bonne défense contre ces hordes affamées qui viendront ravager le pays.*

"If English troops should come, I see no objection to a regiment being employed at the Hague, and another at Amsterdam, in order to enable a part of the Dutch garrison at those places to move towards the frontier; but they would have the best effect in one corps under an able commander, which is much wanted here."

*Postscript.*—"Baron de Hoggner's extract enclosed in my despatch contains some curious circumstances from Petersburg. I am almost tempted to suspect that the Empress is playing a mere game with [us], though I make no doubt that we shall ultimately have her assistance as well as that of the King of Spain. Alopæus having expressed many doubts at Berlin whether Woronzow was authorized to make the overture to your Lordship, M. de Kalitcheff has assured me that the despatch from Comte Osterman passed through his hands under flying seal, and went to the full extent."

## LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 26, Dover Street.—"I send you my *brouillon*, which I flatter myself you will find conformable to the paper that you were so good as to enclose to me last night, excepting in what relates to the pointing our joint measures *directly* against France. Perhaps, on reconsidering the subject, you may be disposed to think that a positive stipulation to that effect is not wholly necessary; at least it appears to me, after repeated trials, to be extremely difficult to draw one up, so as to meet the ideas of the two parties; or even to *name* the actual French Government without giving it some appellation which would be either too honourable for its members to wear, or too coarse for His Majesty to use. I shall be at the Office presently to wait your Lordship's commands, and shall return thither at any rate in the evening."

## [CHARLES MAURICE DE] TALLEYRAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 28, Juniper Hall, Leatherhead.—"Voici ce que j'apprends dans le moment, et dont je pense qu'il est utile que vous



soyez informé. Depuis le crime commis en France Paris est dans l'abattement, et conserve le calme qu'il doit à cette disposition des esprits. Le Conseil Exécutif, effrayé de sa responsabilité, n'ose qu'obéir à la Convention; la Convention n'est point considérée par le peuple à qui aussi elle a obéi, et obéi pour commettre un crime. M. Dumourier s'est tenu à l'écart pendant tous ces derniers tems, et il vient de reparaitre sur la scène. C'est vers lui que tous les partis se portent pour demander leur salut. Le Conseil Exécutif lui montre la plus grande déférence. Paris ne voudroit point la guerre, et sait très bien que la guerre sera générale, ou que la paix sera générale. M. Dumourier est dans cette opinion, et son vœu est pour la paix. C'est là l'état des choses à Paris. Voici maintenant une chose plus secrète et que je sais d'une manière positive. M. Dumourier a proposé au Conseil Exécutif un plan de pacification générale; ce plan a été fort goûté du Conseil Exécutif; et il a été arrêté mercredi que M. Dumourier viendrait le proposer au Ministère Anglois; mais M. Dumourier n'a point voulu venir avant de savoir comment il seroit traité et reçu par le Gouvernement, et pour cela le Conseil Exécutif envoie ici le même M. Maret qui y est venu il y a environ un mois, et doit arriver à Londres dans deux ou trois jours. Voilà ce que je sais positivement. Je suis à la campagne, et je compte y rester encore quelques jours. Tout ce qui avait le cœur François a besoin de solitude. Si cependant vous aviez besoin de quelques détails de plus, je rapprocherais le moment de mon retour, et je me rendrais à vos ordres le jour que vous m'indiquerez. Ce n'est point par le Gouvernement provisoire de France que je suis instruit de ce que j'ai l'honneur de vous mander, je n'ai pas avec lui la plus légère relation, et je n'en aurai pas jusqu'à ce que les sentimens de la nature aient repris leurs droits dans notre malheureux pays."

*French.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Most secret.*

1793, January 29, Hague.—"I stated three questions in one of my letters. 1. Shall we adhere to a decided war at all risks and decline all conference? 2. Shall we keep our decision some time longer in suspense, and try to direct for a certain interval the conduct of the war so as to avert it from our ally and not yet commence it ourselves? 3. Shall we commence it; but nevertheless try to avert it for the present from our ally? I could add some others. 4. Shall we postpone the commencement and try to gain possession of a powerful *médiation armée*? 5. Shall we, without forming any opinion or decision, merely seek to gain possession of all that may be wished to be communicated to us; with a delay merely sufficient for a resolution to be taken afterwards?"

*Enclosing*; a memorandum of the Grand Pensionary proposing, in the interests of the United Provinces, a postponement for six months of hostilities between France and England, in order that a general peace may be negotiated on the basis of the non-intervention of any European nation in the internal affairs of any other.

#### LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 30, Dover Street.—"On examining the Spanish paper which we talked over yesterday, I find that, though satisfactory as far

as it goes, it neither contains, nor professes to contain, a regular answer to Mr. Jackson's memorial of the 29th December, but is merely the *annonce* of such an answer, which is promised to be sent as soon as the Duke de la Alcudia shall have been apprized of the effect of the steps in favour of the Most Christian King, which His Catholic Majesty had caused to be taken at Paris. It seems to me therefore that your Lordship's intended reply to it had much better be deferred till after the receipt of this further communication, and that, in the meantime, it would be sufficient in order to keep up the correspondence, together with the present good dispositions of the Spanish Cabinet, if, on my arrival at Coruña, I were to write a letter to the Duke de la Alcudia to the following effect :

*"That the paper which he had delivered to Mr. Jackson on the 1st of January, in His Catholic Majesty's name, had been laid before His Majesty, who was highly sensible of this mark of His Catholic Majesty's confidence, and of his disposition to concur with His Majesty in establishing between the two Crowns that close correspondence and intimate union so essential to their joint interests, and to those of Europe in general. That His Catholic Majesty will have seen a proof of the King's desire to contribute as much as possible on his side to the keeping up this happy intelligence, in the communications which he had caused to be made, successively, to the Court of Madrid of everything that had passed in the late discussions with France; and that I have now to inform him (the Duke de la Alcudia) farther, by His Majesty's command, that he has ordered Monsieur Chauvelin to withdraw himself from this kingdom in consequence of the atrocious act recently perpetrated at Paris; and has, moreover, formally notified to his Parliament his intention of making a farther augmentation of his forces by sea and land in order to maintain the security and rights of his own dominions, to support his allies, and to oppose those views of aggrandizement and ambition on the part of France. . (in the terms of message). Finally—That His Majesty cannot entertain the slightest doubt, now that the above-mentioned atrocious deed has actually been perpetrated, that His Catholic Majesty will be fully disposed to enter into that concert of measures respecting France which was proposed by Mr. Jackson's Memorial of the 29th December, and that the farther reply to that paper, announced in the Duke de la Alcudia's office [official letter] of the 1st January will contain a notification to that effect; and that, in this persuasion, His Majesty has caused me to be furnished with instructions and powers authorizing me to establish such a concert of measures by a formal act, to be concluded with that expedition which the critical and urgent situation renders so indispensably requisite.*

"This letter, if sent from Coruña immediately on my arrival, would reach Madrid seven or eight days before me, and, consequently, be of use (besides keeping up the ball) in putting into trim the business I shall have to negotiate.

"As I presume that your Lordship cannot have the papers in question entirely in your recollection, I enclose them herewith. I have compared the translation of the Spanish one with the original, and find it perfectly correct. I have no engagement for any part of this day or evening, if your Lordship should wish to see me; or, if you should prefer seeing or writing to me to-morrow, I can put off my journey without the slightest inconvenience."

## LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and most secret.

1793, February 1, Hague.—“If it is to be my fate to have a conference with Dumourier, I intend that either the Pensionary, or the Greffier, or M. de Brantzer (formerly Ambassador for the patriots at Paris, but a man of talents and fair intentions) shall accompany me. It will not prevent my seeing Dumourier separately if he has any personal communication to make to me, and it will be useful in other points of view.

“I enclose receipts for the two sums which I paid this week to Joubert and to his principal. I think that I sent to your Lordship a voucher for 500*l.*, which I paid on a former occasion.

“I have already requested your Lordship to order a second 1,000*l.* to be advanced to my account. If these transactions go forward it is impossible for me to foresee to what extent we may be expected to go. I can only promise not to consent to any material amount, except for advantages previously secured and far beyond an equivalent.

“Mr. Elliot has received a report at Berlin that your Lordship destines him to be Secretary of Embassy here. In that case I should wish to give him every aid in my power, and hope that he will come soon; for I need not mention to your Lordship that I watch with anxious impatience for some interval of calm, when I may step out of this bustle into entire retreat and quiet. Nothing would cross such a plan more than the having the congress, to which our measures seem to tend, at the Hague. But I am sure that it should be rigorously insisted on to be here and not at Coblenz, for many obvious reasons.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1793, February 3, Whitehall.—“My expectations are not sanguine from Dumourier’s proposal, and indeed I have some doubt whether it would have been thought right to accede to it under all circumstances if it had not been for the advantage which a week or two may give to Holland. But for God’s sake let them avail themselves of it to the utmost, for there is surely very little hope that it can last longer. I think it is much the most likely explanation of Dumourier’s idea in making the overture, that he has been told it would embarrass us here, and that by gaining time the spirit of this country might be successfully worked upon. Hitherto there is no appearance of this, but one cannot answer what time and industry may do.

“The facility of assertion which prevails among all those now employed by France gives them much advantage in all *verbal* communications, especially with our extreme delicacy in not disclosing (with whatever provocation) things which we have engaged to keep secret. It is certainly superfluous to put you on your guard on that subject, and yet I cannot forbear doing it, because a man ought to have Parliament quite present to his mind to feel the full force of all that might be said on this subject.”

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and confidential.

1793, February 5, Hague.—“De Maulde continues to assert that his friend will do everything that can be suggested to effectuate the general

objects mentioned in his letter, or that he will perish in the attempt. He continues also to repeat that some most secret and important communications are to be made. I form no opinions as to the result; I have seen enough of the world to be diffident. Besides, I begin to think that if instructions arrive for the conference they will arrive too late; and even after their arrival the place of meeting and other preliminaries may cause insuperable difficulties. In the meantime he is managing the patience of his friend as well as he can, and with that view he sent a servant to him last night. The general profession continues to be that the services to be rendered to us, to their own country, and to the world shall be such as to entitle them to an honourable retreat, at least equivalent to what I have suggested in a former letter.

"Hopes are also *most secretly* intimated that whatever may be the immediate result of the overture, means may be found not to press this country dangerously or materially. I alluded to something of this kind during a former crisis early in December.

"The consternation here has been less than I should have expected; the Grand Pensionary and I have thought it right to say to everybody (even to the Prince) that the attack is certain, and in despite of all fair promises I think it probable.

"If, however, we arrived unexpectedly and honourably at a limited truce, the measure next to be brought into view would be a general congress under our armed mediation.

"I think it fair and friendly to Lord Robert Fitzgerald to disclose a confidence which he has made to me. Three or four days ago his *valet de chambre* brought a letter to me from Berne, written in vexation and agony of spirit. He had received your Lordship's despatches to himself and Mr. Trevor. He had worked all night and had not been able to decipher one syllable. I suppose that they were in the new cipher which has never been explained to him. I thought it best to send him a deciphered copy, giving a most strict charge to the servant to pursue a road separate from all possibility of his being taken. Lord Robert desired me not to mention this; I think it best you should know it."

#### GEORGE III to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, February 9, Windsor.—"The confirmation of the step taken by the faction that governs in France of jointly declaring war against this kingdom and the Dutch Republic is highly agreeable to me, as the mode adopted seems well calculated to rouse such a spirit in this country that I trust will curb the insolence of those despots, and be a means of restoring some degree of order to that unprincipled country, whose aim at present is to destroy the foundations of every civilized state."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, February 12, Hague.—"The activity of Dumourier's movements is such, and his situation subjects him to so many calls, that De Maulde may probably not have found him at *Anvers*. If, however, he has been found there, we shall receive an answer as to the conference to-morrow or on the next day. Our yachts are ready, but though I have strong private reasons to believe that Dumourier wishes the meeting to take place, I doubt whether he can risk the jealousy which it would occasion

among his troops; perhaps also he may not choose to venture himself within Dutch territory.

"The Duc de Berwick was here lately, and talked much about the *régiment de Berwic*, and received here the news of its being *congedié*; since which many of the people are gone to Ireland with passes from me at his desire; and I believe that the others are dispersed."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, February 14, Hague.—"Though I have no doubt that it was right to send back all our ships from *Vlissingue*, and though I can easily understand that it would be difficult and inexpedient for us to furnish even one or two English battalions, I ought not to conceal from you that it is a subject of doleful complaint to our friends, and of malignant triumph to our adversaries in this country, to say and to write that in this moment of extreme crisis, England leaves the Republic without a guinea, a soldier, or a ship, to get out of the scrape as well as she can! I have received some provoking remonstrances on this subject, to which it would not be difficult to give answers. It is, however, a truth that the Republic may be considered at least as an immense magazine including provisions, military chest, *et cetera*, and that the success of the enemy against her would be of the most fatal consequence to the war. My hopes, however, are better than they were; we are at last awakened. We have no news from Dumourier, either *civil* or *military*."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and most confidential.

1793, February 14.—"A proposition has been made to me for procuring the good offices of General Maressé, who commands at *Anvers*. I had before some reason to suspect that this might be practicable, but I am not sure that he is well either with the Commander-in-Chief or with the army. I have answered that the service must precede the recompense. I have suggested in general the sort of services in his power to render, and the person employed will write farther. This will be managed entirely through the Comte de Starhemberg, by whom the agent in question was brought to me; I am not sorry to see M. de Starhemberg so cordial and so well disposed."

Most secret.—"Some reasons have been given to me to believe that the attack shall not be materially directed towards the vulnerable parts of this Republic; but your Lordship will readily conceive that this is known only to the single person who mentioned it, and to you."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, February 15, Hague.—"In a crisis which within a fortnight may decide the fate of the Republic, I suffer beyond measure from the extreme inability of the person who commands, but there is no remedy; we must act under that disadvantage. It would, however, be of great consequence if the Duke of York were here, accompanied by three or four English officers who have seen actual service; and under the

pretext (even if it cannot be immediately realized) that His Royal Highness is to be followed by some English battalions. The great distresses under which the Grand Pensionary and I are labouring, and which it would be useless to particularize, would be removed instantly if we had those respectable means of military influence which are wanted, and the want of which may become fatal; besides, the appearance, and the general spirit which it would inspire, would be of the greatest importance through the country.

"Orders for quarters for British troops would be of great importance, if they can be spared.

"Half a dozen active and enterprising young Lieutenants of the navy would be of use; a frigate or two at Helvoet, and four or five cutters and sloops to run up to Willemstadt if we wished it, would be important. The entrance at Helvoet is safe and good. I would submit that they should be directed to apply to me for instructions.

"There is another most important point. The Pensionary has strong fears that the panic may be such as to stop the loan *entirely*, for the moment. Four per cent. will not counteract the menace of the Dutch Committee, with Dumourier to hang all the lenders. I am of opinion therefore that it would be of infinite use if I might be authorised to draw on Messieurs Drummond, or any other bankers whom your Lordship may name, for any sums not exceeding in the whole 200,000*l.*, as a loan to the States to be properly secured by a secret contract with them, to be repaid by them with interest as soon as this crisis is over.

"Men, commanders, ships, and money! We could not ask more if this country were a part of Yorkshire; but I incline to think that it should be considered as such for the present; and if it is brought to a question whether we are to conquer it and to keep it, or whether Dumourier is to do it, I have no doubt as to the decision; and it is under this principle that I suggest all I have here stated; and such farther measures as may suggest themselves to your Lordship and to His Majesty's Ministers will, I trust, proceed on this idea.

"I have a farther motive for wishing to see His Royal Highness here. The young Princes of Orange are high-spirited; but I will not be answerable for the steadiness of the father when the hour of danger approaches."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1793, February 20, St. James's Square.—"I have to acquaint you (though I could not do it officially) that His Majesty has it in contemplation to name some General Officer who may proceed to the Hague to assist with his advice where it may be useful. But this idea is not sufficiently matured to enable me to say more upon it.

"I hope, but God forbid I should take upon myself to answer for it, that the Guards will have sailed before I can receive your answer to this letter; but, as the contrary is certainly at least possible, it would be useful that you should let me know where you think they had best be landed, whether at Flushing or Helvoet, with a view to the being employed in the manner pointed out in my despatch. I own one of the greatest difficulties I feel in the measure itself is the possibility that the French might, by an alarm here, oblige us to recall these troops, and the danger of the impression which this would give in Holland."

*Copy.*

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, February 22, Hague.—“In writing my secret despatch of this date an idea occurs to me which I beg the favour of you to suggest to Mr. Pitt, if you think that it deserves a moment's attention. Would it not be practicable in the present well-directed enthusiasm of England to effectuate a contribution on the plan of that which we shall probably propose in this province? Supposing it to be taken only at one per cent., with an exception of all persons having an income or salary of less than 30*l.* a year, I have no doubt that it would produce five or six millions sterling. The advantages of such a measure, if the difficulties are not too great to be hazarded, would be of great importance both at present and hereafter. If it is worth a further enquiry I will inform myself of the details of the Dutch measure.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, February 24, Queen's House.—“It seems to me necessary that Lord Grenville should prepare for my signature instructions to the Duke of York to proceed immediately to the Hague, and forward there the arrangements that may be necessary for the reception of my Hanoverian troops which are going to be taken into British pay; as also for his commanding them whilst in British pay, as well as any other troops, whether British or Foreigners, that may be in the same predicament. He may be also directed to communicate such information as may be necessary to the Secretary of State whilst he remains at the Hague through the channel and pen of the British Ambassador there; and, when the army shall be assembled, that a proper person will be authorized to attend him who shall regularly correspond with the Secretary of State. These seem to be the points that occur to me as most necessary, to which Lord Grenville is to add for my approbation such others as may appear to him essential to forward the business now coming forward.

“I perceive Lord Auckland has in his despatch chose to omit an event that has occurred in Holland which does not give an high idea of the spirit of the Dutch officers. Colonel Saumaise who commanded the 500 Swiss Guards detached from the Hague to go to Gorcum has seized the first opportunity to desert; this is supposed to have been from personal cowardice not treachery.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, February 28, Hague.—“Though the dejection in this Province is become great, I do not yet see any dangerous change of disposition. And this morning some principal moneyed interests at Amsterdam sent a private intimation to me that they would immediately furnish to Government a sufficient loan for all present purposes, to be re-imbursed either from the intended contribution, or from whatever mode of supply may hereafter be adopted.

“On the other hand the party spirit of this country is too rooted and too strong to leave a doubt that the French receive intelligence from every town and every corner; and that many disaffected individuals will use both treachery and force, if they can safely risk it to promote M. Dumourier's enterprise. We had a specimen of this yesterday; four Zeland small vessels from Rotterdam contrived to suffer themselves to be

taken by the French on the Flanders shore; an order was sent immediately to Admiral Melville to attack and sink them.

"The Duke of York's arrival is very useful, and gives me good hopes, unless Providence, for some unfathomable purpose, intends the subversion of all Governments and of civil society.

"It being thought necessary towards calming the agitation of the country that the Prince Stadholder should make an address to the Provinces and people, the Grand Pensionary and I proposed it for him, and it will be published immediately in the form of a speech to the States General. We hope it may tend to prevent the kind of panic which would be the most fatal of all events."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private and confidential.

1793, March 1, Whitehall.—"Your despatches which I now answer have given some uneasiness, and perhaps not less on any account than on that of the great uncertainty and ignorance in which we are here with respect to the Dutch means of resistance. You will, I am sure, attribute it to its true motive when I mention that it would be very satisfactory, at a period of so much anxiety, to receive as detailed accounts as possible of the situation in this respect as it varies from time to time, especially when we are called upon to take measures of so much importance, and to which this knowledge is so essential."

*Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, March 3, Stowe.—"I give you many thanks for your kindness in apprising me of everything so nearly interesting to your dear little woman as the accounts of the discovery at Otaheité. I do not, however, understand from your letter that there is any letter from Vancouver, or direct account of the boy. I have, for the last fortnight, been worn with incessant fatigue of details, ridiculous but indispensable, in the arrangement of the recruits of my whole regiment, who will be complete by Thursday to within about thirty men; but I mostly complain of my brother Tom's cursed call, which, by refusing to except militia captains on the march, obliges me to release Sir W. Young and Bernard who were to have gone with the division to Portsmouth, and have now, to their infinite joy and satisfaction, thrown that duty upon me; two of my captains being actually in the Government, and one upon his road from Vienna. I cannot describe to you how harshly I feel this duty which separates me from all my friends, and at a moment so anxious; and, as it could not have attached upon ten people, I think that it was not necessary to have made it so unpleasant to me.

"I look with most anxious earnestness to the next fourteen days, conceiving that if Dumourier does not carry his objects by the middle of March he is in a most serious difficulty. I will beg you to order a line to me of any actual events; for, as I cannot leave this cursed march, I shall be as much out of the way of information as if I were a hundred miles from London."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, March 4, Hague.—"I have not during the last long three months sent so comfortable a set of despatches as I forward this evening. The



Austrian success is very important, and it will add to the good spirits and courage which were taking place here in consequence of our interior arrangements, and of the English aid and encouragement. I have during some days assumed many of the functions of Prime Minister of the Republic. I will, however, bear that faculty meekly, and will retire from it on the first moment that the dangerous agitation and crisis has in any degree ceased." "I should also be glad to receive an instruction to send back any or all of His Majesty's ships in the first moment that they can be spared, with the trading ships (at present detained by the general embargo) under their convoy.

"If nothing bad happens before Friday next, I will nearly venture to say, with confidence, that all will be well; our interior defence will then be very strong; the fermentation and fright of the towns will be calmed; and the necessity on Dumourier *de battre en retraite* will grow every hour more pressing."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, March 5, Hague.—"I have never yet taken occasion to acknowledge in a private letter how much I have really been aided by the cordiality, zeal, and good judgment of the Duke of York, during the eight days that he has been here; he has enabled me to do more than I was able to accomplish in the eight preceding weeks."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

Private.

1793, March 8, Whitehall.—"I cannot let this mail go without making you privately as well as publicly my very sincere compliments on your late conduct and the excellent effect which it has produced. It is certainly very fortunate for the Republic, as well as for this country, that at the most critical period the Dutch have seen since the establishment of the Republic, the post of British minister at the Hague should have been filled as it is; and I trust it will be long before this sentiment is effaced in Holland. I look with great confidence now to the final result of this crisis, though I am sensible that its danger is not yet completely passed."

"By Jackson's letters received to-day it appears that Bourgoing has quitted Madrid, and I hope the co-operation of Spain is now decided past recall."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, March.]—"I have been engaged till this moment and am now obliged to dress for a dinner in the City, at which I must be punctual; which makes it impossible for me to come to you. I have shewn my brother the papers which I return. He agrees that it will be perfectly right to transmit the substance to Spain, with an assurance that it will, of course, be the object of our fleet to watch any movements from Brest, and if they are of the extent stated to follow them. Would it not be right to take some way of sending straight to Cadiz, in order to avoid the time which will be lost by going round by Madrid? At the same time I am not sure how this can be done except through Del Campo, with whom it is perhaps not prudent to trust the business."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, March 13, Hague.—“I am sorry for the fate of poor Willemstadt and of its garrison; they cannot be expected to hold out. In every other point of view our prospects are become wonderfully good. There remains considerable uneasiness within this Province, however, and I do not wonder at it, for it is not pleasant to live within the continued sound of the enemy's cannon; and certainly the danger has been great. Nothing could have averted it but the fortunate circumstance of the water preparation which, I confess, has had a casual importance far beyond what I foresaw when I proposed it; and the other fortunate circumstance of the arrival *au point nommé* of the Duke of York and of the guards. Certainly this country ought to retain a long and warm gratitude to England and to His Majesty's government.

“It is evidently the moment to push the French in every possible quarter with the utmost energy. I have done everything that I can through various channels to impress this on the Prince de Cobourg and on Duke Frederic of Brunswic. We will exert from these Provinces all the means in our power, and in truth those means are not inconsiderable when brought forwards.”

“It appears from every intelligence that England might take an easy possession of Ostend, and be directed to Dunkirk afterwards by the course of circumstances.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, March 15, Hague.—“I will not leave this post whilst there is any appearance of danger or even of difficulty. But if the host of atheists, robbers, and murderers should be driven to the other side of the *Escant*, I shall entreat His Majesty to permit me to return to England. It is become necessary to my health to have this indulgence; and there are other domestic considerations which will compel me to solicit it. I shall hope, therefore, in the case supposed, to be permitted to return home under the escort of one of the frigates; and I mention it now that I may avoid being involved in the measure of a congress, which, according to the turn that affairs have taken, may I conceive be best governed under your Lordship's immediate direction in England. I shall have no objection to the carrying Messieurs de Mercy and Thugut in the same packet boat with me, or at least at the same time: and I have no doubt that Lord H. Spencer would act here to your Lordship's satisfaction.”

## THE DUKE OF RICHMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, March 15.—MEMORANDUM in reference to the draft of a convention between Great Britain and Russia.

“In the second article of the convention it is said, ‘*à cette fin Leurs Majestés s'engagent d'employer leurs forces respectives en autant que les circonstances dans lesquelles elles se trouveront pourront le permettre.*’ It is not said that Count Woronzow objects to this restriction when it is equally binding on the two sovereigns, and one does not clearly see the ground of his objecting to the words—‘*Aussi:ot que les circonstances*’

*de la guerre le permettront,* in a case that affects only Great Britain, after having admitted it in the former case. To me it seems the more necessary to adhere to it in a specific article like the 8th, than in a general one like the 2nd. If Count Woronzow does not feel himself authorised to sign without the omission of this stipulation, it would seem to attach to it an importance that should make us the more cautious of giving way. But might not the business be referred to Petersburg, and Mr. Whitworth be instructed to see if the Ministers at that place insist as much as Count Woronzow does here. Mr. Whitworth would have the further advantage of finding whether there was any real disposition to send troops; if there is, he might get that object inserted in the treaty, and for such an object it might [be] worth while, if they insist on the omission of the words, *aussitôt que les circonstances de la guerre le permettront*, to give way. But if the hopes given us by Count Woronzow that these troops will be sent are found to be delusive, in that case I should adhere to our words, and, in truth, be better satisfied that their ships did not come; for I very much suspect that they will come totally unprovided with all kinds of stores, and that at a moment when we shall want all we have, and the utmost exertions for equipping our own fleets, we shall only have the additional embarrassment of fitting out the Russian squadron, and for no real utility I can expect from them. I further suspect that their object is to winter in our ports and thereby to learn their business, which I should be sorry we should teach them, independently of the embarrassment it must occasion to our Naval Department. Unless, therefore, we get the troops with the ships, I would adhere to our words, and I think that, unless Woronzow will agree to sending the troops, it will be far better to leave it to Mr. Whitworth to try to get them, or to adhere to our words; and if my conjectures are right, he will get the troops, or at least our reservation, which they will grant rather than not send their fleet to our ports, and no time will be lost by referring the signature to Petersburg.

"I have further to observe that, if the project is signed here, the 5th article ought to express, in the same words as in the despatch to Mr. Whitworth, that the troops should be sent with the fleet, otherwise they may *talk* of sending them by land. The draft to Mr. Whitworth must also be altered, as it supposes that ten or twelve thousand land troops would be conveyed from Riga in the ten sail of the line and four frigates; whereas they would be much crowded with one-third of that number, and it would not have the appearance of our being in earnest and having considered the subject to propose a thing in itself impossible. We should therefore ask only for such a proportion as can come in the men-of-war, and authorize Mr. Whitworth to hire transports for the rest, or offer to send them."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, March 19, Windsor.—"It is with great pleasure I have signed the full powers empowering Lord Grenville to sign the two Conventions with the Court of Russia, as the one so completely destroys the whole Russian system of an armed neutrality, which was in the late war the most inimical measure adopted by any nation; and I trust she will now fully prevent the Danes and Swedes from carrying any supplies to France. Indeed, I think the measure so essential that I would rather see both those Crowns join France than submit to their adopting a conduct much more disadvantageous towards a speedy conclusion of the war than so open a conduct would effect."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, March 20, Hague.—“The question of general co-operation on this continent involves many considerations known only to those who compose His Majesty's Government; so far as I can judge from a partial view, I continue to think that the best and most practicable measure, and the most consistent also with our other views and operations, would be to take possession of Dutch Flanders, and of that part of Austrian Flanders which extends from Gand to Ostend, by the collected force under the Duke of York's command, aided by a Dutch corps if necessary, by the vessels which we have ready, and by the good will of the people of the country. This will place the British aid to the extreme of the right of the Prince of Coburg's army, in a position the least committed, and with a tendency to aid our commerce and the maritime war, and ready at hand in case of accidents which may require its removal.”

## LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, March 26, Aranjuez.—“I am afraid that you will have been extremely impatient for the arrival of this messenger, and it has given me great concern to be obliged to defer his departure so long, but I cannot describe to you the difficulty that I find in transacting business with this new Spanish Minister, so as to bring it to anything like a point. He seems to me to be a kind of Birmingham Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, or Carr, Earl of Somerset, of a flashy appearance, great presumption, and tolerably good natural parts, but very ignorant and boyish; and I fancy that your Lordship will find an instance of this puerility of his in his fancy for having the treaty drawn in English and Spanish; though I could not avoid taking charge of that proposal, as he seemed so extremely bent upon it; and the signature of the treaty must, at any rate, have been deferred from my want of a full power. As to the future treaty, I am inclined to think that he will do his utmost to help it forward, though *clogged* (as he would express it) with the commercial regulation; as he certainly wishes well to a connection with England, and is aware, as is likewise the Queen, that it would be a means of increasing his popularity in this country. He is naturally extremely impatient for the arrival of His Majesty's squadron, and of the plan of the British Cabinet for our joint operations in the Mediterranean; upon which last head I have to request that your Lordship will be very particular in your instructions respecting *the command* of the two squadrons, should it be judged advisable for them to unite in one fleet, as, from the punctiliousness of this Court, the arrangement of that point will probably be the most difficult of all.

“I have paid particular attention to what you gave me in charge respecting the Marquis del Campo, and he will receive, by this messenger, a *mercuriale*, which will probably produce a great alteration for the better in his language and conduct; and, in that case, if your Lordship would be so good as to treat him with some show of confidence, it might produce a good effect here, where he is better thought of than he perhaps deserves. You will see, by my despatch, that the idea of sending him an *adjoint* must necessarily be deferred till a future day.

“I take the liberty of mentioning thus early that it would go a great way towards gaining the affections of the Duke de la Alcudia, who is

extremely fond of shew and finery, if particular attention were paid to the taste and magnificence of the present which His Majesty may be pleased to send him, on the exchange of the ratifications of our present treaty. I flatter myself that you know me too well to suspect that the consideration of my own interest has any share in this suggestion.

"I send this messenger by the way of Lisbon, where, however, I understand from Mr. Osterwald, that he is by no means sure of finding a packet; which leads me to request that the next may be sent by the Coruña, and the vessel which carries him directed to wait for his return.

"I had a most uncomfortable, and, indeed, perilous land journey hither; but I escaped without any material accident, and am a good deal better in health than when I last saw you; probably because I am a great deal busier."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1793, March 26, St. James's Square.—"His Majesty is disposed to make a new arrangement of the embassy at Constantinople. You expressed to me some time since a wish that, in case of a vacancy, you should be appointed to that post. From what you afterwards wrote to me I have reason to doubt whether your wishes on that subject are not changed. I would not however submit to His Majesty any other name for that appointment without first knowing from yourself whether you are desirous of it, in which case I should certainly propose you to His Majesty for it.

"I trust that the present circumstances will lead to a permanent good understanding between the two Courts, and that circumstance cannot fail to make your situation there pleasanter than it has been. You will, however, let me know without reserve your wishes about staying there or moving to Constantinople, and I shall feel a pleasure in arranging matters accordingly."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, March 29, Queen's House.—"The letter which accompanies this was received yesterday by the Prince of Wales who communicated to me, and desired I would show it to Lord Grenville who is to return it to the Prince. It is written by Captain Crauford, one of the Duke of York's aid-de-camps; he having been present at the actions of Prince of Cobourg makes the relation authentic.

"I am pleased with the idea proposed from Holland of moving the British troops to Bergen-op-Zoom, where the Hanoverians can join them; this must give jealousy to the French if not retired beyond Brussels. From the proposed station it will be easy to advance to Antwerp, and from thence to Ghent, after which, if with the assistance of the Dutch and some English ships this combined corps can be employed in an attack on Dunkirk, and that it should succeed, a battering train can easily then be brought from Holland for the use of the Austrians, who may then regularly lay siege to the French fortresses, and, I trust, put an early period to the war."

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, March 30, Queen's House.--"I return to Lord Grenville the letters of the two French Princes, which are too clearly expressed to require any comment from me. If Edinburgh could be hinted as the best place of education for them and equally under the protection applied for, I should think much inconvenience would be avoided."

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793], March 30 [Downing Street].—"Enclosed is a letter to you from M. Malouet, with his draft of our answer to him. I think the expression *en séquestre* too vague. The idea ought, as it seems to me, rather to be, that the King should receive and treat them as subjects till the conclusion of the peace, when it shall be definitely settled whether they shall remain under his sovereignty, or whether, and upon what conditions, they shall be restored. If you will correct it as you think proper, I can consult most of our colleagues upon it in the course of to-morrow. Malouet will probably be impatient to receive it. Your instructions to Hailes went yesterday with very slight alteration. The despatch from him received yesterday does not seem to me to hold out so much difficulty as Lord Auckland apprehends from it. The news which this messenger carries from Holland promises every thing that we can wish; but it is still such as to leave us as impatient as ever to hear more. I think, however, it brings nearer the prospect of our having an early opening to employ our force directly against the French coast. I have been employed this morning in endeavouring to fix a plan for augmenting as speedily as possible the British force applicable to that purpose, and I am in hopes with exertion much may be done before the end of April.

"I have sent to see *Gilliers* to-morrow in consequence of Malouet's letter.

"I shall meet you here on Wednesday, but we have been obliged to fix Thursday for the House meeting, which makes an end of my visit to Dropmore, as I shall have full occupation for every day in the interval."

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793] April 1, Downing Street.--"You will receive a further packet of news, which is satisfactory in everything but the appearance of hesitation on the part of the Prussian troops, when their joining the Prince of Cobourg without loss of time might be so essential. This circumstance seems to be a fresh reason for our immediately giving some further explanation as to the manner in which we can co-operate, and I think some instructions might be sent on that subject by the packet to-morrow. Our re-inforcement of cavalry may, I trust, sail this week. And we can probably furnish 4 or 5,000 more of infantry and cavalry from hence in the course of the month. This, with the first column of the Hanoverians and perhaps of the Hessians (with such Dutch forces as can be spared) might, I think, probably be of great use, till the time the Austrian forces are fully collected. It might be employed to occupy Dunkirk and keep open a communication with the sea for stores and provisions, and, at the same time, in other respects facilitate the Austrian operations. Our further preparations would be

proceeding in the meantime, and the Hanoverian and Hessian forces arriving, and, by the time our force is considerable enough to strike a blow in some other part of France, we may hope that the Austrians will be in strength sufficient to proceed without us. If it is not very inconvenient to you, I wish you could be in town by dinner to-morrow to talk this over. Pray let me know early in the morning. If you can come I will have dinner for you.

*Postscript.*—"I have just received yours of to-day, from which I conclude I shall see you to-morrow. Will it not be necessary to send instructions immediately to Sweden, conformable to the plan of those to Denmark, though with some variations from the different circumstances of the two courts."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1793, April 3, Whitehall.—"In obedience to Your Majesty's commands which Lord Grenville had the honour to receive this morning, instructions will this night be sent to Lord Auckland, and also a letter to Sir James Murray for the information of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, authorizing His Royal Highness and Lord Auckland to proceed to Antwerp, and also empowering His Royal Highness to move the British and Hanoverian troops towards the frontier of French Flanders."

*Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, April 7, Gosfield, near Halstead.—"I am to thank you for the wonderful mail of yesterday, which has set all the politicians of my breakfast table wild with speculations. I confess that, as far as I can speculate, I do not expect to hear that Dumourier has been able to raise a party in Paris sufficient to prevent the immediate massacre of those to whom he would look for support, nor do I conceive how he can bring up a sufficient portion of his army in time to counteract those precautions which the Convention (having three days' notice necessarily of his revolt) will have been able to take; and still less can I conceive how he can trust to such an army to stand against the variety of means which will be exerted to detach them from him on his arrival in or near that sink of infamy and corrupted disorder. At the same time, I am not insensible to the wonderful and most unexpected opportunity which it gives to the combined armies of penetrating into France; and I trust that Clairfayt has not lost his opportunity; though I fear that Lille or Valenciennes are beyond the exertions of the Austrian army at the present moment, and yet the panic might do more for him than any additional strength. With the same view I cannot help urging you to consider well the practicability of the surprise of Dunkirk, of which I have thought and read very much since we parted. I am not wild enough to conceive that any force which we can spare at present (even supposing that your six battalions now in Holland could be moved by water to this object) is equal to a regular attempt; but, considering the very neglected state of it a very short time ago, and the very critical moment, it does not seem wholly impossible, if it is understood that there is a *parti royaliste* to the extent that has been imagined to exist in that town; and to every object of operations from this country into France, or from Brabant, or to the object of the security to our

commerce from privateers, I need not state its importance. Much of this would be attained if you could surprise the Risbank, or the forts at the pier heads, and, if this could be risked, it could be done by embarking 400 men [of] the 2nd or Queen's regiment from Dover, under the idea of garrisoning Ostend.

"But, above all, I am most anxious that no time should be lost in striking, almost at any risk, those blows (wherever they may be practicable) which are to repay to us the expenses incurred, and which are to reduce France (under whatever form of government) within those limits which she has been permitted to extend for the last 120 years, so as to enable her internal politics of every kind to influence (as in the last two years) the situation of every power in Europe.

"Whatever may be the result of Dumourier's bold attempt upon Paris, I have no faith in the settlement of the monarchy (in any shape) unless by the co-operation of foreign force; and I much doubt whether, shaken as we know that whole country to be in every point essential to a government, she can, under any circumstances, be reduced to such a state of internal subjection as to permit the combined powers to disarm, even if Dumourier should restore the monarchy partially or with the apparent concurrence of the whole kingdom; and, in one word, I am most anxious that we should proceed to *lop*, while they arrange a government for whatever it may be proper to leave to them at the general pacification.

"You have probably heard of the match which is settled between Sir W. Young and Miss Talbot; my regard for them both induces me to hope for that happiness to which they are both entitled, and of which I trust that they have a fair and full prospect. This, and the delay of my Gosfield journey from the Braunston bill, will detain me here till to-morrow seven night; and if you have any commands for young trees, either for immediate planting or for next autumn, I can give you oak and birch to any extent."

*Postscript.*—"I enclose to you two letters which I took charge of from the French clergy of Winchester, and which I shamefully forgot."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, April 8-13, Downing Street.]—"Captain Crawford's report of what has passed with Dumourier is just arrived. I have desired Aust immediately to send you a copy. It appears by it that the Prince of Cobourg is looking to the object we wish on the frontiers, and is losing no time in making the disposition of force for that purpose. But I can not make out distinctly whether the armistice suspends hostile operations now that Dumourier's army is within the French frontier, or was meant only to give him time to retreat. I think, on the whole, this account need make hardly in any variation in your despatch, if you still think it best to send one to-night, but I doubt whether it might not now be as well to defer it till we hear of the conferences at Antwerp, which we probably shall do in the course of Wednesday."

*Postscript.*—"Crawford's report came in a despatch from Sir James Murray which only encloses it, and says nothing else."

1793, April.—REPORT OF CAPTAIN CRAWFORD, who was sent by his ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK to the PRINCE OF COBOURG on the 31st of March, and returned to Bergen-op-Zoom on the 4th of April.

"Captain Crawford arrived at the Prince of Cobourg's head-quarters at Mons on the 2nd of April. His Serene Highness informed him that



after the battle near Louvain on the 22nd of March, the French had retired in confusion, and Dumourier took his head-quarters at Ath.

"The Prince of Cobourg marched straight to Brussels, and detached at the same time to take Antwerp. On his arrival at Brussels, an aid-de-camp from Dumourier arrived with proposals to enter into a negotiation. The Prince sent his Quarter-Master-General Macke to him, with orders to make two previous conditions before any negotiation could be entered into, or any armistice agreed upon; the one, that the enemy should immediately evacuate the Austrian Netherlands; the other, that they should evacuate Dutch Brabant; both under articles of capitulation, which assured to them a free and unmolested passage into their own country. Dumourier consented to this without hesitation, and signed the necessary orders to the different French commanders. He said he had wished for some time to have an opportunity of overturning the existing Government of France, for it was so infamous and so absurd that its duration was impossible; that he had endeavoured in vain to check the excesses which were committed in the Low Countries; however, that he was jealous of his military reputation, and therefore, though his ardour for the cause had slackened, he resolved to make as much use as he could of the troops under his command, and to oppose the advance of the Austrians; that he had given them battle twice, and, though defeated, he did not consider his military reputation as tarnished, for the volunteers were as infamous as the troops of the line were brave, and of the latter he had not a sufficient quantity to resist such an army as his opponent brought against him; that he now proposed an armistice, and having discharged what he called his duty to the utmost of his power, he was ready to turn his arms against the Convention, and lend his aid in the re-establishment of monarchy in France; that nearly 20,000 of his troops (mostly of the line) would accompany him, and that Valenciennes, and he had every reason to suppose that Lisle also, would declare in his favour, and open their gates to him; and that the assassination of the King (which he protested he had endeavoured to prevent) had disgusted the majority of the nation, who would certainly join him. He requested that the Prince of Cobourg would be ready to assist him with his whole force.

"At this time the French were cantoned along their own frontier, the Austrians along theirs, namely, from Mons to Tournay.

"On the 2nd, in the evening, General Beurnonville, his aid-de-camp Manoir, four deputies of the Convention, namely, Camus, Henry Brancai, La Marc, Cuinotte, and their secretary Foucon, arrived prisoners in Mons. They had gone to St. Amand, the former to take the command of the army, the latter, namely the deputies, to arrest Dumourier and to take him to Paris. They call them hostages for the safety of the Queen and the young King.

"On the 3rd, Dumourier began his march, intending to proceed straight to Paris.

"Of course the Prince of Cobourg places no confidence in him, and considers this as a part which he has been obliged to take to save himself, but supposes it possible that circumstances may keep him steady in it.

"His Serene Highness has put his own troops into very close cantonments, keeping them in immediate readiness to act. The Prussian corps, which was under the orders of Prince Frederick of Brunswick, is marching to place itself in close cantonments between Tournay and Courtray; and the Prince of Cobourg wishes the army under the command of His Royal Highness the Duke of York to advance as soon

as possible, and to canton on the right of the Prussians, along the frontier. All of which troops he thinks should be ready to commence active operations at the shortest notice. Should Dumourier be able to advance, the Prince intends to make him first deliver into his hands at least Lille and Valenciennes, with any other places which may be agreed upon by all parties, before the allies advance to support him.

"His Serene Highness purposes a conference at Antwerp on the 7th instant, at which he hopes the Duke of York, the Stadtholder, and the commander of the Prussian corps will attend.

"The King of Prussia crossed the Rhine at Buchera [Buchenau?] attacked the French at Bingen, Creutzenach, and Altheim, took General Neusvinger, 50 officers, 2,000 non-commissioned officers and privates, 15 cannon, and a military chest, and formed the blockade of Mayence.

"General Wurmser, with a Prussian corps attached to him, was immediately to pass the Rhine at Mannheim, and act on the left of the King. Worms and Oppenheim were evacuated, and the enemy retreated from those places towards Landau. These operations happened between the 27th March and the 1st April."

[LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD ST. HELENS.

--Private.

1793, April 13, Whitehall.—"Lord Auckland has asked a leave of absence from the Hague, and has intimated to me his intention, on his arrival in England, to solicit the King's permission to retire from the foreign line. I, therefore, take the first opportunity to say to you that if the embassy of the Hague would be more agreeable to you than that which you now fill, I should have the greatest pleasure in the opportunity of more constant intercourse with you, and in the advantage which I am persuaded would result to the public service from placing in your hands the business of a mission so intimately connected with all our foreign concerns. You will have the goodness to let me know your determination as soon as you can, as all the other arrangements are necessarily dependent on this.

"The long suspension of news from Madrid is very vexatious, but I trust when it arrives it will be no less agreeable than that which we now receive from all quarters. Dumourier's plan appears to have been formed with as little knowledge of the people he had to deal with as La Fayette's, and he wants the merit of the latter in something like an adherence to his principles, bad as they were. I think we are well rid of him, and that the embarrassment of having any part of our business in his hands would have more than outweighed the advantage of his assistance. Condé they seem to hope will soon fall. Lisle and Valenciennes must be a work of time. Nothing can be more satisfactory than the state of affairs at home."

April 25.—"Different circumstances have prevented me from sending this letter sooner. We have nothing new here, nor have I any thing to add to my despatches. I will take care about the present, as you suggest. I have said nothing about Corsica in my despatch, but the language of the Duke de la Alcudia disconcerts our projects. I tremble for the moment when we come to discuss that tender point of indemnities."

*Copy.*

THE DUKE OF YORK TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, April 19, Bruges.—“Mr. Walpole having taken on himself, at his own personal risk and responsibility, to bring me an inhabitant of Dunkirk to communicate intelligence of the utmost military importance, I take this mode of informing your Lordship that this digression from his instructions was well conceived and meritorious, and has greatly proved his activity and zeal for His Majesty’s service.”

*Signed.*

GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, April 27, Windsor.—“Though it must be obvious to every one how highly detrimental to every idea of concert with other Courts, how liable to jealousy, and how advantageous to interior cabals any encouragement to the letter from Le Brun to Lord Grenville would occasion, I cannot help just giving my disapprobation to the idea in the first instance, and suggesting either that it should receive no answer, or, if Lord Grenville on consulting the other Ministers should think that too strong, the framing an answer that should set aside the idea of any negotiation, which I am certain cannot with safety be even opened.

“Our line seems perfectly plain. The war being once begun, the expense already entertained, France must be greatly circumscribed before we can talk of any means of treating with that dangerous and faithless nation.”

CHARLES WHITWORTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, April 29, St. Petersburg.—“I have nothing to add to my despatch of this date further than to entreat your Lordship will acquit me of being in the least instrumental towards procuring you the visit of the Comte D’Artois. This business has been settled between him and Her Imperial Majesty, who, depending entirely upon the strength of her protection, in consequence of the perfect good understanding which now subsists between the two Courts, does not scruple to recommend him in the strongest manner. It was mentioned to me some time ago, and when I first intimated it to your Lordship, as well by the Prince as by the Empress herself, and of course I could not decently say what I really thought of it. I did, however, insinuate that it might be proper, considering the uniform conduct of His Majesty in avoiding even the appearance of interfering in the interior government of France, that His Royal Highness should observe a strict *incognito*, and in this they both agreed. The Comte D’Artois is too well known to your Lordship for me to say anything of him; he seems to have gained, *quant à son personnel*, from his misfortunes. The Bishop of Arras, who is his political mentor, seems to have undertaken to establish a contrast to the former French method of treating of affairs, and has substituted an affectation of excessive frankness in the place of the usual fraud and double meaning. His leading principle is to stick at nothing (as far as promises can go, for they have nothing else to offer) that may contribute to the re-establishment of their affairs, but that the energy of a good Government will soon be sufficient to replace things in their former state. The other attendants of the Prince have

little to do with politics, but are such, particularly the Comte François D'Escars, as I may very safely recommend to your Lordship's civilities and protection.

"I wrote some days ago by a Russian messenger to return your Lordship my most sincere thanks for the offer you were so good as to make me of a removal to Constantinople, which, however, I have taken the liberty to decline, reserving your Lordship's favour and protection for some other occasion."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, April 30, Queen's House.—"The two letters communicated to me by Lord Grenville, which he received yesterday, seem to bear marks of not being authentic; though the confusion at Paris renders any idea of fresh massacres not improbable. The having sent a proper [messenger] in consequence to Newhaven is perfectly right, who will bring up the Frenchman if such a person is there."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1793, May 10, Whitehall.—"I really feel it impossible to have complied before this time with the earnest wishes you expressed to return home. I now propose receiving His Majesty's pleasure for this purpose, and shall transmit to you the formal letter on Tuesday, or Friday at latest.

"You will allow me to take the earliest occasion of congratulating you on the honourable and well-deserved mark of approbation of your distinguished services with which Mr. Pitt acquaints you by this post. I look to it with still greater satisfaction from the assistance which I shall derive from your talents."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1793, May 18, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to acquaint your Majesty that he has just seen Count Woronzow and the Duc d'Harcourt, and has learnt from them that the Count d'Artois arrived at Hull on the 15th instant, and on receiving the Duc d'Harcourt's first letter, sailed from thence to Harwich where he now is, but *incognito*. Count Woronzow and the Duc d'Harcourt propose setting out to-morrow to Harwich to persuade him to proceed to Ostend."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, May 18, Windsor.—"The conduct of the Count d'Artois seems most extraordinary; it would have been more creditable for him on sailing from Hull to have at once proceeded to Ostend. I trust the advice of the Duc d'Harcourt will still be of use, and make him quit Harwich, and continue his voyage to that port."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, May 24 [Downing Street].—"I forgot to mention to you that the King on Wednesday readily approved of Lord Auckland's

peerage. I have just written to Lord Auckland, to announce this to him, and as he had the precaution to send beforehand his wish respecting his title, it may grace to-morrow's *Gazette*."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1793, May 31, St. James's Square.—"Lord Grenville is much concerned to acquaint your Majesty that the Duke de Sicignano shot himself this evening at Grenier's Hotel. Lord Grenville has seen the Prince of Castelcicala, and apprehends from his conversation that the Duke de Sicignano had no other motive for this unhappy step than his fear of difficulties which he thought he found in the negotiation with which he was charged conjointly with the Prince."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 1, Windsor.—"It is impossible not to feel concerned at the lamentable fate of the Duke de Sicignano, as suicide seems so unnatural a crime that the frequency of it by no means diminishes the horror. The Prince de Castelcicala's supposition that the young man's committing this rash action arose from the fear of difficulties in the negotiation with which he was charged, appears to me a strong symptom of insanity, which I hope is the true solution of the dreadful step he has taken."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, June 1, Whitehall.—"I received your letter last night, and so far from feeling hurt by being reminded of the subject you refer to, that I feel infinitely obliged to any of my colleagues in office who take the trouble to aid me by their suggestions. It always astonishes me when I perceive anybody feel or act on any other principle. In fact, the subject of your letter had not escaped my recollection, and I was in hopes before this time to have put in greater forwardness than it now is, both the detail of that, and the operations to the West Indies and the Mauritius, which must all leave this country in the course of September; and the only way of being certain of no delay at the moment of execution is by all the details being early arranged, even to the appointment of officers to be employed. I have had more than once some general conversation with Mr. Pitt on those points; and it now waits with me to have a distinct and articulate conversation with Lord Amherst, preparatory to a more final arrangement. I can assure you that you do me only justice in supposing that any delays arising from me proceed solely from my being rather over-loaded by a pressure upon my time from various quarters. The war in the one Office, and the India charter in the other, has distracted me in a very great degree during the whole winter; for, although I have not had much trouble in Parliament on my Indian arrangements, the multitude of jarring interests I have been obliged to encounter without doors has created a sad expenditure of my time. The effect of all this has been to put me somewhat in arrear with regard to Canadian business, and, still

more so, with regard to the annual despatches for India. The first I am now busy with, and shall in one forenoon more get finished; and I am sure I shall be completely ready long before the frigate for Lord Dorchester is prepared by the Admiralty. That I make a point of being, cost what it may. As to the East India despatches, it is essential for me not to leave any arrear, as it would encroach on the regularity of the correspondence which has now, for more than two years, been completely established; and, therefore, everything now before the Board must be returned, so as not to retard the East India ships from sailing whenever the *Conway* being ready shall be announced. I do not mention these things to alarm you, or to plead for delay; for you may rest assured that, within a week, all these incumbrances on my time shall be removed, and, even before that time, I shall put the other businesses in proper train.

"Nobody shall ever hear me complain so long as I can avoid it. I have no reason to do so of Mr. Pitt, for, amidst the multitude of things which press upon him, he is at all times ready to accommodate himself to my call. I need not tell you who must feel how much (especially in time of war) an alert and ready co-operation from *other Offices* is essential to the comfort of the *Home Secretary*, who is hourly acting in connexion with them. I have troubled you with a much longer scrawl than I intended, especially as the business part of it might have been comprised in one sentence; which is only to ask you to have the goodness to cause somebody in your Office to send me a note, from the treaties recently made or in contemplation, what disposable force we shall have at our command, at any time in the course of the season, from any of the Powers with whom we would have to act in the Mediterranean."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, June 5, Bodenheim.—"It is with regret that I trouble your Lordship in regard to myself; but notwithstanding the pleasure I may have in doing the honours of this Coxheath of Germany to the ladies of Frankfort, I feel myself in *my present situation* so unable to render any service to His Majesty, or to the general cause, so unequal to influence the Cabinet of Bodenheim, and I perceive so determined a resolution of adhering to their unfortunate system of inaction and procrastination, that I cannot help expressing an earnest hope that your Lordship will not find it expedient to defer authorising me to return to Bruxelles. I have daily less wish to be fixed at this Court, and M. Luchesini takes frequent opportunities of reminding me of the notion which occurred to him at Darmstadt."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 12, Winchester.—"I confess that I felt sensible mortification on receiving, three days ago, from two different quarters the information which, after our conversation, I had looked for from you, of the day fixed for the chapter of the Garter. Your letter of yesterday accounts for that silence, and it has determined me, after much consideration, to come to town instead of writing from this place the sort of letter for the King's information which my feelings and the sense of the

treatment which I have received suggest to me. At the same time I am not very sanguine in the hopes of deriving any satisfaction from the interview which you request me to have with Mr. Pitt on this matter; and this disinclination to meet him arises from circumstances which I rather think that I hinted to you. Of your personal affection I have no doubt, but it is clear that we do not think alike upon this point, and I have no reason to think that Mr. Pitt's ideas vary from yours; at all events, I foresee some uneasy explanation if I am to state *all the points* in which I feel myself neglected; and I certainly do not wish, in looking forward to the steps and conduct to which I am most reluctantly driven, to see more of the ten thousand unpleasantnesses than I now see. However you shall decide for me as to this interview; but it pains me to say that I see very little reason to doubt my abiding by the line which I mentioned to you at Dropmore, after having very well considered it; a line (I again repeat) most revolting to my wishes, but forced upon me by the treatment which I have received. I shall be in town about seven o'clock in the evening to-morrow; you will therefore be so good as to send me a note to inform me whether I can see you in St. James's Square, or not."

LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1793, June 13, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville has this morning seen papers from Paris of as late a date as the sixth, which confirm the account before received of Marat having raised an insurrection in Paris, in consequence of which about twenty of the Brissotine party in the National Convention were arrested, together with Clavière and Le Brun. It appears that measures were to be taken to bring them to trial. A revolt had broke out in Languedoc, and the army of the Convention there had been defeated."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 13, Windsor.—"On returning from walking I have found Lord Grenville's box. I will certainly copy the draft of the letter to the Empress of Russia, and bring it with me to-morrow morning to town.

"The account of the French tumult at Paris is what must have been expected from the total want of a legal Government, and more of the like will arise till the successes of various insurrections in the interior of the kingdom make the majority feel the necessity of returning to a form of Government resembling the old one, though perhaps ameliorated in many particulars."

C. GODDARD TO THE EARL OF ELGIN.

1793, June 14, Whitehall.—"Lord Grenville being too much engaged to write to your Lordship to-day, and being unwilling to subject your Lordship to any inconvenience by further delay in the return of your servant, has directed me to acquaint your Lordship that Lord Beauchamp will set out in a few days for the King of Prussia's headquarters, and that your Lordship may prepare for returning to Brussels in about ten days.

"Lord Grenville desires me to add that he would not wish your Lordship to make any communication whatsoever of Lord Beauchamp's intended journey until your Lordship shall have been authorised to do so from home."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1793, June 19, Whitehall.—"In addition to what is mentioned in my public letter, I have to request that you will mention to M. Lucchesini that the King would very willingly have acceded to the proposition alluded to in his letter to me, of accrediting a Minister to reside near the person of His Prussian Majesty during the course of this campaign, but that personal considerations having prevented Lord Beauchamp from accepting a character of that nature, it has been thought more advantageous not to lose the benefit of his abilities; and that the King is persuaded that the circumstance of Lord Beauchamp's rank and station in this country will be considered as affording a strong proof of the desire which is entertained by His Majesty to shew every degree of attention to the King of Prussia.

"I cannot conclude this letter without thanking you for the constant zeal and diligence which you have exerted during your residence at the Prussian head quarters."

*Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 21, Winchester.—"After thinking very fully upon the conversations which we held in London, I believe that I have made up my mind to sacrifice those feelings which have so long and so severely wounded me; and I trust that I shall have sufficient command of myself to avoid, in future, discussions which give us both pain. It is really almost matter of indifference to me whether this matter is mentioned to the King or not; and, after considering *pour* and *contre*, I hardly know how to decide; but, under the full persuasion that it will be refused, I rather incline that it should not be named.

"But exactly in the proportion in which I forego all gratifications of a public nature, I look to those which spring from the affection and friendship of those who are nearest to me, and this is all that I will ever say upon points which have given me so much uneasiness."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ST. HELENS.

Private.

1793, June 21, Whitehall.—"I send you by this messenger the ratification of the convention. We are entirely of opinion that your idea is right of making the best of our situation with Spain, though I fear it cannot be considered as a very solid foundation of friendship. It would be very useful if we could discover what the views of Spain may be with respect to advantages to be derived to her from the war.

"I have sent you no answer yet about the question of recaptures, because it is rather an embarrassing business. We are highly dissatisfied with Del Campo's conduct, which, really, seems to be that of a man paid to do all the harm he can, and to make mischief between the



two countries. Some irregularities there must always be in the conduct of sailors, but the magnifying them into grounds of national complaint is preposterous. I am most entirely sensible of your object in the steps you took relative to the *Venus*, though certainly as it turned out they were unfortunate. It does not quite appear by your letters whether the proposition on the part of Spain is confined to future cases. You must feel that, if we were ever so much disposed to it, we have not the power to give a retrospective effect to any such arrangement, and I should be glad to know this point distinctly.

"When you exchange the ratifications, you must give the Duke D'Alcudia to understand that the present could not be prepared in time, and that we thought it more attentive to him, as well as to his Court, not to delay the exchange of the ratifications. The present will be sent by the next courier, and will, I hope, be agreeable to what you suggested. The state of that Court is so ticklish, and its good humour so important, that I think it better you should delay your departure for a month or two, till the Mediterranean campaign is put in train.

"Is Spain meditating an expedition against St. Domingo? or will she be content to be told that she has already possessions enough in America, and that she ought to turn her attention to Europe, to Corsica, and the frontiers of France? Can we find this out without beginning a negotiation of which the end may be so unpleasant if we do not succeed in it? or will it be better to stave off all explanation, and to make the best of our own game? I wish to know your ideas on all this, *à vue de pays*, for it involves nice questions, and very serious questions. In the meantime you will, of course, go on urging them to make the best efforts they can."

*Copy.*

LORD BEAUCHAMP to [W. PITT].

1793, June 24, Piccadilly.—"I feel so much anxiety about the success of the business which you have entrusted to me, that I cannot help submitting two or three ideas which have occurred to me since this morning. The two powerful inducements to the King of Prussia to join heartily with the other powers in the prosecution of the war being—1st, that the exchange of Bavaria is not to be brought forward as a *dédommagement convenable* to the Court of Vienna; and 2nd, that this Court will not endeavour to interrupt the King of Prussia in the enjoyment of his new Polish acquisitions. I wish you to consider whether it may not be right to set his mind to rest on both these topics, by something more authentic than the verbal assurances which you may authorize me to make. I am aware of the delicacy of the first subject in regard to Austria, and cannot suppose that England will do more than declare that if any such measure is proposed on the cessation of hostilities and as a medium of peace, it will receive no countenance from His Majesty's advisers. In respect to the other point, it seems necessary to establish this distinction, that though England on account of the treaty of 1707, and the nature of the late transaction in regard to a neutral unoffending power, was not only prevented from approving, but even felt herself bound to represent against the execution of the partition, yet now the transaction is completed we apply to it the maxim, *Quod fieri non debet factum valet*. Though you might very naturally object to the

guarantee of such flagrant injustice, you may perhaps not hesitate about a declaration that this Court will exert its good offices to prevent the late transactions in Poland from being the subject of future wars and difficulties, if such a declaration is the price at which the King of Prussia's active exertions are to be obtained. If either of these ideas is to be adopted, the next question is how are they to be conveyed so as to produce their full effect?

"I feel the utmost distrust of my own ideas on matters in which I have never been practically conversant, but I should suppose that a confidential letter to me from Lord Grenville on both these subjects, of which I might avail myself only in case of necessity, would be the most effectual method of promoting the purposes of my mission, which I hope to effect, as Lord Malmesbury did at Loo, by personal conference with the King. I cannot at the same time but repeat the opinion I urged this morning, and in which I believe you did me the honour to coincide, that a commission merely to treat, without a power to conclude, will prove only a source of disappointment and regret. The King is surrounded with persons who from private interest will labour to counteract every attempt to lead him to the adoption of such measures as his honour and his future security equally require of him. If, therefore, I can get the length of making any impression on his mind, and am not enabled to avail myself of it on the spot, depend upon it that the impression will be effaced before a messenger can reach you with the information. If I can lay the foundation of future confidence and active co-operation between the two Courts, no public situation will flatter me so much as the character of Ambassador-Extraordinary to the King of Prussia under all the present circumstances of the war; but if I find on my arrival at Mayence that my present hopes of success are ill-founded, and that the important purposes for which alone it was granted cannot be brought about, my duty to His Majesty and to myself will point out to me what part I am bound to take."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 28, Beckenham.—"I wrote a few lines to you this morning relative to the employing M. de Jarry to procure secret intelligence from the interior of France, leaving it to his own ingenuity to suggest and pursue the means for that purpose, at a small and limited expense. Mr. Crawford has since sent to me by a servant the enclosed minutes written by M. de Jarry. I request your Lordship to direct them at any convenient time to be returned to me, as they probably will be demanded.

"The idea of its being expedient for the army of the King of Sardinia to direct its operations through Savoy and towards Lyons, in preference to any attempt to gain possession of Provence, is well stated and well supported.

"Lord Robert Fitzgerald might with a little exertion and address open very interesting communications through Lyons.

"Mr. Crawford is to be with me on Sunday; I can either find means to postpone M. de Jarry entirely (I have never seen him); or I can make any arrangement with him through Mr. Crawford; or I can direct him to wait on your Lordship. M. de Mercy has the highest opinion of his abilities; I answer for nothing farther."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 28, Beckenham.—“I understand that Valence and Dumouriez came to this country certainly with bad intentions; and the latter was indiscreet enough in society at Brussels to talk of the facility of creating troubles among us upon the ground of the reform of Parliament.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 30, Beckenham.—“I do not understand from Starhemberg, who was here this morning, that he has received, or expects to receive, any instruction relative to Lord Hervey's letters. I happen to have seen those papers; they were sent to me from the Continent. *C'était sûrement une vivacité diplomatique, pas des plus mesurées.* The principle however was good, and the lecture given to the Tuscan Ministry, though not authorized nor avowed by your Lordship, is more likely to have an advantageous effect than otherwise. Starhemberg seems to think that the Court of Vienna will not be sorry for the incident.

“The Greffier writes to me—*Le ministère Britannique a montré sa sagesse ordinaire au sujet de Dumouriez. Je viens d'apprendre que ce personnage se dispose à se réconcilier avec les Jacobins, et se dévouer à Marat et à son parti.* The disposition may probably enough exist, but it will not be easily carried into effect.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, June 30, Winchester.—“Many thanks to you for your kind letter, and for the interest you still take in an object which has given me so much concern, and which I consider so hopeless. Mr. Pitt and you are the best judges of the only point now open for discussion, but my opinion leans against any further communication of wishes so ill received hitherto, and so little encouraged.

“I have been for the last week much annoyed by a constant inundation of French prisoners, who have been on their *route* from Portsmouth to Bristol; and my officers, who during the long marches have had much of their conversation, all report that the language of the common men was, with very few exceptions, equally violent, particularly upon the subject of monarchy. The orders which we received with them were so perfectly proper, that we were enabled to maintain strict discipline amongst them; but I am very anxious that you should come to some early decision respecting your *parole* prisoners, who are now nearly doubled at Alresford and Waltham, and are hourly more exceptionable in their language, and in their communications with the country people. I am persuaded that some very unpleasant consequences must arise if this practice is not checked, and I do not know how it is to be done. Your own good heart will make you feel for the French priests now at Winchester, to whom these people (230 at Alresford, and 160 at Waltham) have openly vowed massacre whenever the troops are removed; for which I hourly expect orders, as General Hyde informs me that more prisoners must move from Portsmouth, and that I must, with four companies, take the duty of escorting them from Southampton to Salisbury; at which place I have for the last fourteen days had four

companies, who take them to Warminster. Pray think over some arrangement for sending your *parole* prisoners out of England, for they certainly (as they say openly) serve their country better here than they could do at sea or in France. I wrote a few days since to General Hyde upon other matters, and, at his request, I wrote fully upon this matter to Mr. Dundas.

"We begin to grow very impatient for the fall of Valenciennes, and of the King of Prussia's Troy at Mayence; the last letters to our emigrants from Normandy, by Jersey, speak of the excellent consequences of a diversion on that coast, and of the defenceless state of St. Malo and Cherburgh. From conversing with Captain Bertie (of the *Edgar*) who has just been at the latter, I think that it is worth your attention; and of all blows, it would certainly gratify the public most essentially to see that bugbear removed, by sinking an old vessel to obstruct the channel, and by blowing part of the fort D'Artois and of the Isle Pelée into the opening.

"You promised that you would get a company or a Captain-Lieutenancy for young Talbot of the 24th; vacancies are daily made, and Lord Amherst could do it if he would. Pray do not forget it."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, June—July, Downing Street.]—"It has been unavoidable to fix a Cabinet at *four* to-day; as different accounts have been received which make it pretty clear that the French have detached six or seven sail of the line, with transports and troops, to the West Indies. This seems to make it absolutely necessary that we should instantly send a more considerable force, though at the expense of retarding a little even the fleet to the Mediterranean. I have appointments from this time except between twelve and one, when I could either see you, or call on you.—Saturday, half-past nine.

"I wrote this note thinking it might catch you before you left town in the morning.

"The Cabinet now stands fixed for four to-morrow, and no inconvenience can arise from the delay, as not an hour has been lost for taking all the steps for enabling Gardner to sail with eight or perhaps nine sail of the line. This, on the examination of particulars, may be hoped for in five or six days; and as the French squadron was (according to the accounts) to meet its transports off Cape Ortegal, and might wait there some time for that purpose, it is just possible we might be in time to catch them there; and, if not, there seems no doubt that, with reasonable luck, our force would be in the West Indies before them. By cruising to windward of Barbadoes, we shall then have the chance of intercepting them; of preventing their junction with any other force which may have come from St. Domingo; of endeavouring to prevent their landing their troops either for securing their own islands, or attacking ours; and of covering the arrival of our own transports from Gibraltar, from Cork, and from Halifax, all of which would otherwise be exposed to the greatest dangers. These objects are so essential that I have no doubt you will agree with me that they must not be risked. The intelligence of the actual sailing from Brest is from one of our own frigates which saw them. The account of their destination comes from a channel of intelligence to the Admiralty which has generally been found a good one. The circumstance of having transports makes it almost clear that the force could not be destined for the Mediterranean. It seems, however,

possible that our squadron should in its passage make Cape Spartel, at the mouth of the Streights, and procure intelligence there whether any of the ships have passed the Streights, and according to that intelligence either proceed to Gibraltar, or with the whole or part of the force to the West Indies. The sending this force to the West Indies must, of course, retard sending twenty sail to the Mediterranean, probably for about a fortnight beyond the time they would have gone otherwise; but it seems to me clear that even this inconvenience cannot be put in competition with the objects I have mentioned.

"I imagine it will be most satisfactory to you to come to town for the Cabinet to-morrow; but I have endeavoured to send you as accurate a state of the business as I could, that you may have it in your power to stay if you wish it, and, if you think the question sufficiently clear, to send me your proxy.

"Mr. Aust has brought me a letter to you from M. Bourdien, pressing for some decision by Tuesday, which I have thought it would save time to send to the Attorney-General.

"The accounts from Holland are very promising."

#### LOED AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, July 7, Beckenham.—"Mr. Crawford has talked with Monsieur de Jarry, and upon his report I have proposed the following arrangement, subject to your Lordship's approbation.

"M. de Jarry to receive 100*l.* for the purpose of paying postage and such other means as he may employ to procure printed or written intelligence; when this sum is expended he will give an account of it, that it may be considered before he makes any claim to have a farther sum issued. For his own trouble he is to receive 20*l.* per month to commence from the 1st June, and for six months certain; but not to be continued longer unless he should be thought to merit it. If your Lordship approves this (and nothing certainly can be more moderate) I will immediately give to him, through Mr. Crawford, 100*l.* as above, and 40*l.* for the months of June and July. You will also be so good as to tell me whether he shall send whatever he receives under my cover, or to the Office, or to you at your house; and whether you would like to see him. In the meantime I enclose a paper which he has just sent to me, which contains some good sense, and possibly some good and useful hints.

"I send also a private letter from the Pensionary, to shew that Mr. Eliot may rely on being well received. The Pensionary's application of the anecdote relative to Cæsar has wit. He has also sent to me those strange interceptions from Offenbach relative to Dumouriez. The person mentioned under the name of 'Carlo' is I believe 'Carnot,' the man with whom Dumouriez lodged, and a proper man to be sent off. It would also be a good thing if the *Evêque d'Autun* were to accompany him. The only objection to sending these people off is the general proscription which prevails against them in Europe.

"May I request to have the enclosed letter returned to me."

*Postscript.*—"I do not know whether your Lordship has ever had time to write a word to Sir M. Eden on the subject of the Austrian propositions of alliance; but in the last dispatch from M. de Thugut to Starhemberg (who is here for two or three days) he remarks that England seems to be grown cold about the business."

*Enclosing* letters from the Grand Pensionary of Holland and John Craufurd.

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, July 9, Beckenham.—“I am sorry to interrupt you with the enclosed papers. M. de Jarry seems to write under the supposition that a Russian army is to be employed in France; it may be doubted whether the Empress has ever seriously entertained such an idea, at any rate the season seems to be too far advanced for it. There are, however, some good incidental remarks in the papers relative to other points, and the proposition of sending two persons of known ability and confidence to bring authentic accounts from Gaston certainly may be worth immediate attention. I conceive only that the expense should be limited, and that the parties should be required to convey themselves unless Government is sending ships to the coast. Perhaps your Lordship will either give me some final instruction as to M. de Jarry, or you will send for Mr. Craufurd, who lodges at Conest's hotel in Jermyn Street.

“As I understand that M. de Starhemberg is to have a conference to-night or to-morrow, I take the occasion to mention that he has received a despatch in cipher with which he is dissatisfied; it is full of complaints and suspicions respecting the probable views and policy of the English Government; and it concludes with an injunction to Starhemberg not to sign any convention without previously transmitting it to Vienna to be considered and approved. This may embarrass your Lordship's plans if the King of Prussia should be found practicable. Perhaps the delay might be obviated if the project could now be prepared hypothetically, with an instruction from your Lordship to have it agreed to at Vienna and returned with full powers.”

*Two Enclosures.*

No. 1. A letter from John Craufurd in reference to the employing of M. de Jarry in collecting information in the interior of France.

No. 2. Suggestions by M. de Jarry as to military operations of the allied armies, in concert with the Royalists of Bretagne and Poitou, against the French Republicans.

## LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, July 10, Berne.—Soliciting promotion in the diplomatic service.—“There never was a situation more painful than this one where there is no scope for action, and where all one's dealings must be measured by the narrow-minded, slow, and cautious proceedings of a set of magistrates not agreeing among themselves, and each of the thirteen heads constantly thwarting and coming across each other in every matter of consequence and where the fullest unanimity is requisite. The unbecoming and mean conduct of the greater number towards the democrats of France makes the situation of an English Minister less respectable than it ought to be, and although I cannot complain of want of personal attention to me, yet I think these States have no peculiar claim to such marks of friendship and goodwill as His Majesty has conferred upon them in sending a Minister to reside with them. A person in a public character on the part of our Court here may be of some service in these times I do allow, and I shall always reckon myself happy and proud in being that person; but when the advantage that arises to His Majesty's service by my presence ceases, I should then think myself particularly happy in being removed, and, if a choice is allowed me, I

should particularly point out Brussels as the situation I should above all prefer."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1793, July 11, St. James's Square.—"I think Jarry's terms perfectly reasonable, and should be obliged to you to settle them with Craufurd. He had better send what he has to communicate to my house, but, unless he attaches any importance to seeing me, there is no use in it, and I had rather be spared the trouble.

"I cannot think the Offenbach letters worth any attention. The names are such as any person might easily pick up. The rest has all the air of being spurious. Starhemberg has settled with me that I should send him the *projet de convention* to-morrow, which I can the more easily do as Jacobi has now received powers to negotiate a similar treaty here, and is very pressing to enter on his negotiation."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, July 16.—"I send you a letter from a Mr. Corrie of Liverpool. I know not if you ever accidentally met with him. He used to come to me often on the subject of the corn laws and the sugar trade. He is an ingenious man. His letter ought to go to you, if any use can be made of his materials. What he suggests is certainly very desirable. I have not the subject enough on my recollection to know what is the chance of success."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, July 17, Winchester.—"I have been worried out of my life for the last week by repeated change of quarters and of orders, so as to leave no time to acknowledge your kind letters. Your prophecy of the fall of Condé is complete, but, if I am to credit my letters from Valenciennes, that place will hold out to the end of the month; still, however, you will even then be very forward in the campaign, particularly if Mayence should be as near its close as the French here (who know the place) conceive it to be since the capture of Weissenau and Costheim, and the abandonment of the islands in the Rhine. My confidence, however, is in the internal insurrections, and in the success of the Breton army, though, by the last mails, it seems to have met a severe check. The next accounts from Paris will probably be interesting, as it seems impossible but that Marat's party and the Republican armies must come to blows; and I conclude that the young King is separated from his mother with a view of making him a hostage in Marat's hands.

"I am not surprised at your Martinico news, or rather no news; for in such a lottery, where so much must be staked upon events which you cannot command, it is always more than probable that you must fail; at the same time that the bare possibility of success justifies the attempt. Simcoe writes me word that many men might be raised in Canada for West Indian objects, particularly if the Indian war was at an end. His right hand man, Captain Stephenson, is in London waiting for instructions; if you have any questions you will find him particularly well informed."

## LORD ST. HELENS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, July 19, Madrid.—“I return you my best thanks for your very obliging private letter by the bearer of this. To begin with your *quære* respecting the affair of the brig *Venus*. I have no hesitation in saying that my proposal relative to that business was certainly intended by me, and understood by this Government, as comprehending all cases of recapture whatsoever, past, present, or future; but it appeared no less clearly, upon the very face of it, to have been brought forward merely *sub spe rati*, and, therefore, it's non-ratification, though it may occasion ill-humour here, and be unpleasant to myself, certainly cannot expose His Majesty's Ministers to the imputation of a want of good faith, more especially considering that it is justified by the plea of absolute necessity. I confess, however, that I am still at a loss to comprehend on what grounds the Court of Admiralty has assumed to itself the right of deciding upon this business; or, in other words, how it happens that His Majesty, who appears clearly from the articles of the French treaty of 1787 to have possessed at that time the power of laying down the law of recaptures, should no longer possess that power in 1793, no Act of Parliament having been passed in the meantime to deprive him of it. I need not say that this unfortunate business continues to give me great uneasiness. However, I hope and trust that no consideration regarding myself personally will prevent His Majesty's Ministers from acting in it precisely as they may think right.

“I need not say that I am perfectly ready to remain here as long as you please. This Court is certainly at present in tolerable good humour with us, which may easily be kept up by a show of confidence towards them. However, I am aware that there are many points which must be left on hazard, and many others upon which mutual explanations are next to impossible.

“I have not yet received any present on the occasion of the exchange of the ratifications, and have therefore, of course, said nothing as yet to the Duke de la Alcudia respecting that intended for him.

“I shall not fail to keep in mind what you tell me respecting M. del Campo, who seems to be absolutely incorrigible; and I have, therefore, formed a project for ridding you of him entirely, with the success of which I will acquaint you *en tems et lieu*.”

*Postscript.*—“I omitted mentioning in my despatches that, as the Duke de la Alcudia himself has the superintendency of the Post Office here, he would be better pleased to have the negotiation respecting the packets carried on from Court to Court than through the medium of the Postmaster-General.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, July 20, Windsor.—“That Lord Yarmouth should have found a disposition in the King of Prussia immediately to conclude a convention gives one the more satisfaction, as it shews that there was more awkwardness than design in the strange conduct held towards this country for a considerable time. I agree with Lord Grenville in considering the now probable surrender of Mayence, and the material information to be gathered from the language of Count Lucchesini of the subsequent intention of the Prussians advancing into Champagne, while the Austrian army now joined with them proceed to Alsace, as of the highest consequence to the success of the allies on the side of French Flanders.”



## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, July 20, Beckenham.—“Mr. Craufurd has sent to me the enclosed paper from M. de Jarry. It bears on its face strong marks of intelligence and good sense. I forward it to your Lordship as making a part of what you have already received from me. The subject is certainly of essential and urgent importance, but I touch it with hesitation, because I am out of the way of knowing what passes, and think it more than probable that a full communication respecting the farther conduct of the campaign has already taken place between His Majesty's Ministers and the commanders of the allied armies in Flanders.”

*Enclosure.*

A letter from JOHN CRAUFURD on the subject of a paper, “*Sur l'attaque de la Flandre Française*,” submitted to the English Government by M. DE JARRY.

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, July, Stowe.]—“I have got a most miserable headache, but I have so little time on other days that I will not lose the opportunity of thanking you for your long letter, and particularly for your plan of Mayence, which is hourly more interesting as it is more straitened by the new exertions of the Prussians. The French letters which I have seen speak with certainty of its fall before the 1st of August. I am sorry that none of the letters from Valenciennes speculate sooner than for the 10th. In the meantime, I understand Bouchain and Quesnoy to be invested. I do not of course ask for what ought to be secret, but, surely, if Valenciennes should fall as early as we hope for, is it not practicable, by investing and taking Dunkirk, to straiten Lisle to such a degree during the autumn as to hope for success in carrying it, either by a winter siege, or by the first exertions of a very early spring movement. In short, I look to the capture of the French barrier, and to the retaining that at a peace in lieu of the Austrian barrier so wantonly sacrificed by Joseph II<sup>nd</sup>.

“I fear Lord Hood can do little before Toulon unless the Piedmontese have been decisively successful; and I am sorry for the Martinico disappointment, as it will have a certain degree of effect in England. The Duke of Richmond and General Hyde cut across every plan for meeting as yet.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, July.]—“I have no occasion to wait for you, as I have settled with Lord Chatham the despatch to the Admiralty as the foundation of Lord Hood's instructions. It corresponds exactly with what you have wrote to Naples, so far as that coincidence is requisite. What private communications appear proper to be made to Lord Hood (I mean particularly the information respecting Corsica) I have told Lord Chatham I will make without official form through Mr. Nepean.

“As to the hire of foreign troops, I think you are in perfect safety to authorise to the small extent of the special propositions conveyed by Lord Yarmonth, but I would there stop till the report comes from Lord

Mulgrave, for we certainly at present bear our full proportion of the *present* continental operations. I hope we may do without any, but still, to make the objects more secure, I would undoubtedly endeavour to obtain a force of not less than four thousand, disposable to any service. I would not wish to exclude the East Indies, but I would rather do that than not have them disposable for the West Indies, which certainly is the first point to make perfectly certain. They must be at our command, if got at all, ready to *sail* before the 20th of September, and of course an earlier day named. If a body of men to the amount of four or five thousand men could be secured disposable in the Mediterranean, it would in a great degree answer all purposes, for they could be sent to Gibraltar, and be there ready to act in the Mediterranean if any operations are carried on there; or they could be applied to garrison Gibraltar, and, thereby, set at liberty a greater part of our own troops now at Gibraltar for the service of the West Indies.

"I have minutely gone through the objects, though not the detail, of our naval force. A fleet of not less than 25 sail for the Channel service, of not less than twenty for the Mediterranean, of not less than 12 for the West Indies, and of 5 for the East Indies, and I see no reason to be apprehensive about a sufficiency for all those services in their proper order and in due time.

"I think it is safe to do it, and I am much impressed with the idea of opening a communication with the Court of Vienna for the purpose of putting an end to the speculation of any exchange whatever with Bavaria. It, in truth, never can happen creditably for us as parties to it, and I further think it never can in any case take place. It is therefore very inadvisable to lose the good will and hearty co-operation of Prussia, and likewise the immediate aid of Bavarian force, waiting for another system which can never take place."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1793, July 25, Whitehall.—"Before M. Noailles left England for America he made some offers of service here which were civilly declined on account of his former connections and conduct, and because it was not thought likely that much advantage could be derived from them. He expressed however a desire of being of service to you when he got there, and stated himself to have the means of being so, desiring at the same time that his disposition to that effect might be mentioned to you.

"I presume that the last revolution at Paris may probably have affected M. Genêt's situation, he being understood to be connected with the 'Girondistes.'"

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, July 28, Tunbridge Wells.—"All that has yet been done about the Portuguese ships, *officially*, is a letter to the Lords of the Admiralty, of which I have directed a copy to be sent to you. I have wrote a letter, *private*, to Lord Chatham, giving to him my opinion in terms such as I communicated to you. I am afraid, if my opinion should be adopted, the ships are not yet in a condition to go to sea.

"I hope we have pretty much settled your nephew's business."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1793, July 31, St. James's Square.—"The *Mémoire* [of M. de Jarry] is certainly written with knowledge and judgment." "Our plans are

much facilitated by the surrender of Mentz, and by that of Valenciennes which took place on the 23rd, and of which we have received the account this morning.

"I have *private* reasons for believing that the Greffier is to come over here to discuss some points of the situation and future views of the Republic. I shall have great satisfaction in this arrangement if it takes place. We are now more advanced, and consequently more able to speak out, at least according to my idea, which has always been that explanation ought to follow success in this instance and not to precede it. I remember you once hinted to me some ideas of enterprises to be undertaken by the Dutch in the West Indies. I am apprehensive from Lord Henry Spencer's last letter that these are abandoned. If so, I see nothing that the Dutch can look to but on the side of Flanders and of Maestricht, where every step of land will be disputed with obstinacy and pertinacity, particularly by Count Mercy, who is charged with the superintendence of all that business.

"You will oblige me much by letting me have your ideas on this subject, both in that confidence which I flatter myself is established between us, and also such part of them as you think proper, in a form that may be laid before the King's other Ministers."

#### LORD ST. HELENS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, July 31, Madrid.—"The memorial from Messrs. Neave and Willett, which your Lordship enclosed to me in your private letter of the 17th May, had been transmitted to me through another channel some posts before, and the answer I returned was, in substance, that the circumstances of the case did not appear to me to warrant any particular application upon it, as it was comprehended within the general orders which were transmitted from hence to the Governors of the Spanish West India Settlements in the year 1791. I have, however, since receiving your Lordship's letter, endeavoured to get the business privately recommended to the Governor of Trinidad, but these endeavours have hitherto proved unsuccessful; and, at any rate, I am afraid that Messrs. Neave and Willett have no chance of obtaining redress otherwise than by regular course of law.

"I take this opportunity of recommending to your Lordship's kind protection the infant establishment of the Coruña packet-boats, which has hitherto been so lamely conducted that we have had reason to regret our old conveyance *vid* Lisbon. The messenger Dressins, who brought me your Lordship's despatches of the 21st past, was detained at Falmouth for want of a packet during ten days; and the mail of the 28th was kept there three weeks from the same cause. The Spanish packets, on the contrary, have sailed hitherto with the most perfect regularity."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

Secret.

1793, July 31, St. James's Square.—"I send you another paper of M. Jarry's, which particularly relates to military operations on the side of Dunkirk. As M. Jarry is certainly a man of information and talent, I submit to you the propriety of enclosing copies of his two papers confidentially to Sir James Murray. It will be right to remark

to him that they cannot be communicated to the Prince of Coburg, as they might compromise the writer, who is in some degree under the protection of the Austrians; but if any of the suggestions are found worth attention, they may be made matter of communication. It should also be observed to him that the reasonings in this paper are merely hypothetical, M. Jarry having had no communication respecting the real plan in view. The operations which he recommends for the *whole* force are those which the Austrians really have in contemplation.

"It appears by Lord Yarmouth's letters that, after the surrender of Valenciennes, the Emperor will have at his disposal, of the troops of that siege, sixty thousand Austrians and twenty thousand Germans of the contingents. I have already written to Sir M. Eden to express my expectation that they will communicate to us their plans for the employment of this force, and also any operations which the Prussian army may be to undertake in concert with them. A suggestion of the same sort to Sir James Murray seems very necessary, as Eden will probably be referred to the military communications, as he was before. If there really is any ground for Jarry's apprehension that the Austrian part of Coburg's present army is not sufficient, without the British, for the schemes they have in view, they may now be re-enforced to almost any amount, having eighty thousand more disposable men."

*Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 2, Winchester.—"A thousand congratulations to you upon the very brilliant success at Valenciennes, which was the more unexpected, as I had understood that there was but little chance of carrying by storm the horn-work which the French abandoned so disgracefully. The newspaper of this day has given us the proclamation of orders from the Junte. If I had seen them when I last wrote I should have understood them without tempting the disclosure of secrets; but, with the same object in view, I cannot but earnestly recommend to your attention the little tongue of territory comprehending Philipsbourg, Charlemont, and Givet, all fortified; and to which the French have always attached the utmost importance, as communicating by the very narrow slip of territory belonging to the Bishopric of Liege (by Marche en Famine) to Maestricht, without the necessity of moving on the Imperial dominions; and you will recollect that France has more than once availed herself of this route, which would be closed if you can secure this small nook of dominion and vest it in the Emperor. I am sure that you have well considered your details; but I have always been so much struck with the importance of this object ever since it was stated to me twenty years ago by a General Balthazer, who had been aide-de-camp to Marshal Saxe (who, by the bye, moved on this very route) that I have been tempted to recommend it to your particular consideration. You will see in the *Mémoires du M. de Saxe*, by the Baron D'Espagnac, this route for the march of seven columns engraved. You will, I doubt not, think me very extravagant, when I ask you whether you have considered the question of retaining Dunkirk (supposing it taken) in our hands as the flank of the barrier which we might garrison, defraying the expense by the post duties, which might be an immense object of revenue; and the political as well as commercial advantages might be very great. All this is very premature, but I cannot but wish you to consider it. If it should be an object, you

recollect that you can separate it from the other parts of the *pays-conquis* by stating it to have been acquired by Louis XIV. by *purchase from England*, and not conquered from or ceded by the Government of Brussels, either Spanish or Imperial. I should have waited for an opportunity of talking this over but that my army letters state a report that you are going to besiege Bergues, which has determined me to open this idea to you. I do not, of course, pretend to be master of all the bearings of this question; but do not throw it away at once for its eccentricity."

*Postscript.*—"We have just got news of the capture of Guadeloupe, on which I sincerely give you joy; but the news of the arrival at St. Domingo of the French fleet, and of the detention of the Jamaica fleet, is unlucky. You cannot now send ships thither till the month of October."

#### THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 4, Brighthelmstone.—"Many thanks to you for your early and very kind attention to my anxiety on account of Henry. He arrived here yesterday, after having been a month on the voyage from Gottenburg, and having been reduced during the greatest part of the time to live upon red herrings and biscuit. I am extremely obliged to you for your intention of presenting him at Court, which will save me the trouble of a journey to town, and be an advantage to him.

"He has mentioned to me that he has necessarily incurred some extraordinary expenses since he has been *Chargé des Affaires*, beyond his salary as Secretary of Legation. Whatever you think right to do on that subject will of course be satisfactory both to him and me. He will state the particulars of his situation to you, and submit most heartily to your decision. Will you have the goodness to give him a letter for Sir James Murray before he sets out, and to state in the letter the very creditable manner of his return from his diplomatic situation for the purpose of joining his regiment.

"I like all the accounts from France very much, but I shall not be satisfied until I find people in general looking forward to a second campaign, as the necessary consummation of our present successes. The language I hear is, 'all this is very good, because it promises a conclusion of the war in this campaign.' I own I do not think it possible to accomplish all I wish to see done in one campaign, but I hope I may be mistaken.

"His Royal Highness has been most prodigiously gracious to me, and most remarkably so at the great dinner which he gave on the victory at Valenciennes; from which I collect, as well as from his language, that his politics are quite steady; he has seen Henry at his own desire."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1793, August 7, Whitehall.—"I forgot to mention to you that the ratification of the Sicilian treaty having been sent, the forces therein

stipulated, namely, four ships of the line and six thousand troops, are at the King's disposal.

"It seems to me that no time should be lost in apprizing Lord Hood of this circumstance, authorizing him to make the requisition for these forces, and to dispose of them as he thinks best.

"The two obvious means of employing them are either to co-operate in the recovery of Nice, or to make a separate expedition to relieve Corsica, while Lord Hood keeps the French fleet at bay."

*Copy.*

#### J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 10, Whitehall.—"By a French paper of the third of this month, which Mr. Huskisson sent to Mr. Pitt, it appears that the Convention, on receiving the account of the surrender of Valenciennes, decreed that the Queen should be brought to trial, and that she should be immediately transferred to the Conciergerie. The latter was instantly done.

"I also understand that an account has been received of Admiral Gardner having dispatched, after his failure at Martinique, several men-of-war for the protection of Jamaica."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 11, Windsor.—"I am sorry, though not surprised, that the cruel wretches who have possessed themselves of power in France have ordered the unhappy Queen-mother to be tried, the result of which can be most easily conceived. To a man who looks on the conduct of those savages with the rational eye Lord Grenville does, it must be equal surprise as with me what lengths Divine Providence will permit them to go, and I am certain he has been equally shocked with me at their blasphemous comparison in the National Assembly on Marat."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 12, Portsmouth.—"At the earnest request of Captain Warne, who is just named to the efficient command of the Portuguese squadron, I have given him this letter to entreat you to hear him upon the points which he feels it essential to communicate to Lord Chatham. You will learn his character to be very high, and very many of these points having fallen under my own eye; I cannot but be most anxious that you should have the earliest information of them. The state of that squadron is in one word most alarming, not only as you will lose any service which you had proposed to yourself from it, but as it must ultimately fall upon your shoulders. It was stated not to want a nail; I can, from a personal examination of them, say that they are hourly in danger of parting from their very slight anchors and cables; and though they are willing to buy others, yet none of sufficient size can be procured save from the King's yards. They actually drove in the last gale at Spithead, and a few hours' longer gale would have driven them foul of six line-of-battle of ours lying within them. Their large ship, particularly, is in a most ruinous state as to her sails, cordage, and naval furniture. But the provisions of the whole are dreadfully short,

most certainly not more than seven weeks; and of so execrable a quality, that they are hourly falling down in a putrid fever, of which it is impossible to foresee the extent. Above three hundred are now in our hospital, and one hundred more are to be moved to-morrow and next day. Bedding they have *none*, hammocks *none*, clothing, save what they wear, *none*. All these details, of course, are more than you can enter into; but the result is that unless you can get these ships away into a warmer climate (for officers and men told me that they are starved with the cold of this climate) you will find this whole fleet sink under your walls, and your naval hospital filled with the wretched 5,000 men now on board. Of the ignorance, folly, and imbecility of the old admiral, and of the bulk of the officers, I say nothing, because it cannot be helped; but I earnestly beg you to consider well the means of supplying them, so as to enable them to go in the course of this fortnight, or prepare yourself to see all your operations cramped in this port, and an infectious pestilence in our fleet, and the Court of Portugal ready to throw upon you the miseries of these men, who are sacrificed most cruelly. They never can act in our squadron, as the rate of their flagship is so ridiculously inferior to any Dutch dogger ever built; and their furniture is so totally unable to struggle with the autumn and Michaelmas gales which they will meet in September upon our coasts, that I would earnestly beg you not to lose a moment in making up your minds.

"No one knows that I write to you save Captain Warne, and he only knows that I write to present him to you, and in very general terms; but everything which I have stated has been urged to me by Lord Chatham's warmest friends here, namely, Captains Berkeley, Payne, Pakenham, and by Captains Rodney and Eliab Harvey, who have in private told me that the clamour is universal amongst the navy against the Portuguese Minister, who has misled Lord Chatham to believe them fit to render immediate service anywhere, or any service in these seas. At all events you will believe that I can have but one object in all this, and that is suggested by my personal affection to you."

*Postscript*.—"Nothing can exceed the pestilential stench on board the flag ship in particular, or the horrid appearance of the poor wretches whom *I saw* on board, struggling in this horrid fever on the bare deck."

LORD GREENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [Loughborough].

1793, August 15, St. James's Square.—"I return your Lordship Monsieur de Lally's letter. The object is one which cannot fail to come home to the feelings of every man who has human feelings. But I much fear that his zeal makes him a great deal too sanguine when he thinks that the situation of this year differs so far from that of last year as to make threats effectual now which were at best ineffectual then. In truth, I believe the security of the Convention is in the old principle, *defendit numerus*; there seems hardly the possibility of selecting and marking out for vengeance a few where so many are equally guilty; and their confidence is that on so many personal vengeance cannot fall. I rather incline, however, to hope that the present object is only to alarm the fears of those who are interested in the fate of this unhappy family, and that they will not hastily sacrifice hostages so valuable."

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1793, August 15, St. James's Square.—“I send you a note I have received from Captain Warne, whom I saw this morning, relative to the state of the Portuguese ships. It seems clear that the idea of deriving real assistance from them must be abandoned, at least if Warre's representation is accurate. If this is the case, the best thing we can do is to get them home again as soon as we can, and without offending the Court of Lisbon, and particularly M. de Mello, who has certainly acted with the best intentions. Lord Howe's waiting till they are ready is clearly out of the question, but I think they might sail as soon as they are ready, with directions to look for him in a given latitude for a day or two at most, and, not finding him, then to cruise to the southward, till their provisions require them to return to Lisbon. If they do meet with Lord Howe, it must then rest with him to find some proper mode of detaching them to the southward, with similar instructions for returning home.

“There are some prisoners (passengers taken aboard an American ship) still detained at Liverpool, because there is some hesitation in the Admiralty to give orders to discharge them without directions from your Office. I do not pretend to decide where the orders should originate, but it is cruel that these poor people should, on such an account, be detained an hour longer in prison, contrary to the constant practice of war; which, I apprehend, is to consider enemies' subjects, being mere passengers, as not liable to be taken out of a neutral ship, nor even to have their wearing apparel, watches, and other things taken from them, as has been done in this case. Pray enquire about it.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, August 16, Beckenham.—“The terms of perfect confidence in which both the Greffier and Starhemberg have been accustomed to talk with me on the businesses which pass through their hands subject me to some embarrassment in the present moment, when they are adopting and urging contentious notions and interests which your Lordship will probably wish to conciliate, but respecting which I am equally afraid of saying too much or too little. Yesterday at the Drawing Room the Greffier told me that ‘his negotiation was going as ill as possible; that your Lordship seemed to think that little could be done in it, except on a principle of engaging the King's Government to prosecute the war beyond the views and principles hitherto avowed in the different treaties; and that if no means could be found to obviate that objection, he wished to consult me whether it would not be advisable (for his own sake at least) to close his mission and to return immediately to the Hague; as I must feel for him, that his failure (if he ultimately should fail) would operate against him in proportion to the length of his stay in this country.’ I did not allow him to go into particulars; the place was not suitable, and he is to dine and sleep here to-morrow in his way to Lady Holderness. I thought it sufficient to recommend to him to repose himself implicitly on the honourable and prudent manner in which your Lordship would advise him and conduct his negotiation. Starhemberg next attacked me; he told me that I knew well his disposition to facilitate whatever could promote an intimate connection with England, even at the expense of some sacrifices to the



Republic, which however had no pretensions, having merely entered into the war to preserve her own existence; le[a]st of all had she pretensions to be fattened at the expense of the Emperor, and that the principle established was that the *dédommagement* for each party should be taken from the French possessions. He added in candour that, though your Lordship had desired him to wait for a few days before you entered into a particular discussion with him, what he had collected from you seemed to imply that, in truth, the demands of the Dutch were not so extravagant as had been reported and expected. He here mentioned Lillo and Lifhenshoech and the *arrondissement* of Maestricht as the objects known to be in contemplation (from which I did not dissent, I only asked *en passant* what he would think of Ostend and Anvers) and he finished by confiding to me that he had received a letter from the Comte de Mercy on the business of the Greffier's mission '*remplie d'alarmes et très récalcitrante.*' I thought it sufficient to answer him in general expressions. I accordingly remarked that the Republic had come into the war to preserve her own existence; it was equally true that all the other powers were in the same predicament; that supposing Lillo and Lifhenshoech and various districts to be demanded, it was not fair to treat them as sacrifices gratuitously made by the Emperor, for these cessions pre-supposed a considerable aggrandisement to be made by the Emperor on the French side of Flanders, by the joint aid of the Dutch and English armies; that it was an unfair and false reasoning to require that the *dédommagement* for each party should be taken out of the French territory, but if it were insisted on, I saw no answer to a claim of the Dutch to have a part of the towns and districts now conquering in French Flanders; that in short he must feel that, in the supposition of the conquests to be made for the Emperor and to be retained by him, it was reasonable to give to the Dutch even more than they were supposed to ask." "The conversation closed by his saying that I knew the delicacy of his position, and the foolish prejudices which he had to combat; but that he would write confidentially to M. de Thugut to know to the utmost how far he might go; and that, in that case, he would like much to be supported by your Lordship through Sir Morton Eden.

"I see the extent of the objection which your Lordship has stated to the Greffier. It certainly would be inexpedient to enter into any instrument to bind the country to a war for conquests; but, on the other hand, if the Court of Vienna, under your Lordship's influence and recommendation, would give a secret and liberal assurance to the Republic of the nature required, in the supposition of gaining a new barrier in French Flanders, it is possible that all parties might be contented."

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 16 [Downing Street].—"I should not feel any material difficulty in giving the reversion of a share of Lord Torrington's pension to his two daughters. Do you think 200*l.* to each would be sufficient."

"The proposal of restoring the limits of 1718 may certainly be annexed to the alliance without incurring the objections which weigh with me, against the positive stipulation for acquisitions to Austria. And if it can be carried, which I think very probable, I should be glad of it; but though I would press it earnestly, I can hardly make up my mind to think that it ought to be absolutely a *sine qua non* of the alliance with Austria. I should be more inclined to see whether we cannot satisfy the Dutch with *Nizapatnam* [Nizampatam] or turn their views

to some acquisition out of Europe. The ground, however, on which you propose the ancient limits is so fair that I am in great hopes it will be agreed to. My only doubt is whether it comes to the point. It is material enough to obstruct the giving solidity to our connection with Austria, which is probably material to induce them to persist in the war, instead of looking to other projects.

"I shall not get out of town till some time on Sunday, but if you are likely to be at Dropmore I will call and probably dine, in my way to Somersetshire."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 18, Wilderness.—"I return you Lord Buckingham's letter on the subject of the Portuguese ships. Mr. Pitt will have explained to you what passed with Lord Chatham and him on that subject. Lord Chatham is now here. He agrees with us all as to the absolute necessity of getting rid of them as fast as possible. I have advised him to send for Captain Warne immediately on his return to town to-morrow, and concert with him what is essentially necessary to enable [them] to get home.

"I never heard of the circumstance of the American ship's prisoners detained at Liverpool till I received your letter. I gave immediate orders about it, and sent an official letter to the Admiralty."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 20, Tunbridge Wells.—"I return you the Duke of Hamilton's letter. I am a total stranger to the particulars mentioned in his Grace's letter. The chaplaincy held by Dr. Robertson has been long since disposed of to Dr. Hardie, one of the most respectable clergymen in Scotland, and whose publications made a very-conspicuous figure in support of the constitution, during the scenes of last winter in Scotland. Dr. Robertson likewise held a pension of 200*l.*, which the King has been advised to divide into four small chaplaincies, and these have been promised away upon similar grounds. I am totally unacquainted with Mr. Fleming, and, of course, cannot judge of his pretensions further than I am to presume from his enjoying the Duke of Hamilton's protection; but, if I had several more chaplaincies to dispose of at present, I should feel myself bound to dispose of them upon the same grounds which led me to recommend to the others."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCLAND.

1793, August 21, St. James's Square.—"I have not answered your letter respecting the Greffier because I have waited in hourly expectation of Starhemberg's receiving back his courier with instructions relative to the proposal of an alliance, which must enable us to *entamer* the Dutch discussion with more advantage than any other time or mode would afford.

"Respecting the Greffier's situation I hardly know what to advise. It is certainly our wish to obtain for the Republic what she asks, and I have little doubt that we shall ultimately do it; but it may take much time to arrange any formal treaties or assurances on the subject with all the difficulties which we are to attend to here, and which cannot be overlooked for any consideration however material, because upon an

attention to them depends the whole success of the business we are embarked in."—"I believe there is no other solution to the difficulty but that the Ministers of the Republic, if they have confidence in us, should make up their minds to tell their friends that they have so, and to meet their enemies on that ground."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793], August 24, Burton Pynsent.—"Your messenger arrived here very early this morning. I return the despatches, on which we may talk fully when we meet. They open a prospect which, on the whole, I like very much. I shall leave this place to-morrow morning, and mean to be with you at Dropmore either to-morrow night, or before breakfast the next day."

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 24, Winchester.—"I feel extremely obliged to you for the kind attentions with which you send me the early *précis* of what passes in Flanders, where we are all so personally interested. I find, by letters from camp, that the Dutch have not risen in estimation from this event. I have no doubt that your calculations of strength are properly arranged, but I cannot avoid expressing some uneasiness that the force of the army destined for the siege of Dunkirk should be only 40,000 men, for that is the number with the Duke of York. Did you ever see Major-General Morgan's narrative of the share which his troops had in the capture of that place? It is curious and interesting. I do not know how far you look to any project of throwing stores on shore in Bretagne, and still less can we depend upon newspaper accounts; but my old Breton admiral came to me open-mouthed with an article in the newspapers, and with the same narrative in private letters, that the Royalists had seized the little port of Sables. He says that this small port, being near Rochfort, where he passed twenty years of his life, and near his own estate, he knows every part and point of it; and wishes you to know that [it] is secure for about twenty ships not drawing more than 16 feet [of] water, and capable of taking the ground, for it is dry at low water; at the same time he has anchored in large ships and in frigates a thousand times opposite to it, where the bottom is without rocks, or any other inconvenience; and that, in case of a south-west wind they could go to sea, of a wind at west they could find shelter near the Isle of Aix, out of reach of the guns from shore, and with the wind at north-west the ground is so good that he has rid at anchor in a gale for three days from that quarter. If, therefore, the capture should be true, and if you wish to send either a vessel for communication with shore, or a vessel with gunpowder (which they want very much) and some flints and ball (for they have neither) under the convoy of a frigate, he would give the officer every instruction for his navigation and anchorage, or he would, if you wished it, accompany such a mission, or even undertake a communication, in a very small ship, with that part of the shore. I do not, of course, wish to ask you any uneasy questions; but if you look that way, with a view of helping the insurgents by arms and powder, I am persuaded you will draw much advantage from this old man's knowledge of the coasts and interior of Bretagne. He says that Sables is surrounded by an immense marsh, and has only one road upon a *chaussée* defensible against any numbers.

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"Your cursed Portuguese are come down most delighted with your dinner, which they seemed to have swallowed with the same glee as they did all the civilities which the King and others fed them with. It is understood at Portsmouth that you have pressed them to go. For God's sake do not believe me a gloomy prophet in what I have told you, and in what I still most earnestly urge respecting them.

"Lord Amherst is giving companies right hand and left to different officers, without any attention to Lieutenant Talbot, for whom I asked a company six months ago, and for whom you have interested yourself so kindly. Do not think me troublesome to you if I re-urge it as a matter which my wife and I have much at heart, and by which you could oblige me most sensibly. I cannot say how much I am hurt to press this, but the boy will be undone if we cannot carry this point for him.

"I do not know what care you have taken of yourself in the chapter of venison from Stowe. If you have had none, I shall be tempted to blame you for not having sent your orders."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 26 [Winchester].—"Lord Amherst is doing exactly what I suspected, namely, shuffling on the subject of my poor *protégé*. I had, at a very large expense, engaged in raising a company for him, which Sir G. Yonge (before Lord Amherst's command) allowed. The expense of this was so extravagant, and the success so slow, that, after raising seventy men, I doubted of it, and applied to Lord Amherst to give him a company, which he promised; but I have persevered, though very slowly, in raising men for fear of a disappointment, and knowing that I could always get rid of those men who belonged to Talbot and to his Lieutenant whenever I pleased. His answer to Mr. Pitt evidently shuffles off any engagement, and therefore I must have recourse to your friendship in this matter, which I have much at heart, as my wife presses much for it, and the delay is ruin.

"I did not like to say a cross thing, especially when it can be of no use; but it was only from civility to you that I have abstained from writing to you very much upon Lord Howe's return, which, if it disappointed you, most certainly astonished me. There was not a pretence of want of water or provisions beyond what might have been furnished at sea from one ship to another; and the bulk of the fleet have not at this hour touched their ground tier of water. At Portsmouth no one could conceive his motives, and supposed him ordered to port to fit for an attempt with transports upon Brittany; but, whatever be the motive of his conduct, I fear that you will have suffered in general estimation from the inactivity of our vast naval force. I mentioned [this] to Lord Chatham, having passed three days with him at Portsmouth, and having found him full of complaints and of ill humour.

"You do not tell me whether you would wish me to keep my old Breton admiral in England. He has found means to enable himself to go back to the Prince of Condé, which he means to do on the 10th of September, at which period he supposes that it will be clear whether Gaston's army can or cannot open a communication with the sea; till then it is not necessary for me to say one word to him, but a hint from you that it is possible that you may want him will be sufficient for me to find means of detaining him. His property and connexions in Bretagne, and his perfect knowledge of that coast, and of Brest and Rochfort (at both of which he commanded as admiral) may be useful.

He seems particularly to wish to try to open a communication in a very small vessel, in which he would embark with three or four of his officers, if he could be permitted to risk it. I do not know how far this is likely to succeed, but he is very sanguine.

"What is become of your Sardinians? I have looked for them very impatiently towards Nice and Toulon, and shall be much mortified if all our Mediterranean force and alliance ends in nothing. Mr. Hussey (the Spanish chaplain) told me two days ago that news had been received of a second repulse of the Spaniards before Perpignan.

"The *Relation of Major-General Morgan's progress in France and Flanders*, as delivered by the General himself, is a very small octavo which I have at Stowe; and I have found it again here in a *quarto* called "*Phœnix Britannicus*, printed and compiled by J. Morgan, 1782," vol. 1, containing six numbers, of which I believe no more were printed. It is curious, but not instructive.

"I have thought much of late about Cherbourg. I have not the new chart of it, but I am very much inclined to believe from Captain Bertie's account of it, that it is practicable to take it, but certainly to destroy it. Captain D'Auvergne of the navy is the best able to give information, having, in the course of a four years' Channel cruise in the *Narcissus*, anchored there much oftener than in Portsmouth."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, September 1, Beckenham.—"The Greffier conceives hopes that that his negotiation in your hands may not be quite unproductive. I understand that your Lordship means to have a full and confidential explanation on this subject, through Sir Morton Eden, with the Austrian Ministers; and certainly such an opening may do good in many points of view, and will at least tend to lessen the suspicions which prevail in that Court, even if it should not produce the eventual agreement in favour of the Republic which the Greffier has in view. This consideration, like many others which are every day presenting themselves, is connected with the general outline or plan for the close of the war, and unhappily circumstances are not yet sufficiently matured to make it possible to form that outline.

"From the King of Prussia's march of additional troops, and from the manner in which the Austrian Ministers talk of besieging Lisle in full form next spring, I am willing to believe that those two powers will have both the disposition and the means to maintain the struggle till we arrive at a safe pacification.

"I sometimes think it possible that the whole French machine may suddenly fall to pieces under the general pressure which bears against it, and enable us with safety to put an end to the expenses, in part at least, of the war, and to restore to a certain degree the general circulation of commerce. Many circumstances show that the French provinces are growing ripe for a *contre-revolution*, and that the war is maintained chiefly by the desperate efforts of the regicides and by the dregs of a maddened people. Under this speculation I sometimes think that the moment is not far distant when a joint manifesto might be issued by the allied powers of a nature well calculated to place the war and all its objects on their just principle, and to render great service. It is become a general prejudice for the moment to believe that, because

the Duke of Brunswic published a bad manifesto, it is impossible to publish a good one, but I conceive that, if the moment comes, your Lordship could turn the sort of paper which I mean with infinite advantages."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 1, Winchester.—"I feel how little I have a right to trouble you upon a matter so perfectly unconnected with your official duties as the subject of the enclosed letter; but the parties the most interested in it (I mean Monsieur Martin and the French clergy) appear to me so much wounded at the very idea of any misconception on the part of His Majesty respecting their conduct, that they have (from motives of humanity towards them) got the better of my disinclination, and have persuaded me to send you the letter of the Bishop of St. Pol, in hopes that you might find some means of assuring the King that the ecclesiastics at Winchester have not only offered daily prayers for the Queen of France, but that, upon the first news of her removal from the Temple, they performed a particular service which they told me lasts for forty hours, and which is performed (according to their Church) whenever any of their Royal family are in particular danger. It is possible that the Bishop may have been misinformed as to any declaration from the King upon this subject; but if His Majesty has been misinformed, the French clergy of this place will be miserable till they can find the means of removing the unfavourable impressions which this imputation must have suggested to his mind. I have taken every pains to detect a horrid murder committed upon one of these unfortunate men four days ago; but the police of this city is so bad that I very much doubt any immediate discovery. From circumstances, I am rather inclined to suspect one of my soldiers."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 2 [Winchester].—"I forgot yesterday to answer your note respecting the Greffier, to whom, for every reason, I would have wished to have shewn every attention; but I have no servants, no cook, no butler at Stowe, and I should not like to do a thing of that sort by halves. My new Baddison, a Mr. Murray, is very unequal to doing the honours of the place, and if any gross blunder was made, of which (though a very good upholsterer) he is very capable, I should feel pained by it. Under these circumstances, it is possibly more natural to suppose that I know nothing of his intentions.

"I forgot likewise to mention to you that the Duke of York has certainly been open-mouthed against the Admiralty and Ordnance Offices for disappointing him in their respective departments, and this has given the tone to the repetition of the same charges from many of the officers who have written home. I mention this simply that you may be informed of it; but I think that a cry seems forming against Lord Chatlam which makes me uneasy. One letter which I have seen cries out loudly for gun boats; if these should be wanting (some are gone to Dunkirk) perhaps Lord Chatham may not know that the completest boat of the sort is now in Portsmouth yard under a wooden covering; and, as I have reason to believe, not reported in the ordinary of the yard. It carries a 24 pound gun."

## LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1793, September 4, Whitehall.—“From the nature of the suggestion mentioned by your Lordship to have been made to you by Count Mercy, I felt it my duty to lose no time in submitting to His Majesty this strong proof of the Emperor’s attentions towards His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and of the just sense entertained by His Imperial Majesty of the distinguished merits of His Royal Highness. His Majesty could not but feel highly gratified at a circumstance so honourable to the Duke of York, and at the same time marking so strongly the Emperor’s wish to prove his friendship towards His Majesty, and his favourable opinion of His Royal Highness. But it was, at the same time, felt that the difficulties alluded to by your Lordship, in the letter in which you conveyed to me this intimation, were of considerable weight. And, on the whole, it seems to be rather desirable that the proposal should not be made, as the acceptance might lead to embarrassment; and as, on the other hand, it is felt that the declining the proposal when actually made might, in many points of view, be unpleasant.

“Although no further suggestion can with propriety be made on the part of His Majesty, or of His Royal Highness, it may perhaps occur in conversation that there might be other marks of attention, nearly of a similar nature, to which the same objections would not apply, and which there could be no impropriety in His Royal Highness’s accepting, in order to prove the value which the King and His Royal Highness both attach to any public testimony of the Emperor’s regard towards His Royal Highness, although difficulties have stood in the way of the particular mode proposed. The present of a sword, or any similar mark of esteem and favourable opinion, might answer the purpose which the Emperor had in view; and the impression produced by a public testimony of approbation so well merited could not but be advantageous. It can hardly be necessary for me to add that this suggestion is stated to your Lordship without the knowledge of His Royal Highness.”

*Copy.*

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 5 [Weymouth].—“I enclose to you a letter for my brother at Vienna, as I find from his accounts that he is not likely to have it before the end of this month. He does not seem very sanguine as to the success of his negotiation, and I have taken some pains to explain to him the reasons why I shall not be very sorry if that part of it fails which is supposed to treat for taking some Austrian troops into English pay, a measure which I never will believe till I see it concluded. You certainly will want troops, but changing the paymaster or the commander of the Austrians now at Liège and Maestricht will not add one man to the allied force; and I cannot avoid pressing you to consider another idea which, from some pains which I have taken for information, I am persuaded would give you almost any number; and that is, to take into your pay the remnants of the Prince of Condé’s army (about 2700 men) as a foundation for a French army which might be raised, including your actual levies, to twenty-five thousand men without any real difficulty, and applicable to any object

either on the Continent or on expedition, and of a description who have certainly shewn the fullest exertions whenever they were necessary. If these corps were formed upon the old French establishment of six companies of 160 men and five officers each, they would cost about half what ours do, and some of their navy officers might be separated and attached to each corps to serve as artillery. I am sure that I do not exaggerate the number whom you may assemble by such an arrangement, and I cannot conceive the slightest objection to it as a separate army *not blended with our men*. I have been so little in the habit of communication of late upon any public points, that I doubted whether to trouble you with this, but as I am very sanguine in my hopes from it, I cannot but wish you to let me know whether you think well of it.

"The King is in very high health and means to be very civil to me. I am uneasy about him, for the naval guard is certainly very ill done, but there is no help. He speaks very highly of the manner in which we do our duty, which gives him good protection and no trouble. Lord Howe past Portland yesterday at 2 o'clock; we have had a most violent gale at south-west last night, which makes our seamen afraid that he may have been forced to anchor in Torbay; but as he was standing to the south at 2 o'clock, I hope he may have gained a sufficient offing to enable him to keep the sea. Our Portuguese naval allies have done us more mischief than they will our enemies, having got foul of two of our ships and damaged one of them, the *Barfleur*, 98 guns, so as to force her back to Portsmouth. I wish they were safe at Lisbon.

"I have heard from Colonel Nugent, who is happy beyond measure at his situation, which he thinks secure; but he is loud as to the apparent negligence and indifference of the Dutch."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, September 7, Downing Street.]—"The expectation we began to form to-day about Toulon is happily verified, and though perhaps not in all respects as one should wish, it is on the whole a most fortunate event. Many things ought to be done immediately to make the best use of the advantage; and particularly I should think we ought again to press the Emperor, and perhaps Spain, to send troops to act in that quarter. I think you will not be sorry to come to town again to-morrow to talk this over; and if any thing is to be done, it ought to be done soon."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 8 [Winchester].—"After talking a great deal with my admiral, the Comte de Cillart, I did not think it a sufficient object to endeavour to detain him for the chance of the little assistance which he might be able to give; he therefore goes to London for two days on his road to Mayence, for which place he begs your passport, and earnestly begs to *faire sa cour* to you for one minute. He really is an excellent old man, and, if you could allow him to present to you my note of introduction, I should be obliged to you for the one minute which you would bestow upon him.

"Most cordially do I give you joy of the arrival of the Jamaica and Lisbon fleets. I shall be impatient to learn what number of men have



been taken out of them, but I know that it is estimated that these 250 sail ought to give 2,000 men, and God knows your fleet wants them ; it is, however, certain that there are many seamen in every port, if the press was as hot as it might be. As I am now looking forward to my arrangements for the rest of the year, I will beg you to let me know what you have decided, or what you expect respecting the meeting of Parliament."

*Postscript.*—"If you are in a communicative disposition, and if you know it, you will let me know what Lord Howe is come back for."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 13, Winchester.—"I ought to have acknowledged your great kindness in sending me the long and interesting narrative of yesterday, but my whole afternoon was employed in making out muster rolls with the commissary. It is possibly not very easy for you to calculate exactly the consequences of this wretched check, much less so for me, but I see that it will be productive of very serious consequences by encouraging the enemy abroad, and our discontented at home. And unfortunately the season seems too far advanced to give us the means of undertaking any siege of length. I fear from what you say that Dunkirk is now wholly out of the question, at the same time I very much doubt if it is not wisest for us to persevere. I say nothing of point of honour, which may not be worth much attention, but the trifling battering train left behind (not more than the lower battery of a 64 gun ship) can be very easily resupplied, and no other measure can be undertaken which can be so readily and so effectually supplied from Great Britain. Macbride's ship the *Cumberland*, now lying idle in the Downs, can supply her lower battery; you have three battalions in the Downs (namely, 19th, 42nd, 59th), one in transports coming from Falmouth to Guernsey (63rd), two more in those islands (namely, 27th, 28th), one new corps (Seaforth's), and one old corps, I believe (57th), coming round from Scotland, and one more (the 3rd) at Windsor. Total, nine battalions within reach of Dunkirk. Of these, Seaforth's and one old corps are sufficient for the islands of Guernsey and Jersey; or if not, I am perfectly ready to answer for my regiment embarking with me at a moment's warning for them. You will easily believe that I have no military ardour or vanity, but simply a wish to liberate a more useful regiment. I have, at the earnest request of my officers, who have pressed me to offer this by official letter (which I will not do till you have given me your answer) looked over the Militia Act, and, I fear, that though these islands are within Great Britain as to ecclesiastical jurisdiction (of Winchester) yet they are not so to other purposes. Still, however, if you the Ministers are willing to trust for indemnification to Parliament, I am ready to take my share.

"With this reinforcement, which will give the Duke of York 4,000 men, I think he may resume the siege; and the convenience of supplying him from the sea with cannon, stores, and provisions will assuredly throw him in a greater state of forwardness to this than he can be to any other object whatsoever where, of course, all these articles must be collected and brought up from magazines much more remote and insecure for supply than the ports of Great Britain. I think it possible that these ideas, which I have turned very much in my mind, may stagger at first,

but I cannot help thinking that they are very well deserving attention. You will observe that in all this I say nothing of the essential, I mean a covering army, upon which so much depends; but I should hope that the additional 6,000 Hessians from Mayence, or some Austrians liberated from the siege of Quesnoy, may give M. Freytag the means of repelling any similar attempt.

"I do not, of course, expect you to answer any part of this letter save that in which I am personally concerned; if indeed I can be more personally concerned in any point than in whatever interests your political character and happiness."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 15, Windsor.—"I am not surprised at the Landgrave's objecting to his troops serving out of Europe, as I believe there is, as yet, no instance of German Princes subsidizing them for such a purpose.

"I am sorry to enclose a letter communicated to me by the Prince of Wales, by which you will see the Dutch have again been routed; so bad troops and so indifferent a General can scarcely be found out of Italy."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 15, Winchester.—"A thousand thanks to you and as many congratulations for your two *Gazettes*. We have now only to pray that the patriots may besiege Toulon, and that the issue of the contest may be the conflagration of the docks and fleet. I wish to remind you that Lord Hood's 1,500 men have not a single field officer with them, and that you ought to send some *immediately*; the 29th is on board his fleet as marines, and therefore are now at Toulon; if so, Colonel Lord Cathcart is the senior whom you can send, unless you order a General. I mention this as it might have escaped you. No artillery officers are in the fleet; it might be advisable to order three or four overland to Genoa, and an order for a further supply of men and officers from Gibraltar.

"Quesnoy is (under all its circumstances) almost as important; you do not say whether the second victory of Beaulieu on the 10th is confirmed or not; but I am, under every thought which I could give to it, most anxious that you should resume the siege of Dunkirk.

"The idea which I pointed at could only be justified by urgent and imminent necessity; whenever that occurs it is good that you should know that the militia nearest to those points are ready to waive the restriction, and you will easily see my reasons for wishing that this communication should not be known, as it carries an appearance (when the offer is not accepted) very different from the real fact.

"I will beg you to let me know what is decided about Parliament, as I must arrange my motions accordingly.

"I rather think that the cry against the Duke of Richmond and Lord Chatham increases from this misfortune at Dunkirk. If you should think it necessary to equip any of the French ships with French royalist navy officers, I wish to mention to you that the Comte

Hector, their best officer and senior for service, is now at Ham with the Princes; and that my Comte Cillart, who leaves London this day, etays with his family at Maestricht one week.

"What says the great man respecting a company for young Talbot? Commissions are flying in every direction."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1793, September 16, Dropmore.—"There is an expression in Trevor's last despatch, in which he mentions that Mulgrave will find himself the senior land officer at Toulon. With my opinion of his zeal and talents, I earnestly wish he could maintain that situation, at least for the present; but I am not quite sure how that would be best brought about.

"It has been suggested to me that, even if we cannot send troops, the sending an engineer or two and a few artillery officers, who might go by land in ten days or a fortnight, might be a most essential point.

"I guess from Lord Robert FitzGerald's letter that they are taking steps to get some men in Switzerland, but I do not understand well how."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Private.

1793, September 17, Whitehall.—"I cannot let this messenger go without expressing my satisfaction in being enabled to notify to you His Majesty's gracious compliance with your request in nominating you to be one of the Knights of the Bath. It would be very unjust that the rewards of zeal, intelligence, and activity should have been made to depend wholly upon success, particularly where that success was itself dependent on the fluctuating resolutions of such a Court as that of Petersburg.

"I am very little sanguine as to the result of all the pressing instances with which you are charged; but this mode is taken as the best of keeping the Empress at least as far right as she is. You hinted, in one of your late dispatches, that the King's interference might turn the scale at Petersburg in favour either of Austria or Prussia. Precisely at this moment, it does not appear that any avowed interference can be properly used for this purpose either way; but events may soon vary this, and, in proportion as Prussia grows cooler, and Austria more eager in support of the war in which we are engaged, our wishes must of course lean towards the latter. But I shall probably have occasion to write to you soon officially on this subject, and this loose hint is more for your information than your guidance."

*Copy.*

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, September 22, Beckenham.--"The General Comte de Mertanges tells Mr. Eliot at the Hague that in consequence of some conversation which he had with me, an idea has been started of sending the French Princes to the Vendée, and that it is meant to ask whether His Majesty's Ministers

will transport them? I do not recollect the specific conversation; but the expediency of the measure must always depend on the circumstances of the moment, and on other combinations with which I am unacquainted."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 23, Windsor.—"This morning I received the box which Lord Grenville had had the precaution to direct should not be delivered when it came the last night if I was gone to rest. The advantage stated by Lord Yarmouth is certainly material, but not less so the better political aspect at the King of Prussia's quarters. The good sense shown by the Court of Vienna is very commendable; it is with a piece with that of the Prince of Cobourg, who on the complaint (I believe ungrounded) of the Hereditary Prince of Orange against Lieutenant-General Beaulieu, has directed him to state his defence on paper that it may be sent to Vienna; and treats him with coldness till he can exculpate himself, in hopes of putting some degree of vigour in the Dutch on his very candid manner of receiving the complaint."

#### SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, September 25, Vienna.—"I cannot let the messenger return to England without offering to your Lordship my sincere thanks for your private letter by Slater, and expressing wishes that the substance of my despatches of this day may, upon the whole, be satisfactory to your Lordship. Setting aside the zeal that every man must feel in his country's cause at this very arduous moment, private gratitude to your Lordship must render me anxious to facilitate every measure of your Lordship's administration. I live in habits of intimacy with Baron Thugut. He is an able man, and hitherto has not deceived me. The great object of his wishes is the completion of our alliance, which, indeed, is anxiously desired by the whole country. I shall be happy to learn that your Lordship approves of my idea of his passing over to England. Much good must, I think, result from it, and more may be done in a few hours' conversation than in volumes through any secondary channel.

"The Emperor's journey to Brussels at this moment, and the proposal to me to follow him thither, were equally unexpected to me. If your Lordship approve of my going, I will be much obliged to your Lordship to let His Majesty's consul at Ostend be directed to forward to me your orders by express, in which case I may reach Brussels about the end of the month.

"M. de Thugut has promised to pay proper attention to my note about Tuscany, but has begged me not to urge the business too strongly, as it is a delicate subject for him to treat with the Emperor, the Great Duke being his favourite brother; though His Imperial Majesty greatly disapproves of his political conduct, and the trammels in which he is held by his unworthy favourite."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 26, Kew.—"Lord Grenville has acted very properly in stating to me that to avoid alternating with the Court of Portugal, as is the mode with all other crowned Heads, all treaties have been

signed on separate instruments of the same tenor, so that each Minister only signed the one in which his sovereign's name stood first.

"I certainly place no real consequence on this mode being continued, as M. d'Almeida presses for its being concluded in the same form as with other crowned Heads; for no one can suppose that the weight of Great Britain in the scale of the great European powers can be lessened by any civility to the Court of Portugal."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD R. S. FITZGERALD.

Private.

1793, September 26, Whitehall.—"The present situation of things is such as to render it a point of the utmost importance to examine thoroughly all that can be done in Switzerland, with a view to second and support the operations in the southern provinces of France. I intend shortly writing to you fully and confidentially upon this subject, and I think it right to lose no time in mentioning to you that, as I have reason to believe that M. de Mounier may by his talents and character, by the influence he formerly possessed in his own province, and by that which he has acquired during his residence in Switzerland be of considerable use to you, and employ himself much to the advantage of the King's service, I have induced him to consent to engage himself in that view. He is going to Switzerland with Lord Hawke's son, which will conceal the object both of his return to that country and of the different excursions which, on concerting with you, he may find it expedient to make. I need not mention his character to you, since he avowedly stands among the first in that respect who have taken any part in the French affairs since the commencement of the Revolution. His employment is of course to be quite of a private nature, but I am persuaded you will find him zealous and useful to you as well as to the King's service, and, if affairs go on well, he may be of material advantage in the arrangement of affairs in France. Under these circumstances, I am confident of your disposition to treat him with attention and confidence, and to give him, as far as depends on you, the means of employing himself usefully for the common cause. I have a private letter of your's unanswered. In truth I have found a difficulty in answering it, not being able to say anything positive with respect to its subject, although I can with truth assure you of my sincere desire to promote your wishes when circumstances shall allow me to do it."

*Copy.*

W. PITT to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Private.

1793, September 26, Downing Street.—"I have repeatedly expressed my anxiety to Lord Amherst that he would do whatever he could to promote your wishes in favour of Lieutenant Talbot.

"I send you the letter which I received from him yesterday on the subject, by which I am sorry to perceive that his difficulties still continue; and I am afraid that the circumstance of every regiment on this establishment being destined for foreign service leaves little chance of these difficulties being surmounted here. If you still think that Lieutenant Talbot cannot complete his company, and rather wish me to try whether an opening can be found in Ireland, I will, with great pleasure, do so."

*Enclosure.*

LORD AMHERST [Commander-in-Chief] to W. PITT.

Private.

1793, September 25, St. James's Square.—“I have received your letter recommending Lieutenant Talbot, and I beg leave to assure you I should be very glad to find a way of promoting that officer agreeably to your desires. He belongs to a regiment in Canada, and is raising an independent company, of which he has more than half already raised. Several officers have lately engaged to raise companies, and the advantage Lieutenant Talbot has, I think, is a very great inducement for him to pursue the plan, the easiest and best for gaining the preferment in which you interest yourself.

“Permit me to state the difficulties which arise of promoting Lieutenant Talbot in any other way. He has two Lieutenants above him in the regiment; if a vacancy happens, the regiment is abroad and he cannot be put over a Captain-Lieutenant and the two Lieutenants. You are sensible there is no regiment here; they are all on service abroad; and the successions must go on in the corps. There are fourteen regiments in Ireland under the patronage of the Lord-Lieutenant, in one of these Lieutenant Talbot might possibly be brought in; but I cannot flatter myself, in the situation of all the infantry regiments on this establishment at present serving abroad, that I can, consistently with the rules of the service, have an opportunity of recommending Lieutenant Talbot to other promotion than completing the independent company would give him.”

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 27, Kew.—“Lord Grenville, I cannot return the box containing your most excellent draft of a declaration to be made to the French nation without accompanying it with a few lines to express my thorough approbation of it. I have read it with great attention, and made a few verbal corrections in pencil for your consideration. Some were certainly mistakes of the copyist, and the others are such as I thought more clearly carried the meaning you proposed.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 27 [Winchester].—“I detest the constant communication to you of my grievances; but I cannot withhold from you Mr. Pitt's letter to me enclosing a heap of nonsense and of falsehood from Lord Amherst, and the answer which I have written to him, and which I will beg you to transmit after reading it. Lord Bulkeley is (as is most natural) very angry that the bread should be taken from his brother at the moment of his wounds, and I am not better pleased that all my interest with Mr. Pitt cannot procure for me that which I have given at his request in some instances, and in fifty others to claims not quite so strong as those which I feel I have upon Government. In a word, I cannot but feel most sensibly that you are the only link which holds me even to the appearance of habits, where I have found so repeatedly that the wish of gratifying me existed so slightly. I will say no more upon what must pain you, but I feel that I cannot avoid an unpleasant expostulation with Mr. Pitt whenever this is decided.

"I am glad to learn from the newspapers that you are likely to have so able a commissioner at Toulon as Sir Gilbert Elliott. I think him a very creditable appointment, but I hardly expect him to be able to do much unless supported by a larger British force than you can possibly spare for an operation so remote from our ports as that of sending troops from England to Toulon. Your two regiments from Gibraltar are not a very adequate strength to any attempt single-handed; and I much doubt Sir Gilbert's powers of persuasion over the Spaniards, Neapolitans, Piedmontese, and the other possible allies who may wish to forward the good cause in the south of France; and who, unless I am deceived, will do us and the cause much mischief.

"We shall be very impatient to see the destination of this Irish force embarked at Cork, and which cannot (at least the cavalry) be meant for the West Indies; and, if the cavalry is meant for Flanders, the season is very far advanced to risk so long and uncertain a navigation as that of from Cork to Ostend. The correspondences of the French all state the expectation of a rising of the country between Rennes and St. Malo. It seems indeed to have been very unfortunate that no force could have been spared for some attempt either on that coast or on the side of Nantes, which is undoubtedly royalist.

"We have for fourteen days been on tiptoe with respect to the Duke of Richmond. I conclude that there is no truth in the idea of his resignation, but nothing can exceed the general wish expressed upon his subject by every person whom I have heard converse upon it, and, as far as I can judge, the clamour against Lord Chatham has subsided in consequence of it."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 29, Winchester.—"Your manifesto has given me the greatest pleasure; it is full, manly, and dignified, and the language of it remarkably chaste and good. I have ventured to criticise a little, and particularly to suppress the concluding paragraph, which strikes me as remarkably flat after the very animated picture both of French miseries and of the King's views; and it only repeats more weakly what has been stated more forcibly more than once in this composition. God grant us the success which we have a right to expect from it, in the present posture of affairs; at the same time you must be prepared to meet much opposition to the idea of *indemnisation*, which the emigrants now in London are loud in reprobating. At the same time the people of Brest and of Toulon cannot be very anxious for the slices which may be required from France on the side of the Pays Bas, and of Lorraine, or even of Piedmont; and, whether they are or no, it is good to habituate people early to the sound of such a proposition. I do not know whether you agree with me in the idea that it would be very useful to aggrandise, even beyond his natural scale of *indemnisation*, the King of Sardinia; and cannot look at the map without seeing a *natural* line of boundary (as the Convention would call it), which would give him much real strength. Marshal Berwick, in his excellent Memoirs, says that the King of Sardinia may always be kept in check by half his number of men placed near the country of Barcelonnette, because, from the local of the country, he must have two arms [armies] to defend the upper country (Savoy) and the lower; and if he attempts to unite them he is turned, as the French army, in that case, marches upon the string, while they must move upon the arch of the bow. He acted upon this principle in the year 1705, and gives a long *mémoire* and his

map of operations, under which he was enabled, as he terms it, to make Louis XIV. a present of 8,000 men, whom he spared from his army. I mention all this as I hope you have already looked to the bearskin, though the brute is still able to gripe and bite.

"It has occurred to me that an expedition may be formed in the course of the next two months which, though not important, is yet far from contemptible; I mean Senegal and the French ports on the Gambia. I met with a Frenchman who was at Fort Louis last year, and says that it is wholly neglected except that the Convention have sent the tricolor flag, and the *décrets* for their new constitution thither. You will object the want of men. My plan would be to do it by the recruits for the King and the Company for India, of whom you might collect without suspicion about 600 men by the first week of December; and the whole would not detain the one Indiaman, who would embark the whole number, more than one month out of her course, and 100 men of the King's recruits, or one independent company, would be enough to garrison it when captured. If this is adopted, the Company's officers ought to be ordered to recruit instantly under any pretence you please, for in the usual course they do not begin till November. The two bomb ships which would be wanted might receive orders as for the West Indies, and the whole might be finished by the middle of January. But all this depends upon another question which you are, I am sure, competent to decide from having thought it over, I mean the question of the Isle de France, which all the accounts from the passengers captured in the French India ships, and prisoners on *parole* at Alresford and Waltham, stated to be practicable from the want of troops, and from the apprehensions of their slaves."

#### J. B. BURGESS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 30, Whitehall.—"Lord Yarmouth sends over a note delivered to him on the 23rd by M. Lucchesini. It contains a strong remonstrance on the alarming prospective of the prolongation of the war beyond this campaign, with complaints of the expenses and losses sustained by the King of Prussia. His Prussian Majesty declares the impossibility he is under of continuing these heavy expenditures, more especially in consequence of the embarrassments which, he says, have been thrown in the way of his negotiation in Poland by the Jacobin faction. These, he adds, must oblige him to fly to the defence of his new frontiers in that quarter, which the Poles appear determined to insult. He goes on to say that the main object of the convention of the 14th July has already been obtained, the French having been obliged to evacuate the conquests they have made; but that he is still strongly disposed to enforce the other object of the indemnification. He concludes by saying that, in order to enable him to take a further part in the war, it will be necessary to add two secret articles to the late convention—the one, containing on our part a formal and previous guaranty of the new Prussian possessions in Poland; the other, an engagement that, in case the war should not be concluded this campaign, a subsidy should be granted to his Prussian Majesty by the belligerent powers as the terms by which his future assistance is to be secured, and that this country should not only contribute its proportion, but should engage to facilitate the execution of this point on the part of the other powers. On these conditions M. de Lucchesini states that he is authorized to open a negotiation with Lord Yarmouth.



"Lord Yarmouth says M. de Lucchesini appeared much ashamed of this paper, and that he assured him that both the manner and the time of the King of Prussia's departure from the army would be such as not to injure the common cause, by affording room to surmise that he had withdrawn himself from it.

"Lord Yarmouth has signed and sent over the treaty with the Margrave of Baden, with an exception as to the troops being employed in Great Britain, Ireland, and Gibraltar; and with a perfect understanding that they may be sent to Toulon or Marseilles. This assurance was given verbally; the exception I have mentioned is the subject of a secret article. I shall be glad to know whether your Lordship would have the ratification of this treaty prepared, and whether with the secret article.

"The new Hessian troops were to set out as soon as the ratification arrived, but the Landgrave persisted in his refusal to let them march sooner. Major Gunn thinks the Landgrave will at last be brought to consent to their going to the West Indies.

"There is great probability of getting 2,000 additional troops from the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen, should they be wanted; and also that the Emperor will consent to let England have half of the Darmstadt troops.

"The Prussians have occupied the ground lately occupied by the Austrians, and are encamped near Landau, where they are constructing redoubts. The King is gone to Pirmasens, accompanied only by Prince de Nassau and two *aide-de-camps*, which Lord Yarmouth thinks does not look well, as it leaves him entirely in the hands of his military advisers.

"I enclose to your Lordship M. Pictet's ultimatum. He wishes to have an early answer, and says he will be ready to set out on Sunday next."

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, September] Wimbledon.—"We have the King's answer on both subjects, which are perfectly satisfactory. He says nothing of that particular part of the instructions which goes to put our troops under the Prince of Cobourg, but only approves in general of sending Sir Charles Grey as proposed, and therefore approves of the drafts to him, Sir James Murray, and General Ainslie. On the subject of Brittany he seems to think it impossible that we can furnish troops, but that something may be done with the *émigrés*; but adds that, if Lord Moira is willing to stand forth on this occasion, he does not in the least object to his being employed. Dundas will therefore send to Lord Moira immediately.

"After we parted yesterday, I had a more particular conversation with Bouillé, and, if his ideas are right, there can be hardly a doubt that we may both take and keep possession of Isle Dieu with a very moderate force, and act from thence with advantage as our means increase. I am to hear from him again on the subject. We are setting about everything to put this business in train as quick as possible. I hope also that we may settle everything to-morrow for sending Macbride immediately to Jersey with a squadron, to concert with Craig, and to strike a blow against the shipping at St. Maloes.

"The King's approbation of the despatch to Sir James Murray will, of course, enable you to write as you wished to the Hague respecting

the Dutch force. I return the papers you had from Staremburgh, and also those respecting Ferris. The latter do not seem to me to lead to any result different from what we talked of yesterday."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 1, Downing Street.—"Long being out of town, your letter has been brought to me, and I am in hopes that I can relieve you from all difficulty on the subject of it, though what I have to mention upon it would at first sight appear more likely to create difficulty than to remove it. The living of Snodlands was stated to me as lapsing to the Crown and not to the Chancellor, and I accordingly recommended to it, and the King has some time since signed the instruments. It is stated in the King's books at the value of 20*l.*, and it was understood at the Secretary of State's Office that the Chancellor presents only when the living is *under* 20*l.* Your letter was the first intimation I have had of the Chancellor's understanding it otherwise, and I have not had time since to ascertain to which of us the right really belongs. What is most material, however, is that the Bishop has certainly no right to interfere till after he has done homage. This, in its natural course, will not be for three weeks, and I will take care that it shall not take place till this business is settled. In the meantime if the living of Snodlands is in the gift of the Chancellor, you can have no difficulty in procuring it from him for your Wycombe friend, on Mr. Wheeler's resignation. If it proves to be in my recommendation you are equally secure, as there is an [other] living in the gift of the Crown now vacant which will enable me to take care of the person for whom I intended Snodlands; or I can give this other living to your *protégé*, leaving Snodlands to the person to whom I have already given it. As soon as I have ascertained the question of patronage between the Chancellor and myself you shall hear the result.

"The despatches which came yesterday from Lord Yarmouth, and which I understand are now sent to you, look worse than ever, as to the King of Prussia's future intentions. It is very singular that Lord Yarmouth's last letter is of the 24th, and says nothing of the attack of the 23rd, nor of its having been postponed. I hope you and Lady Grenville find your quarters tolerable.

"Have you met with the enclosed verses, which make part of a Latin poem just printed at Turin? I suppose the author anticipated your manifesto."

#### *Enclosed.*

*Hic mihi sæpe datur Grenvillum audire docentem,  
Quid justum, quid non, quo gloria, quo ferat usus,  
Quis fructus belli, quas vult victoria pænas,  
Denique quid spoliū reddendum, quidque tenendum.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Private.

1793, October 1, Walmer.—"Mr. Aust has sent me a letter to him from Harward, the new consul at Osteud, in which he complains much of the loose police with respect to strangers, as opening the way to the French for procuring constant intelligence. General Ainslie wrote to me some time since on this subject, and proposed regulations to be

adopted *here* with respect to passports. I answered him that such regulations could not be established here, but naturally belonged to the military authority in a military port like Ostend. I am apprehensive he has done nothing in it since. I have been much shocked at reading, in a bulletin distributed at Brussels, a *true* account of all that has hitherto been arranged between the Prince of Coburg and our General. I apprehend that, if anything really is to be undertaken against Dunkirk, it is absolutely necessary that some mode should be adopted completely to disguise this intention. Sir J[ohn] M[urray], in the little he said to me on the subject, laid great stress on the hope of finding them to a degree unprepared.

"I hope you will not omit to employ some one to collect all the intelligence that can be procured in London respecting St. Domingo. I am uneasy at the delay in opening this subject to Spain; and yet I did not know how to contend against what was said on that point when we last met.

"It has been suggested to me that any troops going out from hence towards the East Indies might take in their way the French Settlements in Africa. The idea seems worth enquiring about; though, certainly, not with any considerable delay."

*Copy.*

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 2, 11 a.m., Downing Street.—"I agree entirely with you that the answer to Lucchesini's note must be a refusal, at least of the guaranty of the Prussian acquisition in Poland. A subsidy is also out of the question unless in addition to his contingent conformably to the alliance, he will leave any additional body of troops either absolutely at our disposal or to act under our direction, according to some specific plan which may be satisfactory to us; for example, in acquiring possession of Alsace. There is probably little chance of carrying this point, but it seems to me worth trying; and with this view, it may be right to frame an answer to Lucchesini's note, on the idea that the King of Prussia is sincere in his wish to be on a cordial footing with us, and to co-operate in our views of indemnification for ourselves and for Austria, as far as circumstances will permit him; that we can have no doubt of his scrupulous performance of his engagements to us, and that if he is disposed to make efforts in the common cause, beyond what he is bound to do by treaty, and is only restrained by the want of resources, we are ready to discuss what pecuniary succours can be afforded him. I should prefer this way of treating the subject to an absolute refusal of all idea of subsidy, as I think this mode will be less likely to produce a coldness between us and the Court of Berlin; and if he agrees to the idea, it would be more advantageous than any co-operation he has yet afforded in the war. The expense will be comparatively speaking no object, if it produces a real and efficient force at our disposal, in a quarter where it is essential to act with vigour, as part of the general plan for the next campaign. No objection can I think arise to making such an answer as may at least leave an opening for this plan; and we shall of course reserve for further consideration the proportion of any subsidy to the force which he may be willing to furnish. It will probably occur to you that this communication from Lucchesini ought to be mentioned at Vienna; and the possibility of the King of Prussia withdrawing himself next campaign furnishes a strong additional reason

for pressing the Court of Vienna to enable us to satisfy the Elector of Bavaria, in order, if possible, to secure his troops as a substitute in part for the Prussian force.

"I should think it clearly right to secure the troops from Saxe-Meiningen, and any others that can be got on the terms given to the Landgrave, provided the troops are reasonably good. On that point I imagine Lord Yarmouth can satisfy himself, with Major Gunn's assistance."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 2, Downing Street.—"Since I wrote to you in the morning I have been looking more particularly into the treaties respecting the stipulated succours, and I enclose an extract of the articles, lest you should not have them. You will see that we have a right to insist on the King of Prussia furnishing 20,000 men, the Emperor has a right to the same number, and the Dutch to 12,000. The parties *requiring* have by all the treaties the option to demand an equivalent in money if they prefer it, but the other party has (under the circumstances of the present war) no option. The party furnishing the troops is to pay them, but the party requiring them is to furnish provision and forage, and the troops are to remain at his disposal (subject only to the exceptions mentioned in our treaty). The result therefore is that if the King of Prussia admits the *casus foederis* (on which he can raise no cavil with respect to us and Holland, and not very decently with respect to Austria) he is absolutely bound to furnish and pay 52,000 men, in the whole, to remain during the war at our disposal; but then he will be free from the expense of provision and forage, which must fall upon us, the Emperor, and Holland.

"It is difficult to estimate accurately what this latter expense may amount to; and it does not appear to be specified in the treaty in what manner any other extraordinary expenses incurred in active service are to be provided for. Judging from our experience hitherto in this campaign, I think it may be supposed that the whole extraordinary expense may amount to about 20,000*l.* per annum for every thousand men. As the whole amount of the several contingents is, I think, pretty nearly equal to the King of Prussia's present force, his saving would be little more than the extraordinary expense, which on the rough calculation which I have stated would be about one million in the course of next year. Under these circumstances it seems to me to be worth considering, whether it might not be well to offer the King of Prussia the alternative, either of furnishing the contingents on the terms stated in the several treaties, or of continuing as a principal in the war to maintain an army of fifty thousand men to act in Alsace or in such other operations as shall be agreed upon, this force to be paid by him, but the extraordinary expenses to be defrayed (according to the proportion which the contingents would bear to each other) by Great Britain, Austria, and Holland; or a subsidy equal to the probable amount to be paid to Prussia by those three Powers (according to the same proportion). In either case, if the King of Prussia is willing to furnish any number of troops beyond the amount of the contingents (which is not probable) I should think it well worth while to defray the whole expense, as well in the article of pay as of extraordinaries, for the excess so furnished. If these alternatives are proposed, I think the King of Prussia will prefer the latter of them, as without putting him

to more expense than the former, it will avoid the discredit of his withdrawing from a principal share in the war in which he has embarked. It seems also in point of appearance and impression to be better for us, than his seeming to break up the confederacy at this moment, and becoming a mere auxiliary. But then it would be necessary to stipulate precisely for his troops being actively employed in offensive operations, and to fix the quarter, which I think can only be Alsace for the present. Unless these points can be thoroughly secured it would be better for us to have the benefit of the contingents, which the exception in the treaty would not prevent us from employing in Alsace, or in any other part where we are likely to want the use of them. When I saw the King to-day His Majesty entered on this subject, and desired me to write to you with a view to your pressing for the Prussian contingent. I mentioned that I had already heard from you on that subject, and then stated the outline of the ideas which are contained in this letter, and which he entirely approves, if upon consideration we think them advisable. I have also talked them over with Dundas, who on reading the Prussian note had formed very much the same opinion. The King also mentioned to me to-day his having received a letter from the Duke of York, informing him that the Prince of Orange had expressed to the Duke a strong determination that the Dutch force should act during the present campaign in the hope of retrieving their credit; that Maubeuge would give them this opportunity; but that when that operation was over he should be for withdrawing the Dutch troops entirely, unless they received positive assurances from Austria that their demands would be complied with. I do not consider this conversation as of much consequence, but the King mentioned it as a reason for pressing Austria to comply with the Dutch demands, and seemed to think them better entitled to favourable consideration in consequence of the Dutch troops being actively employed for the Emperor's object at Maubeuge. You will of course think it right to give some instruction (more or less pointed as you think best) founded on this idea."

*Postscript.*—"If the alternatives which I have suggested are proposed to the King of Prussia, it will, I conceive, be necessary to communicate them both to the Emperor and Holland, with a view to inducing them to hold a similar language."

#### J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 2, Whitehall.—"I have been honoured with your Lordship's letter of yesterday, and have agreed with M. Pictet for 150 guineas, in full for his journey and all expenses and expectations for a year. He proposes going into the country to settle his affairs, and will be back again on Monday, when he will be ready to set out. On talking with him about a cipher, he particularly desired to make use of two counterparts of Nugent's pocket dictionary, having been accustomed to that mode of writing. It is a very good method of corresponding; and therefore, unless your Lordship should object to it, I propose to comply with his request. Would your Lordship choose to write yourself to Lord R. FitzGerald on this business, or will a letter in cipher from me be sufficient?"

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793] October 3, Downing Street.—"I have desired that the last dispatch to Sir J. Murray, and the draft of instructions to Sir G. Elliott

should be sent to you this evening. The first will, I think, completely meet your idea. On the second I wish much to know what occurs to you. I will register Mr. Wheler's name, to be thought of whenever I can contrive to make an opening, which is not easy, but I hope not impossible. The expectation of Lord Yarmouth's writing again soon on the subject of Lucchesini's note, may make it as well to delay any decision on that subject for a short time. I still incline to the opinion that the alternative I have mentioned should be proposed, but I rather wish, upon consideration, that the King of Prussia should furnish the contingents in question as the best way of relieving us from the continual fluctuations of his Cabinet.

"The verses I sent you are part of a poem lately published at the Parma press, and dedicated to the King, by our friend Trevor at Turin. He is, however, only the editor; who was the author I still leave you to guess. I have received your paper about the French laity, and we will take measure upon it."

*Postscript.*—"I am afraid the instructions to Sir G. Elliott are gone to Wimbledon, and cannot be copied in time to go to you this evening."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 4, Downing Street.—"I have not heard from Jacobi, but have volunteered desiring to see him to-morrow, and have also sent to Mounier. You need have no scruple in sending me as much business as you please, as, like Lord Amherst, I have at present *nothing to do*. I hope you will be tempted to stay at Walmer [or?] to return there for a week later than you talked of, as, after the 15th or 16th, I think I shall be able to be there for a few days."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 4 [Winchester].—"We are waiting with great impatience for the distribution of winter quarters that I may know our fate, as a bird has whispered me that we are to be turned out of our quarters to make room for the Dorset, with which of course I shall be very angry; but, at all events, I shall have the means personally of getting away from a duty which has really pressed very severely upon me. I have promised to pass a few days with Lord Caernarvon in my way home, and I shall probably take Dropmore in my way from thence.

"I could not, *entre nous*, have conceived half the follies of which the Duke of Richmond has been guilty in his command. I am delighted to hear of the possibility of his resignation, for his continuance in command would be productive of the most serious consequences; particularly as the ridicule of his orders and commands has been much encouraged from a quarter that does not love him, and does not conceal those sentiments. Surely your Hessians bound to Toulon will not arrive very soon, if they embark at Ostend; you do not say how they are to move, and I do not see any other route; but would it not have been more practicable to have engaged by subsidy a body of Swiss, who might have reached that place in half the time? I perfectly enter into your ideas respecting inferior operations; still, I think that the four regiments whom you had all the summer in Jersey and Guernsey might have secured St. Malo, where, I understand, they have been ripe for

revolt. Do not consider my Senegal scheme in the same point of view, for I would propose to do it by the King's and Company's recruits for India, of whom you can make no use in your general arrangements. I have not the materials for judging of the importance of the conquest, but you know how much, in a war, it is important to feed the public mind with success, though of no more real importance than the capture of a frigate; and we want an occasional dram of this sort.

"Your opinion of His Excellency the new governor of Toulon was, I well remember, made up as mine was, at the time of the Spanish rupture. I have not the means of judging of Lord Mulgrave, but he seems to have much to do before his reinforcements arrive. I conclude that our fleet winters at Toulon, and refits with *French stores taken upon a valuation*; but, at all events, I hope that you will retain the superiority in those seas even over the Spaniards, whose operations, except those of Langara, do not please me.

"I have been passing two days with one of your new converts, Mr. Sloane, who has passed his summer with his regiment under the Duke of Richmond, and says that nothing can be so firm and decided in his admiration of Mr. Pitt as His Royal Highness the Prince, and that he seems to affect every opportunity of saying that he is the *only* man who can save Europe in the present crisis. His language of Mr. Fox is, in the same degree, violent and offensive.

"I am desired by two different persons to convey to Government information that they have given a license to a Monsieur de Fer to reside at Southampton, who is an improper person. He is frequently absent for two or three days; he has a great deal of money, and of correspondence; his father is a democrat, and *living in Paris*; and he himself was carried before a magistrate, a Mr. Sadlier, about ten days ago for saying to a Mr. Bolder (with whom he had quarrelled) that *he hoped yet to see England a province of France*; he admitted the words, but pleaded great provocation from Mr. Bolder's language, *and was discharged*. I have seen him, his manners are remarkably forward, and he bears the character pretty universally of a dangerous man. I wish you would name him to Dundas.

"I cannot yet persuade myself that Mr. Pitt will wish me to believe that Lord Amherst cannot give a lieutenant of ten years a company; but I am ashamed of being obliged to beg by repeated applications what ought not (if I am to judge by the numbers I gave away, some at Mr. Pitt's wish) to have cost a second letter, particularly when I stated the strong reason I had to wish, for my wife's sake, that it should be done.

"I will beg you to write to Mr. Walpole three lines, recommending Captain Dayrell as your relation; he is going to Lisbon for the recovery of his health, and direct the letter to Captain Dayrell at Lillingstone."

J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 4 [Whitehall].—"M. de Jacobi has desired me to inform your Lordship that the communication he had to make was on the subject of the note delivered by M. Lucchesini to Lord Yarmouth. He has been requested to desire that your Lordship would give as immediate an answer to it as possible. M. de Jacobi is of opinion that the King of Prussia has quitted his army and returned to Berlin,

for he was instructed by his last despatch to send his answer to that place.

"I have prepared a draft from your Lordship to Lord Robert Fitzgerald, which I have the honour to enclose. Should your Lordship approve of it and send me a *blanc signé*, I will put it into cipher and have it in readiness for Mr. Pictet. Your Lordship will perceive from the enclosed letter that this person has returned to the charge about the payment of his debts."

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, October 5, London.—"I have your letter of the 1st, and all that appears to me to be done, with regard to the complaint of loose police, is to cause Nepean to write to General Ainslie to learn from him what steps he has taken; for it is impossible that any thing done here can remedy the evil, if it really exists.

"I never saw the bulletin to which you refer; but it is certainly very bad if even intended military operations are to be propagated in such a manner. It will not probably be attended with any mischief, for, as every thing upon that subject is, by my last despatches, left to the decision of the Prince of Coburg, I think it most likely he will not undertake Dunkirk this season.

"I am now pretty accurately informed as to St. Domingo, and shall be very glad to have brought to a decision, as soon as you please, what the line of conduct respecting Spain is to be. I have just seen General Cuyler, and he seems to entertain no apprehensions of our success in the West Indies.

"When we meet, I shall state what occurs respecting the French African Settlements."

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, October 5, Downing Street.]—"I like very much the general plan of your paper, and have put in the margin all the remarks that occur. On reflecting on the subject before I received it, it struck me, and I still continue to think, that the publication of this general manifesto ought to be deferred till we have an offensive army ready to march forwards; and that, in the mean time, we ought to confine ourselves to a Declaration, addressed particularly to Toulon, expressing the King's intentions on the subject of the agreement with Lord Hood. At all events, such a Declaration seems to me to be necessary, and I send you a draft which I prepared, and have since corrected on talking with Dundas, the Chancellor, and Sir Gilbert Elliott. I send you also the draft of a commission proposed for Sir Gilbert Elliott, that you may consider both these papers before we meet. With respect to your paper, the most material suggestion which I have stated is that which proposes a more pointed recommendation of monarchical government with proper limitations. I do not see that we can go on secure grounds if we treat with any separate districts or bodies of men who stop short of some declaration in favour of monarchy; nor do I see any way so likely to unite considerable numbers in one vigorous effort, as by specifying monarchy as the only system in the re-establishment of which we are disposed to concur. This idea by no means precludes us from treating with any other form of regular government, if, in the



end, any other should be solidly established; but it holds out monarchy as the only one from which we expect any good, and in favour of which we are disposed to enter into concert. The other observations are less material. Perhaps it might be useful with a view to impression, if, in stating the miseries of France, there could be a more particular reference to some of the leading facts, instead of only a general description. Sir Gilbert Elliott shewed me last night a preamble which he had drawn for his commission, which could not be introduced well in the commission, but some part of which might, I think, be engrafted into the manifesto. I thought he had left it among the papers which I brought with me from Wimbledon, but I find that I have it not. If I can get it from him in time I will send it to you.

"Sir James Murray arrived yesterday, and brings nothing remarkable. The French having retreated and there being no prospect of bringing them to action, the Prince of Cobourg is returned to Maubeuge, and means afterwards to come to Dunkirk. The accounts from the Prussian Head Quarters are, at least for the present, very favourable."

*Postscript.*—"I return you the Swiss papers, from which I cannot form any precise result, nor has Cleghorn's conversation afforded me much assistance. I do not think the paper enclosed by Lord Hervey at all justifies the expectation held out in his despatch, but still I incline to think there is some opening given, and that, under the present circumstances, it is worth following up.

"I forgot to mention that Sir James Murray has not the least idea of retarding either the troops for the West Indies or the Hessians.

"I doubt whether any thing can be made of your idea respecting the ships at Toulon, but will think of it. We may talk of Rochler to-morrow."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 7, Downing Street.—"I send you the result of my inquiries, respecting the right of presenting to Crown livings of 20*l.*, which seems clearly to rest with the Chancellor. I conclude you will therefore apply immediately to him respecting Snodlands. I will write to you again to-morrow, and must defer till then Prussian politics.

"There seems no reason for your coming this week."

#### *Enclosure.*

#### J. ERSKINE to —————.

1793, October 6, Tunbridge Wells.—"Having been absent from home for two days, and there being no post yesterday, I have been prevented from answering your letter till now.

"I was informed some time ago by Mr. Talbot (who was Secretary of Presentations to Lord Thurlow during the whole time he held the Great Seal) that livings of 20*l.* exactly, in the King's books, were in the Chancellor's gift; and in consequence of your letter I have examined the book containing the presentations, and find that all livings of that value that have been given away during that time were given by Lord Thurlow, particularly that of Presteign in Radnorshire, which belongs to Lord Oxford, and came to the Crown on the promotion of the late Dr. Harley to the Bishoprick of Hereford.

"I shall be in town with the Lord Chancellor on Wednesday next, and if I can find any further information on the subject I will take the liberty of sending it to you for Mr. Pitt."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 7 [London].—"I received your note this morning, and send you a memorandum of the information which the Office affords concerning him. I wish Lord Buckingham had mentioned some particulars upon which we could interfere, but, at present, all I know is what I transmit to you.

"I think the fitting out the French ships at Toulon is a problematical question. The using the stores for fitting our own there can be no objection to, but I suspect there is very little there. By a private letter from Lord Hood to Lord Chatham, which he showed to me, it would appear that if the French fleet at Toulon had been disabled, either by storm or an engagement, they could not have refitted at Toulon. We have alarms to-day from different quarters that the French Convention, in a fit of despair, are determined upon offensive operations against our coasts. Madness is not to be despised, and therefore it is proper to let our frigates be properly scattered in the Channel."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793] October 8, Downing Street.—"As there will be an opportunity to-morrow of talking over with the Cabinet the business of Prussia, and I have not yet been able to consider sufficiently your draft, I defer writing on that subject till to-morrow.

"We have made some alterations in the instructions to Sir Gilbert Elliott, in consequence of your suggestions, and they will also be considered to-morrow, after which you shall have another copy."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to SIR MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1793, October 8, Whitehall.—"You will receive, with this letter, the King's permission to follow the Emperor to Brussels. You will see how much stress is laid here on the idea of M. Thugut's coming over here, which is felt to be, on every account, extremely desirable. Before he comes I should be glad to receive from you a more particular account of his history and character, and of such details respecting his Court as you may perhaps rather choose to put into the form of a private letter than of an official despatch."

*Copy.*

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 9 [Winchester].—"I send you enclosed a letter from Fremantle which is worth your reading, and upon which I make no comment, save that in which you will join, of lamentation. You will, of course, burn it for fear of accidents, and, in truth, I hardly know whether it is kind in me to send it to you, when I know that it cannot be helped. If the news from the consul at Ostend is not a mistake arising from the capture of the *detached camps* near Meaubouge, I

sincerely congratulate you upon it, and I can excuse much folly and ignorance in favour of such a success, though belonging to the Austrians.

"I am now obliged, from the affection I bear George Nugent, to state to you that he directed his agent to apply to the War Office for leave to raise a regiment upon such terms as Lord Amherst should point out; and he now wishes me to urge it under the idea that he may get the rank of Colonel by it, in consideration of giving up his Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the Guards without sale, and taking the nomination from Government of a certain number of half-pay and other officers. I have attempted to dissuade him from it, and sent Fremantle to him from Ostend on purpose, but I enclose you his letter, and I now wish you to advise me what I can and ought to do. You know my position (as a Frenchman would call it) with Lord Amherst and with Pitt with regard to Talbot's commission; and, yet, I neither like to acknowledge the whole of that truth to Nugent, nor to disappoint (especially after his constant support in Parliament) his wishes to purchase rank by this extravagant mode of purchase. It has occurred to me that if the arrangement could be made, both of my army jobs (if jobs they are) might be carried forward by means of it; but before I write to him I simply wish for your advice, knowing that you would wish to gratify me and Nugent, but knowing that it does not depend upon you. There is no doubt but that he has the means of completing it very rapidly.

"I have yesterday received notice that we remain here for the winter, with which I am much gratified; particularly as I have now the prospect of exchanging these delights for Stowe. Be so good as to let me know when you return from Walmer, and whether I may, as usual, depend upon finding you at Dropmore on a Saturday, Sunday or Monday. We have been reviewed, and I perfectly agree with Major Sturgeon in the sense, that 'it is well for Mounseer that he keeps at home.' It should however seem, from the conversation at some of the French ports in the Channel (Dieppe and St. Malo) as reported by the emigrants, that the patriots have sent to enquire into the means of running over to England *small parties in smuggling vessels.*"

#### GEORGE III to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 10, Windsor.—"I am glad to find Lord Grenville finds advantage in the sea air and bathing, and therefore cordially encourage his remaining there for a longer time; indeed the business rather gains by Lord Grenville being less interrupted, and being by that enabled to draw up the admirable papers which will, I am certain, be allowed in futurity among the ablest in the Paper Office.

"The sudden retreat of the King of Prussia completes the very ill-advised line of conduct that has attended every step he has taken for these four or five years."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793] October 10 [Downing Street].—"On talking over yesterday at the Cabinet your draft of an answer to Lucchesini's note, a good many doubts were started of different sorts. Dundas inclined to think there would be more dignity in shortening very much the introductory part, and confining it more to a simple and formal demand of the succours according to the alliance. All concurred in the necessity of refusing

both the guarantee and the subsidy ; but it seemed to be thought better to soften if possible the mode of doing so, which appeared rather harsh and abrupt. Some idea was suggested of avoiding for a time making an answer, least it should create fresh disgust, and prevent what little co-operation might otherwise be expected in the remainder of this campaign ; but on discussion, I think it was rather agreed to be better to bring the thing to a point, that we may know what to trust to. In demanding only the limited succours, it occurred that we might make a sort of merit of asking no more, as the present is an occasion in which, according to the spirit of one of the articles of the alliance, Prussia might be required to aid us with its whole force.

"The spirit of the convention of July also furnishes a topic of the same sort, as although the precise obligation was only not to make peace without the restitution of conquests, the concert was professedly directed to the object of obtaining indemnification. Consistent therefore with good faith, the co-operation ought to be continued unless as far as real inability prevents it. Some way might also be found of stating that although we cannot give a subsidy as demanded, the taking the contingent will bring upon us the expense of provision and forage, and so relieve the King of Prussia from a great part of the present burden. There is, however, some delicacy in stating this so as not to admit an idea that there can be any doubt or any option as to the King of Prussia's compliance with our demand of the stipulated succours. If, however, any difficulty should be made on this latter point, it was thought advisable that some one at Berlin should have a discretionary power to declare that refusal, or even hesitation, must be considered as a breach of all engagements, and put an end to all connection between us and Prussia. In the present uncertain situation of Poland, added to the inveterate jealousy between Prussia and Austria, and the suspicious conduct of Russia, such a declaration on our part would alarm Prussia with the prospect of standing single, and exposed to the danger of losing all its objects. This sort of language, however, is best reserved for an extreme case ; and, on the whole, our idea was that our language in the first instance should, though firm and distinct, be in some degree conciliatory ; but that if necessary it must be peremptory. I did intend to try to put down such alterations in the draft, as I think would arise out of these different observations, but I have been so broken in upon as to make it impossible, and I have therefore thought it best to send it you back, leaving all these points for your consideration. At all events a few days' delay will not be material.

"With respect to Corsica, I do not see what instructions can be sent till we hear further, and the business will probably be decided before our instructions could reach.

"Lord Hood has only informed the Admiralty shortly of his having sent a squadron, in consequence of representations brought by Captain Masserin. But he mentions no particulars, and not a word of the instructions given. Public letters are, I think, so general as to leave us very much in the dark.

"With respect to Dunkirk you may be at ease, as the despatch from Sir James Murray brought by Lord Elgin seems to put any attempt there out of the question. Sir J. Murray represents the state of the Duke of York's army as much less secure than is consistent either with what I can collect from Lord Elgin, or from most other accounts from the army ; and it rather seems from the French accounts as if they were full of alarm and confusion on their side. I approve most completely of the alteration you have made in the manifesto. Morning-

ton has furnished me with a few criticisms which, though not all of them very serious, I will send you when I write next. To-morrow I hope to send you Sir Gilbert Elliott's instructions corrected. Lord Elgin seems to think he ought to return to Brussels to meet the Emperor.

"If you do not come to town *the beginning* of next week, he wishes to come to you to receive your orders at Walmer in his way back. I begin to despair of getting out of town before the end of the month. You will perceive that I write in haste, which has been occasioned by a thousand bores, and last of all, by being in danger of losing my dinner at the London Tavern with the Tobago planters."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, October 11] Downing Street.—"There has barely been time to copy the instructions as now altered. I think you will find all the points which you suggested provided for in some degree by the corrections and additions, except what relates to restoring the *ancient judicature*. Even supposing it to be defective, I think the restoration of it in the first instance, subject to future correction, must make part of the general system of bringing things back as nearly as possible to their ancient order. You will also see a separate letter to the Admiral and General, which seems the best mode of throwing the civil business almost entirely into Sir Gilbert's hands. If you have time to give another attentive consideration to this subject in the course of to-morrow, I shall hope to receive any alterations or remarks from you on Sunday morning. Sir Gilbert wishes, if possible, to go on Monday.

"What day do you mean to be in town? I hope not later than Tuesday, as there are two or three things which I wish to talk over with you. We mean to let the four regiments destined for the West Indies, which are to reach Ostend to-morrow, remain there at least till we hear again and can send further orders. Any long delay of the West India expedition is, I think, out of the question, and Dundas seems adverse to any. But I cannot help thinking that it is worth a few days' delay to ascertain what turn things take in Flanders, and whether the French project of invasion is anything more than words; if it is, I am still for sending to the West Indies, but some additional exertions will then be necessary to make the country take care of its own internal defence."

#### GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, October 12, Lansdown, near Philadelphia.—"The disorder now raging in Philadelphia is, I believe, the most malignant in its nature, and the most extensive in its effect, of any with which the human race has ever been afflicted in any country. In the course of the last six weeks at least three thousand persons have died in Philadelphia, and the physicians appear, as yet, to be totally unacquainted either with the nature of the disease, or with the means of curing it. In one point they appear to be pretty generally agreed, that it is not imported, but generated in the city. Of my family that remained in town, I have lost my principal servant, and two others are at this moment dead or at the point of death. Happily and unaccountably this disorder does not seem to spread in the country, and I hope that the distance (five miles)

at which my wife and myself are from Philadelphia will effectually protect us from the danger of the contagion.

"The person to whom your Lordship alludes [in your letter of July 25] is the gentleman to whom, in my despatch No. 19, I have represented myself as so considerably indebted. To his attention alone have I owed my knowledge of Mr. Genet's designs, and to his zeal, activity (ever at the hazard of his personal safety) and to his present (I trust sincere) attachment to the cause of order and good government, are in a great measure to be ascribed those impediments which, for the space of five weeks in the port of New York, detained the French ships of war in a state of complete impotence as to any extended operations."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, October 12, London.—"As we shall meet so soon, I shall not trouble you at present with many circumstances which teased me of late, respecting our proposed operations in the West Indies. I have been very nearly out of temper more than once on that subject, and some others; and I shall be indeed much relieved when the armament actually sails, for, till that hour actually arrives, I cannot divest myself of disagreeable sensations on the interruptions it receives. I have, however, seen Sir Charles Grey this forenoon, and there must be some very sad mismanagement indeed if the whole does not get off by the time he mentions as satisfactory to him.

"I am impatient to hear of *Maubeuge* being over, for every day more and more unhinges my confidence in the operations of our army, *separate* from that of the Prince of Coburg. I feel exactly as you do on the subject of Ostend, and the consequences of abandoning it.

"Every thing is in proper train as to the supplies for Vendée, I mean so far as we can give them what they ask; but Lord Howe, *I believe*, is still in Torbay, and unless the great fleet of Brest is kept in its proper subjection by the great fleet of England, all subordinate operations must be nugatory. I am, however, getting into more detail than I intended.

"I return you Lord Auckland's letter. Mr. Jarry's lucubrations shall be taken care of and kept with the rest; but we must have other more pressing objects disposed of before we can look for any force to the purposes he details in his different papers.

"Admiral McBride being still under my immediate command, I have sent him with orders to range the coast of France from Dunkirk to Havre, and report to me distinctly whether any, and what appearances there are in any of the ports of France of assemblages of troops, or transports, or any other symptoms of their meaning to execute their menaces of attacks on this island itself."

W PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, October, Downing Street].—"Dundas and I both agree with you as to the instruction to Genoa. Corresponding orders shall be sent to Lord Hood and O'Hara. I have sent your draft for Lord St. Helens to Dundas, and we will return it to you to-morrow."

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, October, Downing Street].—"I received the enclosed yesterday, but had not time to mention it. It seems to me that some attempt should now be made to get troops from Switzerland; but Cleghorn suggests nothing specific, and I do not know that there would be any particular use in employing him in the business. Of this, however, you can best judge. But the object itself is very material, and the possession of Toulon must probably dispose the Swiss to receive favourably any proposal."

## J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 13, Dartmouth Street.—"As I am unwilling to detain Mr. Goddard, I will give your Lordship only the heads of what I have learnt from the person who accompanied him. He is an Irish priest, of the name of Ferris, who, having returned to France some time ago, has been taken into the confidence of the Jacobins, and has been sent over here by M. de Forgues, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, as an agent to reside here, and to carry on a secret correspondence with him. For this purpose he has brought over with him a cipher, which he says he believes to be the same that is used by the other agents in Germany and elsewhere, and which he has left with me, that I may take a copy of it. M. de Forgues told him that, if he should find it difficult to get into the secrets of Government, he would transmit to him the name of a clerk in your Lordship's Office who had been bought by them, and from whom they had already received some material intelligence. Among the other commissions which de Forgues gave him was one which certainly deserves attention. It was to prepare things for the safe reception of certain persons, who might be sent over to assassinate the King, and those of his servants who are more particularly obnoxious to the Jacobin party. I have particularly cautioned Mr. Ferris to be careful of not letting it be suspected that he has any communication with Government. He appears to be a very sensible, discreet man, and to know fully the importance of keeping the secret; and I therefore think it will be safe in his hands."

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 13, Beckenham.—"I grow very anxious for the result of this Maubeuge business, and am hardly less so for the next news from Lyons. If the Lyonnese can hold out, I am inclined to expect great things from the south of France. In the mean time, when I contemplate the fate of Lepelletier, Marat, Camus, Drouet, Brissot, Vergniaud, and above fourscore others of the regicides, I continue (in spite of Lord Stanhope) to see traces of the divine vengeance."

"I have received a long letter from my old friend the Irish Chancellor. He represents Ireland as quieted for the moment, but in a state of extreme danger unless we have the good fortune to reduce and tranquillize France. In this opinion I perfectly agree with him; and perhaps the same thing might be said even of Great Britain."

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 16, Winchester.—"I have thought anxiously and repeatedly upon your difficulties since I last wrote; and an idea has

occurred to me which possibly may startle you, but which, in some degree, offers a solution for recalling the Duke of York. The British force in Flanders consists now of only six battalions of infantry; namely, three of Guards, 14th, 35th, and 54th; the remainder is all cavalry. You are withdrawing the 19th, 27th, 42nd, and 57th; and you told me that you are sending 6,000 Germans to Toulon. Might it not be more feasible to withdraw the whole of the British infantry for the Toulon expedition, and leave in Flanders only our small body of 2,500 cavalry, which would not be a command for an officer of the Duke's situation. Erskine might remain as a cavalry general to command them, with instructions to act under Marshal Freytag, in the same manner as Lord G. Sackville and Lord Granby acted under Duke Ferdinand. It is possible that this might smooth difficulties in the King's mind, as it would still leave the actual disposal of that combined force under our immediate orders; and you would, of course, replace this British infantry (now reduced to about 1,800 men) with part of the Hessians ordered from Toulon. You allow me to say all that occurs to me, and, under that impression, I cannot help deprecating most strongly the entrusting to General O'Hara such a command as that of Toulon, augmented as it will be to so large a force. Surely Sir William Howe would be more proper for it, particularly if you increase the British force; but nothing can be more unfit or impracticable for such a situation, now placed on so large a scale, as O'Hara.

"Since I wrote upon the subject of G. Nugent, I see by the papers that an army promotion is to take place instantly, and stop with his year. This, of course, makes the question of his regiment very material, and I should wish that it could be possible to ascertain Colonel Vyse's decision, and Lord Amherst's consequent determination. At least I wish to stand clear to G. Nugent, as having done all I can; though I very little expect (after what has passed respecting Talbot) any thing from Mr. Pitt's kindness, or even attentions, in forwarding my wishes.

"I look forward with great pleasure to our meeting, which I will venture to fix, in consequence of your letter, for Saturday the 26th at Dropmore. I could have managed it earlier, but your busy days intervene. If, however, you can be at Dropmore on Friday night I can meet you that day. All this, however, subject to the *invasion*, of which the Duke of Richmond's counter-order seems to think more formidably than you and I do.

"Pray apprise Lady Camelford of our motions; as she wishes to see me, I will consult her convenience."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF YARMOUTH.

Private.

1793, October 17, Whitehall.—"The course and progress of the business which your Lordship had undertaken is so materially interrupted by the departure of the King of Prussia from his army, that there seems little for your Lordship to do or for me to write respecting affairs in that quarter. Your Lordship will see from my despatch that the further co-operation of Prussia is considered as desperate. The compliance with the terms of the defensive treaty can, I trust, hardly be refused unless the King of Prussia is really so ill advised as to mean to stand insulated in Europe, and dependent on the good will of Russia."

"I think it right not to omit mentioning that when Lord Auckland returned from the Hague it was with the intention of not resuming his



situation there, and that I then renewed to Lord St. Helens the offer I had formerly made him, and which he had accepted, of succeeding Lord Auckland whenever he retired. The embassy to Madrid is consequently now vacant, Lord St. Helens being actually on his return home. I am unable to judge how far the business and circumstances of that mission would be agreeable to your Lordship, but, feeling as strongly as I do the importance of its being ably filled in the present moment, I should not think I discharged my duty if I looked to any other arrangement before I had consulted your Lordship's wishes on the subject, with the assurance that nothing would be more agreeable to me than the prospect of having your assistance in so material a part of the business of this Department.

"I have said nothing in my despatch on the idea of your making to the Duke of Brunswick any communication of the note a copy of which I send you, and expostulating with him on the impolicy as well as bad faith of the King of Prussia's conduct. You are better able to judge whether it would be useful or not, but I have little hope that it would."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1793, October 17, Dropmore.—"I send for Dundas's consideration and your's the draft of a letter to Lord St. Helens, in answer to his last letter, which I have received this morning. I should be glad to know your sentiments upon it. You will observe that it passes over the circumstance of the King having nominated a governor for Toulon, and that it rather understates the object of the commission. Is this right or not? I do not recollect that in Elliot's instructions, or O'Hara's, anything is said about Spain. This must surely be done."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 17, Wimbledon.—"You will see a remark in the margin respecting the constitution of 1789 (which I think is material), and another respecting the manner of mentioning Sir G. Elliott's commission. Besides this, we think there ought to be a sentence inserted distinctly mentioning that *we have appointed a governor of Toulon in consequence of the place being surrendered to us*; adding, of course, every proper assurance of our desire to co-operate with Spain in that quarter. We must take this line respecting Toulon, whenever any question occurs between us and Spain on that subject, and the correspondence with the French Princes makes it the more necessary to decide upon it. In all respects the sooner it is taken the more likely to avoid disgust."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 18, Winchester.—"*Bella, horrida bella!* I wish your Frenchmen at the bottom of the sea, which I am persuaded they will never contrive to cross, for having entirely deranged every plan for my comfort for some weeks, by an order to me, in the most peremptory terms, directing me not only to retain all officers at quarters, but to call in all who are already gone. Our projects therefore are for the present at an end, unless you can persuade Lord Howe to wake from his Torbay

slumber. I cannot tell you how peevish I am at this silly countenance given to a silly *gasconade*, but there is no help for it.

"You say nothing of asking about Colonel Vyse's decision, but I trust you will not forget it."

*Postscript.*—"If you really expect the *sans culottes* to risk at all hazards, surely you ought to order *all* Frenchmen from Southampton, which is full of them, *with and without permissions*; and the prisoners on parole at Waltham ought to be ordered to a more inland quarter, for five miles from Gosport is surely too near our arsenals."

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 20, Wimbledon.—"I return you the draft of the despatch you propose to send to Lord St. Helens, with one or [two] notes in the margin for your consideration. It occurs to Mr. Pitt and me that it is better not to keep back a distinct and explicit intimation of our having appointed a Governor. The grounds on which we obtained the possession, and the impossibility of Lord Hood and the officers acting under him continuing to exercise the office and duties of Governor, are reasons too obvious for adopting the measure to be concealed; and, standing on that ground, it is certainly more dignified, as well as more fair, to make the communication of our having done so, without appearing to shrink back from the avowal of it.

"The propriety of sending the despatch you propose is much strengthened by the accounts received in the despatches of this day from Toulon. If the Spaniards have any intention of acting on principles different from us, there could be no better calculated measure for the execution of such an intention than having a Spanish General of consideration at Toulon, at the head of 6,000 Spanish troops. But, if any such sentiment is entertained, I think we may safely rely on its being completely counteracted by a British fleet on the spot; and the great force now collected there, distinctly and unequivocally in the interest and subject to the control of Great Britain. I send you a perusal of the private letters I have received this day from Mulgrave and Sir James Murray; and also a very rough draft of what I think I ought to write to the Commissioners at Toulon, at the same time you write to Lord St. Helens. You will observe that Sir James Murray's letter is two days earlier in point of date than the one from Mr. Bruce to you. I do not know why, but I am strongly impressed with a conviction that, when joined by the Duke of York's re-enforcement, the Prince of Coburg will attack the French army, and not allow them for a moment to enjoy the advantage of any success. I find Mr. Pitt has wrote to you; so I might have saved you the trouble of double reading."

#### J. B. BURGESS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, October 21.]—"Stone has been taken into custody, and a letter from Jackson to him has been found in his house. Mr. Dundas means to examine him at ten this morning, or as soon after as may be convenient to your Lordship, and will be obliged to your Lordship if you will attend the examination. Mr. Dundas suggests the taking Stone to your Lordship's Office as being the most quiet."

## LORD R. S. FITZGERALD. to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, October 22, Berne.—“I received your private letter of the 26th ultimo as I was leaving Lausanne, and am extremely happy to see by it that such measures are likely soon to be adopted in England as may bring matters to a point here where everything that is mean and degrading to a people calling themselves independent, ruinous to the existing constitutions of the country, and hurtful to the common cause of Europe is pursued with a degree of devoted blindness only to be equalled by the activity of the Jacobins in mischief and destruction. It is really high time that the powers in arms against the regicides should interfere, for, if this country is spared much longer, our enemies will get the upper hand completely, and incalculable bad consequences will ensue. I am extremely happy to think I shall soon have the assistance of so intelligent a person as Monsieur Mounier, and I do assure you I shall conform myself entirely to his advice, as my first wish is to promote by every means in my power the good of the King's service, and that I only lament my faculties in this respect do not equal my zeal. I flatter myself that Monsieur Mounier will be as much satisfied with my readiness to conform to his opinion as I shall be pleased at receiving it.

“The Imperial Minister being still at Solenre and not talking of coming here, I propose going to him, and shall shortly inform your Lordship officially of the result of our meeting.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 24, Winchester.—“I cannot describe to you the mortification I feel at our repulse from Meaubeuge, for I begin to fear that we shall be obliged to undertake the winter campaign, without securing the line which covers Mons and Hainault; and, if so, the difficulties will indeed be very great to secure that country from constant irruption; besides that the failure in this material object, announced at the moment of the taking of Lyons, gives impressions to the French which will do more than their decrees to recruit their strength and spirits. I fear, too, that the capture of Lyons will operate severely upon Savoy, and even upon our operations from Toulon. For if the King of Sardinia was not strong enough to clear the Alps of the patriots while this strong diversion existed, I should much fear the result. Lord Mulgrave distinguishes himself as much by his very clear and unostentatious narratives as by his services, and I am glad of it for reasons personal to him; I could willingly have left him there in exchange for O'Hara. I do not understand exactly the footing upon which the allies, namely, Sardinian, Neapolitan, and Portuguese, are to be in Toulon; are they under our orders? I am the more anxious about this, as Langara's letter to his Court certainly does not appear to consider the Spaniards to be under Lord Hood's orders. I will thank you, likewise, if you will explain to me the history of the four French ships of war which are announced as being bound for Brest, L'Orient, and Rochfort, loaded with French democrat seamen from Toulon. I trust that Lord Hood does not confide in the good faith of the Convention to restore these cartel ships; and, upon the first blush of the business, it does not seem wise to risk out of our hands the only safe deposit which the war has placed in them.

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"I say nothing to you upon the inhuman story of the Queen's execution; the whole system has, for some time, been so bloody that these details *cannot now move me*; yet I cannot be insensible to the awful lesson which it holds out to all human vanity. I wish that you would direct Goddard to send me from time to time the extraordinary *gazettes* from the Office, and, if you would order the *précis* of the interesting news to be sent to me from time to time. It would relieve me from much anxiety, which I cannot but feel when your other avocations hinder you from writing.

"I hear of and see new corps, and I see commissions in every *gazette*; and have only to wish that, after undeceiving me with respect to any hopes of giving me the outrageous favour of a company for Talbot, Mr. Pitt and Lord Amherst would likewise put a negative upon Colonel Nugent's wishes, that I might not contribute to keep him in this state of uncertainty."

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 28, London.—"I send you a letter I have this day received from Mr. Burke. I shall write to him to-morrow, and let him know that he is too late in his suggestion, for that the paper has been communicated to foreign countries, meets their approbation, and is to be immediately made public. As he is in your neighbourhood, you will best judge whether you will make the form of a communication to him."

#### Enclosure.

#### EDMUND BURKE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1793, October 27, Beconsfield.—"Having found myself already but too importunate, I stand in need of a great deal of apology for troubling you again. When you named no time for renewing the discourse which had been broken off, I thought I might as well return hither. The far greater part of what I had further to offer would certainly not be of as much importance (supposing it to be any importance at all) a month hence as at present. I have not a shadow of doubt that you were more usefully employed than you could possibly be in any conversation with me upon business.

"Amongst the many things which I meant to take the liberty of submitting to your judgment, and to that of your colleagues, one was relative to an intended manifesto which, before I went to Brighthelmstone, you mentioned to me at the India Office, and, after my return, you hinted at on Friday morning at Somerset Place.

"I confess I have, just at this instant and as things now stand, very serious doubts concerning any measure of that kind; and I am strongly of opinion that if, just now, adopted at all, no one measure which Government can adopt requires so much serious consideration, and so combined a view of all the circumstances. It will fix a principle for the present war, and for future arrangement; and will render easy, or exceedingly embarrass, the proceedings of those who, without being in office, have hitherto defended, by argument as well as by their vote, the cause of Government; and who mean to do so again, with as much energy and activity as their means of action, and their honour and consistency will admit. It is certain that the frank and open communication made by Administration of the two last proclamations to Mr.

Windham and myself, as well as to other gentlemen, forms no title to any similar communication on my part, however it might raise expectations in Mr. Windham. I only most earnestly wish and entreat, from the peculiar responsibility which circumstances have imposed upon me in this branch of the national concerns, that before this proclamation or manifesto appears in the *gazette* I may be heard upon it. It cannot delay it above one day. I do by no means call for any communication of the paper itself, but only to be permitted to submit, with the utmost respect and deference, the considerations which have occurred to me, and which I have very nearly written out, on the time, the measure, and the matter, which, in the nature of things, I presume the manifesto must contain. If I had infinitely less good wishes than I really have for the cause, and for the honour and success of Administration, I should think it quite unjustifiable to criticise a measure on which, before it was adopted, I had an opportunity of giving my thoughts."

THE EARL OF YARMOUTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 29, Manheim.—"I beg to return you many acknowledgements for the confidence you are disposed to place in me, and the personal favour you have determined to show me. Our political views are so much the same that I shall have a particular satisfaction in serving under your Lordship and accepting the situation which you mention.

"I never read a better paper than your Lordship's answer to Monsieur de Lucchesini, and I am happy that there is nothing in it which shuts the door against a reconciliation between the two Courts. If the King is disposed to tread back his late unadvised step, he has a fair excuse for doing so, as the Polish war is no longer talked of even by any of his courtiers. My late despatches will have proved to your Lordship that all hope of future assistance from him is not yet to be abandoned. I know that Russia can do anything with him, but not knowing the actual state of Russian opinions, I am very liable to draw false conclusions in regard to his future intentions."

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE EARL OF YARMOUTH.

Private.

1793, October 30, St. James' Square.—"I am entirely convinced that whatever can be done with respect to the co-operation of our *ally* may be expected from your exertions. It is not difficult to believe that the Duke of Brunswick's situation is a distressing one, and perhaps his own character does not render it less so than it would otherwise be.

"You will, before this, have heard that the war on this side has not gone on for the last fortnight as successfully as might be wished. It has however rather been a suspension of success on our part than any material advantage gained by the enemy. Many of the Austrian officers seem to countenance the idea that the Prince of Coburg retreated from victory, and that a little more confidence in his own successes would have secured the object he was contending for. It is, however, difficult from any reports to form a fair judgment on such an operation. General Wurmser seems to possess that dashing spirit which this war indispensably requires, and I hope his exertions will have been as successful as they deserve to be.

"In the meanwhile the interior of France is becoming every day more favourable to our views. The expenditure of men in this campaign on the side of the French cannot, I think, be computed so low as 200,000. In a report I have respecting their military hospitals it appears that they contained above 50,000 invalids, and the indisposition to the new requisition is represented as universal. With respect to their finances I showed your brother the account printed by themselves of the actual expense of the month of August, by which it appears that in that month alone they had paid (exclusive of arrears incurred) no less than 18 millions sterling, while they had not received, except by the issue of paper, more than a million or twelve hundred thousand pounds. It is remarkable that this is the expense for one month before the *levée en masse* began to be carried into effect.

"We have accounts, which bear all the appearance of authenticity, that there is a new rising in Brittany to the amount of 20 or 30,000 men at a place called Redon, between Rennes and Nantes. It is certain that troops had been marched there from the coast."

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, October–November.—"I do not think there is anything sufficiently prepared for a Cabinet to-morrow, and it will take all the exertion I am able to use at this moment to take care of the Brittany business. The King will not listen to sending any of the Hanoverians to join Lord Moira; so that, if the Germans do not yield their doubts of not embarking, we shall be obliged to take away all the British from Flanders. The intimation to that purpose will go to-night. I am afraid there will always be found a *jealousy* between those services; and yet, it is so much the reverse, that, in truth, they are necessary to the mutual support of each other.

"I do not know what to think of Lord Howe's business, but it is best to believe it."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 1 [Winchester].—"I congratulate you most sincerely upon the extent and consequences of the Weissenbergh [Weissenburg] victory, for, although I dare not trust to the idea of the surrender of Strasburgh, I am still content with Landau (*when taken*) and with the winter quarters in Alsace, which I sincerely hope the Carmagnols will not suffer the allies to enjoy in quiet. I fear very much that Sir C. Grey's *something* which is to be done in a *very short time* will fall short of your views, for I cannot, in truth, see what he can do from the moment that the French abandon the siege of Nieuport, which I conclude they have done. If the attempt in Artois had been ready, surely an impression might be made there. You have now 5,000 men arrived from Cork; why do you not employ them at Havre, or at your point of communication with these insurgents? I would not urge this if your expedition was not decidedly stopped till Sir C. Grey returns from Ostend. You must be to judge of the relative importance of these attempts; but I cannot conceive any operation so likely to assist our Flemish views as such an attempt at any point from Calais to Havre,

supposing that there exists a correspondence that can give you a reasonable hope of co-operation. I see in the reports to the Convention the *annonce* of a plot at Abbeville; I hope that this is not your plot. I have repeatedly read your manifesto, and will fairly own that I do not like it in English half as much as in French. You have, I see, omitted some of your gallicisms, and particularly the phrase of a constitution *craignant l'effusion de sang*, which I despaired of translating. I cannot judge here of the effect of it; pray let me know what you hear of it.

"I begin to grow very uneasy about the discontents of the militia at Brighton. You have no idea of the extent of it, increased by the care which the Duke of Richmond has taken (most improperly) to give the Sussex the best quarters, and to march them from camp before any other regiment. The scheme of cantoning the men in barns cannot, for obvious reasons, answer; one half the money given to the regiments would enable them to build what we called Hessian huts last war, which are perfectly warm and will hold about 24 men each. They cost me about 40 shillings each, to which you must add blankets, wood, and straw for each.

"In the meantime, we are kept most strictly to quarters; and I cannot venture to hope for my release, although I see Lord Caernarvon and Sloane who amuse themselves, not having (though under the Duke of Richmond) received the same orders. I am most anxious to get away, but I know not how to bring my mind to ask for leave till the orders set me at liberty, particularly as we are now the only corps between Portsmouth and Weymouth. Nothing can be more tiresome or distressing.

"I cannot say how much I am obliged to you for your exertion about Colonel Nugent's regiment. I wish extremely that you would direct Mr. Goddard to apply for the paper of the *accustomed terms* and send it to me, that I may see how far I may be able to apply to him to help me for Talbot, as I despair of receiving from Mr. Pitt this very small civility which I, assuredly, never will solicit again from him, and which I can as little ask from Lord Amherst; but which I will not easily forgive. If Nugent cannot help me, I must acquiesce, but you will easily see that I wish not to lose a moment in applying to him, so soon as I know whether the *accustomed terms* will allow him to assist me.

"Our Frenchmen here do not speak sanguinely of your revolt at Rhedon. They seem (from local knowledge) to imagine that the country is infinitely more accessible than in La Vendée, and they doubt the temper of the inhabitants, who, they say, were by no means backward in driving out the nobles and clergy. However, all this varies so much from day to day that I will hope for the best.

"I congratulate you upon your success in *storming the cabinet* of the Duke of Tuscany. I will not enquire how far it agrees with our ancient politics upon that point, but I am heartily glad of it."

#### THE EARL OF YARMOUTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 6, Manheim.—"I am much flattered with your kind intentions in regard to the Spanish Embassy, and as I am soon to see you, I hope you will allow me to postpone till then a formal acceptance of it on account of the business in which I am engaged, to which I feel too strongly attached to withdraw myself from it abruptly while I can hope to make both my private objects and my public duties compatible.

In the meantime I am very sure that the same friendly motives which have induced your Lordship to make me the offer will prevent your listening to an application from any other quarter. I am just going again to General Wurmser, and shall then write to your Lordship very fully. In the meantime I must tell you that the Duke of Deux Ponts has just communicated to me his letter of remonstrance to the King of Prussia, which is drawn up in such terms that I have the greatest hopes from it. It goes to-day by express to Berlin, and he has also written to the Duke of Brunswick at my anxious request to say that if he employs his discretionary power over the Prussian troops by withdrawing them from the present scene, he will be personally responsible to the Empire and to the world for all the mischief which must ensue."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, November 7, Beckenham.—"I enclose another letter from M. de Jarry, in which there are, as usual, traces of good sense and observation, though of the gloomy kind. I incline to his opinion, that our first and great object ought to be to destroy the Convention; and it appears to me that if we are materially diverted from that object by the pursuit of conquests, whether on the continent of Europe, or in the East and West Indies, we risk the fate of the whole war and of the existing race of mankind. May it be added, that we do this in pursuit of acquisitions which we might have without effort or expense? For it is in Europe only that the successes of the allied armies, and the commanding superiority of our naval force can enable us to compel the French nation to such conditions and sacrifices as may be thought necessary for our future safety and tranquillity.

"I beg leave to pursue this idea a little farther. If we can get possession of the Isles de Bourbon and St. Maurice I presume it must be by a mode of operation which will draw nothing from the small disposable part of our European troops.

"This is not the case with respect to West India conquests; and it is therefore impossible to look without anxiety to the regiments embarked or embarking for that part of the world. Not on account of the mortality to which they are exposed; such mortality may be justified as the inevitable result of an inevitable war; and we are to place in the opposite scale the immense importance of St. Domingo, Guadaloupe, and Martinique, or of any one of them; if it can be doubted that they would not fall to us by pursuing the war successfully in Europe.

"Nor is that anxiety excited by the French menaces of an invasion. I do not think it quite improbable that some desperate landing on our coasts may be attempted in the winter months. But we are not on that account to suspend the activity of the war, nor such expeditions as may show resource, invention, system, and a wise and efficient energy. If an invasion should be attempted, it may excite a momentary alarm, but we have by sea, and by land also (without laying too much stress on the militia) ample means to resist it; and there can be no doubt that it would end in the destruction of the invaders.

"Again, that anxiety is not excited by the expediency of having the troops forthcoming to quell attempts which may be made to produce explosions of Jacobinism within this country. I have apprehensions that there are many able and dangerous individuals on the watch to make such an explosion; and I see with concern that all the lower



classes are more or less affected by the execrable doctrines of the day. But the main body of the kingdom is still sound; and I trust that if such a crisis were to come forwards, we should extricate ourselves without the aid of red coats.

"These remarks apply to Ireland as well as England; and though the dangers both of external and internal Jacobinism merit serious attention, I do not think that they ought to preponderate against the plans adopted for the conduct of the war.

"The anxiety which I feel turns upon the first principle stated in this letter; I mean the great importance of directing all our efforts to the destruction of the leaders of the Convention, who will with great complacency see us occupied in the sugar islands.

"We have recently experienced the essential benefit of a disposable body of troops. Without detracting from the Duke of York's late march and measures for the relief of Flanders which do infinite credit to his Royal Highness, I conceive that he would have been foiled, and perhaps that neither Nieuport, nor Ostend, nor any part of Flanders would have been saved, if we had not had a disposable body of troops, and if his Majesty's Ministers had not sent those troops with the same promptitude which last February saved Holland and the continent of Europe.

"It may farther deserve consideration whether the corps in question may not be sent with decisive advantage either immediately, or sometime hence, to the *Isle Noirmoutier*, *Isle Dieu*, *les sables d'Olonne*, or some other station within the Bay of Biscay.

"It is also possible that those regiments may again be wanted in Flanders; perhaps, too, it may become expedient to send a part of them to the Mediterranean.

"Though I write this to your Lordship, I do not even talk on the subject to any other person. I have not mentioned it except to one friend who is in the confidence of Government. From delicacy to Mr. Pitt I have not plagued him with it, because I apprehend that the measure is decided, and it may have been influenced by circumstances (and also by engagements) unknown to me. Besides, if the reasons *pro* and *con* are in any degree equally balanced, I am willing to admit that the appearance of steadiness of plan is material to be maintained; and that a measure adopted and known ought not to be renounced except on new circumstances evidently prevalent and intelligible to the world."

*Enclosing a letter from M. de Jarry criticising the conduct of the Allies, each of whom was led away by short-sighted views of advantage to the conquest of outlying portions of French territory; and insisting that the objects of the war could be fully achieved only by united efforts to sustain and co-operate with insurrection in France, for the purpose of destroying the Convention.*

LORD R. S. FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, November 7, Berne.—"I take this opportunity to inform your Lordship that Mr. Pictet of Geneva has been here some days, and that I shall with pleasure conform to the instructions sent me from your Lordship through Mr. Burges respecting that gentleman, it being always my most earnest wish to forward and promote by every means in my power the good of His Majesty's service; but I cannot help at

the same time saying, that I could on every account have wished that his mission had been kept a profound secret, and that the object of his visit to this country, as well as of Monsieur Mounier's intended one, had not been so generally known as it is all over this town. Your Lordship may readily understand that my regard to my own credit must have imposed the strictest silence on me, and that I can only attribute the publicity of the circumstance to the known loquacity of all foreigners, and that consummate *amour propre* which is ever uppermost in the breast of every Frenchman and Genevese, let their circumstances in other respects be what they will. That Mr. Pictet's mission should be known after two days' stay here did not surprise, although it vexed me; but that the object of Monsieur Mounier's return to Switzerland should be handed about before he appeared himself confounded me extremely, as by your Lordship's very polite letter to me on the subject it was plain that you were particularly desirous of it being a secret, and that you were glad that his care of Lord Hawke's son so cleverly masked it."

FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and very secret.

1793, November 9, Genoa.—"I hope Mr. Aust has communicated to your Lordship the letter I wrote to him by Captain Cook.

"I have since learnt that *Baldwyn* arrived at Paris on the 17th of October, and that he had a conference with Hérault de Sechelles, Hébert, and Forgues (the Minister for Foreign Affairs), but I am not yet informed of the result. *Baldwyn* is represented to be a furious daring Jacobin, very much distressed in his circumstances, and with a numerous family, to provide for whose subsistence he is willing to risk his own life.

"I have the honour to enclose a detailed account of the sitting of the *Committee of Nine* on the 2nd of September last, when this infamous scheme was first proposed. Your Lordship may rely on the authenticity of it, as it was drawn up by a person who is employed as secretary to that committee, and who conceals his real principles under the cloak of the most extravagant Jacobinism. Lord Mulgrave will explain to your Lordship the route by which his communications are transmitted to me. I humbly beg leave to observe to your Lordship that if the enclosed paper should be seen by any except his Majesty's Ministers, it might possibly lead to a discovery which would be very fatal to the writer of it."

*Enclosure.*

BULLETIN No. 1.

Le Lundi, 2 Septembre.—"Le Comité de Neuf ne peut conserver aucun doute de l'événement de Toulon, puisque depuis le premier Septembre à midi jusqu'au second à 6 heures du soir, il arriva soit au pouvoir exécutif, soit au Comité de Neuf, onze courriers, tous porteurs de différens détails, mais tous d'accord sur le fait.

"Le Comité s'assembla non pas au lieu de ses séances, mais chez le Maire Pache, le second à 11 heures du soir. Pache qui avoit eu l'ordre de répandre les veilles de cette nouvelle le second, rendit compte qu'aux clubs des fauxbourgs elle n'avoit pas produit d'effet, que le peuple en étoit

au point que tout ce qui ne touchait pas Paris immédiatement, lui était indifférent.

“Qu’aux Clubs du Palais Royal où se trouvait la foule des Girondins et leur partisans, la nouvelle annoncée avait donnée lieu à des *syndômes* plus graves par l’attention des orateurs Girondins, qui en avaient développé l’importance ; que là il étoit très à craindre que l’on n’en sentit toute l’importance, et plus à craindre qu’on ne la fit sentir dans les faubourgs à la populace.

“Qu’il étoit très à craindre que ces orateurs Girondins ne se répandissent dans les environs de Paris, pour y exciter le peuple et faire sentir la perte qu’on venoit de faire, afin d’ajouter ce moyen à ceux employés pour empêcher le recrutement.

“Que les Royalistes *clair semés* à Paris y étaient moins redoutables que les négocians marchands, tous artisans propriétaires, tous ennemis de la République, et, qu’en bref, il croyoit la République dans un danger imminent qu’il falloit prévenir. Que le meilleur moyen étoit celui convenu entre Hérault, Jean Bon St. André, Drouet, Cambon, Robespierre, et lui unanimement, qu’il falloit profiter de l’espace d’impassibilité des faubourgs, où résidoit la véritable force publique, pour écraser tous les autres partis.

“Qu’il falloit exciter l’insurrection par la difficulté des denrées, que la Municipalité dirigerait l’accusation d’accaparement sur le parti Girondin, les Monarchiens et les Brissotins.

“Que ce moyen promettant une insurrection des faubourgs, il ne s’agissoit pour la diriger pour obtenir de la Convention la dernière mesure qu’il restoit à prendre pour contenir Paris, celle d’augmenter le nombre des tribunaux révolutionnaires, ou tout au moins de s’asservir par la peur celui qui existoit ; et d’assurer l’exécution des volontés des comités et des jugemens du tribunal, en payant 40 sols par jour à tous les sans culottes des faubourgs, qu’on savoit dévoués, et prêts à tout.

“Cet avis fut unanimement adopté, mais on manda au comité le ministre Forgues, avec Henriot commandant.

“Forgues consulté sur ce qu’il espéroit des intelligences étrangères, déclara, que les moyens s’affoiblissoient chaque jour, soit parceque les moyens de payer les gens en numéraire devenoient difficiles, que parceque les gens employés au dehors voloient les fonds, au lieu de les employer ; que Makau, Flotte, Tilli, Henin, Jacob, Noel, étoient spécialement dans ce cas là ; qu’il n’y avoit peut-être que deux vrais serviteurs de la République, Barthélemi et Soulavie ; le dernier avec du zèle sans talens, le premier avec des talens, du génie, et du zèle. Qu’il lui devoit la découverte d’un complot tramé par les aristocrates Suisses en Franche Comté, auquel il espéroit remédier avec ses confreres, et dont il feroit la dénonciation, des que les preuves en seroient réunies. Que Barthélemi avoit parfaitement employé les fonds qu’il avoit eus à sa disposition pour paralyser l’activité des Cantons, ennemis de la République. Qu’en ce moment même il étoit sûr que si l’Empereur exigeoit le rassemblement d’une Diète, il n’obtiendrait pas l’accession à la coalition. Que s’il l’obtenoit, elle ne seroit pas ratifiée ; que dès ce moment éclateroit la ligue des cantons qui ont été lésés par la guerre de 1712. Qu’il est sûr, avec des fonds, d’établir sous peu, aussitôt que cela sera jugé utile, une scission dans le corps Helvétique que durera toute son existence, et que tous ses agens sont sûrs.

“Que les agens employés à fomentier des troubles en Irlande paroissent aussi habiles et sûrs ; que si le succès ne réponde pas aux dépenses, il faut s’enprendre à l’intensité de ce gouvernement, qui, à tous moyens imaginables, réunit une avidité et une énergie qui présente des terribles

obstacles ; mais que la nature de son gouvernement d'autre part est telle que y travailler à exaspérer le peuple ne peut jamais être une entreprise vaine, car, c'est préparer des armes à l'Opposition, et qu'il y a lieu d'espérer que cette guerre qui ne sera pas assez avancée cet hiver pour faire espérer aucune fin prochaine, et dont tous les symptômes annoncent l'éternelle durée, donnera à l'Opposition des armes invincibles contre Mr. Pitt.

“ Que d'une part, on est assuré que Mr. Sheridan prouvera par les documents les plus sûrs, qui seront fournis de ses bureaux, et qui lui parviendront par la voie la plus indirecte (car on ne peut pas nouer aucune relation immédiate avec lui) que cette guerre ne regarde en rien les alliés de l'Angleterre ; que, suivant les circonstances, la Convention pourra seconder la vérité de cette proposition par des déclarations qui la laisseront sans réplique ; et, alors, il est grandement à espérer que Pitt perdra son influence, et que, quant à lui, il est sûr qu'il perdra sa place. Que voilà les motifs qui l'engagent à demander la continuité sans aucune diminution de toutes les dépenses que la République fait en Angleterre ; que partout ailleurs il faut réduire aux frais simples d'espionnage, et renoncer à des propagations des principes de la République, dont on ne peut confier la mission qu'à des fourbes, ou des espions des ennemis.

“ Que malgré les friponneries de Henin, il lui devoit la justice de dire qu'il seroit fort bien à Constantinople ; qu'il y étoit écouté du *Reis Effendi*, et avoit un parti dans l'*Uléma*, qu'il tentoit la plus hardie des entreprises dans les pratiques ; qu'il se ménageoit dans les deux corps des *Janissières* et des *Topgis*, qu'il étoit puissamment secondé par le *drogman Fonton*, qui mettoit en langue Turque toutes les instructions qu'il vouloit faire glisser dans la milice ; que son travail lui paroissoit si important, qu'il prioit de délibérer si, malgré ses friponneries, il n'étoit pas convenable de continuer à l'employer, sans se plaindre de ses procédés.

“ Le Comité délibéra sur l'heure la continuité du travail en Angleterre sur les mêmes bases.

“ 250 mille livres à accorder au citoyen Barthélemy sur le champ, d'après sa demande.

“ La continuité du travail d'Henin, mais en partant au tribunal révolutionnaire une dénoncé secrète autorisée par le comité sur les plaintes, pour y valoir en tant que de besoin.

“ On s'est remis à délibérer sur les reste des propositions du Ministre.

“ Après cela Henriot entra. Il dit qu'il se rendoit caution sur sa tête de la soumission de Paris ; que les mécontents ne devoient pas être examinés en masse, mais évalués par leur qualité ; que les anciens Royalistes n'étoient rien ; et que puisqu'on avoit précédemment fait la faute en 1791 de les laisser émigrer, on pouvoit regarder ces gens là comme des ennemis extérieurs, mais nuls dans l'intérieur.

“ Interrogé par Hérault et Cambon comment il pouvoit appeler une faute de laisser sortir des gens qui étoient autant d'ennemis irréconciliables, quand leur émigration avoit produit 2 milliards à la République.

“ Il répond en attestant Robespierre, qu'il avoit été toujours de son avis ; qu'il falloit en 1791, à l'arrestation du Roi, faire égorger tous ces gens là, leurs femmes et enfants, et, qu'alors, on aurait eu les 2 milliards sans accroître les ennemis extérieurs ; qu'enfin les mécontents dans Paris étoient le plus grand nombre, mais tous, banquiers, agens de change, négocians boutiquiers, ouvriers en chef, artistes et propriétaires de maison. Que tous ces gens là formoient corps avec le peuple en 1780 pour détruire le roi, la clergé, les nobles, et les robins, mais

qu'ils vouloient remplacer tous ces gens là s'arrêter la Révolution. Que la preuve complète étoit qu'au fond tous les partis, excepté les vrais républicains sans culottes, vouloient tous un roi et la constitution de 1791, parceque cette constitution étoit leur ouvrage, détruit leurs ennemis et les met à leur place ; mais que tous ces gens là sont d'une lâcheté qui fait qu'on peut tout se promettre des moyens de force, et qu'il garantit sur sa tête qu'on n'entendra jamais parler de ces gens là, si on a une armée réelle de sans culottes non propriétaires ; qu'alors ce parti mécontent qui est nombreux par ses atténuances, les perd toutes, car tous ceux qui les servoient se placeront dans l'armée révolutionnaire.

"Qu'il faut leur faire payer cette armée ; qu'il faut les dépouiller à fond sur ce prétexte ; et, surtout, en appeler à la *Sainte Guillotine*, et à un tribunal fait pour la servir de son pain quotidien.' Qu'il répondoit de pouvoir en 24 heures disposer tout aux mesures que le Comité jugerait convenables. En finissant, il fut interpellé par Drouet de lui dire s'il étoit vrai qu'il lui avait proposé au mois de Juin un moien sûr pour faire assassiner le roi d'Angleterre, l'Empereur, et le roi d'Espagne ?

"Il répond qu'il n'est pas vrai qu'il lui ait dit qu'il eût ces moyens ; mais qu'il lui avoit dit qu'il faudroit les prendre et qu'ils étoient possibles, non par des émissaires qui prenaient à Paris l'argent pour aller le manger avant d'être aux frontières ; mais en exaltant leurs propres sujets qui sont à Paris ; et qu'il connaissait de ces gens là de ces pays qui étoient propres à cela, que nommément Miranda lui avoit dit tenir dans sa main la vie du Roi d'Espagne. Robertspierre dit que le patriote Miranda avoit beaucoup d'esprit, étoit menteur et fripon.

"Quand Henriot fut retiré on fit sortir Forgues.

"On fit venir Hébert et le Comte Ferfierma ; il resta jusqu'au 3 à 11 heures du matin sous la clef. Tous les membres des Neuf y étoient, Pache, Hébert, et Cambon.

"On y resolût l'insurrection du 4 et 5 dans toutes ses parties.

"On y signa l'arrestation de 2250 citoyens de Paris, qui devoit être faite par l'armée révolutionnaire aussitôt son existence, et on décréta que Chantilli, et l'isle d'Adam seroient remplis de prisonniers, parcequ'on pourrait là s'en défaire sans bruit.

"On y resolût une expoliation de 100 millions en numéraire et on donna la liste de ceux qui les pourraient fournir.

"M. Donet, ancien fermier-général, rue Bergère, fut dénoncé par son propre portier comme ayant 12 millions dans une cave inconnue dans son jardin, et il a été imposé à 9 millions en espèce.

"On y resolût la mort de la Reine, celle des Brissotins, et de tous les arrêtés du 31 May.

"Sur la reine, Cambon fit observer que Forgues disoit qu'on étoit en traité avec Bruxelles et Vienne et avec la Prusse à cet égard, et que, peut-être, on pourroit en effrayant, mais en éloignant le jugement, tirer grand parti de cet objet.

"Hébert, Barrère, Jean Bon St. André, et Hébert s'élevèrent en furieux contre cette proposition ; que la vie de Louis 17 remplissoit ce même objet dans tous ses points, qu'il falloit le sang de la Reine pour associer le tribunal révolutionnaire à la Convention, et rendre la ville de Paris co-opartageante des destinées de la Convention ; que la mort de Capet étoit plus spécialement le fait de la Convention, mais que celle de la Reine étoit le fait de Paris, du tribunal, et de l'armée révolutionnaire.

"Hébert parla d'une manière plus marquante encore —.

“ Il dit : ‘ J’ai promis la tête d’Antoinette, j’irai la couper moi-même, si on tarde à me la donner. Je l’ai promis de votre part aux sans culottes qui la demandent, et sans qui vous cessez d’être. L’instinct de la République les pousse à vouloir s’unir à nous par ce sacrifice expiatoire, et vous hésitez ; mais voici qui vous décidera.

“ Je ne puis voir clair où il fait nuit, ni des roses où il n’y a, que des poignards.

“ Je ne sais s’il vous reste aucun espoir de République, de Constitution, de salut de vos personnes ; mais je sais que, s’il vous en reste, vous vous trompez fort. Vous périrez tous, cela est impossible autrement.

“ Je ne sais si l’on a bien fait ou mal fait d’amener la chose où elle est, mais elle y est. Tous vos généraux vous trahissent, et tous vous trahiront, moi tout le premier si, étant moins désigné, et que je fusse votre général ; et que je visse un bon traité à faire qui me conservât la vie, je le ferois ; mais soyez sûr que Pache et moi et tous les juges du Roi ne peuvent la conserver ; cela ne se pourroit qu’en changeant la face de l’Europe. Cela ne se peut plus à présent.

“ Les Rois se feront un mal en voulant nous anéantir, qui les anéantira eux-mêmes dans vingt ans. Mais nous n’en périrons pas moins. La France sera soumise, elle sera soumise ici, elle se soumettra là ; soyez en sûrs. Nous périrons tous, et tous ceux qui ont marqué comme nous.

“ Si on nous promettoit amnistie, on ne la tiendrait pas, parceque on ne la pourroit pas tenir ; seulement vous seriez poignardés, ou empoisonnés, au lieu d’être écartelés. Dans cette position nous ne vivons donc que pour la vengeance. Elle peut être immense. En périssant, laissons à nos ennemis tous les germes de leur mort ; et, en France, une destruction si grande, que jamais la marque n’en périsse. Pour opérer cela, il vous faut satisfaire les sans culottes ; ils tueront tous nos ennemis, mais aussi faut-il les entretenir dans leur chaleur, et vous ne le pouvez que par la mort d’Antoinette. Cela est pour eux, celle des Brissotins est pour nous, et par la pillage des trésors de nos ennemis.

“ Songez que les moyens de tout leur faire oser, c’est de leur persuader ce que, moi, je leur crie hautement tous les jours ; Que dans cette crise, quelque soit l’événement, leur obscurité est leur sauvegarde, et que nous seuls répondrons de tout. Qu’ainsi ils nous assistent bien, car tous les profits sont pour eux et les dangers pour nous.

“ Voilà tout ce que j’ai à vous dire pour vous apprendre mon opinion.’ Et cela dit, il sortit, sans vouloir rester un moment de plus. Il était 7 heures du matin du 3 Septembre.

“ Après sa sortie on remit à Pache 500,000, pour l’insurrection du 4, en assignats.

“ On envoya chercher l’accusateur du tribunal révolutionnaire pour savoir ce qu’il prétendait faire sur la Reine.

“ Il dit qu’il falloit renouveler les jurés, car cinq étoient résolus à la servir ; que pour le tribunal il falloit une mesure d’insurrection pour vaincre sa peur, que d’Obsent étoit tremblant et lui avoit dit qu’il faudroit empoisonner la Reine pour s’oter cette épine du pied, que lui résoudroit avec le Comité l’acte d’accusation comme on voudroit.

“ Hérault proposa que l’on accélérât l’exécution de tous les objets convenus. Pour détruire le peuple de la prise de Toulon qu’il falloit l’annoncer précisément au commencement de l’insurrection, pour la rendre d’une part plus complète, et effacer par ce moyen l’idée de la perte que l’on avoit faite. Qu’il falloit surtout oublier ce qui dans le discours d’Hébert étoit aussi exagéré qu’impolitique ; qu’il approuvoit tous ses résultats, mais non les moyens ; et qu’il falloit, en conséquence,

enjoindre à Forgues de suivre avec la plus grande activité, toutes les négociations entamées, et à entamer tant qu'il trouveroit le moyen de négocier. Qu'il n'ajoutoit aucune foi à ces négociations pour l'objet réel de la paix, mais qu'il y voyoit l'unique moyen d'amener les Puissances à des plans dilatoires, à des délais nécessaires à la situation de la République, que pouvoit résister à tous ces ennemis et en triompher en usant sagement de l'inclination de quelques Puissances à entrer en négociation, et la mettant à profit pour mettre en activité les ressources immenses mais lentes de la République.

"Drouet annonça alors qu'il étoit temps d'user des derniers ressources, qu'il faisoit la motion d'arrêter les deux gardes des médailles de la bibliothèque du Roi, pour se saisir du médailler dont le Chevalier Lambert offroit un million en espèces pour le Comte de Plumiers, Anglois; qu'il étoit fait aussi de Hollande et de l'Angleterre des offres pour plusieurs millions pour les livres, manuscrits, tableaux, et cabinet d'histoire naturelle; qu'il falloit tout détruire, tout anéantir; car si on ne pouvoit vendre ces objets, il déclaroit qu'il étoit résolu de les livrer aux flammes. On chargea alors Robertspierre, Hébert, avec Drouet de s'occuper de ces objets, et on lança des mandats d'arrêt pour les deux Barthélemi, gardes du cabinet des médailles.

"Pache alors annonça que l'expoliation des gens à argent, si elle étoit bien faite, rendroit plus d'un milliard; mais qu'il falloit faire guillotiner dans les 24 heures ceux qui refuseroient les sommes exigées, que l'exemple de deux ou trois exécutions leur livreroit tout l'argent.

"Qu'il falloit une loi terrible sur les changeurs, pour leur faire racheter leur salut par la tradition de leurs trésors; qu'il estimoit à 110 millions d'or que possédaient en espèces ces étrangers.

"On prit alors tous les décrets nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de tous ces motions.

"Drouet proposa alors de donner un million à celui qui se dévoueroit pour la patrie et assassineroit le Roi d'Angleterre et Pitt; qu'il falloit frapper là que les troubles qui surviendroient en Angleterre à cette occasion dissoudroient la coalition. Drouet fut improuvé; on dit que cette mesure, en réussissant ou en manquant, exposerait aux plus assurées représailles, que ces représailles porteraient le peuple au désespoir, et que la Convention en seroit la victime; c'étoit l'avis de Pache; et Héroult et Robespierre étoient de l'avis de Drouet, qu'il n'y avoit pas de paix possible avec l'Europe et leurs principes, que les conseils des rois le savoiient et le voyoient bien; que s'ils se prêtoient à des négociations c'étoit pour réunir leurs moyens, et dans l'espoir d'être aidés par les troubles de l'intérieur; que si la Convention s'y prêtoit c'étoit pour épuiser leurs moyens, opérer leur ruine, et mettre la division dans la coalition.

"Que, d'aucune part, on ne vouloit une paix impossible, qu'il falloit donc adopter des moyens de nuire assurés pour les coalisés; que, sous ce rapport, ils approuvaient la motion de Drouet, mais qu'ils y trouvoient la difficulté d'exécution.

"Drouet dit alors, 'j'ai celui qui l'exécutera; c'est un Anglois qui ne demande qu'un million pour sa famille, car il compte périr dans l'entreprise. Je demande qu'il soit entendu, il est actuellement à Brest.' On l'a autorisé à le faire venir, et le mener au Comité.

"La séance a fini, parceque la municipalité a envoyé chercher Pache, et l'huissier de la Convention, Barthelot, a averti que la Convention étoit assemblée."

*French. Copy.*

## FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

## BULLETIN No. 2.

1793, Novembre 11.—“La manière dont s’est faite l’exécution du Duc d’Orléans est une chose vraiment incroyable, et doit l’être bien d’avantage pour les pays étrangers. A l’instant où il sortit de la Conciergerie pour être conduit au supplice, il fut réveillé de l’abbatement profond où il paraissoit être par les cris d’un peuple immense qui se unit à applaudir avec fureur, en lui disant ; ‘*Scélérat, c’est toi qui est la cause de tous nos malheurs.*’ On lui crioit des fenêtres les propres paroles dont il s’étoit servi pour condamner le Roi à la mort. On lui crioit, ‘*je vote la mort,*’ de tout côté. Le tribunal n’avoit point ordonné, ainsi qu’on l’a cru, de l’arrêter devant le Palais Royal ; c’est le peuple qui a forcé le cortège de s’arrêter pour lui causer ce nouveau supplice. Il lui a été, à ce qui a paru, très sensible. Il a voulu cacher sa figure avec les mains, le peuple a obligé le bourreau à les lui faire baisser. On l’a arrêté là plus de 20 minutes. Il n’a jamais parlé. Il a seulement, en sortant de prison, demandé des nouvelles du Duc de Montpensier, et on lui a répondu qu’il seroit guillotiné dans la semaine. Il a, en effet, été arrêté le même jour que son pere a été exécuté.

“Cet événement et les exécutions qui se préparent ont totalement anéanti deux partis également ennemis de la royauté et de la religion ; celui que l’on appeloit *Brissotin* et le parti d’Orléans. Ils étoient bien clairement distincts, quoique le tribunal ait voulu les confondre pour que le peuple crût que c’était un seul et même parti. Les Brissotins étoient une modification de ce que l’on nomme *les Monarchiens*, ils n’étoient pas même éloignés, ainsi que les papiers pris à Gensonnet et à Brissot l’ont prouvé, de vouloir un Roi. Mais ils vouloient deux choses, un changement de dinastie, et un Roi qui n’eut aucun autre pouvoir que d’être le Chef du pouvoir exécutif, entièrement subordonné à une Assemblée unique. Le parti d’Orléans vouloit conduire les choses au point où le peuple, lassé de ses maux, l’auroit demandé pour *Protecteur avec l’autorité dictatorial*. Tous les plans et projets à cet égard ont été trouvés chez Sillery, il y a plus de neuf mois. Mais le tribunal révolutionnaire a néanmoins voulu que Sillery parut complice de Brissot, et que d’Orléans parut lui-même complice de cette faction.

“L’exécution de ces deux partis ne laisse en apparence qu’une seule faction dans la République, la faction Républicaine ou les Anarchistes. Mais, depuis le 7, il se manifeste dans les Comités deux partis déjà fort ennemies. Le Comité de Salut Public, où est Robespierre, forme le parti ostensiblement dominateur, réuni avec l’Abbé Siéyes, Pache, Chaumette, Bourdon, et Hébert.

“Mais il est dans l’Assemblée un autre comité revêtu des mêmes pouvoirs que le Comité de Salut Public, et qui est las depuis longtems de son inutilité. Ce comité avoit fixé l’attention des agens royalistes à Paris, les hommes les plus fidèles sans exception dont je puisse me former d’idée. Ils ont par le moyen de leurs agens excité ce Comité de Sureté Générale à se saisir du pouvoir, et lui en ont facilité quelques moyens, non pas pour réussir, mais pour élever une nouvelle faction dans la Convention. Bazire et Chabot sont dans ce Comité de Sureté Générale. Les choses en sont déjà au point, d’après la scène qui s’est passé le 8, que bientôt il doit en résulter un choc dans l’Assemblée. Le 8, les tribunes ont été pour le Comité de Sureté Générale, et ceux qui m’écrivent m’assurent que si les membres de ce Comité avoient eu autant de conduite qu’il a de l’humeur et d’ambition, ils ne doutent pas qu’il ne détruisit le Comité de Salut Public, en se servant habilement pour aigrir le peuple des sottises que fait le Comité de Salut Public en se livrant à



toutes les fureurs de Robespierre et de Hérault. Mais mes amis sont persuadés que l'habitude de faire agir à leur volonté les scélérats, donnera pour cette fois encore gain de cause au Comité de Salut Public, qu'il répandra après la victoire le sang de tous ses nouveaux ennemis. Mais ils prévoient aussi à coup sûr que Robespierre et tout son parti succomberont ensuite d'autant plus vite à la première attaque d'un nouveau parti, que la disette alors se fera plus vivement sentir, et que le peuple sera las de la continuité de leur succès.

"D'après le plan qu'a proposé l'Abbé Syéès, le Comité de Salut Public a adopté le projet de détruire totalement toute espèce de religion, malgré les réclamations qu'ont faites plusieurs membres du Comité de Salut Public pour prouver que le peuple, surtout des provinces, n'étoit pas mués encore pour une pareille opération. Ce qui a fait tout hasarder pour l'entreprendre, c'est que Robespierre prétend que la dépouille totale des églises procurera plus d'un milliard à la République. Et il est de fait que depuis que l'on a commencé à permettre à ces scélérats toutes sortes d'impiétés, il est entré une grande quantité de matière d'or et d'argent dans le trésor public, qu'il y a aussi une infinité de pierreries de toutes espèces. Mais il faut aussi défalquer d'un gain qu'ils viennent de faire près de deux millions qu'ils ont destinés déjà au succès de cette nouvelle mesure, soit pour payer des partisans dans les provinces, soit pour indemniser les prêtres qu'ils engagent à renoncer à leur état, mais, surtout, pour faire apostasier les évêques constitutionnels. Gobel évêque intrus de Paris a coûté 100,000 écus. Chacun de ses vicaires 60,000 livres, et il est à noter que tous ces gens là qui savent qu'on ne peut faire aucun fonds sur des traitemens accordés par l'Assemblée, veulent tous toucher des capitaux, et les toucher en espèces avant d'apostasier. Gobel a même fait plus; il a voulu que l'argent fut envoyé en Angleterre, et ce n'est que lors qu'il a su qu'il étoit arrivé dans les mains qu'il avoit assignées, qu'il s'est porté à la démarche qu'il a faite, et à laquelle tout le Comité de Salut Public attachoit la plus grande importance.

"Maintenant que les agents royalistes croient que les membres du Comité de Salut Public veulent, ou s'emparer eux-mêmes de cet argent, ou l'envoyer dans les pays étrangers pour y exciter des révoltes, ils excitent la jalousie du Comité de Sureté Générale, et l'on doit s'attendre que dans très peu de tems, les débats et les accusations les plus vives vont s'élever dans la Convention.

"L'enlèvement de la chässe de Ste. Genevieve a mis le comble au mécontentement de cette partie du peuple qui n'est pas sans culotte, et à qui il reste quelque propriété. Tous les moyens du Comité de Salut Public n'ont pas amélioré le sort du peuple, il s'en faut. Le pain devient rare, et tous les denrées aussi. L'armée révolutionnaire et les assassins du Comité de Sureté Public compriment tout ces mécontentemens jusqu'à ce jour, mais ils existent bien distinctement.

"Le Comité de Sureté publique apprit le 10 au soir, que l'armée de la Vendée s'étendoit depuis Doufront jusqu'à 5 lieues d'Alençon, que la réquisition de Netagne qu'on croit forte de 6,000 hommes, au lieu de combattre contre l'armée de la Vendée, s'est réunie à elle. Nos amis ont reçu aussi des lettres de la Rochejaquelein du 6 Novembre où il leur dit que leur Conseil délibère s'il faut aller à Rennes, à St. Malo, ou Cherbourg.

*French. Copy.*

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, November 10] Downing Street.—“I found your letter on returning from Guildhall last night. The Chancellor has undertaken to see Lord Malmsbury, and will send to him to come to town, if he does not find that he is returning immediately from Welbeck, where he now is. It will probably be Monday, or perhaps Tuesday before he arrives, so that there seems to be no reason for your coming sooner than you probably would otherwise. I am going to-day to Lord Bayham's, where I shall have an opportunity of meeting Lord Spencer, who, I understand, is in a very good disposition.

“I shall return to-morrow. The accounts from Toulon (though not much more in substance than we knew before) are very satisfactory.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1793, November 11, St. James's Square.—“I am in daily expectation of Lord St. Helens's arrival, and I apprehend that as soon as he comes, it will be right to announce his nomination to the embassy at the Hague, as indeed his proceeding to his post there seems to be not a little pressing.”

“There is an appearance of a beginning of despondency at the Hague, the effects of which may be very pernicious. It is true that the campaign has not answered all that one's wishes suggested, nor even all that at one period of the year it seemed reasonable to hope. But surely to have begun by the defence of the Moerdyck and of Maestricht, and to end with the establishment of our winter quarters close to the French frontier, and, in some parts, within their territories, would in January last have been thought worth compounding for, even putting out of the question Mentz and Alsatia and Toulon, each of them very considerable advantages in their different ways.

“It seems to me that the abandonment of the West India expedition would give an impression of alarm which would operate against us almost as much as the troops could do for us. No serious apprehension can exist for this country beyond a few buccaneering attempts at most; and in Flanders there is surely force enough to defend such a frontier in winter against anything that can be expected to come against it. Our troops may be harassed it is true, and so might twice their number if they were there. But for substantial purposes of attack, I confess I have no fear that the French possess either the design or the means of acting this winter in the Low Countries.

“Jarry's ideas of Bordeaux are upon too large a scale for us to engage in, especially with respect to a place which itself is, by his own account, not defensible but by a large army. I could wish to have his ideas of Belleisle, Noirmoutier, St. Malo, and Havre, on the supposition of a smaller force than he supposed necessary for Bordeaux.

“Do I flatter myself with the hope of what I so strongly wish, or does it strike you as it does me that every fresh account from France brings decisive proofs that the system is drawing to its close, and cannot longer support itself. Consider only the violent and continued effort which the interior requires, and it is surely not being too sanguine to pronounce that this is incompatible with the maintenance of their external defence. I look upon the sort of calm which the winter may give as beneficial to us.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 12, Winchester.—“Having supped last night with Sir P. Parker when his prisoner arrived, he desired me to examine

him, and with great difficulty I got from him the details now sent to Lord Chatham respecting the two squadrons of French frigates now cruising, namely, *La Sémillante* 36 guns, *La Galatée* 36 guns, and two sloops, fifty leagues west south-west of Scilly; and another, *La Carmagnole*, and two others of 36 guns, and two sloops, in the bay. By my advice he sent instantly advice by express to the Admiralty, and to Plymouth, particularly as the account of the capture of the *Thames* of 32 guns, by the *Carmagnole*, and of her being safe in Brest, seems beyond a doubt, from the very correct account which this prisoner gives. But I am anxious (least you should not know the consequence of the capture of this frigate) to remind you that she carried out to Gibraltar the orders to Rear-Admiral Gell to sail to Jamaica, and the despatches for Commodore Ford at Jamaica, respecting the embarkation of a regiment from thence. I find from Sir Peter that no duplicate of these orders has been sent through any Portsmouth ship to Admiral Gell or to Commodore Ford; and therefore I have reminded you of this circumstance, which is peculiarly interesting.

"I have at length got leave of absence, and shall feel most happy in coming to a late dinner at Dropmore on Saturday. My stay there must depend to a degree upon you, but I cannot restrain my impatience from Stowe longer than Tuesday."

#### MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 13 [Winchester].—"I enclose to you Colonel Nugent's letter by which you will see that the great man of the army, or rather the greater man his secretary, has changed most materially the features of Colonel Nugent's business, by departing from the terms repeatedly delivered in writing. You will, I know, do all you can on this subject, and however sorry I may be if you cannot carry the point, I shall still feel highly obliged to you for the pains you have taken.

"There seems a fatality attendant upon every wish and every connexion I have. Bulkeley has been writing to me, in very bad humour, that R. Williams, who has been dismissed by Lord Westmorland from his 180*l.* per annum precisely in the week in which he has been wounded, has been (in a conversation which he had with Mr. Pitt) entirely abandoned, and without any prospect of promotion. He is second for purchase of a lieutenant-colonelcy in the first of Guards, but the prices are so extravagant that I doubt the possibility of his effecting it. I had heard that Lord Amherst had given Captain Harvey Aston a majority to serve as a stepping stone to the lieutenant-colonelcy (by raising men) of General Leigh's regiment, and therefore I requested George Nugent not to engage his lieutenant-colonelcy till he heard whether Mr. Pitt would make for Captain Williams the same arrangement which he made for Captain Harvey Aston, and which, as you see, does not interfere with Mr. Pitt's or Lord Amherst's patronage, as the majority, so proposed to be given, will be at their disposal again in a few weeks; and I have desired Lord Bulkeley to call upon Mr. Pitt and to propose it to him. I state it at length that you may be master of the subject, knowing that if I am to fail in every wish, it does not depend upon your exertions to prevent it.

"I shall write to George Nugent (though I am little able to advise him) to recommend to him to go on with his regiment, as I can hardly imagine that (being so very high upon the list) Lord Amherst can be allowed to withhold ultimately his rank from him; for he has every

prospect of completing it with my help in a very few weeks, and, then, even if the King does not give him the rank at present, he must give it him hereafter.

"I shall, according to my promise, come to you on Saturday, happy beyond measure in my release from the 'circumstance of glorious war,' and happy in the prospect of passing a few interesting hours with you."

#### FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

##### BULLETIN No. 3.

1793, November 13.—"Le 11 après midi, l'ancien maire Bailli a été décapité au Champ de Mars. Dans la soirée du 10 ce misérable, dans l'espoir de sauver sa vie, ainsi que le lui promettoit d'Obsent, Président du tribunal, a fait des dépositions infâmes contre Madame Elizabeth. Le sort de cette vertueuse Princesse paroît irrévocablement décidé. On ne croit pas qu'elle passe la semaine. Déjà l'*Observateur sans culotte*, feuille rédigée par les ordres de la municipalité et du tribunal révolutionnaire, a annoncé sa mort avant le 15.

"Il s'est manifesté le 11 une division formelle dans l'Assemblée entre le Comité de Sureté Générale et le Comité de Salut Public. Le Comité de Salut Public veut accuser celui de Sureté Générale de la révolte qu'il vient d'y avoir à St. Meneshoult. Il est certain que la division est bien établie dans l'Assemblée, et on persiste néanmoins à croire que le Comité de Salut Public aura encore le dessus.

"Après avoir appris au Roi toutes les impuretés imaginables, Hébert lui apprend maintenant toutes sortes de blasphèmes. Sa santé cependant s'affaiblit chaque jour, et il a presque un dévoiement continu. Hébert commence cependant à devenir en horreur à la populace. Il a été personnellement insulté à la Halle. Il n'est pas douteux que la Comité de Sureté Générale n'ait pratiqué cette manœuvre, comme il n'est pas douteux non plus que ce ne soit lui qui ait fait imprimer un petit livre que l'on a jetté dans toutes les rues, intitulé *Les faits du Comité de Salut Public*, et duquel il résulte par preuves irrésistibles, car tous les noms y sont, que le Comité a fait couper dans le royaume 1068 têtes, sans y comprendre les fabricateurs de faux assignats, les malfaiteurs, mais uniquement ceux qui ont péri pour fait de révolution.

"Le Comité de Salut Public apprit le 11 au soir, par la lettre d'un de ses commissaires, que l'Alsace manifestoit tous les germes de la plus prompte insurrection. Le Maire Pache y porta une lettre par laquelle on prévenoit la Municipalité que les troupes de la République venoient d'essuyer une perte terrible du côté de Cambrai. Comme cette lettre n'étoit pas du Commissaire de l'Assemblée, le Comité se flattoit que la nouvelle étoit fausse.

"On a fait donner une idée qui me paroît fort bonne au Comité de Sureté Générale. C'est que comme le Comité de Salut Public a animé le peuple en lui parlant sans cesse d'une prochaine descente en Angleterre, de pousser le peuple à vouloir absolument cette descente; parceque l'une de ces deux choses arrivera; ou la descente seroit tentée, et alors tous les malheurs de cette folle entreprise seront imputés à ce Comité de Salut Public; ou il refusera de la tenter, et alors il donne beau jeu pour détruire sa popularité."

*French.*

*Endorsed:* Received 13 January 1794, from Mr. Drake.

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF YARMOUTH.

Private.

1793, November 14, Whitehall—"I should certainly be very desirous that you should remain where you now are till the scene is finally closed for this year, as I am convinced that if anything can keep the Prussian army even in the appearance of co-operation it is your presence and exertions. When that is over, whatever may be the result, we shall wish to have the benefit of conversing with you and knowing your ideas of future arrangements."

"The situation of things at Madrid is not without its difficulty, and will, I fear, not be improved by the events which have closed this campaign. You may rely upon it that I shall think of no other arrangement for that mission till I have seen your Lordship; and I look forward with much pleasure to the hope of your assistance in that quarter.

"I am persuaded that there is now nothing to be done in Switzerland that could be worth your time and attention upon it. Nothing but considerable success and the most flattering prospects for the future would, I believe, have operated there, and their dangers, which ought to animate them, will only depress the spirits and exertions of those who are well disposed."

*Copy.*

## J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 16, Whitehall—"I think it my duty to lose no time in communicating to your Lordship the substance of a conversation I have this minute had with Baron Nagell.

"He told me he had this morning received despatches from his Government, which he meant to communicate officially to your Lordship on your return to town. They contain a positive instruction to him to co-operate with the British Ministers in the depending negotiation with the Court of Vienna, with a view of including the Dutch as parties in the alliance, and of cementing the most intimate union and confidence between the three Powers.

"By a private letter from the Greffier, Baron Nagell learns that it is in agitation to follow the example of this country, by demanding from the King of Prussia the subsidiary troops to which they are entitled under the defensive alliance of 1788. I did not however collect that any determination had yet been formed upon this point.

"I have ventured to trouble your Lordship with this information, as I conceived it was proper you should receive it as soon as possible.

"M. Ferris called upon me to say he was busily employed in arranging the business of the vessel. He urged me strongly to write in vitriol by the next post to Somers, and to let him have my letter that he might write ostensibly to him on the first page of it. As a proposition of this kind accorded but badly with the reasons he assigned for engaging a neutral vessel, and as it otherwise appeared very objectionable, I gave him no encouragement to think I would comply with it. As he was going away, he begged me to forward a letter to his brother-in-law, the

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Inspector of the posts at Toulon, which I agreed to do. I have the honour to send the copy of it to your Lordship; and I also enclose the original, that you may look at the seal, which I know to be one which belonged to Somers, and with which most of his letters to me were sealed. This is certainly a curious circumstance, and I incline to think that it must have been accidental on his side, the obvious use of his having this seal being to command the contents of any letters coming from Somers, without inducing on our part a suspicion of their having been inspected.

"May I venture to suggest to your Lordship my idea, that some use may possibly be made of Mr. Ferris's correspondence at Toulon? At all events, measures may be taken to become masters of it."

#### LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 17, Beckenham.—"I forward to you a letter which I have received from M. de Jarry in consequence of your wishes to know his sentiments respecting St. Malo, Havre, Belleisle and Noirmoutier, under the supposition of our employing a smaller force than he had proposed for Bordeaux. What he says respecting Noirmoutier is conformable to the opinion which M. de Mertanges, M. de Bouillé, and other intelligent officers led me to adopt many months ago; though the island is small and in some points of view insignificant, it is important '*comme un point d'appui et de communication*'; and without entering into the impatience of those who would exact unreasonable efforts from our Channel fleet, I have always had hopes, whilst the season was good, that we might have looked at least at Belleisle, Painboeuf, Noirmoutier and *les Sables d'Olonne*. This will be done with disadvantages of various kinds in the winter months, particularly if any landing is to be attempted.

"It is very true as M. de Jarry remarks, '*que nous avons affaire à des gens extrêmes qui n'épargnent rien; trop criminels pour céder, si on ne les détruit pas ils détruiront.*' I do not however infer, as he seems to do, that it is necessary to destroy them by fire and sword. It must be confessed that our campaign has had a lame and impotent conclusion, and even with such small and imperfect information as I possess respecting foreign negotiations, it is easy to foresee that the good faith of some of our allies, the confidence and zeal of others, the efficiency of a third description, and the means and finances of the whole combination, may be found fatigued and defective. Still, however, I think that we have a fair prospect of maintaining on the Continent at least a barrier against the incursions of the mad multitude; and I most fully concur with your Lordship in opinion that, if this can be done, the Jacobin system is drawing to its close and will be unable to support itself. On this speculation I rest my hopes, much more than on ideas of conquest, or on the effect of conquests if we could make them. I trust strongly also to the approach and impression of famine, and I observe with pleasure what M. de Jarry mentions on the subject of saltpetre.

"I inclose a letter from Mr. Craufurd. In the same paragraph where he says that the badness of the roads had suspended all farther exertions on the part of the Austrians, he adds that the French continue to make incursions into the Netherlands, and I make no doubt that he is accurate in this.

"I conceive that it might be of some possible service to call on Jarry for his general ideas of a plan; but I will not do it unless your Lordship approves it, and, if you approve it, I wish that you would give me your sentiments as to the manner of turning and expressing such a

requisition, so as to draw every practicable effect from it ; after which I will set M. de Jarry to work."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 19, Beckenham.—"I forward a letter which I have this moment received from M. de Jarry. He reasons on a supposition that there are no royalists at Noirmoutier as had been reported, and that such parts of the royalist armies as remain in France are cut off from the sea-coast and likely to be soon destroyed. I hope and believe that he is mistaken in both those points: but as I am not much better informed than he is, I am unwilling to consume your Lordship's time by risking ill-founded remarks."

*Enclosure.*

A letter in French from M. de Jarry, pointing out that an English expedition might with great advantage have been sent to Noirmoutier, or some other point on the west coast of France, when the royalists were triumphant in Poitou or Bretagne; but that now, when they have been cut off from the sea-coast, and Vendée is a heap of cinders, the time for such an enterprise has gone by.

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, November, Stowe.]—"I have only time to enclose you a note which your kindness which [will?] induce you to attend to as it is so material to George Nugent. Pitt, *as usual*, gives no encouragement for R. Williams's promotion, and Lord Amherst, *as usual*, refuses Cornet Pigott leave to raise the company, though in two instances in the last three months it has been allowed. I conclude therefore that, *as usual*, G. Nugent will fail in his object. All this must and will ferment, till it breaks through the bounds of patience which I have prescribed to myself. But I feel too much for your situation to say more. Adieu; a thousand thanks for your hospitality at Dropmore, and a thousand anxious wishes for what is uppermost in your mind."

THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1798, November 23, Bayay.—"Subsequent to the conversation with Count Mercy of the 20th instant, the details of which I forwarded by a M. le Chevalier Vincent, as courier, I have had one conference with him of a more interesting nature in so far as it comprehended a great variety of objects, and procured me the communication of many of his letters. But, as these matters are in a great measure already before your Lordship, I avoid reverting to them. The opportunity, however, of sending a private letter to your Lordship, which the conclusion of the arrangements I had here in charge for Brittany affords to-day, inclines me to mention that his confidence is to an extent that, I think, may prove of benefit. He has evidently a suspicion that Count Stahremberg is jealous and unfair to him; and he actually offered to make his communications to your Lordship through me, adding, at the same time, that he did not thereby intend to desist from keeping Count Stahremberg *au courant* of what came to his knowledge. I rather imagine that the old rivalryship with Lord Auckland, and the belief that Count Stahremberg's opinions in regard to him (Count Mercy) have been influenced by Lord Auckland,

has some weight in his mind. Your Lordship will believe me when I say I have no object in improving this circumstance but the general good understanding, and the obtaining intelligence. I think, indeed, that it may prove of consequence. You will judge how far you should authorise me to say you think favourably of it. I know that any such assurance would be of great use.

"Besides General Clairfayt, who retires for a time from the army, General Kinsky and General Verneck had made similar requests. These are sent to Vienna, for the decision of the Council of War. Much is said of a change in the commanders. Marechal Lacey is talked of as Commander-in-Chief. Should Prince Coburg remain, either Mack is expected, though his health is very bad, or Prince Waldeck, who lost an arm last year before Thionville."

#### THE EARL OF YARMOUTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 24, Mannheim.—"I was on my road to England when I received the honour of your Lordship's despatch of the 14th instant, announcing to me Lord Malmesbury's appointment to my present mission; and though it was accompanied by the kindest private letter from you, I must say that I did not expect so sudden a supersession.

"The state of the Prussian business is, in three words, this: the king has never intended to separate from the other powers, but perceiving England to be very liberal and very eager, he thought the opportunity favourable to get a large sum of money for doing that which he could not avoid doing without it. With that view, he made the proposal which you so properly negatived, and he has acquiesced in that refusal. He has done more, for he has again taken his part as a principal in the war; but as a man is never so angry as when he is detected in a mean plan, especially if it has failed of success, the king directed Monsieur Jacobi to make the angry declaration which appears to have created so much alarm. I cannot suppose that you will receive it in writing, but I will venture to assert that when Lord Malmesbury's assistance was applied for the danger was over, the victory was gained (by the fresh orders sent at the same time to the Duke of Brunswick) and the late menace was only the last struggle of disappointed meanness.

"Whether under these circumstances the appointment of a new Minister at Berlin is necessary to the public service your Lordship is certainly to determine. I do not presume to say more than that every fresh advance which His Majesty makes to the Court of Berlin will give the king an higher idea of his own importance, and of our dependence in a proportionate degree. An extreme case must have an extreme remedy, but my principal business in returning to England was to show that your alarms from this quarter may be prevented in future by methods simple in themselves, and, I believe, perfectly within your reach. If your late agent can do this I do not say that he will do much, but I think your Lordship will be disposed to listen to him under such circumstances before another man is brought into his place."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD R. S. FITZGERALD.

Private.

1793, November 26, Whitehall.—"I have received your letter of the 7th, and, though much mortified at the circumstance you mention, I



am anxious not to omit assuring you that, even without your explanation upon the subject, I should have done you the justice to be fully persuaded that what I regret is not to be imputed in the smallest degree to you. In truth I am afraid you have assigned the true cause, but we must take people as we find them and make the best use we can of them."

*Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, November 26, Brussels.—"I have shown Brissot's *mémoire* to one or two people, who consider it as a most essential paper; I propose keeping it a little longer for my original purpose, and shall take the utmost care of it.

"A project has been some time formed of encouraging an emigration from Artois and Picardy. It was much impeded by the incursions of the French in October into West Flanders. It regains vigour now, though not yet anything like what was expected, namely 15,000 men. A M. *Cuiricky* (a kind of *commissaire* for the Princes) is at the head of it. But I have a very confidential assurance that the Duke de Richelieu is destined for that post. This is the reason why he does not go to Brittany; a circumstance that will appear striking to all who know him as being the best informed, and by far the most distinguished, among the emigrants."

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, November—December] Hollwood.—"Mulgrave arrived to-day, and I had near an hour's conversation with him before I left town. What he says rather goes to make re-inforcements for Toulon more pressingly necessary even than we considered it; but the great point it makes one anxious about is the arrival of the Austrians; and his conversation with General *Stein* (who commands at Milan) has left with him a strong impression that they mean to evade sending the succour as long as they can. I think what you have already written to Vienna will have secured the point before this time; but it is one so important that I desired a memorandum to be sent to you of Lord Mulgrave's conversation with General Stein; and I think it may be worth while to send another messenger to Vienna, to express again our anxiety at this appearance of delay, and to insist on the performance of their engagement. I shall go from hence to-morrow to Wimbledon to meet Mulgrave."

#### FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

##### BULLETIN No. 4.

1793, Novembre 25–29–30.—"Il y a une division de nature à s'envenimer chaque jour davantage, entre le Comité de Salut Public et la Municipalité qui prend le parti du Comité de Sureté Générale, c'est à dire de ce qui reste à présent de ce Comité, car tous les partis paroissent également décidés de se défaire de Chabot et Bazire.

"Robespierre, L'Abbé Siéyès, Bourdon, et Barrère sont les chefs du Comité de Salut Public.

"Pache, Hébert, et Chaumette sont les chefs de la Municipalité.

“Henriot, Commandant de la garde nationale, paroît jusqu’ici à Robespierre, mais ce qu’on appelle la troupe révolutionnaire paroît se dévouer à la Municipalité.

“En ce moment Robespierre paroît bien avoir le crédit prépondérant, mais les observateurs bien instruits ne doutent pas que la Municipalité ne finisse par l’emporter sur le Comité de Salut Public si Bouchotte, Forgues, et d’Albarade ne parviennent à un rapprochement, au quel ils n’avoient point encore réussi le 30.

“Une des raisons qui fait croire que Robespierre succombera c’est qu’il a pris le parti qui paroît le plus modéré. Il désapprouve les poursuites sanguinaires contre Madame Elizabeth ; il l’a même dit aux Jacobins, mais pour regagner la popularité, il proposa au Comité de Salut Public, le 28, de rendre une loi qui obligerait toute fille de 15 ans de se marier, et si elle n’étoit pas mariée dans six mois, à être livrée au public.

“Cet horrible forfait est affreux, puisque la loi serait d’abord exécutée sur Madame Elizabeth, et sur Madame Royale. Une seule voix dans le Comité s’est élevée contre le projet, et tel est l’état affreux de ce peuple infâme, qu’il est à croire que la loi sera portée.

“La Municipalité veut la mort de tout ce qui reste de la famille Royale ; elle veut que Robespierre tienne sa parole de faire consentir le Comité de Salut Public au massacre de tous les prisonniers qu’il a lui-même provoqué et annoncé.

“Robespierre a remis un mémoire au Comité de Salut Public, le 26 Novembre, par lequel il annonce qu’il voudroit que l’on examina sérieusement s’il ne vaudra pas mieux conserver les prisonniers, qui tiennent la plus part à tous les émigrés, pour obtenir par leur moyens d’entamer des négociations qui fissent passer l’hiver dans une espèce d’amnistie. Il en présenta aussi un autre très secrètement au Comité des 9, pour représenter que la Municipalité usurpoit les pouvoirs de la Convention Nationale en proscrivant tout culte ; parceque les décrets de la Convention en proscrivant tous les cultes à l’extérieur, laissoit la liberté de tous les cultes dans les maisons particulières.

“Ces premières escarmouches sont le prélude nécessaire de quelque affreux malheur.

“Si les Ministres réunissent tous les partis, ce ne sera qu’en s’accordant mutuellement de grands forfaits ; s’ils restent divisés, un choc d’opinion est inévitable.

“Tandis que tout ceci se passe dans le sein de la Convention, et de la Municipalité, il se fait des amas d’or et d’argent considérables de la dépouille des églises, et des propriétaires ; et non seulement le Comité de Salut Public a ordonné de fondre en lingots de cent pistoles toutes les matières d’or que possédoit le trésor public, mais il a ordonné de fondre en lingots de cent pistoles tous les louis d’or qu’on pourroit se procurer.

“Le Comité de Salut Public, d’accord avec les Ministres, vont employer cet argent pour acheter des traitres dans les places frontières, exciter, s’il le peut, des insurrections chez les puissances, et, surtout, en employer une grande quantité en Irlande, et faire une alliance avec La Porte Ottomane, dont Henin, Ministre à Constantinople, se flatte si Toulon est repris ou détruit, et qu’on donne 20 millions de subsides au Grand Seigneur.

“Forgues a remis un mémoire à ce sujet le 27, qu’on trouve fort long, et très diffus. D’Albarade, Ministre de la Marine, en remit un autre le même jour ; il disait clairement que le général La Harpe et les Commissaires de la Convention à Nice s’obligeoient sur leurs têtes, et

qu'il étoit leur caution, que si on vouloit sacrifier dix millions rassemblés déjà à Lyon, ils prendraient Toulon, ou le feroient incendier, et détruiraient plusieurs vaisseaux des escadres ; qu'il demandait qu'on lui nommât deux commissaires pour examiner les moyens.

"Carnot et Robespierre ont été nommés, le 29, par les Comité pour cet objet.

"Pendant que le Comité de Salut Public disperse ainsi du trésor public dont il est le maître, la municipalité songe à s'emparer de ce trésor, au moins à l'anéantir. Pour cet objet elle a fait semer parmi les sans culottes qu'il faut que le peuple s'empare, et partage le trésor public.

"Le Conseil des 9, qui est instruit, a fait redoubler les gardes nationales autour de l'Hôtel des Monnoies, et dans la nuit du 26, on a amené dans la cour de cet Hôtel, 30 pièces de canon.

"La municipalité qui juge que l'entreprise seroit difficile à Paris, a déjà fait la motion de faire transporter le trésor public à Versailles, parceque Le Cointre et Cambollas, qui ont un parti très considérable, sont du parti de la municipalité.

"On a lu, le 28, au Comité Secret, une lettre de l'Evêque d'Autun qui, en dénonçant son ami Champfort comme traître à la République pour avoir dévoilé sa correspondance à l'agent du Duc d'Aiguillon à Paris, annonce que les Monarchiens constitutionnels sont en grande faveur auprès de Lord Grenville ; qu'il est à présumer que l'Angleterre adoptera leur moyens ; qu'elle traite avec la plus grande défaveur les royalistes, et ne veut en envoyer aucun en Vendée ; et qu'en envoyant de l'argent il est indubitable qu'on peut établir dans le Parlement même une forte opposition qui entrave toutes les mesures du Ministère. Il assure que le Comte d'Artois n'ira point en Vendée, qu'une partie des Ministres s'y oppose, et qu'au moins s'il y va, ce ne sera qu'après qu'on aura vu la tournure que prennent les affaires au Parlement.

*French.*

*Endorsed : Bulletin.*

Received 13th January 1794 from Mr. Drake.

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1793, December 3, Whitehall.—"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your private letters. The only point in them on which it is necessary for me to answer particularly is that of the offer made to you by Count Mercy of transmitting through your Lordship to this Government his sentiments and views on the different affairs, as they occur, in which the two Courts may be interested. It will certainly be right for you to encourage this opening, and I should be obliged to you to express in my name to Count Mercy the great degree of attention with which any suggestions of his will always be received and considered by me.

"You will, however, have the goodness to attend to the keeping this mode of communication secret, because, although Count Mercy's influence with his Court is certainly superior to that of Count Stahrenberg, yet as the latter is the channel of direct communications from Vienna, I derive much advantage from the footing upon which I am with him, and should, therefore, be very sorry to give him occasion of jealousy, the effects of which might be permanently disadvantageous.

"I am sure you will attend to this caution, and if that is observed, nothing but benefit can result from your receiving and encouraging Count Mercy's communications, especially as I know you are aware of his character."

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 6 [Stowe].—"You will excuse me if I urge to your consideration the expediency, under the strange contradictory accounts of Lord Howe, of ordering the Plymouth ships to sea. My reason is shortly this: Lord Howe chased the French fleet of six or seven sail on the 18th with the wind at east, consequently unable to regain Brest; Lord Howe being reported to be to windward. The *Bellerophon* and *Vanguard* having parted, were in his *rendezvous* off Ushant on the 21st and saw *four* sail of the line French. It is barely possible that these might be part of the seven sail first chased; but you will observe that the Swede's and Pellew's account speak of the *five* sail as being taken by Lord Howe on the 23rd. Now these cannot be the same. Is it not more probable that one of these divisions seen on the 21st, or taken on the 23rd, may have been a re-inforcement from Brest, in consequence of the alarm given by the brig, who, by all the accounts, worked to windward, and escaped towards Brest on the 18th; and is it not equally probable that the French will put their whole fourteen ships to sea from Brest, even if they have not already detached; and, in that case, Lord Howe's single and separated ships rendezvousing singly off Ushant may be caught. Now, a squadron of eleven sail sent off Ushant instantly, and re-inforced by single ships from Portsmouth, and picking up straggling ships from Lord Howe, may, in every point of view, and to every service, whether of intercepting outward-bound squadrons, or the French straggling ships separated by chase, or the homeward-bound ships from America of which two are of the line, be of most essential service. You are the best judge of all this, but pray think it over. You do not make any comment upon the no-answer to Lord Moira's signals. *Cherburgh* to *Carteret* was not within the first plan; so that under that impression, I am not so uneasy as I should be if I thought that this no-answer might arise from the defeat or dispersion of the Royalists, with whom we were to combine."

## The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, December 7, Brussels.—"I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's private letter of the 3rd inst. relative to Count Mercy, and shall most punctually obey the directions it contains.

"Until the answer comes to the representation made by the Duke of York to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, I am unable to conjecture where the difficulty in regard to the embarkation lies, and, therefore, cannot pretend to judge whether it will be got over or not. But it has come to my knowledge that the Duke of York would be very much pleased were the Guards sent on the expedition to Brittany, and the Hessians left under his command. Your Lordship understands that I have no direct authority for saying this. But the private wish of His Royal Highness has come to me in a way that justifies my submitting it, thus secretly, to your Lordship, should the idea be in other respects suitable to the plans of His Majesty's servants."

## LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, December 7, Brussels.—"I received yesterday morning at a very early hour a letter from the Duke of York desiring me to meet him in the evening at *Ath*."

"I had infinite satisfaction in everything I heard from His Royal Highness; it seemed to one impossible to express more zeal and eagerness in the cause, and to display more knowledge of the means of defending and supporting it than he did."

"Madame de Balbi, who is supposed to have a great deal of influence with *Monsieur*, told me that he had left Hamm and was going to Toulon at the particular request of the Court of Spain."

"She said *Monsieur* disliked going or rather attempting to go to Toulon, and that she believed he would wait at Turin and apply to England for advice."

#### LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, December 7, Brussels.—"Lord Yarmouth, whom I expected to meet as an old friend and as disposed to give me every information and assistance, has expressed himself towards me in terms of the most exasperated reproach for having accepted the mission on which I am going. He treated it as a premeditated design of mine to supplant him in a negotiation which he has begun, and which he considers as brought to a state so as to make a successful conclusion of it easy; that it is on my part a breach of private friendship, and, in his public capacity, that it carries with it a *particular* mark of imputation on his conduct and abilities, and stigmatizes him with one of public disgrace.

"I have therefore to entreat your Lordship that you will have the goodness and justice to explain to Lord Yarmouth exactly what has passed relative to my nomination.

"Lord Yarmouth intimated his intention that he would ask to return to Berlin to be *with me there and on the same footing*. I am perfectly ready to give way to him if it is deemed necessary, *or for any reason expedient*, but I need not, I am sure, say how impossible as well as useless it would be for me to remain there with him."

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793] December 8, Downing Street.—"In thinking over what could be done with a view to having some plan suggested and acted upon in Flanders, Dundas and I have had a good deal of conversation with Lord Amherst, and desired him to talk the business over with M. Freytag. The result has not led to anything very specific; but has determined us on the whole to prepare a despatch to Sir J. Murray, stating, a good deal at length, the grounds which make some active measures necessary, and describing the sort of operations which it is conceived may be practicable. You will receive a copy of the proposed despatch. Another draft is gone to the King with a suggestion to His Majesty either to write himself or to authorise a letter being written to the Duke of York, directing him to send General Abercromby with this communication to the Prince of Coburg. Dundas will, in that case, write privately also to Abercromby, desiring him to consult on the whole subject with Sir W. Erskine, and to take the best way he can of suggesting these ideas to the Duke of York, or the Prince of Coburg, or both. This seems to give the best chance of having the subject thoroughly considered, and of our knowing with some accuracy what is really thought practicable. In addition to this, it would be very useful that Count Mercy (who is already well disposed to our

general idea) should be pressed to second them with all his weight with the Prince of Coburg. For this purpose we think it would be right that you should send to Lord Elgin the copy of Dundas's despatch, with an instruction to communicate it immediately to Count Mercy, and to desire his assistance. As the military detail will be to be arranged by General Abercromby or whoever is the officer sent, there will be no danger from Lord Elgin's fondness for arranging military projects. Be so good to return the draft with any suggestions which occur to you, and with any despatch you write to Lord Elgin, as early as you can to-morrow; as it is of course material to send off the messenger without loss of time. The last accounts from Lord Moira which came yesterday do not promise well for the present, but they do not, I think, lead to any very certain opinion.

"Direct your answer to Dundas, in case I should be out of town before it arrives to-morrow. I shall not go, however, till after two."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 8 [Stowe].—"I see that Sir J. Dashwood is dead. Can I be of use to your Wycombe politics with the son, who is a great admirer of mine, and I do not know whether you are acquainted with him.

"I doubt more and more of Lord Howe unless it can be supposed that a second small French squadron is out, and, in all events, I wish to God that the Plymouth ships had been ordered ten days ago off Ushant. Does Lord Moira's business depend upon this fleet of Lord Howe, or what is he waiting for?"

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MALMESBURY.

1793, December 9, Whitehall.—"If in the course of your journey you fall in with any person belonging to the French Princes who is fit to be talked with on any point of business, you would do well to urge the necessity of *Monsieur's* coming back to some place where he may be treated with, instead of pursuing his foolish project on Toulon, which will expose him to a public affront, and unavoidably oblige us to cast a slur upon him at the very moment when our interests lead us to endeavour to raise his character, and to use him as an instrument of effecting the important objects we have in view."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO THE EARL OF YARMOUTH.

1793, December 10, Whitehall.—"I have omitted writing to you on the subject of the last private letter I had the honour to receive from you, as I have been in the daily expectation of seeing you here, and will only say that no idea had entered into my mind of sending any person to Berlin, until I understood that you had expressed a disinclination to following the King of Prussia, and a disposition to undertake the embassy to Madrid.

"But I should be sincerely sorry if your Lordship continued to consider it at all in the light of a supercession."

*Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1793, December 10-15, Stowe.]—"I congratulate you most sincerely upon the capture of Pondicherry, which is not [only] in itself most essential, but the very early period at which it was captured, apparently without loss (as far as we can understand Colonel Braithwaite's nonsense) and certainly before they could be sickened by the rains, is a most valuable circumstance with a view to your future operations. But with respect to those operations (I mean the attempt on the Mauritius) though it is not immediately in your department, I cannot help saying that, after a very full and attentive consideration of the question assisted by the best maps and narratives, I doubt most anxiously of the possibility of success unless the island is betrayed into your hands. I need not state to you the effect of the climate there, and very much doubt whether they can be worth either to the King or the Company half the expense of this armament from Europe and India. It is likewise very doubtful to me whether the capture of these two posts will (even if you should ultimately retain them) have the intended effect of driving the French out of the Indian seas, if they should either now or hereafter make it a point to send a squadron into those seas. I mention this because I say everything to you that occurs to me, but my strongest doubt is as to the prospect of success.

"I fear that Lord Moira's mission is at an end; surely however, whether it is or not, it would be wise to send to Sir C. Grey, or rather to St. Domingo, part if not the whole of the eight battalions borrowed from that most important point of our attack. They are still in time, and the great number of recruits raised in the last two months (since this armament was formed) will enable you, by sending the new regiments to Ireland, to withdraw old troops. I should very much prefer sending this force to St. Domingo, because that is by many degrees the most valuable and the most promising object, and because Sir C. Grey cannot with his crippled force have attacked Martinique; and I doubt whether the junction of his whole original force would arrive in time to enable him to grapple with so extensive an undertaking, which would require so much time, and that too while this alarming fever in the Windward and Leeward Islands will probably very soon cripple his army.

"As to Flanders, I have seen and heard so much that I hate to think of it, and look most anxiously to some arrangement there before our disgrace is more disgraceful. I certainly have not altered an iota of my opinion as to the necessity of supporting our allies in this war; but the question of sending British troops (particularly infantry) to fight in Flanders, while we pay a more numerous body of Hessians to fight under Lord Moira, is a very different proposition; and I fairly own to you that I cannot make up [my mind] (unless the necessity is unavoidable) to that part of the system, particularly if it involves with it the second edition of the imbecility and more culpable misconduct of our last Flanders campaign, carried on at an expense which would have defrayed four times their number.

"In the midst of this struggle for princes, to be sure Prince Augustus will come forward with particular *éclat* and effect, and, in that view of it, I am very sorry for the story; in any other view there must be so many radical defects, independent of the Royal Marriage Act, in a marriage by banns which could not have described the Prince, and which were asked only in St. George's, in which he did not reside, that there can be little doubt of the event of the suit. At all events,

the Declaratory Act will be proper ; but I think that the *misdemeanour* ought not to be suffered to pass off without notice.

"I am made very happy by the kindness which you have shewn to Jemmy and the General; had it not been for your exertion this instance would have been added to the very many upon a list not very pleasant to the parties concerned. I have reason to believe that this office, independent of its profit, will be particularly eligible to the General.

"I hear from every one the warmest praises of your speech on the first day, and, from what I read, I think that Mr. Pitt and you have had the advantage of raising the spirits of people by convincing them that more had been gained than they imagined. I need not say how delighted I am with every credit that you can gain."

#### J. B. BURGESS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 15, Whitehall.—"I cannot omit to mention to your Lordship some points of a very long conversation I have had with Lord Yarmouth, as I am satisfied his meaning was to convey to your Lordship through me a proposition which he did not wish to make to you personally.

"After talking over the several plans he had formed for the formation of a Germanic league, for arming the Alsatians, *et cetera*, he told me that he had been induced by two reasons to decline the embassy to Spain, which your Lordship had offered him. The one, the age and precarious health of Lord Hertford, who had expressed great uneasiness at his going to a place to which the only access at present was by sea : the other, the earnest desire he felt to be employed on the side of Germany, and to have an opportunity of carrying on those plans which he had been instrumental in bringing forward. With this view, he wished an arrangement might be suggested to your Lordship, the accomplishment of which he said would afford him the highest satisfaction and enable him to give more effectually than by any other mode that support to your Administration which, on every account, he was desirous of doing. His proposal is, to give the Spanish embassy to Sir Morton Eden, and to name him to Vienna, with a general commission to the Princes of the Empire. He is aware of the difficulty there may be in the way of turning the mission of Vienna, into an embassy ; but he said the rank and title was a small consideration when compared to the real importance of the employment, and that, if your Lordship did not object to this arrangement, he would not make any difficulties. I asked him whether he had settled this point with himself. His answer was, he believed he had ; but that, if I were so good as to give your Lordship a hint upon the business, he would engage for it that no difficulties should arise on his side, though undoubtedly, considering the circumstances in which he stood, he hoped it might be possible by some means to give the rank to which perhaps you might think him entitled.

"It was easy for me to perceive that Lord Yarmouth was extremely anxious that your Lordship should find such an arrangement practicable. He indeed urged it so strongly, that he came to me a second time to repeat what he had said, and to enforce it by several new arguments, relative to the importance of the depending business, and his own qualifications for its management. My own opinion is, that his wish to obtain this mission is so strong that he would prefer it to any other, even without the rank of ambassador. He has indeed another motive



for being thus earnest, which he mentioned confidentially to me, and which I have reason to think he was not desirous I should mention—a considerable soreness at Lord Malmesbury's appointment. He appears to have entertained a hope of being employed on this occasion; and, though he talked upon this subject with great delicacy, it was easy to see he felt disappointed, and thought that a nomination to Vienna would be the best proof that his services had been approved of, and that your Lordship conceived him to be qualified to carry your future plans into effect."

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 18, Park Lane.—"I have spoken to Henry on the subject which you mentioned to me some days ago. He thinks the advantage of the situation you propose for him at the Hague so very great that he will not hesitate one moment about quitting the army in order to obtain it, if you should find yourself at liberty to give it to him. He will immediately endeavour to put himself into a situation to obey your orders, whenever he may receive them. When you can speak with more certainty on the subject, you will be so good as to let me know your determination in order that I may direct his conduct. I cannot tell you how strongly I feel your kindness on this occasion. Henry is as sensible of it as I am. I am persuaded you will find him as attentive to his business as you could desire, if you employ him as you propose. Pray send me the *Moniteurs*."

LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, December 19, Beckenham.—"The other inclosure is from M. de Jarry. Till we know the true state of the royalists, all reasonings as to the mode of succouring and seconding them to the best advantage seem to be nearly superfluous. If it is true that the regicides have destroyed the bridges of Tours and Blois in a panic, we may expect great news; and if it is favourable, the royalists may still return to the sea-coast with great advantage. Be this as it may, I feel confident that we shall do well, *and soon*, provided only that we can maintain perfect tranquillity, and general loyalty, in this country and in Ireland.

"The Comte de Damas, who at my recommendation raised a corps of 700 French for the service of the States-General [of the Netherlands,] has written to me to desire that his corps may be sent to serve in the Vendée, at the expense of Holland, under M. de Bonchamp, who was heretofore a subaltern officer under Damas in the East Indies. I will privately communicate his letter to the Greffier."

THE EARL OF YARMOUTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 19, Piccadilly.—"The embassy to Vienna which you have been so kind to think of for me will be perfectly acceptable to me, and I shall be happy to concert with your Lordship the time, manner, and every other circumstance relative to the acceptance of it, as they may best suit your views, and the different objects of a public nature which I wish to render compatible with it."

## The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GREENVILLE.

[1793, December] Park Lane.—“Henry has found an opportunity, remarkably advantageous, for an exchange from the Guards, but it is of such a nature as must probably oblige him to quit the army immediately. As I know your first object is to be of service to him, I am persuaded you will let me know your determination respecting the Hague as soon as you can make it. It is of great consequence to him to know his fate soon, as such an opportunity for an exchange is not likely to offer again.

“Pray send me your *Moniteurs* if you can to-night, as I am going to-morrow for a few days to the Speaker's, where I can study them. I am really very ill with a cough, which I have had now for about a fortnight.”

## FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GREENVILLE.

## BULLETIN No. 5.

1793, Decembre 20.—“Deux moyens ont servi à donner des lumières sur ce que se passe en Angleterre ; le premier, la saisie des papiers de M. Champfort ; le second et le plus abondant a été la saisie de ceux de Rabaud St. Etienne. Ils entretenoient des correspondances en Ecosse et en Irlande. Un nommé *Brouer*, et *Hastee*, étoient les correspondants de Rabaud St. Etienne en Ecosse. L'Evêque d'Autun et Champfort étoient spécialement chargés de l'Irlande ; mais, à présent que ces moyens de correspondance sont tombés entre les mains du Comité du Salut Public, ils ont pris une toute autre importance par la résolution qu'a pris ce Comité le 14 Decembre, d'employer tout l'argent qui sera nécessaire pour exciter des troubles dans l'Ecosse et en Irlande, et forcer (comme l'a dit Robertspierre) l'Angleterre à se retirer de la coalition, ou la nation à se défaire de M. Pitt. De la part des deux Ecossois que j'ai nommé, il y a certainement des lettres de leur main à Rabaud St. Etienne ; mais on ne trouve pas qu'il soit facile de s'en saisir, parceque comme elles font partie des pièces d'accusation contre les Deputés détenus, les greffiers n'osent pas les vendre. Il n'y a pas de correspondance avec des personnes de marque en Angleterre. Toutes les paroles ont passé par l'Evêque d'Autun, par Thomas Paine, et par un M. Morris, Ministre des Etats Unis à Paris. Ce Morris n'est point, quant à lui, un démocrate ; mais c'est un homme qui cherche à se rendre utile au parti dominant, et qui, ayant des correspondances avec M. Grey, cherche à les rendre utiles à Robertspierre et à Danton ses amis. La dernière lettre de l'Evêque d'Autun, adressée à M. Forgues, traitoit des moyens qu'il imaginait pour détacher l'Angleterre de la Coalition sans la compromettre ; il dit qu'il assurait à ses amis, qu'il n'est aucun sacrifice que la France ne fit pour y parvenir, qu'il faut bien fortifier l'Opposition de ces idées afin qu'elle puisse faire une vigoureuse sortie contre Pitt et le dépopulariser totalement à l'ouverture du Parlement ; qu'ils doivent compter que Grey et Scheridan parleront dans des principes entièrement opposés à ceux des Jacobins, parceque le peuple Anglois les a en horreur ; mais que ce à quoi l'on peut viser se borne ou à détacher l'Angleterre de la coalition, ou à y exciter de tels troubles que Mr. Pitt soit obligé de quitter sa place, et le Ministère de changer de politique. Il prévient dans cette même lettre qu'il sera probablement obligé de partir, mais qu'il ne partira qu'à l'extrémité, et, qu'en ce cas, la correspondance continuera suivant les adresses qu'il enverra au Comité de Salut Public, lorsque son départ sera décidé. En même temps que je vous donne ces renseignements que

vous demandez, je vous envoie aussi les noms de quelques braves gens en Irlande aux quels on peut s'adresser pour savoir parfaitement les trames ourdies dans ce pays, et dont nous n'avons que des notions confuses. Le premier est *M. Aherne*, Professeur émérite du Collège Navarre : il s'est réfugié en 1790, en Irlande, sa patrie, dans le pays de Korck. On peut encore s'adresser à un appelé *Flotte* ; mais celui qui a le plus d'entregens, qui vaudroit le mieux, est un nommé *Feris*, prêtre Irlandois, Procureur au Collège de Montaigu. Les gens là, surtout le dernier, connoissent de vue la plupart des agens des Jacobins.

"Par une lettre du General Dugommier, écrite en très grand secret au Comité de Salut Public, en date du 14 de ce mois, et signée avec lui par Barras et Robertspierre, il signifie à la Convention qu'ils vont marcher sur Toulon le 16 ; que si l'entreprise ne leur réussit pas, les vivres leur manquant, la désertion devenant considérable, ils seroient obligés de se retirer ; qu'ils ne pouvaient pas cacher au Comité que si leurs intelligences dans la ville ne leur étoient d'un grand secours, si les divisions qui étoient établis dans la coalition ne les aidait, ils doutoient du succès de l'entreprise, parceque, au fait, ils n'avoient que seize mille hommes *parfaitement armés* ; que le reste des troupes de réquisition, quoique considérable, n'étoit pas armé autrement qu'avec des faux et des piques ; et que cette réquisition étoit en grande partie composée d'enfans de 10 ans à 15 ans, et de vieillards de 60.

*French. Copy.*

*Postscript by Mr. Drake.*—"The names of *Brower, Hastee*, are exactly copied from the original, but they may probably be ill-spelt.

"The late accounts from Marseilles have confirmed that part of Du Gommier's letter above quoted, where he speaks of the number and state of his army."

LOED GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

Private.

1793, December 21, Whitehall.—"I enclose you a letter I have received from Colonel Gardiner at Warsaw. I am very apprehensive that his request for an increase of salary there cannot be complied with, but the close of his letter suggests to me to ask you whether he might not be employed on service. You know, I am persuaded, that he has always served with distinction, and has the character of a good officer.

"I have desired Aust to speak to Nepean about the transaction at Ostend, where General Dundas has seized an English outlaw and sent him here for trial. The man has been reclaimed by the Austrian Government, and I apprehend that the grounds of that claim are unquestionable. A letter was written to your Office desiring that Dundas might be called upon for a report of the transaction, as a ground of further proceeding. I am aware that he is not within reach, but the statement of that fact would enable us to proceed on other information.

"The case itself is one deserving a good deal of attention. I heard much of it, four years ago, when I was in your Office, and I am inclined to believe that it had been a good deal misrepresented, to the prejudice of the person accused. I suppose you know the outlines of it. He is a Mr. Purefoy, an Irishman, who, after some disputes in the West Indies with Colonel Roper his superior officer, quitted the

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service, and killed Roper in a duel here. The cry was so strong against him that he left England to avoid standing trial, and has remained ever since in the Low Countries. I have heard one side only, but, on that statement, I fear General Dundas's conduct has been hasty and ill judged.

"The present point, however, is the claim of the Government in the Netherlands to have this man restored to them, as having been unduly seized. My idea is, as soon as the best information of the circumstances of the fact is obtained, to refer the point to the civil and common lawyers for their opinion and advice."

*Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 22, Stowe.—"Mr. Pitt not having taken the least notice of my letter, which you transmitted to him, I shall still pause some days before I write further to him, but, in the mean time, the hopes which you entertained of doing away the outrageous breach of faith to Lieutenant-Colonel Nugent are entirely removed by the appointment which the King has made of his six *aide-de-camps*, amongst whom he has not placed Nugent. Your letter to me upon the subject, though you was deceived to tell me that there would be no new brevet, did not in truth give me much hopes; and, even if you had been more sanguine, I should have doubted for the same reasons which have in different shapes crossed every wish in favour of every person connected with me. Colonel Nugent's very modest statement of his own pretensions I enclose to you. If Mr. Pitt has any feeling, he is bound, as a man of honour, to see that proposal under which Nugent quitted the Guards made good to him; but if he should still (as I think most likely) sacrifice one who has been so constant in his parliamentary support, whose military pretensions are so high, and whose connexion in blood and friendship with me ought not to have injured his pretensions, I shall be to add this to the many other causes for the decision which your good sense must see is only delayed to give Mr. Pitt an opportunity of writing to me if he should think fit.

"I have had a good deal of plague from Hobart to examine old letters respecting Lord Loftus's claim to be an Earl. The essential papers appear to be in your hands, but I have sent him enough to satisfy him that I always denied such an engagement; and that Mr. Pitt and you directed him to ascertain the renunciation of all ideas of an Earldom before you would submit to the King that recommendation which I would never have made under a claim of engagement. I mention all this for the sake of the fact, not caring one straw for the event."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO W. PITT.

1793, December 22, St. James's Square.—"I should not have written to you again on the subject of my last letter, if I had not received from Lord Buckingham the enclosed statement of Colonel Nugent's claims, services, and situation drawn by himself, and with it an intimation that Lord Buckingham's letter which I delivered to you last week was still unanswered. I cannot bring myself to say all I feel on that subject; but when I see myself brought every day nearer to the necessity of deciding

between the two friends whom I value most in the world, I should think myself unpardonable if I did not express with freedom how much this want of attention on your part to my brother (if he was only my brother) wounds and mortifies me. I have softened many uneasinesses, and prevented much of what would have been, at least to me, extremely unpleasant. But I cannot be blind to Lord Buckingham's real situation, nor can I be so humble as to consent that the office I hold should, instead of promoting his objects and those of his friends, operate as a bar to them. You will not think that I cite the instance of Dundas's nephew invidiously to Dundas, whose merits and services deserve, as I think, any reward that could be given them. But I cannot help making the comparison, and it is little flattering to me.

"I am obliged to say all this because the occasion will require me to state both to you and Lord Buckingham all I feel when I shall be called upon to act in the most embarrassing of all situations to me. I have at least the poor satisfaction of having done all I can to avert it. Whatever line I take, you may depend upon it that it will not be incompatible with a sincere affection towards you, and, I must add, a strong sense of many instances of friendship towards me."

*Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 23, Downing Street.—"On returning just now from Cambridge, I have found your letter on the subject of the late promotion. The best answer I can give to it is the short state of the case. The idea of the promotion of Major Generals occurred in conversation on Wednesday or Thursday, and was mentioned by Dundas, on the last of those two days, to the King, who said he would consider of it. You will not wonder, considering the business which was just then on our hands, that it escaped me to mention it to you when we met. About eleven on Saturday morning, I saw a note from the King to Dundas, saying that he intended the promotion should take place. Though I had not much time to spare, I determined to see Lord Amherst before I left town, for the very purpose of endeavouring to obtain the rank of *aide-de-camp* for Colonel Nugent. It happened that Lord Amherst called upon me, as I was going to send to him; and I then found from him that the King had sent for him that morning, and given directions at once both for the promotion of Major Generals, and of the persons whom he had fixed upon for his *aide-de-camps*, all of whom were senior to Colonel Nugent. Under these circumstances I felt it was utterly impossible to take any step in the business, but if I had had any time to spare, or if I had imagined the arrangement could appear in that night's *Gazette*, I should have written you word what had passed.

"As to the rest, I can only say that I must always feel too nearly for whatever interests you, and have already had too large a share in your anxieties, not to be very desirous to do all that I can and ought, to prevent further embarrassment; and I therefore must wish it may be practicable, either now or soon, to obtain the step for Colonel Nugent in the mode you suggest. But I must fairly own to you, that although I will certainly try to forward it, if it is attainable, I do not see the possibility of making a point of it, especially as arising out the late promotion; and I cannot help thinking that you will, in this respect, be of the same opinion."

H H 2

## LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1793, December 23, at night, Dropmore.—“Your letter followed me here. If I had felt sure of your being in town in any time I would have stayed to converse with you on the subject. I certainly cannot but acquit you of any desire to produce all that is likely to follow upon this unfortunate business, but I must regret that you did not desire Lord Amherst to stop the notifications until I could at least be apprised of what had happened, and enabled to consider what should be done. If time had been given me to state to the King so very moderate and reasonable a request, I am confident he would not have refused it, nor indeed do I believe that there is any supporter of Government of any rank or consideration, however personally unconnected with us, to whom such a favour would be denied, when asked in behalf of a person whose character and situation were such as Nugent's are.

“As it is, that cannot now come in question. There are two other modes by which Nugent may have his rank. A promotion of brevet Colonels would certainly very naturally follow that of Major Generals. But even that would not give to him the advantage to which he looked when he applied to raise a corps. The other is that which I conceive quite unexceptionable in itself—the giving him the rank on his raising the corps. I told you what Lord Amherst said to me upon the subject, which is conclusive as to any real impropriety or difficulty in this request. If then, from omission or misfortune or both, Nugent's friends have been deprived, without any fault of theirs, of the opportunity of making a request in his favour which hardly could have been refused, it is surely not too much for them to look to another mode equally unexceptionable of procuring for him the same step in his profession.

“You say that you do not see the possibility of making a point of this. Whether Lord Buckingham wishes that you should do so or not must rest with him, and the decision of doing it or not with yourself. I certainly feel that your situation in that respect is wholly different from mine. Lord Buckingham has not the same claims upon you that he has upon me, and the consequences of any step taken by you are infinitely more extensive than those which can follow from my conduct. Nor do I wish to put you to the painful task of advising me upon my line. But, if it should be contrary to your opinion, you will at least be inclined to think the question doubtful when you consider the very peculiar situation in which I am placed by this business; having, in consequence of our former conversation, written to Lord Buckingham, to say that a promotion, such as that which has taken place, was not in contemplation. I am fortunate enough not to have added what I might have added, from the same conversation, of your opinion and Dundas's respecting the reasonableness of the request itself. At least I think so, for I have no copy of my letter to Lord Buckingham.

“With respect to him, you are not ignorant that this is but one of the many points of this nature of which he thinks he has to complain. As nearly as I am connected with him in every way, I do not feel myself at liberty to take any step of consequence to support points which I either think unreasonable in themselves, or pressed by him beyond their natural importance. Neither of these is the case in the present instance. Feeling this, I might almost appeal to the rectitude and honour of your own mind, which I know, to ask what you would do in my situation, and in such a case. But I will not put such a point to you. I have reasoned with myself, and (I think) calmly and dispassionately upon the subject, and I believe my mind is made up. But

I have said nothing to Lord Buckingham as yet which decides my line, because I feel that any step of that nature ought not, for his sake, to be concerted with him.

"You will tell me whether you wish me to write to Lord Amherst on the subject, or whether you would think it better to speak to him first. If I write, I shall of course do it in the first instance merely in the form of a request, but grounded upon the unfortunate circumstances which prevented my being able on this last occasion to submit to the King Lord Buckingham's application and mine in behalf of Colonel Nugent."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 24, Wimbledon.—"After writing to you yesterday I received your second letter. Painful as the whole subject is, it is one on which it is much better to converse than to write, and I therefore wish much for an early opportunity of seeing you, when I must tell you without reserve all that I think and feel.

"The Cabinet, which was to have been fixed for Thursday, is put off, as nothing can well be done till we hear again from Toulon. If you could conveniently come to town that day, I will meet you at any hour in the morning you please; or, if it makes very material difference to you, I will come to you at Dropmore; though it would be rather more convenient to me to meet you in town."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1793, December 24, Dropmore.—"I stated to you so fully, in what I wrote last night, all that occurs to me on the subject, that I hardly see what advantage could arise from our conversing upon it, which could not but be painful to us both. In this impression, I freely own that I am very unwilling to sacrifice two mornings out of the few that remain of my holidays to so disagreeable a destination. You will however easily suppose that, if you wish it, I am ready to come to town for that purpose, and I cannot be so unreasonable as to wish to put you to any inconvenience merely for my laziness and love of my amusements here. I think Friday would suit me rather better than Thursday, but possibly it could not be equally convenient to you. You will let me know and I will regulate my motions accordingly."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 24, Wimbledon.—"I need say nothing at present, but on the subject of your writing to Lord Amherst. It rather strikes me to be better deferred till I have seen him, which I will endeavour to do on Thursday, if we meet in town, and if not on Friday. The writing to him in the first instance might perhaps lead to his sending the letter to the King, and a sudden decision might add to the embarrassment."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 24, Stowe.—"I should have complied with your wishes of not saying one word to you for some days upon this unpleasant

subject, if I was not anxious to express what I feel upon receiving from you expressions of sensibility, which are truly valuable to me, and to assure you that, in my most angry moment, I cannot bear the idea that all or any part of what has occurred, or is likely to occur, should operate upon your personal resolutions. I am ready to co-operate with you to every measure that can assist your views; but I should indeed reproach myself if I availed myself of your kindness or sensibility against your advantage. This is all that I will say to you, except that I have always been inclined to take your advice in preference to my own, and therefore expect it from your affection; under the promise that I will endeavour to weigh it dispassionately."

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 25, Wimbledon.—"There is certainly nothing which makes the conversation I wished to have with you press to a day, and as I find I could not come to you to-morrow without a good deal of inconvenience, it will be quite as well deferred. But whatever is the end of the present embarrassment, there are one or two points connected with it which it will be a satisfaction to me to talk over at leisure."

THE EARL OF MORINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, December 27, Park Lane.—"I am persuaded you will believe that I should have been very happy to have called on you at Dropmore, on my return from Mr. Speaker's, if I had not been really out of order. I have not yet got rid of a very bad cold, and I must be very careful, otherwise I shall be in danger of suffering *deux ou trois mois de fers*. I shall try to lay hold of you for three or four evenings in London, in order to vent all the streams of spoutation which have flowed from your suggestions, *a quo seu fonte perenni, Parliamentiacis ora rigantur aquis*. I find from Henry that his exchange cannot take place for two or three months, in consequence of a caprice of the Duke of Gloucester's. This circumstance may perhaps be favourable to your good intentions.

"I am quite shocked at Sir G. Elliott's *excess of that good quality courage*, at *his honorable fault*, and at *his Governor prodigal of his person*; I think these are worse than O'Hara's capture.

"I hope it is true that the Duke of Brunswick has defeated the French again on the 19th and 20th of this month. But how the devil could you hear of it so soon? Pray let me have the *Moniteurs* as soon as they are bound.

"I beg my best compliments to Lady Grenville. Has she received any other bribe from the Sublime Porte yet? I insist on dining with you the first time you feast Jussuff Effendi.—Do not forget to have a lamb fed on Pistachio nuts, and some exquisite wine of a purple colour. Let your dinner be in the palace of pictures."

"Do not you admire *that revolutionary torrent, the Loire*?"

FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

BULLETIN No. 6.

1793, le 28 Decembre, Paris.—"Le 15 au soir, au Comité des Neuf, Robespierre rendit compte que D'Albarade, Ministre de la Marine, avoit



reçu une lettre des Commissaires de la Convention à Marseille, qui lui apprenoit qu' avant le 20 la ville de Toulon seroit au pouvoir des patriotes, qu'il n'y en eût autre que 4 millions au lieu de 10 qu'on y avoit destinés. Quoique l'événement ait prouvé la justice des manœuvres des Commissaires de Marseille, il est à présumer qu'ils ne s'attendoient pas à recevoir Toulon, comme on le leur a donné.

“ On a ordonné, le 16, que les départemens des provinces méridionales mettroient la plus grande activité pour rassembler les troupes de réquisition. L'on a envoyé cet ordre par un courrier, qui est parti le 17 au matin, adressé aux Commissaires de la Convention à Lyon, qui ont ordre d'envoyer dans le Languedoc et le Dauphiné. On a ordonné d'employer 4 millions de l'argent trouvé à Lyon pour accélérer le recrutement.

“ St. Just proposa dans le Comité des Neuf d'employer le Général Dagobert qu'on avoit injustement destitué dans le Roussillon, à l'armée destinée à agir en Piémont. Cela n'a pas eu lieu parce que Robespierre s'y est opposé. Il ajouta ce même jour, 16, au Comité qu'il avoit eu plusieurs conférences avec Bouchotte, Ministre de la Guerre ; qu'il avoit arrêté avec lui plusieurs points essentiels pour la police des armées, principalement celui qui obligeoit tous les généraux de la République à soumettre toutes leurs opérations au conseil dont on les environnoit ; que la mécanique devoit être celle-ci ; que forcé souvent de changer de généraux et d'employer non pas des hommes habiles mais les hommes d'un civisme prouvé, il falloit que leurs opérations fussent dirigées par des bons militaires de tout état, et de tous pays ; et que l'emploi des Commissaires du Comité de Salut Public auprès des armées n'auroit d'autre fonction principale que celle d'obliger le Général de se soumettre au conseil, et de surveiller les membres du conseil ; que Houchard n'avoit été puni que pour n'avoir pas suivi l'avis du conseil ; qu'il avoit fallu destituer Cartaux par la même raison ; et que ce que faisoit l'objet de ces conférences avec Bouchotte étoit de forcer les généraux à ne pas s'écarter de cette règle. Ils ont lu un très grand mémoire, qui tint à peu près deux heures, sur cet objet là, sur l'état de chacune des armées de la République. La conclusion fut que toute espèce de proposition de paix étoit inadmissible, parce que une trêve seulement ou un armistie pourroit ralentir l'exfervescence du peuple ; que vu la désunion de la coalition, son peu de progrès après tant d'efforts, l'impuissance de ses moyens, on étoit convaincu qu'il n'y avoit d'ennemi véritablement à craindre que la Vendée ; que le plus grand péril de la République existeroit lorsque les Royalistes de la Vendée pourroient recevoir des secours des puissances ; que le Ministre de la Guerre venoit d'apprendre qu'entre Vannes et Rhédon il y avoit eu un combat où les patriotes avoient perdu leurs canons, leur artillerie, leurs munitions de guerre, et de bouche ; que les ennemis n'étoient cependant qu'au nombre de 10 mille hommes, mais qu'ils se renforçoient à chaque moment par la multitude des mécontents qu'avoient produit les derniers excès de la Municipalité contre les cultes ; et que, comme d'un moment à l'autre, il étoit possible qu'il s'effectuât une descente des Anglois à St. Malo ou auprès de la Roche Bernard, et qu'une pareille nouvelle, imprudemment annoncée dans Paris, pourroit y produire l'effet le plus funeste. Robespierre proposa aux Commissaires d'envoyer sur le champ des courriers dans tous les départemens qui se trouvoient sur la route des armées de la Vendée, pour ordonner à toutes les autorités constituées, d'arrêter tout soldat et officier revenant des armées ; si c'étoit des blessés de les mettre dans les hôpitaux en secret, de regarder tous les autres comme des fuyards et de les mettre en prison. La motion de Robespierre fut décrétée, et les courriers sont partis dans la nuit.

"Le même Comité, le même jour, fit donner ordre aux diligences d'Alsace de ne plus partir pour Strasbourg.

"La division entre le Comité de Salut Public et la Municipalité est en pleine activité. Si Robespierre parvient à éteindre toute correspondance de la Municipalité de Paris avec l'extérieur et l'intérieur, il obligera cette Municipalité à se renfermer uniquement dans ses fonctions. Jusqu'ici toutes les apparences de succès sont en faveur de Robespierre. Il vient de faire chasser des Jacobins le scélérat Clootz, grand ami de la Municipalité. Il veut faire couper la tête à Chabot, et Bazire, pour pouvoir après s'établir en dictateur; mais il n'y réussira pas si aisément, attendu qu'il est naturellement poltron. Le procès de Madame Elizabeth a été suspendu. Le roi est malade toujours d'un espèce de dévoiement. Madame Royale et Madame Elizabeth se portent bien."

*French.*

*Endorsed* : "In Mr. Drake's No. 9."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793, December 20, Brussels.—"I enclose the very unfortunate intelligence of Toulon in my *private* letter to your Lordship, that you may give what publicity to the report you please, and put it into the form you prefer. The destroying the fleet and arsenal, and saving the garrison, are great palliatives. I am very sorry to say that secret intelligence, on which I can thoroughly rely, makes me dread that this report is, in fact, true; at least it was strongly feared."

#### FOREIGN OFFICE JOURNAL of J. B. BURGESS.

1793, December 22.—"Baron Jacobi called; his sole intention appeared to be to get at the nature and extent of Lord Malmesbury's instructions, which I made no scruple of telling him he would have known long ago, had the King's Ministers deemed such a communication necessary, or had the mode adopted at Berlin with respect to Mr. Rose made it proper. He bore this with great good humour, and entered into a long invective against the late proceedings of his Court in Poland, which he called rash and unwise; but he persisted in the same sentiments he formerly mentioned to me, with respect to the conduct of the King of Prussia at this moment, and the impossibility of his continuing to be a party in the war without he received the subsidy he demanded."

1793, December 28.—"Baron Jacobi called; held the same language as when he was here last, except with regard to Lord Malmesbury's instructions, on which subject he observed we should soon be all equally informed.

"Mr. Pinckney called; much agitated in consequence of the new instruction to commanders of ships of war and privateers—very anxious to know whether it would be rigorously enforced—insisted strongly on the injustice of such a measure, and on the destructive consequences it must entail on his country, which now would be deprived of every means of exporting its produce, as the Act of Navigation shut them out from our islands, and this new instruction would equally shut them out from those of France; so that nothing but a few inconsiderable markets would

be left to them. He enlarged on the unpleasant sensation which this measure must occasion in America; and concluded by saying that this was a matter of so much importance, that he should hope to find Lord Grenville disposed to give him some explanation on it before the sailing of the mail. He did not, however, ask for a conference. He also expressed a wish to receive an answer to the note he had presented, on the subject of the former additional instructions."

1793, December 30.—"Baron Nagell called; informed me confidentially, and under a promise of not revealing M. Hogguer as the author of his intelligence, that there was, at this moment, such a scarcity of money (whether real or affected) at Petersburg, that the household expenses of the Empress, even those of her kitchen and domestics, were paid in paper, at long dates, and bearing an interest of 6 per cent.; notwithstanding which they were at a discount of 10 per cent. Baron Nagell was of opinion that this was nothing more than a consequence of the Empress's determination to amass all the money she could get, in order to be enabled to strike a decisive blow in the spring against the Turks, which became still more probable from the naval commissaries having been sent for from the Black Sea to Petersburg. It appeared that M. Hogguer entertained a similar sentiment.

"Baron Nagell told me he was excessively desirous that Lord Grenville should instruct Mr. Eliot to propose to the Grand Pensionary (on the natural ground of concurrence in a measure connected with the war, and avoiding further explanation) to publish on the part of the States General an additional instruction to the commanders of the Dutch ships of war and privateers, similar to that published here for the prevention of intercourse with the French West India islands. In addition to the immediate advantages likely to result from such a measure, he observed that a compliance on the part of the Pensionary would inevitably entail the consequence of making him abandon in fact his favourite doctrine of free ships making free goods; and that, of course, the most material obstacle which had prevented the conclusion of a treaty of navigation and commerce would be done away. He said that, circumstanced as he was, it would be highly imprudent for him to recommend such a measure at the Hague; but that, if Lord Grenville would instruct Mr. Eliot to do so, and if his Lordship would give him notice of his having so done, he would immediately write about it, and enforce it as far as he was able. He further said, that he hoped to see Lord Grenville on his return to town, as he wished, as soon as possible, to know his determination with respect to this subject."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, January 2 [Stowe].—"It is indeed but natural that I should have felt all the impatience for which you give me credit; but I have thought it most due to you, whom I have so repeatedly distressed with the detail of my complaints, to wait fully for the communication which you wished to make to me before I take any further steps. I will therefore content myself with saying that I am sure you have taken every pains to do whatever you imagined might best forward my wishes. Since I wrote to you, a most violent fever and loss of health has determined young Pigott to quit the army, so that I am not in danger of fresh outrage on his subject; and, if any disposition existed to repair the injury to Lieutenant-Colonel Nugent, it is most easy to separate

his case from every other; he being the only Lieutenant-Colonel who gives up a company in the Guards after eleven years' service in that commission, without asking to sell it, *though it was bought*. Major-General Leigh and Major-General Bertie, who give up their companies, have their full rank, and can gain nothing by raising their new corps; and the other new corps are either raised by *Colonels*, or from the *half-pay*, or by very young Lieutenant-Colonels or by *Majors*, who get the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel given them for that for which Nugent, who sacrifices so much, gets nothing, *although Lord Amherst's official letter upon which he undertook it, specifically promises him the rank of Colonel*. I state all this that you may be master of all the facts; but I have not the smallest expectation that any change will now take place in a disposition of which I have seen so much that I have no doubt of its existence.

"I was aware of the impossibility of the Antigua report being true respecting Cap Nichola mole; but the very inadequate force on that service makes it more than possible that we shall be checked on that island, unless (which I do not expect) the islanders are more in earnest in support of their allies than the French of every description have been elsewhere. The loss of Toulon is indeed a most dreadful blow, after staking the whole force of the Southern Confederacy upon that object, and it is very difficult to foresee exactly all the consequences of it with respect to our Mediterranean allies.

*Postscript*.—"Since writing this I have seen a letter which states that Colonel Nugent's corps, which is 600 men, will be completed by the 1st of February; and that it is probable that orders will be given to augment it to 1,000 men, on the same terms as the old army corps already augmented. If so, the rank of Colonel might be given to him as a promotion on that augmentation, for the extraordinary rapidity with which it has been raised. I have enlisted above 60 men for him, and I have no doubt that the whole thousand might be completed by the 1st of April."

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1794, January 3, Beckenham.—"I enclose two letters from M. de Jarry, addressed to me but intended for your Lordship. Both of them, and particularly the latter, so far as it regards Lord Moira's expedition, may be worth your perusal, though they contain nothing that will have escaped you. Till we know what has really happened at Toulon, all reasonings thereon must be subject to revision. M. de Jarry thinks it possible that the effects of famine may finish the war, or if not, that the next campaign, *if well planned and executed*, would completely do it, and so far I agree with him.

"In the possible failure however of those speculations he talks of a *trêve*; and there I do not understand him. I can picture to myself a possible situation of France divested of her naval force and all her external possessions and commerce, and nevertheless so mad and so malignant that it might be good policy to keep her blockaded and to wait the result of the fermentation. But as to a *trêve*, the only hope of the leading regicides consists and must consist in fighting the whole world *à toute outrance*.

"The best speculation is in the general position of the French nation, which is too monstrous and too unnatural to be permanent."

*Enclosures*.—Two letters from M. de Jarry offering suggestions in reference to the conduct of the war against the French Jacobins.

## LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, January 6, Berlin.—“I fear that what has passed between his Prussian Majesty and me will not come near enough your idea to lay the foundation for a convention; its having passed however cannot be productive of any harm, and it has produced this good, that it has put me on the footing of doing business directly with the King of Prussia; and although I must always ultimately expect to be made over to his ministers, yet their knowing that I have access to him will prevent their prevarications and keep them under some control.

“I have not the least doubt of the King of Prussia's eagerness to return to the army, and I could observe that the idea of his being at the head of 100,000 men and taking the lead in the war dwelt with great pleasure on his mind. If the *real* command belongs to Marshal Möllendorf, we may expect a very different campaign on the Rhine from that which has just terminated so unfortunately.

“Prince de Nassau has done a great deal better than I expected, and hitherto I should be very unfair if I was to tax him with any appearance of duplicity or reserve. He is received by the King with great distinction, and if, on the event, he really should turn out to be in earnest and steady in the cause, he may be of great service. The strong language held through him from the Empress of Russia, the still stronger, according to his account, she used in a letter of six pages, written in her own hand to his Prussian Majesty, and the offer the Emperor has made to submit to her arbitration and mediation the settling of the pecuniary support he is to give this Court, has produced a very good effect here.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, January 6 [Stowe].—“Your news of the relief of Landau and the repulse of the Germans beyond the Rhine is indeed most alarming, for there is hardly a consequence of the most unpleasant nature to which it may not lead; and, when added to the misfortune at Toulon, will, I fear, immediately decide upon the conduct of some at least of the confederate powers, and consequently upon the hopes of doing that with a diminished force in which we have failed with all our exertion and resource. Unless the royalists should have gained some essential advantage, this accumulation of defeat will induce them to submit, or make their terms; and, if so, your prospects are indeed limited, and the dissatisfaction and difficulties at home increased. The inactivity of the Prince of Cobourg, and of the Duke of York, while the frontier opposite to them has been permitted to send 15,000 men to the Moselle, and 12,000 to Normandy, has contributed as much as anything to this reverse, and I fear that there is but little time, and probably still less inclination, in Flanders to wake from their slumber (at least till Parliament meets) of winter quarters. Near 50 officers have got leave of absence. Surely they ought *all* to be ordered back, and, if possible, the arrangements which we discussed together, as the *sine-quid-non* of our future prospects, ought to be brought forward *instantly*. Your new Adjutant-General is, I fear, not one iota more likely to succeed than Sir J. Murray; and unless the whole of that German operation is put upon a very different system, it can produce nothing but a disgrace and disappointment as boundless as the extravagance of it. I again urge an attempt be made from Flanders towards the Cambresis, to assist by a diversion the operations of Lord Moira; and the very shew of it, by

ordering back all absent officers, may prevent them from adding to the force detached against him. You have at Cork two battalions ordered for Toulon, embarked, and not yet sailed. You are in time to order them to join him, and if all depends on his exertions, for God's sake, stake everything upon it. If no diversion can be made on the Cambresis, why should you not strengthen Lord Moira with the British infantry now in Flanders; the whole number is 2,200 men, a number very inadequate to any serious operation there, and most essential when added to the 5,000 British and 4,000 Germans now under his orders. In short, risk everything for the hopes of giving a turn in the next 14 days, or I fear very much for the general result on the public mind.

"I feel that you have done for me all in your power, and I thank you most truly for the trouble which you have taken. At the same time, I feel that I must have a thorough explanation with Mr. Pitt, that I may, once for all, know his line towards me, for I cannot bear this constant topic of uneasiness which necessarily breaks in upon the mutual happiness which we feel in conversing and writing, and which ought not to be interrupted by a constant reference of complaints between Mr. Pitt and me. I defer this until I hear again from you at your leisure, if indeed public calamity gives you any."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GREENVILLE.

1794, January 9, Beckenham.—Concerning his own immediate retirement from the post of Ambassador at the Hague; the removal of Lord St. Helens from Madrid to the Hague; and of Sir Morton Eden from Vienna to Madrid:—

"M. de Jarry is to give to me next week for your Lordship's use the heads of a detailed plan for the ensuing campaign, adapted to the late change of circumstances. From what has passed relative to it, I have reason to believe that your Lordship will find it deserving of attention."

#### LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GREENVILLE.

Private.

1794, January 9, Berlin.—"The *inside* of this Court is really a subject fit only for a private letter; unfortunately it is so closely connected with its public conduct and influences it so much, that I wish to give you every information relative to it in my power. I have been here so short a time and so constantly employed that my account will be naturally very imperfect, but Lord Darnley, who has had more leisure and opportunity than myself to investigate it, will supply the defect.

"The female in actual possession of favour is of no higher degree than a servant maid. She is known by the name of *Mickie* or Mary Doz, and her principal merit is youth and a warm constitution; she has acquired a certain degree of ascendancy, and is supported by some of the most inferior class of favourites, but as she is considered as holding her office only *during pleasure*, she is not courted, though far from neglected, by the persons of a higher rank.

"The two candidates for a more substantial degree of favour are Mademoiselle Viereck and Mademoiselle Bethman. The first (I really believe extremely against her will and her principles) is forced forward by a party who want to acquire consequence, and I am told, she has the good wishes of Lucchesini, who thinks he shall be able to lead her. Mademoiselle Bethman plays a deeper game; she acts from and for

herself; she professes to love the king, but that her principles prevent her giving way to it. She is all sentiment and passion, her aim is to be what his first mistress was, and to turn to her account all the licentious latitude it is said the *Illuminés* allow themselves. Mademoiselle Bethman is a cousin of the wealthy banker of that name at Frankfort, and from what I learnt there, is perfectly qualified to act the part she has undertaken. The King of Prussia inclines to believe all she says, and calls her *une fille bonne et pieuse*.

"Lucchesini is certainly still a very governing man here; why he went to Vienna on a commission which required no superior talents, or was likely to produce any great applause, and why he stays on there, I cannot learn, unless we are to suppose him acting in complacency to his wife, who is at daggers drawn with her sister Madame Bishopswerder, and who, I am told, dislikes Berlin.

"Bishopswerder is undoubtedly restored to great *personal* favour, but hitherto is neither consulted or trusted on any matter of business, foreign or domestic. He is now living at Potsdam; the King of Prussia invited him there on Monday, and writes to him, as I hear, every day.

"Manstein is his great opponent, and very unlike him in character. He is rough, active, and interested. He has no system of his own, depends on Lucchesini, and pays the most assiduous court to *Haugwiz*, who is the only person amongst the Ministers of State at all in possession of the King's favour or confidence. Haugwiz has gentle and pleasing manners, quite without knowledge and experience, but with capacity sufficient to understand an unpleasant commission, and temper enough to acquit himself of it with great moderation. He is supposed also to be an *illuminé*, and it was as such he was first noticed by the King.

"Count Finck and Alvensleben, the other two Ministers for the Foreign Department, are perfectly insignificant. Finck is respected from his age; Alvensleben is the fine gentleman of Berlin, and takes the lead in all the balls and suppers; amongst the other Ministers of State none are worth noticing but Struensee, who is said to be an able financier, although no proof of his ability in this branch is to be found.

"The first man undoubtedly here in every respect is the Marshal Möllendorf. He possesses character and integrity. He thinks and reasons most judiciously on the part this country ought to take, and it is of the last consequence that he should command the army, if the Prussian army is to act.

"In regard to the Foreign Ministers, either by forming connections here, or from a deficiency of understanding, they are *all* much more like *agents* of this Court than like men of rank sent to attend to the interests of their own. Prince Reuss from Vienna, Count Zinzendorf from Saxony, Monsieur Alopheus from Russia, and above all Baron Reeden from Holland, come so entirely under this description, that it is impossible to derive any other advantage from a connection with them except to learn what the Prussian Ministers wish you to do.

"I am at loss what to say of the Prince de Nassau. I am well aware of the French proverb that says "Nothing is so like an honest man as a clever rogue," but I really do not know whether it ought to be applied to him. I have as yet discovered no deceit or duplicity in his conduct, and his vanity and indiscretion have rather given me an advantage over him in our conversation. He is uncommonly well received by the King, who likes his manners, which are very pleasant.

"I am exceedingly well satisfied with Count Lehrbach ; he is open, confiding, and active. His only fault is the betraying too strongly his feelings at the manner in which this Court does business, and his suspicions of its insincerity."

LORD MALMESBURY to W. PITT.

Private.

1794, January 9, Berlin.—"It seems to me that there is every reasonable ground to suppose that the King of Prussia is *at this moment* as eager to go on with the war as we are that he should not withdraw himself from it. The irresolution and weakness of his character is indeed such that I cannot venture to pronounce that, if he is allowed to cool, this disposition will last, or that his conduct will be consistent with it ; I only venture to vouch for his *present* feelings ; but at the same time I must add that I am still more certain that they will be of no avail if they are not secured by a compliance, in some shape or other, with his demand of pecuniary assistance. I collect both these circumstances not only from what he says himself, but from the language of those who surround him ; from that of Haugwitz, of Manstein, and of Müllendorf ; Lucchesini indeed is not here, but as everything is communicated to him, I must suppose he thinks as they do.

"The state of the finances here is, I believe, nearly what I have mentioned ; on comparing the different accounts I have received from different quarters, it appears that the lowest reduce what remains in the Treasury to 14 millions of crowns, the highest to 20 ; and there is no doubt that at the accession of the present King of Prussia it was upwards of 80.

"I think, therefore, we may venture to establish this principle, that though the conduct of this Court has been such a one as most completely to justify all the suspicions we have had and every step we have taken, yet that it has been occasioned by a weak, not a deep cunning ; that no change of system has been produced either by Jacobin leanings, or from listening to Jacobin offers ; that His Prussian Majesty thinks right, and is disposed to act right, but, circumscribed in his own ideas and advised by persons whose views do not reach beyond the profit of the present hour, he forgets the common interest and common danger which unite him with the rest of Europe in the issue of the present contest, and is actuated by the sole motive of not impoverishing himself still more, and, if possible, to repair the diminution of his treasure by making the coalesced Powers pay for a support he is taught to believe he can withhold without any immediate danger to himself, but which they cannot do without."

"The question reduces itself to a very narrow compass. *Can we do without the King of Prussia or can we not.* If we can, he is not worth the giving a guinea for ; if we cannot, I am afraid we cannot give too many. We must only look to the making the best and quickest bargain possible, to the purchasing him as reasonably, and to the binding him as fast and as securely as we can."

"If I am right in my view of this Court and on the object of ours, the putting the business into the shape of a treaty or convention is the next step to be taken. My despatch of the 5th instant by Slater may perhaps serve as the ground-work for one. It goes to the idea of a very large Prussian army being brought into the field on the opening of the campaign, part of which is to be defrayed by His Prussian Majesty and



the remainder by the combined Powers. I fear very much that the King of Prussia is so strongly impressed with the opinions I have stated in this letter, that we shall not be able to prevail on him to exceed the number of troops to be supplied on his own account that he proposed to me, but it perhaps may be tried whether he would not consent to furnish 40,000 men; which number being the amount of the double succours he is obliged by treaty to furnish His Majesty and the Emperor, might be taken as such and allowance made for their bread and forage; the remaining 60,000 men (supposing the whole army to be 100,000) to be provided for at the joint expense of England, Austria, Holland, and the Empire, in some one of the ways which have been suggested. It seems possible in the distribution of quotas that the Empire, instead of being charged with a part of the loan or engaged as one of the securities for it, might stipulate to supply the baggage-waggons *et cetera*, (what is called *le charrois de l'armée*), and also provisions and forage at a regulated price. This would be no great burthen to such parts of it as are near the Rhine, and the more remote ones might contribute their share of the expense in money, which may be taken either as a part of the general sum required, or be applied to this particular purpose. It is certainly most reasonable that the Empire should bear a proportional share in the expense of a war carried on in part for its defence; but to attempt to load it with a weight of debt or of responsibility at all equal to that His Prussian Majesty proposes would, in my mind, be productive of the worst consequences, particularly if it was to be supported on the idea of secularizing the ecclesiastic states in it, as the seats become vacant.

"It is of the last consequence that the Duke of Brunswick should be removed and Marshal *Möllendorf* take the command. This cannot be an article in a treaty, but I feel almost certain of settling this point if the others are agreed on.

"The greatest difficulty is to secure the hearty co-operation of His Prussian Majesty till the end of the war, and on this point I confess I am quite at a loss what is to be done.

"If there is no duplicity on the part of Russia, no concealed or indirect views of her own in her fair professions towards us and in employing the Prince of Nassau to execute them, the Empress may be employed very usefully on this occasion. But I have experienced so often the little reliance to be had on her promises, and seen such proofs of dissimulation when she has any particular object of ambition, that I never can think the management of our interests quite safe in her hands."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to SIR MORTON EDEN.

1794, January 10, Downing Street.—"The destination of Lord St. Helens for the embassy of the Hague will occasion a vacancy at Madrid, and I have His Majesty's permission to offer you that mission on the same footing as it is now held by Lord St. Helens. As I flatter myself that this mark of the King's approbation and favour cannot but be gratifying to you, I will only add the assurance of the pleasure which I feel in conveying it."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1794, January 16, St. James's Square.—Asking if he will undertake to second the Address in the House of Lords at the opening of the next session of Parliament.

"A more important object is the consideration of the enclosed despatch from Eliot enclosing a proposal from Hope. It is of a nature to frighten the Pensionary, and therefore his objection to it is of less importance than might at first appear. But the evident difficulty is that, supposing so strong a step taken, there is no *mind* of energy enough to execute the powers so given or taken. And yet something of the sort seems indispensable.

"The question of Berlin co-operation all turns on money. If that (to a very large amount) could be found it seems likely that we might have the effective support of 100,000 men under Möllendorff. Proposals are thrown out of paper money to be issued on the credit of the confederacy, to remain as a charge on France, and it is to a scheme of this sort that Hope alludes where he speaks of what he calls the Pensionary's plan. Other ideas are, that Great Britain and Holland should advance the money, which cannot be less than from 14 to 16 millions of crowns, or near 2 millions sterling as I compute it, on the credit of such a re-imbursement. The subject is full of difficulty, and yet something seems of absolute necessity to be done.

"Pray let me know your ideas upon the whole as far as they occur to you, and in the meantime return Eliot's despatch which nobody else has yet seen."

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793 [1794], January 16, Beckenham.—"The subject [of Mr. Eliot's despatch] was not entirely new to me, as I had already received from Holland the two papers alluded to, with a remark from the Pensionary, that 'if a large sum should be necessary to be furnished by Holland to save the fate of Europe, Europe would be lost.' I will wait on you to discuss this subject at whatever time you may appoint. I readily undertake to second the Address, in order to show my zeal for his Majesty and the Government in such a crisis as the present. "I shall have occasion to write to your Lordship to-morrow morning with a very interesting paper which I have received from Jarry, and which will merit your perusal immediately, if you can possibly find time."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

1794, January 17, St. James's Square.—"We are under great difficulties from the enormity of the sum in question, and the apparent impossibility of procuring any considerable part of it otherwise than from the resources of this country. In the statement of force which you have transmitted, it seems as if 15,000 are camp followers, drivers and others who are not commonly included in the estimate of the fighting men of an army. This would reduce the whole force to 85,000, and the addition to about 55 or 60,000 exclusive of the contingent to Austria and the Empire.

"It is a smaller consideration, but it is quite impossible that, in the *mode* of doing it, we can consent that the King of Prussia shall apparently furnish his whole quota to those two Powers (if the Empire can be so called) and nothing in consequence of our alliance.

"The only way that this can be arranged would be by a treaty reciting all his engagements and obligations, throwing them into a common mass, and agreeing that, for the good of the common cause, they

should, with his additional force, constitute one army towards the support of which the Powers concerned would, under certain stipulations, furnish certain sums.

"But the main difficulty is where sums to that amount can be found. German Princes think England a pretty good milch cow, but, surely, hardly to the extent supposed in the account you have transmitted; and I fear that Holland is very little willing, and Austria and the Empire very little able, to give money to save themselves from ruin.

"I shall however write to you more at large on these points by the next messenger."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, January 17, Queen's House.—"I entirely coincide with the opinion transmitted to me by Lord Grenville of not sending Lord Yarmouth to Flanders; indeed, on reflecting yesterday much on the subject, I had once thought of writing to Lord Grenville on the subject; by sending no one over we keep the negotiation more in our own hands. My son shall therefore be instructed by me to collect the whole of the plan proposed at the meeting by the Prince of Cobourg, Count Mercy, and Major-General Mack, and state he can give no opinion how it will meet with approbation till he communicated it here; and he shall propose that Major-General Mack shall come over here to explain the plan, and shall also have my leave to come over at the same time. Colonel Craig will most naturally attend him on the occasion."

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, January 19, Beckenham.—"I beg that you will not take the trouble to write to me relative to Mr. Craufurd's letter; as it comes, in effect, from M. de Mercy, it may be worth your perusal; and you can tell me when we meet to-morrow whether I shall forward the enclosed addressed to Jarry. If any commission should ever take place of the kind alluded to by M. de Mercy, I conceive that it should be in London, and with a plenipotentiary from every power engaged in the war. I forget whether I mentioned that Colonel Mack has intimated to me his willingness to come to England if it should be wished, after having had a full conference with the Prince de Coburg and the Duke of York."

*Enclosure.*

JOHN CRAUFURD to LORD AUCKLAND.

1794, January 14, Brussels.—"You ask me what M. de Mercy thinks of the present posture of things? He was, with many others, not a little surprised at the late misfortunes, but now, instead of being dismayed, I think he has acquired greater courage. He says that he hopes the different Cabinets will now see the necessity of acting with good faith towards each other, and at last perceive the danger with which all the Governments in Europe are menaced; but as the great

burden of the war lies upon the shoulders of England and the House of Austria he wishes, as I sometime ago mentioned to your Lordship, that a *commission* were named by those two Courts of persons whose character and talents would obtain attention and respect, to reside here or any other central place, with full powers both in political matters and to *surveiller* the operations of the armies. He says that unless a good and well-digested plan of operations be immediately agreed upon and such a commission appointed, he shall apprehend the same delays, the same want of activity and concert that occasioned the failure of the late campaign. He observes that, if the Court of England thought it necessary, to this commission might be admitted, either generally or occasionally, a Minister on the part of the States General, but as the Prussians will have no troops in this quarter, he imagines that one from the Court of Berlin might be dispensed with. He wishes very much that Jarry should be employed as soon as possible to make out a plan of operations for next campaign, observing that whether the whole be adopted or not, *parmi ses idées il y aura beaucoup de choses à prendre*.

"M. de Mercy has more than once expressed a desire, if it could be done with propriety, that Jarry were sent to converse with the Duke of York, even if he immediately returned again to England; as he thinks that from his talents, experience in his profession, and knowledge of this frontier and all the country that is likely to be the theatre of the war, he would be able to give his Royal Highness much valuable information."

#### SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, January 22, Vienna.—"I was yesterday honoured with your Lordship's private letter of the 10th instant, informing me of his Majesty's gracious permission to your Lordship to offer me the embassy of Madrid. My present situation, to which your Lordship's protection raised me, is so eligible as to have left me little or nothing to desire in the line, but an embassy is so honourable that, whatever in other respects may be the difference of the two posts, I can have no hesitation on the subject. I, therefore, entreat your Lordship to lay at His Majesty's feet the assurances of my devoted attachment to his royal person, and to express to His Majesty how fully gratified I am by this new mark of his approbation and favour, and my grateful acceptance of it."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, January 24, Palace Yard.—Enclosing for approval the draft of a letter to the Grand Pensionary of Holland.

"I submit to you that the Prussian payments should be by instalments strictly in proportion as the forces arrive in the field, and in proportion also to the time of their remaining during a complete year if required. In truth the Prussia Cabinet is open to such strong suspicions of corruption and profligacy and inconsistency, that if strong measures are not taken in this respect to secure the service for the money, suspicions and discontents will be great. Why should not the Empress of Russia contribute to the subsidy?"

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, January 28, Stowe.—“Two months ago, in consequence of a conversation with some most intelligent men upon the subject of the immense fund of canal property now embarked in speculations of which the greater part pay enormously, I found myself supported in opinion by them, that a duty on the transfer of that property would raise a large sum, and would, as a matter of regulation, be essentially useful. It is a property hitherto not taxed, and even exempted, by a summary mode of conveyance pointed out in the Acts, from the payment of the usual stamp duties; for instead of a lease and release, each of one if not two skins, the conveyance takes place on a ten shilling stamp, which, by fraud, is in most canal companies commuted for a six shilling stamp, and often done by entry in the companies' books without any stamp whatsoever. I have had, since that, much conversation with individuals best able to assist me, and I have employed Chaplin and Grey, now the most competent to give universal information from their most extensive communications upon these matters, to draw up the proposed papers, promising them that, if they were adopted, I would recommend them to be employed in the only office necessary for the superintendence, under the Board of Stamps, of this very easy duty, which is very much understated in the enclosed papers. The Grand Junction Company alone has transferred above 2,500 shares in the course of this year, and the defalcation on this head, which will possibly take place when the property is more fixed, will be counterbalanced by the increase of the duty, by license on the boats, which will probably be very productive.

“You will observe that this revenue will literally require not one additional officer for collection; as the usual allowance on the distribution of the stamps will pay the collection, and a very moderate appointment to the Inspector General of the Canal Companies' books will be sufficient for such an officer, who must be conversant with the subject.

“I have amused myself with this matter in hopes of assisting Mr. Pitt in that very unpleasant part of his labours; but, as circumstances prevent me from communication with him, I send the papers to you that they may not be lost, if you think them likely to be useful. And if Mr. Pitt should wish that Mr. Rose should see Mr. Chaplin, whose name must not at present (for obvious reasons) appear in the business, he is to be found at the office of the Grand Junction Company, No. 6, Parliament Street, and from his intimate acquaintance with Mr. Lowndes, the Bill might be drawn without loss of time.”

## HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794, January] Wimbledon.—“I was obliged to leave my Office this morning at twelve, first to call on Lord Moira, and afterwards on the Prince of Wales, where I was detained till dark, so that I did not get your box till now. There cannot be a doubt of your sending the papers to me officially, and as little of our making the most strict enquiry; and, indeed, under the ignominy into which our national characters as military men is brought, we ought to rejoice that an opportunity of enquiry offers.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1794, January 28, St. James's Square.—“My long despatch of this date leaves me very little to add on the points to which it relates. It will I hope be sufficient to put you fully in possession of our ideas, and

you will see the confidence we feel in your doing the best that the untoward circumstances of the moment will admit. I enclose to you a rough draft of a preamble to a project which I had prepared on the idea suggested by the King of Prussia, but which it was afterwards agreed to set aside. I send it only in order that you may see more distinctly than it is perhaps expressed in the despatch, my idea of the only means by which we can relinquish for the present our claim for the stipulated succours without any appearance of acquiescing in the pretensions of the King of Prussia to be left at liberty to fulfil his treaty to Austria, breaking that with this country. You will, of course, feel yourself under no obligation to adhere to the precise terms of a paper communicated in this shape, but I thought that it might save you time to see it.

"I received your letter on the subject of Lord Yarmouth, whom I saw almost immediately afterwards. I was very sincerely concerned to see that he had considered the business in a light which appeared to me so little to belong to it, and I said everything that I thought most proper to put it on its true footing. I trust I have in some degree succeeded, though I know not whether I can flatter myself with having done so as completely as I should have wished.

"The event of the first day's debate in the two Houses will, I am persuaded, make its due impression abroad; and the rather, because I have every reason to believe that the Prussian Minister here had in his reports to his Court given very different impressions. We have much reason to complain of his conduct and disposition, and it cannot but be useful that you should drop such hints as may prevent a too implicit faith being given to what he may represent.

"I have to acknowledge also your letter on the interior of the Court of Berlin, which is one of those subjects which it is necessary to understand, but on which when it is explained the less is afterwards said the better. The Duke of Brunswick has openly announced his intention of quitting the command, and I have certainly better hopes from Möllendorff, if he gains weight enough over the King's mind to keep in his own hands the direction of the military operations, without being thwarted by those nameless intrigues which we last year had so much reason to lament.

"I suspect that Lucchesini will be disappointed in the postponement of the Emperor's journey to Brussels, as his object seemed to be to accompany him there, and so to find himself near the centre of action and negotiation. Possibly he will now rejoin the King on the Rhine, but I earnestly hope not."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1794, January 29.—"I enclose you two letters I have received from a Major Osborne, an East Indian, who is probably not unknown to you.

"They relate to the means of raising companies, and making other voluntary exertions in his neighbourhood (Hampshire). When any thing is settled on that subject, you will let me know what answer I shall give him."

*Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, January 31 [Stowe].—"I possibly did not explain myself sufficiently in my last letter when I meant to convey to you that the hornets in question would (so far from being troublesome) not be disinclined to the duty proposed, from the advantage attending the regulation; but this is mere matter of explanation, as I must be indifferent to the subject itself. Your ideas of an invasion, and of the necessity of the adoption of some plan for increasing our internal force, would give me some alarm if I could bring my mind to believe in anything more than a privateer's attack; but I will almost venture to prophesy that the alarm will die away, and that you will not think it necessary to avail yourselves of that popular disposition, which, at this time last year, would have enabled you to call forth many resources of that sort to which you point. Your letter does not point at any particular plan, but, when we conversed last, we discussed the idea of county troops of cavalry equal to the tenth part of the militia, or about 3,500 men; of an augmentation to the militia by adding companies, or to the strength of existing companies; or of additional provincial regiments, which last are, for many military reasons, peculiarly exceptionable. But, if you really are in earnest in wishing for some system, surely no time ought to be lost in consulting those through whom ultimately you must be to work; for you must know that a system not yet even discussed cannot in any way or shape help you for the next three months. I need not say that I am ready to help you, either by advice or exertion, in any way to the utmost of my power, if you think I can be useful from the knowledge of the details; but, otherwise, I have too little of the confidence of anyone else of your brethren to give myself any trouble about the measure till it is proposed in Parliament.

"As to your water guard, it is growing very respectable indeed; for, including your six of the East Indian Squadron, which of course will be part of the outward-bound force, you have now from 36 to 40 ships nearly fit for sea: a force much more than sufficient for the two great objects of the present moment. I earnestly hope that it will give you sufficient confidence to enable you to send away part of Lord Moira's force to the West Indies, for I grudge it most bitterly at Cowes; and remember how we have always agreed in former times in deprecating a defensive war, which this must be, if so large a force is locked up by the alarm of Havre or Cherburg preparations. Your naval equipment really does you credit, but, for God's sake, avail yourselves of it to conceive our coasts guarded by it, without keeping that large force inactive.

"I am delighted at your account of Mack, because I am persuaded that his return will operate very much upon the conduct of the operations, and, more possibly, upon the opinions of the soldiery; but the Duke of York *must not* remain in command of our army; for nothing can counterbalance the mischief arising from his gross misconduct; and this evil increases.

*Postscript.*—"Lieutenant-Colonel Badcock, having resigned, I have given the Lieutenant-Colonelcy to Tompkins, *en attendant* for Dick, and the Majority to Mr. Fremantle, who has quitted the Guards; this will relieve me from much trouble.

Colonel Nugent's regiment is 520 strong. I have recruited 90 men for him, and, by the bye, have bought three commissions in it rather than *ask more favours*."

*Postscript.*—"Since writing the above I have determined to send you a plan which goes to a small increase of numbers, but goes to liberate some of the Royal Artillery, which is a very material point to you. I propose that the additional Lieutenant may be taken without qualification, and to retain his half-pay if he has it, and I have no doubt but that every regiment will get one either from the half-pay of the artillery, navy, or army fit for this duty.

"The guns are now served by the Royal Artillery, and by a detachment from each company of militia, which is often very inconvenient, and is *strictly illegal*.

"You will observe that this plan gives 1642 privates and 124 corporals, for whom it requires only 62 subalterns and 65 sergeants; if these men were raised and officered on the usual establishment of 60 men to each company, they would require 27 captains, 54 subalterns, and 81 sergeants; so that it is very economical, and might be completed in a fortnight or three weeks."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794] February 2, ——"I received your note this morning at Wimbledon just as I was preparing to write to you. I have forwarded your draft, to which I ventured to make some additions, which are not very material; but I have desired Aust to send you a copy of it, and also copies of despatches to much the same effect, which go by the same messenger to the Duke of York and Lord Cornwallis. If the Emperor really takes this step under the present circumstances, I not only dread its immediate effect, but fear it must be considered as a symptom of a change of system which will leave little hope of a vigorous prosecution of the war; and will drive us to some *second best system*, which God knows must be deplorably bad. However we shall have done our best."

"I see nothing more to be done till we hear again."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, February 2, Brussels.—"The Duke of York having entered in his official correspondence so fully into the subjects of Colonel Mack's conversation of to-day, I am not called upon to address myself to your Lordship in a public letter. One or two points, however, seem hardly to have been strongly enough stated by His Royal Highness, and I, therefore, trouble you in this manner.

"In the first place, His Royal Highness having only heard from the King about his going to England, does not advert to it in writing to Mr. Dundas. Now, not only on His Royal Highness's own account (which I cannot help thinking a very essential object in the present circumstances) but also on Colonel Mack's account, it should be known that their journey can only take place, with propriety, at this instant; because Colonel Mack is seriously of opinion that all the army should be brought forward, and put *in order of battle* by the *fifteenth of this month*. This is, put into such positions as may not merely be preparatory to the operations of the campaign, but more particularly intended to present a ready and great resistance, should the enemy make any considerable attempt on this frontier. For this reason Prince Cobourg and the Arch-Duke are not anxious that Colonel Mack should go at all to England. But the Duke of York pressed it, and on the most cogent



considerations; and gave Colonel Mack the assurance that a frigate should be at Ostend for them, as early as possible, and that he should not be detained about [above] forty-eight hours in London. I think your Lordship will judge this to merit much attention.

"The next general object is, the exertions which (it is evident from the conversation of officers and ministers) will be deemed necessary on the part of Great Britain, in order to secure the assistance, as desired, from Prussia, and the hearty effectual concurrence of Holland. I need not dwell on these matters; but it is a singular and unpleasant fact that when the 4,000 Dutch, who lately came into Namur, reached their destination, they had not a cartridge for their firelocks or cannon, nor one draught-horse of their own; all taken from the peasants for the occasion. In the choice of their troops, there appears also a good deal of impropriety."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, February 4, Brussels.—"Not having yet received a copy of the plan which Colonel Mack read this morning, I decline entering with your Lordship on any of the points which lead to any discussion during our conference. I am the more induced to defer writing to your Lordship this evening as I shall have an opportunity of sending a letter with the plan, when the Duke of York sails on Thursday or Friday next.

"Before His Royal Highness's departure from hence, I shall have some conversation with him, as well as with Colonel Mack and Count Mercy, on the points referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 3, January 31, the result of which shall be forwarded to your Lordship immediately.

"I therefore, at present, have merely to say that the Duke of York, the Hereditary Prince of Orange, Prince Cobourg, Count Mercy, Colonel Mack, and myself, were invited to wait on the Arch-Duke Charles, when the plan of campaign was read."

#### WILLIAM PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794] February 4, Downing Street.—"The Prussian draft is, I think, extremely improved and in most parts perfectly right. I return it you that you may see Dundas's remark which, I think, still deserves a good deal of consideration, but applies only to the concluding part of the paper. I think it would be very right to give Lord Yarmouth the option of going at present to Berlin or to Switzerland; and, in any case, to give him the offer of going afterwards to Spain. If Lord Yarmouth prefers Switzerland, I think there may still be some use in the experiment of sending Lord Malmesbury for a time to Berlin, but it will be time enough to talk of that when we meet.

"Do you propose to give instructions such as you mentioned to Mounier. From his conversation I think he may be made very useful in assisting Lord Yarmouth or anyone else."

#### THE EARL OF YARMOUTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, February 12, Charles Street—"I enclose a state of the Palatine troops which I know to be very exact, as also a letter from the Duc de Deux Ponts' confidential adviser, on the subject of the treaty of

subsidy which was in contemplation last summer. Your Lordship, I daresay, recollects enough of the transaction to be at once struck with the difference of the conditions which are now asked by the Abbé de Tholey on the part of the Duc de Deux Ponts, and those on which I stated my conviction of being able to bring the negotiation to a conclusion, while I was with the Prussian army. The fact is that no man upon the Continent can abstain from the practice so generally established of demanding higher terms than he afterwards is willing to accede to. In case any future circumstances make His Majesty wish to resume the negotiation, I have no doubt of being able to prove that what I said in the summer was well founded, and that 25,000 of the Palatine troops may be obtained for the duration of the war by a subsidy of a hundred thousand pounds, provided a guarantee of the Palatinate dominions and an accession of His Majesty to the treaty of Teschen be not thought an inadmissible condition. Your Lordship will, I am sure, be of opinion that on either plan of dropping the negotiation entirely, or of keeping it so far alive as to be able to resume it at a future opportunity, it will be necessary to empower me on my return to Germany to say something precise and definite to the Duc de Deux Ponts, who is very much disposed to coincide with His Majesty's present views and those of the Court of Vienna. My only wish upon the subject is to prevent any umbrage being taken by him, as he behaved with the most perfect good sense and propriety in all the transactions which took place towards the latter end of my mission."

*Signed.*

LORD LOUGHBOROUGH [Lord Chancellor] to HENRY DUNDAS.

1794, February 13, ——"The Bishop of London has been twice with me lately to consult upon the manner in which the baptism of the child should be entered in the parish register. The last time Sir Wm. Scott was with me, who, as Chancellor of the diocese, was better entitled to give an opinion on the point, we both agreed that the entry should be in the usual manner of those cases where the child to be christened has no father whom the law acknowledges in that character; that is, described only by the name of the mother. It was supposed that an attempt would be made to follow in the entry of the baptism the words of the entry of the marriage; *son of Augustus Frederick and Augusta Murray*. But although such an entry would not bespeak a legitimate birth, it was thought better to adhere strictly to the more usual form, and not to permit any sort of indication of the name of a father to stand upon the register.

"I must naturally feel anxious that His Majesty should not disapprove of the part his Chancellor has ventured to take in this deliberation."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, February 13th, Queen's House.—"It must be from a great desire of unnecessarily finding fault if I did not in the fullest manner approve of the matter and manner of Lord Grenville's two drafts. The only idea that has occurred to me is whether the love of all the troops and the conciliatory manner of the Prince of Cobourg might not be added as a reason to wish he may remain in the command, which seems the more reasonable as his successes were rapid beyond example whilst

assisted by Colonel Mack. I thought I should not do justice to Lord Grenville's desire of knowing my sentiments on the present delicate measure if I omitted conveying any thought that had on the occasion occurred."

#### LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, February 16, Berlin.—"I fear we are still wide of each other's terms, but I have endeavoured in vain to bring them nearer. I thought it much better to put the whole into the shape of a treaty than let it remain in the endless labyrinth of conferences and verbal notes. If it were possible to suggest some provisional convention which could be signed *with safety* immediately, I think I could undertake to put the Prussian army directly in motion, and the principal treaty might be concluded at leisure.

"Prince de Nassau's journey was an idea of his own. The King of Prussia approved it, and gave him a letter to the Emperor. Prince de Nassau, who is enterprising and sanguine, thinks he will succeed in hastening a decision to carry on the war with vigour. The Prussian Ministers were very glad to get him away from Berlin, and for this reason encouraged his departure. Count Lehrback, who is naturally hasty and rather of a suspicious character, was at first much displeased at his going to Vienna, which he considered as an intention of taking part of the business out of his hands, but now inclines to think it may produce some good, of which I have my doubts.

"I am apprehensive that I may not have understood rightly your ideas, and may have erred in sending Timms on to Petersburg; particularly as the last letters from thence seem to put every hope of any kind of support from that Court, in support of the common cause, as quite out of the question.

"I think it right to tell you that I have strong grounds to suspect that the general substance of what Timms brought to me on *Wednesday the 5th instant* was transmitted from Jacobi, and received here on *Sunday the 2nd*. This circumstance, of which I am nearly sure, made me go with less hesitation at once to the full extent of the offers I had to make."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1794, February 16, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to mention to your Majesty that during Colonel Mack's stay here there were two conferences, at the first of which Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas, and himself assisted, Colonel Mack being accompanied by Count Starhemberg and Count Meraeldt; and at the second, in addition to the persons above mentioned, Lord Amherst was present; and His Royal Highness the Duke of York was also pleased to assist at the latter.

"At these conferences the general plan of operations as proposed by Colonel Mack was agreed to, subject to such political measures as it seemed right to insist upon on the part of this country, in conformity to the ideas before stated in Lord Grenville's despatches to Sir Morton Eden, and upon which Lord Grenville will take the liberty of troubling your Majesty as soon as the papers are prepared to be submitted to

your Majesty ; but subject also to such arrangements as should be made respecting the command, on which subject it was stated to Colonel Mack that considerable difficulties were felt here.

"It was explained, and agreed to by Colonel Mack, that the command of the army to the right of the main army seemed on every account more proper for His Royal Highness than that of the army in West Flanders, and that a distribution of British and Austrian troops must be made conformable to that idea. With respect to the command of the whole, Colonel Mack explained in confidence to Mr. Pitt that he felt it impossible for him in any case to serve with the Prince of Cobourg, whom he represented as wholly insufficient even for a situation of nominal and ostensible command ; and he even added that he had accepted his present situation only on the condition that the Emperor or the Archduke should take the ostensible command.

"These circumstances necessarily led to the making some further communication on the subject to the Court of Vienna ; and Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas, and Lord Grenville having considered the whole subject, have thought that it might save your Majesty trouble if they submitted their ideas upon it for your Majesty's Royal consideration in the form of a draft to Sir Morton Eden, which Lord Grenville accordingly now takes the liberty to transmit.

"Lord Grenville begs leave to mention to your Majesty with respect to one part of those ideas that, on a consideration of the different arrangements proposed for carrying Colonel Mack's plan into effect, it appeared that, even supposing a considerable part of the British force to be allotted for the active service destined for His Royal Highness the Duke of York, there would still remain on the frontier of West Flanders a very large number of the troops in your Majesty's pay. This circumstance, together with the great importance to the immediate interests of your Majesty's dominions of preserving the maritime frontier of Flanders from invasion during the campaign, appeared to render the command in that quarter an object of just and necessary attention on the part of this country, and to make it fitting that a British officer of high rank should be employed there. In addition to this consideration, it was felt by Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas, and Lord Grenville that it would on every account be infinitely desirable that advantage should be taken of the fortunate circumstance of Lord Cornwallis's arrival in order to bring forward into a situation of activity his distinguished talents and military skill. Under this impression they thought that your Majesty would not disapprove of their endeavouring to learn the general disposition of Lord Cornwallis on the subject, and they have the satisfaction of finding that he expressed a perfect readiness to come forward in any situation which might be proper for him.

"The circumstances of the army in West Flanders, even under the idea of his commanding there, would certainly not afford, at least in the first period of the campaign, as active a situation as might be desired—in order to have the full benefit of such abilities as his. But his serving there even at that period would unquestionably be highly advantageous ; and if the proposed plan should succeed as it is laid down in Colonel Mack's paper, there would hereafter be many opportunities of Lord Cornwallis's being employed with honour to himself, and with the greatest benefit to the common cause as well as to your Majesty's service in particular. And in the interval, the public impression here of Lord Cornwallis's being in any manner employed upon the Continent could not fail of being highly favourable.

...“It is under these ideas that the draft has been prepared which Lord Grenville now ventures to submit to your Majesty. He does it with that deference to your Majesty's judgment which he must always feel on every occasion, but most peculiarly on a subject of this nature.”

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, February 17, Windsor.—“I have read Lord Grenville's explanatory letter as well as the draft to Sir Morton Eden with great attention. I certainly approve that my son the Duke of York shall act on the right of the main army, not to be left with that in West Flanders, which, though as essential to the main object, yet from its nature must be less brilliant. I am very sorry to find the Prince of Cobourg is not likely to remain at the head of this great army, for, though in some points he may not be so decisive in his opinions as might be desirable, yet he seems so particularly suited to gain the esteem of the officers and soldiers under his command, which, at all times a very essential quality, is still more calculated for one composed of troops from different countries, and his successor, be he whom he will, may not be blessed with that talent.

“I certainly cannot but eagerly embrace any plan for letting the Marquess Cornwallis serve with the army in West Flanders, but must insist that this is not to be effected by letting my son head a smaller corps of British troops than he commanded that last campaign. Indeed he ought to have an additional brigade of British infantry, and therefore the British to be placed in this second army with the Marquis of Cornwallis to be an additional corps of British troops of which the Scotch brigade may make a part; the Hessians both from Cassel and Darmstadt, and the Brunswickers, and Baden troops may be thrown into this corps. The Hanoverians must all belong to the corps under my son, or he will not have sufficient to make his command as considerable as at the end of the last campaign.

“I fear when the Court of Vienna hear the idea of the Marquess of Cornwallis, though they may acknowledge his talents, will never consent to bind themselves that he, in case General Clairfait does not command the covering army, shall have it; they will always send an officer of older date to keep him in the second place.

“I thought it right to state what occurred on the whole to me that Lord Grenville may see that, though I coincide in general, I do not think the plan void of difficulties; and that we may not too securely trust that our proposal will be accepted at Vienna.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1794, February 17, St. James's Square.—“It has always been the intention to propose to your Majesty not only that the British troops to serve under His Royal Highness the Duke of York in the next campaign should not be diminished, but even that they should be augmented to the full extent stated by your Majesty.

"Lord Grenville has now the honour of submitting to your Majesty the draft of a despatch to Sir Morton Eden respecting the political arrangements which seem necessary to be adopted in order to insure the full assistance and co-operation of the Prussian and Dutch troops to the extent supposed in Colonel Mack's plan."

"Lord Cornwallis has been consulted upon the subject of Negapatam, and has expressed his decided opinion that no prejudice whatever will result to the British interests in India from the cession of Negapatam to the Dutch.

"A corresponding instruction will be sent to-morrow to your Majesty's Minister at the Hague with orders to insist in the strongest manner that the Dutch Government shall, without the smallest delay, make all the preparations necessary to enable them to bring forward a force to the amount stated in the plan of operations."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, February 18, Queen's House.—"I received last night the accompanying drafts, which meet with my fullest concurrence. I have ever thought that it [is] common justice that the Dutch, provided they give a cordial support this campaign, but for which in many articles they are as yet totally unprovided, that England must restore Negapatam, and Austria the territory forced from them by the treaty of Fontainebleau in 1785, should the war end as successfully as there is every reason to suppose, provided we act on a fixed plan, and do not depart from it by drawing our means to fresh objects."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793 [1794], February 19, Palace Yard.—"*If Jarry can be trusted*, as I really incline to believe he may, it might be possibly useful to send him for ten days to M. de Mercy and to Colonel Mack, more especially as the latter expressed such a wish. He would be able on his return to give a clearer notion of many matters than he can do at present."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794, February, Downing Street].—"From intelligence which Nepean has picked up, there is some reason to fear that some of the Comte d'Artois's creditors will be on the watch for him, on the idea that Government will be compelled to pay the debt. Besides this consideration, it has also occurred as a matter of doubt, whether the intelligence from the Vendée, and the idea of making an attempt in that quarter, are not reasons for delaying the Comte d'Artois's coming; as his arrival just at this time might be coupled with the news brought by M. de Tintiniac, and might lead to conjectures as to our intended expedition. On the other hand I am aware that there is some awkwardness in retracting the invitation just after it has been sent. But on the whole, we incline to think that it would be best to write to Lord St. Helens, and to desire him to prevail on the Comte d'Artois to postpone his journey for the present. It would I suppose be necessary to assign confidentially the real reasons, though without entering into any

detail as to the latter of them. I have not waited till I see you to mention this, as, if the journey is to be stopped, there is probably no time to lose.

"Pray send me, by the return of the messenger, directions by which my servant may find my quarters at Windsor to-morrow evening. I enclose you a list of guests for next Thursday, which you may send, if you approve it, to Captain Rose, at the Trinity House. I have not added any more of the tribe of Foreign Ministers, as the number seems sufficient, but there can be no objection to including any others you wish."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1794, February 19, Downing Street.—"I have received your private letters through Brussels and the Hague, and have great pleasure in your acceptance of the embassy to Madrid. It is, on many accounts, highly important that no time should be lost in your proceeding there, as, in our present situation as with respect to Spain, the presence of a Minister of the first order is of great consequence, with a view to keep up the due weight of this country there. I wish, therefore, that your preparations should be made for leaving Vienna with as little delay as possible, without putting yourself to too great inconvenience. Lord Yarmouth will succeed you at Vienna, and, from what passed on the subject when I last saw him, I imagine he will be in readiness to proceed there almost immediately, though he may possibly not be prepared as yet to assume his public character."

FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, February 21, Leghorn.—"I have the honour to enclose a Bulletin from Paris together with a note respecting Baldwyn, which I have this instant received. The latter I believe will have been transmitted to your lordship by Sir Richard Worsley, to whom it has been communicated in consequence of my having given directions (at the time when I expected that the affairs of Genoa might call me from hence) that every information relative to *Baldwyn* might be *instantly* forwarded to any one of the King's Ministers, in order to avoid any delay which might endanger His Majesty's safety.

"Your Lordship will be pleased to observe in the account of disbursements which I transmitted to your Lordship's Office some time since, that about eighty pounds have been already advanced to defray the various expenses attending this correspondence from Paris since it was commenced. I am now applied to for a further advance of fifty pounds, which I shall remit by to-day's post, hoping that your Lordship will be pleased to send me your commands, if your Lordship wishes it to be discontinued."

*Postscript.*—"By a second letter, which I have just received, it appears doubtful whether the enclosed report respecting Baldwyn was sent to Lord Robert Fitzgerald or Sir Richard Worsley; but as it is certain that it was transmitted to one or other of those Ministers, I hope your Lordship will have received it."

*Enclosure Number 1.*

BALDWIN.

"Le 19 de Janvier, à 11 heures du soir, est sorti de la prison de l'Abbaye, l'homme *Baldwyn* ; c'est la Municipalité qui lui a fait ouvrir la porte sans l'aveu du Comité de Salut Public, et malgré Robespierre. On ne sait s'il est resté à Paris, et jusqu'au 22 Janvier, on n'a pas pu en procurer des renseignements. Le 20 au soir, le premier commis du Ministre Forgues remit une note au Comité du Salut Public de la part de ce Ministre, pour lui apprendre qu'il avoit fait partir ce même jour le nommé *Thezi*, ci-devant noble, ci-devant officier au régiment de Poitou, pour se rendre à Londres, y portant des lettres de ce Ministre pour ses partisans en Angleterre ; que pour lui obtenir un passeport, il avoit pris la précaution de lui faire donner une lettre, sous le nom d'*Elie Tommin*, pour un des commis au bureau des plantations de la part de Monsieur *Morris*, qui l'annonçoit comme un Américain ; qu'il croyoit qu'il lui seroit aisé d'arriver à sa destination.

Ce *Thezi* est un homme de 5 pieds 8 pouces, très mince, d'une figure agréable et douce, cheveux blonds, bouche begayant un peu, ne parlant Anglois qu'avec difficulté, ayant l'accent Normand en parlant François. Il seroit de la plus haute importance, si en effet cet homme pénètre en Angleterre, de l'arrêter, et surtout de saisir ses papiers. Si on en trouvoit de chiffres qu'on ne peut déchiffrer, il faudroit les conserver, et on feroit parvenir le chiffre si l'on vouloit indiquer le numéro qui se trouve toujours dans ces sortes de dépêches à côté de la date."

*French. Copy.**Enclosure Number 2.*

BULLETIN No. 7.

"Le 18 Janvier, le Ministre Forgues lut au Comité Secret des Neuf, que la Porte (c'est à dire le Capitaine Pacha) avoit prêté deux cent cinquante mille piastres pour les armemens François au Levant ; que Descorches avoit hypothéqué pour cette somme la caisse riche et les quatre frégates Françaises. Le même Ministre annonça qu'il y avoit la plus grande désunion entre Hénin et Descorches."

"Ce même jour, 18 Janvier, il fût décidé par le Comité d'envoyer deux commissaires à Constantinople, de les adresser spécialement à M. Muragia. Le Ministre apprit au Comité que ce Muragia demandoit une gratification de cinquante mille livres pour la continuation de ses services ; qu'il avoit été dénoncé à Constantinople, chassé de chez tous les Ministres étrangers excepté celui de Suède son patron qui le soutenoit fortement, mais qui désiroit qu'on lui accordât la gratification qu'il demandât. Forgues lut alors une dépêche de ce Muraggia, qui lui disoit que le Capitaine Pacha étoit toujours ami de la République ; que ce Pacha avoit présenté un mémoire à la Porte, qui avoit été communiqué à lui Muraggia ; que ce mémoire disoit en substance qu'il falloit se déterminer à la guerre avec la Russie avant qu'elle eût habitué la nation Polonoise à plier sous le joug de ses volontés. Le Reis-Effendi Raschid répondit à cette note le lendemain sur un ton tout opposé, disant qu'il falloit absolument maintenir la paix, que le système politique de l'Europe alloit devenir si compliqué que l'on ne risquoit rien de reculer la guerre de quelques années, pour la faire ensuite avec plus d'avantages ; que l'Empire Turc avoit besoin de réforme pour se mettre en état de



faire la guerre.—Muraggia ajoute que cette opinion prévaut dans le Divan, et que si l'on se détermine à seconder le Capitaine Pacha en laissant à sa disposition la caisse riche qui est entre les mains de Descorches, il ne faut espérer aucune diversion de ce côté-là.

“Le 27 Janvier, le Ministre Forgues lût une autre lettre de Hénin dans laquelle il lui apprenoit que la Russie se refusait à changer le traité de commerce de 1783; qu'elle venoit de déclarer que ce traité étoit intimement lié avec celui de Jassy; qu'elle ne sera pas la première qui ébranlera les bases de la paix, et qui prendra sur elle une pareille responsabilité envers son peuple; mais qu'aussi elle ne souffriroit pas la plus petite lésion de ses droits; et Hénin marque si on n'envoie pas un homme très marquant à Constantinople avec beaucoup d'argent, le Reis-Effendi l'emportera sûrement sur le Capitaine Pacha.

“Le 29 Janvier le Comité des Neuf a délibéré que Robespierre le jeune iroit à Constantinople; qu'il auroit l'entière disposition de la caisse riche; qu'il emporteroit des assortimens en diamans de la couronne pour la valeur de cinq millions; qu'il auroit en outre 1,500,000 livres en argent comptant. Le 31, Robespierre le Jeune, qui avoit été précédemment averti de cette affaire, a écrit au Comité qu'il ne vouloit point absolument de cette mission là. Les choses en étoient là le 31 Janvier.

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1794, February 22.—“The orders given by the Court of Spain to their officers at Nootka arrived here some time since, and similar orders ought to be given to our officers in those seas, duplicates of which must be sent to Madrid.

“Measures must also be taken for sending out those orders. When we expected a much earlier answer from Madrid, steps had been taken, as you remember, to have a vessel ready to sail in October or November.

“Under all the circumstances of season, I am inclined to believe the best way now would be to send our officer through Spain, and New Spain, in the same manner that Mr. Mudge came; but that you will of course settle with the Admiralty; if you think proper.

“When the orders are prepared, and the arrangements made, you should, I believe, transmit them to me officially in order that I may send them to the King's Minister at Madrid.”

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794, February 23, Downing Street.]—“You probably know that the vacancy of the auditorship has taken place, and I wish much to talk over with you all that has occurred to me on the subject. I return of course to-morrow, and can be at leisure any time that suits you best between half-past one and half-past three. You will, I am sure, believe that I feel no small anxiety that you should not forego the opportunity of an arrangement so desirable. I confess, however, that, on thinking it over very fully, I cannot help feeling that your holding such an office in addition to the income of Secretary of State, would, under all the present circumstances, produce an impression very unfavourable both to you and to me, and to the cause in which we are engaged. What I would propose to you is to diminish your present income, by giving up

the parks, and by relinquishing the *salary* of Secretary of State, which I take to be about equal to the value of the auditorship. This is certainly a bad exchange for the present, but the situation in which it would place you is on the whole such, that I think you will not feel it an uncomfortable one. You will on every account easily believe what indeed is evident in itself, that I can have no reason for wishing this mode of settling the business, except a persuasion, that to do it any otherwise would be liable to very strong objection. I will tell you more particularly all the grounds of my opinion when we meet.

"Grey has given notice of a motion for all papers which have passed between our Ministers and Genoa, Florence, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and America, relative to their neutrality; and also the Orders in Council respecting America, on which he meant to ground some further proceeding. I wish to know whether you think it best to give any of the papers, or to take the debate generally on the merits, in combating the ground for the papers. I shall probably be obliged to tell him to-morrow which line I mean to take, and he will then fix a day. I rather think the Orders in Council and instructions respecting captures ought to be given, and all the rest refused."

LORD GRENVILLE TO W. PITT.

1794, February 24, St. James' Square.—"I did not receive your letter till near five to-day on my return from the country, and it was then too late for me to hope to see you before the House; but I quite agree with you that, supposing it fit to give any papers, no more can be given than those you mention.

"With respect to the subject of your letter, I have no reason to doubt that you must be a much better judge than myself of what is fit to be done on an occasion when my opinion is liable to so much bias. But I must, on the other hand, say at once that, in the manner in which you propose the thing, I had infinitely rather decline having any concern with it at all. In the first place, I much doubt whether, as a mere pecuniary transaction, it would be worth my while to give 1,200*l.* *per annum* in present, and during my continuance in office, for the expectation of 2,800*l.* when I quit my employment. At least I am sure the difference is not worth purchasing by incurring, as I think I should, very nearly the same envy and clamour as if I enjoyed the office in the same manner as all other rewards of that sort have always been enjoyed by persons in similar situations.

"But what is much more important, and is indeed with me quite decisive, is that I know I could not diminish my present income, continuing Secretary of State, without incurring debts, which I am resolved never to do. You will not wonder at this statement if you consider what your own expenses are as a single man in a situation in other respects nearly similar. I am not conscious of any extravagance, nor do I see what I could reduce (continuing Secretary of State with a reduced income) except my occasional expenses at Dropmore (I do not speak of the building), and these constitute, as you know, my sole amusement and relaxation.

"You will not understand what I have said as meant to urge you to an arrangement which, from the moment you have told me you think its impression would be unfavourable to you as well as to myself, I must consider as out of the question. But it was better I should tell you before we met what I felt upon the other proposal. I shall be very glad

to talk the whole subject over with you whenever you please, and you will see that, in stating to you what my decision is, I have not withheld from you the grounds of it, which are such as you are equally qualified with myself to weigh and to examine.

"It is besides necessary that I should see you to-morrow, to decide what is to be done in the House of Lords with the Duke of Norfolk's motion. You will let me know when and where we can meet."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO W. PITT.

1794, February 26, St. James' Square.—"Having consulted my pillow on the subject of our yesterday morning's conversation, I have, on the whole, decided that it would be best for me to take the auditorship, keeping the Secretaryship of State, but reducing the salary of the latter so as to leave my official income precisely what it now is. I have felt strongly what you said about quitting the public line under such circumstances as the present, but, as my main difficulty on the other side is that, by placing myself on the footing which I have just mentioned, I seem to diminish my own liberty of retiring (if my health or spirits should require it) under circumstances of less public difficulty, I trust there can be no objection to its being understood that I am to be left at perfect liberty to take that decision after the war shall be over and the peace made and concluded, if I should then feel disposed to do so. It is unnecessary to detail my reasons for desiring some understanding or explanation on this subject. But every man knows himself best, and I am sure that the notion of indefinite and unlimited service in such a situation as mine is not fitted to the frame of my mind. I have hitherto always felt that (generally speaking and excluding moments of particular difficulty) I could quit my situation without reproach whenever I felt myself, from whatever reason, less fitted for it than I had been. The having a provision of this sort eventually secured to me might seem to take away from that liberty if I had not established some previous explanation on the subject. And to that explanation, as now stated, I trust there can be no objection. I do not trouble you with assurances of the manner in which I feel your constant friendship, because I hope you know my sentiments, and do justice to them."

*Copy.*

FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, February 27, Leghorn.—"I have the honor to enclose a copy of the Bulletin which I received this morning. As this, as well as several others which have been lately transmitted, contain some very strong allusions to persons in England, I thought that my addressing them by a *private* letter to your Lordship would be equally useful and more prudent, as I cannot take upon myself to be responsible for the absolute veracity of the statements which may so deeply affect the persons referred to."

A 78290.

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## Enclosure.

## BULLETIN No. 8.

1794, le 31 Janvier, Paris.—“Le 20 de Janvier, dans la nuit, le Ministre Forgues lût au Comité de Salut Public une lettre adressée par le Sieur d'André, que se trouve à Londres, à Danton. Il ne lût pas la lettre en original, mais un simple extrait rédigé en forme de mémoire. Dans ce mémoire étoit le discours que le Roi d'Angleterre devoit prononcer le 21 Janvier au Parlement. La lettre de d'André étoit datée du 15 au soir, et étoit venue par courrier extraordinaire depuis Calais. Elle avoit été adressée à Calais au nommé *Robelin*, agent intermédiaire du Comité de Salut Public avec ses correspondants en Angleterre. D'André disoit qu'il s'étoit procuré ce discours par ses intelligences dans le Bureau du Secrétaire d'État. Il ajoutoit qu'il avoit crû devoir communiquer ce discours à Milord Lauderdale et à Monsieur Grey ; que le premier a prétendu en avoir déjà connoissance, et que le second l'en a fort remercié. Dans cette lettre, D'André annonçoit que tout espoir de paix particulière avoit échoué, principalement parcequ'on n'avoit pas envoyé en Angleterre quinze millions qu'on avoit promis de destiner à cet objet depuis le mois de Septembre 1793 ; que l'Evêque d'Autun avoit déclaré n'avoir reçu en trois remises différentes que neuf cent mille francs ; que lui n'avoit reçu que cent cinquante mille, et qu'avec si peu de moyens, ils n'avoient pu produire les grands effets qu'ils prémédoient. Il ajoutoit que l'Evêque d'Autun n'étoit point parti pour l'Amérique Septentrionale, mais qu'il s'étoit seulement retiré sur les confins d'Irlande ; qu'il demandoit de l'argent avec les plus vives instances ; que leurs amis d'Ecosse sollicitoient de lui un emprunt de cent vingt mille francs pour empêcher la ruine entière des opérations des sieurs *Brewer* et *Margerot* ; et que sur le tout il demandoit les décisions du Comité.

“Le Comité de Salut Public ne s'occupât ce soir-là que du discours du Roi d'Angleterre, et il fût résolu (malgré l'avis de Robertspierre) sur la proposition de Barrère, que le lendemain, 21, il prononceroit un discours où il dénonceroit ceux qui désiroient la paix, et feroit rendre par la Convention un décret pour la continuation de la guerre. Le principal but de cet expédient étoit de prémunir le peuple contre l'effet que pouvoit produire le discours énergique du Roi d'Angleterre, après, surtout, les insinuations que l'on avoit faites de tout côté que l'on négocioit une paix particulière avec l'Angleterre. Ce discours, qui devoit avoir lieu le 21, n'a pu être prêt et prononcé que le 23. Le Comité en a fait imprimer une grande quantité et l'a envoyé dans tous les départemens. Le Comité délibéra ensuite, le 31, sur le restant de la lettre d'André. Robertspierre et Carnot le traitèrent de brigand et de voleur ; néanmoins on décida qu'on pourroit employer un million aux différents objets qu'il proposoit pour l'Irlande et l'Ecosse, mais qu'il falloit pour cela qu'il envoyât un nouveau mémoire et de son but et de ses moyens.

“Le 22 Janvier, la Municipalité, réunie chez Pache, prit un moyen infernal pour détruire les partisans de Robertspierre ; ce fut de faire annoncer dans tous les papiers publics que l'on avoit trouvé, le 21, l'original de la *Pétition des vingt mille* contre les journées du 31 de Mai. Robertspierre dénonça au Comité de Salut Public que cette liste avoit été fabriquée non pas contre lui personnellement, puis qu'il avoit été à la tête des événemens du 31 de Mai, mais pour y englober tous les partisans du Comité de Salut Public sous ce prétexte. Cela causoit beaucoup

de tumulte dans le Comité, qui ne voulût cependant prendre aucun parti, et on a remarqué que, depuis ce jour-là jusqu'au 31, Robertspierre n'a paru ni à la Convention ni au Comité.

"On lut au Comité, le 28 Janvier, une lettre de Constantinople de Hénin qui demandoit, avec les plus vives instances, un commissaire très accrédité de la Convention, et chargé de ses pleins pouvoirs. Sa lettre étoit du 18 Decembre. Il y disoit que le Capitaine Pacha attacherait le plus grand prix à ce que la Convention envoyât pour commissaire un Député de son sein ; que lui (Hénin) ne doutoit pas que si ce commissaire portoit des présens considérables et de l'argent, le parti du Capitaine Pacha, qui vouloit la guerre, ne prévalût dans le Divan. Le Comité de Salut Public, composé seulement de Huit (car Robertspierre n'y étoit point) se décida à envoyer pour commissaire chargé de tous les pouvoirs de la Convention Robertspierre le Jeune, avec des diamans pour la valeur de cinq millions, un million et cinq cent mille francs d'argent, et a liberté de disposer des quatre frégates ainsi qu'il le jugeroit convenable. Le 29 matin, Carnot, Secrétaire du Comité, portoit cette délibération aux deux Robertspierre. Le 30, Robertspierre le Jeune écrivoit au Comité qu'il refusoit cette mission, et n'en vouloit sous aucun rapport. Le 31, le Comité n'avoit pris encore aucun parti à cet égard.

"Le 30 Janvier, le Ministre Forgues déclara au Comité, par écrit, qu'il étoit en voie de négociation pour un traité offensif et défensif avec la Suède ; il disoit dans son écrit qu'il en prévenoit le Comité par un office signé de lui pour engager sa responsabilité, et parceque il savoit que quelques membres du Comité contre-disoient son dire ; qu'il demandoit en conséquence sous sa responsabilité qu'il lui fût permis de faire distribuer, à son gré, quinze cent mille livres en Suède ; et qu'à ce prix il s'engageoit avant le premier d'Avril à présenter un traité d'alliance à la Convention. Cela lui a été accordé à l'unanimité de toutes les voix du Comité, et sans contradiction.

"Le 30 au soir, le Ministre de la Guerre lut au Comité de Salut Public un très longue mémoire sur la position militaire de la République, et sur la campagne prochaine. Il a été impossible d'avoir un extrait de ce longue ouvrage jusqu'ici ; on devoit le retirer le lendemain pour y délibérer, mais peut-être un extrait sera envoyé sous peu. Le Ministre déclara que ce mémoire n'étoit pas de lui ; qu'il étoit d'un officier de l'état-major de l'armée, rempli de génie et de talents, appelé Dumas de Montpellier, qui ayant été l'ami de La Fayette et membre de la seconde Assemblée, se croyoit suspect, et vouloit par quelque grand service mériter l'indulgence et la confiance de la République."

*French. Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794 [February 27—March 2, Downing Street.]—"I have said nothing on the subject of your note, because there were some considerations which had occurred to me on which I really had not been able to make up my mind quite satisfactorily, and when I tell you the only doubt I have had, I am sure you will not disapprove it. For the same reason I wish still to say nothing for a short time, except that, in thinking on the subject, you may believe that friendship and affection to you will go as far as circumstances admit.

*Postscript.*—"I do not find that the Duke [of Newcastle] is yet dead, but my accounts also are that he cannot recover. The appointment is by the Treasury.

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794] March 3, Palace Yard.—“I am glad to communicate to you the inclosed letter from the Pensionary, because, notwithstanding his peevish expressions to Mr. Eliot, it shows that the business is perfectly in the train in which you wished to place it, and, in short, that it will do.

“I do not think it any breach of confidence to send to you at the same time Mr. Eliot's private letter to me. It certainly does credit to him, in respect both to his modesty and good sense. The plain truth is, that the Pensionary with all his talents, and with an extraordinary reach of understanding, cannot bear to be led by a man much younger than himself.”

## The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, March 7, Brussels.—“I am really so tired with the operation of writing this evening, that I dare not venture, in any ostensible manner, on some points which I shall take an early opportunity of submitting to your Lordship. But I must mention that the Emperor, in a letter which the Archduke received yesterday, talks obviously of his own coming; and says he shall probably leave his Royal [Imperial] Highness the command of the army. Both General Mack and Count Mercy are much hurt by the late correspondence from Vienna. Mack is too precious to be trifled with. It is impossible to conceive the change already in all arrangements. One may flatter oneself that we shall have good news to send home soon, if his first operations are seconded and supported with spirit.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

1794, March 7, St. James' Square.—“You will see from the public despatches how little hope we derive from the tenor of the Prussian *projet*, and how little confidence we have that the business can be satisfactorily concluded. The more I consider the subject, the more strongly I am impressed with the persuasion that those proposals were brought forward for the purpose of being negatived, and that they must be too well apprized at Berlin of the state of the Austrian finances to have seriously proposed a subsidy from Vienna of little less than a million sterling, in addition to one of the same amount from the Empire.”

“It would certainly be desirable that the thing should, if possible, be brought to a speedy issue, in order that we may know our ground and take our measures accordingly. I am sorry that it has fallen to my lot to send you on so fruitless an undertaking, but it will probably not have been a long employment, though a very unpleasant one I fear while it lasts.

“The King of Prussia will probably refuse to fulfil his engagements supposing the negotiation to end as it is now likely to do. If that is the case, the next point will be to see what posture he assumes as with respect to Russia, and whether he will contend by force or menace for a share in the dominion of Poland, or try to obtain further acquisition there by compromising with the Empress and encouraging her to attack the Turks.

*Copy.*

## FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, March 7, Leghorn.—“It is with deep concern that I transmit your Lordship the enclosed extract of a letter which I received yesterday, mentioning the very critical and dangerous position of General O'Hara. I have sent this information to Sir Gilbert Elliot, suggesting to his Excellency the possibility of averting the danger which threatens the general's life, by a menace of retaliating on the person of Saint Michel (the commissary of the Convention at Bastia) in case he should fall into our hands.

“I have the honour to enclose an extract of the plan of campaign proposed by Mr. Dumas, referred to in my last Bulletin. It does not contain all the details I could wish, but I hope to be able to transmit a second extract in a post or two.”

*Enclosure 1.*

**BULLETIN No. 9.**

1, 4, et 7 Février.—“Il s'est passé une scène atroce à Chantilli; on y avoit renfermé, le 11 Septembre 1793, onze femmes, dont les unes avoient été au service de la Reine en 1792 et 1793. La nommée Depréaux y avoit été en 1789, et l'avoit quitté après le retour de Varennes. Toutes ces femmes avoient été arrêtées comme suspectes et comme sachant des détails qu'il étoit essentiel de taire. Le 31 Janvier elles demandèrent leur liberté. Les maris, les pères de quelques unes la réclamèrent aussi. Le Comité les a fait égorger dans les prisons dans la nuit du premier au second ce mois; et Barrère annonça à la séance du second, en riant, qu'on en étoit heureusement débarrassés. On croit que sous le prétexte de les transporter ailleurs, on les aura embarquées sur la Seine, et noyées.

“Le 2 Février, Barrère rendit compte que, lors de la prise du général Hoare, on avoit saisi ses papiers, ainsi que ceux que son chirurgien et son domestique lui avoient portés de Toulon; que ces papiers, remis au Comité, lui avoient été remis pour les examiner; qu'il n'y avoit trouvé qu'une pièce de la plus haute importance; que cette pièce étoit un brevet du Roi d'Angleterre, qui établissoit O'Hara son général, et, en même tems, son ministre à Toulon, l'autorisant à traiter au nom du Roi d'Angleterre, et d'accorder des capitulations et garanties à celles des villes et des provinces du Midi qui auroient fait des instances près le Cabinet de St. James, pour être admises à se mettre sous sa protection. On l'a interrogé sur le brevet, et obligé qu'il déclarât qu'elles étoient les villes qui avoient demandé pareille assistance, et quelles étoient les négociations. Le général a répondu n'avoir aucune sorte de connoissance sur ces faits; que l'amiral Hood en avoit en seul la direction jusqu'à l'arrivée du Chevalier Elliot; que comme aucune négociation n'avoit été amenée au terme nécessaire pour qu'il en fut rendu compte au conseil, il n'avoit pu en être instruit, les patentes du Roi d'Angleterre que l'on avoit trouvées, ne lui donnant d'autre droit que celui d'être consulté quand des négociations de cette espèce auroient été amenées à la conclusion. Cette réponse rapportée le 2 Février, Robespierre, qui jusqu'ici avoit été pour les partis moins affreux que ceux proposés par les scélérats dont il est le chef, voulut se distinguer dans cette occasion, et fut d'avis que O'Hara fut conduit au tribunal révolutionnaire, et, s'il refusoit les renseignemens requis, qu'il fut envoyé à la guillotine. Le Comité a été entièrement opposé à cet avis, et

Barrère à réuni les avis à ce qu'on prit tous les moyens possibles pour forcer O'Hara à s'expliquer sur les demandes, jusqu'à le mettre aux fers, et à la question, et que s'il subissoit ce dernier moyen, alors il falloit s'en défaire en prison. Jean Bon St. André et Prieur de la Marne ont été nommés commissaires du Comité pour cet objet. Le 4, ils doivent rendre compte de leur premier interrogatoire.

"Il est à présumer que le prince de Talmond n'est pas pris. On peut l'espérer, car il n'est dans aucune prison de Paris, et il est faux qu'il soit arrivé un courrier de Laval portant qu'il y ait été mis à mort. Ce courrier n'est jamais arrivé, puisque c'est sur la motion de Prieur, et pour apaiser le peuple qui se croyoit trompé, qu'on a publié la lettre lue au Comité et à la Convention. Il est vrai que le Comité prétend être sûr de son arrestation, mais on n'a pu savoir qu'elles preuves Robespierre et Barrère ont de ce fait.

"Ce qui se passe à Paris sur la descente en Angleterre est singulier. Le Ministre de la Marine l'a déclarée impossible, et la déclare encore telle par écrit, le 4, au Comité. Le Comité la croit impossible, mais il est forcé par le peuple, à qui on en a persuadé la possibilité, de s'en occuper, et peut-être le serat-il de la tenter. Le Club des Cordeliers veut la demander par une pétition expresse. La municipalité, qui voit dans les malheurs qui en seront la suite la ruine des meneurs actuels, y pousse de toutes ses forces.

"On a eu, le 5 Février, le regret d'avoir accordé 15 cent mille livres au Ministre Forgues pour son traité à faire avec la Suède, et on a craint que ce traité ne fut pas satisfaisant. En conséquence on a nommé, le 5 Février, Hérault de Sechelles pour l'examiner, et on a écrit à Casteux\* à Copenhague de suivre ces négociations et de se rendre à Stockholm."

## *Enclosure 2.*

### BULLETIN No. 10.

1, 4, et 7 Février, Paris.—"EXTRAIT, tel qu'il a été possible de la retenir à une seconde lecture, du MÉMOIRE lû par BOUCHOTTE le 30, et relû le 31 Janvier.

"Dumas, auteur de le mémoire, exposa d'abord l'état des troupes en 1789, 1792, et 1793.

"Il prétend que le moment le plus périlleux pour la République fut celui où par les trahisons des La Fayette, Lukner, Dumourier, les troupes anciennes, nommée troupes de ligne, se trouverent tellement diminuées par la désertion, la maladie, et les pertes dans les batailles, que le bon esprit tacticien qui dominoit ces troupes instruites, se trouva anéanti par la supériorité des troupes de gardes nationales; et, par conséquent, que l'indiscipline dans l'intérieur des camps, et l'ignorance des manœuvres au dehors, prévalut de toutes parts.

"Alors si les ennemis eussent profité de notre position au commencement de la dernière campagne, dit Dumas, la République étoit perdue, et, pour le prouver, il entre dans les détails de l'état de chaque armée à cette époque, et de l'esprit qui y regnoit; d'où il suit, suivant lui, qu'à l'ouverture de la dernière campagne, il ne restoit, de véritablement redoutable, à la République que les débris de l'ancienne artillerie.

"Mais les dissensions parmi les Coalisés; les maux qu'ils ont voulu se faire l'un à l'autre; les moyens d'argent et de dépenses énormes

\* Ce nom n'est pas bien lisible dans l'original.



employées à corrompre dans leurs armées ; la multitude d'intelligences qui toutes aboutissoient au Comité de Salut Public, lui donnoient la facilité de faire concourir tout au même but ; la puissance absolue du Comité établie de la plus énergique manière ; voilà, dit-il, ce qui dans ce moment très dangereux a sauvé la République.

" Là il entre dans de très longs détails sur les opérations des armées, et s'attache à prouver que si lors de la défection de Dumourier, qu'il assure avoir été plus nuisible à son armée que ne l'auroient été vingt défaites, si lors de sa défection Cobourg étoit marché droit sur Peronne, que les autres coalisés eussent seulement menacé de l'apparence d'une diversion, en ce cas, il avoue, qu'il n'a jamais pu imaginer comment la République eut échappé à ce péril.

" Après s'être extrêmement étendu sur ces objets là, Dumas en vient à dire que la situation des armées est entièrement changée par cette dernière campagne ; qu'il n'a pu retrouver, il est vrai, dans les armées qu'il a pu observer, cette discipline et cette tactique des anciennes troupes de ligne, mais qu'il y a trouvé plus d'assurance de succès qu'il n'en a jamais existé dans les armées depuis 1792 ; que dans l'armée du Var, que sa position et son amitié avec l'un des commissaires l'a mis à portée d'observer, il a remarqué une chose à la quelle il faut faire la plus sérieuse attention.

" Que lors de la levée en masse de la première réquisition, et d'une partie de la seconde, on ne peut se cacher que les deux tiers des soldats requis, et armées malgré eux, ne fussent dans les plus funestes dispositions ; qu'il croit bien que leur habitude avec les vrais sans-culottes, la facilité d'entendre les vrais principes dans les clubs, en a ramené un grand nombre, mais qu'il a observé que la conduite des coalisés étoit le plus puissant des convertisseurs. Que les conversions s'étoient opérées d'abord dans les officiers, et surtout dans ceux de l'artillerie, dont une grande partie seroit, au commencement de cette campagne, dans le désir de contre-révolution. Ils le manifestoient même d'une manière très dangereuse.

" A mesure que les succès des armées de la République se sont accrûs, il y a eu dans la conduite des généraux vraiment Jacobins, ou dans cette des généraux Brissotins, une différence qui n'a pas été assez remarquée, quoiqu'elle eût eu sur l'esprit public des armées la plus notable influence.

" Lorsque la campagne s'ouvrit par des désastres, Custine dans son armée, Dumourier dans la sienne, et leurs généraux subordonnés, ne mirent aucun obstacle à la communication par lettres entre leurs officiers et leurs parents ou amis émigrés, parcequ'on ne leur annonçait que des succès des projets brillants de la part des ennemis de la République, et que, par ce moyen, ils laissoient corrompre l'esprit public dans leurs armées. À cette même époque, les vrais sans-culottes, nos généraux d'aujourd'hui, alors subordonnés, dénoncerent ces correspondances, dénoncerent les trompètes parlementaires qui servoient de courriers, et jetterent les hauts cris sur la trahison des généraux.

" A la fin de cette même campagne, les mêmes Jacobins, devenus généraux par la punition des traîtres, ont favorisé par tous les moyens la correspondance de leurs officiers avec les émigrés, et ils l'ont fait avec le plus grand avantage pour leurs armées. Pichégru, Jourdan, Hoche, Dugommier ont laissé parvenir des lettres des émigrés, et ont favorisé les correspondances entre leurs amis et parents, mais avec cette différence entre eux et leurs prédécesseurs, que ceux-ci n'ont toléré cette correspondance que dans nos malheurs, et qu'alors elle nous étoit funeste ; et que ceux-là ne l'ont établie que lors de nos

victoires, et alors elle a été très favorable au redressement de l'esprit public.

" Ces lettres d'émigrés à leurs amis et parents royalistes cachés dans nos armées, ont plus puissamment changé l'opinion, et affermi les indécis qu'aucun autre moyen n'a pu le faire. La manière dont on humilioit les royalistes au dehors, dont on les repoussoit de partout, la profonde misère dans laquelle ils étoient, leur désespoir, leurs regrets, ont mis la rage dans le cœur des royalistes cachés que nous avions dans nos troupes; ils n'ont vu de salut que dans l'établissement de la République, et, furieux du traitement qu'éprouvoient de la part des rois leur parents et amis, je peux assurer qu'ils sont devenus plus irrités, plus furieux qu'aucun autre officier de nos troupes; qu'ils ont conservé ces lettres, qu'elles ont produit le plus salutaire effet. Cette cause, que j'ai bien observé, particulièrement dans l'armée de Dugommier, a contribué évidemment à ramener le bon esprit dans nos armées, et à guérir surtout le corps de notre artillerie.

" J'apprends de St. Just que cet effet a été général puisque Hoche, Jourdan, ont pratiqué les mêmes manœuvres, et que le premier notamment a fait imprimer et distribuer à son armée les lettres authentiques qu'il s'étoit procurées par ceux la même à qui elles étoient écrites. Je crois donc pouvoir assurer, dit Dumas, que l'esprit des officiers de nos armées est tel qu'il n'y existe pas des royalistes, que les officiers qui l'ont été sont devenus aussi acharnés que les Jacobins, et que la vengeance a fait en eux ce qu'avoit fait dans les autres le patriotisme.

" Quant aux soldats, ceux des premières réquisitions que le défaut d'anciennes troupes de ligne livroit à leur peur, et à leur inexpérience, le danger n'est plus; elles se sont aguerries. La rigueur des châtimens en a imposé; ces troupes sont, au moins les deux tiers, d'un fort bon esprit. La peur conduit le reste. Il ne s'agit que de leur imprimer une peur plus forte de la guillotine que du canon; alors on en tire le plus grand parti.

" Le mode adopté par le Comité obtint les plus grands éloges dans ce mémoire. Il définit ce mode en moyen de recruter et moyen de maintenir l'armée. Le moyen de recruter, dit-il, est consigné dans les annales du monde, parceque la force s'accroît toujours avec le besoin; et la détresse de la République. Il appelle le moyen actif du recrutement, toutes les loix de la Convention sur les subsistances, celles du maniement des réquisitions, des denrées, et des accaparements.

" Il entre dans un long détail sur ce qui a été fait à ce sujet, sur l'effet que cela a produit, et ce qui reste à faire. Enfin il en conclut que par les moyens déjà pris, et les additions aux loix qu'il propose, tous les genres de subsistance sont dans la main du Comité des Neuf à sa volonté; que de là il résulte que tous les moyens de subsistance sont pour les troupes, peuvent leur être plus spécialement réservés, à mesure que ce recrutement devient plus forcé, et peut se pousser au point extrême qu'il n'y auroit de moyen d'exister pour tout ce qui peut porter les armes, que dans les armées.

" Le moyen de maintenir par la sévérité dans les camps et la licence des passages est le seul moyen qui reste à la République pour opérer sa conservation, et la perte des coalisés.

" Après de très grands détails sur les dévastations ordonnées par le Comité, et les conservations proditoires de Dumourier, il en vient au plan de campagne proposé à la République pour l'année prochaine. Il débute par déclarer nettement qu'il estime que du premier Mars au premier Novembre le sort de l'Europe sera irrévocablement décidé, ou que la

République sera anéantie. Qu'il n'oserait pas décider si la République pourroit fournir à une troisième campagne; qu'il croit tout possible de l'énergie du Comité; mais que, pour les puissances, il est clair que c'est ici leur ultimatum. Que le Comité doit, avant tout, considérer l'espèce de cette guerre pour bien déterminer le mode de la faire.

"Qu'il ne faut pas se cacher que de même que le Comité par ses négociations et son argent a jeté la dissension parmi les membres de la coalition, de même ceux-ci ont semé les germes de la dissension entre les départemens contre la capitale; que cette haine existe partout; que les châtimens sévères infligés à ceux qui ont osé se déclarer en ont imposé, mais que la haine n'en est pas moins forte; que les rois la fomentent de tous leurs moyens; que l'abandon de toutes les villes qu'ils avoient séduites à la vengeance de la République a bien détruit leur influence, mais qu'elle n'est pas anéantie, parceque les châtimens même infligés aux départemens rebelles a irrité, et a semblé aux autres départemens une tyrannie de la ville de Paris sur toute la France.

"Qu'en cet état de cause, le palladium de la liberté est l'existence de Paris, la conservation de la Convention; que toute espèce de maux sont réparables tant que l'existence de ces deux objets est assurée, et que les Jacobins voient une tête, un ralliement, et un chef. Que, donc, la destruction de Paris et la dispersion de la Convention doivent être le premier but de cette dernière campagne; et que c'est parceque c'est le seul moyen de ruiner la République, qu'elle doit supposer ce but à ses ennemis.

"Qu'elle doit compter sur la désunion, la défiance, les trahisons des membres de la coalition qui se haïssent plus entre eux qu'ils ne haïssent la Convention, puis qu'ils lui ont, dit-il, à peu près tous séparément demandé la paix.

"Mais que ce moyen tout puissant peut avoir un terme où il cesseroit; qu'il peut exister un instant où la prépondérance de l'Angleterre et de l'Empereur, unie au péril, rallie toutes les efforts; que le danger ne peut être long, parceque les dissensions sont dans la nature des éléments de la coalition; mais encore, dit-il, faut-il prévoir la possibilité de le danger pour le franchir.

"Que la nature des armées de la République ne se prête pas à une guerre d'attente, à une guerre défensive; qu'il faut secouer cette armée comme on a secoué le peuple pour amener la Révolution; qu'il faut les conduire de manière à ce qu'elles soient toujours attaquantes, et qu'elles aient des retraites dures quand elles seront attaquées; qu'il faut songer principalement à la conservation de Paris, parceque c'est de là que dépend l'existence de la République; que Paris détruit, chaque département s'insurgeroit, chaque département se déclareroit d'abord contre Paris et tout ce qui fut Convention, et traiteroit ensuite ou se soumettroit au vainqueur; que sous le rapport, l'existence de la Vendée étoit le ver-rongeur de l'état; que ce danger seroit toujours réel de ce côté là, parceque toute cette partie et la Normandie étoient infectées, et que des descentes, des succès sur ces points là, renouvelleroient une Vendée.

"Qu'il alloit déposer son plan général, et que l'ensemble des moyens il le fourniroit au Ministre; qu'ils étoient prêts sur chaque partie, mais qu'il demandoit l'approbation du Comité pour le principe.

#### *Première Vue.*

"Que l'armée la plus formidable de la République soit cette de Jourdan; que, sans affectation, on éloigne de cette armée tout ce qui

n'est pas sans-culottes, propriétaires des nouvelles propriétés données on vendues par la République ; qu'on y place dans toutes les armes les gens qui se sont le plus prononcés, ceux qui ont contribué, ou remercié, ou demandé la mort du tyran, ceux enfin qui croient qu'il n'y a pour eux de salut et de profit que dans l'existence de la République ; qu'on y envoie les meilleurs fournisseurs, les meilleurs médecins, les meilleurs approvisionneurs ; enfin, qu'on regarde cette armée comme le cœur de l'état ; que par sa nature elle soit disciplinable, et par son intérêt unie au sort de la Convention.

### *Seconde Vue.*

“ Qu'on envoie aux armées du Rhin tout ce qui n'est pas propriétaire, tout ce qui a une fortune à espérer dans les victoires et le pillage, parceque les armées là, toujours en activité, toujours offensives, doivent opérer la plus puissante diversion, avancer dans l'Empire, le dévaster, toujours le menacer, et, par conséquent, forcer à une défensive ruineuse.

“ Que la seconde et troisième réquisitions soient sur pied avant la fin du Mars dans tout le midi ; qui tout homme pouvant porter les armes enfin soit enrôlé, soit dans l'armée des Alpes, soit dans cette des Pyrénées.

“ C'est dans ces provinces où la rareté des subsistances obligera, dit-il, à opérer qu'il n'y ait du pain que dans les armées, c'est à dire pour ceux servant la République, soit aux frontières, soit dans l'armée révolutionnaire de l'intérieur, les armées doivent faire la guerre la plus offensive.

“ Heureuse ou malheureuse la guerre offensive du midi sera le sauveur de la République ; et il l'expose qu'il ose improuver très fortement les dispositions que le Général Du-Gommier lui a communiquées comme étant celles du Comité. Que ses plans avoient, pour premier objet, de transporter tous les moyens les plus actifs aux Pyrénées, et de se mettre presque en défensive à l'armée des Alpes ; que si la volonté du Comité n'a en pour but que d'exterminer les Espagnols, de leur reprendre leurs conquêtes, de les chasser du territoire avant l'ouverture réelle des campagnes décisives, il croyoit à la bonté et à l'utilité de ce plan ; mais que si décidément il avoit pour but de mettre, l'été prochain, l'armée des Alpes en défensive, et celle des Pyrénées en offensive, il regarde ce plan comme désastreuse pour la campagne prochaine.

“ Que le but des guerres offensives du midi, outre le but de défendre cette partie de la République, avoit encore celui d'occuper les troupes des coalisés ; que l'Espagne n'avoit d'autres lieux à employer ses troupes que sur une frontière de 170 lieues d'étendue ; que ne les employant pas là elle ne pouvoit, vu la nécessité de se garder elle-même, les employer ailleurs.

“ Qu'ainsi, hors du grand plan de campagne, une défensive imposante contre l'Espagne suffiroit pour la neutraliser, si elle étoit compatible avec le caractère national ; mais, qu'au moins, il en résulteroit que c'étoit l'armée d'Italie qu'il falloit rendre la plus offensive possible, parceque les intérêts des Souverains seroient d'y établir des armées qu'ils pourroient employer en Flandres et sur le Rhin, que chaque conquête en Italie étoit de la plus haute importance par la nature des pillages et contributions, et la facilité qu'on devoit trouver dans les peuples ; que rien de tout cela n'existoit en Espagne, et que l'esprit du peuple y étoit aigri et animé contre les François.

“ Que les autres armées de la République étant organisées pour

l'offensive, celle de Jourdan devoit l'être de manière à être offensive et défensive avec un égal succès, et que dans sa composition de propriétés, elle trouveroit naturellement cette sorte d'esprit; que cette armée étoit le palladium de Paris, et qu'il trouvoit des places pour sa conduite soit dans l'offensive ou la défensive; que le danger le plus grand étoit d'une descente des Anglais en Bretagne, ou en Normandie, parcequ' alors la République, c'est à dire Paris, couroit deux dangers imminents, et que quand la flotte de Brest ne produiroit d'autre effet que d'empêcher le débarquement, elle pourroit se flatter d'avoir sauvé l'état.

"Ce mémoire, rempli de détails de calculs, qui a duré trois heures de lecture, ne contient que cela en substance.

"Le premier Février le Ministre a été autorisé à accorder sa sauvegarde à Dumas, et au Chevalier de Rivière qu'il nommoit comme l'un des plus habiles officiers de génie. Il lui a mandé de se rendre à Paris; que son plan étoit adopté; qu'on vouloit les détails d'exécution, et qu'il se concertât avec le Comité."

*French. Copy.*

#### FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GREENVILLE.

Most private and most secret.

1794, March 10, Leghorn.—"It was with extreme mortification  
3297 2107 1290 26 3857 189 185 3455 2618  
that I received a letter from Lord Hood, on Saturday last, containing  
12 430 2143 235 777 2511 3163 1887 2009  
some very distressing information from Corsica. Though I am on  
1931 2014 1 2127 2387 1848 3854 3466 855  
all occasions unwilling to transmit to your Lordship anything that  
2880 1831 2893 3787 30 1741 57 1668 1919  
may affect any person employed in the King's service, yet I think it  
923 1751 542 1948 557 167 934 267 1873 3691  
an indispensable part of my duty to forward to your Lordship, extra-  
538 2299 3 1383 750 2365 2360 348 2912 3924  
officially and privately, a copy of that letter, and also to inform your  
905 952 1428 1105 745 2138 3080 3727 2434  
Lordship of the reports which have reached me, relative to the breach  
1723 23 1919 793 545 30 1354 2362 242 1766  
and differences which exist between the two Commanders, in conse-  
590 808 2270 3848 990 281 3598 1164 1725  
quence of the slowness and over-cautionsness with which General  
3708 213 3609 3814 745 1200 725 957 3339  
Dundas is represented to carry on the military operations.  
1534 905 1634 389 1820 832 1644 2360.

"As the consequences of a possible failure of the Corsican expedition  
2360 2410 2511 263 3750 855 1328 1193 1234 30 1072 555  
will be extremely disastrous in every respect, I have taken the liberty  
3650 2218 3466 1462 2638 828 565 1026 184 765 1336 1579  
of suggesting to Lord Hood the propriety of making an immediate  
2747 263 166 238 1424 2601 2618 12 1744 1949 969 2273 939  
requisition to the Court of Turin for a body of Sardinian troops, and  
1931 3 1435 1154 2752 2496 2227 3820 2534 3366 1199 745

I have also written to apprise Mr. Trevor of the possibility of such  
 2182 2487 2360 70 2388 793 1015 494 204 1154 3019 1542  
 a requisition being made, in order that he may be prepared for it, and  
 2419 1480 2300 2852 2299 890 1512 223 2300 1885 873 2262  
 that no time may be lost."

901 643.

*Cipher.*

*Enclosure.*

LORD HOOD TO FRANCIS DRAKE.

Secret and confidential.

1794, March 3.—"I am grieved to tell you that on the 2nd at  
 1331 905 1654 285 2360 645 2996 26 2814 1661 1626 683  
 night, to my great surprise and disappointment, I received a letter  
 2373 1539 565 3068 745 2148 8857 199 185 3455 957 3339 1534  
 from General Dundas, dated the 28th of last month, of which the  
 849 30 389 1899 667 263 2275 156 1072 2087 79 2535 1424  
 following is an extract; and I beg you will not communicate it to  
 1493 3306 852 905 2604 565 1941 819 2299 3010 1948 1927  
 any person whatever. 'I have already had the honour to inform  
 753. 1579 819 1728 263 12 305 1919 26 2511 1578 626 1114  
 ' your Lordship that, on a full examination of circumstances, and  
 410 985 494 3367 426 427 1812 291 3723 1493 15 577 1983  
 ' of our present situation, any active attempt on Bastia is beyond  
 2388 985 1430 503 1752 1072 855 256 2951 3244 2299 3094  
 ' hope or calculation and not to be thought of. I yesterday  
 745 3719 1797 1725 2339 30 1647 212 1072 2688 349 3072  
 ' found it necessary and proper to bring two regiments from the  
 1499 1766 430 777 2270 2986 1017 15 263 1273 3055 1890  
 ' mountains of Tykime and encamp them beyond the gorge of  
 2353 1105 1072 2884 905 3311 3555 905 1467 1105 1515  
 ' Fiorenzo. The streightening the enemy's communications and  
 969 2813 1931 263 3343 30 819 1199 745 291 1931 1468 1099  
 ' attending to our own post of Fiorenzo I look upon to be our  
 241 30 1114 2384 905 3311 3555 905 1467 1105 256 3403 3010  
 ' great objects at present.'  
 899 360 442 30 3550.

"When I sailed from hence on the 24th, it was with a view  
 1013 1606 840 60 2814 2275 2784 3297 189 845 2601 613 263  
 to co-operate with the troops when they descended from the  
 3366 30 1013 180 2793 167 419 212 887 200 2634 1931 2865  
 mountains, either by landing three hundred men by way of  
 1306 3832 1651 3165 216 2868 204 448 3023 1651 674 1931 3  
 creating a diversion, or by making an attack upon Bastia, where  
 473 1756 3723 3239 2118 2196 565 1424 2738 2299 1445 2217  
 I was going in hopes it might have stimulated him; but as  
 235 501 589 3073 306 2832 1820 2507 966 804 2972 871 263  
 it was without effect, nothing is now left but to starve the enemy  
 3343 450 3116 1739 753 2626 756 2819 1517 167 200 3755 563

into a submission. I am this moment interrupted by poor Paoli.  
 586 806 881 340 1603 777 2251 2127 1396 167 15 3009 8550  
 who is distressed beyond measure at our inactivity, which I cannot  
 2886 281 3944 3392 636 263 1664 256 2901 204 2646 2807 969  
 cure; because the more I urge a contrary conduct, the more he  
 1664 2723 1329 667 2360 236 1577 804 3424 30 1693 899 1676  
 is determined to lie upon his *oars*, by which our difficulties will daily  
 2509 1534 1646 855 2687 167 777 12 430 1744 667 389 110 61  
 increase."  
 436 3941.

*Cipher. Copy.*

SIR MORTON EDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, March 11, Vienna.—“I shall not leave this country without regret. My best endeavours have been exerted to re-establish the ancient union between the two Courts, from a firm conviction that it would be for the advantage of both. The want of decision that I have often experienced has given me great pain; I must, however, add that I believe it often to have proceeded from the situation of M. de Thugut, whose plans are thwarted by the great nobility. His fame, and perhaps political existence, depend on the accomplishment of the alliance; and, if his interview with your Lordship takes place, I think that a few conversations must remove all the difficulties that exist.

“In a private letter I may add that he expressed the utmost dissatisfaction with General Mack, as he has, he says, the strongest reason to believe that he prevailed on His Majesty’s Ministers to give up the expedition to the Vendée, and to insist on the accomplishment of the Prussian convention. On the latter subject it is useless here to enter; but, on the former, I will repeat his words, *s’il n’y avoit pas de Vendée, il faudroit en créer une*. He told me that the Emperor would strictly adhere to the plan proposed in London, though it was very different from his wishes and expectations, which were to take Landrécy and Sedan and then march towards Paris. The many sieges now proposed, with the garrisons for the different towns that we may take, will, he thinks, so far weaken us as to prevent our undertaking anything decisive; nor by this plan shall we be able to bring the French to a general engagement, which we might hope for if we marched forwards to Peronne.

“I have said so much of the mistrust here of the Prussians, that I am not willing to speak further of it in my despatch, but I will here say that it is greatly increased by the reception given at Frankfort to the French commissioners, and by the assertions of Count Goertz at Munich that M. de Lehrbach has had orders to propose anew at Berlin the facilitating of the exchange for the Electorate of Bavaria. The fact has been positively denied by the Vice-Chancellor, Prince Colorado, to the Palatine President, who was, a few days ago, charged to express the Elector’s apprehensions, and to require further assurances from this Court that the project is given up.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD ST. HELENS.

1794, March 12, St. James’s Square.—“The daily proofs which I receive of the absolute necessity of not deferring your departure for the

Hague, oblige me (though I do it very reluctantly) to press you again upon the subject, and to beg that you will fix a day, and that as early a one as you can make convenient to yourself.

"You are, I am sure, persuaded that if I did not see strong public grounds for being so urgent, I should have much pleasure in begging you to consult exclusively your own wishes."

*Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, March 12 [Stowe].—"An idea has occurred to me which I have only mentioned to George Nugent, and which (though I ask you to interest yourself in it if you think proper) I shall think no more if you should not think it practicable.

"Your conversation with me respecting Corsica suggested this wish, namely, that as you will most certainly find it necessary to garrison that island, and as Nugent's regiment is to be in the south of Ireland, from whence the force can go most conveniently which is to keep it, I earnestly wish thus early to request you to send him and his regiment there, whenever you send any. You know his discretion and abilities as an officer, and it is barely possible that, if he should do well with his regiment in that island, it might by chance save him and his corps from reduction at the peace. On this last event I do not dwell, nor do I on any part of it, if it is to give you any difficulty or uneasiness *anywhere*; and in that case I shall not think further of it.

"Just going to Winchester, *très malgré moi*. A prospect of a good house at Stokes Bay reconciles me *individually* to Gosport."

#### FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, March 14, Leghorn.—I have the honour to enclose two extracts of letters from Paris.

#### *Enclosure Number 1.*

#### BULLETIN 11.

1794, Février 8, 10, 12, et 14, Paris.—"Le 10 Février, St. Just ayant annoncé au Comité que le Ministre Forgues désiroit présenter au Comité assemblé le Sieur *Morris*, Ministre des Etats Unis, qui étoit chargé de la part du Congrès de traiter avec le Conseil Exécutif, mais de communiquer autant qu'il le pourroit avec le Comité de Salut Public pour des objets du plus grand secret, et de la plus haute importance. Le Comité chargea St. Just et Collet d'Herbois d'amener, le 10 au soir, ces deux personnages à la salle du Conseil des Invalides, où le Comité se réuniroit pour les recevoir. Cela a été fait ainsi. Morris, admis au Comité, dit qu'il étoit autorisé à lui présenter, comme puissance reconnue par ses maîtres, le discours de Washington, prononcé le 6 Decembre; qu'on lui prescrivait en même temps de faire agréer au Comité Secret que cette démarche ne fût pas publique jusqu'à ce que les négociations qu'il devoit entamer avec la Convention eussent une issue favorable. Morris lut alors un assez long mémoire sur la position respective des deux républiques, où il prouva que leur sort



étoit politiquement lié, car, dit-il plusieurs fois dans ce mémoire, nous sommes parfaitement instruits que les guerres avec les sauvages sont fomentés et perpétués par les Anglais, et que notre anéantissement politique seroit une suite nécessaire du succès de la coalition. Il ajouta plusieurs autres raisons dont on n'a pas retenu toute la suite. Morris dit, dans ce même mémoire, que les États Unis étoient décidés à établir une marine respectable, à effectuer un traité de commerce avec la France, à donner des ouvertures (ce furent ses propres termes) pour des traités politiques de la plus haute conséquence entre les deux États ; que, pour y parvenir, il faudroit entraîner Washington au-delà de sa politique, naturellement circonspecte à l'excès ; que dans ce moment les États Unis avoient besoin d'argent pour effectuer les mesures nécessaires à une neutralité armée, et qu'il étoit chargé de demander cette assistance au Comité de Salut Public ; et que, comme cette ressource leur étoit d'une nécessité indispensable, il devoit savoir les intentions du Comité avant d'entamer aucune espèce de négociation ; qu'il ne cachoit pas au Comité, et qu'il offroit de prouver au Ministre Forges et à ceux du Comité qu'on voudroit adjoindre à cette négociation, que l'Angleterre leur avoit offert de conditions très avantageuses pour les décider à entrer dans la coalition ; qu'en ce moment même on devoit voir par le discours de Washington qu'on étoit en négociation avec l'Espagne, négociation qu'il importoit de suivre, pour que si les demandes du Congrès étoient rejetés par le Comité, il leur restât quelques moyens de faire d'autres arrangements.

“ Robespierre observa alors au Comité devant Morris, qu'avant de traiter, il lui demandoit quels étoient les subsides que désiroient les États Unis ? Morris répondit que, s'ils étoient annuels, ce seroient douze millions de livres Tournais par an, pendant la durée de la guerre, ou bien trente millions une fois payés. Robespierre lui déclaroit, très dictatorialement et sans consulter le Comité, que jamais il n'obtiendrait pareils subsides ; que le Comité alloit nommer deux de ses membres et les adjoindre au Ministre pour traiter avec lui, mais que si c'étoit là son ultimatum, il pouvoit se dispenser de conférer. Morris sortit sans répliquer, et d'un air fort mécontent. Le Comité nomma pour conférer avec lui Robespierre et Collot d'Herbois. Robespierre ayant refusé la commission, fût remplacé par Prieur de la Marne.

“ Le 11, le Comité reçut des nouvelles de la Vendée. Des royalistes à Paris en ont aussi reçu, le 10 au soir, de La Roche-Jacquelin du champ de bataille de Beaupreaux. Il annonçait sa réunion avec le Général Charrette, qu'ils avoient donné, les 5 et 6 Février, deux fortes batailles aux conventionnels ; que la dernière action avoit duré plus de huit heures ; que leur confrère La Roche St. André avoit été blessé, M. de Donissant blessé, M. de Douglas Commandant de l'Artillerie blessé ; qu'ils avoient perdu 2300 hommes ; qu'ils en avoient tué aux ennemis plus de 7,000 ; qu'ils s'étoient saisis à la suite de la bataille des magasins d'armes de St. Flourent et de Montrevault, où ils avoient trouvé plus de 110,000 fusils, provenant des désarmemens que les conventionnels avoient fait dans tous les lieux de leur passage depuis Angers jusqu'à Grandville ; que ces armes alloient être distribuées à l'instant, et qu'on en enverroit au moins la moitié à Royerant commandant les royalistes de Morbihan ; qu'il alloit être tenu un grand conseil de guerre pour déterminer les mouvemens à faire pour se rapprocher encore une fois des côtes. La Roche-Jacquelin ajoute dans la même lettre qu'ils ont constaté par procès-verbal, signé des principaux d'entre eux, que depuis le premier Septembre jusqu'à l'évacuation du Fort St. Michel, ils ont rempli toutes les conditions imposées par les Anglais, et que l'Angleterre, faute d'accomplir ses

promesses, a été cause, lorsqu'ils tenoient le Mont St. Michel, qu'ils ont éprouvée une perte de 18,000 hommes de leurs meilleurs troupes ; que d'ailleurs, il dit en toute confiance, les vues qu'ont démontré les Anglais ne les rassurent point ; que les Anglois ne veulent pas rétablir la Monarchie, et que eux ne veulent pas abandonner les principes des royalistes ; qu'il en arrivera ce qu'il plaira à Dieu, mais qu'ils prévoient les plus grands malheurs si les Anglois effectuent une descente et veulent chercher à corrompre l'esprit de leur armée ; qu'ils n'y réussiront pas, et ne feront qu'amener leur perte, et la totale destruction de leur armée.

“Le Comité de Salut Public a dénaturé les nouvelles qu'il a reçues, mais il les a bien reçues dans toute leur vérité. On a beaucoup enflé les succès du Général Frigeville qui, d'après le rapport fait au Comité, ne paroissent avoir aucune conséquence.

“Le 13 soir, le Comité de Salut Public envoya un de ses secrétaires en courrier au Général du Gommier, Commandant en Rousillon, pour lui enjoindre que, sans aucun retardement, il aille à attaquer les Espagnols sur tous les points, et à les chasser du territoire de la République. On le prévient que Robertspierre le Jeune est réparti pour Nice portant le plan de campagne d'Italie adopté par le Comité ; que l'exécution lui en doit être confiée, s'il met dans son expédition en Espagne toute la célérité imaginable.”

*Postscript by Mr. Drake.*—“Some of the proper names in the above relation may possibly be ill-spelt, as they are not very legibly written in the original.”

### *Enclosure Number 2.*

#### BULLETIN 12.

1794, le 12 Février, Paris.—“Depuis à peu-près un mois, on ne cessait de demander quelques détails, quelques nouvelles sur la situation des prisonniers de la famille royale qui sont au Temple. On répond enfin, dans une lettre du 8, que l'on n'a pu donner des détails de ce qui se passait au Temple, parceque depuis longtemps, avant sa retraite, le nommé Simon qui d'abord avoit été utile, avoit été si effrayé par le danger qu'il couroit, qu'il se prêtoit à tout ce que vouloient les scélérats, ne rendoit plus compte de rien, et ne travailloit qu'à sortir de cette place. Depuis qu'il en est sorti, on a eu le moyen d'avoir deux conférences avec lui, et le 6 et 7, on est venu à bout de faire monter la garde au Temple par deux gardes nationales qui sont entièrement dévoués à la bonne cause, qui nous ont donné des détails sur la position actuelle. Il —\* de ce que Simon a dit qu'il est impossible de traiter avec plus de dureté qu'on traite Mademoiselle Elizabeth et Madame Royale.

“On leur a refusé constamment, pendant plus de deux mois, des femmes pour les servir. Pendant le courant de Janvier, Madame Elizabeth présenta une espèce de requête à la Municipalité de Paris pour lui demander une femme qu'elle fut pour la servir ainsi que sa nièce. La réponse que lui fut faite, signée par Pache et Hébert, fut que la requête ne pouvoit être admise, que si elles avoient besoin de quelque service, elles pouvoient s'adresser au geôlier.

“Depuis la mort de la Reine, elles sont très mal nourries. On leur a refusé du vêtemens de deuil. Souvent on les laisse manquer de linge. Hébert, à qui Simon lui-même faisoit des représentations à cet égard, répondit qu'il en agissoit ainsi pour forcer ces deux à présenter

\* Unintelligible.

des requêtes à la Municipalité. Le Roi, à ce que dit Simon, étoit un peu mieux tenu et soigné, grâces à lui, à ce que il dit. Il convient, cependant, qu'on lui a donné l'usage de boire des liqueurs fortes, et qu'il n'a aucune espèce d'éducation ; que Hébert et les soldats dont on l'entoure, ne lui apprennent que des ordures et des impiétés. Il prétend avoir voulu plusieurs fois lui donner des leçons contraires, et avoir couru par l'indiscrétion de cet enfant les plus grands dangers. Ceux qui me donnent cette nouvelle, m'ajoutent qu'ils ne croient pas un seul mot de ce fait là. Simon ne doute pas, quant à lui, que le Roi ne soit infecté du mal vénérien, quoique depuis la mort de la Reine on ne lui ait plus présenté de prostituées ; mais il croit que ce qu'on fit à cette époque pour le faire déposer contre sa mère, et prouver par l'état de sa santé la vérité des dépositions, a suffi pour le corrompre et le gangrener. Il prétend donc très décidément qu'il a du mal, et qu'on ne fait rien pour l'en guérir. On ne lui donne pour l'amuser que les livres les plus infâmes, et, enfin, depuis la mort du Roi, il n'est rien qu'on ne fasse pour le corrompre. Il prétend que, de temps en temps, il sent sa position, pleure et se désespère ; alors les Commissaires l'étourdissent avec de l'eau de vie, et en le faisant jouer au billard. Il prétend aussi que plusieurs fois Hébert l'a menacé de le faire guillotiner, et que cette menace l'effraye si horriblement qu'il a vu souvent cet enfant s'évanouir à cette menace. Les deux gardes nationaux ont appris à peu près des détails semblables, mais ils ont ajouté que l'un d'eux ayant été de garde au vestibule de la prison de Madame Elizabeth et de Mademoiselle Royale, il avoit vu que les commissaires forçaient ces princesses à laisser toujours leur porte ouverte, que tous ceux qui vouloient les voir entroient dans leur appartement jusqu'à 4 heures du soir, que les commissaires les fermoient sous clef, qu'ils avoient vu et entendu qu'on tenoit à ces princesses les propos les plus exécrables, et que lorsque leur porte étoit close, on chantoit des chansons infâmes sans égard pour leur sommeil, et que nommément, eux ayant témoigné improuver ces cruautés, le nommé Carpentier, commissaire du jour, les avoit inscrit pour qu'on ne les envoyât plus monter la garde au Temple. Tels sont les détails effroyables qu'on a de ce qui se passe dans ces prisons."

### *Enclosure Number 3.*

#### BULLETIN 13.

1794, Février 16, 18, 20, 22, 25 et 29, Paris.—"Une chose fort remarquable a été observée dès le 14, et étoit en pleine activité jusqu'au 27, époque de cette lettre. C'est que l'on permettoient aux orateurs populaires qui harangoient le peuple dans les cafés du Palais Royal, où se rassemblent ordinairement ceux que l'on soupçonne être royalistes et modérés, de discuter dans leurs discours les vues, la conduite, des puissances coalisées envers les royalistes, et qu'unanimentement on cherchoit à leur prouver que les vues des puissances coalisées étoient absolument opposées aux prétentions et espérances des royalistes ; que chacune de ces puissances agissoit pour son propre compte, vouloit la destruction totale de la France, l'anéantissement de la maison de Bourbon ; et, avant tout, exposoit la conduite des puissances coalisées envers les provinces ou villes qu'elles avoient engagé à se révolter, assurant qu'elles ne les avoient acceptées à contribution que pour les voler et les dépouiller, et ensuite les abandonner pour que la Convention achevât leur ruine totale. Ces discours sans cesse répétés, ne laissent pas que d'opérer à peu près le but que se propose la Convention, qui est de jeter la tiède dans le parti de la Révolution, et de décourager les

**Royalistes.** Ce qui prouve que cette mesure est une invention nouvelle du Comité du Salut Public c'est que, le 16 soir, à l'assemblée de ce Comité, le Ministre Forgues, après avoir lu un mémoire sur l'état de l'Europe, sur la politique des cours, mémoiré dit-on assez incohérent, le terminoit par ces propres paroles : ' Je conclus de tout ceci une chose ' qui paroît démontrée par les faits, c'est que l'Angleterre, la Prusse, et ' la Russie sont parfaitement d'accord sur la mode, le but, et la fin des ' opérations de la guerre. Elles veulent écraser la France, la mettre hors ' d'état de former aucun poids dans la balance d'Europe, y établir un ' Roi à la manière Poniatowski, de rognier enfin de tous côtés les moyens de ' l'Autriche, la laisser sans alliés, car l'ultimatum de cette guerre est ' l'humiliation de la maison d'Autriche après l'anéantissement de la ' maison de Bourbon.' La comparaison de ce discours, prononcé dans la séance du Comité des Neuf, avec ceux que prononcent les orateurs démagogues dans les lieux publics, mérite la plus sérieuse attention.

" Le 18, il arriva trois courriers au Comité des Neuf, envoyés par les commissaires de la convention d'Angers, et par les généraux Queanoui et Turreau employés contre la Vendée. Ils demandoient à la Convention qu'il fut ordonné au commissaire la Planché, commandant en Normandie, d'envoyer toutes les troupes dont il pouvoit se passer dans la Vendée; qu'il s'y élevoit des nouvelles armées de royalistes, également dangereuses par leur fureur et leur nombre; qu'ils venoient d'éprouver un échec auprès de Chemillat; que les troupes de la République avoient perdu à peu près 5,000 hommes et huit pièces de canon; que, d'autre part, sous les ordres d'un chef royaliste appelé Lesquir [Lescours?], les royalistes s'étoient emparés de nouveau de la presque totalité de Noirmoutier; que, le 12 Février, Charette étoit à trois lieues de Nantes; que la désertion parmi les soldats de la première réquisition devenoit tous les jours plus allarmante; que les royalistes ne vouloient accorder aucun quartier aux prisonniers; que notamment un avant poste de 2,000 hommes, républicains, ayant été cerné par 7,000 royalistes auprès de Nantes, ceux-ci avoient jetté leur armes et demandé quartier; que le General Charette les avoit fait couper en pièces, que les femmes de ces royalistes s'étoient réunies aux soldats pour déchirer ces prisonniers avec une fureur que inspiroit de l'effroi à toutes ces troupes.

" En même temps que le Comité recevoit ces nouvelles, les royalistes ont reçu une lettre de Charette du 16 soir, qui leur apprend le motif de la furieuse insurrection, et de la rage des royalistes de la Vendée, que les généraux n'ont pas voulu découvrir au Comité du Salut Public.

" Les trois commissaires de la Convention à Angers firent proclamer par le General Turreau un placard, qui accordeoit de la part de la Convention une amnistie pleine et entière à tous les Vendéens qui, avant le 7 de Février, seroient rentrés dans leurs foyers. Ce moyen occasionna quelque désertion dans les armées de Charette et de la Roche-Jaquelin; mais, du 11 au 12, les Municipalités dans lesquelles s'étoient réfugiés plusieurs de ces malheureux qui vouloient profiter de l'amnistie, les firent arrêter. Dans la seule journée du 12, on en a fait fusiller près de 2,000. Aussitôt tout ce qui étoit en état de porter les armes les a prises, et de là est née l'augmentation de l'armée royaliste et son excessive fureur.

" Le Général Charette ajoute qu'il attend avec la plus grande impatience le retour de l'adjutant qu'il a envoyé à Londres; il assure qu'il se trouve en état d'exécuter toute espèce de plan. Il dit de ne pouvoir concevoir par quelle raison l'Angleterre s'obstine à lui refuser M. le Comte d'Artois; et il demande qu'on lui dise positivement, ainsi qu'à ses camarades, quelles sont donc les vues de l'Angleterre, et si M. le Comte d'Artois n'a aucun moyen d'arriver malgré eux en Vendée.

“Pendant que le Comité de Salut Public recevoit ces nouvelles, il reçut un nouveau courrier du commissaire La Planchette en Normandie, qui demandoit qu'on lui envoyât de l'argent, parcequ'il falloit, avant de forcer de nouvelles troupes à se rendre en Vendée, gagner une multitude de chefs accrédités, parmi elles qui les engageoit à refuser de marcher; refus qu'il venoit d'éprouver de la part des deux premiers régiments qu'il avoit commandés pour cette expédition. On a envoyé un commissaire avec 1,200,000 francs à Caen; il est parti le 20. Le 21, l'assemblée du Comité de Salut Public a été très remarquable. Elle a eu lieu à l'Hôtel de la Guerre, Rue Grange Battelière; elle étoit spécialement convoquée pour entendre le rapport du Ministre de l'Intérieur réuni au Ministre de la Guerre sur l'état de Paris et des armées. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur portant la parole dit, ‘que jamais l'état de Paris n'avoit été plus allarmant sous quelque rapport que l'on vouloit la considérer; que deux dangers menaçoient éminemment la Convention, la disette de tous les genres de subsistance, et la division que se manifestoit parmi toutes les sociétés populaires de la Capitale, à laquelle participoient généralement tous les départements; que la société des Jacobins, quoique divisée elle-même dans son sein, avoit cependant un excellent esprit républicain, étoit dévouée au Comité de Salut Public et principalement influencée par Robespierre et Danton; mais que la municipalité s'empara du Club des Cordeliers; que ce club, ne préchoit autre chose que le pillage et l'anarchie, le partage des propriétés et du trésor public; que Hébert y prenoit le plus effrayant ascendant; qu'il avoit osé y dire publiquement que Robespierre avoit demandé la paix à toutes les puissances, et que, si aujourd'hui il parla un langage contraire, c'est qu'il n'avoit pu l'obtenir. Il accuse le Comité de Salut Public d'avoir dépensé 170 millions pour opérer des révolutions en Angleterre ou y obtenir la paix; qu'il n'avoit obtenu aucun de ces deux effets, et qu'il falloit qu'il rendît compte de l'emploi de cet argent. À ce danger déjà imminent, il ajouta qu'il venoit d'en succéder un autre plus menaçant encore, qu'il venoit de se former un troisième club qui s'étoit emparé de la salle électorale de l'Archevêché; que son unique but étoit de s'emparer de toute l'autorité et de détruire la Convention; que tout ce qu'il y avoit de scélérat dans Paris s'y étoit agrégé; que ce club étoit tacitement convenu de ne délibérer qu'armé, pour mettre aussitôt en execution ses délibérations; que la disette des vivres favorisoit toutes ces dissensions; que le grenier qui étoit à Meaux ayant été dilapidé, il déclaroit qu'il n'y avoit aucun moyen d'approvisionner la Capitale.’

“Bouchot, Ministre de la Guerre, prit alors la parole. ‘Il déclara que les armées du Nord ayant manqué du pain pendant trois jours, il avoit fait enlever le grenier de réserve qui étoit à Meaux, parceque le danger étoit pressant, soit par la révolte des armées, soit par la révolte des communes que pilloient les armées. Qu'il déclaroit que les armées étoient dénuées de tout, et le mécontentement y étoit général. Il accusa Dubois du Crancé d'avoir produit un partie de ces malheurs.’

Dubois du Crancé se mit à bavarder ‘sur l'union des troupes de la République et sur la désunion des troupes des Coalisés.’

Bouchot lui répondit avec beaucoup de vivacité; ‘Que toutes les sottises qu'il venoit de dire, ne détruisoient pas une seule de ses raisons; qu'elles prouvoient seulement que le seul obstacle au succès des Rois étoit *labor est cogere victores vincere.*’ À ce propos Dubois du Crancé, furieux, leva la main pour donner un soufflet à Bouchot, et

le Comité se sépara sans rien décider. Le 27, le Comité n'avoit encore rien décidé sur aucun de ces objets, mais jamais les chefs des partis n'ont été dans une pareille anxiété. Le Comité de Sûreté Publique s'assemble tous les jours, mais les clubs populaires restent aussi perpétuellement assemblés. Il se prépare infailliblement une grande crise. La Municipalité que veut la rendre atroce, parle déjà publiquement, ainsi que le tribunal révolutionnaire, de faire égorger tous les 7,300 prisonniers qui sont détenus dans les différentes prisons de Paris, et, pour rendre la guerre interminable, de faire massacrer par le peuple les prisonniers de guerre.

“Le 26, le Comité de Salut Public reçut deux courriers de Brest, qui lui annonçoient qu'il se manifestoit une insurrection très dangereuse à Brest; qu'on y avoit égorgé plusieurs officiers municipaux et commandants de la marine; que les insurgés paroissent payés et poussés par le parti Anglois; qu'ils ne parloient d'autre chose que d'incendier les vaisseaux et les arsenaux; que, d'heure en heure, le danger s'accroissoit, et qu'il demandoit les secours de la Convention. On fit partir sur le champ un membre du Comité même, Jean Bon St. André, pour se rendre à Nantes, avec toute l'autorité du Comité de Salut Public.

“Le 26, dans la nuit, on reçut encore une lettre du président du club de Commercy en Lorraine, qui déclara que, le 25, il s'y étoit manifestée une insurrection dangereuse; que le président du club militaire avoit dit dans ce club ‘Nous n'aspirons qu'après le moment de fonder à la ‘rémolade tous ces brigands qui sont restés dans nos foyers pour tourmenter nos parens, nos amis; nous saurons, dans peu les mettre à la ‘raison; tels sont les sentimens de ma troupe, qu'elle m'ordonne de ‘vous signifier.’

“Dans la même nuit, d'autres courriers apprirent les agitations multipliées et menaçantes qui se manifestoit depuis Lyons jusqu'à Moulins. Le Comité, excessivement allarmé de sa position, prit d'abord la mesure qui pouvoit empêcher qu'à Paris on ne fût instruit de ce qui se passoit dans les Départemens. Il ordonna que toutes les nuits à commencer du 27, à l'entrée de la nuit et jusqu'au jour, 400 hommes parcouroient toutes les avenues de la Capitale, arrêtant et faisant fusiller tous les déserteurs, et tous les courriers qui ne porteroient pas le cachet symbolique du Comité, avec la signature du président et du secrétaire. Pendant cette détresse on guillotine jusqu'à 20 personnes par jour. La lâcheté des bourgeois de Paris et gens qu'autre fois on appelloit honnêtes, est poussée à un excès inconcevable. Danton a osé dire au Club des Cordeliers devant plus de 3,000 personnes; ‘Que tous ‘les Propriétaires de Paris, que tout ce qui n'étoit pas sans-culottes ‘n'ayant qu'un assignât de 6 livres dans la poche, étoit si lâche que ‘si les clubs ordonnoient à tous ces gens-là de se tenir tel jour à leur ‘postes tous nus pour y être fusillés, ils n'y manqueroient pas d'y ‘obéir.’

“Le Comité du Salut Public voyant la détresse qu'il se trouve, a envoyé ce même jour à midi un de ses membres, appelé Billaut de Varennes, au Général Pichégrou pour lui ordonner impérativement d'avoir à engager une action d'éclat avec l'armée de Cobourg. On a rappelé en même temps le Général La Poppe pour avoir refusé de tenter les passages pour se porter sur Ventimille; et on a prévenu par un autre courrier le Général Dugommier que, s'il n'avoit promptement quelque affaire brillante et décisive, il seroit rappelé.”

*Endorsed* : “In private letter from Mr. Drake.”

## LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, March 15, Berlin.—“As the only benefit which can arise from the Prussian co-operation depends on its being insured in time, I hope you will not think I have done amiss in consenting to remove the negotiation to the Hague. The King of Prussia places an implicit confidence in Count Haugwiz; he trusts him with the whole conduct of this business, and he will be vested with the most unlimited full powers. The idea originating here is a favourable symptom; it proves the King of Prussia's eagerness that the arrangement should take place, and Count Haugwiz himself is certainly a well-wisher to it. Under all these circumstances, and with the support of the abilities of the Great Pensionary, I would willingly hope that whatever can be done will be done.

“I am not satisfied with the *projet de convention* in its present form, but I could not gain any ground on this point. The King has been at Potsdam since Wednesday, and I am so anxious that my letter of to-day should reach you at least as soon as those you may receive on the measures of this Court from Flanders, that I cannot think of delaying my servant.

“We have fixed on Tuesday next the 18th as the day of our departure. It is to be a profound secret even to the other Prussian Cabinet Ministers. We are [to] go on that day to Potsdam under pretence of being sent for by the King, and to leave it on Wednesday. We shall be about ten days on the road, and reach the Hague about the 28th instant, which I reckon will be the soonest possible day your answer to these letters can get there.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD AUCKLAND.

1794, March 16.—“Will you have the goodness to mention to M. Jarry that it is wished he should go to Brussels to be there under Lord Elgin's direction, in order to be at hand to be consulted on the different occurrences which may arise. This request originates from a desire to this effect expressed by Colonel Mack. I should wish to see him before he goes.”

*Copy.*

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Memorandum.

1794, March 19.—“To recommend to the Court of Spain to undertake constantly to watch with a superior fleet the French force at Toulon, and to take measures for blocking as effectually as possible all the French ports in the Mediterranean, in which His Majesty's naval force in the Mediterranean will be directed to co-operate, whenever it is not necessarily employed in other services.

“To suggest to them the great utility of their having squadrons constantly cruising in the latitude of Cape Finisterre, to intercept the trade and supplies of the enemy in that direction, while similar measures will be taken by our cruising squadrons off Cape Clear.

“Also the advantage which would arise from their maintaining a secure communication between Corunna and Bilbao, which, it is imagined they could easily perform, and without which we are under the necessity of having convoys between those ports, which is attended with material inconvenience.

"That while they are performing these services, His Majesty will dispose his naval force, so as to take the most effectual measures for cutting off all supplies through the ports of the Channel, and for watching with his main fleet any movements from Brest."

"To inform the Court of Lisbon that any squadron which they may be desirous of employing in conjunction with His Majesty will be received here with the utmost cordiality, and may be employed to serve either with our principal Channel fleet, or with some of our cruising squadrons."

[GENERAL] MACK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, March 21, Valenciennes.—"J'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire dans un moment où j'étois encore dans une affliction et désolation bien profonde à cause de la retraite prochaine des Prussiens. Vous m'avez rendu un peu de vie. J'avois bien besoin de cette consolation, et j'espère que vous n'aurez jamais sujet de vous repentir de me l'avoir donnée. Permettez que Lord Elgin soit l'organe de mes idées, de mes sentimens, de mes douleurs, et de mes espérances. Je l'ai instruit en tout, et muni même de plusieurs papiers qui n'auroient peut-être jamais dû sortir de mes mains. Mais je sais à qui je les communique, et je sais aussi que vos intérêts ne peuvent être que ceux de mon Souverain. Vous daignerez lui permettre aussi qu'il soit l'interprète de mes sentimens d'admiration et d'attachement envers vous et vos dignes et respectables collègues, et quel prix inestimable je mets sur l'honneur de votre confiance. Daignez me la conserver, et daignez être persuadé que je tâcherai de la mériter."

*French.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, March 23, Queen's House.—"I think it right to acquaint Lord Grenville that I have read the voluminous despatches from Berlin with much attention, and, upon the whole, think the project now brought forward bears a greater semblance of success than any from that quarter for a considerable time."

"It has ever been a wish of mine that the two great German powers, though agreeing in the plan of attack on France, should in the execution act separately; by that means much jealousy will be prevented, and any success gained by the one serve only to encourage the other to act vigorously to obtain equal military praise."

"If, on the whole, the measure can be brought to bear, as the Prussians will act nearer Holland, the Dutch can less object to contributing to enabling these troops to be put in motion."

"It seems to me advisable that the 20,000 men left on the Rhine should also be brought to act with the other Prussians; thus three armies will be brought into the field. 1. That under the command of the Prince of Cobourg. 2. That under the King of Prussia. 3. That under the Duke of Saxe Teichen; the two former to act on the offensive; the latter to defend Germany, and, if opportunity allows, to advance into Alsatia. This view is certainly promising."

"I should think much jealousy would be avoided if Lord Grenville acquainted the Court at Vienna that, the former project having failed, this has been adopted with a view of carrying on the war and keeping the King of Prussia engaged in the common cause. As the King of Prussia is to be brought forward at the expense of Great Britain and Holland, I should think he ought to engage to make no acquisitions for his own advantage but for the powers who pay him."



## LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, March 23, Potsdam.—“I feel that I go to the Hague with a rope about my neck; but I have acted to the best of my own judgment, and I trust not against the end of my instructions, since if no advantage arises from my having consented to remove the negotiation there, I trust no possible harm will result from it, as the final determination must (by my being so much nearer you) be hastened on; and this, let it be what it will, cannot be known too soon.”

## LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1793 [1794], March 30, Palace Yard.—“Mr. Craufurd’s notion of the expediency of a declaration on the part of the combined powers of their intention to restore the French monarchy, with a reform of abuses, is suggested by M. de Mercy, and is open to evident and decisive objections. I have sometimes thought that advantage might result from a declaration on the part of the King, shortly and specifically, of his determination to leave to France the uncontrolled arrangement of her own interior, on the sole condition of a just indemnity to Great Britain and to her allies, and a renunciation on the part of France of any system and professions adverse to the tranquillity and safety of other Governments. Perhaps that point might be touched with advantage in the speech at the prorogation.”

## LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, April 5, Hague.—“Count Haugwiz has opened himself to me, with the appearance of the fullest confidence, on the interior situation of the Court of Berlin and of his own situation in particular.

“I have not time to relate to you how he first became acquainted with the King of Prussia and how he first got into office. I shall reserve this for more leisure moments; it is enough for the present to say that, according to his own accounts, he enjoys exclusively the whole of the King of Prussia’s confidence, and is to every intent and purpose his Prime Minister; and this should seem true from the very unlimited full powers he has, from the very kind letters His Prussian Majesty writes him, and from all the business of the Foreign Department being sent to him here, and nothing of importance done without his previous assent.

“His professions of political faith are as right as possible, particularly in his abhorrence of the conduct and principles of the French. He tells me (what I suspected before) that Count Schulemberg (now at Frankfort) is his great antagonist, and that he is labouring there to counteract everything we are doing here; that he is assisted by General Kalkreuth whom he represents (and with great truth) to be an unprincipled interested character, and a rank Jacobin. These two have acquired an ascendancy over the easy-tempered Marshal Möllendorff, and, contrary to his own judgment, persuade him that the Prussian army under his command cannot be displaced, but must remain on the Rhine.

“Count Haugwiz has written fully on this subject to Colonel Manstein, and in a way to defeat the efforts of this dirty intrigue. It was for this reason that I strongly opposed the going to Frankfort, and I besides wish to keep His Prussian Majesty (I may say it in a private letter) out of the way of Mademoiselle Bethman, who might create as

many and as dangerous delays as the slowest deliberations of this country. Liege also was objectionable from its being a nest of thieves and assassins, and from the part the Court of Berlin acted there four years ago, which was of a nature not likely to leave very favourable impressions behind it."

THE EARL OF YARMOUTH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, April 6, Charles Street.—"I have received a letter from a considerable military authority in Germany, which contains a train of reasoning to which you may perhaps think it important to advert while your arrangements are making between the two great powers of Germany. The letter is occasioned by the movement of a part of General Möllendorf's army towards Cologne, which naturally has led my correspondent to the conclusion that the Prussians are to act upon the Meuse, as they can enter into France only by that river or the Moselle, and it is notorious that they have renounced the Saar and the Rhine. The system of a cordon depends for its effect upon the co-operation of the different corps which compose it. If any part advances or holds back beyond what is agreed upon, a *trouée* is made by the enemy, and the *mauvaise foi* of an ally becomes in such a situation more extensively mischievous than in any other. It would be very desirable that, as the jealousy of the Prussians and Austrians is risen to a greater height than ever, their operations should be quite distinct; but that is impossible, and, though the mischief cannot be prevented, it may be mitigated or increased according to circumstances. Your Lordship regretted to me last year, when I set out for Mayence, that the King of Prussia by being on General Wurmser's right flank might effectually cripple all his exertions, and the event justified your apprehensions.

"For two months after the siege of Mayence, the King held a curb in Wurmser's mouth, till he at last broke loose in a manner which (as he himself told me) nothing but the necessity of his situation could in any degree palliate. Without this breach of all military rule, no attempt would have been made upon Alsace. If in the last campaign one Austrian army was thus prevented from attaining its purpose, may not the efforts of *two* be defeated, if the king now occupies a position between them? May he not (in other words) expose either the left flank of the Prince de Cobourg's army, or the right of General Beaulieu's whenever he thinks fit? If either army appears to advance too rapidly for his views, he may by withholding his support, compel them to retreat, for which military pretences will never be wanting. It never occurred to me that the King of Prussia would quit the confederacy, because he cannot so effectually betray it as by an ostensible co-operation; but nothing can so much favour his left-handed politics as such a central situation, which (if my friend's reasoning is just) will make him the arbiter of the whole campaign. This suggestion strikes me so forcibly, that I cannot help laying it before you, especially as the Court of Vienna is not yet apprized of what is going on, or at least has not had time to consider its political effects."

FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, April 7, Florence.—"I have the honour to enclose an extract (No. 2) of intelligence from Paris, together [with] a copy of a paper respecting the state of the King of Sardinia's army, drawn up, as I

have been assured, by a person thoroughly well-informed upon the subject.

"Your lordship will be pleased to observe in the extract the names of a Peer of Great Britain and a Member of the House of Commons. I must again beg leave to repeat that I cannot be responsible for the truth of insinuations of so infamous a nature, and I would wish to believe them to be unfounded; at the same time I think it my indispensable duty to lay before your Lordship every circumstance which may come to my knowledge, which may relate to the King's service or to the welfare of His Majesty's dominions."

*Enclosure Number 2.*

BULLETIN 14.

Février 28, Mars 2, 7, et 9, Paris.—"Le 27 au soir, le Ministre Forgues envoya une note au Comité de Salut Public signée par Morris, Envoyé de l'Amérique Septentrionale, par laquelle ce Ministre faisoit part au pouvoir Exécutif, pour le mettre sous les yeux du Comité de Salut Public, que les États Unis renoueloient leur demande la plus formelle d'un emprunt ou d'un subside; qu'en ce moment les États Unis armoient des forces considérables sur terre et sur mer pour repousser toute insulte; que les États Unis interpellés par les Cours de Londres et de Madrid sur les motifs de ces préparatifs, avoient répondu à ces deux Cours, et notamment à celle de Madrid, que c'est qu'ils vouloient se mettre en état de ne se soumettre à aucune demande qui pût déplaire à quelques unes des puissances belligérantes. Mais qu'il avoit reçu l'ordre de ses commettants d'assurer le Comité de Salut Public que le but principal de ces préparatifs, dont l'objet apparent étoit de tenir les sauvages en échec, en se tenant eux-mêmes dans la défensive la plus respectable, étoit de ne pas craindre les Anglois en cas même d'une attaque de leur part. Qu'ils étoient assurés, que cette nation avoit juré la ruine de l'Amérique Septentrionale; que par un aveuglement inconcevable, la plupart des Puissances de l'Europe y prêtoient les mains; qu'une démarche éclatante d'un secours considérable les mettroit à même de se déclarer à l'instant, et de se réunir à la République Française; que le moment pour se décider étoit précieux, car il avoit l'ordre le plus précis de ne pas cacher au Comité de Salut Public qu'en ce même moment ils étoient aussi en négociation avec les principales Puissances de l'Europe. Après de fort longues discussions, le Comité de Salut Public fit répondre à Morris par le Ministre Forgues, que le 10 Mars les pouvoirs du Comité de Salut Public expiroient; que dans l'état actuel des choses, il falloit avant tous que le Comité, en triomphant de ses ennemis, eût fait renouveler ses pouvoirs; qu'il promettoit au Ministre Forgues qu'à l'instant où il auroit obtenu le succès, il étoit résolu d'entrer en négociation amicable avec lui, et d'accéder sans délai à tout ce qu'il pourroit demander de raisonnable et de faisable pour l'objet proposé.

"Le 4 Mars, le Comité resta assemblé tout le jour pour délibérer sur l'état de sa position. Le début de sa séance fut la lecture d'un nouveau rapport fait par le Ministre de la Guerre et le Comité des Médecins qui lui étoit adjoint. Ils déclarèrent que dans toutes les armées, notamment dans celle des Pyrénées et celle du Var, les maladies contagieuses qui y regnoient, et qui dans toutes les armées avoient les mêmes symptômes, provenoient spécialement de l'usage des eaux de vie envoyées par le Comité de Salut Public dans ces armées; que ces

eaux de vie, préparées dans les brasseries de Santerre, étoient amalgamées avec les drogues les plus nuisibles, et notamment avec la cantharide; que le goût de ces eaux de vie étoit même altéré, et que leur effet assuré devoit être les inflammations ardentes, et contagieuses gangreneuses qui constituoient la maladie épidémique des armées. Le Ministre demanda la cessation de l'envoi de ces eaux de vie, ce que le Comité refusa à l'unanimité. Le médecin Colombier, qui étoit arrivé le 28 de l'armée des Pyrénées Orientales; déclara que les armées étoient dans un dénûment affreux de vivres et de munitions de toute espèce. Le Ministre ajouta à ce rapport que, sans les soins du Ministre Tilly à Gènes, et la prépondérance de son parti dans cette république, les armées de Nice et du Var auroient été obligées de se replier, faute de subsistance, au-delà de la Durance. Il étoit à peu-près 8 heures du soir le même jour, quand tous les ministres réunis se rendirent au Comité. Paré, Ministre de l'Intérieur, portant la parole pour tous, déclara au Comité; 'Que l'état où étoit la ville de Paris devenant chaque jour plus allarmant, et le moment de l'extrême danger s'approchant, ils avoient crû devoir, réuni en corps, rendre compte au Comité et recevoir ses derniers ordres. Que le Club des Cordeliers auquel la Municipalité étoit toute dévouée, et qui avoit un très grand parti dans le Club des Jacobins influencé par Hébert, étoit résolu à exterminer tout le parti de Robespierre, tous les ministres à l'exception de Bouchotte, à faire égorger tous les prisonniers du Temple, et à livrer à la fureur du peuple tous les détenus comme suspects. Que le moment où l'on renouveleroit les pouvoirs du Comité de Salut Public sembloit être fixé pour l'instant de l'insurrection. Que le plan étoit de forcer la Convention à accuser Robespierre et tout son parti, en même temps que l'on feroit égorger dans tous les prisons ceux qui y étoient détenus. Que ce parti prenoit une consistance affreuse puisque, par la terreur qu'il avoit inspirée à la Convention même, La Poype et Fréran, dévoués au Comité de Salut Public, avoient été mandés à la barre par la Convention.' Le Comité, excessivement allarmé, interroga le Ministre Forgues pour savoir si le parti des Cordeliers avoit quelques intelligences avec les Puissances Coalisées. Le Ministre répondit 'qu'il ne le croyoit pas.' Sur ce mot St. Just se leva furieux, et traita le Ministre de scélérat et de fripon; disant 'qu'après avoir dépensé plus de 180 millions dans son département, il falloit qu'il fût encore un traître s'il étoit réduit à dire, *qu'il ne croyoit pas*, tandis qu'il devoit être sûr de tous les agens, vu les dépenses qu'il faisoit pour cela.'

"Barrère prit le parti du Ministre. Celui-ci se défendit avec beaucoup de présence, d'esprit, et de talent. Il prétendit 'qu'il y avoit une exagération énorme dans les prétendues dépenses de son département; qu'il s'engageoit sur sa tête à prouver au Comité du Salut Public la vérité de ce que Barrère avoit dit de sa part à la Convention; qu'il répétoit nommément qu'en Angleterre, Ecosse, et Irlande, il y avoit une si grande foule d'espions et de co-opérateurs qu'il craindroit d'être accusé de dilapidation dans ce genre, s'il n'étoit assuré de prouver l'utilité de chacun de ceux qu'il y employoit. Que les dépenses étoient excessives dans ces parties; que le banquier Haller pouvoit rendre témoignage, que dès l'ouverture du Parlement, il avoit fallu, pour faire honneur aux engagements approuvés par le Comité de Salut Public, faire passer à Londres à la disposition de my Lord Lauderdale et de Charles Grey la somme 1,100,000 livres.' Il ajouta que 'dans toutes les Cours de l'Europe, sans en excepter, dit-il, l'insignifiante Pologne, la Convention avoit des espions du pays. Qu'à force d'employer par tout des étrangers, d'acheter les secrets des naturels du pays et des agens des différens Ministres, les frais étoient incalculables. Que le citoyen

Tilly, pour la partie de l'Italie, en simples dons ou en paiements, avoit dépensé près de 7 millions depuis la prise de Toulon ; qu'il est vrai que le soin de toute la Lombardie et de la presque totalité de l'Italie lui étoit confié. Que son principal agent Retria, négociant de Cadix, outre les services qu'il rendoit en Italie, alloit être chargé d'avoir la principale direction de tout ce qu'il étoit possible de faire en Espagne. Que la Suisse contait un argent si énorme, qu'il y en eût qu'il ne concevoit pas comment on pourroit acheter si cher une si ruineuse nullité... Qu'il avoit exigé pour continuer dépareillées négociations les ordres les plus précis du Comité du Salut Public, que les ayant reçus il avoit dû s'y soumettre mais qu'il n'en étoit plus responsable. Qu'il prouveroit quand on le voudroit que les différentes distributions faites à leurs partisans en Suisse, se montoient à plus de 7 millions depuis moins de 6 mois, et que dans le seul canton de Zurich et le Pays de Vaud on avoit dépensé plus de 2 millions à pûre perte. Que c'étoient des dépenses de ce genre qui fermoient les dépenses de son département, et qu'il étoit prêt à en rendre compte quand on le voudroit. Que le plus grand crime dont Hébert et son parti se fussent rendus coupables avoit été, sans contredit, d'empêcher l'effet des négociations entamées avec la Cour de Londres avant l'ouverture du Parlement ; mais que, comme toute espérance de succès étoit perdue de ce côté-là, il croyoit que, pour mettre la division parmi tous les Coalisés, il faudroit publier tout ce qui a été dit et fait à ce sujet. Qu'il avoit dans son bureau des pièces assez importantes, et en assez grande quantité, pour opérer par leur seule publication la désunion dans toutes les parties de la Coalition. Qu'il demandoit donc nommément, qu'on mît 600 ouvriers de Paris à sa réquisition, qu'on les y tint pendant 3 mois renfermés dans une maison qu'ils ne puissent sortir ni jour ni nuit, ni parler à qui que ce soit de dehors qu'en présence de deux Commissaires.

« Cette disposition a été adoptée le 7 Mars au matin. Il y a été ajouté simplement qu'il y auroit 800 ouvriers au lieu de 600, et que, additionnellement à l'objet principal, il seroit imprimé dans toutes les langues des ouvrages qui pourroient inspirer aux peuples des différens royaumes l'horreur de la tyrannie et le mépris de leurs souverains. Le Comité décida en outre que, pour captiver les paysans des environs de Paris, et dans les départemens voisins, le Comité enverroit des Commissaires chargés de questionner le peuple sur les pertes qu'avoient faites les individus dans leurs héritages. Que chaque Commissaire feroit bien ostensiblement des procès-verbaux, et promettrait de la part du Comité, des indemnités considérables à chacun de ceux qui auroient soufferts pendant ce tems-là. Nous avons la certitude que Roberspierre a la plus grande frayeur de ce qui se prépare.

« La disette de viande est telle à Paris que, pour en obtenir 2 livres de 12 onces, il faut le certificat d'un médecin ; que ce médecin aye un certificat de civisme, et que la Municipalité délibérant surtout accorde une permission. Le 4 Mars matin, l'état des marchés de Paris, remis au Comité, constatoit qu'une poule se vendoit 4 livres 10 sous, un poulet 8 à 10 livres, une poularde 16 à 17 livres, un chapon 20 à 24 livres, un litron de haricots ou des lentilles 40 sous ; et à 11 heures du matin, il fut impossible d'en trouver à aucun prix. Point de mortue, ni de poisson d'eau douce d'aucune espèce.

« Le 6 au soir, le Commissaire Fauchet expédia deux courriers de Moulins pour annoncer que dans cette partie et le Limosin, il se formoit des rassemblemens menaçants sous les ordres du Général Frécy ci-devant Commandant à Lyons, que le 7 Mars ce rassemblement se portoit à 14,000 hommes ; qu'il n'avoit aucun moyen d'y résister

efficacement, et que ce qui rendoit cet événement excessivement désastreux, c'est que le Général Précý, sachant que la ville de Paris ne tiroit plus ses provisions de bœufs et de moutons que du Bourbonnois et Limosin, il avoit déclaré qu'il feroit pendre tout fermier qui enverroit des provisions quelconques à Paris, et que, déjà, 4 fermiers, excellents patriotes, avoient été pendus; qu'il soupçonnoit qu'il étoit même assuré que le projet du Général Précý, s'il ne pouvoit soulever ces provinces, étoit de les traverser, et de se porter sur la Vendée. Il a été décidé qu'on ne rendroit pas compte de ce fait à la Convention. À St. Malo, les troupes de ligne et les gardes nationales se sont battus; 700 hommes ont été tués de part ou d'autre. En Bretagne, à Quentin et ailleurs, le peuple est dans la plus grande fermentation; il demande des prêtres Catholiques et ne veut plus d'assignâts.

"Le 7, le Comité de Salut Public resta assemblé tout le jour pour amadouer le peuple d'éviter les dangers qui le menacent. Il rendit un décret pour ordonner que tous les détenus comme suspects n'auroient de traitement que 40 sous par tête par jour, qui seroient payés aux dépens des riches; que tous les bijoux, or, argent, argenterie, diamans des prisonniers seroient portés au Trésor National; que, le 8, tous les immeubles des prisonniers auprès de Paris seroient distribués aux paysans sans-culottes de chaque commune; que l'on commenceroit dès le 8, la distribution des champs et jardins appartenant à la famille d'Ormesson dans la commune d'Orly. Malgré cette précaution, le Comité a donné une terrible preuve de faiblesse en n'osant pas dénoncer le club des Cordeliers, qui hautement conspire sa ruine, et qui assure qu'il y aura un aussi grand coup que 21 Mai. On ne doute pas que la municipalité et les Cordeliers ne triomphent de leurs ennemis, et on est sûr que Pichégru et Hoche sont du parti des Cordeliers; et si ce parti triomphe, ce qui est encore plus sûr c'est que le reste de la famille Royale sera massacré, aussi que tous les prisonniers.

"Le 7 au soir, le Comité de Salut Public chargea expressément Roberspierre de dénoncer à la Convention Hébert, Chaumette, la Municipalité, et le club de Cordeliers, comme étant en traité d'accord avec les puissances coalisées pour égorger la Convention, et livrer la France aux tyrans. Nos amis dans Paris étoient bien convaincus le 8, que ni Roberspierre, ni aucun de ses collègues n'oseroit tenter une démarche aussi désespérée et aussi hasardeuse."

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, April 9, Hague.—"I shall not fail to take the earliest opportunity of conversing with the Pensionary upon the contents of the very important paper contained in your private letter of Tuesday. The same idea had struck me some time ago, but I was deterred from mentioning it to your Lordship, by the consideration which you state, and which still seems to me to over-balance Mr. Boyd's reasonings, though they are certainly highly deserving of attention. It is certainly true, as he states, that in consequence of the present appearance of danger, much larger quantities of goods than usual have been shipped for Hamburg, Bremen, and other places, but these cargoes consisted chiefly of tobacco, sugar, &c. which were originally intended for the northern market.

"I am under the necessity of entreating your Lordship to send me some decisive instruction respecting Audibert Caille and his

companion Fonsenbert, that is to say, empowering me either to demand that they should be delivered up to me in order to be sent prisoners to England, or to consent to their being released. They are making daily applications to the Courts of Justice here, as well as to the States of Holland, for their *habeas corpus*, which I had the greatest difficulty in over-ruling, as they are certainly entitled to it by law.

"I have been so repeatedly solicited by Count Bernsdorff through the channel of the Danish Minister here, M. Schubart, to represent to your Lordship his sincere and anxious desire to conciliate the present differences between the two Courts, that though I am aware that it is a business in which I have no kind of right to intermeddle, yet I cannot help just saying that, from the whole tenor of his despatches to M. Schubart, which I constantly see, I am confident that he is really desirous to prevent matters from coming to extremities. In his last letter he says, *qu'un seul mot sérieusement amical de la part de l'Angleterre, suffirait pour nous tranquilliser, et pour mettre fin à nos préparatifs*. The only answer that I have returned to him has been a recommendation to send a special minister to England to negotiate this affair, which I trust your Lordship would not disapprove, as it is evident that the present *intermédiaires*, on both sides, are but ill qualified to become the channels of an amicable explanation."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, April 10.—"I see with pleasure from Lord Grenville's note that, upon the whole, the *projet* of a treaty with the King of Prussia is so near the idea that had been transmitted to Lord Malmesbury that, with the observations now to be made by Lord Grenville, the business may be brought to an happy conclusion. I also approve of Lord Malmesbury being directed immediately after having signed the treaty to proceed to Brussels, to endeavour to arrange with the Emperor the new distribution of the different forces, and every other point relative to this affair."

#### FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, April 12, Leghorn.—"I have the honour to enclose the Bulletin which I received by the last post, to which I beg leave to subjoin the following article of a letter from Paris of the 26th of March. *Hébert, Chaumette, et la plupart des Chefs du Club des Cordeliers ont été arrêtés et vont être guillotinés. Le parti dominant de Robespierre les accuse d'intelligence avec Monsieur Pitt. On prouvera cela sans doute lorsqu'ils auront été guillotinés. On a attiré la haine sur eux à un tel point que si on ne les guillotine pas demain (27) il est à croire que la populace forcera la prison et les mettra en pièces. Tous ces événements n'ont pas fait arriver le grain à Paris, où il est défendu sous peine de la vie de séparer le son de la farine. Robespierre triomphe momentanément, mais c'est une royauté qu'il paye à un terrible prix; il n'ose ni aller à l'Assemblée ni à s'en absenter; ni avoir des gardes, ni marcher sans gardes. Lui et l'Abbé Siéyès ne couchent pas deux nuits de suite dans le même endroit.*"

*Two enclosures.*

#### Enclosure Number 1.

#### BULLETIN 15.

Mars 11, 13, et 15, Paris.—"Le 9 au soir, Robespierre et l'Abbé Siéyès se retirèrent à Choisy avec une partie des chefs de leurs partisans,

pour y prendre les derniers moyens d'éviter le danger qui les menaçoit, et y attendre l'issue des négociations de Danton et de Barrère avec la Municipalité, et les chefs du Club des Cordeliers. Le 10 matin, Hébert, Pache, Chaumette, se rendirent à Choisy. Le parti de la Convention leur accorda pour obtenir la paix, de faire payer d'une part 2,200,000 livres à la Municipalité sous le prétexte des frais extraordinaires d'approvisionnement, et de prêter 100,000 écus à Hébert, et 800,000 francs au Club des Cordeliers. La paix, ou plutôt la trêve, a été conclue à ce prix. Toutes les manœuvres subséquentes pour faire renouveler le Comité ont été résolues entre l'Abbé Siéyès et Pache. Il a été en effet renouvelé le 10, et décrété le 11, sans que l'on y ait fait l'addition même de nouveaux membres pour remplacer deux membres absents, qui sont Billard de Varennes à l'armée du Nord, et Jean Bon St. André à l'armée de Brast.

"La réconciliation entre ces deux partis n'a pas été de longue durée. Toutes les conditions en ont été fidèlement remplies par Robespierre; mais Hébert, dès le 13, sans attaquer nommément Robespierre, se déclara avec fureur contre Barrère, et Chabot, et ce qu'il appeloit la faction; et attaqua nommément le rapport de St. Just contre la séance qui avoit eu lieu aux Cordeliers, et la prétendu complot qu'il avoit dénoncé.

"Ce même discours, malgré le succès qu'il avoit eu à la Convention, avoit été critiqué très fortement par Prieur de la Marne au Comité de Salut Public, comme contenant une foule de faits hasardés, et ne présentant aucun fait réellement essentiel. St. Just en convint lui-même le 10, et en rejeta toute la faute sur le Ministre Forgues, qui fournissoit de très mauvais renseignemens au Comité. Le 12, à 10 heures du soir, le Comité de Salut Public, renouvelé dans ses pouvoirs, se réunit aux Invalides, et tous les Ministres y furent mandés.

"Le Ministre Forgues porta la parole pour tous. Il débuta par lire un mémoire dans lequel il déclara que la dénonciation de St. Just, et de Prieur de la Marne étoit excessivement injuste, en ce que St. Just avoit refusé de faire usage des renseignemens qu'il lui avoit donnés, parceque son discours à la Convention étant fait avant les avoir reçus, il auroit été obligé d'y faire des changemens, ce qu'il n'a pas voulu. Il dit qu'il renouveloit au Comité sa demande de pouvoir mettre sous ses yeux toute la suite de son travail, que Robespierre la connoissoit dans toutes ses parties, mais que cela ne suffisoit pas à sa justification, puisqu'il étoit perpétuellement accusé dans le Comité; qu'il déclaroit formellement qu'avec la quantité d'agens, et d'espions de tous les pays, employés par le Comité de Sécurité Publique, et dont la dépense étoit renvoyée à son département, avec la multitude d'intelligences qu'il étoit obligé d'entretenir de tous les côtés, et l'énormité des prix que chaque agent de la République se permettoit de donner pour se procurer ou se conserver ses intelligences, il estimoit que la dépense pour son département pour cette année iroit à 180 millions; qu'elle montoit à cette somme depuis que les manœuvres pour les bleds étoient réunies à son département. Il déclara qu'il avoit trouvé un moyen de soulager la République de cette quantité énorme de numéraire qu'exigeoit principalement le département des Affaires Etrangères; qu'il existoit dans le trésor public, et dans le trésor qui étoit immédiatement sous la garde du Comité de Salut Public une très grande quantité de richesses en pierreries de tous les genres; qu'il étoit impossible de songer à s'en défaire avec avantage, parceque cette quantité de diamans mise dans le commerce en feroit baisser le prix, mais qu'il y avoit des moyens d'employer ces diamans en donatives, au lieu d'argent, dans les négociations de son département; qu'il demandoit donc, sous sa responsabilité, que lorsque le Comité l'auroit autorisé à faire telle ou telle dépense, il peut prendre des diamans appartenants à



la Nation, suivant l'estime qu'en seroit fait à concurrence des sommes qui lui auroient été accordées.

“ Le Comité délibéra sur le champ, et rendit le décret que désiroit Forgue. Il lut ensuite des lettres qu'il avoit reçues la veille, de Hochet, Paris, et Fitterman, Commissaires de la Convention, pour l'échange des prisonniers de Mayence résidants à Frankfort. Ces lettres étoient du 2 Mars. Dans l'extrait qu'il a été possible de retenir à la simple lecture, on a noté que ces Commissaires continuent à se louer de l'accueil que, par les ordres du Roi de Prusse, on continua à leur faire à Frankfort. Ils disent qu'ils se sont assurés que c'étoit d'après les ordres exprès du Roi, contre l'avis de M. de Möllendorff, qu'ils avoient été aussi ostensiblement accueillis; que la partie ostensible de leur mission n'éprouvoit aucune difficulté, et qu'ils avoient déjà convenu d'une quantité de dépenses, se montant à 580,000 livres, lesquelles sommes étoient payées au fur et à mesure aux officiers du Roi de Prusse; qu'ils avoient éprouvé de l'accueil aux ouvertures qu'ils avoient fait, pour détacher le Roi de Prusse de la coalition; mais qu'ils étoient tous trois unanimement d'avis que le Roi de Prusse ne se servoit d'eux que comme moyen pour arriver à ses fins, et que c'étoit précisément pour cette raison que l'on mettoit beaucoup d'ostentation dans la manière dont on les traitoit en public, et une affectation presque ridicule dans la publicité que l'on donnoit à des conférences que l'on disoit devoir être secrètes; que dans ses conférences les agents du Roi de Prusse disoient toujours, quand on les pressoit, n'avoir aucun pouvoir de recevoir aucune proposition que pour en instruire les Ministres du Roi de Prusse; qu'ils étoient donc convaincus que le Roi de Prusse, qui vouloit se faire acheter par les Coalisés et qui en éprouvoit des refus, se servoit d'eux, et des pratiques qu'il avoit avec eux, pour effrayer la Coalition; que cette idée leur avoit été confirmée par le amis qu'ils s'étoient acquis auprès des généraux, qu'en ce moment le Roi étoit extrêmement mécontent de la coalition, qu'il parloit sérieusement de rappeler son armée, mais que certainement cette mesure n'auroit lieu qu'en désespoir d'obtenir les subsides qu'il demandoit. Ils prévenoient qu'ils employoient avec la plus grande utilité le temps qu'ils passaient à Frankfort pour y établir d'excellentes intelligences; qu'ils avoient vérifié en maintes occasions que l'esprit public des officiers Prussiens étoit entièrement opposé à la guerre qu'on leur faisoit faire, mais que l'esprit public en Allemagne s'exaspéroit contre la République au point qu'ils ne pouvoient pas douter qu'on n'obtint une levée en masse redoutable; qu'enfin, au point où en étoient les choses, ils croyoient très utile de se prêter aux vues feintes ou réelles du Roi de Prusse, et de rester à Frankfort autant qu'ils le pourroient. Ils ajoutoient qu'ils étoient convaincus que Danton avoit des intelligences personnelles parmi les Ministres du Roi de Prusse; qu'au reste, ils promettoient de le découvrir bientôt avec certitude. Le Ministre lut ensuite une note qu'il venoit de recevoir de M. Morris, Ministre des États Unis, dans laquelle il apprenoit au Comité, qu'il continueroit à traiter avec plein pouvoir de conclure tous les objets mentionnés dans sa note du 27 Février, mais qu'il prévenoit le Comité, que les États Unis venoient de nommer Jefferson leur Ministre en France, que M. Madrisson [Madison] auroit en Amérique la place de M. Jefferson, que tous les deux abhorroient les principes de la Coalition, et étoient connus par le plus pur républicanisme. Le Comité nomma Collot d'Herbois, et Prieur de la Marne pour entamer sur le champ avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et M. Morris des conférences.

“ Le 13, le Ministre de la Marine écrivit au Comité qu'il lui proposoit de faire tout ce que dépendoit de lui pour procurer la liberté au nommé Margarot et ses collègues qu'on alloit déporter à Botani Bay, et de

décreter, s'il parvenoit à arriver en France, que la Nation donneroit, en pur don à Margarot, toutes les possessions qu'avoit en France le Duc de Richemont sous le titre de Duché d'Aubigny.

"Le 14, le Comité étant assemblé, il n'y fut question que de l'état actuel de Paris et de la Vendée. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur dénonça encore que, malgré tous les moyens qu'il n'avoit cessé d'employer d'accord avec la municipalité et l'armée révolutionnaire, la misère étoit à un point très allarmant; que pour satisfaire le peuple qui, poussé par le Club des Cordeliers, vouloit absolument piller le Palais Royal, et exciter par le moyen une grande insurrection, on avoit été obligé de faire entourer le dit Palais sous prétexte que des aristocrates y étoient renfermés, et avoit fait des amas de provisions chez des restaurateurs; qu'en effet, malgré tous les soins des malveillants, cette scène bien ménagée avoit suffi pour distraire le peuple; mais qu'au fait, excepté en viandes salées, on n'avoit trouvé aucun amas de provisions; que le 13, le peuple exigeoit à la Halle que la Convention décréta la défense à tout individu d'avoir chez lui, en quelque genre que ce fut, des provisions au-delà de deux jours de consommation; qu'il croyoit qu'il faudroit rendre le décret. Que la nourriture des prisonniers, à quelque point qu'on les eut restreints, étoit encore un objet énorme, parceque, bien qu'on ne porte sur les états publiés le 12 Mars à la Municipalité que 6022 détenus, il déclaroit au Comité que, le 13 au soir, il y en avoit dans Paris 16,300 en prison, et qu'il falloit songer aux moyens de se débarrasser de ces gens-là. Le Comité s'occupa ensuite tout le jour des nouvelles de la Vendée; des rassemblements s'y forment de toute part. Le Comité envoya sur le champ un courrier pour ordonner à ses généraux de faire sortir de Nantes et de Saumur tous les patriotes de la Vendée qui s'y sont réfugiés, et d'ordonner à tous ceux qui ne sont pas des plus populaires, d'avoir à s'éloigner à 20 lieues du théâtre de la guerre. Le Général Turreau apprenoit à la Convention que les troupes de la République venoient d'essuyer une défaite près de Nantes; qu'il s'occupoit à rassembler des renforts de toute part, et qu'il avoit envoyé du Quesnoi sur les lieux recueillir des détails, qu'il n'en savoit encore aucun de précis, si ce n'est la certitude d'une défaite considérable."

*French. Copy.*

#### *Enclosure Number 2.*

#### LETTRE DE SAUMUR, ÉCRITE PAR UN DEMOCRATE.

1794, Février 24, Saumur.—"Aucune affaire n'a été si désastreuse que celle qui a eu lieu le 23; jamais, cependant, nos dispositions n'avoient été mieux faites pour terminer tout d'un coup cette guerre infernale, et sanglante. Nous avions à enfermer trois colonnes des rebelles cernées déjà depuis quelques jours entre Vihiers, Beaupreau, et Clisson; il sembloit qu'il n'y eût pour eux aucune espérance de salut. Notre armée, augmentée des gardes nationaux de toutes les communes environnantes, et de tous les jeunes gens de la première réquisition, pouvoit s'étendre sur un espace de 20 lieues, et présenter un front redoutable. Nous avions à exterminer 15 ou 18,000 hommes au plus, mais les lenteurs qui nous ont été constamment contraires, viennent de l'être d'une façon bien plus funeste cette fois. Cordelier, qui s'étoit retiré de la Jumelière après l'affaire de Beaupreau, devoit attaquer, dans la matinée du 23, la colonne de la Roche-Jaquelin, tandis que Turreau, partant de Doué, attaqueroit Charrette à Vihiers, et que Dutrin partiroit de Mortagne pour couper la communication entre Beaupreau et Clisson.

“ Nos mesures ainsi prises, nous avons placés des gardes nationaux le long des pays qui bordent la Loire depuis Brissac jusqu'à Morveaux, et les réquisitions gardoient nos derrières, et s'étendoient depuis Montreuil jusqu'à Chollet. Il ne restoit donc aux brigands aucune retraite. Ils étoient ensevelis, et leur position devoit leur servir de tombeau si tous les Républicains eussent été braves, s'ils eussent été tous animés du véritable amour de la patrie, ou plutôt, si nos généraux n'eussent pas donnés le temps aux rebelles de les attaquer. C'est justement ce qu'ils ont fait, et cette faute, peut-être irréparable, aujourd'hui a coûté la vie à deux généraux, et à un nombre infini de braves Républicains. Les brigands se voyant cernés, n'ont pas attendu qu'on les attaque. Eux-mêmes ont attaqué nos colonnes au petit jour, dans la nuit du 22 au 23, mais avec tant d'impétuosité et de fureur, qu'on ne se trouva pas en mesure pour soutenir le premier choc, et que le désordre se mit bientôt dans les rangs. Les cris des généraux, de tous les officiers, les noms chers de la patrie, de la République, ne purent rallier nos soldats glacés par la terreur, et ils furent poursuivis jusqu'à Doué, et St. Florent (près Saumur), où on en fit un carnage horrible. Cette journée coute à la République plus de 6,000 républicains. Il me seroit impossible d'en déterminer le nombre, mais quand je le porte à 6000 je ne crois pas exagérer, puisque les routes de Vihiers à Doué, et de Beaupreau à St. Florent étoient jonchées de leurs cadavres, et couvertes d'hommes et de femmes, armés de faux et de poignards, qui ne faisoient grâce à personne.

“ Nous avons été forcés d'abandonner toute notre artillerie, et de la laisser au pouvoir des monstres qu'elle étoit destinée à détruire. Je crois qu'il est plus que temps de renoncer à détruire les brigands. Ils sont indestructibles, rien ne peut dompter leur courage. Les femmes de ces contrées sont pires encore. Elles excitent leurs époux, leur enfants, à soutenir cette guerre sanglante; on les voit, armées de pistolets et de poignards, parcourir les rangs et souffler partout la rage qu'elles ont dans le coeur. D'autres, armées d'un crucifix, font l'arrière garde, montrant cette image à ceux qui retournent en arrière, et les rengageant au combat par l'exemple des souffrances du Dieu pour lequel ils combattent. On a vu de ces harpies se précipiter sur nos canons, poignarder nos canonniers, et affronter des décharges à cartouches. On les a vu se répandre dans les campagnes, et profiter de la déroute des républicains pour les égorger, et en faire un massacre épouvantable. Les victoires successives des rebelles ont encouragés les départements à la révolte; il est à craindre que la Bretagne entière ne se déclare pour eux. Le lendemain de notre défaite, ils ont fait répandre une proclamation par laquelle ils invitent tous les habitants des départements voisins à se joindre à eux pour défendre l'autel et le trône.

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

Private and Secret.

1794, April 14, Downing Street.—“ In order not to delay the signature of the treaty, which we are anxious to have soon, in order to its being laid before Parliament, I have, as I mention in my despatch, reserved for a future letter the whole discussion of the subject respecting the concert between Austria and Prussia, which can evidently now be no otherwise settled but by our intervention. I shall write to you fully on this subject by to-morrow's mail if possible. Our general idea is that, immediately after the signature of the treaty, you should proceed to Brussels, where you will find much confusion and difference of

opinion. From thence it seems desirable that you should come over here in order to communicate fully what you shall have found there; and then it would be much our wish that you should return with Lord Cornwallis or such other officer as may be fixed upon to serve with the Prussian Army, and, after passing through the Duke of York's headquarters, proceed with such officer to Maestricht to settle with the King of Prussia the final destination of his troops, and the combined plan of the Austrian, Prussian, British, and Dutch operations.

"As all this ought to be done before the end of May, you will see there is not much time to be lost. When this has been done it is very much our wish that you should remain with the King of Prussia in order to keep him steady to the plan which may be settled. I trust that you will not decline this service, which is so important to the object of our having the real use and benefit of what we have now purchased."

*Copy.*

LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, April 18, Hague.—"I hope to-morrow evening between five and six that the treaty and other instruments which were brought to me on Wednesday last by Schaw will be signed, and that I shall be able to dispatch him a few hours after. The alterations I have ventured to make are so very trifling that I flatter myself you will not disapprove them. The only puzzling point was to satisfy this country about the mode of raising the money, and the Pensionary was so uneasy and anxious that this should be done in an explicit manner, that I have consented to write a note to him and the Greffier with rather more positive assurances than perhaps I was authorized to give. The treaties please here, and I never saw so little grumbling on a measure which affects their purses.

"I shall have the pleasure of writing to you more fully to-morrow, but I cannot end this letter without acknowledging yours of the 14th, and without assuring you that I am ready to go anywhere or to do anything that (without obliging me to a permanent foreign life) may be considered as useful."

FRANCIS DRAKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, April 18, Leghorn.—"In answer to some questions I proposed relatively to the memorial of Monsieur Dumas, I have just received the enclosed No. 4, the which together with No. 5 I have now the honor to transmit to your Lordship."

*Enclosure 1.*

BULLETIN No. 16.

1794, Mars 23, Paris.—"Il n'est pas aussi facile que vous le croyez d'avoir les renseignements dont vous nous donnez une parfaite nomenclature par votre lettre du 2 Mars. Nous en sentons comme vous toute l'importance. Mais nous sentons mieux que vous, comme de raison, l'extrême difficulté de se les procurer. Pour vous en faire concevoir l'embarras, nous vous dirons d'abord que vous vous trompez en croyant qu'il suffiroit d'avoir des agens chez Bouchotte pour être au fait des plans que l'on adopte, et de ceux que l'on propose. La plupart du

temps, cet animal de Bouchotte ne savait pas plus ce que l'on doit faire que vous même. Souvent Bernard lui apporte de la part du Comité de Salut Public toute une opération militaire décidée, les ordres tous prêts auxquels on fait apposer sa signature sans les lui laisser lire. D'après cela vous concevez que ce n'est pas près d'un Ministre de cette étoffe qu'il faut envoyer des agens pour découvrir d'avance les opérations militaires.

"Vous savez que par l'établissement décrété au Comité des Neuf, le 11 Janvier, ce qui a été établi pour la conduite des armées. Le Comité des Neuf n'entendant rien absolument à la guerre, et se trouvant très souvent forcé par l'influence des clubs d'employer des généraux totalement ineptes, ou tout au moins très inexpérimentés, on a bientôt senti le danger de cette position, et on s'est, en conséquence, adressé à Darson et Lafitte, qui sont les principaux agens des Comités, et ceux en qui l'on a toute confiance ; ces Messieurs ont formé le plan qui a été adopté au mois de Janvier.

"Toutes les opérations militaires, tous les plans de campagne quelconques, sont censés, décrétés, et ordonnés comme mesures révolutionnaires par le Comité de Salut Public, et le paine de la vie est prononcée contre tous généraux que y refuseoient obéissance. Le Comité de Salut Public ne fait jamais autre chose que de revêtir de son nom, en forme de décret, les délibérations du Comité de la guerre.

"C'est toujours Darson qui va lui en porter les rapports. Tous les plans de campagne sont envoyés à ce Comité ; tous les rapports des espions dans les Cours étrangères et dans les armées ennemies leur sont encore renvoyés ; toutes les dépenses nécessaires pour les espionnages militaires leur sont allouées sans difficulté. Ce Comité est composé de quinze personnes ; Darson, Lafitte, le Chef d'artillerie Bosting, l'Officier de génie Larivière, le géographe ingénieur militaire Latour, en sont membres ; c'est donc là que s'est discuté le plan de Dumas, ainsi que tous les autres plans militaires.

"Pour l'exécution, le Comité envoie à chaque armée, à ses commissaires, le plan d'opérations qui lui est ordonné ; chaque général a un conseil militaire qu'il ne préside qu'en l'absence du commissaire de la Convention. Ce conseil est choisi entièrement par le Comité Militaire de Paris, et il n'a à délibérer que sur le mode d'exécution. Pour peu que le général s'en écarte, il est puni de mort ou destitué ; ce qui est alternativement arrivé à Jourdan, et à son prédécesseur.

"L'esprit militaire de ce Comité est de diriger toutes les opérations militaires d'une manière perpétuellement offensive, et la raison en est bien aisée à concevoir, parceque ce n'est que par le moyen d'attaques offensives que le Comité Militaire peut exercer sa suprématie. Ce qui pourroit arriver de plus heureux pour nous est en effet arrivé. La division s'est établie dans ce Comité depuis quinze jours, et c'est à l'y fomenter que nous employons tous nos moyens.

"Le rapport du Dumas y a été goûté et accepté, mais l'exécution en paroît difficile puisqu'il s'agiroit, suivant ce plan, de faire une trouée sur Namur jusqu'à Luxembourg, d'en faire une autre sur la ligne de Courtrai à Nieuport, de rendre même active l'armée du Rhin, et de lui faire une trouée par les vallées de Neckar.

"Mais, le 21 de le mois, Darson a été au Comité de Salut Public pour y présenter un plan à l'effet de faire agir l'armée des Ardennes pour faire une invasion dans le Namurais pour intercepter la communication entre l'armée de Pays-Bas et celle du Rhin.

"Il ajouta en outre que les rapports de tous les espions de l'armée de Cobourg se réunissoient pour assurer que le plan adopté par cette armée étoit, à quelque prix que ce fut, d'éviter le passage de la Somme,

très difficile et toujours dangereux pour une armée; que l'unique but dans cette campagne étant de s'approcher de Paris, et de s'en emparer, on assuroit que les intentions de Cobourg étoient de s'emparer d'abord de Maubeuge et de Landrécy; que dans cette position, soutenu par l'armée Angloise, par les Hollandois, et la partie de son armée qu'il comptoit laisser sous les ordres de Hohenloe, il comptoit former une armée d'observation, et alors avec son armée marcher de Landrécy sur la ligne de Compiègne.

“Que dans cette position deux mesures également hardies étoient les seules raisonnables. Le première de tracer un plan au Général Pichegru qu'il puisse forcer les passages sur l'un des points de la ligne immense qu'aura à défendre l'armée d'observation depuis Namur jusqu' à Nieuport; et qu'alors, entrant dans la Flandre Autrichienne, il y commettra toutes les dévastations imaginables pour forcer au moins l'armée d'observation aux ordres de Hohenloe à cesser de suivre celle de Cobourg, et à se replier sur la Flandre attaquée. Qu'alors l'armée du Général Ferrand, accrue de toutes les réquisitions de l'intérieur, et des détachements des meilleures troupes de l'armée du Rhin, marcherait à grandes journées sur le direction de Compiègne, prendroit la position avantageuse que le Comité lui feroit désigner au pont St. Maxence, et que là il attendroit les ordres du Comité pour livrer une bataille décisive.

“Ce plan, dont il a laissé les documens au Comité, n'a eu, comme à l'ordinaire, ni approbateurs ni improbateurs; on se bornera s'il y persiste à en ordonner l'exécution, à moins comme nous l'espérons, que le Général Rosting ne demande à le contredire, ce qui mettrait le Comité dans un plaisant embarras.

“J'oubliois que Darson avança au Comité qu'il étoit parfaitement instruit par ses espions à l'armée de Cobourg qu'il regnoit la plus grande division parmi les généraux de cette armée, que l'Archiduc Charles avoit vainement essayé d'y rétablir l'accord, qu'on pouvoit espérer beaucoup de cette division parmi les puissances ennemies. Voilà ce qui s'est passé de plus nouveau pour ce Comité.

“Nous ajoutons pour vous donner une parfaite connoissance de ce Comité que, quoiqu'il adopte tels ou tels plans que lui sont présentés, on ne peut avoir un résultat fixe de ses déterminations que par les ordres qu'il est obligé de rendre très souvent au Comité de Salut Public.

“Pour parvenir à des résultats plus prompts, il seroit important que vous nous prévenissiez que vous désirez avoir des renseignemens sur tels objets expressément déterminés, parceque alors, il nous seroit très possible de faire demander dans le Comité de Salut Public qu'on y rende compte de tels objets, ce que ne se peut sans donner lieu à suspicion quand on parle des choses en général sans en avoir bien déterminé l'objet.

“L'ordre est donné et redonné d'entrer en Italie, ou, du moins, de le tenter; et le refus est obstiné de la part des généraux d'y obéir. Voilà tout ce que nous pouvons vous dire à cet égard.

*Copy.*

*Enclosure 2.*

BULLETIN No. 17.

Mars 15-21, Paris.—“On a découvert avec certitude qu'il y avoit eu une nouvelle assemblée à Choisy le 12 Mars, à laquelle s'étoient trouvés Robespierre, l'Abbé Siéyès, Couthon, Barrère, St. Just, Billaud de Varennes, et le Maire Pache, qui est celui qui a découvert les projets

d'Hébert après avoir été de son parti, ou feint d'en être. Le 13, à trois heures du matin, tous ceux qui avoient été à Choisy le 12, arrivèrent à Paris. On rassembla tout de suite le Comité de Salut Public, et on y rendit compte de tous les plans qui avoient été arrêté à Choisy. Il est constant que Robespierre épouvanté vouloit, ainsi que Couthon, abandonner la partie et se sauver dans l'Amérique Septentrionale. L'Abbé Siéyès seul s'est opposé à ce projet, et tout ce qui a été fait pour écraser la faction d'Hébert est son ouvrage. Lui seul parla pendant plus de deux heures au Comité du 13 Mars matin. Le précis de tout son discours fut de prouver au Comité que les Anglois par leurs intelligences à Paris avoient donné naissance à cette nouvelle faction ; que le Comité devoit se rappeler des négociations qui avoient eu lieu avec différens agens de cette puissance, tant à Paris directement qu'à Londres par leurs intermédiaires : que le Comité devoit se rappeler que la réponse catégorique de Mr. Pitt avoit continuellement été que le principal obstacle à la paix, et la reconnaissance d'un gouvernement quelconque en France, seroit toujours l'existence des factions et leur foiblesse respective ; que s'il y avoit une autorité quelconque en France qui présentât des bases stables, et un pouvoir assuré, l'Angleterre traiteroit aussitôt avec ce pouvoir dès qu'elle y trouveroit toutes ses sûretés ; que le Comité de Salut Public avoit désiré, vers la fin de l'année passée, à présenter lui-même à l'Angleterre ce pouvoir stable et fixe, et à traiter sur des bases républicains ; qu'ayant bientôt aperçu que ce n'étoit pas là ce que désiroit Mr. Pitt, toutes les négociations avoient été suspendues. Que lors des premières négociations, les principaux chefs du Club des Cordeliers et de la Municipalité avoient été participaux du secret des négociations ; que c'étoit en se ressaisissant de ces mêmes idées que Hébert et tout son parti avoient formé une nouvelle conjuration ; qu'ils avoient bientôt aperçu que le projet de Mr. Pitt étoit de faire prévaloir en France le système des Mitoyennistes et des Monarchiens, de faire le sacrifice du clergé et des émigrés à condition qu'on feroit le sacrifice des formes républicaines, qu'on établiroit en France un gouvernement monarchique, et qu'on reconnoitroit pour roi Louis XVII., mais que lui donneroit un conseil de régence composé des principaux chefs de la faction d'Hébert ; que le premier acte d'autorité de ce gouvernement devoit être le massacre de tous les Jacobins, et la destruction absolue de la Convention ; qu'alors l'Angleterre traiteroit avec le nouveau gouvernement, reconnoitroit son existence légale, s'en porteroit garante et médiatrice envers les autres souverains en garantissant à le nouveau gouvernement l'abandon absolu du clergé, des émigrés, et des princes françois ; que c'étoit pour parvenir à ce but que, depuis trois mois, Hébert et son parti ne cessoient d'agiter la République ; que l'argent seul leur avoit manqué et que leur entreprise avoit échoué parceque au lieu de s'emparer du trésor national comme l'avoit proposé Hébert dès le premier moment, on en avoit sans cesse retardé l'exécution ; qu'en le moment où la vigueur du Comité avoit terrassé cette terrible faction, le but des délibérations devoit être de trouver des moyens de l'anéantir dans toutes ses branches, d'établir le pouvoir du Comité sur des bases si solides qu'il présentât seul à l'Angleterre un pouvoir avec lequel elle put traiter si on vouloit reprendre les négociations, ce qui ne pouvoit s'examiner qu'après les événements de cette campagne ; mais, qu'en attendant, il falloit sans aucun retard, sans être arrêté par aucune considération, par aucun obstacle, anéantir tout ce qui en France présentoit des possibilités de négociations monarchiques, et servoit à nourrir l'espoir des Mitoyennistes et de leur chef Mr. Pitt. Robespierre parla fort longtems après l'Abbé Siéyès, mais on l'aperçut si effrayé des dangers, que son discours auroit

plutôt allarmé que rassuré si St. Just n'avoit repris la parole et exposé les résolutions prises à Choisy. La première fut de mettre à la disposition du Comité de Salut Public tous les fonds qu'il jugeroit nécessaire d'employer, et que les gardes du trésor national seroient tenus de délivrer sur l'acquit, en comptant de Robespierre, chargé à cet égard des pouvoirs du Comité. 2nd, de faire sur le champ tripler la garde de tous les dépôts d'argent appartenant à la Convention. 3rd, de faire arrêter Hébert, Momoro Président du Club Cordeliers, et tous les chefs de la faction d'Hébert. 4th, de préparer par des rapports successifs le Club des Jacobins et la Convention au parti décisif qu'alloit prendre la Convention pour anéantir ses ennemis. 5th, que le compte général, où l'on instruiroit la Convention de ce qu'on voudroit qu'elle sent au sujet de cette conjuration, seroit fait par St. Just, mais lu et délibéré auparavant dans le Comité de Salut Public ré-uni au Comité de Sûreté Générale et au Tribunal Révolutionnaire ; que lorsque le compte général auroit été rendu, il seroit encore délibéré de nouveau par ces mêmes personnes pour juger, d'après l'effet qu'il aurait produit, de ce qu'il faudroit y ajouter ou en retrancher avant de le livrer à l'impression, et, qu'à cet effet, le jour où il devoit être prononcé, le Comité de Salut Public chargeroit expressément les inspecteurs de la Salle d'empêcher qui que ce soit, pendant qu'on prononceroit le rapport, d'en copier ou d'en extraire aucune partie. Il fut ensuite délibéré et résolu sur la motion de l'Abbé Siéyès et de Robespierre, qu'il falloit absolument se défaire de tous les prisonniers du Temple ; que le Tribunal Révolutionnaire chercheroit à mettre en cause Madame Elizabeth, et à la juger ; qu'une émeute populaire rechercheroit de détruire ce qui restoit au Temple. L'Abbé Siéyès insista principalement pour cette mesure, en assurant le Comité que le but des négociations de Mr. Pitt seroit toujours la reconnaissance de Louis XVII., parceque son enfance laissoit un libre champ ouvert à toutes les spéculations de l'Angleterre ; mais qu'en même temps cette puissance, bien résolue de détruire la maison de Bourbon, ne se prêteroit jamais à reconnoître ou à laisser reconnoître pour un Roi un des princes émigrés de la famille des Bourbons ; qu'ainsi le Comité devoit songer que la mort de Louis XVII. étoit peut-être le salut de la République, parceque cet événement changeroit aussitôt la nature de la guerre.

“ Sur huit membres qui composoient le Comité de Salut Public, six adoptèrent cet avis et deux s'y opposèrent ; mais il fut décidé qu'il auroit lieu. En conséquence, le lendemain 13 Mars, St. Just, pour y préparer la Convention, prononça cette phrase d'après l'ordre du Comité ; ‘ Nous ne connoissons qu'un moyen d'arrêter le mal, c'est d'immoler sans pitié sur la tombe du tyran tout ce qui regrette la tyrannie, tout ce qui serait intéressé à la venger, tout ce qui peut la faire revivre parmi nous.’ ”

“ On a remarqué que cette phrase, qu'il a répété deux fois, étonna beaucoup plus qu'elle ne fut applaudie. Le 14, à quatre heures du matin, Hébert, le Président du Club des Cordeliers Momoro, tous les chefs du club furent arrêtés et conduits à la Conciergerie. Robespierre, Barrère, et Couthon se chargerent d'exciter la Convention contre eux ; Billaud de Varennes fut chargé des Jacobins ; Collot d'Herbois promit de se rendre le même jour aux Cordeliers. On avoit déjà répandu près d'un million pour les membres qui le composent et parmi les sections qui le soutiennent, aussi rien n'égalait la faiblesse dont a été l'assemblée des Cordeliers.

“ Le 14 Mars, tout observateur attentif a du parfaitement se convaincre qu'il n'existe certainement dans tout l'univers un peuple plus susceptible d'être attiré par la peur que la bourgeoisie, et le peuple de Paris. Rien au monde n'a prouvé d'une manière plus évidente que si



jamais une armée de la coalition s'approchoit de Paris, ce n'est pas le désespoir qu'on remarqueroit dans cette ville, mais la peur et uniquement la peur. Le 14 au matin, la Convention étoit aussi effrayée qu'il est possible de l'être, de l'arrestation qui venoit d'avoir lieu, et des effets qu'elle pouvoit produire sur le peuple qui habite le quartier où siègent les Cordeliers. Les Jacobins s'étoient fait entourer par tout leurs partisans dans leur club, et ce n'est que lorsque, enfin, on a sçu que le Club des Cordeliers étoit effrayé, et abandonnoit la partie, que le parti triomphant a repris toute sa férocité. Le 15, le Comité de Salut Public a resté assemblé tout le jour. Quand Hérault de Sechelles y arriva, Robespierre, Président du Comité, lui signifia qu'il eut à se retirer, parceque le Comité délibéroit en ce même moment sur des dénonciations qui le regardoient. Hérault de Sechelles se retira et s'évanouit. On envoya chercher l'accusateur du Tribunal Révolutionnaire, et il fut décidé que Hérault seroit arrêté et guillotiné. Le prétexte en sera d'avoir été visiter des prisonniers malgré la défense de la Convention; mais le motif réel est celui-ci. Le 10 Mars, le Ministre Forgues, aussitôt qu'il eut appris que le Comité avoit été renouvelé le matin, se rendit le soir au dit Comité pour lui demander que, sur le champ, il délibéra sur la partie des dépenses secrètes de son département qui avoit trait avec les négociations entamées, et suivies avec les puissances neutres, et il unit à cette demande celle de la liberté de commerce avec les mêmes puissances neutres, et la demande de cent et tant de millions pour faire face aux négociations entamées avec les neutres. St. Just, qui étoit préparé à cette motion, la combattit par le discours le plus violent contre Forgues et les Ministres de la République. Il calcula ce que chacune de ces puissances avoit couté, et conclut pour rejeter la demande du Ministre, qui, en effet, fut ajournée. Hérault de Sechelles, qui soutenoit la demande du Ministre, furieux du discours de St. Just, se permit de dire à tous ses amis que St. Just avoit proposé au Comité d'abandonner les puissances neutres et de faire la paix à ce prix avec les puissances belligérantes. Cela excita une assez grande fermentation dans les clubs. St. Just, furieux, s'est permis de livrer son discours à l'impression. L'inconvénient de cette vivacité s'est bientôt fait sentir; on en a arrêté par les moyens les plus prompts le débit autant qu'il a été possible, et cela a déterminé à perdre Hérault de Sechelles et son agent Simon. Le même jour, 15, Couthon, par l'ordre exprès du Comité, pour préparer aux événements résolus contre le Temple, dénonça que le tribunal révolutionnaire avoit découvert des envoy de lettres, paquets, et argent, de la part de la faction d'Hébert aux prisonniers du Temple, pour qu'ils puissent s'échapper et assister à l'érection du conseil de Régence. Le même jour on excita des sections de Paris à demander par des addresses la mort des prisonniers du Temple. Le 16, le Comité de Salut Public fit arrêter Bath, agent du Baron de Breteuil à Paris, Gusman Espagnol, le Baron Frey, c'étoient les trois banquiers qui avoient procuré à la faction d'Hébert 1,800,000 francs pour les premiers moments de l'exécution. Le 17, le Club des Cordeliers a nommé des commissaires secrets pour traiter avec Robespierre en abandonnant les chefs. Hérault a été arrêté; on a décrété au Comité de Sûreté Publique ce jour là, de se défaire de Chaumette, procureur de la Commune favorable au parti d'Hébert. Le 19, le Comité resta assemblé toute la nuit. On y a décidé de pousser le peuple au massacre des détenus dans les prisons. On y a décidé que, du 21 au 23, tout ce qui avoit trait à cette faction devoit être exterminé pour que le parti dominant put s'occuper sans interruption des affaires extérieures."

## LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, April 19, Hague.—“I trust that the paying the 100,000*l.* to the King of Prussia as soon as the military concert has decided where and how the army is to be employed, will be consented to. I stand in a manner pledged that it should be done, and, as Count Haugwitz has negotiated very honorably and liberally on this occasion, I should be sorry to have my promise disavowed.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, April 23, Windsor.—“I have just received Lord Grenville’s note accompanying the despatches from Lord Malmesbury with the Prussian treaty. I do not pretend to be critical enough to decide whether every expression is such as would have been wished, but I am perfectly satisfied with the necessity of the measure, and, as such, not inclined that it should be in the least postponed by trying to have them amended. I therefore authorise Lord Grenville to have the ratification prepared.

“I hope no difficulty will arise from the assurances given to the Dutch, and know no one will try to explain it in its true sense better than Lord Grenville.”

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794], April 24, Walmer Castle.—“I received your box this morning, and am sincerely glad the treaties at any rate [are] concluded, though I rather wish the stipulation respecting the sum to be borrowed for the Dutch could have been omitted. As soon as I return I will apply at the Bank about it; in the meantime there can be no objection to enabling Lord Malmesbury to say that we will certainly find some means of making good the engagement. It seems perfectly right to notify through Lord Malmesbury the intention of appointing Lord Cornwallis, and of his being immediately sent to concert operations.

“I mean to be in town on Saturday morning, and shall probably not go farther than Wimbledon between that time and Monday. You will probably hardly return till the latter day, and will defer till I see you any decision about arrangements.”

## FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, April 24, Leghorn.—“I have the honour to enclose a bulletin together with the speech of St. Just in the Committee of Public Safety on the 11th of March last. I shall communicate this last to Sir Gilbert Elliot, and shall take his Excellency’s opinion upon the propriety of printing and publishing it. Its publicity may very essentially serve the common cause inasmuch as it may tend to check the progress of French corruption in the neutral states, by inspiring in those persons who may be in the habit of receiving French money the dread of being detected. If Sir Gilbert Elliot should be of this opinion I shall take care to have it printed at a distance from this place, and in such a manner as to render it impossible to be discovered from what source it comes.

“I shall apprise the Tuscan Government of the Abbé Favier’s new employment under the Committee of Public Safety, in order that his conduct may be narrowly watched.

"I think it necessary to apprise your lordship that the person from whom I receive these bulletins is a most decided royalist, and I believe he is in constant correspondence with *Monsieur*."

1794, May 10, Milan.—*Postscript*.—"As Basilico is still detained here, I have the opportunity of enclosing another bulletin."

*Enclosure Number 1.*

BULLETIN No. 18.

1794, Mars 25–28, Paris.—"Le 24, ont été guillotiné tous les chefs du parti Hébert. Le 22 et le 23, il y avoit eu quelque espèce de négociation avec le Comité de Salut Public pour leur conserver la vie en les confinant dans une prison, mais leur espérance n'a pas été longue. Elle étoit née de la fermentation qu'on avoit remarquée dans le peuple qui disoit assez hautement que cette conjuration étoit une invention de Robespierre. Celui-ci étant inquiet, se prêtait à la proposition d'Hébert de reconnoître la vérité des imputations qui lui étoient faites, si on vouloit ensuite lui accorder un sursis, et ensuite le faire évader ; mais dans la journée du 23, Robespierre a fait répandre parmi le peuple huit cent mille livres en assignats, qui ont produit tout l'effet qu'on en désiroit ; des lors, il n'a plus été question de proposition d'Hébert. Il est toujours constant et indubitable qu'il n'y a eu de réel dans cette prétendue conjuration que le désir d'écraser Robespierre et les Jacobins, dans l'espoir de pouvoir ensuite traiter avec l'Angleterre. Robespierre lui-même à présent ne peut établir son autorité que pour cet unique objet, mais il aura bientôt un rival redoutable dans le Comité de Salut Public. Ce sera St. Just, qui paroît véritablement avoir beaucoup plus de talents que Robespierre, qui en ce moment lui est entièrement uni pour le charger de tout l'odieux des vengeances du Comité.

"On doit se bien persuader que Robespierre n'est pas un homme de courage, ni même un homme d'un grand talent. Le mérite qu'il a eu pour parvenir où il est, c'est tandis que ses complices dans la première Assemblée Constituante, et dans l'Assemblée Législative, vouloient garder les ménagemens qu'ils ont en effet gardé pour amener le peuple par degré au point où il est, lui s'est constamment refusé à ces ménagemens, et, dès la première année de la révolution, il a professé purement et simplement le démocratisme comme il le fait à présent. Cet homme avec de pareilles manières ne seroit jamais parvenu à faire la révolution dans laquelle peu-à-peu ses complices ont entraîné le peuple ; mais il devoit en arriver ce qui arrive aujourd'hui, c'est que, la révolution faite, il devoit en acquérir la plus grande popularité ; la conserver n'est pas dans sa puissance ni dans son caractère ; il en jouit avec trop d'insolence pour cela ; et sans l'abbé Siéyès, qui luy est très attaché, il y a déjà longtemps qu'il auroit perdu toute son influence. L'Abbé Siéyès, le plus méchant homme qui aye jamais existé, est surément l'homme le plus fécond en ressources et le plus féroce qui existe peut-être en France. Il ne veut point très décidément s'emparer personnellement du pouvoir, mais il veut gouverner ceux que par ses conseils il conduit à l'autorité suprême. Il a trouvé cela dans Robespierre, et très certainement il ne le trouvera pas dans St. Just. L'Abbé Siéyès est très persuadé, et il ne s'en cache en aucune manière depuis trois ans, que le règne des rois est fini en Europe ; qu'il existera un siècle d'anarchie dans tous les états, après quoi, dit-il, on verra des institutions nouvelles. D'après ce qu'on en cite, il n'entendra jamais de bonne foy aucune proposition d'accommodement avec aucun

souverain; cependant il a déclaré plusieurs fois au Comité que, s'il étoit besoin d'une cessation de guerre, il ne s'opposeroit point à une trêve, parcequ'il la croyoit bien plus funeste pour les rois que dangereuse pour la République. Tel est le caractère bien connu de ceux qui à présent triomphent de tous les partis, et qui ne tarderont pas de se diviser entre eux. Le ministre Forgues, si rudement attaqué par St. Just le 11 Mars, a déclaré qu'il lui répondroit péremptoirement lorsqu'il plairoit au Comité de luy donner un jour fixe pour cet objet; et par le discours qu'il prononça à ce sujet dans le Comité le 26, on a pu en inférer qu'il fait entrer comme partie principale de la grande dépense imputée sur les 170 millions que coute son département, le projet d'une vaste conjuration qui se subdivisoit en plusieurs branches, en Italie, en Pologne, et dans d'autres pays, qui doit éclater avant l'ouverture de la campagne, et être suivie d'une déclaration d'alliance défensive et offensive entre le Danemarck, la Suède, la Pologne, et la Turquie. Son discours n'a pas fait un grand effet. St. Just lui a reproché d'avoir pris en tout de fausses mesures, que l'événement prouveroit que tout l'argent qu'il avoit employé pour un pareil plan étoit perdu.

"Il paroît qu'il y a quelque amendement dans la position de la famille royale au Temple. Cependant, comme le Comité de Salut Public fait présenter des adresses par les communautés où il y a des agens, le danger est encore bien réel; il ne sauroit être plus pressant. Ce que l'on croit c'est qu'on les conserve pour avoir toujours quelque objet pour occuper le peuple; mais à la manière dont les membres du Comité en parlent, leur perte paroît résolue. Robespierre a fait décider le rappel et jugement du General Pichégrou. Le motif réel est que, le 15 Mars, Robespierre luy ayant écrit pour sçavoir s'il marcheroit à Paris sur la seule réquisition du Comité de Salut Public, il avoit répondu négativement, et avoit dénoncé cette démarche à Hébert. Sa perte est résolue.

"Le 26, le Comité de Salut Public a ordonné que, le 12 Avril, sans autre délai, il lui serait remis l'état de toutes les matières d'or et d'argent monnoyé ou en lingot qui, de quelque manière que ce peut être, appartenoit à la Convention. Cette mesure a été amenée à la suite d'un établissement décrété par le Comité de Salut Public qui consiste à établir une maison de commerce à Basle, formée par le crédit de Perrego Haller, qui auroit entre les mains, comme gage, des bijoux de la Couronne évalués 32 millions, et qu'on a réduit dans l'estime du Comité à 22. Un Abbé Favy, Ministre du Grand Duc de Toscane, est à la fois associé et agent de cette nouvelle maison de banque, et il a assuré plusieurs fois au Comité que, si on avoit besoin d'un plus grand crédit, il se ferait fort de le faire fournir à la banque. Cet Abbé Favy a été envoyé à Basle, en retournant à Florence. Un Américain nommé Smith est l'agent de le Comité établi à Basle pour parcourir les pays étrangers, et il a aussi le titre de Commissaire du Comité de Salut Public auprès de cet établissement. Le but de cet établissement a deux objets principaux, l'un que Robespierre avoue publiquement ainsi que St. Just, et l'autre qu'on lui suppose; le premier est d'avoir une quantité très considérable de fonds disponibles pour exciter des mouvements révolutionnaires dans les royaumes étrangers, et en profiter en leur accordant des moyens; l'autre motif que l'on suppose, est de se ménager des fonds en cas de malheur et de destruction de la République. Ce Smith, comme Américain et se disant Anglois, voyagera partout où il sera nécessaire. Il connoît dans chaque pays les affidés du Comité de Salut Public; il a droit de traiter avec eux, d'écrire en droiture à la Convention; et, dans les pays où elle a des ministres, ils ont ordre de recevoir les ordres de Smith, et d'envoyer à sa volonté des courriers à

Paris. L'Abbé Favy est chargé spécialement de l'Italie, sous les ordres cependant de Smith, et avec injonction à l'un et à l'autre de n'employer jamais que des naturels du pays dans leurs négociations."

"*Postscript.*—"Je vous envoie le discours très singulier qu'a prononcé St. Just au Comité de Salut Public, et dont parloit mon avant-dernier bulletin. Il n'a pas été possible de l'envoyer imprimé, parce qu'il y a défense de le laisser débiter, et de le garder. La suite de cela sera la mort de Héault de Sechelles. Il paroît qu'on est résolu de changer tous les ministres, et de les remplacer par les agents du Comité de Salut Public qui n'auront aucune manutention. Ce seront des valets renforcés du Comité dominateur.

"On a trouvé dans les papiers des co-accusés à Paris (je crois dans ceux de Héault de Sechelles) des lettres de M. Mallet du Pan, qui s'annonce comme ayant la confiance de Milord Grenville, et celle de M. Pitt, et comme employé par l'un et l'autre aux dépens de l'Angleterre, pour opérer en France une contre-révolution. Mallet fait part à son ami à Paris d'un mémoire qu'il dit avoir envoyé au Cabinet de Londres et à celui de Vienne, où, dit-il, ils ont été reçus avec transport. Il lui envoie aussi la copie d'une lettre qu'il a écrite à Mr. de Trevors, Ministre d'Angleterre à Turin, dans laquelle, dit-on, il trace des plans de campagne aux puissances coalisées, et prétend d'avoir fait à peu près tout ce qui se fait en Europe. Au reste ceci s'éclaircira bientôt, car Robespierre est d'avis qu'on imprime toute cette correspondance. On pourroit peut-être avoir copie de la lettre à Mr. Trevors, ou du mémoire au Cabinet de Londres; il sera alors bien aisé de vérifier si ce fait est vrai, ou si c'est une nouvelle manœuvre du Comité de Salut Public."

*Copy.*

#### *Enclosure Number 2.*

Discours prononcé par St. Just dans le Comité de Salut Public, le 11 Mars, 1794.

*Copy.*

#### *Enclosure Number 3.*

#### BULLETIN NO. 19.

1794, Mars 27—Avril 2, Paris.—"Le 27 au soir, le Comité de Salut Public où assisterent, outre les sept membres qui le composent, l'Abbé Siéyès, et Henriot Commandant de la Garde Nationale, résolut sur la motion de l'Abbé Siéyès d'englober dans les conspirateurs le fameux *Danton*, jusqu'à ce jour le collègue de Robespierre. L'Abbé Siéyès lut un mémoire de Foulquier Tainville [Fouquier Tinville], accusateur public près le tribunal révolutionnaire. Dans ce mémoire Foulquier déclaroit que, par la suite des interrogations secrets faits à Hébert, il avoit déclaré dans l'espoir d'obtenir sa grace, que Danton avoit été expressément désigné par M. Pitt, pour l'homme qu'il falloit mettre à la tête de la besogne, pour que les puissances crussent pouvoir traiter avec sûreté. Les dépositions d'Hébert à cet égard, telles qu'on les rapportait dans ce mémoire, sont en effet concluantes, mais on les croit fabriquées par l'Abbé Siéyès, Robespierre et Foulquier. On a englobé Héault dans la même accusation, et on s'est servi, pour l'inculper, des lettres interceptées au mois de Juillet, écrites par M. de las Casas au Duc d'Alcadia, que le Ministre Forgues avoit gardées jusqu'à ce jour, en ne les communiquant qu'à Robespierre et l'Abbé Siéyès qui, à cette époque, ne crurent

pas devoir en inculper Hérault, qui jouissoit d'une grande popularité. Robespierre vouloit faire le rapport qui a eu lieu à cet égard le 31 de Mars, mais St. Just demanda à en être chargé, et il l'obtint du Comité. St. Just voudroit, à ce qui paroît, sauver les 72 Députés, détenus comme complices de Brissot, parcequ'il espère s'en former un parti puissant dans la Convention, qui le mit à même de lutter contre Robespierre. Celui-ci en consentant qu'on ne les juge pas, veut qu'ils soient détenus comme suspects, et on croit que Robespierre l'emportera cette fois sur St. Just.

"Le sort de la famille royale inspire toujours de la plus vive crainte. Rien, jusqu'au 2 d'Avril, n'a pu faire voir dans le Comité la cessation de la volonté de les faire périr. L'Abbé Siéyès au contraire, le 31 Mars, insista pour qu'on en finit à cet égard; mais le Comité parut penser unanimement qu'il falloit encore différer jusqu'à des instans plus critiques. Le Roi continue à annoncer qu'il a une santé totalement détruite. La vie qu'il mene est affreuse sous tous les rapports. Il paroît que le projet du Comité est d'inspirer du mépris et de l'horreur pour lui à ce qui compose la garde nationale. Henriot, commandant de cette garde, affecte de faire passer chaque commandant de bataillon à la garde du jeune roi. Le commandant doit résider auprès du roi. Il y admet ses principaux officiers, et il n'est sorte d'horreurs que pendant ce temps-là, on ne fasse dire et faire au Roi.

"Le 29 Mars, Madame Elizabeth écrivait de sa main au nommé Solmou, commandant de la garde de la service de jour lié au Temple, pour lui demander du linge pour elle et sa nièce. Il se rendit aussitôt chez la Princesse pour lui dire que la nation étoit fatiguée de ses demandes, qu'elle pouvoit laver son linge, si elle vouloit. Ils sont très mal nourris depuis plus de 6 semaines, mais rien n'égale l'héroïsme de Madame Elizabeth. Quelque chose qu'on lui dise ou qu'on lui fasse, les bourreaux conviennent eux-mêmes dans les comptes qu'ils rendent à la Municipalité, qu'on n'aperçoit pas en elle, le moindre mouvement d'impatience.

"Jean Bon St. André, commissaire du Comité de Salut Public près la flotte de Brest, écrit le 27 mars, que tout est prêt pour la grande expédition; que, dans la disposition des esprits, il faut absolument tenter une descente sur les îles de Jersey et de Guernsey avant de songer à descendre en Angleterre. Il demande le titre de Représentant du peuple François en Angleterre, revêtu extraordinairement de tous les pouvoirs du Comité de Salut Public; ce qui lui a été accordé le 31 Mars, et envoyé par courrier extraordinaire, avec une instruction très courte du Comité portant l'ordre exprès, si une descente quelconque s'effectue, de ne point prendre possession du pays, quand-même il y trouveroit toute facilité et avantage; de se contenter de détruire et incendier un ou plusieurs points quelconques, et de se rapprocher aussitôt des côtes de France; que tout retard inutile dans son expédition lui seroit imputé à tort par le Comité de Salut Public.

"Le 1 d'Avril, le Ministre Forgues se rendit au Comité de Salut Public et demanda d'être autorisé pour l'affaire de Pologne à traiter avec les chefs des patriotes, dont deux agens étoient arrivés la veille à Paris; ce qui lui fut accordé. St. Just l'interroga avec beaucoup d'amertume sur l'état où étoient les négociations avec la Suède. Il répondit, que sous peu de jours il seroit prêt à en rendre compte au Comité; que la signature d'un traité avec cette puissance, devant être suivie par la reconnaissance de la République, effrayoit le Régent, qui assurait trouver plus de difficulté encore de la part du Danemarck; qu'il présenterait dans très peu de temps un traité dont le but principal seroit d'assurer à la République cette puissance, sans la faire sortir de la

circonspection momentanée qu'elle exigeoit de la République Française ; et qu'au reste, cette puissance se prêtoit dès ce moment à tout ce que pouvait désirer la République pour les différentes sortes d'approvisionnements qui lui étoient nécessaires. St. Just invectiva fortement le ministre ; depuis deux jours il avoit tellement effrayé le Comité au sujet du pouvoir exécutif provisoire, qu'il emporta ce qu'il demandoit, qui a été de faire décider par la Convention la cassation de l'organisation du ministère, et son remplacement par des Commissaires au choix du Comité de Salut Public. Malgré ce succès, Forgues paroît destiné par l'effet de la protection de Robespierre et l'Abbe Siéyès, à être chargé, sous le titre de commissaire, du département des affaires étrangères.

" Une lettre de Bollet, représentant du peuple à Douai, écrite le 30 Mars, apprend au Comité de Salut Public que si ce Comité n'ordonne à tous les généraux d'attaquer de tous les côtés, et d'ouvrir la campagne avant les coalisés, il prévoit les plus grands malheurs pour cette campagne ; que le soldat est en général mécontent et factieux, qu'il n'y a de ressource contre l'esprit général qui se manifeste dans les troupes, que de les tenir dans la plus grande activité.

" Ferrand, général commandant à Maubeuge, écrit, le 30 Mars, que M. de Coburg et de Hohenlohe ont cherché à séduire sa fidélité par des offres d'argent et de sûreté s'il vouloit rendre Maubeuge à l'Empereur ; que ce sont des espions, faisant semblant d'être déserteurs des troupes Autrichiennes, qui ont porté les propositions ; qu'il pourroit les faire arrêter, mais qu'il demande à cet égard les ordres du Comité, et qu'il a cru, en attendant, devoir déclarer la ville en état de siège. Le Comité lui a répondu qu'il alloit lui envoyer un commissaire du Comité, chargé de tous les pouvoirs pour guider ses démarches ; mais qu'en attendant, il devoit continuer de traiter avec les ennemis ; bien traiter les transfuges à l'effet de faire donner les ennemis dans quelque embûche. On a, en conséquence, envoyé à Maubeuge Helly, un des secrétaires du Comité. Billaud de Varennes promet de se rendre comme commissaire auprès des armées du Nord, pour les faire agir sans retard. St. Just proposa, le second, de rappeler d'Artigot de sa commission dans les provinces méridionales, ce qui a été ajourné, le Comité ne voulant pas le rappeler.

*Copy.*

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, April 24, Beckenham.—" Our friend Mack seems to have opened the campaign in a manner which justified the opinion formed of his talents ; and he has contrived to give to the Emperor a very auspicious and creditable *début* in the military line." " Our prospects are nearly restored to what they were at the capitulation of Valenciennes, and with the additional advantage of having secured our indemnity in the islands.

" I conceive that the Prussian treaty and the Dutch Convention will be received with good humour at present, and the wisdom and efficiency of such an exertion will be more and more felt every day."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, May 1, Cateau.—" It has been my lot since my return to see a great deal, and to have had many very interesting discussions with persons whose opinions may be worth attending to in the present conjuncture. And I have availed myself of the opportunity of repeating

them to Lord Malmesbury and Sir Morton Eden, that they may reach your Lordship in the most effectual way. My correspondence, of course, does not enter upon them. But I feel it my duty to your Lordship, to mention in this manner what has forcibly struck me, namely, that these two Ministers see things in points of view widely differing one from the other. My conviction arises from no vague hints, but from much confidential discussion with each, on most matters of moment now before us. It is immaterial (however decided I may be) for me to say to which opinions my observation leads me to give assent. All I mean to suggest is, that this difference in judgment does exist, to a very great degree. And I advert to it as a fact that your Lordship may wish to be apprized of, now that you have the means of consulting the one, as well as the other."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, May 12, Valenciennes.—“When General Mack mentioned to me what is contained in my letter of this date, marked *most secret and confidential*, I recollected having heard from Lord Malmesbury that, among the various modes which had occurred for employing the Prussian troops, that of entrusting to them the defence of Flanders had been suggested as not disagreeable to the King of Prussia, and, in some respects, desirable for England. The objection to this, which I remember stating to Lord Malmesbury, was an impression that exists in the Low Countries which makes it material not to put such a command into the hands of any foreign officer. This objection is, by its nature, very trifling; and your Lordship will pardon my observing that, if the plan alluded to is approved of in England, and the mode of indemnity at which it points for Austria meant to be supported, much benefit may be hoped for, from bringing the Prussians entirely to the right; leaving all the Austrian army in immediate conjunction, and employing the Austrians, English, and Dutch (without the Prussians), in the offensive operations. At all events, the Prussians will be welcome guests whenever they may arrive.”

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, May 26, Windsor.—“I have received the enclosed very judicious letter from my son the Duke of York with the mail of this day. I desire you will communicate it to Mr. Pitt and return it to me in town when you go to-morrow to the House of Peers. The information I have received from General Walmoden and from Colonel Craig exactly coincide with this. I am clearly of opinion that it would be highly proper to authorize my son to collect all the troops in the pay of Great Britain into one corps, for which the Imperial army being now united is sufficient reason; then it may co-operate with the Austrians, but will not be detached on all occasions, and, to save the Imperial army, be cut by small detachments into pieces, and by degrees lose that ardour which alone can give success. This is not an idea of the moment; I have for some time thought the measure advisable, but in the present posture of affairs absolutely necessary. In one word, if it is proper the Prussians should be a separate army, the same reason holds good for the troops in British pay.”



*Enclosure.*

The DUKE OF YORK to GEORGE III.

1794, May 23, Tournai.—“When I had the honour to write to your Majesty on Monday night by Colonel Craig I did not choose to enter into any account of the unfortunate event of the 18th, as Colonel Craig was able to give your Majesty the fullest information by word of mouth.

“I am sorry to say that ever since then has existed in the Austrian head-quarters a degree of pusillanimity and alarm which still continues in spite of the success of yesterday, and which, I am afraid, will be productive of the very worst consequences. During the whole engagement yesterday they were talking of nothing else than of passing the Scheldt and taking a position before Ath, in order to cover their magazines.

“I represented to them, in the strongest terms I could, how shameful such a project would be; but, finding that I made no impression upon them, I thought it my duty to say that, though I had no orders whatsoever from your Majesty on that subject, yet that I could not help telling them that England had as yet given them every assistance in her power, but that, as certainly one of the great objects of that assistance was to protect Flanders for the sake of Holland, should His Imperial Majesty choose to give up Flanders without attempting anything for its relief, he must not be astonished if your Majesty employed the forces which you have in this country for the purposes most advantageous to yourself and to your allies the Dutch, without any regard whatsoever for him. I have reason to believe that what I said had some effect, as this morning the Emperor called a council of war in which General Mack, in the Emperor's name, acquainted the general officers that, as the victory yesterday was so considerable, the Emperor had resolved not to abandon Tournai, but to detach only a small corps under General Walmoden to cover Oudenarde, and to let the troops recover their fatigue in their present situation; when he intended to move forwards, and attack the enemy near Courtray, unless he received any bad news from the Sambre, where the enemy is in great force opposite to General Kaimitz, which might induce him to alter his projects.

“I have another very disagreeable subject to mention to your Majesty, which is the very shameful and insolent manner in which the Austrians behave to all the troops, of whatever nation they are, in your Majesty's pay; which has so exasperated them that it is very much to be wished that we might form a separate army without being in the least mixed with the Austrians.

“Knowing of how much consequence it was to keep up a good harmony among the different troops, I have done everything in my power to keep everything quiet; but really the behaviour of the Austrians is such that it is my duty to represent it. They despise everything which is not their own. They are continually throwing every blame upon your Majesty's troops, and accusing them of slackness, when, God knows, they are infinitely braver than their own; and are at the same time wantonly exposing them upon every occasion.

“Wherever I am they dare not do it, but I have received the strongest complaints on that account from the British, the Hanoverians, and the Darmstadt troops who are now serving under General Clairfayt. I am informed that in the attack which Clairfayt made on Lincelles, a French battery at a village near there having opened on an Austrian column, he chose to send to another column for an Irish and

a Hessian squadron to attack it, while he had in his own column three squadrons of Austrians whom he did not choose to employ. These two squadrons succeeded in taking the battery; but the Irish squadron out of one hundred and forty-two men only brought back thirty, and the Hessian squadron lost seventy men. I therefore cannot help humbly entreating your Majesty to allow me to form a separate army of the troops in your pay—without the Austrians, and I have no doubt that we shall agree perfectly well together, and, being animated with the same spirit, we shall be able to be of much more use than we now are.”

*Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794, May 26–31, Downing Street.]—“I return you the King’s letter and that from the Duke of York. They came to me only within this half hour. I do not know whether you need express any opinion in returning them to the King. But (whenever that point is to be discussed) I am clear that forming a separate army of the troops on British pay is a measure that cannot be adopted.”

FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, May 30, Turin.—“I have the honor to enclose a Bulletin, No. 20, which has been detained some time at the post-office in Leghorn.

“I have also the honor to enclose a copy of the Manifest of the Army of La Vendée, dated the 20th of March, published in La Vendée on the 18th of April, and denounced to the Committee of Public Safety by Barrère on the 29th of April. The enclosed copy is conformable to that of Barrère.

“Bastia having now surrendered to His Majesty’s arms, I shall recall to Sir Gilbert Elliot’s recollection the observations on the coasts of the Mediterranean which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship and his Excellency some time ago. I have had several conversations with General De Vins on the subject of them, and that general is of opinion that nothing would contribute more to check the progress of the French in Italy than an enterprize on the coast of Provence.”

*Enclosure 1.*

BULLETIN No. 20.

1794, Avril 4–12, Paris.—“Le 5 Avril, le Comité du Salut Public composé de neuf personnes, parceque Lindet y a remplacé Héault de Sechelles, et Couthon Jean Bon de St. André pendant son absence, fut assemblé à la demande de Robespierre à l’Hôtel des Invalides. Il y fut mandé à sa demande aussi le Maire Pache, Henriot commandant de la garde, et Carrier, le même qui aux Cordeliers avoit demandé l’insurrection. L’Abbé Siéyès s’y trouva aussi. Alors Robespierre déclara qu’il avoit crû nécessaire de donner à Pache et à Carrier les autorisations, et les sauves-gardes du Comité du Salut Public, pour la conduite qu’ils avoient tenue dans l’affaire de Danton et dans celle d’Hébert; qu’il comprenoit dans la même classe Luiller que le Tribunal Révolutionnaire avoit innocenté par les mêmes raisons qui lui faisoient demander de

sauve-garde du Comité pour ceux qui étoient ici présents. Qu'il déclaroit donc que c'étoit par ses ordres, et par ceux de Barrère, donnés au nom du Comité du Salut Public, et sous sa sauve-garde, qu'ils s'étoient familiarisés avec ceux que le Tribunal avoit jugé coupables, et qu'il leur devoit toutes les lumières que l'on avoit pû porter dans cette nouvelle conjuration. Cette déclaration causa des singuliers débats dans le Comité même. St. Just prétendit expressément que Pache, nommé, avoit trempé dans ces conjurations sous prétexte de les découvrir; qu'il n'en avoit fait l'espion que lorsqu'il avoit décidément vû que ce parti alloit être exterminé; qu'il avoit à cet égard des preuves complètes qu'il se réservoir de faire valoir en temps et lieux, et pour cela, qu'il refusoit son assentiment à la sauve-garde qu'on lui demandoit. Les débats se prolongèrent presque toute la nuit, mais enfin le Comité assura par l'influence de Robespierre la sauve-garde qu'on lui demandoit; St Just persistant cependant toujours à la refuser.

"Le lendemain L'Abbé Siéyès demanda une assemblée du Comité, où il n'assisteroit que ses membres, et dont on feroit sortir les deux secrétaires. Le lendemain en effet le Comité étant assemblé au même lieu, l'Abbé Siéyès y lût un assez long mémoire, dont le but étoit d'établir qu'il falloit absolument simplifier le gouvernement, lui donner des formes stables, simples, et uniformes pour le retirer de cette agitation continuelle qui énerve tous les moyens, et détériore chaque jour l'esprit public. C'étoit là l'unique moyen d'obtenir deux choses, la décomposition et la ruine de la coalition, et de conclure par une paix honorable la reconnaissance et l'existence de la République Française. Que cette vérité avoit été également sentie par les puissances belligérantes, telles que l'Angleterre avec laquelle on avoit ouvert des négociations pour une paix séparée, et par les autres puissances telles que la Suède et la Turquie, qui ne demandoient qu'à y voir leur sûreté pour conclure des traités d'alliance avec la République; que la nullité des négociations avoit toujours tenue de l'anarchie qui a déshonoré la République; que Hébert et Danton, qui avoient bien connus l'état des choses, avoient voulu, en détruisant le Comité du Salut Public, les Jacobins, et la Convention, devenir eux-mêmes cette puissance prépondérante, mais que Danton en y portant ses talens et ses données avoit rendu cette conjuration très dangereuse; que son plan étoit de faire changer le Comité de Salut Public, et que le Tribunal Révolutionnaire étoit néanti du discours qu'il devoit prononcer, lorsqu'il se seroit agi de renouveler les pouvoirs du Comité de Salut Public; que cette conjuration échouée, il falloit bien se garder de croire qu'on eut évité les plus grands dangers; qu'ils existoient tous dans toute leur force à Paris par la multiplicité des complices de Danton, leur ressources, et leur hardiesses, mais bien plus encore dans les armées; qu'on pouvoit regarder tous parmi les officiers que parmi les soldats comme divisés en deux factions bien distincts, les Cordeliers, et les partisans du Comité du Salut Public; que dans ce moment il falloit parler clair au Comité où, depuis l'expulsion de Hérault de Sechelles, il n'y avoit plus de trinités, que toute division de vues et de projet parmi les membres du Comité entraineroit avec la ruine du Comité celle de tout son parti; qu'il falloit donc éviter sur toutes choses les crises dangereuses et périodiques qui se renouveloient chaque mois lorsqu'il falloit renouveler les pouvoirs du Comité; que son avis étoit donc que le Comité usât de tous ses moyens, fit présenter des addresses de toutes parts à la Convention pour obtenir la prorogation [prolongation ?] du Comité de Salut Public, avec tous ses pouvoirs, jusqu'à la paix. Qu'il pouvoit annoncer que, le jour que ce décret serait rendu, l'alliance entre la Suède et les États Unis seroit signée à Paris; que dans quinze jours on

recevroit des propositions de paix de la part de l'Angleterre et de la Prusse. Il finit enfin en déclarant au Comité que si ces mesures étoient adoptées, et si la campagne n'étoit pas décisive pour les coalisés, il répondoit de trois choses ; de la reconnaissance de la République par toutes les puissances de l'Europe l'hyver prochain ; de la stabilité du gouvernement républicain en France ; et d'une révolution totale dans les principaux états des puissances actuellement belligérantes avant quinze mois. Ce discours, fort applaudi par le Comité, fut vivement censuré par St. Just. Il dit qu'il seroit trop clair à tout successeur des Danton et des Hébert de prouver à tous les départemens l'existence des projets dont Hébert avoit accusé Robespierre ; que tout ce système n'étoit qu'une concentration graduée par la quelle les têtes du Comité détraisoient les têtes de la Convention, et qu'en suite la tête d'un dictateur pourroit bien tuer celles du Comité. L'Abbé Siéyès et Robespierre lui demandèrent alors quels moyens il prétendoit dont se mettre à la place de ceux qu'il rejetait ; il se contenta de répondre qu'il n'y avoit pas réfléchi, mais qu'il y penseroit. Il ne fut rien du tout décidé sur le mémoire de L'Abbé Siéyès. Mais le 10, Pache et Henriot dénoncèrent au Comité qu'il se formoit des attroupemens à Paris et aux environs qui osoient même menacer les gardes nationales qui vouloient les dissiper ; qu'il y avoit des manœuvres pour exciter des disettes dans les bleds, et dans la viande ; qu'ils assuroient surtout le Comité que tous les moyens de répression étoient encore dans ses mains ; que Henriot prendroit les ordres chaque jour, que le Tribunal Révolutionnaire, dont la cause étoit inséparable de celle du Comité, les prendroit également pour tous les individus soumis à ses jugemens.

“ Le 11, on lut des lettres des commissaires aux armées du Nord, qui déclaroient que le plus grand mal existoit dans l'armée ; que le mécontentement y étoit si général qu'il n'étoit pas douteux que plusieurs villes frontières n'ouvrissent leurs portes aux ennemis, si elles étoient sûres de n'être pas abandonnées ni pillées. Ce même jour la Municipalité vint assurer le Comité que par les enlèvemens qu'on pourroit faire en moins de quinze jours, on pourroit se procurer des bleds pour nourrir Paris plus de six mois ; mais que la Municipalité étoit parfaitement instruite que le plan des ennemis étoit de marcher sur Paris, et de rejeter tous les citoyens des villes dont ils s'empareroient, afin de l'alarmer, et de l'affamer ; qu'il falloit absolument que le Comité prit un parti à cet égard.

“ Le même jour on lut au Comité des lettres de l'agent national en Pologne qui rendoit compte de trois avantages remportés par les confédérés de Cracovie, et qui demandoit avec instance la remise des cinq millions restants de dix qui leur ont été promis. On a autorisé le commissaire de tirer sur Hambourg pour la valeur des cinq millions, et d'en promettre dix autres si, ici au 15 Juin, la confédération prenoit de la consistance. On y lut aussi des lettres du banquier Perregaux de Neuchâtel, le 3 Avril, qui dit qu'il exécute les ordres du Comité au sujet des prêtres Catholiques, et émigrés réfugiés dans la commune de Landeron ; que ces prêtres et ces émigrés viennent d'en être chassés, malgré les habitans fanatiques de Landeron, par le Conseil Souverain de Neuchâtel, mais que la Convention a dans le sieur Brocheton un ennemi dont il faut se défaire, et qu'il va mettre tout en œuvre pour y réussir ; que cet heureux début ne lui a pas coûté 500 louis.

“ Le 11, on lut dans le Comité des lettres d'Angleterre en date du 2 Avril, dans lesquelles l'agent du Comité de Salut Public rend compte que Mr. Pitt veut proposer au Parlement de former des corps de déserteurs François et de paysans, à la solde de l'Angleterre ; les porter jusqu'à 16,000 hommes, et les mettre dans l'armée du Général Moira pour se rendre en Vendée sous les ordres de Monsieur le Comte d'Artois.

“Nous avons reçu une lettre de Charette du 1 Avril, qui demande l’envoi de plusieurs caisses de remèdes, et des chirurgiens, qui lui ont été expédiés sur le champ par des moyens aussi sûrs que prompts. Il nous prie de faire répandre dans toute l’Europe qu’il est faux qu’aucun chef de l’armée royaliste ait jamais traité avec aucun Gouvernement d’après des principes monarchiens ou constitutionnels ; qu’ils aimeroient mieux tous périr que de consentir à aucune altération à l’antique constitution Française, ou à celle de Bretagne ; qu’ils ne reconnoissent de maître que Louis XVII., de Régent que Monsieur ; qu’ils n’ont cessé de demander avec les plus vives instances Monsieur le Comte d’Artois ou un de ses enfans ; qu’il a chargé empressement Monsieur de Robuerge de publier par tout les principes des royalistes en Angleterre, et que cet aide-de-camp, qu’il a envoyé à Londres, a l’ordre exprès de demander Monsieur le Comte d’Artois ou un de ses enfans pour la Vendée ; et que les royalistes de la Vendée demandent à leurs co-opérateurs à Paris de faire savoir leurs principes et intentions à tous leurs frères royalistes de l’Europe.”

*Enclosure 2.*

BULLETIN No. 21.

1794, Avril 20–25, Paris.—“Le 19 au soir, le Comité du Salut Public, après avoir écouté le rapport du Darçon, Président du Comité de la Guerre, décida qu’à quelque prix que ce fût, il falloit faire lever le siège de Landrecies. Le plan que le Comité de la Guerre présenta pour y parvenir fût adopté sans aucune contradiction par le Comité. Ce qui en souffrit infiniment davantage fut la demande que fit Lindet que St. Just fût chargé de se rendre auprès des armées du Nord pour faire exécuter les décrets du Comité. Robespierre vouloit que ce fut Couthon, mais, pour cette fois, St. Just eut la pluralité des voix. Il est parti le 21, dans la nuit, pour l’armée du Nord.

“Le 21, Robespierre fit adopter par le Comité une mesure de la plus grande importance. Dans l’état de fermentation où il représenta la ville de Paris, il a fait adopter par le Comité que l’on renforceroit encore de 60 pièces de canons le parc d’artillerie de Meudon, parceque, en cas d’une insurrection menaçante de la ville de Paris, ce seroit à Meudon que le Comité du Salut Public et le parti qu’il a dans la Convention se retireroient, pour de là maîtriser la ville de Paris. L’exécution de cette mesure, qui dès le moment même a eu une grande publicité, a été fortement critiquée par tous les ennemis de Robespierre ; mais une affiche du Comité, et l’arrestation de 220 personnes dans la nuit du 21, ont imposé silence à tous ceux qui vouloient tirer parti de cette mesure pour faire apercevoir le peuple de tous les moyens de tyrannie que se prépare Robespierre. Dans la nuit du 22 au 23, le Comité reçut deux lettres de Jean Bon St. André, son commissaire à Nantes, écrites à trois heures de distance l’une de l’autre, pour lui apprendre que la Vendée se fortifioit tous les jours par un nombre prodigieux de Normands, Picards, et Bretons, qui ne cessoient de s’y rendre. Qu’il estimoit que la force des trois corps d’armée pouvoit être de 120,000 hommes, dont 60,000 étoient très bien armés ; qu’Angers étoit au moment d’être incendié, et que sa position, ainsi que celle du Département où il étoit, devenoit excessivement pénible ; que les Royalistes ne conservoient aucun prisonnier ; que, dernièrement encore, Charette venoit de faire égorger, pour représailles de quelques-uns de ses complices qu’il avoit fait guillotiner, 350 prisonniers qu’il avoit à Marville. Le Comité, extrêmement alarmé, s’est déterminé à envoyer un commissaire sur les lieux, et à ne rendre même aucun compte à l’Assemblée de l’état des affaires.

"Le même jour le citoyen Buchot, chargé des affaires étrangères, donna part au Comité d'une lettre qu'il venoit de recevoir du 6 Avril, signé Kulkiusko [Kosciusko] chef suprême de la force armée de la République Polonoise, et de Madalinski Lieutenant General, par laquelle il demanda à la République, en lui envoyant l'engagement de son conseil, qui elle lui fasse un prêt de 16 millions de livres tournois. Le Comité répondit sur le champ par un refus positif jusqu'à ce que l'emploi des 10 millions déjà accordés au Général Kulkiusko eut produit des effets qui autorisassent le Comité à lui faire des avances plus considérables. Buchot insista beaucoup en faveur de Kulkiusko; il alla jusqu'à déclarer qu'il étoit autorisé par la Suède à dire au Comité que les démarches éventuelles de cette couronne pour se rapprocher, par des traités, de la République Française, dépendoient principalement des succès qu'auroit la révolution Polonoise. Malgré cette forte raison il ne put rien obtenir du Comité.

L'événement affreux du 19 et 21 Avril, qui a occasionné le supplice de presque tous les Présidents à mortier du Parlement, est principalement dû à un mémoire affreux de l'Abbé Sièyès, qui a fait prendre dans le Comité la résolution de se défaire de tous les magistrats que l'on pouvoit saisir dans le royaume. Le vertueux Malesherbes, âgé de près de 80 ans, a subi son supplice avec la plus extrême fermeté. Interrogé par le tribunal si le Roi ne lui avoit pas confié des secrets, il répondit : *sa majesté m'a honoré de toute sa confiance*. Interrogé sur les secrets que lui avoit confiés le Roi, il répondit : *la posterité les connoitra, mais j'espère que mes contemporains les connoîtront bientôt*. Interrogé sur ce qu'il vouloit dire par ces dernières paroles; il leur dit : *elles signifient qu'avant la fin de l'été vous aurez un Roi*. Interrogé si le Roi lui avoit confié des papiers, a répondu : *oui, en différentes occasions*. Interrogé où ils étoient, a répondu : *hors de France en des mains sûres, avec les détails de tous les secrets que le Roi m'a confiés*. La même fermeté l'a accompagné jusqu'à la mort, où il a été conduit entre sa fille, sa petite fille, âgée de 22 ans, et son gendre. Rien ne peut représenter la férocité du peuple à ces exécutions. Plus de 200,000 âmes remplissoient la place et toutes ses avenues, et la populace n'a cessé d'applaudir jusqu'à la dernière exécution.

"Le Roi est beaucoup mieux traité depuis quelques temps. On ne doute pas que, dans la position actuelle des choses, Robespierre n'ait un de ces deux projets; d'emmener le Roi dans les provinces méridionales si les armées s'approchent de Paris, et c'est là le projet du Comité; ou d'emmener le Roi à Meudon et de faire son traité personnel avec la puissance qui s'approchera de Paris, et c'est là le projet dont on accuse Robespierre.

"La pénurie de toute espèce de comestibles augmente sans cesse à Paris, mais ce qui rassure le Comité c'est l'assurance que la municipalité lui a donnée le 23, qu'il y avoit assez de grains pour nourrir tous les sans-culottes pendant 6 mois. La lâcheté de la bourgeoisie, et des marchands de Paris l'assure qu'ils mourront tous de faim sans oser faire un mouvement."

*Enclosure 3.*—Manifesto issued on March 20, 1794, by all the chiefs of the Catholic and Royal armies of France, in the name of the most Christian King Louis XVII. of France and Navarre.

*Copy.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 2, Maestricht.—"I have written a short letter to Mr. Pitt on the eternal subject of the money, to which I beg leave to refer

you. The immense importance of saving time under the present circumstances supersedes all other considerations, and everything I am doing goes to this point. Nothing can be fairer or more explicit than the declarations I have received from Count Haugwiz; as I have hitherto found him sincere, I hope he will not deceive me in the most material point of all, but that the Prussian army *will* act up to all the engagements we have contracted with His Prussian Majesty. General Wartensleben, who is just come from it, says that it is completely 62,400 men, but that the corps under General Kalkreuth, which is to furnish their contingent of 20,000, is by no means so. He likewise confirms what I hear from Count Haugwiz that the Marshal Moëllendorf is without horses, pontoons, and magazines.

"Count Haugwiz intends leaving this place as soon as the military conferences are over, and to return to Berlin. He is very anxious to be there, and I fear his adversaries have been endeavouring to undermine him during his absence."

"I shall probably move towards Frankfort, so as to meet the King of Prussia."

"It is at Frankfort that I can best superintend and press the march of the Prussians, as it is there that Count Schulenberg and the commissariat is established."

*Copy.*

#### LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 3, Maestricht.—"Count Haugwiz has this moment received a messenger from Baron Jacobi, with letters of Friday the 30th, in which he says that no part of the money was then set out, and that he cannot take upon him to say when it will actually be embarked. Count Haugwiz persists in the utter impossibility of taking any step for the march of the Prussian army towards the Meuse till the advance and first two months' payments are made, and it is in vain that I attempt to urge him to it by any argument and any means I can employ. I therefore have desired him to redespach his courier immediately in order that he might state through Monsieur Jacobi to you what he said to me yesterday and repeated again to-day, 'that till the 'money was actually paid, they on their part could do nothing; that 'when it was paid they would [do] everything;' by being paid he understands its being on the road to Berlin. He appeared more discomposed and out of sorts on this occasion than I have ever seen him, and either Jacobi's reports or some absurd ideas he has conceived since we parted in the beginning of May has filled his mind with the most illiberal and unfair doubts. I have only to repeat what I wrote to Mr. Pitt yesterday, that the 600,000 said to be ready in silver dollars is wanted *at Berlin* immediately, and on this being done depends the march of the army; that for the 150,000 due the first of June, bills will be drawn by Count Struensee, Minister for the Financial Department at Berlin, on Messieurs Hope of Amsterdam; and that as these bills will be presented in about a week from this date, it is necessary provision should be made for their being accepted."

"The whole end of the treaty will be done away if the pecuniary stipulations in it are not most strictly complied with. Their notions and our notions on subjects of this nature are so widely different, that it is impossible to measure them by the same standard; and however safe security may be given, nothing will satisfy them but the money being actually in their possession. However unpleasant, we must act up to this principle, or forego all the advantages of the treaty."

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1794, June 5, Downing Street.—“We have been a little disappointed at the demand of another month before the Prussians even begin their march, and I have thought it necessary to arm you with every possible topic to resist so mischievous a delay.

“Lord Cornwallis, whom you will have seen before this time, will, I fear, have furnished you with even stronger reasons than any in my despatch, and I earnestly hope that it will be possible to bring the army down into Flanders sooner than is now proposed, as there is no answering for the consequences of six weeks’ further delay of reinforcements in that quarter. The proposal is in my mind connected with the measure of having actually begun to act on the Rhine, a step, notwithstanding the first successes that have attended it, I by no means consider as favourable to our interests. I am confident that the idea exists of selling again to the Empire what we have bought so dear, and this idea must at all hazards be decisively counteracted. I hope that Lord Cornwallis will take some effectual mode of ascertaining the real number of the forces that actually move, as we shall be much pressed on that subject from the general idea that prevails here of frauds intended in that respect.”

“Our naval news gives us hopes of an engagement between the two fleets, but I recollect too many disappointments of that sort to think with much confidence of the probability of an event so ardently to be wished.”

*Copy.*

## LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 9, Maestricht.—“I am doing everything in my power to prevail on the Prussian Minister to give immediate orders for the march of the army; his answer is it cannot move till it has all that is necessary for its mobilization, and that this can only be obtained through our money. He is profuse in his assurances that not the most remote doubt exists as to the good faith of our Court, but the inability of His Prussian Majesty to furnish any supply of money is so great that even that part of his troops which is now on the Rhine must remain without their pay till he receives our subsidy. He assures me, and so does Court Warsleben, an Austrian officer, that the army we are to have is 62,400 effective men, and this I have little doubt may easily be ascertained. I see no appearance of objection as to carrying the army into Flanders that cannot easily be got rid of: and I receive the strongest assurances from Court Haugwitz of the stability of his own favour, and of the King of Prussia remaining steady to the opinions he professed when I saw him at Potsdam.”

## FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 10, Milan.—“I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship copies of two letters, the latter of which, together with the letter No. 1 annexed to my official letter of this day, I received yesterday by express.

“I have been called upon for a further sum of fifty pounds towards defraying the expenses of this correspondence, and I have complied



with the demand, trusting that your Lordship will be pleased to transmit me orders for my guidance in future, in case your Lordship should think that these letters are not worth the expense attending them. I have long had reason to believe, and I am now confirmed in my suspicions, that the person who writes them is most intimately connected with Monsieur, le Comte d'Artois, and leaders of the army of La Vendée."

*Enclosure 1.*

BULLETIN No. 22.

1794, Mai 4-9, Paris.—“ Dans la journée du 3, depuis midi jusqu'au lendemain matin 4, il arriva à Paris une si grande quantité de fuyards de l'Armée du Nord, et tant de chariots remplis de blessés, que le Comité qui s'assembla dans la nuit fut unanimement d'avis que l'on ne pouvoit plus du tout différer de donner part à la Convention des événements de l'Armée du Nord, et de la prise de Landrécy. Barrère fut chargé de l'annoncer dès la lendemain à la Convention, mais, en même temps, le Comité adopta deux mesures; l'une d'interdire par les menaces que feroit Barrère, les discussions sur un pareil événement, et la seconde, de faire arrêter ce même jour tous ceux que l'on trouveroit dans les cafés et autres lieux publics entretenant le peuple de cet événement. La consternation du Comité est extrême, mais les discours qu'il prononcera à la Convention ne se ressentiront pas de cette frayeur, l'Abbé Siéyès étant accouru ce même jour au Comité pour les bien assurer que, vu la disposition où étoit le peuple de Paris, la moindre apparence de crainte dans le Comité pourroit y occasionner une révolution.

“ Dans la matinée du 4, le Comité, ainsi qu'il le pratique dans les grandes occasions, eut soin de faire remplir les tribunes, plusieurs heures avant la séance de la Convention, par les affidés au Club des Jacobins, et par les gardes nationales de la section de Bonnes Nouvelles, plus spécialement dévouées au Comité. Malgré toutes ces précautions, cette nouvelle, déjà répandue avant l'ouverture de la séance, a causé la plus grande fermentation dans Paris. Il arrive continuellement des voitures chargées de blessés, qui ne veulent absolument pas qu'on les dépose autre part que dans les hôpitaux de Paris. La plupart sont de la première réquisition partie de cette ville. On est obligé de les repartir dans les environs de Paris, à St. Denis, au Bourg-la-Reine, à Sèvres, et à St. Cloud. Ce spectacle a fait un effet prodigieux sur ce peuple, mais la Municipalité n'a pas osé empêcher ces soldats blessés d'arriver, sans un ordre du Comité de Salut Public, que celui-ci n'a pas osé donner. Ainsi, dans la journée du 4, le peuple parloit avec le plus grand effroi de l'armée Autrichienne, et de la certitude que cette armée viendrait à Paris.

Dans la nuit du 4 au 5, le Comité resta assemblé depuis huit heures du soir, jusqu'à la séance à dix heures du matin 5. Tous les Commissaires du pouvoir exécutif y assisterent, la Municipalité de Paris, le Commandant de la garde nationale, et huit des principaux membres du Comité de Sûreté Générale. Robespierre ouvrit la séance en disant au Comité que l'agent de Danemark venoit par ordre de sa Cour de faire au Comité de Salut Public une communication amicale qui prouvoit bien que quelques fussent les succès de la coalition, ses membres eux-mêmes ne croyoient pas possible de vaincre la République cette année. Que cet agent avoit donc fait part que dans le traité signé entre le Roi de Prusse, l'Angleterre, et la Hollande, il existoit un article secret en vertu

duquel les parties contractantes disoient que, malgré la teneur du traité public, vû la nécessité où l'on seroit de continuer la guerre l'année prochaine, les parties contractantes promettoient et s'engagoient de continuer toutes les clauses de ce traité et toutes ces obligations pour l'année prochaine. Cette déclaration de Robespierre dût faire bien peu d'effet sur le Comité; mais ce qu'il dit après en fit davantage.

" Il dit que, d'après tous les comptes rendus aux commissaires du Pouvoir Exécutif et aux officiers municipaux, le peuple dans tous les marchés publics témoignoît croire que la machine du Gouvernement étoit détraquée et usée; qu'il voyoit avec indifférence tous les efforts de la Convention pour le garantir de la famine et des suites de la guerre; qu'il avoit permis, depuis trois jours, à la Halle aux bleds qu'on traitât de ridicules et tyranniques les mesures adoptées par la compagnie travaillant sous les ordres du Comité à l'approvisionnement de Paris; qu'il accusoit cette compagnie de faire attendre des jours entiers la demie livre de viande qu'on accorde aux individus, de ne donner des haricots qu'en forçant de prendre la même quantité de pois gâtés; que les choses en étoient au point que l'on seroit obligé de livrer les membres de cette société à la fureur du peuple; que les ouvriers mal-payés étoient en grande fermentation; qu'il avoit fallu apaiser, à des prix énormes, les canonniers qui vouloient s'insurger le 3; que bref, le Comité devoit le tenir pour dit, que si l'armée Autrichienne continuoît son plan de campagne et s'approchoit de Paris, le peuple étoit dans la disposition, et la manifestoit, d'exterminer la Convention et de la livrer aux tyrans.

" Qu'il savoit bien qu'il seroit le premier immolé, mais qu'il étoit fermement résolu aussi de faire égorger dans toute l'étendue de la République toutes les personnes détenues comme suspectes, et qu'il ne lai-seroit en France que des cadavres et des cendres. Ce discours jeta le Comité dans l'abattement, mais St. Just se prononça dans cette occasion avec la plus grande fureur, contre l'opinion de Robespierre.

" Il déclara que la seule partie de son discours qu'il adoptoit dans toute sa plénitude, étoit de faire égorger, sans retard comme sans miséricorde, tous les prisonniers suspects dans toute l'étendue de le République; mais que cette grande mesure il l'auroit encore exécutée, quand les armées Républicaines auroient été victorieuses de tout côté. Qu'il falloit du sang au peuple pour le rendre féroce; mais que la lenteur de la guillotine ne pouvoit plus suffire au besoin de la République; qu'il falloit que les commissions populaires entrassent en exercice de leurs fonctions dans chaque prison; qu'on renvoyât au Tribunal Révolutionnaire tout ce qui seroit plus marquant pour être guillotiné publiquement, mais qu'il falloit que, sans aucune espèce de forme, les commissaires populaires fissent mourir le reste dans l'intérieur des prisons. Mais que, cette mesure adoptée, il étoit bien loin d'avoir les terreurs de Robespierre; qu'il étoit de la dernière évidence à ses yeux, comme à ceux de l'Abbé Siéyès, de Prieur, et de Couthon, qu'avant la fin de l'été, la coalition seroit en pleine dissolution. Que les dépêches lumineuses du citoyen Barthélemy portoiient l'évidence dans ses idées. Qu'il étoit clair qu'aucun des coalisés ne vouloit le rétablissement de la Maison de Bourbon; que les princes François étoient morts civilement pour les puissances de l'Europe comme ils l'étoient pour la France. Que les dernières lettres de Londres, du 28, mettoient ces vérités dans un nouveau jour, puisque un homme aussi parfaitement instruit que celui qui écrivoit cette lettre, les assuroit positivement que l'on convient chez les ministres que rien ne seroit plus puissant pour opérer une insurrection en France que d'envoyer un prince François en Vendée; on pouvoit être sûr que l'Angleterre n'y consentiroit jamais, parceque l'Angleterre vouloit bien la destruction

des Jacobins, mais non le rétablissement de la Maison de Bourbon ; que dans ces dispositions les conquêtes que feroient les coalisés seroient le germe de leurs dissensions. Qu'il s'agissoit seulement de faire écrire de la part du Comité de Salut Public à tous les départements et clubs associés aux Jacobins qu'ils persuadassent bien le peuple de cette grande vérité, que les puissances étoient d'accord entr'elles pour détruire la République, anéantir la France, et la partager. Il se répandit en suite en longues discussions sur l'opinion de Robespierre et de l'Abbé Siéyès. Il leur rappela qu'ils étoient convenus le 3 Mai, qu'avant de se fixer à aucune idée, il falloit attendre les révolutions prêtes à éclore en Allemagne et en Espagne ; qu'il falloit prévoir les événements dans toute leur étendue, et donner aux arrêtés du Comité du 2 Mai toute la latitude dont ils pouvoient être susceptibles. Que les instructions avec lesquelles étoit parti le citoyen Megent pour les armées des Pyrénées étoient de tout point insuffisantes, parcequ'il ne falloit pas se flatter qu'un citoyen d'un aussi grand talent que Megent put travailler avec un aussi grand succès pour les projets du Comité, s'il ne les connoissoit pas dans toute leur étendue. Qu'il prévoyoit comme Robespierre la possibilité de la marche de l'armée de l'Empereur sur Paris ; que la Comité de la Guerre leur avoit clairement démontré par la communication des plans de l'Empereur ; qu'en les supposant couronnés par les plus entiers succès, si la République n'étoit pas trahie à Cambrai et Maubeuge, il étoit impossible que l'armée ennemie s'approchât vraiment de Paris d'une manière menaçante avant la fin de Juillet. Qu'il falloit donc employer les dernières ressources pécuniaires de la République à maintenir ses intelligences dans cette armée et à les accroître. Qu'il falloit, en même temps, fomentier par tous les moyens possibles, les étonnans succès des insurgés de Pologne ; souscrire à toutes les conditions qui seroient imposées par la Suède et la Danemark ; mais, qu'en même temps qu'on prendroit tous ces moyens conservatoires, il falloit en prévoir le non-succès, et se décider, au cas que les armées marchent sur Paris, à adopter en entier le projet du Comité de la Guerre, dont la base étoit de se rendre avec tous les membres du Club des Jacobins, avec la portion de l'armée Parisienne qui resteroit fidèle, et tous les trésors que l'on auroit pu conserver à la République, dans les provinces du Midi. Que le moment à saisir pour exécuter ce projet seroit celui où le Comité de Salut Public, parfaitement instruit de la position, jugeroit cette mesure nécessaire ; en même temps qu'il prendroit les moyens les plus sévère et les plus forts pour comprimer tout mouvement dans la multitude. Que le Comité de la Guerre avoit encore un plan à cet effet dont le succès paroissoit immanquable. Qu'il faudroit aussi décider, à l'avance, cette grande question ; à la quelle des deux armées des Alpes ou des Pyrénées convient-il de confier les destinées de la Convention ? Qu'il y avoit à ce sujet dans le Comité de la Guerre deux avis opposés ; celui du citoyen La Fite, qui pensoit qu'il falloit se réfugier dans l'armée des Alpes, et celui du citoyen Darçon, qui pensoit qu'il falloit se jeter en masse dans l'armée des Pyrénées, et pénétrer avec elle dans l'intérieur de l'Espagne. Que depuis deux jours il entendoit discuter toutes les chances de l'un et de l'autre parti ; que la majorité des membres du Comité se rangeoit à l'opinion de Darçon, et que, quant à lui, il la jugeoit politiquement la meilleure de toutes. Qu'en attendant que le Comité se décidât sur les rapports qu'on devoit lui faire, il demandoit que le citoyen Megent fut instruit dans tous les détails du projet du Comité ; et qu'on envoyât aux armées des Alpes le citoyen Lindet, avec la même commission que Megent, les mêmes pouvoirs, et la même confiance. Qu'en attendant, il falloit redonner à Paris une nouvelle énergie en unissant toujours davantage le sort de la ville de Paris à

celui de la Convention, et que, pour cet effet, il demandoit expressément qu'on ordonnât au Tribunal Révolutionnaire de juger les prisonniers du Temple.

“Ce long discours, qui dura près de deux heures, n'éprouva aucune sorte de contradiction. Il fut donc décrété que les commissions populaires entreroient sur le champ en fonction dans les prisons ; que le Comité feroit part à tous les départements et clubs patriotes des plans des puissances étrangères pour la destruction de la France ; que tout le numéraire de la Trésorerie Nationale, celui de toutes les confiscations faites et à faire seroit mis en réquisition actuelle le lendemain 6 ; et que St. Just se concerteroit avec le Comité de la Guerre pour l'engager à présenter son rapport le plutôt possible ; que le Tribunal Révolutionnaire auroit ordre de juger les prisonniers du Temple.

“Dès le lendemain 6, les prisons ont été entièrement occupées par les commissions populaires. Leur première démarche a été de dépouiller tous les prisonniers de tout ce qu'ils pouvoient posséder, de ne laisser à chacun en assignats que de quoi se nourrir pendant un mois, à 50 sols par jour.

“Le 7, on a fait sortir de prison 80 personnes réclamées par le club des Jacobins, comme vrais patriotes. Les commissaires de la Convention ne dissimulent pas que tous les prisonniers suspects qui ne seront pas égorgés, seront déportés dans les ports de mer ; ce qui ne sera pas autre chose que de les faire massacrer hors de Paris.

“Le 8, le Comité de Salut Public décida de faire rentrer dans Paris, et de placer dans différentes prisons qu'on y prépare, tous les prisonniers qui sont dans des châteaux et casernes dans les bourgs et villages. Il est impossible de savoir en ce moment à quel nombre se portent les massacres déjà faits dans les prisons. Ce que l'on sait pour l'avoir vu c'est que de l'Hôtel de la Force, dans la nuit du 8 au 9, il est sorti trois chariots remplis de cadavres.

“Dans le Comité du 7, il y eut une chose mémorable ; c'est que St. Just reprocha à Robespierre d'avoir dans son discours pour le rétablissement d'un culte, nommé le Lord Stanhope, quoiqu'on l'eût prié instamment de ne pas le compromettre, et qu'on l'en eût prié de la part de Lord Stanhope. Robespierre nia qu'on lui eût rien dit de pareil. Barrère lui soutint alors en face non seulement qu'il le lui avoit dit, mais encore que, par excès de précaution, il lui avoit lû la lettre de Lord Stanhope à ce sujet ; d'on il résulte clairement que Barrère est son correspondant à Paris.

“Le 8 au soir, le Comité reçut l'avis que le Général Clairfayt avoit fait de telles dispositions que l'armée de Fichégru couroit les plus imminens dangers. Le Comité est dans la plus grande alarme à ce sujet.

“Le Comité a décidé, le 8, que Madame la Duchesse d'Orléans seroit jugée et exécutée après Santerre.”

#### *Enclosure 2.*

#### BULLETIN No. 23.

1794, May 10-16, Paris.—“En conséquence des ordres du Comité de Salut Public du 5 et 6 Mai, Fouquier Tinville, accusateur au Tribunal Révolutionnaire, prévint par un billet le Comité, le 9 au soir, qu'il étoit disposé, ainsi que le Tribunal, à faire périr Madame Elizabeth le lendemain. Le Comité envoya chercher à minuit Henriot, Commandant de la Garde, pour savoir s'il y avoit quelque danger à craindre de la part du peuple. Le réponse d'Henriot fut qu'il n'y avoit

rien à craindre ; aussitôt, le Comité de Salut Public ordonna à Tinville d'agir. On eut quelque peine à trouver dans l'état-major de l'armée Parisienne un homme qui voulut se charger d'aller chercher Madame Elizabeth pour la conduire à la Conciergerie. Robespierre désigna le nommé Saralier. Ce monstre se rendit au Temple à l'entrée de la nuit ; il monta chez Madame Elizabeth et Madame Royale, suivi d'un huissier appelé Monet, et d'un officier d'artillerie appelé Fontaine ; la femme et les filles du geolier y étoient aussi. Madame Elizabeth faisoit la lecture à Madame Royale quand on l'interrompit pour lui signifier qu'elle devoit se rendre à la Conciergerie. Elle reçut cet arrêt avec le plus grand courage, et dit à Madame Royale, 'préparez-vous, ma fille, vous me suivrez bientôt.' Elle vouloit lui parler en secret ; on l'en empêcha. Elle vouloit l'embrasser ; Saralier s'y opposa. Comme la femme et les filles du geolier fondoient en larmes, Saralier, craignant, a-t-il dit depuis au Comité, de n'être plus obéi par ses soldats, saisit Madame Elizabeth, voulut l'attacher, et comme elle faisoit quelque résistance pour ne pas abandonner sa nièce sans lui avoir dit quelque secret auparavant, ce monstre se porta jusqu'aux dernières fureurs ; il la saisit par les cheveux et l'arracha de sa chambre. Elle passa la nuit en prières à la Conciergerie. Amenée à onze heures devant ses juges, son interrogatoire dura à peine vingt minutes. Elle fut exécutée le soir même, 10. Elle est morte comme un héros, avec une telle patience et une telle tranquillité que sa mort a produit même parmi les monstres qui l'ont égorgée, un tel étonnement que, le soir même 10, il fut porté chez tous les imprimeurs et journalistes un ordre du Comité de Salut Public, qui défendoit de parler d'aucun des détails de cet événement.

"Dans la nuit du 10, le Comité resta assemblé jusqu'au lendemain 11. Il s'agissoit de faire renouveler les pouvoirs du Comité de Salut Public, et on savoit à n'en pas douter que St. Just et tous ses partisans devoient s'y déclarer contre Robespierre, et demander que l'on revint au scrutin pour la confirmation ou le renvoi de chacun des membres du Comité. Il faut que, Robespierre et l'Abbé Siéyès ayant cru que leur parti s'étoit affaibli puisque l'assemblée du Comité, cette nuit-là fût entièrement employée à négocier le raccommodement et l'union de St. Just et de Robespierre. Elle a été enfin conclue en apparence, mais, assurément, elle ne l'est pas en réalité ; car le lendemain 11, à huit heures du matin, St. Just assembla ses amis chez lui avant de se rendre à l'Assemblée pour leur faire approuver sa conduite, qu'il leur représenta comme dictée par les circonstances, et surtout par la nécessité de faire renouveler les pouvoirs du Comité. Le Maire Pache a été absolument sacrifié par Robespierre à la haine et à la rage de St. Just, qui exigea qu'il fut arrêté sur le champ, et séance tenante, et remplacé par Florian, l'un de ses plus intimes complices. Le Comité fut, en effet, renouvelé le lendemain, sans éprouver la moindre opposition.

"Le lendemain, 11, le Comité s'assembla à 5 heures du soir ; il s'y passa la plus effroyable scène qu'il soit possible d'imaginer du nommé Tupin, jadis chef d'un des bureaux de l'intendance du Languedoc pour la partie des contrôles des domaines, homme estimé et bien récompensé jadis par le Gouvernement, vieillard de 65 ans, homme extrêmement habile dans sa partie. Député à la Convention, se présenta au Comité avec Cambon, pour y dire qu'en vertu des arrangements qu'il avoit pris avec le citoyen Laumont, commissaire des revenus nationaux, et qu'avoit approuvé le Comité de Salut Public, il s'étoit engagé à procurer à la République 20 millions en numéraire, et toute la fortune en assignats des ci-devant fermiers-généraux ; que son objet étoit rempli puisqu'il les avoit fait exécuter tous le 5 de Mai et jours suivants, en vertu des accusations qu'il leur avoit intentées. Qu'il lui avoit été

promis ainsi qu'à l'Accusateur Public, le 10 per cent. de tout le numéraire qui seroit trouvé dans leurs confiscations ; qu'à ce compte il leur seroit dû près de 1,400,000 francs ; qu'on ne vouloit leur donner à chacun que 100,000 écus en assignats. Cambon parla en faveur de la Trésorerie, et le Comité ordonna que les 100,000 écus seroient payés en assignats, sans que la Trésorerie fut tenue de rendre aucun compte au citoyen Tupin.

" Dans la nuit du 12 au 13, le Comité s'attendoit à recevoir le compte du travail du Comité Militaire sur le parti à prendre, et celui qu'il devoit choisir entre ceux qui proposoient la Fite et Darçon, mais l'un et l'autre écrivirent au Comité, que les courriers multipliés qu'ils recevoient sans cesse des armées du Nord, et la position critique où se trouvoient ces armées absorboient toute leur attention et tous leurs moments. Que malgré les avantages remportés dans la Ouest-Flandre par les Républicains, il étoit très possible que l'on fut obligé de se replier sur la France, et de renoncer à ce plan de campagne, excellent sous tous les rapports, qui avoit pour objet de porter le théâtre de la guerre sur le territoire ennemi ; qu'avant peu de jours le sort de ces armées seroit décidé ; que tout ce qu'ils désiroient du Comité étoit de n'admettre aucune raison, quelle qu'elle fût, qui autorisât les généraux et les commissaires de la Convention à différer d'un seul moment d'exécuter les ordres d'attaquer, sur les quels tous les plans du Comité étoient fondés.

" Le Comité passa le reste de la séance à écouter les relations de Buchot, chargé des affaires étrangères. Il apprit au Comité qu'il étoit arrivé, la veille au soir par Bâle, un officier d'artillerie Polonois nommé Zedulkeski, qui lui avoit apporté des lettres des généraux Polonois. Que ces lettres lui apprenoient les victoires importantes qu'ils venoient de remporter. Qu'il venoit prier le Comité avec les plus vives instances d'accorder un prêt de 16 millions en numéraire à la nation Polonoise, qui, sans ce secours, se trouveroit réduite aux plus affreuses nécessités ; que jusqu'ici elle n'avoit pu obtenir de la Porte Ottomane que des promesses sans aucun effet, et 1,200,000 francs une fois payés ; que cet empire n'attendoit que des succès ultérieurs pour se déclarer, et, qu'en témoignage de cela, il garnissoit toutes ses frontières de troupes. Que le Général Kulkiusko [Kosciusko] avoit signé, aussitôt qu'il avoit été maître de Varsovie, des articles arrêtés entre lui et la Suède qui, si les succès soutenoient, devoient amener à la prompte conclusion d'un traité. Que la Pologne étoit décidée plus que jamais à s'unir par une alliance éternelle avec la République Française ; que lui Kulkiusko et ses confrères sentoient toute la nécessité de déclarer appartenant à la nation toutes les propriétés de l'église en Pologne, mais que ce parti à prendre offroit des difficultés insurmontables, jusqu'à ce que le parti de Kulkiusko eût acquis une assez grande prépondérance pour pouvoir prononcer nettement les principes de la Convention sur les propriétés des Ecclésiastiques. Que c'étoit pour obtenir ce succès qu'il demandoit avec les plus vives instances le prêt de 16 millions ; ce qui lui a été absolument refusé, le Comité ayant résolu, d'après l'avis de St. Just, que, si le général Kulkiusko étoit maître de Varsovie et faisoit éclater la révolution dans la Lithuanie, alors le Comité lui accorderoit un subside de 2 millions par chaque mois, à la charge qu'il enverroit un commissaire qui résideroit auprès du Général et y jouiroit de la protection du droit des gens ; le Comité s'engageant, néanmoins, à l'instant que la Suède et la Turquie se seroient publiquement déclarées, à fournir en une seule fois, à la place du subside par mois, les 16 millions demandés. Cette affaire s'est traitée avec assez d'unanimité dans les opinions.

“ Il n'en a pas été ainsi le lendemain quand il fut question de la Vendée. Il paroît que la ville d'Angers a été saccagée et détruite par les Royalistes. Ce qui excite surtout de grands débats fut la plainte que formoient les municipalités et les départements contre les représentants du peuple auprès de ces armées, qui par les exécutions qu'ils faisoient faire des prisonniers, avoient autorisé de leur part les plus cruelles représailles. St. Just soutint la nécessité de continuer à traiter les Royalistes en rebelles, et son avis prévalut sur celui de Robespierre, qui vouloit l'établissement du cartel.

“ Pour s'emparer et mettre à la disposition du Comité tous ceux qui, ne possédant rien dans la République, se dévouent à ceux qui les payent, le Comité a ordonné de faire le rapport qui étoit préparé depuis trois mois, et qu'on n'avoit pas osé faire, sur l'extinction de la mendicité. Le 14, par une très savante manœuvre de l'Abbé Siéyès, le Comité qui commençait à redouter l'autorité des tribunaux révolutionnaires des départements, qui sembloient s'éloigner de ses opinions, a fait supprimer tous les tribunaux révolutionnaires des départements avec des restrictions telles qu'il put en conserver, et en créer de nouveaux à volonté ; ce qui veut dire qu'il put avoir des assassins dans chaque commune à son bon plaisir.

“ On a remarqué avec grand soin que, lors du débat de Cambon et de Tupin, que le premier, fortement appuyé par St. Just, insista sur la nécessité absolue de ne jamais se dessaisir d'aucune partie du numéraire, vît le besoin extrême que l'on en avoit pour les approvisionnements et négociations extérieures. St. Just répéta plusieurs fois que l'existence et le salut de la République Française dépendoit du plus ou moins d'argent que pouvoit fournir la Convention. Il dit qu'il étoit fortement convaincu que, si la République pouvoit amasser la quantité de numéraire nécessaire avant la fin de l'été, il n'existeroit pas un état qui ne fut en pleine révolution ; que tous les Cabinets et toutes les armées étoient à vendre ; que tout ministre à qui la Convention fourniroit de l'argent et qui ne viendrait pas à bout d'acheter une place, un chef dans les bureaux des ministres, et la mort des tyrans, méritoit l'échaffaud ; et que Forgues n'y monteroit qu'après la vérité de ces principes. Il ajouta qu'en ce moment avec de l'argent on feroit déclarer la guerre par la Turquie, la Suède, le Danemark, et l'Amérique septentrionale, et cela dans ce moment où il n'y avoit pas un état en guerre avec la République qui n'eût tous les préparatifs d'une révolution, à laquelle il ne falloit pour éclore que de l'argent.

“ Dans la nuit du 15 au 16, Jeannot, Piquet, et Potonier portèrent au Comité de Salut Public un plan pour les approvisionnements à faire par la Mer Méditerranée, dont les bases étoient déjà jettées ; mais il s'agissoit de faire remplacer le Bailli de Foresta et les trois agens de la Convention arrêtés à Gênes comme complices de la faction d'Hébert. Dans ce projet les agens du Comité dans le Levant doivent, à quelque prix que ce soit, accaparer les bleds dans la Morée, et l'Égypte ; on doit en acheter dans la Mer Adriatique et à Triëste. L'entrepôt général doit être à Malthe. On doit mettre à ce prix la vie de tous les Chevaliers qui sont en prison en France, et offrir à Malthe toutes les concessions, nantissements, et sûreté pour la décider à accorder cette faveur à la République. Le Comité décida que les commissaires de la Convention à Constantinople seroient chargés d'autoriser le citoyen Florenville à se mettre à la tête de toutes les négociations dont étoient chargés les commissaires arrêtés à Gênes, et à choisir lui-même ses agens.”

## FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, June 17, Milan.—“I have the honor to enclose a Bulletin. The assertion respecting the Court of Denmark is so extraordinary that I am inclined to think that there must have been some mistake in the disguise in which the original is written.

“With regard to the paragraph on the affairs of Genoa, it may be necessary to observe that the magazines, which Tilly had formed at St. Pierre d’Arona, have been lately in great measure sold off. I have heard nothing from Genoa of any provisional treaty between that Republic and France being on the *tapis*, though such a measure has been doubtless long the object of the wishes of the Democratic party.

“It appears that Tilly still continues to preserve his credit with the Committee of Public Safety, under the patronage and protection of Robespierre, and notwithstanding the severe censures of St. Just.”

*Enclosure.*

## BULLETIN No. 24.

17, Mai 17–24, Paris.—“Dans la nuit du 16 au 17, Lindet, membre du Comité de Salut Public, instruisit le Comité qu’il pouvoit entièrement compter sur les cinq membres qu’il avoit chargé de composer la commission populaire à l’effet de se débarrasser de tous les détenus comme suspects; qu’il proposoit seulement au Comité de changer le mode d’encouragement qu’on avoit proposé d’accorder à ce tribunal, qui consistoit à lui accorder le vingtième de toutes les confiscations qu’il procuroit à la République par la condamnation des détenus; que cette manière de récompenser, donnant le droit à ceux qui l’obtenoient de s’immiscer dans les affaires du Trésor National, il valoit mieux accorder à chaque membre du nouveau tribunal 100,000 frans à chacun pour les six mois qu’on croyoit que devoit durer cette commission, leur réservant le droit d’en demander une nouvelle, si le tribunal étoit obligé de prolonger ses séances.

“Le 18, la séance du Comité fut très orageuse, et se prolongea toute la nuit. Robespierre y porta des plaintes contre certains membres, dit-il, de la Convention qui répandoient dans le peuple, et écrivoient dans les départements qu’il s’emparoit de toutes les autorités, et que le Comité de Salut Public étoit entièrement dans sa dépendance; que son but étoit quand il seroit le maître, de se vendre ensuite à la puissance que lui feroit le meilleur accord; que c’étoit aussi pour préparer sa ruine que l’on affectoit de publier qu’il étoit brouillé avec Collot d’Herbois; qu’il savoit que dans ce moment toute division dans le Comité de Salut Public seroit mortelle pour la République; qu’il avoit eu, en effet, quelque différend avec Collot d’Herbois, mais qu’ils étoient, à présent, parfaitement d’accord. Comme personne ne répondoit au discours de Robespierre, St. Just prit la parole avec beaucoup de violence et lui dit; que sans prétendre juger quels étoient ses projets à venir, il n’avoit pu s’empêcher de causer avec ses collègues de l’immensité de pouvoir dont s’emparoisent Robespierre et l’Abbé Siéyès; qu’il n’avoit pu s’empêcher de faire observer que Robespierre cherchoit par tout moyen à s’emparer exclusivement de la garde nationale de Paris, et par elle de toutes les gardes nationales du royaume; qu’il n’avoit pu s’empêcher de faire observer la marche de Robespierre qui, sous prétexte que l’état-major de la garde nationale étoit composée d’Hébertistes et Moderantistes, avoit fait décréter par le Comité du



Salut-Public, réduit à trois de ses membres en l'absence de tous les autres, que chaque individu de cet état-major passeroit au scrutin épuratoire du Comité, et que ceux qui n'obtiendroient pas ses suffrages seroient remplacés par le Comité seul; c'est à-dire Robespierre qui, présidant la Convention, sauroit prendre le moment où il n'y auroit que les membres à sa dévotion. Robespierre fut obligé, en conséquence, de proposer que l'on ne pourroit nommer à l'état-major de la garde que lorsqu'il s'y trouveroit huit membres des douze qui composent le Comité. Malgré cette précaution, on ne peut se dissimuler que Robespierre aura presque toute l'influence; mais on ne peut se dissimuler aussi que St. Just, par ses attaques multipliées, ne détruise, peu à peu, la popularité de Robespierre.

“Le lendemain 19, la Municipalité de Paris s'étant rendue au Comité de Salut Public pour se plaindre que, toutes les nuits, malgré sa sévère vigilance, on affichoit des placards dans toutes les rues que menaçoient la Convention et la Municipalité, Robespierre dit que c'étoient des agens des princes François et ceux des puissances coalisées qui, à la fois, excitoient le mécontentement du peuple par tous les moyens, et, de l'autre, le provoquoient par ces placards; que l'autorité étoit trop divisée, ce qui lui oïtoit sa force. L'Abbé Siéyès, qui s'étoit rendu au Comité, parla dans le même sens. St. Just se leva alors avec la plus grande force, et sans nommer Robespierre, il dit nettement, qu'il y avoit un parti dans le Comité de Salut-Public qui faisoit par ses agens ce dont il accusoit ensuite les agens des Princes et des Coalisés; que tout cela n'avoit pour but que d'arroger l'autorité nationale à un seul et à ses amis; que déjà ce parti disposoit de tout dans la République; qu'il remplaçoit tous les officiers civils et militaires à son gré, et que depuis un mois il nommoit jusqu'aux juges de paix; qu'il n'ajoutoit qu'un mot, c'est que Pache avoit été le principal instrument de ce parti et que Robespierre avoit toujours été son protecteur. En parlant des princes François St. Just répéta plusieurs fois qu'on cherchoit à tromper le Comité avec de pareils phantômes, que l'unanimité de toutes les relations de leurs agens et correspondants au dehors leur prouvoit, que les princes François étoient dans un tel état d'abandon et de misère qu'ils n'avoient pas pour eux-mêmes les moyens d'exister plus longtemps; qu'il n'en étoit pas de même des agens des Coalisés, mais que toutes les relations prouvoient que toutes les intentions des puissances avoient pour objet d'éloigner et d'anéantir les princes Bourbons; qu'il falloit donc, pour ne pas s'égarer, partir de ces bases, et ne point parler des princes François, parceque cela rappelloit leur existence en France, où il importoit d'une part de les faire oublier, et de l'autre, à bien persuader à ceux qui pensoient à eux que les puissances vouloient partager et asservir la France, mais non pas y rétablir les Bourbons. Il avoua, après plusieurs autres discussions, que l'état de Paris étoit toujours de plus en plus allarmant par le défaut de subsistance de tout genre, excepté le vin et le pain, et parceque la Municipalité n'empêchoit pas les attroupemens. A quoi la Municipalité, qui étoit présente, répondit; qu'elle avoit défendu les attroupemens, mais que l'on éprouvoit presque partout de la résistance pour les dissiper, et qu'à peine on les avoit dissipés. Ils recommençoient que les chariots de blessés, qui arrivoient de toutes parts autour de Paris, entretenoient dans le peuple une fermentation funeste.

“St. Just, qui reprit la parole, dit clairement que l'état de Paris n'avoit jamais été plus allarmant; que si les armées de l'Empereur et de l'Angleterre avoient des succès et s'avançoient sur Paris l'explosion y étoit inévitable; non pas dans le sens que vouloit le faire craindre Robespierre, qui croyoit que les Parisiens feroient la contre-révolution

et proclameroient les Bourbons ; que cela n'arriveroit jamais à Paris parceque les Parisiens, en très grande majorité, n'attendoient que le moment favorable pour incendier, piller, et réduire Paris en cendres ; que quant à lui, qui prévoyoit le possibilité de cet événement sans le craindre, il avoit songé à des ressources qu'il développeroit dans le temps.

“ Le 21 matin, interrogé par celui qui écrit, sur ce qu'il avoit dit l'avant-veille, il lui dit nettement que cette crise étoit décisive à jamais, que d'ici à deux mois tout seroit fini. Que s'il pouvoit (ce fut son mot) atteindre, sans que Paris fut pris, les premières épis de la récolte, la République étoit sauvée et les Rois perdus ; que si on étoit forcé d'abandonner Paris, il falloit porter la Convention et tous ses partisans à Marceille, si on étoit les maîtres de Gênes ; et à Bordeaux, si on avoit laissé le temps aux coalisés de s'emparer de Gênes ; et qu'il vouloit faire décider cela très incessamment au Comité.

“ Le 22 au soir, on chargea le Président du Comité d'écrire à Richard et Choudien, représentans du peuple à l'armée du Nord, que le Comité leur fourniroit tout l'argent qu'ils demanderoient pour les intelligences qu'ils proposoient d'entretenir dans les armées du Duc d'York et de l'Empereur. Le même jour le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères déclara positivement qu'il alloit signer des préliminaires avec la Cour de Danemark, qu'il présenteroit incessamment au Comité. On lut aussi des lettres de Dugommier, général de l'armée des Pyrénées, qui demandoit que Millot et Soubrani eussent à leur disposition quinze cent mille livres, en numéraire, pour établir des intelligences dans l'armée Espagnole, et y acquérir des partisans qui leur promettoient les plus grands succès, si l'on assuroit leur fortune. Cette proposition fut rejetée comme n'offrant point de détails assez circonstanciés, et il fut ordonné d'écrire à Darligoyte de se rendre sur le champ à Perpignan, et d'y rassembler Millot, Soubrani, et Du Gommier, d'y prendre connoissance de leurs projets, et d'envoyer son avis par un courrier au Comité de Salut Public.

“ Le 23, il fut accordé à Dumas, général de l'armée des Alpes, et à Dumerviant autre général, la disposition d'une somme de quatre cents mille livres, pour les intelligences à entretenir dans le Piémont. On lut, ce même jour, une dépêche de Tilly, qui demande que l'on envoie promptement de la cavalerie à Nice ; qu'il est en mesure de signer un traité provisoire avec les Génois, qui savent, à n'en pouvoir douter, que l'Autriche veut les attaquer à Gavi, et les Piémontois à Savonne ; qu'il demande, en conséquence, que l'on s'empare au plutôt de Savonne ; qu'il a des magasins énormes à St. Pierre d'Arena ; qu'il faudra ensuite marcher sur Gênes et prendre le quartier-général à Vado, ainsi qu'il en est convenu avec les partisans de la République. On a ordonné à Tilly de se rendre sur le champ à Nice, et on a autorisé les Représentans du peuple en cette partie, à se concerter avec lui, et à tirer sur le Trésor National tout l'argent qui leur seroit nécessaire. Malgré tous ces préparatifs, le Comité de Salut Public est dans la plus grande agitation et le plus grand effroi. Il néglige toutes les affaires d'administration pour ne s'occuper que de ses dangers. Tous les jours St. Just et Robespierre ont des conférences avec Darçon à Passy, à Belleville, et à Buelle. On renforce, sans cesse, le parc d'artillerie à Meudon. Le 23, on y a envoyé une grande quantité aussi de munitions de guerre et de bouche.

“ Dans la nuit du 23 au 24, Robespierre alla chercher le roi au Temple et le conduisit à Meudon. Le fait est certain, quoiqu'il ne soit connu que du Comité de Salut Public. On croit être assuré qu'il a

été ramené au Temple la nuit du 24 au 25, et que ceci étoit un essai pour l'assurer de la facilité à s'en emparer.

"Nous avons reçu, le 23, une lettre du Général Charrette qui nous écrit que jamais ils n'ont été en meilleure posture qu'à présent; qu'il attend le retour de ses aides-de-camp de Londres pour commencer les plus grandes opérations, et, qu'en attendant, il vient de forcer toutes les autorités constituées depuis Angers jusqu'à Nantes et aux portes de Rennes, de lui fournir toutes les provisions et comestibles dont il avoit besoin. Qu'il a eu besoin, pour donner de l'activité à ses réquisitions, de faire pendre toute la municipalité en le département de Mortagne, qui refusoient d'obéir à ses ordres.

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 21, Mentz.—"My first idea on returning from our interview yesterday with Marshal Möllendorf was to go myself to Berlin: but on talking the business over with Lord Cornwallis, it was determined that it would be more advisable for me to write a strong letter to Count Haugwitz, for it was uncertain whether he had not already left Berlin, and equally uncertain, if I was to follow him to Poland, whether before I could get there he would not be on his road here, and our meeting be by this means retarded instead of being brought nearer. It was also conceived that my sudden appearance at Berlin immediately after such a conference would, beyond a doubt, betray what had passed in it, and be a public avowal that there was some hitch in the execution of our treaty, which would be a very unpleasant impression to be given at this moment. Besides, I felt I could write even still stronger than I could speak, and that, as it was a subject which was reducible to a single point, everything could be conveyed in a letter that could be said in conversation.

"In addition to the letter to Count Haugwitz which I have enclosed in my despatch (which I intend he should show to His Prussian Majesty) I have written a private one, where I enter into the consideration of his personal favour and power, and advert to all the risks to which these will be exposed as well as his reputation, if he suffers the cunning and knavery of those who surround the Marshal to prevail over him, and defeat the effect of a measure he himself has brought about. I have endeavoured to awaken all his alarms on these particular points, and to interest every feeling he can have for his character and situation in order to induce him to act up to what has been his constant professions from the first day of our negotiation. I have concluded this private letter by urging him to come here as soon as possible, and when he is [come] to exercise the authority with which I suppose him still to be invested; and in the case that his coming here soon should be impracticable, I have requested of him to name some place where we may have as early a meeting as possible; till I receive his answer I shall remain at Mannheim, which is as central a spot as I can fix on. I have sent Wiffin on with these letters, with directions to follow Count Haugwitz wherever he may be.

"The conduct of the Marshal and the language of Count Schulenberg, both in flat contradiction to what I have so repeatedly heard from the King of Prussia and from his confidential Minister, are melancholy proofs of the excessive weakness of the present Prussian Government, and I cannot but fear that Luchisini promotes in secret the resistance we have met with.

"I do not however like to despair; and it is my intention, while I remain near the Prussian army, to leave nothing untried likely to act on the ambition of the Marshal, or to influence on the narrow characters of those who are about him and to whom he listens too much.

"When I was at Bonne (on the 16th) I saw Count Walstein the favourite and, in a manner, Minister of the Elector of Cologne. This gentleman said that he had collected from Count Trautsmannsdorff, who had passed through in the morning, that after the affair of the 22nd of last month, many councils had been held by the Austrian Ministers, that *peace* had been recommended by Rollin, and only rejected because it was not known to whom or how to propose it; that many plans as well political as military had been discussed, and great wrangling and division of opinions taken place, and that at last the result was that the Emperor should immediately leave the Low Countries and return to Vienna. That the war should be reduced to a very circumscribed defensive, in which only part of West Flanders was to be comprised, under the persuasion that the Maritime Powers would (because they *must*) defend the remainder. There is such a degree of probability in this information that I do not hesitate to send it you in a private letter. It is certain the Emperor only altered his intention to go to his army in this neighbourhood when he got near Frankfort. He then took a round-about way to avoid it.

"I need not say how much this strange conduct of the Prussians vexes me, nor how much I have it at heart still to get all right."

#### LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 22, Beckenham.—"I feel it right to send you an extract from a letter of Mr. Elliot, heretofore Lieutenant-Governor of New York.

"I have known Mr. Jay's character intimately from his outset in public life. He was originally under me in adjusting some boundary lines of the Provinces. He has good sense and much information; has great appearance of coolness, and is a patient hearer with a good memory. He argues closely, but is long-winded and self-opinioned. He can bear any opposition to what he advances, provided that regard is shown to his abilities. He may be attached by good treatment, but will be unforgiving if he thinks himself neglected; he will expect to be looked up to, not merely as American agent, but as *Mr. Jay*, who was in Spain, who has been high in office from the beginning. On the whole they could not have made a better choice, as he certainly has good sense and judgment, both of which must have been mellowed since I saw him; but almost every man has a weak and assailable quarter, and Mr. Jay's weak side is *Mr. Jay*.

#### FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, June 24, Milan.—"I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a Bulletin.

"The following is an extract of a letter from my correspondent in answer to some questions I proposed to him relative to the negotiations which are said to be carrying on between France and two of the Baltic Powers, and to which he has so frequently alluded.

*"Vous me demandez dans votre lettre No. 12 des détails sur les négociations entre les scélérats et le Danemarck; mais pour l'intelligence*

*à venir des nouvelles que nous vous envoyons, il faut que vous sachiez qu'il est impossible qu'on nous abuse sur ce que se dit de plus secret dans le Comité de Salut Public ; mais nous avons éprouvé bien des fois que, comme il y a deux factions dominantes dans ce Comité, le ministre qui y rend des comptes abuse quelque fois le Comité par de fausses nouvelles qui favorisent le parti auquel il appartient.*

*"Quand De Forgues étoit ministre, nous avions un moyen sûr de rectifier ses rapports par nos intelligences dans son bureau intime ; nous n'avons pas encore le même avantage avec son successeur. Nous cherchons à nous le procurer, et cela nous est indispensable."*

*Enclosure.*

BULLETIN No. 25.

1794, Mai 26-31, Paris.—"Le 24 à la pointe du jour, le Comité de Salut Public se rassembla, au sujet de l'assassinat qui avoit été tenté sur Collot d'Herbois, l'ami intime de Robespierre. Aussitôt qu'il en fut question, St. Just n'hésita pas de déclarer que, depuis plus d'un mois, on savoit que le nommé L'Amival, coupable de cet assassinat, étoit un homme furieux et fou, que l'on réservoir comme une machine propre à mettre en action dans le moment ; que cet homme avoit été au point de l'assassiner lui-même à l'instigation de ses ennemis ; qu'il déclaroit donc, très positivement, qu'il ne doutoit pas que L'Amival n'eut voulu assassiner Collot d'Herbois, mais qu'il étoit très certain que Collot d'Herbois étoit prévenu du moment de cet assassinat, et que l'on avoit pris toutes les précautions nécessaires pour qu'il n'eut aucun effet ; qu'il attendoit maintenant ce que l'on vouloit faire de cette tragédie. Que si c'étoit, comme il avoit lieu de le croire, pour loger Robespierre et ses amis au Palais-National avec une garde, il se déclaroit à l'instant à la tête de ceux qui s'opposeroient à la tyrannie. Que si on vouloit employer cette tragédie à augmenter le pouvoir des Comités, il ne s'y opposeroit pas ; et que si on vouloit l'employer à pousser la guerre aux dernières extrémités, il seconderoit ce parti de tous ses moyens, et offroit, si cela étoit adopté, de partir le 26 pour se rendre aux armées du Nord. Après de très courts débats, tout ce que demandoit St. Just fut adopté.

"L'assassinat de Robespierre, dans la nuit du 24 au 25, fut une suite des manœuvres du Comité, mais il est à remarquer que les deux sujets qui ont voulu assassiner Robespierre et Collot d'Herbois l'ont voulu de bonne foi ; mais ils y ont été incités par les agens du Comité de Salut Public, et, comme de raison, trahis par eux.

"Avant son départ, St. Just exigea qu'on vérifiât devant lui et Lindet son ami, l'état réel du numéraire ; ce qui a eu lieu dans la nuit du 25 au 26, et St. Just déclara ce jour-là au Comité qu'il avoit vu et vérifié physiquement qu'en matière d'or, d'argent, et argent monnoyé, la République possédoit 365 millions à la disposition du Comité de Salut Public, et qu'il étoit bien aise que tous les membres du Comité de Salut Public, et ceux du Comité de Sûreté Générale fussent participans de ce secret, parceque de l'emploi que l'on feroit de ce fonds dépendoit le salut de la République.

"La division la plus déclarée est toujours dans le Comité de Salut Public. On y remarque que lorsque Robespierre proposa de faire décréter qu'il n'y auroit plus désormais de prisonniers de guerre Anglois, il demanda si cette mesure étoit celle d'un homme qui vouloit avoir quelque rapport avec Pitt ? A quoi St. Just répondit à l'instant que, si on le vouloit, il seroit aisé de prouver au Comité que la correspondance de certains gens avec

Pitt étoit la plus active cet hyver, et cela au moment où les crimes du Gouvernement Anglois étoient à l'ordre du jour aux Jacobins et à la Convention.

" Dans la nuit du 27 au 28, on lut au Comité des lettres arrivées de l'Amérique Septentrionale, en date du premier Avril.

" Les agens du Comité lui assurent que la guerre entre l'Angleterre et les États-Unis paroît inévitable ; qu'elle seroit déclarée à l'instant si l'on ne pouvoit conclure le traité avec la Suède et le Danemark. Qu'il est important d'autoriser les commissaires de la Convention en Amérique de signer les préliminaires d'un traité éventuel, et à dire de la part de la Convention au Congrès, que la Convention est résolue de ne traiter avec les puissances du Nord, qu'en appelant à ce même traité l'Amérique Septentrionale. Cette dernière demande fut rejetée par le Comité à l'unanimité, et le surplus fut renvoyé au Pouvoir-Exécutif pour s'entendre avec le Ministre des États-Unis, et en rendre compte ensuite au Comité. St. Just est parti pour l'armée du Nord, mais son ami Lindet au Comité de Salut Public y a pris la part de l'opposition contre Robespierre, Barrère, et Couthon, de manière à prouver que le voyage de St. Just peut augmenter son pouvoir et non le diminuer.

" Dans la séance du Comité du 28 au 29, les commissaires du Pouvoir Exécutif rendirent compte des lettres qu'on avoit reçues du 16 et 18 Mai, du Général du Gommier. Ce général y disoit que ses intelligences en Espagne étoient nombreuses et sûres, parceque la plupart des subalternes Espagnols étoient très mécontents de leur état ; que l'on feroit un très mauvais emploi de l'argent en s'obstinant à vouloir l'employer pour favoriser la désertion, qu'il falloit l'employer à fomenter le mécontentement et à disorganiser totalement cette armée ; que cela seroit moins dispendieux, plus facile, et infiniment plus utile ; que quoique le Roi dépensât beaucoup d'argent pour ses armées, il étoit certain que les soldats y étoient nuds et manquoient de vivres ; que les officiers étoient sans aucune volonté, qu'ils abhorroient leurs généraux, la plupart fort ignorants ; que c'étoit donc le mécontentement qu'il falloit fomenter non la désertion, parceque le soldat étoit féroce et soumis. Le Pouvoir Exécutif demande qu'il fut autorisé à accorder 60,000 livres à la disposition de Du Gommier pour récompenser des intelligences qui lui avoient livré St. Laurent de Mauge, ce que lui fut accordé sans discussion.

" Darçon, président du Comité-Militaire, prit ensuite la parole pour blamer, avec beaucoup d'amertume, les plans de campagne envoyés par le général Du Gommier, et autorisé par Millot et Soubrani, représentants du peuple. Il dit, nommément, que l'ineptie connue de ces gens-là pouvoit seule les garantir de l'accusation de trahison ; que le plan de Du Gommier ne rouloit que sur la possibilité de s'emparer de la Catalogne, et sur la volonté d'y faire une guerre réglée, en s'y emparant pied à pied de toutes les places et terrains ; qu'il parloit même de faire le siège de Barcelone ; que ce plan extravagant étoit entièrement contraire à celui du Comité de la Guerre, qui consistoit principalement, après avoir chassé les Espagnols de la France, à établir de formidables camps retranchés sur leurs frontières, et essayer de faire soulever toute la Catalogne pour la République Française ; et, pour y parvenir, la dévaster et la ruiner entièrement par des pillages et des dévastations. Il offrit de partir sur le champ pour y diriger les plans du Comité Militaire jusqu'au moment, dit-il, où les succès des armées du Nord portant toutes les forces de la Convention au Midi, il seroit alors raisonnable de changer de système. Le départ de Darçon fut rejeté, mais toutes ses réflexions furent adoptées.

“ Le 29, on lut les dépêches d'Henin du 7 Mai. Il assuroit que les intentions de la Porte étoient excellentes pour la République; que les Ministres des Puissances Coalisées étoient obligés de faire tous leurs efforts pour l'engager à garder sa neutralité. Que le Reis-Effendi a des conférences journalières avec eux et avec les agens de la Pologne. Que le Grand-Vizir l'a fait prévenir qu'il seroit peut-être forcé par les réclamations de l'Angleterre et de l'Empereur de demander à la République qu'elle rappelât ses quatre frégates; mais qu'on ne se presseroit pas de les faire partir. Qu'en conséquence, il vient d'ordonner à une de ces frégates d'établir sa croisière entre l'isle de Tenedos et le Cap Janissaire. Que les autres ont ordre de parcourir l'Archipel en tout sens, et de visiter avec la dernière rigueur tous les batiments neutres. Le Comité a approuvé la conduite de Hénin, et l'a prévenu qu'en lui envoyant, s'il en étoit requis, l'ordre de renvoyer les quatre frégates, il enverroit au Capitaine St. Vallier, commandant des frégates, l'ordre de rester dans la même position.

“ Dans la séance du Comité du 30 au 31, on lut les lettres de Stockolm du 11 Mai. Les agens de la République disent que tout s'y dispose à signer un traité avec la République, qu'on leur a fait part avec la plus intime confiance de tout ce qui s'est passé avec le Danemark; que l'on n'est pas aussi avancé qu'on le désiroit avec la Turquie; que cela arrête la marche des choses, et le traité général. Que le Régent désiroit qu'on envoyât de France à Stockolm, à ses frais, un homme habile dans l'art des écritures; et sur ce que Du Barraud demanda ce que cela vouloit dire, et ce qu'on désiroit, Buchot lui dit tout naïvement, qu'il croyoit, d'après les insinuations verbales qu'on lui avoit faites, que c'étoit un bon faussaire qu'on vouloit pour le procès de Darmfeld.

“ Le Comité autorisa qu'on envoyât sur le champ Bethenay, un de ses agens, qui a été archiviste de l'ordre de Malthe, chassé de sa place par le Bailli de Margou, et qui a été plusieurs fois en procès criminel comme faussaire. Il va à Stockholm sous le nom de Chauvin.

“ On lut au même Comité des lettres de Tilly du 20 Mai. Il exhortoit avec les plus vives instances, d'avancer en force vers Savonne; qu'il y avoit des intelligences multipliées; que la place seroit livrée à la première sommation, ou qu'il y auroit une révolte où les partisans des Jacobins seroient les plus forts; que de là il falloit marcher sur Gènes; qu'il y avoit des magasins énormes de toute espèce à St. Pierre d'Aréna; que dès qu'ils paroistroient, il y auroit une révolution dans la ville; mais qu'il étoit inutile de l'espérer tant qu'on ne tiendrait pas aux partisans de la Convention les promesses qu'il leur avoit faites par écrit, le 30 Avril, par ordre du Comité de Salut Public. Le Comité de Salut Public ordonna qu'on envoyât les ordres les plus précis d'agir aux commissaires représentans du peuple à Nice.

“ Le même jour le Comité reçut la nouvelle que la flotte de Howe tenoit en échec celle de Brest; que le riche convoi venant des isles étoit dans le plus grand danger d'être pris; que le bruit même se répandoit qu'il étoit pris; que jamais il n'y avoit eu plus des dangers à courir pour une descente qu'elle aura lieu suivant les apparences à St. Malo; que les Royalistes de la Vendée s'étoient réunis le 20 Mai aux Chouans; que ceux-ci s'étoient mis aux ordres des chefs de la Vendée, et qu'ainsi cette armée s'étend depuis Grandville, Coutance, et Avranches, jusqu'aux portes de Nantes; qu'elle existe partout sans être fixe nulle-part, et ne se fait connoître que par des dévastations et les massacres les plus horribles.

“ Ce même jour, les nouvelles des armées du Nord annonçoient des désastres, et le Comité de Salut Public refusa non seulement d'en faire

part à la Convention, mais nomma Lindet et Robespierre pour en conférer avec le Ministre.

“ Le 30, le Roi étoit rentré au Temple.

“ Le même jour 30, Darçon alla au Comité déclarer qu'avant de former un plan de campagne à exécuter en cas de défaite et d'abandon de Paris, il falloit que le Comité décidât, péremptoirement, un fait; savoir, si la Convention se retireroit à Bordeaux ou à Lyon; que St. Just et Lindet vouloient Bordeaux, Robespierre et Barrère Lyon; que le Comité à la pluralité des voix étoit pour Bordeaux. Le Comité remit à délibérer uniquement sur ce sujet au Mardi, 3 Juin.

“ Lindet proposa qu'on étendit à toutes les puissances le décret pour ne faire aucun prisonnier. Collet d'Herbois déclara que tel étoit bien le plan du Comité, mais qu'il falloit voir comment ce décret contre l'Angleterre réussiroit dans les armées du Nord, et que, à la première représaille que feroient les Anglois, il falloit, pour rendre le peuple participant à cette mesure du Comité, livrer à sa colère les prisonniers Anglois qui étoient en France.

“ Barrère annonça ensuite au Comité que son ami Stanhope recommandoit au Comité un Colonel Hamilton, Anglois, membre de la convention d'Ecosse, qui se réfugioit en France.”

*French. Copy.*

#### BULLETIN No. 26.

1794, Juin 2-7, Paris.—“ Le Sieur Voulland, créature de Robespierre, Député de la ville d'Usez, un des plus lâches scélérats de l'Assemblée, a été élu à la fois Président du Club des Jacobins, et Président de la Convention. C'est ce monstre qui a imaginé et fait exécuter toute l'exécrable calomnie de cet infâme Serrurier qui a prétendu que le feu Roi avoit voulu l'empoisonner.

“ Il s'en faut bien que Robespierre, malgré sa toute-puissance, en jouisse avec sécurité. Il tremble d'être assassiné, et a demandé avec instance au Comité de Salut Public de ne plus s'assembler la nuit dans des lieux éloignés du Palais National, qui est le Louvre.

“ L'état de la ville de Paris est véritablement incroyable. Il faut le voir de près pour se persuader le possibilité qu'il existe un pareil ordre de choses. La très grande majorité du peuple, on peut même dire la totalité de tout ce qui reste encore de propriétaires, boutiquiers, marchands et négocians, est au désespoir. Mais chaque jour, ou plutôt chaque instant, voit changer leur façon de penser. S'ils apprennent des succès des armées du Nord ou de la Vendée, ils ne s'occupent que de conserver les débris de leur fortune, et d'échapper aux vengeances qu'a méritées la ville de Paris. S'ils apprennent quelque disgrâce dans les armées coalisées, ou quelque fausse démarche en politique, ils croient à l'instant que tout est perdu, que le règne des Scélérats est indestructible. Non seulement ils croient à toutes les calomnies que le Convention fait répandre contre les intentions des Rois coalisés, mais ils les regardent eux-mêmes avec une sorte de rage, et, dans leur fureur, ils poussent vraiment tous les partis aux mesures les plus violentes. Cette canaille, car on ne peut pas donner d'autre nom à tout ce qui est dans Paris de quelque parti qu'il soit, est dans cette disposition qu'elle est prête à se soumettre, et sans aucune restriction, à la première force qui pourra l'emparer de Paris; qu'elle préféreroit que les Rois eussent les moyens d'être les plus forts; que s'ils l'étoient, elle se soumettroit à l'autorité la plus despotique, non seulement sans murmure mais avec le plus grand empressement, mais de rien faire pour eux qui puisse hâter



leurs succès, il n'y faut pas compter en rien ; et, si les Rois doivent succomber, ils n'auroient pas de pires ennemis que ces gens désespérés qui, d'une part, pour obtenir la vie du parti vainqueur, et de l'autre, pour se venger des Rois, feroient l'impossible pour que l'Europe entière fut bouleversée. Voilà quel est l'esprit journalier de tout ce qui est bourgeois, marchand, négociant, ou homme enfin ayant de quoi vivre par lui-même. Tout ce qui n'a rien, tout ce qui est simple manouvrier réuni avec tout ce que est de gens perdus et les voleurs, formé essentiellement le peuple dévoué à la Convention. Celui-là a le courage de tous les crimes ; celui-là souffre beaucoup moins de la disette que toutes les autres classes de la société ; celui-là regardant tous les meurtres, tous les assassinats du Tribunal Révolutionnaire comme des profits pour le trésor de la Convention, applaudit à toutes les exécutions, et exige souvent d'une manière menaçante, qu'il y ait des exécutions. Et, néanmoins, cette populace affreuse, altérée de sang et de crimes, mais plus altérée encore de l'ardeur du pillage, seroit, sans hésiter un moment, la première, si elle voyoit les armées Royales s'approcher de Paris, à égorger depuis le premier jusqu'au dernier membre de la Convention, et à piller tout ce qu'il seroit possible de piller dans Paris.

“ Le Comité de Salut Public est à cet égard parfaitement au fait de sa position dans Paris, et il a le courage de ne pas vouloir qu'on le flatte à cet égard. Mais sa grande et sûre ressource est dans la lâcheté excessive de tous les partis, qui les empêchera de jamais oser rien tenter sans l'entière certitude du succès. En conséquence, le Comité pour être dans les circonstances même les plus difficiles le maître absolu du parti qu'il aura à prendre, a pris tous les moyens imaginables, et les plus violents, pour qu'aucune nouvelle ne parvienne à Paris que par son organe. Il est défendu à tous les maîtres de poste du royaume, sous peine de la vie, de fournir des chevaux à qui que ce soit, sans un ordre du Comité de Salut Public ou des Représentants du peuple dans les départements. Et, de plus, dans tous les lieux publics de Paris il y a une foule d'espions du Comité qui arrêtent, à l'instant, tous ceux qui sans mission du Comité répandent des nouvelles. Deux jours après ils sont guillotins ; et le nommé Chantemerle, qui au Café de Foy a appris la nouvelle de la victoire de l'Empereur auprès de la Sambre, a été arrêté et guillotiné le lendemain comme conspirateur. Par ce moyen le Comité sera toujours averti plusieurs jours à l'avance, et, il useroit des momens où il joueroit encore de sa pleine puissance pour opérer sa retraite. Depuis plus de cinq semaines il y a dans le camp de Meudon 350 mulets, des chevaux, des trains et bagages de toute espèce. Depuis cinq semaines, il n'y a pas un écu en espèce, ni un marc en argent, dans aucune caisse nationale ; tout est déposé dans les mains du Comité de Salut Public ; et partie de ses richesses sont à Meudon, partie dans les caveaux du vieux Louvre et de St. Germain l'Auxerrois. Toute la partie de la garde nationale qui a conduit le Roi au supplice, et dont l'Assemblée a fait soigneusement imprimer le nom de chaque individu, tout ce qui, enfin, ne peut espérer aucune grâce, formeroit l'arrière garde de l'Assemblée. Voilà dans ce moment, 2 Juin, les dispositions de tous les partis et de la Convention. Savoir où elle porteroit ses pas est bien décidé dans la tête de Robespierre, mais le Comité de Salut Public n'est pas décidé. Il ne s'occupe vivement des projets de Darçon et de La Fitte à ce sujet que lorsqu'il y a des désastres et de l'effroi dans le Comité.

“ Le 2, Robespierre s'emporta violemment contre les Commissaires Millot et Soubrani. Il lut une lettre de Dartigoyte, son ami particulier et Représentant du peuple dans le même pays, qui lui dénonce que Dugommier et les deux autres commissaires ont consenti à ce que le commandant de Collioure fit partir des émigrés, avant la signature de la

capitulation ; tandis, dit Robespierre, qu'il eut été de la plus grande importance de se les faire remettre pour les faire supplicier dans toutes les provinces méridionales, à l'effet d'irriter le peuple contre l'Espagne. Il lut en même temps une lettre de Chateau-Neuf de Rhendon, Représentant de la Convention en Languedoc, qui lui apprenoit qu'il faisoit imprimer dans tous les patois de cette province, la capitulation de Collioure, avec des additions qui feroient le meilleur effet. Collot d'Herbois, donnant dans les sens de Robespierre, proposa de charger Chateau-Neuf de Rhendon de faire traduire en grande hâte des prisons d'Avignon, de Montbrison, et de Lyon, dans différentes villes de provinces méridionales, et de les y faire exécuter comme émigrés rendus par la Cour d'Espagne ; ce qui a été adopté.

" Le 4, Robespierre prononça un discours furieux contre ceux, sans les nommer, qui avoient forcé à ordonner la sortie de la flotte de Toulon. Lindet se leva contre lui, soutint qu'il vouloit apparemment attaquer St. Just qui avoit été de cette opinion, déclara que s'il arrivoit quelque chose à la flotte, ce seroit parceque Robespierre, malgré la volonté du Comité, pour complaire à Salicetti, avoit fait ordonner au Commandant de cette flotte par d'Albarade sa créature, d'aller secourir La Corse au lieu de se porter à Gênes, ainsi que l'avoit fait décréter St. Just. Mais que si cela arrivoit, il falloit que la tête de Robespierre ou la sienne tombât. Cette violente dispute a causé les plus grandes inquiétudes à Barrère et à Couthon les amis de Robespierre, et il paroît impossible de les rapprocher.

" Le 5, toute la séance du Comité fut uniquement employée à la lecture des dépêches de St. Just. Il apprenoit qu'on avoit beaucoup grassé dans les commencemens les avantages de l'Empereur près la Sambre ; qu'il avoit été tenu une espèce de comité à Maestricht, dont le résultat avoit été le départ de l'Empereur pour Vienne, l'abandon des plans du Colonel Mack, la résolution de former les sièges de Maubeuge et de Lille ; que le désespoir étoit dans les armées Imperiale et Angloise, que les plus fumeux généraux regardoient la campagne comme totalement perdue ; qu'il demandoit avec les plus vives instances que le Comité prit la résolution de mettre à l'entière disposition de ses agens aux armées une somme importante, parcequ'il étoit hors de doute que le départ de l'Empereur alloit faire naître des divisions parmi les généraux, dont il étoit important de profiter. La résolution du Comité a été d'envoyer Billaud de Varennes joindre St. Just, à l'effet de faire un dernier rapport, qui décideroit la marche du Comité.

" Le 6, Carnot lut les lettres les plus effrayantes sur les progrès des Royalistes de la Vendée. Nantes, St. Malo, et Rennes sont sur le point de tomber entre leur mains. Le résultat fut d'envoyer des armées du Rhin, de celle du Nord, de celle des Ardennes, de forts détachemens à la Vendée, et de les remplacer par la deuxième réquisition qu'on leveroit à l'instant même, et par la troisième, qu'on leveroit dans tous les Départemens à mesure que l'on auroit fait la récolte.

" Le 7, D'Albarade écrivit au Comité que les nouvelles de la flotte de Brest, cansoient les plus grandes inquiétudes, mais qu'il attendoit ce soir même un courrier de Jean Bon St. André, et qu'il n'avoit réellement rien de positif à mander au Comité.

" Le 9 Juin.—St. Just vient d'arriver dans ce moment à Paris ; il y a répandu la consternation ; à Brest, on ne doute pas de la perte du grand convoi et de plusieurs bâtimens de guerre. Le Comité a obligé St. Just à écrire à Barthélemy que le discours qu'on lui attribuoit n'étoit pas de lui ; qu'il étoit de Mr. Pitt. On n'a pas encore osé le désavouer à Paris même, parcequ'il y est trop récemment connu, et que les exemplaires imprimés en Hollande et en Suisse que le Comité a reçus,

et que ses agens lui ont envoyés, sont conformes de tout point à ceux qui ont été imprimés à Paris chez Garnieri et Baudoin.

*French. Copy.*

# BULLETIN No. 27.

1794, June 8-14, Paris.—“Le 5 Juin, Lindet envoya un courrier à St. Just, le prévenant de ce qui s'étoit passé, le 4, au Comité de Salut Public entre lui et Robespierre à son sujet, lui demandant instamment de revenir à Paris le plutôt possible. St. Just arriva le 7, à 2 heures du matin. Il alla descendre à la Municipalité. Il fit venir le maire à l'Hôtel de Ville et le requit d'envoyer, sur le champ, des gendarmes chez chaque membre du Comité de Salut Public leur apprendre son arrivée, et les sommer de sa part de se rendre tout de suite à la salle du Comité. Le Comité fut assemblé, le 8, à cinq heures du matin, et resta assemblé jusqu'à 11 heures. St. Just n'y dit pas une seule parole qui eut le moindre rapport à ce qui avoit excité la colère de Lindet, le 4. Il rendit compte de la situation des armées, loua la bravoure des troupes de la République en disant qu'il avoit chargé cinq fois les Autrichiens à la tête de la cavalerie ; mais il se livra aux plus fortes invectives contre les Généraux Pichegru, Jourdan, et contre les ordres contradictoires et absurdes, dit-il, que donnoit, sans cesse, ou le Comité de la Guerre, ou le Comité de Salut Public, ou les Représentans du peuple. Que les généraux étoient extrêmement mécontents et découragés, qu'ils cherchoient à se faire valoir par les plus absurdes et les plus grossières calomnies, qu'ils faisoient à la Convention des rapports d'une fausseté évidente, mais qui leur étoient commandés par des gens qui vouloient dominer et le Comité de Salut Public et la Convention ; qu'il pouvoit déclarer en toute vérité et sur sa responsabilité que, nommément, l'entrée dans la Ouest Flandres n'étoit due, ni aux plans du Comité de la Guerre, ni aux résolutions des généraux des armées du Nord. Que les Autrichiens eux-mêmes avoient bien pu s'en convaincre par la prise et les dépositions de Chapuy Tourville, qui étoit leur prisonnier. Que l'occupation de la Ouest Flandres par les troupes de la République étoit due, toute entière, à la haine que les généraux des troupes de l'Empereur portoit au Colonel Mack, et à l'exécution de ses plans. Que le Général Kinski, nommément, avoit, par ses manœuvres, forcé à entrer en Ouest Flandres, mais que les messieurs du Conseil de Guerre n'avoient rien à revendiquer à cet égard, car il déclaroit qu'ils n'avoient eu aucune part aux manœuvres du General Kinski, aucune espèce de relation avec lui ; et que tout ce qui s'étoit passé à cet égard, n'avoit été que l'effet d'intrigues aux quelles ces messieurs n'avoient eu aucune part. Il ajouta que, s'il étoit prudent de publier toutes les preuves qu'il avoit de ces faits, il le feroit du haut de la tribune, et au milieu de la Convention ; parceque là, dit-il, il y avoit des gens plus disposés à l'écouter que dans le Comité de Salut Public. Il dit aussi qu'il y avoit dans l'armée un parti qui tenoit à des messieurs puissants qui corrompoient l'esprit public en cherchant à persuader à des troupes écrasées par les fatigues, que l'on traitoit de conclure la paix, ou au moins, de faire une trêve ; qu'on lui avoit tenu des propos à cet égard dont il rendroit compte en temps et lieu.

“Il rendit ensuite le compte le plus décourageant qu'il soit possible s'imaginer, de la situation des armées du Nord, et des événements à venir de la campagne. Il déclara nettement au Comité, sans aucun détour, que si la division ne se mettoit pas parmi les ennemis, et si l'union la plus intime ne se rétablissoit pas dans le Comité, la République étoit anéantie ; qu'il ne falloit pas économiser sur les moyens de détruire la

force des armées combinées, par la désunion de leurs chefs ; qu'il *faillait* y employer jusqu'au dernier marc d'argent qui se trouvoit en France ; que dans les dispositions où étoient les choses, et d'après le départ de l'Empereur, il avouoit qu'il mériteroit de perdre la tête, si cette affaire lui étoit confiée, qu'on lui fournit tous les moyens, et qu'il ne réussit pas. Qu'il demandoit, en conséquence, à retourner le plutôt possible aux armées, mais après ces trois préalables ; un décret qui réunit la toute-puissance en tout genre dans les mains du Comité de Salut Public, et qui, par le Tribunal Révolutionnaire, mit toutes les têtes à sa disposition ; le renouvellement de tous les pouvoirs du Comité ; et l'union de ses membres. Qu'il offroit de donner l'exemple du rapprochement avec Robespierre ; qu'il demandoit à avoir une conférence avec lui en présence de Couthon son ami ; et que le Comité se rassemblât le 8 au soir, à 9 heures, dans la salle ordinaire. Tout cela fut résolu, mais, avant que le Comité se séparât, le citoyen David, adjoint de d'Albarade Ministre de la Marine, y porta deux lettres, que le ministre avoit reçues dans la nuit ; l'une du Maire de Brest, et l'autre du Président du Département. Ces lettres furent lues à l'instant. L'une et l'autre disoient qu'il venoit d'arriver une frégate du nombre de celles qui, avec trois vaisseaux de ligne, escortoient le grand convoi des Isles ; que le capitaine avoit déclaré s'être échappé de la prise que les Anglois avoient faite de la totalité du convoi qui marchoit escorté par trois vaisseaux de ligne et plusieurs frégates ; qu'ils naviguoient tous sous pavillon neutre. Que les Anglois avoient arboré sur leur escadre le pavillon tricolor ; qu'ils avoient gagné de quatre jours de vitesse l'escadre Française, et s'en étoient emparés par cette trahison presque sans coup férir ; que ce convoi étoit de 254 voiles de la plus haute importance, et de la plus grande richesse. Le Maire ajoutoit qu'aussitôt qu'il eut eu connoissance de la déposition du Capitaine, il l'avoit fait arrêter et mettre au secret ; qu'il avoit fait défendre à tous ceux qui montoient la frégate de descendre à terre sous peine de la vie, et à qui que ce soit d'en approcher. Que le même jour il avoit appris que des trois frégates et des trois vaisseaux qui croisoient à la hauteur de Cherbourg, deux vaisseaux avoient été coulés bas, que le troisième étoit rentré tout en feu dans le port, et que l'on assuroit que la corvette, *l'Assemblée Nationale*, étoit au pouvoir des Anglois. Ces nouvelles qui se sont répandues assez promptement, quoique vaguement, à Paris, ont fait que l'inauguration de la nouvelle religion de Robespierre qui a eu lieu le 8, et où il a fait le Pontife et le Magistrat, s'est passée tristement. Le peuple avoit l'air de regarder tout cela sans curiosité, et avec ennui et mépris. Après la cérémonie Robespierre a été chez Couthon, et de là, il est venu avec lui au Comité de Salut Public à 9 heures du soir. L'Abbé Siéyès s'y est trouvé. Le Comité a été assemblé jusqu'au lendemain matin. Robespierre et St. Just se sont promis union et fraternité, dans la ferme résolution de s'égorger l'un l'autre au premier moment.

“ Le décret pour mettre toutes les têtes de la République à la disposition du Comité par le Tribunal Révolutionnaire y a été arrêté, ainsi que la demande du renouvellement du Comité, faite dans le même moment. Barrère y a rendu compte des dépêches secrètes des commissaires Cavagnac et Pinet auprès des armées de Bayonne, et de celles des commissaires Millot, D'Artigoye, et Soubrani près de l'armée de Rousillon. Il en résulte que l'armée de Bayonne a eu un petit avantage et s'est emparé du camp des Alledudas, et que celle du Rousillon exige absolument qu'on lui envoie de l'argent et des hommes, et qu'on établisse un tribunal révolutionnaire à Toulouse avec la même autorité de tout point que celui siégeant à Paris. Darçon, qui savoit le

rapport qu'on devoit faire, se présenta à onze heures à la porte du Comité, demandant à y faire un exposé. Robespierre vouloit qu'on l'introduisît ; St. Just déclara qu'il savoit que la fin de cet exposé n'étoit autre chose que lui Darçon se rendit à l'armée de Rousillon, et que, comme il importoit aux succès des armées du Nord qu'il restât à Paris, il s'opposoit à ce qu'il fut admis au Comité ; et en effet, on lui en refusa l'entrée. Alors, sur le rapport de Lindet, il fut décrété que l'on tireroit de l'armée opposée à la Vendée 10,000 hommes des meilleures troupes qui se porteroient en toute hâte à l'armée de Rousillon ; qu'elles seroient remplacées à la Vendée par les détachements des armées du Nord ; que tous les Représentans du peuple dans les provinces méridionales recevraient l'ordre de faire lever en toute hâte la deuxième et troisième réquisition, et d'envoyer toutes ces masses aux armées de Rousillon et de Navarre. Que l'on enverroit à l'armée de Rousillon les citoyens Joannot et Laumont, employés à la Trésorerie Nationale, pour y apporter tous les fonds nécessaires ; qu'il ne seroit point établi de tribunal révolutionnaire à Toulouse, mais que pour tout ce qui concernoit les réquisitions et la levée en masse, les commissaires feroient juger et exécuter à mort tout ce qui feroit obstacle aux moyens des conseils militaires.

“ Le 9, à la séance de la Convention, furent portés les deux décrets convenus ; l'un, en vingt-deux articles, pour renforcer l'autorité du Tribunal Révolutionnaire et sa dépendance du Comité de Salut Public ; l'autre pour renouveler les pouvoirs du Comité. Ce qui se passa en cette occasion a démontré bien clairement toute l'habileté de St. Just, et toute sa mauvaise foi dans son accommodement avec Robespierre. A peine le décret pour le Tribunal Révolutionnaire fut-il proposé, qu'un Député de Saintes, très ami de St. Just, se récria contre l'autorité despotique que le Comité prétendoit s'arroger sur la Représentation Nationale. Il fut aussitôt secondé par cinq ou six autres Députés du parti de St. Just. Quant à lui, il n'assista pas à la séance, à la fin de la quelle on rendit un décret qui jetoit sur le Comité tout l'odieux de la tyrannie de la Convention ; ou plutôt ce décret résolut ce que fut décidément rendu que le 10 ; mais dans la nuit du 9 au 10, et du 10 au 11 ; le Comité de Salut Public fut constamment assemblé, pendant plusieurs heures, pour déterminer la marche à suivre afin de faire révoquer ce décret. St. Just, sous prétexte de ses occupations et des ses fatigues, n'assista pas au Comité. L'Abbé Siéyès y assista, et parla comme un furieux pour forcer à ce qu'on révoquât ce décret, qui portoit atteinte à la suprématie du Comité, et le discréditoit. Robespierre, qui chaque jour devient plus sombre et plus violent, y donna tête baissée, et le 11, en effet, la Convention rapporta son décret ; mais l'effet en sera funeste pour Robespierre ; 1, parceque la question a été décidée au fond, et qu'aucun Député ne peut être envoyé en jugement sans un décret de la Convention ; 2, parceque le 12 au matin, St. Just et tous ses partisans se récrioient contre le despotisme de Robespierre et ce qui s'étoit passé le 9 et le 11 ; et donnoient en preuve de la volonté où étoit Robespierre de traiter avec les puissances étrangères pour faire la paix, sa conduite en cette occasion, où il n'avoit pas voulu souffrir la plus légère altération à ses volontés, pour prouver à l'Angleterre sa toute-puissance en France.

“ Le 12, la fermentation étoit extrême dans tous les clubs à Paris à ce sujet. Dans la nuit du 11 au 12, St. Just assista au Comité de Salut Public, et Robespierre n'y parut pas. Buchot y vint lire une dépêche de Barthélemy et une autre de Madame de Semonville. L'une et l'autre annonçoient que les dispositions des Suisses devenoient plus mauvaises chaque jour ; qu'il n'étoit pas douteux maintenant que la politique de la Suisse ne fut de rester neutre jusqu'à ce qu'elle put se

réunir à la coalition avec l'assurance du succès, mais pourtant lui donner une assistance décisive. Barthélemy dénonçoit que Madame de Semonville faisoit des placements en Suisse, et y faisoit venir sa fortune convertie en marchandises non prohibées. D'autre part Madame Semonville demandoit que l'on fit éclore une insurrection dans le pays de Vaud le plutôt possible, et qu'on lui donnât les pouvoirs nécessaires pour conclure un traité avec le parti dominant chez les Grisons. Les pouvoirs pour conclure ce traité ont été envoyés non pas à elle mais à Barthélemy, et il a été envoyé ordre à Huningue d'arrêter tous les ballots de marchandises adressés à Madame de Semonville."

*French. Copy.*

*Endorsed:* Intelligence received 29 July from Mr. Drake.

#### BULLETIN No. 28.

1794, Juin 14-22, Paris.—La dissension augmente sans cesse non seulement dans le Comité de Salut Public, mais elle éclate très fortement entre le Comité de Sûreté Générale et celui de Salut Public. Leurs attributions sont à peu près les mêmes, mais le Comité de Sûreté Générale n'a pas le maniement des deniers de la République Jacobine, et cela lui donne un furieux désavantage. C'est malgré l'avis du Comité de Sûreté Générale, rendu à la presque unanimité du Comité, que le Comité de Salut Public a fait rendre le décret qui reconstitue le Tribunal Révolutionnaire en la forme où il a été confirmé. St. Just a beaucoup d'influence dans le Comité de Sûreté Générale; néanmoins il paroisoit, jusqu'au 21, que la nécessité et les négociations de l'Abbé Siéyès réuniroient St. Just et Robespierre; que Robespierre auroit tout le maniement de l'intérieur, et St. Just l'autorité sur les armées; le tout en se servant toujours du nom du Comité de Salut Public, qui se trouve réellement partagé entre ces deux scélérats. Le 12 Juin, Robespierre avoit prononcé un discours très violent contre ses ennemies à la Convention. Il y avoit dit cette phrase très remarquable; *Je vous déclare qu'il suffiroit qu'un seul homme manifestât des principes opposés à ceux de la Convention, pour que 300,000 hommes se réunissent aussitôt à lui.*

"Le 13, le Comité de Salut Public fit sentir à Robespierre l'importance d'un pareil avertissement, qui alloit devenir public par le moyen des tachygraphes, qui copient les discours à la Convention aussi promptement qu'on les prononce. Robespierre convint de son tort sur le champ. On convint qu'il falloit que la phrase se terminât ainsi; *pour que tous les ennemis de la liberté se ralliassent à lui.* Cette décision fut prise le 13, à trois heures du matin; et à 4 heures, des gendarmes se rendent chez tous les rédacteurs de journaux, portant un billet ainsi conçu; *le Comité de Salut Public avertit le citoyen — que le citoyen Robespierre s'est exprimé ainsi à la séance du 12 Juin, et qu'il doit rapporter son discours dans cette forme dans son journal sous peine de mort. Signés, Couthon et Prieur de la Marne.*

"Dans la nuit du 13 au 14, l'Abbé Siéyès y lut un mémoire sur la nécessité de profiter de la reconstruction du Tribunal Révolutionnaire pour détruire, en totalité, ce qui restoit en France, de prêtres, de nobles, et de magistrats. Le moyen en étoit tout entier dans la nouvelle composition du Tribunal Révolutionnaire, et le prétexte dans deux conjurations qu'il demanda que le Comité fit dénoncer, le 14 et le 15; la première, celle du Baron de Batz, et la deuxième celle de Catherine Théos; la première pour y englober tout ce qu'on voudroit de nobles et de magistrats, la deuxième pour y englober tous les prêtres.

“ Le Baron de Batz, dont on a fait le prétexte d’une grande conjuration, est lui-même un scélérat de la plus vile espèce, que Carnot fit parfaitement connoître à cette même séance, en rappelant toute sa vie depuis dix ans. Son but étoit d’empêcher qu’on adoptât le projet de l’Abbé Siéyès. Ce Batz, fils d’un pâtissier de l’Albret, vint à Paris en 1784. Il y arriva sans un sou, mais y portant beaucoup de talent pour l’intrigue et beaucoup de friponnerie. Il se fit cette année-là une généalogie où il se faisoit descendre des princes souverains, des Comtes de Lomagne. Il vouloit se faire présenter à la Cour, mais il y avoit une si infâme réputation, qu’il ne put jamais en obtenir la permission du feu Roi, malgré la protection du Baron de Breteuil, qui en avoit fait un de ses agens. Il vendoit la protection du Baron de Breteuil, conjointement avec la Duchesse de Brancas, maîtresse du Baron. Il se fit, ensuite, agioteur et banquier ; et, enfin, en 1787, il avoit un hôtel à Paris, deux maisons superbes à la campagne, et 80,000 livres de rentes. Lors des États-Généraux, il se fit députer par la noblesse d’Albret, moyennant un don de 50,000 écus. Arrivé à Paris, il se fit placer par les États-Généraux dans le bureau-général des liquidations. À force d’argent, il s’en fit nommer le président, et là, pour faire préférer une créance à une autre, il se fit tellement payer par tous ceux qui avoient à faire à ce bureau, qu’on l’en chassa, en l’accusant d’avoir volé un million. Il est resté depuis à Paris, l’agent du Baron de Breteuil, et il est hors de doute que la multiplicité de ses intrigues a hâté la mort du Roi. C’est sur cet échafaudage que Robespierre et l’Abbé Siéyès ont absolument voulu qu’on échafaudât une conjuration qui put atteindre tous ceux qu’on voudroit faire périr.

“ Catherine Theos est une folle, qui depuis 15 ans se dit la *Sainte Vierge*. On l’a fait sortir de la maison où elle étoit renfermée pour servir de prétexte à la conjuration pour perdre les prêtres. Malgré tous les efforts de Carnot et de Prieur, il fut décidé qu’on adopteroit ces deux moyens en la forme proposée. Ce qui a eu lieu, en effet, le 14 et le 15.

“ Dans la nuit du 15 au 16, le Comité resta assemblé 11 heures de suite ; la Municipalité vint y rendre compte que la République avoit couru de grands dangers lors de la fête à *l’Eternel*, par la permission qu’elle avoit donné à tout citoyen d’y assister armé. Que les espions avoient entendu tenir de très mauvais propos. Que l’on se proposoit tous les Décadi de donner des fêtes semblables, soit à Paris, soit dans les départements. Le Comité donna, sur le champ, un ordre à la Municipalité pour défendre, sous peine de la vie, d’y parôître armé.

“ Il est impossible d’exprimer l’effroi qui régné dans le Comité de Salut Public. Cette terreur lui fait prendre les mesures le plus atroces. Le Tribunal Révolutionnaire qui lui est aveuglement soumis, a fait guillotiner en huit jours 157 personnes. Le peuple infâme de Paris se porte en foule à ces exécutions. On les fait toutes, maintenant, à la Barrière du Trône, afin que plus de spectateurs puissent y assister. La Municipalité dénonça aussi une révolte parmi les ouvriers employés à la manufacture des assignats. Le Comité ordonna que, dans la nuit du 16 au 17, on en fit étrangler 14 des principaux, sans autre forme de procès.

“ Le 15 matin, on afficha sur les murs de Paris, ou placarda dans tous les cafés, défense sous peine de mort de répandre des nouvelles propres à allarmer le peuple et à diminuer le patriotisme, défense sous peine de mort de calomnier les administrations. Cette défense a été public le 15, et le 16, à quatre heures du soir, onze personnes ont été guilloténées pour avoir semé de fausses nouvelles, et parlé en mal de

**l'Administration.** Les choses en sont à cet excès le 20, que deux patriotes, quelque prononcés qu'ils puissent être, ne peuvent dîner ensemble trois ou quatre fois, sans être arrêtés comme suspects. L'accusateur public, Foulquier, publiquement, en pleine audience du Tribunal Révolutionnaire, vous accuse d'avoir ri de telle manière, d'avoir causé avec telle ou telle personne suspecte, d'avoir menacé par geste la Représentation Nationale, et si les jurés disent que leur conscience est instruite, à quatre heures du soir vous allez à la guillotine.

"Le 16, Robespierre força Barrère de faire un rapport à la Convention Nationale. Il y lut une lettre de Jean Bon St. André du 9 Juin, qui place au 8 le combat de l'Amiral Howe du premier. Le même Jean Bon St. André écrit, du 12, que le convoi d'Amérique est à St. Mathieu, que, le 13, il est arrivé à Brest. Ni la Municipalité, ni aucune des autorités constituées n'ont écrit cela au Comité de Salut Public. Prieur de la Marne fit observer, le 15, que les papiers Anglais et la lettre de my Lord Howe plaçoient le combat au premier Juin, et non pas au 8 ; et, qu'au fait, on n'avait aucune nouvelle du convoi que par le dire de Jean Bon St. André. Robespierre, Couthon, et Barrère exigèrent absolument, que les lettres de Jean Bon St. André fussent lues et donuées comme positives à l'Assemblée. Il l'emporta d'une voix dans le Comité de Salut Public. Ce qui rend cela singulier c'est que Jean Bon St. André étoit réellement opposé à livrer bataille, qu'il en protesta contre les ordres du Comité avant de quitter Brest, et envoya sa protestation à Billaud de Varennes, son ami.

"À la séance du 19, Barrère annonça la prise d'Yprés, le 17. Robespierre l'a fait annoncer sans en avoir dit un seul mot au Comité, qui n'en a entendu parler que le 20, à la séance. A Paris on ne croit pas du tout à cet événement, parceque l'annonce de ces victoires a été suivie immédiatement de la création de 1700 millions d'assignats, et de l'offre de la Municipalité d'un emprunt forcé de 100 millions.

"Le 20, le Comité de Salut Public murmura beaucoup de ce que s'étoit passé à la séance du 19. Sur la motion de Carnot, malgré toutes les résistances de Robespierre, il fut ordonné au Ministre de la Guerre d'apporter l'original de la capitulation d'Yprés. Le Ministre se rendit au Comité pour y dire qu'il attendoit cette capitulation à tous les instants, mais qu'il ne l'avoit pas reçue. Le Comité reçut des lettres de la municipalité de Rouen qui lui apprenoit, qu'à l'avenir, elle ne pourroit donner que deux livres de pain par décade à chaque individu.

"Le même jour, la municipalité d'Orléans prévint qu'elle n'avoit plus du tout de pain à donner. Ce même jour, le Comité rendit un décret qui enjoit au Comité de la Guerre pour tout délai, de rendre compte des plans adoptés pour la retraite, en cas qu'elle ait lieu dans les provinces du midi, au 10 Juillet.

"Le 20, à cinq heures du soir, un gendarme de Paris revenant de la Vendée, passant dans la vieille rue du Temple, dit à un nommé Bénard, qu'il ne savoit pas être un juré du Tribunal Révolutionnaire, que tout ce qu'on disoit de la Vendée étoit faux, que les Royalistes occupoient cinquante lieues de terrain, et étoient plus de 60,000 hommes. Ce malheureux, dénoncé le soir même, a été guillotiné le 21, à quatre heures."

*French. Copy.*

*Endorsed:* Intelligence from Mr. Drake, received August 2nd.



## LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 25, Hague.—“I enclose to you a private letter from Lord Malmsbury, with many apologies for my having opened it, which I assure you was owing entirely to mistake.

“Though it had always been expected here that the Prussian Ministers and Generals on the Rhine would endeavour, by secret and underhand means, to retain that army in its present position, we are quite astonished at finding that they have had the effrontery openly to oppose its removal to the Belgic Provinces on any pretended ground of right. It certainly does not become me to offer any opinion as to the instructions that it may be advisable to send to Lord Malmsbury on this occasion, but I take it for granted that the scene of the negotiation will, at any rate, be removed to Berlin, or to the King of Prussia's head-quarters: it being evidently impossible to treat to any effect with such prejudiced and ill-disposed persons as Marshal Möllendorff and his diplomatic associates.

“The late untoward events in west Flanders have, of course, occasioned a good deal of alarm here, but I need not say that we are in no immediate danger, unless it be from *within*, where the malcontent party is becoming daily more insolent, in consequence of the supineness of the Government, and particularly of the Grand Pensionary. I am endeavouring to rouse him from his lethargy; but my efforts, hitherto, have been to little purpose.”

## LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, June 25, Beckenham.—“There is on my table a letter from Mallet du Pan dated ‘Berne 5 Juin 1794’ and addressed to a correspondent in England. It is written dogmatically and conceitedly, but with some touches of strong sense. I will transcribe some detached passages.

*“Me voici encore Helvétien, grâce aux exploits de Pichégru. Je me souciois peu de le recevoir en Brabant. Cette campagne sera au moins infructueuse. Elle débute même de manière à faire trembler pour ses suites. Les alliés attaqués chaque jour avec fureur, n’ont aucune armées de réserve.”*

*“La crise actuelle est la pire où l’Europe se soit encore trouvée depuis quatre ans. Les revers des alliés, la fluctuation des chances, l’indomptable résistance des Français, le spectacle de leurs moyens gigantesques démolissent chaque jour l’opinion. Quelques horribles que soient les scènes de férocité dont Paris est le théâtre, il suffit que ses armées soient victorieuses. Partout le vulgaire s’attache au plus heureux, sans considérer la moralité respective des actions.”*

*“Le commerce, séduit par l’appât de gains énormes avec les Français, est redevenue leur allié en Italie, en Allemagne et presque partout. Des propriétaires aussi aveugles ne voyent de même que les sacrifices du moment. Il faut leur arracher de modiques secours aux Gouvernemens. La peur leur fait désirer la paix, et ils donneroient pour l’avoir avec des brigands sans foi, toutes les offrandes qu’ils refusent aux dangers de la société générale, et au leur propre.”*

*“Les Prussiens font de grandes efforts. Ils ne sont pas encore suffisants.”*

*“La Piémont a repris courage; 28 mille Autrichiens y sont arrivés. On n’a plus d’alarmes. Cependant, je vous le répète, le salut de la Révolution tient à celui de l’armée des Pays Bas. Si celle des Français est vigoureusement battue, elle sera presque anéantie. La Comité en*

*tremble. Il se regarde comme perdu si cette événement a lieu. J'ai vu une lettre d'un de ses membres qui s'informe s'il pourrait au besoin trouver un asyle en Suisse."*

THE MARQUIS OF HERTFORD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, June 26, Nivelles.—“I am so unequal to the task of writing an official dispatch to you by Mr. Timms, after having been fourteen hours on horseback, that I hope you will accept a private letter of a few lines instead of it. Whenever I get to Brussels, where I intend being to-morrow evening, I shall be able to recollect myself, and will go into some very important matter to which our new situation compels us to attend. In the mean time, it is necessary to acquaint you that the great struggle of to-day has not ended to our advantage, that after an unsuccessful attack on the whole chain of French posts at Gosselies, Fleurus, and other points, the Austrians were obliged to retire with a considerable loss, and the enemy remained in possession of the field of battle, though we had all the advantage of acting in a plain, and employing a prodigious body of German cavalry. The Prince of Cobourg retreats to a strong position near Halle in order to cover Brussels; Clerfaut is at Ghent, and we have just heard that Charleroi, with an Austrian garrison of 2,200 men, is fallen into the hands of the enemy. It gives me real concern that I am not enabled to send you a more favourable account of our operations.”

LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, June 28, Manheim.—“I feel more hurt and more indignant at the conduct of the Prussians than I can describe. I do not naturally lean to despond, but I know enough of the shallowness of the King of Prussia's character not to give way more to fear than to hope on this occasion. I think I have done more good (if it deserves that name) by coming here than if I had run after Haugwiz or the King of Prussia, and I believe my presence has kept the opposition under and checked their operations. The great evil was Count Haugwiz leaving me at Frankfort, and the thing the most to be wished is to get him to come here as soon as possible. I am endeavouring to bring about this by every means I can devise. It is *here* the push must be made.”

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, June 29, Downing Street.—“By some mistake Lord Cornwallis's despatch did not reach the Office till this morning, after I had received Lord Malmesbury's from you. My first impression was exactly the same as yours, that we ought to insist on an immediate order for the Prussians to march, or consider the treaty as broken, but the postscript to Lord Cornwallis's private letter would of itself shake that resolution; and I confess too that, on considering part of M. Möllendorff's reasoning, I have some doubt whether, pressing as the necessity is, it is really practicable to bring them down without some arrangement to supply, in part, their place. We otherwise may run the risk that the French army on the Rhine will first destroy the inadequate force left to oppose it in that quarter, and either push its operations on that side in a way that will distract our operations in Flanders, or, afterwards, bring down to this side a greater proportionate reinforcement to the enemy,

than that which we shall have obtained. In either of these two ways, the general balance of force against us will be encreased. I wish much to talk over these ideas with you before we actually send decisive instructions. If I could answer for nothing fresh coming for four and twenty hours, I would come down to you ; but as that is far from being the case I should be very glad if you could spare time to meet me at dinner to-morrow at Wimbledon. Dundas will then be returned, with whom I should be glad that we should both converse. Pray return the despatch and Lord Cornwallis's letter early in the morning.

"I was employing myself in forming a statement of efficient force for the month of August, which I had nearly brought myself to think would still bring this campaign to a good issue. But all my speculations depended on the full use of the Prussians, and if that cannot be obtained we are condemned to a *wretched defensive*. We must, however, attempt even impossibilities to avoid it. Nothing yet from Burlington House.

"I send you a letter from Lord Moira. Be so good to return it also. I have had a dispatch sent to him, to advise him not to risk remaining at Ostend if he thinks the enemy in force enough to make it untenable."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, June 30, Camp, Weymouth.—"At the request of Lord Clifford, I trouble you upon a business, which, from his letter, appears to have been fully explained to Mr. Pitt ; and, not knowing how far you are apprised of the opportunities which the Tower prisoners have of corresponding, I enclose to you two copies, which my chairman sent to me. But, whatever liberty of correspondence is given to the prisoners, I am sorry that you have been forbid to correspond with me, for nothing else would have made you drop me entirely for six weeks."

#### GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 1, Windsor.—"I sincerely feel the disaster of the Prince of Cobourg not having succeeded in his attack of the enemy near Nivelles, of which no accounts are received by Lord Grenville but in the short but too authentic statement in the Marquis of Hertford's private letter, and the few lines from Mr. Bruce.

"There is no doubt of the dismay it will occasion at Vienna ; I therefore highly approve of no time being lost in conveying the strongest assurances in my name of persevering in the most vigorous efforts which the present crisis requires.

"I return only the private letter from the Marquis of Hertford ; the rest of the papers shall follow in the course of the day."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, July 1, Brussels.—"My principal object, when last in England, was to impress on your Lordship's mind, more forcibly than by writing, my clear conviction that, on the one hand, France, in men and in resources, was infinitely more formidable than the generality of intelligence received, and the common line of political reasoning inclined persons to suppose. And, on the other, that the Court of Vienna was, at present, a most suspicious, and dangerous dependance for the prosecution of the war in this quarter. My opinion on the first point arose from the combining all the information and all the

observations which it had been my unremitting study last winter, with constant opportunity before me, to collect from France. The second was confirmed to me by my knowledge of Prince Cobourg, and of the inferior officers who at all times guide him; by the opinion which from my experience I had conceived of the generality of Austrian officers; by the political systems of the Ministers and Directors at Vienna, and the effectual opposition that I knew to be made from thence to the principles and conduct of the war, as recommended and approved by Great Britain; whether the mode of opposition was by refusing to send the necessary re-inforcements and to come to terms with the States of this country; or by discrediting General Mack, whose sentiments on the war had been sanctioned by the King's Ministers, but whose character (incapable as he is of sacrificing his military reputation to political purposes, and of concealing his impressions against persons of every description) was an object against which intrigue could easily be exercised.

"These convictions, founded on those and other considerations not so immediately within the sphere of my observations, I deposited when in London, less in detail with your Lordship (from the occupations you had) than with one or rather two persons who enjoy your intimate friendship, and with whom, of course, I ventured to converse most confidentially. Since then, my discussions with the Ministers who accompanied the Emperor, and my acquaintance with all that passed during a month that I remained with the army, previous to the 16th May, left no doubt in my mind on the one or the other of these opinions. To this was added the contempt which our army had acquired of the Austrians; and the total change in prospect, as well as in the then state of the combined military operations. And it was under these impressions, and these circumstances, finding the determination taken of not allowing *Ministers* as such to follow the Austrian army, that I offered to remain at the Austrian head-quarters in my military capacity. I conveyed this offer in a public letter, because I wished the matter to be considered in a view to its public utility alone. I had no inducement to solicit your Lordship's personal goodwill in my behalf. For, I give you my word, I felt that if it was accepted, I should thereby be placed in a situation in all respects inferior to my other situation, in one of a very trifling degree of importance, and the most odious that could be devised. Your Lordship knows that, without waiting for any answer, I quitted the head-quarters on the very day that the return of post arrived; and I have never since been at the army.

"The measure might, I am aware, be considered as imprudent in regard to my Lord Yarmouth, but when I can with accuracy assert that, under all the circumstances of this mission, I have never deferred giving him the earliest notice of every matter of interest in my knowledge, without having received from him, in return, any one single communication of any kind, I may be allowed to deny having had any personal view whatever on that occasion directed against him."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, July 3, Downing Street.—"The offer made to me by your Lordship of the Spanish Embassy was so flattering that, though contented and happy in the honourable situation in which your Lordship's protection had placed me, I accepted it without that enquiry into the nature of its advantages and disadvantages which I should have made,

had I not supposed that your Lordship wished for my immediate determination. I have since often regretted the sacrifice that I made to the ambition of the moment. I fear the climate for Lady Elizabeth and my children, and am distressed at the thoughts of not being able to procure for the latter at Madrid the masters that are requisite for their education, which will render an early separation from them necessary. My earnest wish, therefore, is to return to Vienna with the same rank and appointments which I enjoyed there, should Lord Hertford, in consequence of his father's death, decline that mission. As, in any arrangements that may be in contemplation, the vacancy of the Spanish Embassy may be as convenient as that of the Vienna Mission, I have ventured to submit my sentiments to your Lordship, and I entreat you to have the goodness to let my wish be humbly laid before His Majesty. I desire no pecuniary compensation for the expenses which I have necessarily incurred, but I may presume and hope for the honour of the Privy Council, as a mark that the change is not in consequence of any disapprobation of my conduct."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, July 5, Downing Street.—"The mistake which has arisen is, I really think, no fault of mine, but is not on that account the less embarrassing. I have just seen the Duke of Portland, and find from him that the whole arrangement, which in all other respects seems to have been satisfactorily settled, is likely to go off on this difficulty. On the other hand I feel it quite impossible to venture the experiment of leaving the War Department in the Duke's hands. You know the difficulty with *other* Departments, even with the advantage of Dundas's turn for facilitating business, and of every act of his being as much *mine* as *his*; and, therefore, if all the details of the war (particularly in one line which I need not mention) were to be settled by communication with a person new both to me and to *others*, I am sure the business could not go on for a week. This is the leading consideration with me, and seems decisive. I own, besides, that though I have a perfect confidence in the Duke of Portland's intention to act cordially, and have no doubt of our being on the best terms, I could neither expect to establish the same sort of communication with him which I am used to with Dundas, nor could I be content, on the other hand, to leave that Department to his *separate* management. Under this difficulty what can be done to prevent the arrangement breaking off, which will be, in all views, worse a thousand times than if it had never been thought of? I see in the first moment but one, which depends entirely on yourself; and I know too [well] your general way of thinking and feeling towards me, as well as your anxiety on the points now depending, to have any scruple in mentioning it; though it is a proposal that you should make what must probably be a considerable personal sacrifice. If you were to take the Home Department (new-modelled as we propose it, and leaving the war to Dundas) the Duke of Portland would probably be equally satisfied with succeeding you, as he would have been with the other Department entire. The arrangement for business will, undoubtedly, be far less convenient, as well as the situation to yourself less pleasant. But the latter consideration is not likely to decide you under such circumstances, and things might at least go on in this way reasonably well. If you can devise any other expedient I shall be inexpressibly obliged to you, but I am persuaded you will agree with me, that the two things to be

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avoided are, that the arrangement should break off, or that the War Department should be put into the Duke of Portland's hands. I have said nothing of the effect on Dundas's situation of giving the Duke the Department entire; though I should feel that as a great objection. He however would not, I am persuaded, let it stand in the way, if that were all, but the other difficulties are insurmountable. The result of all is, that I am afraid I must beg you, if possible, to breakfast at Wimbledon to-morrow. An early hour will on all accounts suit me best, and will probably answer best for yourself, if this heat continues. I dine at Wimbledon to-day, and will beg you to send your answer to me there, whether you can come to-morrow."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1794, July 5, Dropmore.—"Happening to be out this evening rather later than usual, I did not get your letter till it was too late to answer it with any chance of its reaching you to-night. I may probably be at Wimbledon to-morrow before you get this, but I will at least take the chance in order to say in a very few words that I and my situation are, as you well know, entirely and always at your disposal, and that, besides, I agree with you in thinking the expedient you propose the best to avoid an alternative which seems either way embarrassing. Under these circumstances I do not ask myself whether what is proposed is or is not a sacrifice on my part, but am ready at once to say that no consideration could reconcile to my mind the standing for a moment in the way of your wishes, or of so great a public object as is in question."

*Copy.*

LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, July 6, Berne.—Applying for leave to return to England for a few months, or, if his absence from Switzerland in existing circumstances should be considered inadmissible, to reside during the winter at Lausanne.

If I obtain leave of absence, it will be necessary to appoint some one to assume my functions here. M. Mounier is willing to accept the position; and, in order to avoid the difficulties incidental to his birth and religion, he proposes to carry on his public correspondence in the name of the Sardinian Minister, Baron de Vignet des Étoles. I would gladly recommend M. Pictet as Chargé d'Affaires in my absence if it were not that "he is one of the most imprudent and inconsiderate men I know, heedless with whom he places his confidence, and absurdly vain of the appearance of being connected with me; the consequence of which is that he holds forth in all companies without distinction, while his own is generally composed of a set of prying inquisitive French emigrants, and that his unguarded language unfortunately passes with all for the expression of my sentiments."

I would further beg of your Lordship to take an early opportunity of transferring me from a station "which I have multiplied reasons to be displeased at, not only from the most insufferable coldness and pride which distinguish the people I live with, but from the pain I experience in seeing them act with a degree of meanness towards the declared enemies of my King and country which would even disgrace a more degenerated people. What I complain of in their forbidding manners is not compensated to me in any other way, for, in point of economy

there is no place less eligible than Switzerland is now become; the country being exhausted in consequence of the immense supplies of provisions of all sorts which have been poured into France."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 7, Downing Street.—"I can now have the satisfaction to tell you that every thing is finally settled, and in a better way than we expected. Your offer seems to have produced the impression which it ought; but the Duke [of Portland] says the Foreign Office is that of all others which he would the least like to accept, and that it cannot be so well in any hands as yours. The result is that he has made up his mind to accept the Home Department, *without* the management of the war, but *with* the Colonies, and, after talking with Dundas, I have thought it right to close with this suggestion.

"I have just seen the Duke of Portland a second time, and we agreed that they should all kiss hands on Friday, as I could hardly make all the moves before that time. Windham takes the Secretary at War, and all the rest is as was before understood."

T. GRENVILLE to his brother LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 7 [London].—"I am beyond measure gratified in being able to tell you that every thing is settled to the satisfaction of the Duke of Portland and his friends. The Duke had a conversation this morning with Pitt, in which he found, upon explanation, that the Home Department was to be upon the same footing as in time of peace, and that the correspondence and communication with naval and military officers was the essential part which was wished to be reserved to Dundas. As it had been thought that the colonial correspondence was likewise desired to be reserved, this explanation, in which Pitt consented to leave the colonial correspondence and every other part of the peace establishment of the Home Department, was deemed quite sufficient; and the whole arrangement is considered as settled and to take place on Friday. To you I need not express the warm and sincere pleasure which I take in this event, but I cannot help saying that I feel, too, great additional satisfaction in seeing the readiness with which you personally offered to lend yourself to any shape of accommodation; and you will be gratified, I am sure, to hear from me that the offer which you so handsomely made, though not brought into effect, has had no small share in the happy conclusion of this business. *Quod felix faustumque sit*, is, I hope, as much a prediction as a prayer. I shall try to see you when you come to morrow."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 8, Camp, Weymouth.—"I am much obliged to you for the communication of the arrangements which have been taken. I wish I could say that I think well of them; or that I am much comforted by the Duke of Portland's abilities for the most efficient office in the present moment; or of a Cabinet, formed from the ranks of the ancient enemy, so nearly complete, that it wants only the accession of Mr. Fox to render it an efficient administration. I cannot but recollect how widely such an arrangement differs from the ideas which both Mr. Pitt and you had upon it some months since, and I have seen nothing which leads me to imagine these second thoughts better than

the first; or that such a coalition (for it is as completely so as Lord North's ever was) will be particularly recommended by the revival of a third Secretary of State, which must be the case (however the name is disguised) for the accommodation of the very men who suppressed it. In short, I doubt much if Mr. Pitt has made one friend by this measure, and he must lose many, who, for many different reasons, must disapprove so very entire a change in the complexion of the Cabinet. I will fairly own that I dislike much of it, and fear much more.

"As to the question of war or peace, I do not imagine that it can be at our option at the present moment; but the grounds are so entirely changed by the relinquishment of all Flanders to the enemy, that, if I conceived with you that this check would make it necessary to fall back upon Antwerp, and consequently to confine the line of defence of Holland to Berg of Zoom, Breda, and Maestricht, I should doubt very much whether it might not be wiser to attempt a negotiation with France under the present circumstances, rather than wait for the event of the French attempt upon that line, with an army probably stronger in numbers from their victories and accession of territory; certainly stronger in resources and supplies of all kinds, and opposed to us; and Holland, weakened by the desertion of the Emperor, who, I conclude, will be a feebler ally for the defence of the Dutch (even if he should not abandon the Confederacy) than he has been a feeble principal for the defence of Flanders and Brabant. But I do not see our situation in that gloomy point of view, nor can I imagine what panic should make it necessary to retreat at once from Tournay to Antwerp, abandoning all the ports, which, independently of the fortresses, were disputed for near a century, under circumstances not unfrequently of greater difficulty, by the ablest officers of Europe. You have said nothing of the Flemish conquests. But, if you have made up your minds to this measure, you must lose your four towns, which have cost so much blood. It would therefore be wiser (if practicable) to negotiate with that bonus in your hands. But, above all, it strikes me that the retreat to Antwerp, and the consequent abandonment of all I have stated, will be the signal for the King of Spain, King of Sardinia, and King of Prussia to get out of the war by separate negotiation. My advice, therefore is, in two words: either defend Flanders by disputing every inch in it, and staking any money or any force to that object; or endeavour to negotiate before you are driven in beyond Antwerp, which must inevitably happen, if you run out of Flanders as fast as Dumourier did. All the Jersey and Guernsey accounts speak of the coast of France being entirely *dégarni*; in Normandy not 2,000 men of national troops in all the maritime towns of that province. Surely Lord Moria would be better employed there than in joining this retreat. If you tell me that you have hopes that he will restore the confidence of the allied army, and possibly the re-establishment of our frontier, he cannot be better employed than with General Clairfayt; but if you continue to act on the defensive, we are lost.

"I see by the papers that Lord Camelford is arrived; if he is, pray tell your little woman how much I participate of her feelings upon it, for no one loves her better than I do."

*Postscript.*—"I have not said all I think about the new arrangements, from which I will venture to prophesy most unpleasant consequences to the public, to Mr. Pitt, and most certainly to myself.

"Upon reading your letter again, I find I had forgot to beg you to use Paddington as your own. I am happy that it can be of use to you and Lady Grenville."



THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 16, Brighton.—“I agree entirely with you in the danger you apprehend from making Jay the channel of any negotiation for the exchange of my sister, I should be extremely obliged to you if you would let me know in what way you would advise me to proceed with the Swedish Minister. My own idea was to endeavour to transmit a memorial to Paris stating my sister's and Henry's cases in the plainest terms, and offering either an exchange of prisoners or a reasonable ransom for their release.

“By the enclosed letter you will perceive that there has been some mistake or negligence relative to the dispatching your resignation to Ireland. I am persuaded you will order it to be sent immediately.

“Is there any foundation for the report that the King of Prussia has refused to fulfill his subsidiary treaty?

“I heard last night from no less authority than Tom the Third, that a treaty of separation and provision is on foot (if not already concluded) between His Royal Highness and the late Princess Fitz [Herbert]. I think you ought to marry His Royal Highness to some frow immediately; and I am told (by the same eminent authority) that he is very well disposed to take such a wife as it may be His Majesty's pleasure to provide for him.”

MINUTE OF MR. PITT IN REFERENCE TO MILITARY OPERATIONS  
AGAINST FRANCE.

AUSTRIA.

1794, July 15.—“To represent the necessity of concerting vigorous measures for the protection of the Dutch frontier, and for keeping up the communication with Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and Landrecies, and to state the force applicable to those purposes.

“To insist on a change of Commanders.

“To concert further measures for increasing the Austrian force on the side of Flanders, if possible, in the course of this campaign, and, at all events, before the opening of the next, to at least 100,000 effective.

“To agree on the acquisitions to be made by Austria, without which no peace shall be made but by their consent, provided they agree to keep up the stipulated force, and not to make peace without our consent, or without our retaining the acquisitions which we have now or shall have made in the East and West Indies, and provided they also agree to the cession desired by the Dutch.

“If these points are settled, to offer either to conclude immediately a treaty of defensive alliance, or to agree to conclude it at the end of the war.

“To agree on a concert of measures with the Princes, and on taking steps to assist the Revies of French troops, as well as on the recognition of the French King, and the Regent, as soon as any footing shall be gained in the interior of France.

“To ascertain whether any pecuniary arrangements are necessary and practicable to enable Austria to prosecute the war vigorously for at least two campaigns after the present.

## PRUSSIA.

" To insist on the immediate march to Flanders of the army under M. Möllendorf; and on its being completed, without loss of time, to the number stipulated by treaty.

" To express a readiness to enter into a full explanation as to the acquisitions to be made by Austria and to engage to form a mutual guarantee of our respective possessions as they may stand at the peace.

" To propose, as soon as the present force is completed to its stipulated amount, to subsidize an additional body of 30,000 men.

" In the field exclusive of garrisons; Austrians - 70,000  
(Deducting 8,000 for Blankenstein's corps)

|                                 |   |   |   |   |   |               |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---------------|
| " British                       | - | - | - | - | - | 23,000        |
| " Foreign troops in British pay | - | - | - | - | - | 15,000        |
| " Dutch                         | - | - | - | - | - | 12,000        |
|                                 |   |   |   |   |   | <hr/> 120,000 |
| " Prussian                      | - | - | - | - | - | 40,000        |
|                                 |   |   |   |   |   | <hr/> 160,000 |

" Proposed to be added in the course of this campaign, and in the interval before the next.

|  |   |   |   |   |   |                |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|----------------|
| " Prussians, to complete the number stipulated by treaty                   | - | - | - | - | - | 10,000         |
| " Foreign troops in British pay, to complete them to the stipulated number | - | - | - | - | - | 10,000         |
| " Dutch to complete them to at least 20,000                                | - | - | - | - | - | 8,000          |
| " Austrians to complete them to 100,000 men employed in Flanders           | - | - | - | - | - | 30,000         |
| " To be further subsidized, if they can be obtained                        | - | - | - | - | - | 30,000         |
|  |   |   |   |   |   | <hr/> [88,000] |
|  |   |   |   |   |   | <hr/> 78,000*  |
| " Force now in Flanders  | - | - | - | - | - | 120,000        |
| " Force after arrival of Prussians   | - | - | - | - | - | 160,000        |
| " Force proposed for next campaign   | - | - | - | - | - | 238,000"       |

## LORD ST. HELENS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 15, Hague.—" Before I received your private note of the 11th, I had sent a passport to the English nuns from Liege to enable them to pursue their journey hither, and you may be assured of my affording them on their arrival whatever protection and assistance they may want. I am much obliged to you for your instruction respecting foreign immigrants of this description, which relieves me from a considerable degree of embarrassment; as I had always felt that their flocking to England in such considerable numbers must be productive of inconvenience, but was unable, without some ostensible authority, to check that practice so effectually as I could have wished, more especially as it had been so much encouraged by my predecessors.

\* Mistake of 10,000 in addition.

"I have not yet delivered the magnificent snuff-boxes which you have sent me for the Pensionary and Greffier, as they hesitate about accepting them, alleging that it would be contrary to a positive law.

"If you should have no particular employment for Lord Elgin I should be glad to keep him here, as he may be occasionally useful to me, and he seems to be very willing to stay."

LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF HERTFORD.

1794, July 17, St. James' Square.—"I think it right to lose no time in apprizing your Lordship that, since I had the honour of seeing you here, the King's Ministers have judged that it will, on the whole, be most advantageous to the public service that one of His Majesty's confidential servants should proceed without delay to Vienna, with a special commission relative to those objects which I mentioned to your Lordship as appearing to press for immediate explanation and arrangement between the two Courts in the actual circumstances of the war. Under this impression Lord Spencer has undertaken this commission which will, of course, be of a nature merely temporary, and referring to points in which the personal intervention of one of the King's Ministers upon the spot appears to give facilities and advantages towards success which could be expected from no other arrangement. In the execution of this important service, as I explained to your Lordship yesterday, and for the reasons which I then detailed, the King's servants think it absolutely necessary that we should have both at Vienna and at the army persons of weight, consideration, and talents, and they look with anxiety to your Lordship's continuing to carry on that branch of it in which you have hitherto been engaged at the Austrian head quarters. In this manner Lord Spencer and your Lordship will mutually assist each other in contributing to this great object; and I flatter myself both that your Lordship will, from your disposition towards the support of the cause in which we are all embarked, readily concur in any arrangement which the King's servants feel best calculated for the attainment of the objects in view; and also that the distribution of it could in no other manner be settled either so satisfactorily to your Lordship, or so advantageously to the public service, as by a commission which must evidently and from its nature be of very short duration, and which in no manner interferes with the ordinary duties either of the person employed in a political situation at the army, or of the mission to Vienna."

*Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF HERTFORD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 17, Charles Street.—"I shall be excessively ready to concur (in the business which you mention to me) with Lord Spencer, for whom I feel the same degree of confidence and esteem which I expressed to your Lordship yesterday in regard to Lord Cornwallis."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 19, Windsor.—"I highly approve of Lord Grenville's proposal that the commission to the Court of Vienna be a joint one for Earl Spencer and Mr. Grenville. I have copied the letter to the Emperor and enclose it."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 19, Weymouth.—“If the enclosed letter only concerned me, I should not on this account regret the difficulty which cut me off from any communication with the Office which Mr. Dundas has quitted; but, after considering the subject, I thought myself bound in honour to Colonel Simcoe (as a consequence of the confidence which he reposed in me) to communicate this very short and interesting note to Mr. Pitt and you, who first employed him. I will thank you to return it to me, as I wish to answer it immediately, and to state to him how entirely this change in the Cabinet, and particularly in the Home Department, has altered my situation, and my means of assisting him in his correspondence. Upon a subject from which I apprehend so much, I must form my opinion from the few lights which are in your letter, which notified it to me, and they are certainly not sufficient to alter the opinion which I should have given (had it been asked) upon this coalition, so entirely new to me. However, as your opinion differs so entirely from mine upon that point, I certainly will not say more upon what must be unpleasant to us both, than simply to express a wish that your friendship to me had led you to a more confidential intercourse with me, on these points and others connected with them.

“As to your prospects and plans for the Continental war, the later mails have indeed solved what appeared to me incomprehensible; namely, the necessity of the retreat of the British army to Antwerp. I stated to you how little I could understand this necessity of abandoning a country which, under greater difficulties, had been fought inch by inch; and, if I understand your letter, you do not seem absolutely to controvert the idea, but you state that it had been decided to take this measure, not by the Duke of York or Lord Cornwallis, but by the Austrians. If this necessity does exist, I fear that it brings with it a reason most decided and most irresistible for changing your plans of operations, and for endeavouring to negotiate. For, if this measure arises from the indifference on the part of the Emperor to the war, or to its object, or from incapacity and inability, surely it is madness to persevere in the Continental war under such circumstances either of weakness or of treachery on the part of Austria and Prussia, the two principals in the war. That peace is not attainable in this moment is possible, but that it is to be attained ultimately, and with prospects infinitely less hazardous to the country than those which must result from repeated defeat, and repeated defection of our allies, who in every point seem unequal to their own defence, I cannot but believe. But, if you should not agree with me as to the point of negotiation, or if it should not be now practicable, still our impression upon France must be more easy from the sea than from a *defensive* line of British troops on the Scheld or the Maes.

“I write to you on these points without reserve, because I am very anxious to show you the effect of these mishaps and misconduct on the mind of one, whose zeal for the war was, and is, as true as that of any one, but who feels that his zeal ought to be proportioned to his powers; and I must protest against the wild project of undertaking to bribe Prussia, Sardinia, Naples, and perhaps Austria and Spain, to defend their own frontiers by resources drawn from this country. Not one of these powers have yet furnished anything like the contingent with which we were flattered; and I do not expect that Lord Spencer and my brother will or can be more successful than their predecessors on these missions, in drawing in the month of August any further force from the Emperor, unless we engage to pay for it, which I cannot conceive anyone

mad enough to propose. Could we now close the war, even with the sacrifice of some of the least essential of our conquests, surely France is unequal for some years to any solid attempt to disturb this country; and for the rest, we must trust to the exertions of a strong Government (I mean strong in abilities and measures) for our security at home. But this strength you have not obtained by the coalition, from which I prophesy so ill.

"Personally to you I must ever, and most cordially, wish every credit and comfort; though I fear very much for both, as far as they are connected with these new plans, and very new confidential friends.

*Postscript.*—"My brother wrote home to notify his mission to Vienna, and to desire me to answer his letter. I received his letter yesterday; and the first post does not go out till to-morrow."

#### THE EARL OF MANSFIELD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Most Secret.

1794, July 20, Portland Place.—"I will not trouble your Lordship at present with more than the substance of some information which I have this moment received from a foreigner of distinction upon the express condition that I should never mention his name. He is well acquainted with Flanders, which he left lately; and his intelligence which, I am persuaded, he gives from the purest and most laudable motives, struck me the more as it agrees in many parts with that which your Lordship has received from other quarters. Those parts I need not relate. I will only say that his opinion of Prince Cobourg's insufficiency is the same with that which his Majesty's servants entertain and have acted upon. He thinks the Marshal himself an honourable man, but governed and *betrayed* by two officers of his *état major*; *Froissart* his *aide de camp*, who is of Geneva, and has a brother in France a rank Jacobin; and *Fisher* his *aide de camp général*, a man of low birth, detested in the army, and most strongly suspected.

"What my informant said of *Rollin* agrees perfectly with what we have heard, with this addition, that the extraordinary distinction shown by the Emperor to *Rollin* who is the son of a barber in Lorraine, was highly displeasing to the Archduke, and that *Rollin* strongly urges the necessity of immediate peace. Count *Trautmandorf* and M. *Thugut* concur in the same sentiments, and are eager for a negotiation. *Thugut* has large sums in the French Funds. One of Count *Mercy's* secretaries was secretary to *Mirabeau*.

"General *Schneider*, who commands at *Luxembourg*, has a French secretary named *Pelport* who is strongly suspected. This *Pelport* and several other ill-intentioned persons meet frequently at the house of one *Couturier*, an apothecary at *Luxembourg*, who has a brother, a member of the convention, with whom he is in regular correspondence.

"My informant speaks in the highest terms of the Archduke Charles, of his zeal, his talents, popularity; and thinks that the removal of Prince Cobourg, and the appointment of Prince Charles to the command, with *Mack* under him, would give great satisfaction, not to some of the Austrian Generals perhaps, but to the army at large, which he represents as much dispirited, not only from their repeated misfortunes, but from a general suspicion of being betrayed."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 24, Windsor.—"It is a satisfaction to me that I did not instantly return the letters that arrived yesterday from the Lords

Malmesbury and St. Helens, as it has enabled me coolly to reflect on the disagreeable situation in which the unjustifiable conduct of the King of Prussia has placed both this country and the United Provinces. On the maturest consideration I am clearly of opinion that the only measure to be taken with either attention to our own dignity or the success of the great cause in which we are embarked, is to order Lord Malmesbury to join the King of Prussia and make a last attempt to get him to hold a conduct agreeable to the treaty signed at the Hague, the object of which there is no shadow to dispute. Should this not succeed, we must then take the unpleasant step of stopping any farther payments of the subsidy, and I own I should think it wise to offer the Court of Vienna that sum for 62,400 men to be employed in Flanders in addition to the 100,000 we have proposed should be left there by the Emperor."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794] July 24.—"I read over in haste this morning the despatches from Colonel Crawford and his namesake, as well as those from Wickham. It is vain to lament how backward every preparation still appears to be on the part of the Austrians, when any vigorous move on their part would ensure general success. The only real question is whether this varies any of your instructions to Crawford, Wickham or Sir Morton Eden.

"The point I chiefly doubt about is the instruction to Wickham to encourage active measures at Lyons. Everything, I think, confirms the propriety of urging to the utmost the Austrians to act for themselves, or let the Prince of Condé act for them. And possibly our diversion in Brittany may, before the next instructions arrive, have given spirits enough even to Clerfaye [Clairfait], to act in earnest.

"But any separate attempt on the part of Lyons, without certainty of support, either from the Prince de Condé or the Austrians, might risk prematurely everything in the south. The best thing, according to my reasoning, would certainly be that the Austrians or the Prince of Condé should act as soon as possible; the next best, that no attempt should be made in the south till the Convention has been obliged, as it probably will, to detach a large proportion of force from thence to Brittany. I return to town early to-morrow and shall wish much to know what you think on the result of these accounts. Aust has very properly stopped sending your instructions till he hears from you again. We have nothing new from the coast to-day."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 25, Windsor.—"My opinion concurs entirely with that of Lord Grenville as to the unfavourable account received yesterday from Lord Malmesbury, in addition to what he had sent by the mail the day before; but what aggravates it much is that it seems to remove any possibility of placing the smallest opinion on the military abilities of General Möllendorf, and that it appears by the very well drawn up despatch of Mr. Paget, that Count Haugwitz has lost the confidence of the King of Prussia; and consequently that either Count Schullenburg or Lucasini, have again possession of the King of Prussia's political faith, which cannot but be detrimental to everything that is right.

"I approve of Lord Grenville's ordering the warrant of 1,500 per annum for Lord Hervey."

T. GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, July 27, Cologne.—"The unlucky circumstance of the retreat of the Austrian army, and the consequent movements of the English and Dutch towards Breda and Boisleduc taking place in the moment of our first reaching that country delayed us infinitely in all means of advancing, and impeded our access to the Duke of York, whom we did not see till Wednesday the 23rd at Camptol near Achterbrook. We found him highly exasperated with the Prince of Cobourg, who had actually begun his retreat, and had ordered the corps which immediately supported the Duke's left flank to join him at Maestricht, without any notice whatever to the Duke or any of his officers; so that if General Walmoden who commanded on the left had not observed the withdrawing of the Austrian outposts, the British would have been left entirely exposed without even suspecting their danger."

July 28, Bonn.—"Count Mercy's journey makes it unnecessary to say more than I have done in the public letter; his conversation is very earnest; and having by accident met with Mr. Quintin Crawford at Cologne, he shewed me a private letter from Count de la Marck to him in which Count de la Marck says he finds Mercy quite an altered man, and disposed to act with the greatest degree of vigour and energy. I could get nothing from Mercy about Thugut's appointment to the complete foreign department; his language is certainly very satisfactory, and he is full of the idea (whether true or no I know not) that much of the misunderstanding between the English and Austrians is owing to French intrigues; if in your conversation with him these intrigues turn out to be any proof of corruption, they will be of great use to us at Vienna. There is some mystery about this last retreat; the Duke of York maintains stoutly that the Prince of Orange could not have described his intended retreat as being concerted with the Duke, because he had never mentioned it to him; yet Mercy shewed to us the Prince of Orange's letter to Cobourg in which he certainly announces this retreat as a measure taken by him *de concert avec le Duc d'York*, and I find the Austrians in consequence stating this retreat as having abandoned them, and as making their own retreat a matter of necessity."

"I think we shall be at Vienna about this day se'nnight, and if we go by Ratisbon we shall hardly be able to write before our arrival. We both trust that Mercy's visit to London will shorten *our* stay, and you must not overlook the word *our*, because, as you had once the notion of my going alone, it might occur that you might wish me to stay there, which, however, is an arrangement that I could not upon any account or in any view accede to. We thought we saw little or any proof of activity on the Dutch frontier. Sir S. Smith, who went on with us from Flushing to Bergen, was, in his mind's eye, turning every boat into a gunboat, and if he could actually do so, it might perhaps be very useful."

"I see in the Duke of York much uneasiness at the notion of his army being lessened in number, or in any way so arranged by garrison duty as to become smaller in the field; his own wish, therefore, is that the Dutch army should be put on garrison duty, and his own left entire, in which state he thinks (perhaps too confidently) that he should be strong enough to cover Holland. The real defence of Holland, however, is the Meuse, and if Mercy can be in any way depended on,

that defence is a point to which he is determined to adhere. I hope the account of the Prussians is exaggerated by Mercy, but he describes Möllendorff as every day throwing out hints of his crossing the Rhine, and nothing we can urge can induce him to bear that idea without immediately withdrawing the Austrian army from the Meuse, so that, in his view of the business, it all rests upon the Prussians being kept where they are and made more active in the defence of that quarter.

"I know not what difficulties we shall find at Vienna, but I suppose they will much dwell on our repurchasing Flanders with the West India conquests."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF HERTFORD.

Private.

1794, July 28, Downing Street.—"By our last accounts the Prince of Cobourg was retiring towards Cologne, and M. de Mercy was going there also. As this makes an entire interruption of all communication with our army, it becomes more important that we should have there some person of confidence, and I therefore feel myself under the necessity of expressing my wish for your return there, however unwilling I am to press you at a moment when I feel that your private affairs may so naturally call for a longer stay in this country."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 28, Windsor.—"I return the letter from the Prince of Orange to me which I have opened, and, as the contents are of a political not of a private nature, I desire Lord Grenville at a proper time to have an answer prepared. I, at the same time, communicate the letter I have just received from the Duke of York, who, in the hurry of writing, has made some omission at the end of it; and send his despatches to Mr. Dundas, which may be of utility in answering the Prince of Orange."

#### THE MARQUIS OF HERTFORD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 30, Charles Street.—"You will do me the justice to recollect that I have never suffered my private affairs to interfere with His Majesty's service. I left the Low Countries *only* because, both Lord Cornwallis and Lord Elgin being ostensibly employed there, I thought the moment a very favourable one to state to your Lordship and to Mr. Pitt all that the new state of things, particularly in regard to Holland, appeared to me to render indispensable. Your Lordship also knows that I did not decline the mission which Lord Spencer has since undertaken, and that I left it entirely to your Lordship to cast the different parts which we were severally to fill for the public service. A very short time will enable me to discharge all the family calls upon my present situation, but I would submit to you, as a matter equally material to Government and to myself, whether during the pendency of Lord Spencer's negotiation, or till some answer be received on the leading point which he has to treat, I can with propriety return to the Austrian headquarters. I had settled with Monsieur de Mercî, the Baron de Thugut, and even the Emperor in person, that the fullest powers should be left to the former upon the spot. Your Lordship appeared to doubt the existence of such full powers, or of Monsieur de Mercî's disposition to use them. My opinion was certainly different,



but, though it was formed upon the spot, your Lordship very naturally adopted another course of conducting the business now depending, which appeared preferable to you. I wish only to remark to your Lordship that whatever powers Monsieur de Merci might have had, are and must be suspended by Lord Spencer's mission, from which such expectations are conceived at Vienna that, till the result of it is ascertained, Monsieur de Merci's habitual caution will prevent his taking any measure whatever with me. If I have mistaken any fact which bears on this point, I, of course, retract the reasoning grounded upon it, and beg to conclude by repeating what I hope your Lordship gives me credit for, that I wish only to reconcile what my own situation in life requires of me to the most assiduous discharge of His Majesty's commands while I have the honour to be in his service."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794, July, Downing Street].—"You will have seen by the dispatches which Nepean has forwarded to you, that we are still in suspense as to the Prince of Coburg's intended attack, and that we have probably also to expect something important one way or other from Lord Moira, who seems disposed to dash. The Duke of York having thus far made good his retreat, is, as things stand, to be reckoned fortunate. The worst of all is Lord Cornwallis's account of the Prussians, which is just what you apprehended. All chance of re-establishing offensive operations this year is at an end, if they cannot be brought to Flanders or Holland. If they can, and the Emperor will but really furnish 70 or 80,000 men to be employed in the same quarter, our own means are such that we may still make another great effort.

"I have heard nothing more yet from Burlington House. Lord F[itzWilliam] seems almost as tardy as the Prussians.

"I have seen one set of the American merchants this morning on the subject of the debts. They seem very moderate and sensible, but think it necessary to call a general meeting, for the purpose of collecting all possible information as to the amount and particulars, and of then naming a committee with full power to communicate secretly and confidentially with us, on the best line to be adopted."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794, July, Downing Street].—"I find there is, as I expected, some sort of jealousy between the different sets of American merchants. There is a Committee consisting of Messrs. Duncan Campbell, Mollesoi, and Nut, on the part of those who have debts due to them contracted *previous to 1776*. There is another Committee on the part of the general body of merchants now engaged in the American trade, of which Mr. Sansom is the Chairman. This last committee proposed to call a general meeting (which I mentioned to you some time ago), for the sake of collecting information as to the debts of all descriptions. But the other Committee have taken an alarm at this, saying that they were already in possession of all the information which could be obtained, and had delivered a full statement to Government, up, I think, to the year 1791; and could easily obtain an account of any variations which have since taken place, without raising the alarm which they think would attend a general meeting. In fact I believe their case is distinct from the others, and that they can separately give all the

information which concerns them ; but I believe their real apprehension is lest, if they acted jointly with the other merchants, their separate pretensions might be less forcibly urged. Sansom's Committee seem to be of opinion that the debts *prior to 1776*, may be left to be discussed with the other gentlemen, and have no desire to mix themselves in it. But they say there is another description of debts, in which many American merchants are concerned ; those contracted *during the war*, chiefly for goods sent to the parts of America which were from to time in the possession of the King's Arms ; and they think the best way of obtaining information on this point is to call a general meeting of the persons interested in this description of debts. They wish first, however, to know whether we think their doing so could be attended with any inconvenience, or afford Mr. Jay any advantage in the negotiation. It seems to me that it would rather have the contrary effect, as the appearance of the merchants being anxious on the point, would rather support our demands, and at the same time, I have no doubt of bringing them to be contented with a reasonable accommodation. They left with me the proposed advertisement, and I told them I would consult with you, and let them know our wishes on the subject.

"I should have tried to save this long letter by seeing you for two minutes, but I found you had very wisely escaped early this morning. I got into a long prose with our new colleagues, before they left me yesterday evening, and was extremely satisfied with it. It seems, however, material to have a Cabinet for fully discussing the general state of things, as soon as possible after Lord Cornwallis arrives ; and I hope he will come in time to fix it for Tuesday morning.

"Did Starhemberg's communication amount to anything from which you can judge of the real intentions at Vienna ?"

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CHATHAM.

Private.

1794, August 1, Downing Street.—"I send to you a letter I have just received from D'Almeida. When you are able to form your opinion as to the best mode of employing these ships, will you have the goodness to let me know it, that I may communicate with D'Almeida upon it.

"I take it for granted the first thing to be done is to have the report of some of our own officers upon the state in which our allies are come to us this year."

*Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF CHATHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 1, Admiralty.—"I am in doubt whether the Portuguese Squadron can be employed in any way that can strictly be said to be useful ; but I believe the most agreeable to them, and what will answer the purpose best of teaching them their business, will be to attach them to the Channel Fleet, and to put them under the immediate command of Lord Howe. He will then make a particular enquiry into their state and condition, and make a report upon them, which will be the most satisfactory, both for us and them.

"The sooner, therefore, we are authorized to put them under Lord Howe's command the better, as I am in hopes his stay at Spithead will not be long."

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 2, Windsor.—“I cannot have a doubt, in the present state of the war, of the propriety of Lord Grenville's and Mr. Pitt's opinions that the Count d'Artois, accompanied by Maréchal de Castries, should come over to settle the mode of collecting to one point such force of different descriptions of emigrant Frenchmen as can be brought to act for the restoration of monarchy in France; indeed my own inclination would tend to oblige every one of that perfidious nation here, either to go on that service, or, by the Alien Act, be removed from this country.

“I trust the Count d'Artois will appear entirely incognito, and, when the business is concluded, not think of prolonging his stay.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CHATHAM.

*Private.*

1794, August 4, Dropmore.—“Immediately on receiving your note I wrote to the Chevalier d'Almeida, and have now got his answer, by which it appears that he will apprise the Portuguese Admiral that he is to put himself under Lord Howe's command, and to obey him in all respects. I imagine, therefore, that nothing further is necessary than the inclosed letter from me to enable the Admiralty to direct Lord Howe to take those ships under his command; and I have sent it in this form in order to save time; but if you think any other step is wanting, it may be settled when we meet.”

*Copy.*

## T. GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, August 4, Maeskel.—“We found Lord Malmesbury evidently dispirited to the greatest degree about the conduct of his Prussian friends, and stating his opinion strongly to be for putting an end to the subsidy at once.

“Our conversation with Lord Malmesbury was not likely to be very agreeable to him, because its subject was evidently connected with the failure of his treaty, but he is naturally so much out of humour with them as to be disposed to see the necessity of what we are doing. We agreed that it would be best for him to state to the Prussians that the object of our mission is to produce a more vigorous prosecution of the war from the Court of Vienna.

“For my own part I should have hesitated perhaps as to communicating to Lord Malmesbury the proposed convention, because it is one to which the course of his negotiations and wishes must be hostile, but Lord Spencer having shewn him our first despatch to you which mentioned this convention, he, of course, became acquainted with it, and it may be useful that you should know he is so far apprised and no farther.

“I doubt he cannot with prudence press anything that disturbs the present arranged concert, as the Prussians might take advantage of any alteration as releasing them from their present concert; indeed, to say the truth, my only hopes of the fortresses being relieved are in the assistance which you may prevail on Mercy to give, because the distance of Vienna will hardly admit of any assistance in probable time so as to

be useful, other than may be had by the change of the command; but the troops which move for that purpose must be from Coburg's army or from none, though we shall doubtless urge reinforcement if possible from the army of the Rhine.

"I have not had time to tell you that I am much pressed by Lord F[itz William] to go with him to Ireland if he goes; it is not exactly what I wish, but I am not decided against it; tell me what you think of it."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD ST. HELENS.

Private.

1794, August 5, St. James's Square.—"I enclose you the copy of a paper delivered to Mr. Pitt by Mr. Boyd, who, as it appears, has had some communication with Mr. Hope on the subject. The first idea which it suggested to my mind was that of the very bad effect which such a measure would produce in Holland, as an indication that the Governments of both countries think the defence of the Republic desperate, while our object ought to be to create precisely the contrary impression, and to give confidence as the foundation of exertion. This feeling is strengthened by the assurances we have since received of the intention of the Austrians to defend the Meuse which, if they do this, will certainly afford protection sufficient to cover the Republic. The paper, however, is one which, as it seems to me, is so far worthy of attention as to make it desirable to communicate confidentially with the Grand Pensionary upon it, in order to learn his sentiments on the subject. It is almost superfluous to say that we should willingly lend ourselves here to any measure that seemed really advantageous as a means of saving a part of the wreck, if the vessel is to be lost; but I should be sorry so to do this, as to contribute to the loss of the vessel itself. When you have conversed with Monsieur de Spiegel on the subject, I shall be glad to know the result of his opinion; but it seems desirable that the communication should not go further, unless he wishes that it should."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794, August 1-6, Wimbledon.]—"I have but just got these drafts time enough to read them while dinner is waiting, but they both seem to me perfectly right. That to the Prince of Orange I conclude is accompanied with one to Lord St. Helens; in which perhaps it will be wisest not to say more on the subject of naval assistance, than that we are waiting the return of the officer sent to Flushing, to see what can be done. My brother has, however, undertaken in the meantime to do whatever he can in forwarding gun boats and armed vessels, and I trust is expediting it. I conclude there is another despatch to Whitworth, instructing him to conclude the alliance, if the present war is made a *casus federis*, without insisting (as a *sine qua non*) on a revocation of the prohibitory edicts.

"Lord Cornwallis is here. I am impatient for Mercy.

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 6, Weymouth.—"In consequence of your intimation to me respecting Sir J. Jervis's conduct towards the American seamen

at Martinique, in which Captain Nugent was engaged, I have, without writing to him one word on the subject, inquired of Major Finch Mason, *aide de camp* to Sir C. Grey, and now here for his health, what were the severities or the grounds of them, which Sir J. Jervis had inflicted on the American seamen; or if we had heard of any complaint made by them. I found from him that Sir J. Jervis's construction of the proclamation respecting American ships had given very great offence and, as far as I understand it, with reason, but that he was not aware of any *severity*, which is your word, unless by confining, and afterwards impressing many American seamen, who had been personally very active on the French batteries and army. Of this fact he offered a proof which is very strong; namely, of his servant, a mulatto, who served in Bellegarde's army, and is now with him in England, and speaks positively to great numbers of Americans, having constantly served with them. I mention this as you may possibly not dislike to have this general answer to give to general complaints; specific charges are very different. Major Mason has no objection to state this in a public letter if necessary, but he does not know or guess at the object of my enquiries.

"I fear very much for Colonel Simcoe's situation if *all* the posts, and particularly Detroit, are *immediately* ceded. I understood from him that he conceives Detroit a very essential post, if it is intended to keep up any communication with the Ohio, or to preserve the Indians on the Eastern side of it; but the population of the settlement is at least 3,000 souls, who must not be turned over, but must have ample time to remove; and till they are removed the fort must remain to us. It was Simcoe's idea to establish a large town at the *embouchure* into Lake Sinclair of his river Thames (or La Tranche) where some settlers are already fixed. Old Michillimachinach is abandoned, and a small post established in an island near it, within their line; that island must be struggled for, as I understand that it has the only secure bay for anchorage at the mouth of the Straits. Niagara cannot be given up until a new road is finished which is begun from Lake Ontario to the Lake Erie on the western shore; for, until some road is opened, the whole supply of provisions for the forts and settlements on the upper lakes must stand still, as well as the trade. He is very sanguine in his hopes that the communication will be opened, and settled by families, from York (Toronto) to the Lake Huron, by Lake Simcoe to Maghadosh Bay, before winter, which will entirely divert the course of the fur trade. You have the best information on all this, but I owe it to him to state his ideas. He thinks Oswego may be given up whenever you will, as being wholly useless. I will venture to suggest to you an idea which has occurred to me, and which is surely very well worthy attention; and that is to settle a commercial intercourse with America for the West Indies, and blend the discussion of it with the convention treaty respecting their posts. Your knowledge of the subject will show you the advantage of gaining time at present; and I have reason to think that America would conceive it a very great boon, which it certainly would be; but either the direct or the indirect boon seems unavoidable, for they will trade by exchanging provisions and lumber for molasses and sugar, in spite of you.

"I am very uneasy about the King's journey here, for the more I have considered the local, the more I am convinced that one of the smugglers' row-gallies, of which there are so many on the French coast, in the constant practice of running their cargoes between St. Alban's Head and Weymouth, may, in spite of any water-guard whatsoever, land on the north side of Weymouth Bay, and carry the King away at

night, unless a guard is posted sufficiently near to protect him; and you know the difficulty of persuading him to admit common precautions. However, I will exert myself, and, at night, I will have walking sentries and patrols in spite of him; but the charge is most unpleasant. Adieu, I have heard that you are unwell and look jaded, which I do not wonder at as you have much to suffer from mental as well as bodily fatigue."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 7, Windsor.—"I return the letter for the Prince of Orange which I, with pleasure, copied, as it contains that sound advice of which he seems, as well as the Republic, much in need."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ST. HELENS.

Private.

1794, August 7, Downing Street.—"At the same time that I send you the King's answer to the Prince of Orange's letter, stating, in pretty distinct terms, the impression which His Majesty has felt on being told by the Prince that the Republic *could make no greater efforts* than those she has already made, I can not avoid stating to you the very great uneasiness which is occasioned by every account we receive here of what is passing on your side the water. Many of our best officers have been in a situation, and some of them very lately, to see what measures are taking by the Dutch Government along the different parts of their frontier, and their reports are, uniformly and without exception, so discouraging as to create the most serious alarm. I am credibly informed that the troops who came over to Flushing from the island of Cadsand, leaving behind them arms, baggage, stores, ammunition, everything in short that could be left, fled before a force inferior to their own. At Flushing itself the most ordinary means of defence were neglected. A part of the defence was pointed out to their officers as necessary to be occupied; the answer was that Flushing was a place in which a garrison *might capitulate*, but which could not be defended. Yet no measures were taking for abandoning that which it seemed determined not to defend. No security respecting the ships, no measures for employing actively those that are manned and equipped, no steps for manning other ships, or even for manning thirty gun-boats, the only means of defence for the Province of Holland itself, and which, if the French suddenly gain possession of, will probably give them the command of all the inland waters where frigates cannot come up, or, coming up, cannot lay in safety. Yet, at this very moment, ships are daily arriving in their harbours full of seamen, and we are forced to strip men from our channel fleet to man armed vessels to send over to Zealand. If this is a true state of things, I fear we must conclude that with common exertions on the part of the French, and they are not likely to be wanting, the Republic cannot be saved. *Non ipsa si velit salus servare potuit hanc domum.*

"You know how sincerely I respect some of the persons to whom the principal direction of affairs in the Republic is entrusted, and I am not so unreasonable as not to be able to make some allowances for difficulties of situation of which I am well aware. But those considerations may be carried too far and nothing should prevent your speaking out upon the subject when silence leads to utter ruin.

"It is surely a very vain hope to imagine that without some signal interposition of Providence, the ordinary resources and efforts of a Government, too weak in time of profound peace for the common purposes of government, can be sufficient now to avert the most imminent danger with which a country ever was menaced. More powers must be given or assumed, a different energy must be given to all the branches of government, or the thing cannot be done. The risk in this case is nothing, for, if the present system leads to evident and unavoidable ruin, what worse could happen from the failure of any experiment made in order to bring forth such means as can alone save the country.

"I do not choose to write to you ministerially on this subject, for the doing it would lead to no advantage, and might tend to possible inconvenience; but the subject is one which deserves no slight attention on your part, and I am persuaded that, if you have not already considered it in the light I have now stated, you will immediately do so. It is a galling reflection to think that this country, with an unparalleled success in every separate effort she has made, and employing as she does greater exertions on the Continent than ever she did before, is reduced, from the weakness and supineness of her allies, almost to tremble for her own existence, instead of reaping the fruits of her victories. But this consideration is light compared with that of the infinite calamities which the fall of Holland must bring on us and on all Europe. I do not press you to exert yourself to avert them, because I am sure you do so to your utmost; but I beg you to bring the subject earnestly and seriously under the consideration of those whose efforts might save the Republic, if she can yet be saved.

*Postscript.*—"I have said nothing in this letter of all that we hear about Breda, Gertrudenberg, Bergen-op-zoom, and other places; but the reports respecting them all are as unfavourable as that about Flushing, though not all as authentic."

*Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794], August 10 [Weymouth].—"I directly sent a messenger after Colonel Nugent, who had just left Weymouth for Exeter, to direct him to go to London, and to wait Lord Amherst's orders or yours. Nothing can be more satisfactory to me than that one whom we love so dearly should have the means or opportunity of distinguishing himself, and, if I owe this to your kindness, that consideration must add to my pleasure. Let me now beg you to find means of employing Captain Nugent on the same service; he is particularly fit for it, having commanded all the flat boats in the West Indies, during the sieges of three islands, with great credit, and having, likewise, commanded, during the whole time, nine hundred seamen who acted with the troops. Colonel Nugent has the highest confidence in him, and I am persuaded that their joint exertions would materially assist the service. He is just now in an awkward situation; ordered two months ago to wait for the return of his *Veteran* from Guadeloupe, with an order of leave from the Admiralty, and by the accounts brought by Captain Stanhope, who landed on the 5th, that ship is detained and the *Vengeance* is ordered home in her place. If Lord Chatham has no other means to employ him, I am confident he would undertake the command of the boats, particularly those which are to act with his brother's brigade, with the greatest satisfaction.

"I have writ to Mr. Pitt a letter which he will show you respecting Weymouth, and my most unpleasant charge. I am very seriously unhappy, and shall be more so, if a small force is not encamped to the eastward; for, having now reconnoitred the whole local, I must say that nothing can be more unsafe than to leave the King to the chance of an accident. Lord Amherst told Lord Chesterfield that there would be an order for patrols of cavalry, but you know the carelessness of such a patrol of raw recruits, unsupported by any piquet, and unvisited (as they must be) by any officer. Having however stated all I feel, I shall do my best, and will take care that the King shall not see a soldier, though he shall be as closely guarded at night as if he was my prisoner.

"I am glad that your American Treaty goes on to your liking. We have indeed enough upon our hands."

#### T. GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, August 12, Vienna.—"Although I have no reason to suspect any actual negotiation with France nor any determination to abandon the war, yet I own I think I see many circumstances unfavourable to the business on which we came. The disposition of the people here is said to be much in favour of peace; the Diet of Hungary has never been assembled because they do not dare to assemble it, although they can neither have men nor money without doing so: in the army there is great party and intrigue, but great want of military talents, and, except Brown who is dying of the gout, I do not hear of any distinguished officer. Mack was here for two days, and then returned to Bohemia supposed to be still well in the Emperor's estimation, though, as you see by our dispatch, he is not so with the Ministers. What is however the worst feature in my view is the impression one takes from Thugut's conversation, upon which I have likewise much dealt in the public letter. Whether the distress of their finance be or not as bad as they state it to be I cannot determine, but the result to England is the same if the expense is still to be brought on her shoulders. The efficacy of Thugut's proposal to restrain the King of Prussia through the Court of Petersburg seems to me uncertain, and if it should be so, that is to say if the transfer of subsidy from Prussia to Austria should make Prussia menace this country even in a distant manner, no principle would induce this court to move its army on any other view than that of a Prussian war. Lord Malmesbury writes word that Jacobi is spreading all sorts of reports about our mission, and that Hardenberg is thoroughly frightened about it; but still the Prussians recede as usual from their bargain, and, in spite of their agreement of the 26th July to move towards the Moselle, they are got again nearer to the Rhine.

"The Duc de Polignac has come with a message of civil communication from the Regent, which of course we said we had no authority to hear anything about; he wants the Condé corps to be augmented, and thinks it might get into France by Huningue and Belfort to make a good diversion whenever the Vendée is alive again."

"What you will decide about our mission neither Lord Spencer nor I exactly foresee. We are under some difficulty, as you have described no specific barrier, how to name any or to avoid naming one as the instructions recommend; we feel a little doubtful too about the fate of our stout denials as to loan and subsidy, as we see Thugut has better hopes of Mercy's correspondence than our conferences on that score. They will, I fear, again play with us by giving orders to move when



they get money only, and they will probably get none till the places are lost which they ought to recover."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ST. HELENS.

Private.

1794, August 13, Downing Street.—"With respect to Monsieur D'Audibert Caille, and his associate, there certainly is not in the papers received here (as far as they could be read) any ground to demand their being sent over to England for trial. I am not enough acquainted with the municipal law of the Republic, or of the different Provinces who compose it, to judge how far these men can *claim* their release. And yet it appears strange that the law of any country can compel the release of a foreign enemy discovered to have resided in the country subsequent to the declaration of war, and to have carried on from thence a ciphered correspondence with the Government of the enemy. In this country no *Habeas Corpus* could be claimed or granted to such a man by any court of law; and this, on the evident principle that the mutual duties of allegiance and protection cease as with respect to the subject of an enemy who remains in this country, but adheres to the enemy. I am indeed much mistaken if D'Audibert can be considered in any other light than that of a spy whose life has hitherto been spared in the hope of obtaining discoveries from him.

"It is unquestionable that such discoveries are in his power to make; and it would, particularly, be very interesting to obtain from him by menace or persuasion the key of his ciphered correspondence, and the account of the orders received by him (what they were, and from whom received) relative to the transmission of the letters he received from England, particularly from Tone and Jackson.

"On the whole, the Dutch Government must judge both of the means of detaining him and of the effect of releasing him in this moment. shall be sorry if the latter is done; but I do not see how any demand can be made from hence for sending him over, as he is not a British subject, but a Frenchman, and has conspired and carried on his designs in favour of our enemies, not in this country but in Holland. If, however, the Pensionary can point out any tolerable ground for such a demand, we should not be difficult.

"Count Bernsdorff's overtures are not very sincere as to his desire of doing any thing agreeable to this country on any other ground than that of compulsion. But, from whatever motive Schubart's representations have proceeded, we can have no wish but to encourage them, and the idea which you have suggested is, I believe, the best that could be proposed. Wedel's dispositions are not Jacobin, but his temper is as bad as possible, and prevents him from listening to any reason or argument. I have strong reason to believe that, in the outrageous note which he lately presented here, he exceeded his instructions; and that he is very much in the hands (strange as it seems) of the Swedish Minister, who is a determined Jacobin and a great *intrigant*. Schubart is I believe rather better disposed, but every Dane hates England and fears Russia."

*Copy.*

LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, August 13, Hague.—"I can, with great truth, assure you that the representations and remonstrances which you have empowered me

to make to the leading persons here have been most faithfully delivered; but I fear that, though received with some seeming contrition, there is little hope of their producing any real amendment. There is indeed some appearance at present of a little stir and activity, and various plans have been adopted for procuring both men and money; but, being all founded more or less on the practice of peaceable times, they have not as yet, as far as I can learn, produced a single recruit for the army or navy, or a single stiver for the public purse. In truth, our exertions in their behalf instead of producing, as they ought, proportionable efforts on their part, appear hitherto to have had the direct contrary tendency; that is to say, that in proportion as we *add* to our share of the joint-stock of ways and means, their pedlar-like spirit leads them, instead of doing the like, to subduct from theirs; so as to leave the sum total nearly as before. And it is from this persuasion that, in order to keep up those apprehensions which can alone stimulate them to any activity, I have ventured to hint that the succour which has just been sent to Zealand is intended to be merely temporary, and will be withdrawn as soon as the immediate danger is over.

"I received yesterday from Mallet du Pan the enclosed letter, which is addressed to Lord Elgin, but was sent to me under flying seal; and, the information and reflections which it contains seem to me to be so well worthy of your Lordship's attention, that I cannot resist the temptation of sending it to you. I never send you any printed French papers, as I presume that you receive them directly from Bale; but, if you should have any commission of that kind to give me, I shall be happy to execute it.

"I have seen since my last M. de Wedel's *note verbale* of the 25th past, which, I confess, contrasts very strongly with the assurances from Count Bernsdorff which I mentioned in my last; however I still think that matters may be made up without any dishonourable or disadvantageous concession on either side.

"I shall expect with great impatience your Lordship's farther directions respecting the Count D'Artois; whose notion of *incognito travelling* with a suite of no fewer than fifteen persons alarms me greatly, as it may lead to much inconvenience both in England and here. I purpose meeting him at Rotterdam, to concert such arrangements as may be immediately necessary for his security, at least while he remains on this side of the water."

#### *Enclosure.*

#### MALLET DU PAN to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1794, August 3, Berne.—"Je quitte ce triste chapitre que me menerait trop loin. J'avais à vous envoyer nombre d'informations importants qui vous eussent préparé à la dernière scène de Paris. La chute de Robespierre et de Couthon est une événement plus important qu'une victoire du Prince de Cobourg. Il put changer totalement la face des choses; mais les Puissances ne feront qu'agrandir leurs malheurs si elles méconnaissent la marche nécessaire que leur prescrit cette explosion.

"Collot d'Herbois, Lindet, Billaud Varennes (tous trois du Comité) 200 membres de la Convention, un grand nombre de révolutionnaires de toute classe ont conduit cet événement. Je sais que leur pensée définitive tend à une contre-révolution, mais faite à leur manière, et non à celle des émigrés et de Mr. Burke. Les principaux étaient liés à Danton, exécuté pour avoir projeté de proclamer le Roi Louis XVII., et M. de

**Malsherbes Régent.** Ils ne veulent ni de Monsieur, ni de M. le Comte d'Artois. Probablement ils se réunissent aux Constitutionnels et aux Fédéralistes. Tous tendent à rétablir la monarchie, mais limitée par la représentation nationale, et par les bases de la constitution de 1789. Ils s'opposent à toute contre-révolution pour l'ancien régime, pour les Princes, pour la noblesse. Si les Cabinets vont aujourd'hui contrarier ces vues, au lieu de les favoriser, ils se trouveront la résistance la plus invincible. J'ose vous garantir cette vérité; l'incertitude du sort de cette lettre m'empêche de l'accompagner des preuves nécessaires. Au nom de Dieu, My lord, éclairez votre Cabinet; il a dans ses mains le fin de cette crise, s'il écoute des informateurs bien instruits, s'il consulte les circonstances de —, et s'il cesse de s'étayer sur la chimère de la Vendée, sur les royalistes qui n'existent plus, et sur les émigrés qui ne forment qu'une atome. . . . Il faut faire la contre-révolution avec ceux qui *peuvent* la faire, et non avec ceux qui ne peuvent rien."

*French.*

#### T. GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, August 15, Vienna.—"Since we came here, I may venture to say that we have spared neither time nor trouble nor the incessant solicitations of every day to try to create something like spirit and activity in those orders from the Court which are so much wanted at the army. It has accidentally happened that the circumstance of Monsieur de Mercy's mission, though it bore in some respects a favourable aspect to our business from its shewing on their side a strong disposition to union and agreement, yet, inasmuch as it furnished them with a pretence for waiting for M. de Mercy's despatch, we have in point of time found in his mission a new motive of delay. We have found this, much against our will, insisted upon as a reason for retarding that new appointment of a commanding officer, because they say that Mercy had orders to direct an immediate concert between Cobourg and the British for the relief of the fortresses, that he was instructed to press the Cabinet of London to this measure as offering the readiest prospect of succour, and that, as Mercy's instances on this subject may have been agreed to, they cannot run the chance of overturning that plan by a new nomination; and therefore, though they profess to be ready to make it, they insist upon delaying to do so till they hear from Mercy. The plain English of this undoubtedly must be that they will do nothing till they find whether they are to be assisted in money, and that intelligence is in fact the intelligence which they wait for. What their intended nomination is they do not tell us, nor can we yet discover. I still see in Thugut a strong inclination to contend that though they agree in the necessity of appointing another Commander-in-Chief and Quarter-Master, yet still that the pressure of time for this forward movement does not allow of a new appointment *previous* to the march in question. He said yesterday that if we could acquiesce in Clairfait's taking the immediate command, for the interval till a new general should arrive, a letter might directly recall Cobourg and Waldeck; Clairfait next in command being on the spot might immediately march, and no time would be lost. We know the objections that are entertained to Clairfait's commanding in chief, but it appeared to us upon reflection, that it was so great an object to lead them directly to the undertaking the relief of the fortresses, and so important to the success of that undertaking that Cobourg should be withdrawn from it, that if we could ensure those two points, it was not

our business to lose a single day by contending with them against Clairfait's holding what is to be merely a temporary command; particularly too as they seem disposed to try to lay at our door the delay in this enterprise which, they say, would be inevitably occasioned by sending a new general to conduct it. We told them therefore that to us it seemed very practicable without loss of time to send a general of vigour and activity, directing him to make an attempt to relieve the fortresses, and shewing him that the attempt must be immediate in order to be successful; but that, if they persisted in the idea of this delaying the enterprise, it would be infinitely better to try it under Clairfait than to delay it altogether, and therefore we would readily acquiesce in that temporary command for the purpose of the expedition which they say they can thus give to the forward movement. They agree to propose this to the Emperor, and promise an immediate answer, and the immediate execution of what may be the Emperor's orders upon it, but still I fear till they can hear the money jingle in Count Mercy's courier's portmanteau we shall not yet advance. Nothing too can be more explicit than their declaration that they can do nothing next year without a subsidy. We have, as you may suppose, followed our instructions in most steadily refusing to admit the possibility of any such measure. In the ordinary course of things, therefore, our negotiation though conducted with perfect good humour would find itself stopped short at the outset, but we see in them a strong persuasion that Count Mercy will have got for them in London what we so stoutly refuse to them at Vienna."

"What the exact state of their finances is we have as yet no sufficient intelligence. The Dutch Minister here, who passes for being well-informed, makes no scruple of saying that they have as yet made no exertions in point of taxes, and that they are no otherwise embarrassed than they must be while they have the addition of a war expense without providing such taxes as might be found, and as are necessary to supply it; and he says roundly that if they do not find money at home it is because they do not want to find it; *et peut-être ils ont raison* was the additional remark which he made, and which I can only account for from the very desponding terms in which he speaks of the war. M. de Miel, the Hanoverian Minister long resident here, is likewise said to possess ample information of their finances, but as yet I have not got at him, though I probably shall very soon. It is agreed on all hands that Hungary is well able to furnish considerable assistance both of men and money; the contribution which they have made hitherto has been extremely trifling, and even that payment has only been made in the return of notes of no very high credit which the Emperor had issued payable at the end of the war. When we urge them to take steps for availing themselves of so considerable a resource, they declare that they are taking those steps, but that the internal obstacles which they find have hitherto made it impossible. These obstacles, such as they are, arise (as I am informed) from a promise made by Leopold, and actually subscribed by him, of ample privileges and concessions to the very numerous and powerful body of Protestants in that country. This promise has hitherto been eluded, partly by the bigotted opposition of the Catholic clergy there, and partly by a long train of petty intrigues built on this contention; the result is that the Emperor has hitherto called no Diet there, and though the Minister of that country is actually here upon the business; I do not yet find that they see their way through it enough to make the assembly of the Diet probable, and of course till they do, there are no hopes of the supplies which might be had from thence. This

circumstance alone is a striking description of the weakness and inefficiency of the present Government, and it seems to me no immaterial part of the considerations which ought to decide upon the policy of subsidizing Austria instead of Prussia for the next campaign. A total want of vigour and activity in the Government, as well as a cold and languid view of the great interests which are at stake, are such radical defects in their present system as must be severely felt by all who place any dependence upon an active, zealous, and effectual co-operation on their part; and I know not how to hope that even to give them next year the subsidy which they want, instead of that given to Prussia, would create that zeal and vigour which alone can make their armies useful, but which if it is not to be found in their Cabinet cannot be purchased by paying their armies. It is disgusting likewise to observe that much of their eagerness upon this subject of subsidy appears to arise in as great a degree from their belief in our readiness to give it, as from any necessity which they state themselves to be under to receive it; so that, when they are weary of arguing upon their own poverty, they think their request sufficiently founded by urging that we have already given this to Prussia. For my own part I have frequently asked them fairly to tell me what they had intended to do if no proposition had been made to them from Great Britain, and have put it to them that by their own account, if true, they were in a state which left them no means of defending themselves or of continuing the war; but they answer me only with '*vous voyez notre misère; nous ferons sûrement la guerre, mais pour la faire vigoureusement, si nous le pouvons; nous ne le pouvons pas.*' What poverty indeed not of purse only but of mind and apprehension to imagine that they can discharge the letter of their duty only by being in a state of war, and gravely to tell themselves that by lessening those efforts which have hitherto been too limited to succeed, they shall best consult the interests of their country. If they are sincere in this declaration it is the extreme of imbecility; if (as I suppose) it is only an artifice to excite our apprehensions and draw the money out of our pockets, it is a poor and paltry device; and when one looks at all the great interests on which it bears, large as the sum may be, one almost wonders that they could be such wretched swindlers. Besides, however, all my suspicion of their incurable inefficiency, and besides the idea which I entertain that their fears and jealousies of Prussia (heightened by his indignation both at losing his own subsidy and seeing it in the treasury of Vienna) would perhaps make them hamper all their operations by acting as much with a view to war with Prussia as with France, besides too the belief one may entertain that they might be content to undertake another campaign without subsidy provided none was given to Prussia, I own I feel that, after the evident failure of the enormous expense which we incur this year in the shape of subsidy, I know not how to think that the country would bear another even to be differently applied, unless one had much more reasonable expectation of having the money's worth than I think can in this case be prudently entertained.

"You will naturally ask what other resource presents itself, and whether, in our choice of evils, bad as this is it may not be the best; but is it certain that one may not hope to produce almost as great an exertion next campaign without paying 1,800,000*l.* as we have by paying it? Is it clear that the nearer approach of danger may not produce greater exertions than the lazy receipt of money is on this occasion likely to do? Is there no hope that so much energy may be given to these daily changes in the interior of France as to bring

hem to a c count in the shape in which one wishes to see them in that country?"

August 16.—“Lord Spencer writes, I believe, at the same time, and as he tells me, with very much the same impressions to Mr. Pitt, so that I may venture to think that whatever of our opinions on this matter are worth knowing will have been quite sufficiently communicated. As things now stand we certainly neither of us see much or indeed any hopes of our convention being concluded without a price too enormous indeed to pay for it, though Thugut, I see, expects to succeed in getting it. I flatter myself by the event of to-day that our importunity, which has indeed been unceasing, may have been of some use as to the command of the army, and as to the immediate effort for relieving the garrisons, but, as to any further advantage, I own I am not sanguine enough to think we can have them but at too dear a rate. I am persuaded we, both Lord Spencer and I, agree in our readiness to stay for any useful purpose here, and I am sure you will not wonder that, unless that useful purpose can be well obtained, we should be glad to be discharged as soon as might be.”

“We shall hear of much more detail as to barrier than your instructions tell us how to answer. Cambray, and Givet, and Sedan perhaps, and many other places are named which (not being in French Flanders) are not in the reach of our instructions though they do not much exceed the spirit of them; yet if (which I cannot expect) they give up the subsidy, and the convention goes on, we must trouble you for an ampler detail upon that subject, and especially a description of places to be ceded to Austria as a barrier upon the idea of no conquests whatever being made in the French territory at the time of peace; a state of things which Thugut declares that he is confident will be the case.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1794, August 15.—“I had, by some accident, mislaid the enclosed, which has prevented my returning you an earlier answer upon the subject, as I had been desirous of doing; but I understand that, in the interval, the business has not proceeded in the Council Office, though I presume it will now go on, as I, at least, see no reason for its stopping.

“When I had the honour to see Sir J. Morshead, I explained to him, as I thought clearly, that my reason for declining to enter into discussion with him upon the subject was that I had neither authority nor power to do so from any of the parties concerned; that, as far as Lord Camelford's interest was involved in the business, I was neither Lord Camelford's guardian, nor the executor of the late Lord's will; nor chose to be considered in any other light than that of a person connected very nearly with his family, and, of course, anxious as far as possible to promote his interests in his absence, but having no authority (even if I were disposed to it) to enter into engagements in his name, or those of his friends. Under these circumstances I had not the least idea that Sir John Morshead could expect to hear from me further upon the subject; nor do I see what purpose could be answered by any communications between us respecting it.”

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1794, August 16, Downing Street.—“We are duped by the Prussians, but it would be a bad revenge if we suffered our resentment to bring

the thing to a point at the precise period that would be most inconvenient to ourselves.

"I have felt for your situation which must have been extremely irksome and unpleasant. As it is, I do not see what more remains to be done where you are. We have given the thing the best chance of success by the employment of your talents and zeal. It has not succeeded, and I am convinced that no further endeavours will obtain more from the Prussians than we have had for the last twelve or fourteen months, until events put us in a situation to speak in a higher tone.

"I am sure if you see from any new circumstances an opening for better hopes your zeal will induce you to remain where you are. But if I find by your answer that your opinion coincides with mine, I will lose no time in taking the King's pleasure for sending Lord H. Spencer to Berlin, to which post he has long been destined, and for sending some person of much inferior rank in the diplomatic line to reside at the Prussian Army.

"I will only detain you by repeating the assurances of my conviction that all has been done that could be done."

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 17, Wimbledon.—"The pressure of other more important matters has prevented me, of late, from speaking to you on the subject of Mr. Baldwin, respecting whom I have a good deal of correspondence with Mr. Pultney whose family has always befriended [him]. I send you the perusal of the correspondence. It is a certain fact that by his alertness and exertion in his present situation, Pondicherry has fallen into our hands at the early period of the war; his intelligence having been first received, and conveyed in such form as to enable our Governments in India to act upon it with vigour and success; and when the accounts of the late capture of Pondicherry arrived, I did feel a little awkwardness in the recollection that, about the same time of his doing that public service, he would receive his letter of dismissal. I know you will tell me this is an Indian merit and service, and belongs to me more than to you. I was not [inclined to] dispute that with you, thinking perhaps the Indian Treasury could afford it better than the Civil List. This idea has chiefly given rise to the correspondence between Mr. Pultney and me, and I certainly must, in some shape or other, bring it to a point, for the poor man must not be allowed to flounder between stools.

"I send you likewise the perusal of a letter from Pultney to our friend Fergusson. I don't know what he means by the conclusion of it, but it looks as if he thought he would be called upon to exert his own personal vigour in the contest.

"I am sorry for the delay of your meeting with Mercy. I feel some little remorse in keeping Lord Cornwallis hanging on in waiting from day to day. Mr. Pitt writes me that you and he propose coming here tomorrow after the Cabinet. Half after one is rather a late hour for our meeting, but I hope we shall be punctual."

#### LORD ST. HELENS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, August 19, Hague.—"I enclose to you a most voluminous despatch which has been sent to me from Rotterdam by General Jarry,

who, by the way, appears to me from the little that I have seen of him to be by far the most judicious, clearheaded, and unprejudiced of the emigrants in this part of the world; which may, perhaps be one reason for his being universally scouted by them.

Nothing could be more welcome, or arrive more *à propos*, than the message you sent to the Comte D'Artois by the Duc D'Harcourt. I am confident that he will now be content to put off his journey as long as you please, but I must endeavour to find out some better place of temporary residence for him than one of Admiral Harvey's ships, where, it seems to me, that his establishing himself would be highly inconvenient to all parties.

"The Pensionary reprobates *in toto* Mr. Boyd's plan of opening the ports of Great Britain for the reception of *flight goods* from this country, which, he says, would be tantamount in its effects to the cry or signal of *sauve qui peut* in a fleet or army; and that a contrary regulation would, were it feasible, be far more expedient, in order to leave to the Hopes and other over-grown capitalists of this country no other chance for saving their property than the giving or at least lending a part of it to supply the wants of the Government. In truth, the selfish and unpatriotic conduct of these gentlemen in the present emergency shews but too plainly that the maxim, *that the subject's purse is the sovereign's best Treasury* is to be added to the ten thousand others of which the present war has demonstrated the fallacy.

"I have seen, since my last, your lordship's reply to M. de Bernsdorff's *note verbale*, which I cannot sufficiently applaud and admire, and indeed he himself seems to feel that it has put him completely *dans son tort*. He adds, in his letter to Schubart, that M. de Wedel will be directed to make a fresh communication on that subject, the nature of which he does not exactly explain, though he styles it *an advance*.

"I have not yet been able to bring the Pensionary to any decision respecting Audibert Caille."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 21, Weymouth.—"I have this morning received the letter from the Emperor which Count Mercy brought. Lord Grenville will see that it is little more than a credential for his treating with my Ministers. I own I am therefore glad he is not come here. My answer should be consonant to the instructions that have been given to Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville, and to the language Lord Grenville will have held to Count Mercy, but, at the same time, it should not be of the desponding colour of the Emperor's letter, and hold forth my thorough resolution to support the trial we are entered upon, and which the difficulties that have been met with must consequently [be encountered by] more exertion, not despondency.

"I am glad to find Lord Grenville's health improves, but I trust he will not omit taking the first opportunity of coming to bathe here."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 22 [Weymouth].—"I am very much obliged to you for your last long letter, which I have been prevented from answering by my constant attendance upon various nonsenses of importance, and by the many precautions which are taken for the King's security against his inclination; but I wish you to shew this letter to Mr. Pitt that you may consider with him how far you think it prudent



to continue the present arrangements without change, or addition to the force. Lord Chatham promised to send the *Albion* floating battery, two frigates and some small craft; and the whole of this service was put under the orders of Admiral Macbride, whose squadron was to protect this part of the coast. The King has now been here a week; the *Albion* sailed for Portsmouth before he arrived, and is now gone to Holland; the *Nonsuch* (floating battery) put in here with transports for Jersey, but sailed three days ago. The whole therefore of the force afloat is the *Southampton* of 82 guns (whose captain is never sober) and two small craft. Macbride never has been eastward of Torbay, and is now snug in Plymouth. As to the force on shore, the three troops ordered hither turned out, as by the report now before me, to be—

|                            |          |             |         |                  |            |
|----------------------------|----------|-------------|---------|------------------|------------|
| Major,                     | Captain, | Lieutenant, | Cornet, | Quarter-Masters, | Sergeants, |
| 1                          | 1        | —           | 1       | 2                | 2          |
| Trumpeters, Rank and File. |          |             |         |                  |            |
| 2                      42  |          |             |         |                  |            |

“Such then, added to my regiment, is the whole of what you have to trust to! We mount 102 by day, and 152 by night; but it is probable that we shall not be able long to continue this heavy duty, exclusive of smaller duties, of our sick; and our very large drill of recruits. The King has spoken to Goldsworthy (as he tells me) in terms of dissatisfaction of his naval guard, and expected a small force to have been encamped east of the town. Every signal has been settled to ensure the protection of the Royal Family, but I think their situation *most insecure*. Add to this, the Ordnance have refused to send me any horses for my guns, which they give to every other regiment, so that I cannot move them in case of alarm, and have sent to me *three* flints per man, as the whole allowance for exercise and service, and have not added one grain of powder since the King’s journey has been fixed. I have written an official letter to Goldsworthy, by his orders, on this last subject, and my only reason for writing to you this detail is that Mr. Pitt and you may be fully informed, and may decide what (if left to the military and ordnance departments) would take weeks to give orders upon.

“I think the King very well in health. He has been very civil to me and high in every praise and attention to my regiment; and I have the comfort of finding my officers and men pleased with the opportunity of shewing themselves, instead of feeling the constant trouble of it.

“I have to mention to you both, in confidence, that I have seen a letter from Major Grey stating, from his father Sir C. Grey, *that the whole of the misfortune at Guadeloupe arose from the scandalous neglect of Ministry in suffering that armament to sail from Europe, without detaching at least an equal reinforcement to him, and that he was determined, whatever might be the consequence, not to continue in command an hour after he had tried to assist Jervis in the destruction of the shipping*. The young man adds his hopes of a parliamentary enquiry into this neglect. You will, of course, make your use of this, but you will conceal the information. The lines marked were quoted from Sir C.’s letter, and I give them from recollection, having seen the letter from Major Grey last night.

“The King tells me you are far from well, and that you had some thoughts of coming here. I wish you could think of it, when the Royal Family are leaving us, as I fear, from your account of yourself, you want bathing and quiet.”

## EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, August 24, Vienna.—“The several despatches which we have sent to your Lordship since our arrival here have stated so much at large the general impression which the course of our conferences with His Imperial Majesty's Ministers has produced on our minds, that in availing myself of the departure of this messenger to trouble your Lordship with a few lines on the subject of my present situation here, I rather wish to refer you to the contents of those despatches, than to tire you by repeating in a private letter the opinions I have already concurred in transmitting to you in a public despatch.

“The chief motive for my giving your Lordship this trouble is to remind you that the idea entertained of the mission to this Court, with which his Majesty has been pleased to honour us, was that it related to a point which, at the same time that it was of the greatest importance, was also of a nature to be brought to a speedy and immediate decision, and not to call for any long and tedious negotiation. The objects on which our instructions turned, and the views which they authorized us to hold out to the Cabinet of Vienna were undoubtedly of such a nature, but it happened, rather unfortunately for this view of the subject, that M. de Mercy's mission to London gave the Ministers here an opportunity to protract our conferences, under the pretext of waiting for the answer he might communicate to the propositions of pecuniary assistance he was charged to make; to which propositions, when made to us by the Ministers here, we were absolutely unable to listen, not only from the tenor of our instructions, but from the decided opinion we have been led to form on the subject in consequence of what we have observed of the dispositions and views entertained by the ruling powers at Vienna.

“Whatever may be the answer which M. de Mercy will have to communicate from London, it appears to me that, unless we can succeed in prevailing on the Ministers here to act in the manner in which we have with the most earnest and unremitting solicitations pressed them to act, the negotiation with which we were entrusted may be considered as having failed in its object; and the future communications which shall be thought advisable by his Majesty's Ministers to be carried on with this Court, on the subject of any other arrangement, will require to be conducted by some person whose residence here may be of a more settled description, and better fitted to the protracted negotiations which are likely enough to be produced by the present languid and inactive disposition of the Court of Vienna.

“How far 't is still probable that a repetition of our solicitations on this subject may produce a better effect than they have hitherto done, is a point which I will not absolutely take upon myself to determine at this moment; all I can assure your Lordship of is that no efforts shall be left untried on our parts to produce the desired effect, however we may see reason to despair of success in our endeavours; and with this assurance, I shall leave the future determination on this point to the better judgment of your Lordship and the rest of his Majesty's Ministers, in the anxious hope and expectation that, if the present state of affairs here shall appear to you in the same light as it does to us, I may receive, in answer to this representation, the permission to return home, and devote myself to the exercise of those other duties which arise from the situation with which his Majesty has been pleased to honour me.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1794, August 24, St. James's Square.—“Lord Grenville has the honour to acquaint your Majesty that Count Mercy still continues too

ill to attend to business, and that Count Starhemberg having, in consequence of this circumstance, been charged by Count Mercy to open the negotiation here, Lord Grenville yesterday evening saw Count Starhemberg, in the presence of Mr. Pitt, whose attendance Lord Grenville requested, as he foresaw that so much of Count Starhemberg's proposal would relate to measures of pecuniary aid, to forward the efforts of the Court of Vienna. What passed was nothing more in substance than what is stated in the despatch from Earl Spencer and Mr. Grenville, which your Majesty will receive by this messenger; and the whole subject was taken by your Majesty's ministers merely *ad referendum*, and with a view to enquiries which Mr. Pitt is to make as to the possibility of any immediate pecuniary advance, on which point Count Starhemberg was very urgent."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 25, Weymouth.—"I am sorry to find by Lord Grenville's note that Count Mercy still continues unable to transact the commission entrusted to him, though perhaps the rapidity of Count Starhemberg may carry it on more expeditiously than all the diplomatic buckram of the old Court.

"I own I am still of opinion if, when the Prussian subsidy expires, it could be changed for one to the Court of Austria, provided then a sufficient force be kept both on the Rhine and in the Low Countries, that it would be a very advantageous alteration; Russia engaging to keep Prussia quiet, which is as much assistance as we shall ever receive from the north."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1794, August 25, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville is concerned to have to acquaint your Majesty that Count Mercy died this morning at about four o'clock. Lord Grenville has seen Count Starhemberg, who despatches a messenger to-morrow to his Court with this information. The event seems to be a very unfortunate one in many points of view; particularly as Count Starhemberg has assured Lord Grenville that he sees nobody at Vienna at all fit to replace Count Mercy at the army, and as the whole direction of affairs seems to be so entirely thrown into M. Thugut's hands."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, August 26, Weymouth.—"I am sorry to find by Lord Grenville's note that Count Mercy is dead and that Count Starhemberg is of opinion that it will be detrimental to the general system, which requires every exertion of the different [Courts], but more particularly of the Court of Vienna. Undoubtedly since the beginning of the business the late Count has not been fortunate either in effecting much vigour or showing that he had advised it."

#### LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1794, August 27, Frankfort.—"I have long since felt precisely about Prussia as you do, and, for several weeks past, been fully convinced of

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the total inutility of my remaining here, and if I have forebore taking notice of it, it was from a wish to avoid the appearance of an over anxiety to leave a situation merely because it was an unpleasant one. Your kind letter set me quite at ease on this point, and you cannot oblige me more or, as far as my private considerations are concerned, do me a greater service than by taking the King's pleasure on my returning home, as soon as possible.

You may, however, be at the same time quite assured that if, by any favourable alteration amongst those who lead the King of Prussia, or from any other new and unexpected circumstance, there should be the most remote chance of any advantage being derived from my staying on, that I will not stir.

"I could not with any propriety mention in my official letter the sources from whence I drew my information relative to conduct of the Austrians; it comes from several Prussian officers of rank who still retain a sense of the former character of their army, and who begin to be ashamed at its inactivity and insignificance, and it is confirmed by a long letter from General Seckendorf (Quarter-Master-General to Duke Albert). This letter is addressed to Baron Hardenberg in reply to one this Minister had written, and by him, whimsically enough, left with me a sufficient length of time for me to copy. I enclose it to you as a prolix but very *naïf* justification of the conduct of the Austrians, and it is so strictly true both in fact and argument as to be quite unanswerable."

#### T. GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, September 1, Vienna.—"If M. de Thugut is waiting with impatience the result of M. de Mercy's negotiation, you will easily believe that we have no less impatience to know your decisions upon that subject, though you will have seen that Lord Spencer and I have not been able to teach ourselves to wish that the pecuniary demands may or ought to be gratified by us. If they had confined themselves to asking only such a temporary assistance as might have given a more immediate spring to the vigorous movement which we are urging them to make, I should have been as little disposed as anybody could to withhold any practicable facilities of that description; but to the extent to which they steadily continue to point, I own I feel myself too little satisfied as to the equity of their claim upon us, and as to the probability of their acting fairly and manfully up to the great exertions which they ask from us, to entertain much disposition towards those demands. They dwell certainly upon the difference which they state between loan and subsidy, and wish to prove to us that their offer of security upon the revenues of the Low Countries should at least by us, who always insist on those territories as remaining at the peace in the hands of Austria, be accepted as a good and ample mortgage for the repayment of the sums which they want for this year and the next; but, if it is true that they do not feel interested at heart in these possessions, or if they think us so earnest in our wishes on this subject that they may safely throw the whole of it upon us, their offer of a *hypothèque* on those possessions takes a much more suspicious character; nor is it perhaps an unreasonable jealousy on my part to apprehend that they may wish you to have a mortgage of two millions on the Netherlands, as an inducement to you hereafter to give up some of your French acquisitions in the West Indies in order to recover for them a country in which you

will have a large pecuniary stake, added to the ordinary course of political considerations. Much at least of Thugut's conversation would seem to tally with this view of the matter. It is observable that he perpetually recurs to its being a settled point that, *de façon ou d'autre*, the Netherlands will be secured to Austria at the peace, and yet that, in his view of the military operations to be pursued, he never seems to consider them as a main object of defence, and is so little disposed to make them so that he expresses much reluctance as to the idea proposed of engaging Austria to furnish so large an army *to act in that country*, which, he thinks, might be better employed elsewhere. Add to this, his remarking that England might be satisfied by the irrecoverable detriment done to the navy and the commerce of France, and his contrasting the difference in points of acquisitions made by Great Britain with the total failure on the side of Austria; and it is no great refinement to suspect the whole of this to lead to an expectation that we may better buy back the Netherlands for them than put them to the expense of defending them or regaining them, and that we should have an additional motive for sacrificing some of our conquests to this object if we have two millions of money mortgaged upon it. Of the advantage which may be expected at home from adopting this shape of lending upon security rather than of furnishing a direct subsidy I do not well know how to judge; but unless the security could be shewn to be in itself substantial, and of a nature to be easily got at by those to whom it was due, I should doubt whether the public at home would be better reconciled to it than to a direct and acknowledged subsidy."

"Lord Malmesbury hints to me a suspicion of a proposed concert between the Emperor and the King of Prussia to compel the Maritime Powers to make peace, though he appears to give no great credit to it; certain it is that in the month which we have passed here, one of the most striking features of the conversation both of Ministers and of individuals has been a hatred and aversion to Prussia; by Thugut, too, particularly marked towards Lucchesini, of whom he never scruples to speak to us in terms of the most unqualified dislike; so that, as far as can be collected from what we hear, there ought to be no ground to suspect any plan of intimate concert between this Court and Berlin. It is possible, to be sure, that, independently of any such concert, the Government here, if unassisted by money from us, might endeavour to withdraw from the prosecution of the war; but as we have had no reason to expect any ultimate success to the propositions which we brought here, we have endeavoured, as much as possible, to learn what their conduct would be in failure of the proposed convention, and to consider them in all that we have said as equally bound to continue in their co-operations with us, according to the existing agreement, whether any new arrangement should succeed or not. To this view they have not only acceded always in distinct terms when urged by us, but they have frequently stated this of their own accord, confining themselves only to the observation that their means are limited, and will no longer allow of the exertions which they wish; but solemnly protesting against any present idea of peace, and always expressing their belief that Prussia is now desirous of peace being made because, in the present situation of things, it might be probably made to the disadvantage of Austria. Unless therefore their opinions should be disguised to a degree which I cannot well believe, or should undergo an entire change, I do not see what ground there is to suspect in them any intention of abandoning the war, though I can entertain no great hopes of such a vigorous prosecution of it as we might wish and expect from them. There is but one opinion as to the Emperor's inclinations on

this subject, and, if his personal character had steadiness enough to influence the Government, his disposition to the true principles of the war would be a great security to us; at present, however, it is of little or no avail, and it is much to be lamented in times like the present that, though there is no dislike entertained to him, there is not either the respect or consideration which ought to be attached to his situation to make it tell with any of the effect one wishes to derive from it. With respect to his Ministers, you have seen too much of our remarks upon the striking features of their conduct to make it necessary for me in every letter to repeat them. Thugut is certainly the only efficient Minister here. Very diligent and laborious in his office, he seems to have acquired an influence here by being the only man of business about the Court, and with this recommendation has reached a situation which the nobility of the country are mortified to see him hold, because he has no pretensions to hereditary rank, and because they have been used to see that office for many years filled by Prince Kaunitz. What we however miss in him is, either the disposition or capacity to see the present great crisis of Europe upon the large scale on which it should be looked at by the leading Minister of this Empire; instead of which we see, in all our discussions, a cold, narrow and contracted view of this subject, infinitely too languid and little for the object, and made peculiarly unfavourable to our propositions by the disinclination which he certainly feels to concur heartily with us in the great interests attached to the Austrian possession of the Low Countries.

"Yet though the shortness of our possible residence here makes this inanimate character of the Government a bar to that immediate spirit and alacrity which, for the purposes of the present crisis, it was highly desirable to create here so as to act upon instantaneously, much I should suppose may be done after our return by any person of steadiness and activity in the course of an established residence here; there being certainly fair grounds for the most intimate union between the two countries, and appearances enough of general inclination towards it, though traversed for the present by their hopes of fighting at our cost, and by the unfavourable turn of M. Thugut's mind upon the subject of the Netherlands.

"We have heard of Lord Malmesbury's intention to quit Frankfort on the 10th September, and we have read the formal acceptance signed by him of the military concert of the 26th July. You will already have seen in our dispatch, No. 5, our apprehensions of the inconvenience of placing Clairfait's army in any state of dependance upon the Prussian line, as we are always afraid that the Prussians may by a nominal concert upon this subject become a real hindrance, and throw difficulties in the way of the proposed enterprise for the relief of Valenciennes. In this view, therefore, we had certainly rather have seen Lord Malmesbury remaining, at least till the movement in question had actually been carried into effect; and the more so, as we have always kept their fears a little quiet here by promising that Lord Malmesbury at Frankfort should look to, and strictly watch the operations of M. Möllendorff's army."

LORD GRENVILLE to the LORD CHANCELLOR [Loughborough].

1794, September 12, Downing Street.—"I send you the book containing the marriage treaty of the late Prince of Wales. As I understand that the business respecting the marriage of His Royal Highness is in such forwardness that it may probably soon be necessary to send a

proper person to Brunswick, and that his Royal Highness has suggested Lord Southampton for that purpose, I should be obliged to your Lordship to consider whether any variation will be necessary in the commission or in the treaty to be signed. The commission, I observe, is read in Council previous to its passing the great Seal.

"Mr. Jay is to dine with me in the country to-morrow sevensnight (Friday) and to stay Saturday. I do not know whether your business here will make it possible for you to be absent from town, but if you can come to me, I shall have great pleasure in showing you my house."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1794, September 13, Downing Street.—"In the present critical situation of public affairs Lord Grenville feels it his duty humbly to submit to your Majesty's consideration the draft of proposed instructions to Earl Spencer and Mr. Grenville, grounded on the change which the late events must necessarily produce in the views and prospects of the allies. On the best consideration of all the circumstances connected with that subject, such of your Majesty's servants as are in town, the Lord Chancellor, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas, and himself, have thought that the proposal of the transfer of the Prussian subsidy to Austria must now be laid aside, unless it should have been already agreed to on the terms which Earl Spencer and Mr. Grenville were before instructed to propose. It is on this idea that the draft herewith transmitted to your Majesty has been prepared, and, as the points in question are there so fully detailed, Lord Grenville does not presume to trouble your Majesty with a repetition of what is there stated; only begging leave to mention to your Majesty that it was not thought prudent to explain to the Court of Vienna the ideas to which your Majesty's servants hope the situation of your Majesty's forces will enable them to look for submitting to your Majesty the plan of material operations to be carried on in support of the Royalists, at the same time that so considerable a force as is mentioned in this draft shall be employed in the Netherlands.

"Lord Grenville also requests your Majesty's permission to instruct your Majesty's Ministers at Vienna to represent strongly against the article in the capitulation of Valenciennes by which the *émigrés* are classed with the deserters, and as such given up to the enemy; and also against the supposed intention of the Emperor to destroy the constitutions of the different provinces in the Netherlands, in case of his recovering the possession of them."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, September 13, Weymouth.—"The draft of instructions to Earl Spencer and Mr. Grenville are very suitable to the change of circumstances. If, without diminishing the forces in Flanders, a large force can be thrown into France to aid the Royalists, and the command in *reasonable* hands, it must greatly forward the operations on the other side. Lord Grenville cannot too strongly express disapprobation of the article in the capitulation of Valenciennes which classes the *émigrés* as deserters, as also the supposed intention of the Emperor to destroy the constitutions of the different Provinces in the Netherlands in case of his recovering the possession of them."

## EARL FITZWILLIAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, September 15, Milton.—“The Duke of Portland has had the goodness to give me a sight of the instructions your Lordship proposes to forward to Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville, for which I feel very much obliged to his Grace. Upon the point of withdrawing the offer of a subsidy to Austria (considering the complexion the pending negotiation at Vienna has assumed, and also the opinions of Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville) I can have no doubt. We still hold out a great pecuniary assistance to Austria by the support we give to the credit of her loan; and, all things considered, it is as much as she ought to expect or we to grant. However desirable it may be still to hold out to her a co-operation in our ports, and by our arms, in her military operations on the side of the Netherlands as the best means of securing the defence of the United Provinces, has your Lordship fully considered how much we may embarrass ourselves, and how much, in the event, we may cramp and render uncertain all other services, by the proposed stipulation, not of furnishing in that quarter a *fixed* number of men in British pay, but an *indefinite* number to be regulated by that produced by Austria? For my own part, however important and however desirable I may hold the acquisition of a strong barrier upon the confines of France on the side of the Netherlands, I have very little hope of its being acquired by the dint of arms in that quarter. Whenever we again approach that quarter, we shall again find ourselves in the thick of regular strong places; every operation then becomes the work of time; everything is to be done *pas-à-pas*, as has been experienced not in this war only, but in all preceding ones. The Netherlands then, I fear, are only to be reconquered speedily so as to be held securely, and a barrier is to be acquired only in the interior of France. These things must be looked for through the breaking up of the present usurpation; to the best means of attaining that great end we must look for all the rest. In my humble opinion the invasion of Frenchmen is that best means; it is so as being the one and the only one that will foment insurrection within. But to give a prospect of success to an invasion by Frenchmen, British troops will be necessary: there must be that countenance; from that spring every other must be put in action. It is then from viewing our great object in this light, and from a fear lest this service should again be put by for the purpose of forwarding others, or to answer some unexpected call, that it appears to me that a stipulation for an *indefinite* number of co-operating troops to be furnished by us will not be so guarded as in prudence we ought to be; entertaining at all times the thorough intention of a handsome performance on our parts of all we engage for. I wish to suggest this for your Lordship's consideration. I shall get to town to-night, and shall endeavour to see your Lordship early to-morrow.”

## T. GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, September 15, Vienna.—“The conditions now attached to the two questions of loan and subsidy appear certainly to be the best which could have been imagined for promising a fair use of the troops for which we are desired to pay . . . but . . . it is manifest that, instead of complying with all the propositions in question, they could not easily be brought to consent to any one of them. Upon the subject of command,



there is a soreness which would be an insuperable bar to the idea of a large combined force (chiefly Austrian) acting under the command of any General but one of their own ; and yet there is so little hope of their acting vigorously under any of their own, whom we know of, that the difficulties in either case appear to be extreme.

"Under the pressure of your letter,\* which led us to imagine that Lord Cornwallis is actually gone to Flanders, we have done and said all that was in any shape likely to assist his situation there ; at the same time from Wyndham's letter, and from the fall of Valenciennes, it is possible that his journey may have been delayed."

"They do not talk heartily here of Clairfait's co-operating, though they do not plainly refuse it ; but I fear that it is too likely that they will satisfy their dignity by keeping their army entirely distinct from ours, a determination which may perhaps but too much assist the views of the French, if they really make a vigorous attack upon Holland ; all that we could do by threats, entreaties, and remonstrances on this very important point we have done, and will continue to do so long as we shall stay here.

"Upon the subject of transferring the subsidy, I believe they are in earnest when they say it is out of their power to engage for any considerable subsidy from the Empire to the King of Prussia ; and, if it is true that they are now under the necessity of ascertaining what are their means for the next campaign, it may be true that they cannot act upon the uncertain speculation of receiving so much from us as they could procure from the Empire for the King of Prussia. I know not whether I am right, but I have thought once or twice to-day that Thugut has spoken with some marks of dislike to Count Stahrenberg, whom he appears to suspect of having broached this proposition at London. To prevent any corroboration of his suspicion, we did not, in any part of our conference, quote any opinion of Count Stahrenberg's ; and, as I believe you are well disposed towards him, I shall be glad to find that I have mis-interpreted the word or two which Thugut dropped upon this matter.

"We are come back again (upon the failure of our overtures) to the hearing of a reduced scale of military operations, and phrases of that sort, more like a haberdasher of small wares than the Minister of a great Empire. What the supposed plan of this contracted war may be I never have been able to learn, and indeed it requires all the good temper which one can muster to make so discouraging an enquiry.

"Orders are, however, said to be issued for raising 60,000 recruits in the hereditary States of Austria ; but no hopes are given of assistance from Hungary, where the harvest has been in many places uncommonly deficient. We have done what we could to urge them to be active in Sardinia, now the French there appear to be retiring ; and though an invincible prejudice with respect to that quarter prevents Thugut from readily doing all he might, yet he expresses no disinclination to concur in an attack upon Nice, if the English fleet would co-operate, as soon as the equinoctial snows have fallen to guard the mountains of the Milanese. There are, however, bad reports here of Kosciusko's having declared war against Austria which will be a reason, and still more a pretext, for suspending any enterprise of activity which was to be directed from Vienna."

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\* Published in "Courts and Cabinets of George III."

## EARL SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, September 15, Vienna.—“ I take this opportunity of repeating to you the request contained in my private letter of the 24th August, that the answer to the despatch we now send may convey to us, without loss of time, his Majesty's permission to return home, if it shall not already have been granted in consequence of the representations I have before taken the liberty of making.

“ In addition to the reasons on which I grounded this request in my former letter, I have now to state that the alteration which has taken place in the situation of the campaign by the loss of Valenciennes and Condé seems completely to put an end to the most pressing object of our mission, namely, the relief of those fortresses; and that, even if there appeared a greater disposition in his Imperial Majesty's Ministers to enter fairly into negotiation on the terms now proposed to them by Great Britain than the manner in which they have received our communication of those terms gives us any reason to expect, the discussions on that subject would necessarily be drawn into such a length as very far to exceed the nature of the mission with which we were originally charged.

“ I therefore trust that I may depend on our receiving, in answer to our despatch of this date, if it should not have been before sent, our permission to take our leave of this Court; and we propose setting off as soon after the receipt of it as we can, in which case we should probably be arrived at Helvoetsluys between the 1st and 10th of November; and as it will not be prudent to sail from thence without convoy, we shall hope to find one there ready for us at that time.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD.

Private.

1794, September 16, Downing Street.—“ Circumstances which I cannot explain by this conveyance having prevented me much longer than I had expected from writing to you on the subject of your private letters, I send this merely that you may not believe that I have overlooked or been inattentive to them. I hope soon now to be able to enter into details upon the subject, but I feel it necessary to say that I do not think I could with propriety, under the present circumstances, recommend it to the King to give leave of absence to his Minister in Switzerland. The state of things there is too critical, and the appointment itself was revived only from a sense of the necessity of having a British Minister resident there. If you should continue in that country during the next winter, I certainly see no objection to your residing at Lausanne if, under all circumstances, you think yourself safe from insult there. The remainder of your letter I will answer by another opportunity, having, as I have already mentioned, been prevented from doing so longer than I had expected.”

*Copy.*

## FRENCH AFFAIRS.

[1794, September.]—Extract from the letter of a correspondent; without date or signature.

“ Les dernières nouvelles de France vont jusqu'au 30 Aout. Elles confirment que Tallien et Treillard, unis en apparence, ne le sont momentanément que parceque leur intérêt demande la mort de Barrère,

Collot d'Herbois, Billaud Varennes, Vadier, Amard, et David, qu'ils ont résolue plus décidément encore dans un conciliabule tenu au Palais Royal chez un marchand ami de Tallien, au quel a été invité un scélérat de la lie du peuple, aussi fameux par plusieurs assassinats que par une manière de fidélité à ses amis, et d'incorruptibilité dont il a donné maintes preuves, ayant été successivement employé par le Duc d'Orléans, Mirabeau, Pethion, et St. Just, toutes les fois qu'il s'agissoit de s'assurer du peuple du Faubourg St. Antoine, qui, habitué à recevoir par ses mains le salaire des différens mouvemens qu'on lui feroit faire, le regarde comme son chef; aussi dispose-t-il de celui-ci à volonté, ainsi que de la foule de bandits, et gens sans aveu qu'il y a dans les différens Départemens, et qui à sa voix se rendent à Paris. Cet homme nommé Chouneux ou Jones, ne sait ni lire ni écrire. Mais il a un journal dont il dispose, et le *Nouveliste* dit qu'un passage de celui-ci, cité dans les papiers publics comme une preuve que les Jacobins préparoient les esprits du Faubourg St. Antoine pour une insurrection, et qui porte *On prépare, dit-on, une insurrection; la Convention n'a qu'à faire son devoir, ou le peuple est là, pour le lui faire remplir*, n'est autre chose que le mot du guet, donné par cet homme à ses satellites dans les Départemens, pour refluer vers Paris, et que ceci est fait d'après le résultat du conciliabule dont j'ai parlé plus haut; le moment de l'exécution n'est pas encore déterminé, et tient à celui où les esprits seront montés à la hauteur de l'entreprise. Il est remarquable que cet homme a constamment été l'ennemi de Robespierre, qui cependant n'a jamais osé le faire arrêter; il en a tiré parti par le canal de St. Just, qui étoit son ami."

*Copy. French.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, September 20, Frankfort.—"I have thought it necessary, to avoid any false construction which might have been put on my going away if it had taken place suddenly, to mention it to Baron Hardenberg as not very distant; he received it as an event for which he was prepared, and could not but admit its propriety.

"I do not conceive that what has just passed in Poland is of a nature to make any alteration necessary on this point. If it should be deemed expedient to renew the treaty with Prussia, it seems to me absolutely necessary that it should be done through an extraordinary commission sent by His Prussian Majesty to London; and, at all events, although I never like to shrink from service because it is unpleasant, I confess I should be very sorry to be employed on this occasion. I intend on leaving this place to write a short letter to Count Haugwiz, in which I think I may, without danger of doing mischief, venture to express my own feelings.

"The situation of the Court of Berlin is drawing very fast towards that point which must place it in an insulated state. The disgraceful failure of every military operation His Prussian Majesty has undertaken since the year 1791 has destroyed the reputation of the Prussian army, and the duplicity and versatility of his Cabinet put an end to all confidence and good faith."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, September 20 [Weymouth].—"We do not differ very much in our view of the present struggle, except that I do not see quite so

gloomily as yourself the certainty of the overthrow of all the Governments, as the inevitable consequence of the establishment of the French Republic. There would be much and very severe contest, and it is probable that the contagion would spread, but I am not convinced that it would be impossible to keep the wolf out of our doors; and if that could be, I should console myself if the Polish wolf were strong enough to bite right hand and left. As you tell me that it is not probable that Austria will be subsidized, I am very well contented to leave the argument to its fate; assuring you that few things have given me more pleasure than to learn this *fact*, no matter what the reasons are which have induced it. My opinions have been very much strengthened by the events which have since taken place, namely, the loss of all, and the very infamously disgraceful capitulation of some of the conquests in Flanders; all which convince me that nothing will be done by Austria in that quarter that can tend to decide this struggle.

"I have doubted very much whether I should say one word to you on a subject which you have avoided in your letters; but as you must be aware that mine is not a common interest in it, I wish you to consider for a moment what we have so often discussed respecting the Duke of Portland's system of Irish Government, and of the subsequent game played under his direction, by his family and friends in that kingdom. I wish you to read the correspondence which passed between us (with the participation of Mr. Pitt) upon that subject, and to recollect the extent to which I was committed with them, as much in consequence of your opinions and his, as my own. You will, likewise, recollect the public opinions and measures to which those people have pledged themselves since their dismissal, and you will be better able to decide upon the several bearings of the measure which you have adopted of surrendering that kingdom to Lord Fitzwilliam and the Duke of Portland, under the government of Mr. Porsonby. I repeat that mine is no common interest in this matter, and that I never can consent to waive the interest which I take in it. I do not think it quite impossible but that you may know less upon this subject than I do; all I now mean is to turn your attention to it in all shapes, and with all the bearings with which I must view it.

"The guard upon the King has been very painful to me from many considerations; but his great attentions to me have contributed to lessen much of the real inconvenience attending it. The whole of the naval business has been very ill done, and, some few nights since (namely Sunday) the frigates gave us a most wanton and most disgraceful alarm. The King has been as loud in praise of us as in blame of the navy, *who actually exchanged shot in the road*. We were reviewed on Tuesday, and nothing can equal the compliments from the whole Royal Family who dined with me after the review. You will find the King wonderfully mended in health and looks, and talking more incautiously than ever upon points which are uppermost in his thoughts at present.

"Colonel Nugent wrote to me twelve days since to inform me that he was appointed to the command of the 31st, 34th, and 79th, and was ordered to be at Spithead by the 20th instant; he understood he was to go to the West Indies, and was delighted with his command. This cursed fever embitters every pleasurable consideration on this subject. Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Fremantle is amongst the victims."

## T. GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, September 22, Vienna.—“The course of this last week has been employed, as you will have seen from our dispatch, in very long but fruitless arguments on our parts.

“The proposal which we send to you [has no other recommendation than that of it's having been strenuously resisted by us and sturdily persisted in by them. If the fact really was, as they are disposed to consider it, that England, at no risk and no expense, could in the shape of this guarantee furnish means to Austria without which they must consider themselves as beat, and act, too, under that impression, to their own certain ruin, and to the great probable danger of Holland; if, I say, all this mischief could be prevented without any real expense to England the question would seem to me very different from what it now is; but I confess I have not been able to make out of their conversation on this subject any of that security on these points which they most insist upon.”

“One considerable difficulty in regard to this proposition seems to be in the influence which this loan might have upon their wish to regain the Low Countries, a wish which we already think too weak in their minds, and which would probably become weaker from the reflection that the income of those revenues was already mortgaged for a considerable sum. It was with a view to this that I dropped to them the notion of their giving a large security, and asking a smaller loan, as well as complying with the requisitions of augmented force and British command. The general security you see they do consent to give, but, till I hear some more distinct explanation, I shall still fear that they mean to throw the whole security upon the Netherlands.

“They are still quarrelling more every day with every thing that is Prussian; they have stopped a large magazine of blue cloth from Prussia to Switzerland which they say they know is destined to France, and the King of Prussia threatens in consequence to stop some of their supplies in their passage to their army. Thugut said of the King of Prussia to-day with some truth and some humour that all he wanted was, to save the whole of his army to conquer Poland without the loss of a man, and, in reward, to receive from us a pension of a million and a half *per annum*. If half that sum could purchase from him 30,000 troops absolutely at our disposal, to make with British, Hessians, and Dutch, an army under English orders of 100,000 men for the side of Holland, and that the other half, namely 700,000*l.*, given in the way of subsidy to Austria could give it good heart to make a vigorous offensive campaign, I know not whether my inclinations would not lead me to the experiment; but their wants here are so great and their resources, or at least their spirit and exertion so reduced, that the prospect is certainly very discouraging.”

“I know not who you are sending here, but we have taken great pains to keep alive in them here the most favourable disposition that we could, and, as far as appearances can be depended on, if the pecuniary demands were out of the question, nothing can be more promising than their general language and professions are, of earnestly desiring to establish the most intimate union between the two Courts.”

## The MARQUIS OF HERTFORD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, September 24, Sudbourn, near Orford.—“I entirely concur in your Lordship's opinion of the impropriety of having a Minister from

His Majesty with the Austrian Army, and have never looked to that situation since it was thought advisable to remove the negotiation then pending to Vienna. Whenever that has assumed a fixed form, and the relative situation of the two Courts can be properly disclosed to me, I shall be happy to have an opportunity of knowing from your Lordship the further views of His Majesty's confidential servants in regard to that mission, as there is no circumstance in my situation to prevent my undertaking it if I can hope to contribute to the public service."

LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, September 26, Frankfort.—"The conduct of the Prussians in this neighbourhood grows every day more and more shameful, and I lament every hour that I remain near them."

T. GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, October 1, Vienna.—"Though the account which we sent you of their adhering to their demand of a loan of six millions, instead of accepting three in the shape offered to them, is a matter which admits of much farther negotiations, yet it evidently tends to such a lengthened discussion that Lord Spencer and I have determined to avail ourselves of our letters of recedence which we present in a day or two, and hope to begin our journey home on the eighth instant; and indeed we observe by your last letter to Lord Spencer that, if our proposal should not be accepted, you think it yourself advisable for him to turn over the continuance of this discussion to whoever is to be the Minister here. We have promised them here that they shall have a Minister without delay, and I think we leave them in very good inclinations and dispositions, though sturdily insisting upon their money, and convinced, I believe, that somehow or other it will be given to them. You will see by my last that I am not informed what sort of security is offered by Desardrouin, or what precautions the matter admits of as to payments of interest and capital; but I see that they always treat the subject here as if the terms of the offer in themselves provided against the possibility of this guarantee becoming chargeable to Great Britain. If this could be made out in any satisfactory manner, certainly much of the difficulty and objection would be done away; but I own I have not yet in my own mind been able to make out any such arrangement, though perhaps in London Mr. Pitt and Mr. Desardrouin may contrive some mode that may to a great degree succeed. We pressed them yesterday to know if they would take the guaranty of three millions as good to November 1795, and leave any farther guaranty to be discussed again at that time if necessary, but they declined any accommodation of this sort, and are, I see, persuaded that they ought to succeed in their application for six millions, and that the pressure of circumstances will induce you in England to give way to them. Meanwhile their language and disposition as to Holland is, as you will see, such as we could wish it to be, and in this critical moment we think it right that you should know of this disposition as soon as may be. We write also to Lord Malmesbury to urge him to keep the Prussians close upon the Moselle, and to remind him for Möllendorff's observation, that Clairfait's approach towards Guelderland is as necessary for the safety of the

Prussian dominions as even for Holland itself. To Lord St. Helen's we have likewise sent by this messenger, as a communication of the activity which they promise here for the defence of Holland may give some confidence in that country; and, if I can judge from a post letter which Lord St. Helen's sent to us, there wants in his neighbourhood all the courage, vigour, and support which can be given to it. It seems very important to endeavour to assist the Austrians in point of supply, as it is doubtless desirable by all practicable means to confirm them in the zeal which they now express to defend the Dutch frontiers at all risks; and it is evident that they think they have great reason to complain of their High Mightinesses not only for absolutely refusing to concur in attacking Mauberge, but for having latterly neglected to supply Maestricht for more than four months, though six or seven months' provision is evidently necessary for the safety of the garrison, and many representations had previously been made on this matter."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, October 1, Weymouth.—"I am this moment setting off for two visits to Lord Dorchester and Lord Arundel in this country, and shall be in London on Monday night, where I propose staying till Saturday morning. I do not know how far this may fall in with your arrangements, but I hope that we may meet, as I fear that we do not understand each other upon the subject of my last letter. If I am *mistaken* as to Lord FitzWilliam's appointment, I have indeed been misled by a most extraordinary chain of information. If I am *mistaken* likewise as to the existing engagements avowed by Mr. Ponsonby to his friends as taken by Lord FitzWilliams to him, I am misled in a manner and from a quarter as extraordinary. It is (I again repeat) not a common or an uninteresting moment to me, as a public or as a private man; nor can I consider arrangements of this nature quite as abstract propositions, with which I am unconcerned. It is possible that I may not feel it very easy to converse upon this subject with you; and if so, I shall be sorry for it, as I have already felt too much uneasiness at things which I have so much disliked, and which I still feel as very increasing evils."

#### LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, October 5, Frankfort.—I am not sure that this last trait of M. Möllendorf, and his seeming readiness *now* to do what he ought to have done weeks ago, is not of the blackest of his whole conduct; but I mistrust my own feelings on this point, and my opinion of him is so warped that I will not venture to [write] it. Nothing however is more certain [than] that there did not, at the moment he consented to pass the Moselle, exist a motive that did not press as strongly on him six weeks ago; and, luckily for us and for our vindication, it will stand on record that these motives were repeatedly urged to him."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1794, October 5, St. James's Square.—"Lord Grenville having received last night by express from Lord Robert Fitzgerald a despatch

under a separate cover, which was brought him unopened from the Office, and the contents of which appear to him to be of a nature requiring peculiar secrecy, he has taken the liberty to transmit them to your Majesty in this separate box, and humbly requests your Majesty's permission to keep them for the present out of the Office, and to communicate them only to your Majesty's confidential servants for their opinion on the subject.

"Lord Grenville has conversed with the Lord President, the Duke of Portland, and Mr. Pitt respecting it, who all agree with him in thinking that, supposing this overture really to come from the now prevailing party at Paris, considerable use might be made of it for accomplishing the great object on which the safety of Europe seems to depend, that of restoring a government in France capable of giving protection to the inhabitants of that country and security to the other nations of Europe. Under this impression Lord Grenville's idea would be, with your Majesty's permission, to send secretly into Switzerland some person properly instructed to make the best use of this opening if it should be real, or to break off all further proceedings in this business if it should turn out to be only a visionary project of the individuals named in Lord Robert Fitzgerald's letter; in either case, to observe the strictest and most inviolable secrecy.

"What is known here of the views of Tallien's party at Paris seems certainly to lead to a belief that they may be disposed to some measure of the nature now suggested; and very recent accounts, which Lord Grenville understands are received in town through an American vessel, would shew, if they can be depended upon, that Tallien still maintained his superiority, though with much difficulty."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, October 6, Windsor.—"The letter I have received this morning from Lord Grenville accompanying the letter he received last night from Lord Robert Fitzgerald, with the *mémoires* drawn up by Monsieur Mounier in concert with Monsieur du Pan, deserves the greatest attention and secrecy. I therefore perfectly coincide in the opinion that these papers should not at present be deposited in the Office, and their contents only communicated to the confidential Ministers. I own I do not expect that things can yet be ripe enough in France for any reasonable plan coming forward with any prospect of success; but I am far from wishing therefore that, with prudence, it should not be attempted.

"Lord Robert Fitzgerald is certainly not an able nor quick-sighted man, and the two French gentlemen he has with him are men of superior talents, and may have their own private views to effect. It is consequently highly necessary that Lord Grenville should find out some very wary man to go to Switzerland to take the chief part in this difficult negotiation. Discretion is perhaps as essential an ingredient in the character to be chosen as talents; if such a person can be found I approve of no time being lost in dispatching him to Switzerland."

#### LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, October 13 [Frankfort].—"On the reception of your last despatches the first idea which struck me was to go immediately to Berlin and to enforce there all the very powerful arguments my mind was



impressed with, and which, powerful as they are, I was confident would produce no effect here; and I believe (for I confess I was irresolute on the subject) I should have carried this step into execution if, while I was debating it in my mind, I had not received a messenger from Lord Spencer informing me that he and your brother had left Vienna on the 7th, and that they would probably be here on to-morrow or next day. The importance of their mission, and its near connection with all I am about, decided me at once to remain where I am.

"In the meanwhile what I have mentioned in my secret despatch of this date, if it is as true as I am assured it is, leaves us little hopes to be supported in the way we require from either of the German Powers. The connections of the Elector of Mentz, and particularly the character of his minister (Albini) leave no doubt that he does not act without a pretty strong certainty that he will be supported at Vienna, and the long conference he has had with Baron Hardenberg this morning, which I am certain has taken place (although Hardenberg has not mentioned to me), affords room to suppose that he may also have the concurrence of the Court of Berlin. *If* this should be the case, I should feel I was acting a very undignified part, and under the imputation of the want of that information I should be ashamed to be without, if, while the King of Prussia was listening to proposals for ending the war, I should be soliciting from him the means of carrying it on with more vigour and effect than has hitherto been employed. In a few days I probably shall be able to ascertain something more positive on this very material point, and, till I receive orders from you, shall act up to the best of my judgment."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, October 13, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville should look out for a proper person to carry the invitation to the Duke of Brunswick to accept the supreme command of the allied army in Holland. The Duke is not void of vanity; the more celebrated the person may be, the better it would be liked by him.

"I shall certainly be willing to write to the Duke on this occasion, but, that the letter may entirely correspond with the measure, I desire Lord Grenville will form it. I shall write to-morrow to my son the Duke of York who, I doubt not, will see this proposal in a very different light than he could possibly the former."

#### LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, October 16, Frankfort.—"After several very long conversations with Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville, and after considering the subject under every point of view in which we could possibly place it, it appears that my going to Berlin at this moment is not advisable.

"The only reasons which could justify me in taking a step not authorised by my instructions would be either that some circumstances perfectly new and unexpected had arisen since I heard from you, or that some material and manifest alteration was known to have taken place in the sentiments and conduct of the Court of Berlin. Neither is the case. Holland was nearly in the same state of danger then as it is now, and Prussia had, when you wrote your despatches of the 30th September and 3rd of October, persisted in its refusal to fulfil the stipulations of our treaty. It was under these impressions that the Cabinet came to the resolution to suspend the October subsidy."

"I expect every day to hear of the Prussian army crossing the Rhine and to be told by Baron Hardenberg that His Prussian Majesty considers the treaty as at an end. In this case my mission will be over, and unless I can be of any further use on the Continent, I trust you would be so good as to send me His Majesty's leave to return home."

T. GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, October 16, Frankfort.—"The assurances so frequently renewed to us by Thugut have not, as you see, prevented Clairfait from passing the Rhine, though it does not appear to us that any new event had made that retreat necessary; and still less can we imagine how it can be represented by the Austrian Government as being in any way consistent with their professions of vigorous co-operation for the defence of Holland. The little effect produced by the assurances which we have received on this subject gives us no confidence in those which have been made to Mr. Straton, and if the report of this place is true that Clairfait means to move towards Wetzlaar, there seems reason to fear that little or no reliance is to be placed on the promises of assistance to Holland from the Imperial army. Lord Malmesbury has much consulted us upon the propriety of his going to Berlin with the view of trying, under the menace of the withholding the subsidy, to procure a speedy assistance to Holland from Prussia. I have not known what advice to give him, because I do not know how far his appearance at Berlin might agree with your intentions as to the Prussian subsidy; and my doubts have been increased by the persuasion of his mind that he could do nothing with Prussia short of engaging for another year's renewal of subsidy, a measure which I know not how, even under all the pressing difficulties of this moment, to reconcile myself."

"I hinted to Lord Malmesbury the possibility of trying to get 30 or 40,000 men for next campaign from the King of Prussia to be put under English command, but he does not seem to think it likely that the Prussian troops would act cordially or usefully in that situation, even if the King should consent to such an arrangement.

"We are just greeted with the tidings of the surrender of Bois le Duc; it seems impossible to calculate upon the course of events so unexpected and so important in their consequences. Our journey from this place must now be prosecuted with some caution; we are advised to go from hence by Cassell, Hanover, Osnaburgh, Deventer and Utrecht to the Hague."

LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, October 22, Wednesday, Hague.—"I have determined to keep by me the letter you have sent me for Mr. Grenville, as he and Lord Spencer must certainly come through the Hague if they mean to embark at Helvoetsluis, and there exists *as yet* no kind of reason for their going round by Hamburg. I imagine, however, from Lauzun's account of the state of the roads, that they cannot be here before the end of this week.

"I am now waiting with much anxiety and impatience for the arrival of the Duke of York's ordinary messenger for the packet of this day. According to report His Royal Highness retreated yesterday to Arnheim, from whence, I am afraid, that he must soon retire still further, as there is no position on that side that can be rendered tenable against an enemy

so greatly superior in point of number. The present is therefore, without doubt, the critical moment for obtaining an actual reinforcement of from 15 to 20,000 Austrians, which I am persuaded that General Clerfayt may be *compelled* to grant, however reluctantly, if it be rendered the condition, *sine quâ non*, of our continuing to furnish him with the means of subsistence. You will find full proof of this (if you have no objection to the means of seeking it) in the letter from the Commissary-General of the Austrian army to M. de Starhemberg, which I enclose in this packet, and the purport of which (it having been read to me by M. Pelve) I have sent to the Duke of York, with a strong recommendation to His Royal Highness to adopt that measure, to which I know that he is of himself sufficiently inclined.

"The leading people here are thoroughly persuaded that the Duke of Brunswick will immediately accept the command now proffered to him; but I rather suspect that he will defer giving any positive answer till the close of the campaign, or till he shall have learnt whether his *projet*, which I sent by my letter of last night, is likely to be adopted; in which case he will no doubt eagerly take charge of the execution of his own scheme. Mr. Paget's letter by this messenger certainly affords some reason to suppose that that *projet* had been previously sanctioned at Berlin; however, if we have no better grounds for hoping that the King of Prussia will make an effort to save this country than his tender affection for his relatives here, I am afraid that little reliance can be placed upon them; and indeed it is observable that his letter to the Prince of Orange (which I likewise forwarded to your Lordship yesterday) was written, contrary to his usual practice, not by his own hand, but by that of his secretary M. Kenfuer, who evidently composed every syllable of it."

#### LORD ST. HELENS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, October 22, Wednesday night, Hague.—"By a letter which Wyffin has brought me from Lord Spencer I find that his Lordship and Mr. Grenville purposed being here by the day after to-morrow; but, by Wyffin's account of the roads, I judge that to be impossible, and I shall therefore send a letter to meet them at Deventer, mentioning such particulars as may be likely to be useful to them. I need not say, however, that they are in no kind of danger; as, let the event happen, it will be impossible for the enemy to penetrate as far as their line of march till a fortnight hence at the very soonest.

"The motion in the assembly of the States General, which I mentioned in the postscript to my letter of this morning, was partly set aside, but not without difficulty and much altercation; and I understand that it will be renewed to-morrow, when the news of the Duke of York's retreat behind the Waal, which I find was not *publicly* known till this evening, will afford a fresh argument to those who are clamorous for the proposed deputation. I still think, however, that the business will end by the sending over M. Fagel upon the same sort of commission, and with the same instructions, as were originally proposed by the States of Holland.

"I have been particularly requested by General de Jarry to lay before you his humble entreaty that you would be pleased to pronounce *sur son sort*, the meaning of which expression I do not exactly understand, but suppose that it refers to some previous application. He appears to me to be extremely intelligent, and I know that he was highly considered by the late Count de Mercy."

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

*Private.*

1794, October 24, Downing Street.—“I at length transmit to you your release from the unpleasant scene in which you have been engaged. I am far from thinking it a disadvantage that the resolution of withdrawing the army has been so decisively and abruptly taken at Berlin. The season is, I trust, too far advanced to allow of any considerable impression being made on the German frontier in the course of this year; and we have the whole winter before us to take our measures for the next campaign, knowing what we have to trust to. It is a desperate game that the Court of Berlin is playing, and one which can hardly turn to its ultimate advantage.

*Postscript.*—“Since I wrote the above, I have reason to imagine that, in two or three days, I shall be authorised to send you a messenger with instructions to proceed to Brunswick, to undertake a commission of a very different nature there.

“I mention this to you in order that, if you leave Frankfort, you may not go out of the reach of a messenger.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, October 25, Weymouth.—“My brother Mr. T. Grenville having apprized me in very kind terms of the arrangement which was still undecided, but which had been earnestly pressed upon him, to take the situation of Secretary to Lord Fitzwilliam in Ireland, I am now obliged to write to you three words only upon that arrangement, which has been known to all mankind for above two months, but which you did not mention to me, even in the conversation which I held with you some days since.

“Whatever may arise out of the present political crisis, I will have nothing to reproach myself with, either with respect to Mr. Pitt, or to you, which is much more essential; and therefore I have not even answered his letter. But whatever may have been the reasons for withholding this from me, you will probably think it due to both of us that he should not be ignorant of my opinion which I explained to you; and which I have as explicitly detailed to Mr. Pitt in my letter to him of the 16th, which he certainly has communicated to you.

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1794, October 30, Dover Street.—“Lord Grenville has the honour humbly to acquaint your Majesty that the draft of the marriage treaty between your Majesty and the Duke of Brunswick is prepared, and will be laid before the Lord Chancellor early to-morrow morning for his correction, and that, as soon as Lord Grenville receives it from the Lord Chancellor, he will forward it to your Majesty.”

*Copy.*

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, October 31, Windsor.—“As Lord Grenville's note contains only his excuses for not having transmitted at the usual hour this morning the proposed draft of the marriage treaty, I should not have answered it, but that I wish to convey that I am all times so certain of the

diligence and exactness of Lord Grenville, that I could not have imputed any neglect to him if I had not received his attentive explanation."

THE MARQUIS OF HERTFORD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 2, Charles Street.—"As Lord Spencer is not yet arrived, which I looked to as the period when your Lordship would naturally take your measures in regard to the Emperor, I do not think myself at liberty to defer for a moment longer my answer to your enquiry by acquainting your Lordship that it will not suit me under the present circumstances to set out for Vienna. I would not have left you for a day in suspense upon this subject if I had not expected measures adapted to the new state of things. Our affairs in Holland are now come to such a crisis that I cannot undertake a distant mission with satisfaction to myself, or the prospect of advantage to the public service, while the present uncertainty continues, both with regard to the events themselves, and the sort of arrangements which His Majesty may be induced to make in consequence of them. During the six months which I have been in His Majesty's service, I should not have been absent a day from my post but for reasons which, as your Lordship knows, did not depend upon myself, and I can neither wish to make any pecuniary claim upon the public beyond that period, nor to induce your Lordship, from motives of attention to me, to keep a mission open which you may be disposed on public grounds to fill up."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 11, Wimbledon.—"I send for your perusal a letter I have received from Mr. Wyndham, accompanied by two letters from Utrecht. I need not enter into any detail, as I entirely coincide with Mr. Wyndham that if some other plan is not adopted, and *insisted upon* for giving protection and countenance to those levies, however disgraceful the measure would be, we must abandon the prospect totally, and with it the best prospect the country looks up to for the ultimate success of our present contest. It is clear that of all things we can least set our face to is the predicament of laying nothing before Parliament but the expense of the project, without any other fruit produced by it. You will feel that the subject admits of no delay, and that Lord St. Helens and every foreign Minister must be made to act upon our feeling in the business, and not on any fancies of their own, or what they may derive from intercourse in the societies in which they live. But I need not observe to your Lordship that all authority in every other quarter must be in vain, if they can quote the Regency of Hanover as an example for them to follow."

LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL SPENCER.

1794, November 11, Downing Street.—"Since you left me I have seen Mr. Pitt, who has had this morning a conversation with Lord Fitz-William, in which he had mentioned that he meant to-morrow to propose to the King to make the proposal in question to Lord Mansfield. I have stated to him the doubt which had occurred to us, whether it was fair towards Lord Mansfield to bring the subject forward in that manner, at least in the first instance; and, as he perfectly agrees

with us in feeling that difficulty, he wishes to know whether there would be any objections to the Duke of Portland's sending to Lord Mansfield a letter from him, as we think the proposal would come in that manner with more weight than if it was separately made by him. But if there should be any difficulty in this, he would have none in writing himself directly to Lord Mansfield. I thought it best to mention this to you lest what had passed between Lord FitzWilliam and Mr. Pitt should have prevented your ascertaining the other point.

"If this obstacle can be removed, it seems then very material that no time should be lost in proceeding to a full and unreserved communication on all the particulars connected with Lord FitzWilliam's appointment, and such an explanation will, I earnestly hope, remove all other difficulties."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 11, Windsor.—"The copy of the letter the Greffier Fagel is to present to me tomorrow, is a melancholy proof of the Prince of Orange's want of energy, as well as the commission one of that of the whole leaders of the Dutch Republic. I am therefore not surprised at the Greffier's being sensible of the inutility of the commission he has undertaken. I cannot help adding the last expression of the letter I received on Sunday from my son the Duke of York, *that he is in every instance thwarted by the people who he is trying to save*, and the complaints made by the combined army of the unkindness they experience from the Dutch on all occasions, and the total neglect of every assurance of taking any measures to defend themselves, seems inexplicable."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 12, Windsor.—"I approve of Sir Morton Eden's taking leave this day and being at the same time called to the Privy Council; his setting out for Vienna in the course of next week is very proper, for, at the present crisis, not an hour should be lost to bring that Court, both with regard to exertions in Germany and in Holland as well as to a thorough concert in Italy, to some specific points, and by the residence of a Minister on the spot to be convinced that what shall be agreed upon is actually effected."

#### MINUTE OF CABINET.

1794, November 14.

#### *Present :*

The Lord Chancellor, Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Duke of Portland, Earl of Mansfield, Lord Amherst, Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Windham, Lord Grenville.

"On reading the letters from your Majesty's Ministers in Germany, and from Mr. Woodford, Inspector-General of the French Emigrant Corps now raising on the Continent under your Majesty's Royal authority, stating how much the execution of that important measure has been retarded by the great difficulties which the colonels of those corps have experienced in obtaining proper places for dépôts in Germany; your Majesty's confidential servants have thought it their duty humbly to submit it to your Majesty, as their opinion, that at a moment when

it appears more than ever necessary that every effort should be made which can lead to prosecute the war with energy and vigour, fresh authority and directions should be sent to your Majesty's Ministers in that part of Europe, and also to Mr. Woodford, to make the most pressing applications, in your Majesty's name, to the several Princes and States of Germany whose dominions afford any favourable places for depôts for these corps, in order to obtain from them this facility towards the execution of a measure the success of which might eventually contribute, in so very great a degree, to the prosperous termination of the contest in which both your Majesty and the Empire are engaged.

"In humbly submitting to your Majesty this opinion, it was impossible for them to overlook the infinite advantage which such an application would derive from its being supported by the great influence and example of your Majesty's Electoral Government, if such depôts might be allowed to be formed in any parts of your Majesty's German dominions, where the measure might appear to your Majesty likely to be attended with the least inconvenience; and under any such restrictions which your Majesty might think fit to impose upon them, in order to ensure the good conduct of the persons employed, to prevent the enlisting any except such as are really French emigrants, and to hinder the resort of emigrants in general."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 15, Windsor.—"I have just received Lord Grenville's letter enclosing the minute of his conference with Count Starhemberg and the two Minutes of Council. As to the first it meets with my thorough approbation, and as to the steps to be taken at Vienna and Ratisbon on the ill-judged proposal of the Elector of Mayence, I had already given orders similar to what is recommended, and shall renew them.

"As to the admitting French corps to be levied in my Electoral dominions or to admit any dépôt for collecting them there, it is absolutely out of my power to countenance such a request; I have difficulty enough in forming a new corps to supply the deficiencies of the Hanoverians in Flanders, which requires the greatest attention, and the eyes of every military man to keep things quiet. I cannot therefore risk the admitting French in the present unsettled state of all minds on the Continent; but am willing to recommend the measure to any other German Prince."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 16, Wimbledon.—"If the French either by conquest or treaty get possession of the seat and instruments of the Dutch Government, and have their senses about them, their first act will be to send a French force on board the Dutch shipping to the Cape and take possession of it. There are, I am afraid, too many democrats and disaffected subjects there to leave any doubt of their being too cordially received. We must be before-hand with them, and the means of it are not difficult. I need not trouble you with the detail, but some authority from the Dutch Government is necessary, and the foundation of the transaction ought to be a liberty to us to lodge at the Cape any force we please, to be protected as a Dutch possession, and for their behoof when peace is restored; but, in the mean time, to be defended at all events against any attempt of a French force to possess it. I am not sure but the Prince of Orange is properly the head of the Dutch

East India Company, and, as such, perhaps could give the order himself to admit our force at the Cape. Of this, however, I am doubtful, as it is some time since I looked minutely into the constitution of the Dutch Company; but my general recollection leads me to believe it is so intricate and complicated as to ruin and retard, in place of executing business; and I know not how far the Prince of Orange would choose to give such an order as [would be] necessary for our purpose, without going through all the forms which the constitution of the Dutch Government, and particularly of the East India Company, may require. This however must be settled, and it must not be delayed; for my idea goes to the measure of every India ship carrying out so many, and leaving them at the Cape, and that can be done without encroaching upon other pressing services, by making the East India Company raise £ in place of 3,000. I beg you to think of all this with your first convenience."

#### MINUTE OF CABINET.

1794, November 18, Downing Street.

#### *Present :*

Lord Chancellor, Lord Privy Seal, Duke of Portland, Lord Amherst, Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas, Mr. Windham, Lord Grenville.

"Upon consideration of the despatches received this day from Lord St. Helens, and of the general situation of affairs as appearing from all the different information received from the United Provinces;

"It was agreed humbly to submit to your Majesty that it seems impracticable under the present circumstances to induce the Dutch to make such efforts for their own protection as are now become necessary in order to preserve that country from being overrun by the enemy. And that, under the impression of panic which appears to prevail there, no arguments that can be used from hence will be sufficient to prevent their listening to the offers of peace made to them in the name of the French Convention.

"That for these reasons it seems proper that Lord Grenville should be authorized by your Majesty to communicate to the Greffier, and also to the Prince Stadtholder and the Grand Pensionary through your Majesty's Ambassador at the Hague, that although your Majesty is still ready to continue your utmost efforts for the defence of the United Provinces, provided the States General are willing to co-operate vigorously in those efforts, yet that if the Dutch Government think it more expedient for the safety of the country to close with the proposals of peace mentioned in Lord St. Helen's despatch, your Majesty does not wish that they should be prevented from adopting that measure by any considerations resulting out of the various engagements by which they are bound to this country.

"But that your Majesty expects that, in any such negotiation, effectual care will be taken as far as possible to secure the independence of the Republic, and its present constitution and form of Government. And your Majesty's servants are of opinion that such instructions should be framed as may best provide for the means of withdrawing your Majesty's troops without inconvenience or risk.

"Your Majesty's servants have also felt that under these circumstances it would be expedient (if your Majesty should think it proper) that Parliament should be further prorogued to the end of December, as the communication to be made by your Majesty at the opening of the Session relative to the state of affairs upon the Continent must necessarily so much depend on the issue of the measures now in contemplation."



## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 19, Windsor.—“I have received this morning Lord Grenville's note accompanied by the Minute of Cabinet in consequence of the last advices from Holland.

“Though I think any country falling off from the cause of withstanding the principles and conduct of those who tyrannize France is to be lamented; yet the little vigour shown by the Dutch from the beginning of the contest makes their secession of but little real loss; as they have frequently prevented exertions that would have been highly advantageous to the common cause, by applications for personal succour, which have never been refused them, but sent with incredible expedition. I therefore approve of the proposed steps to be taken by Lord Grenville in my name.

“If the Treasury do not see an immediate necessity of assembling Parliament next week, which I had understood from pecuniary reasons could not be longer delayed, I am clear for every other reason it is better postponed to the end of December; in which case this should be known this day, that it may be as early known as possible for the convenience of those who otherwise would come up to attend on the occasion.”

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 24, Stowe.—“The rest of your letter announces to me the resolution taken of replacing Mr. Ponsonby and his friends in high office. As I had heard nothing from Mr. Pitt in answer to my letter respecting the new arrangements for Ireland, I had hoped from that circumstance, and from other information, that a measure which as a public man I deplored to you both, and which I considered as the strongest personal measure that could be taken, had been suspended. I am cured of every ambition by being sacrificed by those on whom I had public claims as well as those of blood. It is now my duty to endeavour not to be disgraced, and I have taken my line decidedly. But I would not have said even thus much to you if I had not deemed it necessary to apprise you of the extent to which I feel this marked and public blow which throws every former neglect so far behind. I have not written on this subject to any one friend or relation (save the three lines to my brother Tom, which he has probably shewed you, and upon whom I had no claims whatsoever), and I shall certainly not call upon any one to follow me in my resentment and separation from Government. But, as it is perhaps not unknown to you that Colonel Nugent means to resign and quit the service as soon as the campaign is over, I enclose to you a letter by which you will see that I have not irritated his feelings by any communication with him either upon his injuries or my own. A letter received from him this day by his brother confirms this intention, and the news that he is superseded in the command of his brigade, after being swindled (the word is his) out of his company in the Guards, and 3,000*l.* in money, by a promise which was broken, which was commuted afterwards as a great favour to me for the rank of Colonel, dated March 5th, 1794, and again completely broken six months after, by antedating to the 1st of March 1794 the commissions by brevet of those over whom he had bought his rank at that enormous price, and the same rank of 1st March 1794, given at the same time to the Lieutenant-Colonels of three years below him. My only reason for stating this is, that Mr. Pitt may decide (if you should think it worth while to mention it to him) how far he means that Colonel Nugent should feel himself sacrificed to he knows not what.

"This, probably, is the last letter I shall ever trouble you with upon public matters; they have indeed been fatal to my happiness, for they have induced us to think less favourably of each other upon points on which, I had hoped, we had one common sentiment; that chain is broken and the thread substituted in its place is indeed very brittle; but I thank God I have no reason to reproach myself, and certainly do not mean to reproach you.

*Postscript.*—"I conclude that you have a copy of my letter to Mr. Pitt which states more at length my opinion as a public man upon this unfortunate arrangement."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 1, Windsor.—"The strange state of public affairs at the present moment inclined me yesterday to draw up the accompanying paper for Lord Grenville's perusal. If it is of any use in bringing what I think a fair statement of the times before him, and that from it any thing to the advantage of the great cause in which we are engaged can be produced, I shall not grudge the serious attention I have given to the subject previous to thinking of putting the result on paper."

*Enclosure.*

"To foresee evils is the lot of few, to profit by experience the advantage of all who have any claim to sense. That the ill success of the last campaign, in every part of the Continent, arose from the want of concert between the European powers combined against the system of the French, cannot bear the shadow of doubt; and where that did not exist from the beginning of the campaign, it has arisen in the process of it.

"The Court of Berlin seems with long strides to be retiring from the contest, and the Dutch have in the most open manner testified the intention of making peace with France. It behoves therefore the remaining powers without loss of time to enter into such a similarity at least of conduct as may render the next campaign more likely to be crowned with success.

"Should the Dutch succeed in their pusillanimous attempt to be permitted by France to retire from the present contest, a smaller force may be sufficient on the north-east of France, therefore the British national troops may be withdrawn from the Continent, and the army to remain there consist of the German troops in British pay, joined to a corps of Austrians under an Imperial General; and on the Rhine the army of the Empire strengthened by a corps of Imperialists, to effect which Great Britain must either grant Austria a subsidy, or guarantee such loan as may be necessary to enable her to keep both corps in the field, under the express conditions that the former army is to keep the French employed on their eastern frontiers, and the latter to defend the Empire, and if possible advance from the Rhine into France.

"Having withdrawn the British troops from the Continent, a part of the cavalry and infantry with such corps of emigrants as may have been collected, must be transported early in the spring to the north-west of France, to prove whether under the protection of such a corps, those who feel the evil of the present tyranny and anarchy will not be encouraged to step forth and declare themselves.

"At the same time Spain should be pressed to make some effectual effort in the south, and if she would combine her attack with those of

Austria and Sardinia, who ought also to be written to on this subject, then if possible one conjunct expedition as the most advisable measure might be attempted; but if that cannot be effected, each, though moving on different points, so far to concur that the movements may be at the same time, which must occasion infinite perplexity to France.

"Our conquests in the West Indies to be forwarded at the same time, as they must be greatly aided by the employment given to the French at home preventing any succours being sent to those distant regions.

"These hints are roughly drawn up for Lord Grenville's consideration; if they deserve attention they must be dressed in a mode to be sent to the various Courts to which they refer, and no time is to be lost in laying the foundation of that union which alone can render any plan susceptible of success."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 4, Windsor.—"On reading the papers Lord Grenville has this morning transmitted to me, it is impossible not to be struck at the propriety of Mr. Wickham's conduct, and, I think, clearly of the duplicity both of Mounier and Mallet du Pan; the having so deliberately stated their letters and answers from France and their having instructed the person sent to France, and on a close investigation their confessing the not having heard from thence, and not having seen the negotiators since the death of Robertspiere, are not the effects of imprudence but of premeditated falsehood; and I am certain Mr. Wickham, who is highly fitting the remaining in Switzerland, will from this strange transaction be cautious of any communications he may receive from either of those persons, and be careful to keep them out of any business he may have to transact."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 5, Wimbledon.—"I have received your proposal for a corps to serve in the East or West Indies. The first is out of the question, as we will not send foreigners of any description there. The demand of half-pay seems to render the proposition inadmissible, but if in that and other respects the proposal was rectified, perhaps they could be better employed in Corsica, or as a substitute for our British troops on the Continent (if we are wise enough to withdraw them when we can). These or the West Indies are certainly our most pressing objects. I shall send it to Mr. Wyndham."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1794, December 5, Dover Street.—"I was entirely ignorant of any part of the transaction respecting Colonel Nugent till I received your letter enclosing one from him to Sir W. Young. If I had known it earlier, the interest which I must take in the situation of a person so nearly connected with you, independent of the personal regard and good opinion I entertain of him, would certainly have induced me to do whatever was in my power to prevent the measure of which he complains, or at least to remedy its effect as with respect to him. Since I was apprized of the circumstance I have lost no time in endeavouring to set the matter right, and I have been in daily hopes of being able to say to you that this was done. As, however, it is now in

such a train as I trust cannot fail to lead to a satisfactory issue, I would not any longer delay apprizing you of it, that you might not think I was neglecting the business at the very time that I was most engaged in forwarding it.

"Now what shall I say to you upon the other part of your letter? I am unwilling even to suffer my own mind to dwell upon some of the expressions in it, because I feel confident, not only as with respect to them, but with respect to the whole subject, that the time will come, and I trust it is not distant, when you will feel my conduct in the whole of this transaction as meriting a very different description; and whatever your present sentiments upon it may be, deeply as I must regret them if they have made upon your mind any such impression as your letter seems to imply, I am sure it is impossible that they can vary my sincere and heartfelt affection towards you, or the earnest desire I have ever felt to do everything, and sacrifice everything that an honest man could, in order to consult your honour and happiness. This sentiment has always regulated my conduct, and always will to the best of my judgment and understanding. It has certainly done so in the present instance, but I have no desire to dwell upon that point, because I am far from wishing to make a merit with you of having acted as I was bound to do. As to the point on which we differ, I fear it would not answer any good purpose to continue the discussion upon it by letter, as I have indeed already said upon it all I think the subject admits of. I trust that when we meet and talk it over you will see it in what, I think, its true light; but, at all events, it surely cannot be difficult to induce you to be persuaded that I can neither have any feeling, nor any interest, that could lead me to act respecting it on any other motives than those of the strong and unalterable affection which must ever bind me to you.

*Postscript.*—"I hope that, in the interim, Colonel Nugent will take no step of resignation."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 7, Windsor.—"This morning I have received Lord Grenville's two notes; the one from Downing Street acquainting that in consequence of Mr. Pitt's information to the Cabinet of the state of the business respecting the Austrian loan, it had been the opinion of those present that he should proceed to ascertain the terms which might be offered and the respectability of the person who would engage in it. I am glad my rough ideas have been of any use to Lord Grenville.

"The other from Dropmore forwarding the continuation of the Paris intelligence, and the *Moniteur* containing the account of the decree of the Convention for shutting up the Jacobin Club.

"Yesterday my son the Duke of York arrived; his account of the unfriendly conduct of the Dutch is far beyond what I before imagined, and, what is worse, that the friends of the House of Orange are not behind-hand in animosity to the most violent patriots. He most satisfactorily proves the falsehood of the complaints against the formed British infantry, but does not conceal that the Irish banditti, both officers and men, that have been sent over, and the shameful want of discipline of the corps that have been under Lord Moyra, can scarcely be believed."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD.

Private.

1794, December 9, Downing Street.—“The presence of Mr. Wickham in Switzerland appearing to afford an opportunity of complying with the request you had made of a leave of absence from that country, and there appearing to be some motives of convenience to the public service for leaving the public business for the present in his hands on your departure, I have laid before the King your former application on that subject, and have the honour to send you by this messenger an official notification of the King's permission to that effect, and a direction to leave the correspondence in Mr. Wickham's hands as *Chargé d'affaires*.

“When I have the pleasure of seeing you here I shall have the opportunity of conversing with you respecting your future destination; but as it may possibly make a difference in your arrangements on quitting Switzerland, I think it right to mention to you, that if you should prefer it to your present station, the appointment of Lord Henry Spencer to Berlin will enable me to offer you one of the two northern missions, though I am not enabled in the present moment to decide which.

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

Private.

1794, December 9, Downing Street.—“The late transactions in America have unavoidably led to your being placed in a difficult and disagreeable situation there, and I imagine it will be by no means unpleasant to yourself to be relieved from it; while, on the other hand, a better chance may possibly be given to the operation of a system of conciliation by the communications passing through another channel, and being carried on by a person unmixed in the late discussions. I know your good sense too well to have any apprehension that this will convey to your mind any impression of disapprobation respecting your past conduct, which has, on the contrary, been such as to merit, under very trying circumstances, the most complete approbation on the part of His Majesty's servants. I send you by this mail the King's leave of absence; and I think it right to accompany it with this intimation, in order that you may make your arrangements accordingly; as, on your arrival here, I shall probably have to propose to you another situation, in which your talents and zeal may be exerted for the King's service; and I am very anxious that you should be persuaded that the whole of your conduct has been such, since I have had the opportunity of observing it, as to convince me that, in whatever situation you are placed, you will not fail to give the most efficient and useful assistance to the business of the Department under which you serve.”

*Copy.*

LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, December 13, Lausanne.—“Mr. Wickham returned here from Rolle this day, and he seems now fully persuaded that the object of his mission is totally at an end, and that the whole business was a fabrication of *French stuff* invented by the friends of La Fayette, who

have no other motive than that of engaging the British Cabinet in a negotiation with Prussia for the recovery of his liberty. M[ounier] and M. du P[an] are now undeceived, and seem not a little ashamed that two such *great* men should have been so grossly duped by people of inferior capacities."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 14, Windsor.—"I take it the marriage treaty as signed by Lord Malmesbury and Monsieur de Feroner is exactly agreeable to the draft for that purpose sent to Brunswick, and as such, Lord Grenville is to direct the ratification to be instantly prepared and sent for my signature.

"As to Lord Malmesbury's disappointment at not having specific orders as to the travelling of the Princess of Brunswick, this seems alone to arise from over-hurry of the Prince of Wales, who, it appears, has sent directions by Major Hislop which Lord Malmesbury could not with any propriety take notice of, as he had not through the Secretary of State any directions to that effect; which, in my opinion, would be greatly premature till it was known here that the treaty was signed, and in consequence my ratification returned to that instrument.

"Now it is proper Lord Grenville should acquaint Lord Malmesbury that it is desired the Princess should, with every attention to her convenience, travel from Brunswick to Utrecht; where Lord Malmesbury will find directions as to the most convenient mode of conducting the Princess from thence to Amsterdam and the Texel, where the vessels for conveying her to England are ordered [to] repair, as the sea officers seem to think that the safest place for embarkation at this late season of the year.

"I shall take the opportunity of the ratification of the marriage treaty to answer the letters I received by the former messenger from Lord Malmesbury."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 15, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville will forward these letters to Brunswick when the messenger carries over the ratification of the treaty, and direct Lord Malmesbury to decline the portion that has been offered, and to press the Princess's departure from Brunswick to Utrecht, where she shall receive notice as to the most convenient mode of being conveyed from thence to the Texel; for which purpose I desire Lord Grenville will write to Lord St. Helens to enquire whether she cannot from Utrecht go by water to the Texel, or whether on the whole a land journey is to be preferred. He had best, after making the proper arrangements, give sufficient notice to Commodore Payne, who commands the convoy sent on this occasion, that every thing may be in readiness for her reception in the vessels appointed for this service."

GEORGE III to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 16, Windsor.—"I am glad to find by Lord Grenville's note that the instructions to the Lords Malmesbury and St. Helens, as well as the ratification of the marriage treaty which I signed last night, will be dispatched this evening.

"I approve of my picture being sent to Monsieur de Ferone, and the five hundred pounds to the Brunswick Chancery. I have no doubt in the case of my late father's marriage presents to the Court were not given; it was not the custom in the German courts at that time, and the late King was not likely to introduce the custom; in the case of mine I remember Lord Harcourt found it necessary, and therefore it was done. The only rule Lord Grenville can follow on the present occasion is to state to Lord Malmesbury it not having been the case on my father's marriage, but if he finds that it is absolutely expected, he must do it with moderation, and charge it in a bill of extraordinaries."

THE MARQUIS OF HERTFORD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December, Piccadilly.—"My attention to the subject of German politics, on which I had the honour of conversing with you this morning, made me forget another topic, on which it certainly became me to give an immediate answer. I am very sorry I cannot undertake the Spanish embassy; the business which I have just left, and which I shall be happy in some shape to resume, has, I confess, a preference with me to every other. In the mean time I am happy in the opportunity of sending you the enclosed particulars which have made my successor's mission a very easy one, and, I trust, will lay the foundation of a better system in Europe."

LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1794, December 23, Brunswick.—"I can venture to say that you may depend on the authenticity of the information I have enclosed in my official letter. It proves at once as many bad political qualities in Prussia as can possibly exist at the same time in the same power; weakness, perfidy, insolence, avarice, and folly, and all of these come forward in their turn and appear in Haugwitz's conversations with Paget. I cannot resist the desire of writing him one more strong letter before I leave the Continent. I expect no good whatever from it, but it is some sort of satisfaction in return for their conduct, that its duplicity and folly should stand upon record in a manner not to be contested.

"I need not say how impatient we are *all* here to get away, nor how many puzzling and distressing questions I am asked on this side of the water, and how many pressing instances I receive from the other. It *ought* to be felt that I cannot stir without His Majesty's commands, and that the negotiation with which I am now charged is as much a state affair as any treaty whatever. I fear however this is not the case, and that, on my return, I shall be exposed to a little ill-humour for not having obeyed a summons it was against my duty to listen to."

W. PITT to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

[1794, December 20-25.]—If I had not been pressed with much more than the usual weight of business, I should have no apology for not having very long since answered your letter on the subject of the arrangements in Ireland. At this time it would perhaps be of little use to enter far into particulars. But I can, with great truth, assure you that if the line I have adopted does not fall in with your opinion, it is not because I have felt less anxious than I ought to be for your credit.

and honor, but because I have had a different view of what these considerations required. Anything that appeared to me to convey an imputation on your system of measures in Ireland, or to injure the fair claims of those who supported you, I felt myself bound decidedly to resist, from a sense of what was due to you, as well as to myself. But, on the other hand, I could not feel that, under the present circumstances, the past conduct of those of whom you and I had so much just reason to complain, ought to be a bar against re-admitting them to a share of the Government, provided they were willing to join on fair and honourable grounds, and on the same principles as have been felt sufficient to bury former distinctions of party in this country. In this point seems to consist the only material difference between our sentiments; and even if, upon reflection, you retain your opinion, you will, I trust, admit that you have no reason to be dissatisfied with the motives which influenced mine; or to impute them to any indifference to your personal feelings. Without dwelling further on this subject, I am impatient to explain myself on another which has been recently mentioned to me, and which I am sure you will allow me to do with perfect freedom.

"The idea which has presented itself of proposing an Irish peerage limited to your second son, is one which seems to me attended with no difficulty, and it will give me the greatest pleasure to make the proposal, if it will be an acceptable mode of marking an attention to your wishes.

"I must, however, add that the idea of accompanying the peerage by a grant of any reversion in Ireland or England seems to me liable to the strongest objections. Instead of adding to your personal consideration and credit, it would, as I think, in a great degree do away the effect, and call into question the propriety of the peerage; and it would, at this time, subject yourself and all your connections, as well as Government, to observations of the most invidious sort, and such as must materially affect in the public opinion the character and reputation of all those concerned in the transaction. I really feel this impression so strongly that I should not act either a friendly or an honest part towards you, if I were not to state my opinion as explicitly as I have done, and if I did not earnestly entreat you to reconsider this part of the subject. If you do so, I really flatter myself it is impossible that you should not admit the force of what I have stated.

"I was too much interrupted to be able to finish this letter in time for the post yesterday, and therefore I send it by a messenger."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794] December 27, Stowe.—"I enclose you a letter from Newport, with a letter from the uncle of Mr. Purefoy now under prosecution for the murder of Lieutenant-Colonel Roper; you will easily believe that I know nothing of the story but from common report; and the change of your Department relieves you from thinking about it. I enclose likewise a letter from General Hyde, which is so civil that I cannot refuse to forward it; particularly as it encloses a *mémoire* respecting St. Domingo which I know to be drawn up by a very able man, and which will probably alarm you from the magnitude of the force required as much as it does me. If you should wish to know his informer's name, you shall have it. I have been very unwell for the last fortnight with some alarming symptoms of my old complaint, but I trust I shall have taken it in time."



The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

1794, December 30, Stowe.—“I had determined after writing to Mr. Pitt on Sunday night to consider the chapter as closed which we had discussed together, for I could not look upon a peerage to my second son as a sufficient grace to remove the impressions created by the recall of Mr. Ponsonby to high office, which I consider, under its actual circumstances, as a disavowal of me and of my measures. At the same time, both in the conversations which we had together, and in the reflections which have occupied every moment of my wretched time since I received Lord Grenville's letter and yours, I have felt the force of the arguments against the grant of a reversion in either kingdom to my son. The object, however, of an Irish peerage is so ridiculously unimportant that it would not sufficiently mark the grace and favour of the Crown, so as to remove the impressions of which I complain, and in this view of the matter, I continue determined to refuse it.

“But the misery I feel in separating from Lord Grenville upon such a point, and in justifying that separation to the public by every means in my power, united to other considerations of very different descriptions, but all pressing most sensibly upon my feelings, have induced me so far to conquer repugnance of every sort, as to make through you to Lord Grenville, and to Mr. Pitt, one further proposition, which from the agitated state of my mind, and from the short time now left for decision, I am sensible is the last proposition I can make; and whatever may be the result of it, I will entreat you at least to do me the justice of believing that, in making it, I sacrifice very much of every sort to my wish of clinging to the last thread that as yet remains, before I take decisive steps to which I look with a misery which I cannot describe; but to which I continue, after the most serious and anxious investigation, to feel myself driven in the contingency of the failure of my propositions for conciliation.

“I have (as Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt will tell you) repeatedly sacrificed my objects of office to the accommodation of the King's service; I felt that I grew too indolent for very active employment, and the less efficient offices I agreed to relinquish. It would not now be possible perhaps to open them, and I have no right to ask it. The pecuniary object of such an arrangement is unaffectedly below my notice. I have then made up my mind to offer to give to the public and to Mr. Pitt the most specific pledge of my co-operation, by engaging with the King's servants in the Cabinet, provided that a conversation with Mr. Pitt enables me to feel that I can, *bonâ fide*, embark in his plan for public measures. You and he will see distinctly by this proposition that I do not look to any thing that can embarrass him; and such a step, added to the peerage, would effectually answer every purpose of obviating or repressing the impressions which must arise of a supposed disavowal of me. You will see that, in this proposition, there is no stipulation for a reversion for my son. I am content to yield to the pressure of the times. If things go ill, my parchment would be worth nothing; if well, I shall think, at some future time, that a claim put by *upon these considerations* only, still exists as a claim.

“Now I expect from your kindness to me, and from the fairness with which I have always acted towards those of whom I complain, to be believed by all, when I declare in the most solemn manner, and after the severest search of my heart, that in this proposition I have no object of ambition, and none of vanity; that I dislike extremely this undertaking, which can promise no personal credit to me, but

involves me in much trouble, much uneasiness, much responsibility, and much risk; and that my only reason for entertaining it arises from wishes of the purest nature towards the public, and of the most affectionate nature towards those who are nearest to me. I again repeat that I see no other solution to this very real difficulty. It is possible that objections may arise to it from that part of the Cabinet with whom I have had no connexion. If this should be the case, I fear that the die must be cast; and, at all events, my state of mind (and other reasons not so strong) require as early an answer as can fairly be given. If you should be aware of any decisive reason for *knowing* that this is impracticable, it would be idle to open the idea to Lord Grenville and to Mr. Pitt; and, in that case, you will have the goodness to relieve me from an anxiety which almost drives me mad. I make to you no apology for all this, knowing that your good heart will find the sincerest gratification in soothing the agitation of my mind and spirits, as much as they can be calmed by such an arrangement; which after all, will leave many a thorn behind. But it will even in the most painful and bitter moments (if indeed I am driven to what I so much dread) be a gratification to me to reflect not only that I have not been instrumental in bringing forward the measures which lead to this alternative; but that, before God, I have done all that as an honest man I could (by sacrifice of every feeling and [of?] every sort) to remove or to counteract the difficulty created by others. If you should transmit my letter to Mr. Pitt, and if the idea should be *entertained for discussion*, I will come to town on Friday or Saturday; but I will trouble you to direct your answer to me at Mr. Praed's, at Tooting, near Newport, as I promised him to inspect his troop there on that day."

#### MEMORANDUM OF LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 31.—"The King told me that the Duke of York had mentioned to him that when Colonel Don was sent by His Royal Highness to Marshal Möllendorf to press him to bring a part of his army down to the assistance of Holland, Marshal Möllendorf had told Don that he was under the greatest embarrassment; that he had written to the King of Prussia for orders, and had received a letter from *the King himself*, who was in Silesia, saying, *that he had no orders to give him, and looked upon him as under the orders of the Maritime Powers*; that, at the same time, he Möllendorf had received instructions from the Prussian Ministers at Berlin directing him not to march, and that as his own opinion was against marching he intended to act accordingly."

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